Offshore Oil and Gas Risk Context Statement

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A Ap pr ri i l l 2 20 00 05 5
Office of Transport Security
Department of Transport and Regional Services

Commonwealth of Australia. Use by permission only.
2

Table of contents
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................. 3
INDUSTRY BACKGROUND............................................................................................................... 5
RISK MANAGEMENT CONTEXT................................................................................................... 10
GENERAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ..................................................................................................10
AUSTRALIAN OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS SECURITY RISK CONTEXT .....................................................11
AUSTRALIAN OIL AND GAS PREVENTIVE SECURITY REGIME.............................................................13
OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS SECURITY ENVIRONMENT............................................................................13
ATTACHMENT A OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS SECURITY ASSESSMENT PROCESS ...... 21
ATTACHMENT B GENERAL RISK AREAS FOR CONSIDERATION WHEN PREPARING
SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENTS ................................................................................................... 24
ATTACHMENT C SOME POLITICALLY MOTIVATED ATTACKS ON OIL AND GAS
TARGETS. ............................................................................................................................................ 25
ATTACHMENT D - USEFUL INFORMATION LINKS ................................................................ 27
AUSTRALIA.........................................................................................................................................27
INTERNATIONAL/ASIA PACIFIC...........................................................................................................27
UNITED KINGDOM..............................................................................................................................27

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Introduction

In J uly 2004 the Australian Government established a Taskforce on Offshore
Maritime Security to review security arrangements for Australias offshore oil and gas
facilities. The Taskforce concluded there was a need for an enhanced and formalised
approach by operators to the security of fixed and floating offshore oil and gas
platforms, including the security regulation of these facilities under the Maritime
Transport Security Act 2003 (MTSA).

The MTSA is being extended to apply to offshore oil and gas facilities to provide the
necessary regulation for oversight of the implementation of appropriate security
measures as documented in offshore facility security plans. The offshore oil and gas
industry will play its part in protecting its facilities through the provision of on-site
preventive security measures.

The purpose of the Oil and Gas Risk Context Statement (OGRCS) is to provide the oil
and gas industry and other relevant bodies with a description of the current security
environment in the context of transnational terrorism as relevant to the oil and gas
industry.

The OGRCS is an unclassified document that is intended to supplement threat and
risk assessment information from other sources. The statement does not replace the
need for owner/operators to consider their individual circumstances and determine
their own risks consistent with security risk assessment processes, such as the
Australian and New Zealand 4360:2004 Risk Management Standard (see attachment
A - Offshore Oil and Gas Security Assessment Process).

Under the MTSA, offshore oil and gas owner/operators are required to specify their
own threat situations and identify all relevant security risks within the context of
Australias broader threat environment when completing a security assessment of an
offshore oil and gas facility captured under the legislation.

Specifically, operators should consider the security environment of the local area of
their operations, including trading routes, when determining the risk contexts for their
own operations. All forms of terrorism, including potential terrorist acts, should be
considered when undertaking offshore oil and gas security assessments (see
attachment B).

This document should be read in conjunction with the Office of Transport Security
(OTS) Offshore Oil and Gas Security Assessments Guidance Paper which provides
further information on requirements for security assessments under the MTSA and
associated regulations.

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The Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) OTS welcomes
comment on the content and presentation of this document. Please forward any
comments to:

Oil and Gas Risk Context Statement
Maritime Security Branch
GPO Box 594
Canberra ACT 2601

Or, e-mail your comments to transport.security@dotars.gov.au with Oil and Gas
RCS in the subject field.

April 2005

5

Industry Background
General

The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that global primary energy demand
will grow at an average annual rate of 1.7 per cent over the next three decades,
reaching 15.3 billion tonnes of oil equivalent in 2030. This projection represents an
increase in energy demand of two-thirds over the thirty year period and the need for
$16 trillion, or almost $550 billion a year to be invested in global energy supply
infrastructure.

The oil and gas sector brings in excess of $18 billion annually into the Australian
economy and with a projected increase in world oil consumption, petroleum will
continue to be one of Australias most valuable export commodities. In 2003-04
Australias petroleum exports (excluding petroleum products) were valued at $9.9
billion with 27,716 megalitres of crude oil and condensate produced during this
period.

In 2003-04 Australian private mineral exploration expenditure on petroleum was
valued at $944 million. In general, a 20 per cent rise in production leads to a 0.4 to
0.5 per cent increase in gross national product and a 0.2 to 0.4 per cent increase in
employment. An estimated 14,000 people are directly employed in Australias oil
industry.

Australia produces 6 per cent of the world production of LNG and 10 per cent of the
Asia-Pacific LNG market, with exports valued at $2,174 million in 2003-04. Whilst
the North West Shelf gas project is currently the only LNG project in Western
Australia, an additional facility is being considered in the form of the Gorgon gas
project. Gas sources in Australia are NWS, Northern Australia, Timor Sea, Gorgon
fields and Browse Basis with reserves of 100 trillion cubic feet.

In Queensland, South Australia, the Northern Territory and Western Australia
electricity is generated largely using natural gas, sourced from the major producing
areas such as Moomba in South Australia, the Amadaeus Basin in the Northern
Territory, the North West Shelf in Western Australia and Bass Strait and Otway in
Victoria. In 2001/02 natural gas provided 24 per cent of energy for electricity
generation in WA; 63 per cent in SA and 96 per cent in the NT.

Australias production of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) was an estimated 4,639
megalitres in 2003-04, with the North West Shelf and Gippsland Basin producing the
majority of Australias LPG. The total exports of LPG are valued at $647 million,
with J apan as the primary export destination.

The majority of offshore oil and gas facilities are in Australias Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) and the J oint Petroleum Development Area.

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Australian Offshore Oil and Gas Sources

Bass Strait - Gippsland, Bass and Otway Basins
The Bass Strait platforms comprise 21 oil and gas production platforms situated
between 23 to 80km off the southeast coast of Victoria. Supported by 600km of
underwater pipelines and other installations, the Bass Strait platforms cost $12.5
billion to develop and produce oil and gas for the domestic and overseas market.
They provide the supply of natural gas and crude oil for the Longford Gas Processing
and Crude Stabilisation Plants. Crude oil and condensate from the platforms
constitute 27 per cent of Australias total petroleum production. Longford produces
approximately 80 per cent of Victorias natural gas supply and plays an important role
in the supply of gas to New South Wales, Tasmania and recently South Australia.

Reservoirs feeding the Bass Strait platforms are expected to produce crude oil and
natural gas until at least 2030 and these platforms will continue to play a vital role in
delivering oil and gas critical to Australian economic and domestic needs.

In the last 3 years discoveries and developments in the Otway and Bass Basins have
seen new offshore developments and onshore gas plants being built. The Otway in
particular is significant due to the proximity and access to both the Victorian and
South Australian markets.

North West Shelf - Carnarvon Basin
The North West Shelf Venture (NWSV) oil and gas system is located 135km north of
Karratha off the coast of Western Australia. The NWSV exports around $6.7 billion
worth of products annually, including Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG), condensate and crude oil. The revenue from NWSV generates
approximately $7.7 billion per annum and notionally accounts for around 1 per cent of
Australias GDP. NWSV also produces natural gas for the domestic West Australian
market (Domgas), which accounts for 60 per cent of WAs natural gas market.

The three main NWSV offshore oil and gas facilities are North Rankin A platform,
Goodwyn Alpha platform and the Cossack Pioneer - a Floating, Production, Storage
and Offtake vessel (FPSO). The North Rankin and Goodwyn Alpha platforms are
connected to the Karratha Gas Plant via a subsea dual trunkline that runs along the
surface of the seabed at an average depth of 100m.

There are also many smaller facilities in the area, some unmanned, which produce oil
for the export market as well as gas for the domestic gas system in WA.

Timor Sea - Bonaparte and Browse Basins
The Timor Sea has vast reserves of oil and gas that will contribute to the future global
energy market and will have a significant impact on the regions economic
development and future gas supply for Australia.

Part of the Timor Sea is subject to overlapping territorial claims by Australia and
Timor-Leste. The Timor Sea Treaty entered into force on 2 April 2003 and seeks to
resolve each countrys claims to oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea. The majority

7
of resources are in the J oint Petroleum Development Area (J PDA), which is located
between Timor-Leste and Australia. The centre of the J PDA is approximately 500
kilometres north-west of Darwin and 220 kilometres south south-east of Suai.

The resources in the J PDA amount to almost 12 trillion cubic feet of gas and 900
million barrels of oil. The concentration of resources are located in the Bayu-Undan
and Greater Sunrise deposits which are still in the development phase. The Greater
Sunrise is the largest gas field in the Timor Sea of which 21 per cent lies in the J PDA
and 79.9 per cent in Australian waters. Australia stands to gain $3.8 billion from
Greater Sunrise and $2 billion in total revenue from Bayu-Undan. Future financial
gain for Australia could be as much as $22 billion, including the provision of up to
20,000 jobs in the Northern Territory. The area is clearly of significant economic
importance to Australia.

The Timor-Leste economy will also benefit from the revenue generated from tax and
royalty revenue from J PDA petroleum production, Timor-Leste currently receives 90
per cent of the J PDA revenue with Australia receiving the remaining 10 per cent.
Over $US1 billion has been generated by the production from the J PDA since 1998
with approximately $US27.1 million accruing to Timor-Leste.

There are a number of oil and gas deposits located outside the J PDA that are
exclusively in Australian Timor Sea Waters. These include the J abiru, Challis, and
Blacktip deposits.

Offshore Oil & Gas Infrastructure

Oil & Gas platforms

Fixed Production Platforms
Fixed oil and gas platforms are permanently fixed or connected to the seabed and used
in petroleum production operations for the recovery of petroleum from sub-seabed
deposits.
Fixed platform structures vary and include conventional steel fixed platforms;
concrete gravity platforms; mini platforms; monotowers; monopods; and minipods.
Some platforms are co-located and form a production network with interconnecting
pipelines.
Platforms can be manned or unmanned depending on the nature of the operations they
perform. Personnel and equipment are transported to and from manned platforms via
helicopter, while food and other provisions are regularly delivered by supply vessels
and are lifted on to a platforms deck by cranes located on the platform structure.
Unmanned platforms do not require personnel to be permanently stationed on the
platform, but can be equipped with accommodation facilities for emergency
situations. Most platforms have independent communication systems and run off
power generated from the platforms recovered oil and/or gas supplies.

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Under The Petroleum Submerged Lands Act 1967 offshore facilities, including oil and
gas facilities have a 500m safety exclusion zone from the base of the structure to
prevent accidental collision.

Floating Production and Storage Facilities
Floating facilities include Floating Production, Storage and Offtake (FPSO) vessels
and Floating, Storage and Offtake (FSO) vessels. FPSO vessels are either purpose
built or converted tankers with oil processing plants on the deck. FSO vessels store
oil, but do not have processing capabilities. Floating facilities can be permanently
moored in place or can be disconnected from the flowlines that run down to the
subsea well-heads. Oil from the wells is stored in FPSO and FSO vessels and later off
loaded to other tankers. Disconnectable FPSOs/FSOs can disengage from the subsea
pipes and move under their own propulsion.

The FPSO vessels Modec Venture and Northern Endeavour are located approximately
170km southeast of West Timor and 500kms west-north-west of Darwin. The Jabiru
and Challis are moored 180kms southeast of West Timor and 600kms west of
Darwin. The Northern Endeavour, located in the Bonaparte Basin, is the largest
FPSO facility in the world and capable of holding 1.4 million barrels of oil. Its steel
hull has ballast tanks fully protecting the cargo tanks from external impact and a
single-skin bottom shelf. The Knock Neris is the largest FSO, capable of holding 4.1
million barrels.

There are also a number of existing FPSOs and FSOs operating in the Carnarvon
Basin including the Griffin Venture and Cossack Pioneer.

Mobile Drilling Facilities
Mobile drilling facilities are used in the exploration phase. The most common types
are Drillships, J ackups and Semi-submersibles. These vessels frequently move
internationally and usually conduct operations independently from any existing
production facilities. They have no capacity to produce oil and gas, other than for
production tests for short periods. They generally have no storage capacity for oil or
gas. Drillships are usually equipped with propulsions systems and can sail as a vessel.
J ackups and Semi-submersibles usually have limited or no propulsion systems and are
generally not capable of navigating the seas unless under tow.

Oil Tankers
There are several types of oil tankers, including petroleum product carriers and very
large crude carriers (VLCC). Petroleum product carriers transport up to 50,000 dead
weight tonnes (dwt) of mainly refined petroleum although they also can transport
vegetable oils. Crude carriers can transport up to 300,000 dwt of a variety of liquid
cargoes, the main cargo being crude oil. The majority of new oil tankers are double
hulled to prevent spillage, however there are many single hulled ships in service. Oil
tankers typically make between 12 to 15 knots at sea.

Oil tankers deliver crude oil directly to Australias refineries which are mostly sited in
coastal locations, although some product is delivered to Victorian refineries via a

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pipeline from Bass Strait. Refined petroleum is also delivered in bulk quantities to
storage terminals in coastal cities.

The majority of Australias light crude oil, or condensate production is exported and
imported through the Southeast Asian sea lanes. Depending on their intended
destination, oil tankers sailing between Western and Northern Australia and Southeast
Asia use either the Sunda Strait or the Lombok Strait. VLCCs are capable of carrying
up to 2 million barrels of oil and must use the Lombok Strait to run between the
Middle East and Southeast Asian ports as they have a draught of greater than 19
meters and can not use the Malacca Straits.

LNG Tankers
LNG tankers are visually distinctive from other tankers and average around 14 knots
at sea. There are two predominant types of LNG tankers, Moss Rosenberg tankers
which have four large spherical cryogenic tanks, 40 meters each in diameter that are
visible above the deck of the tanker; and Membrane tankers which have long
geometric tanks visible above the deck. Moss Rosenberg tankers are slowly being
phased out for newer Membrane tankers.

LNG tankers carry approximately 130,000 cubic meters of LNG kept at atmospheric
pressure with the gas temperature maintained at -160
o
C. Tankers carry Australias
export LNG from Burrup Peninsula to J apan via the Ombai Strait north of Timor
every 3 days and there are currently nine LNG tankers transiting this route, four of
which are Australian flagged. Australias LNG exports to J apan are worth $2 billion
annually.

LPG Tankers
LPG tankers carry both propane and butane in a liquefied state, which significantly
reduces the volume of the original vapour composition. LPG is either shipped and
stored as a liquid at ambient pressures (refrigerated) or as a liquid at ambient
temperatures (pressurised). Some LPG/chemical combined tankers are capable of
carrying the cargo partly refrigerate and partly under pressure. The odourless LPG is
carried at temperatures as low as -48
o
C and stored in two or three tanks of about
2500m
3
in volume. J apan remains the primary export destination for Australias LPG.

Pipelines
The Bass Strait network of facilities is connected by a series of oil and gas pipelines.
There are also a number of key trunklines that transport the oil and gas from the main
hub platforms to the Longford Plant via subsea pipelines, shorecrossing sites and
buried onshore pipelines.

Condensate and gas are transferred from the offshore NWSV facilities to the Karratha
Gas Plant via a 135km subsea Dual Trunkline (DT) system that runs along the seabed
at an average depth of 100m. Each trunkline uses two-phase hydrocarbon flow
system, allowing both liquids and gas to flow concurrently with no free water

10
The pipe lay of the pipeline connecting the Bayu-Undan platform to Darwin
commenced in J uly 2003 and was completed in J anuary 2005. To date 40,750 joints
of pipe have been installed on the seafloor, involving 1,488 offshore project hours.

Risk Management Context

General Security Environment
The main terrorist threat to Australia comes from Islamist extremists associated with
al-Qaida. Since 11 September 2001, Australia has been named as a target for al-
Qaida in five public statements by Usama bin Laden and two by his deputy Ayman al
Zawahiri. Australia has also figured in media and internet statements by al-Qaida
and associated extremist sources.

The general threat enunciated in these public statements has been reflected in
planning for specific attacks. Intelligence and investigations have revealed planning
for attacks by Islamist extremists in Australia and against Australian interests
overseas. The threat from al-Qaida and associated groups remain for the foreseeable
future. Australian interests should be considered as potential primary targets for
attack.

The targets of successful, aborted and thwarted terrorist attacks by al-Qaida and
associated groups include government buildings, diplomatic and consular offices,
commercial buildings including hotels and other tourist facilities, residential
compounds, commercial and military shipping, aviation and oil and other energy and
transport critical infrastructure. In addition, al-Qaida and associated groups have
considered a large range of targets from bridges to sporting stadia while in the past
many of these plans proved impractical or beyond available resources at the time, the
possibility exists that they may be re-addressed in the future.

Al-Qaida and associated groups have undertaken, trained for and considered a wide
variety of terrorist tactics. Thus far, methods of attack have included suicide car,
truck, boat and plane bombings, aerial suicide attacks, remotely-detonated car and
truck bombings, armed assault, assassination, and surface-to-air missile attack.

Aviation has been a particular focus of al-Qaida. The 11 September 2001 attacks in
New York and Washington were its most dramatic use of aircraft for terrorist
purposes. There is no doubt that al-Qaida will maintain its interest in aircraft as
weapons and targets for terrorist attacks. Al-Qaida has also successfully carried out
attacks against the maritime sector, involving the USS Cole (Yemen, October 2000)
and the French oil tanker MV Limburg (Yemen, October 2002). Land transport was
targeted with the train bombings in Madrid in March 2004.

Al-Qaida and affiliates have worldwide reach, capability and intent and any apparent
geographic focus cannot be taken as absolute. They have demonstrated the capacity
to undertake attacks using a variety of methods, and intent to attack infrastructure.
Al-Qaida has shown it is innovative and able to undertake extremely complex

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planning and operations. It has not limited itself to a particular type of attack or
target, other than a tendency to attack symbolic targets.

More traditional forms of terrorist acts such as assassinations and hostage-taking have
not disappeared. Hostage-taking was involved, to varying degrees, in the Moscow
theatre siege, the 2004 Al-Khobar attack in Saudi Arabia and the Beslan school siege
in Russia, and has become a feature of Islamist terrorism in Iraq. Targeted
assassinations and armed assaults against Westerners have recently been adopted as a
favoured tactic in Saudi Arabia. However, al-Qaida and its associates have received
training in all forms of assassination. Assassination is an easily planned, low-cost
form of terrorism with a high degree of symbolic impact.

Terrorist groups worldwide have ready access to information on chemical, biological,
radiological and to some extent, nuclear weapons, via the Internet, publicly available
scientific literature and scientific conferences. Interest in such weapons of mass
destruction remains strong amongst Islamist terrorists. Al-Qa'ida and associated
groups have also produced and distributed explosives and poisons recipe manuals to
their operatives.

While there have been no instances so far of cyber attacks for terrorist purposes,
hackers sympathetic to terrorist groups including al-Qaida have undertaken low-level
cyber attacks including web-page defacement.

It must be stressed that, within its resource and capability constraints, al-Qaidas
range of targets and attack methodologies is limited only by the imagination of its
planners and operatives. It is therefore important that agencies and owner/operators
with responsibilities for counter-terrorist response take an extremely broad view of
attack scenarios. Al-Qaidas innovation and ability to identify and exploit security
weaknesses mean that past action by them is no guide to future plans.

Australian Offshore Oil and Gas Security Risk Context
Australias oil and gas sector is integral to our economic well being and protecting it
from the threat of terrorism is a national priority for the immediate and foreseeable
future. The predominance of a small number of offshore oil and gas installations in
supplying Australias domestic and overseas energy markets make these facilities
critical elements of national infrastructure and attractive targets for terrorists in the
current security environment (see attachment C for examples of politically motivated
attacks on the oil and gas industry).

The threat to Australias oil and gas industry should be viewed in the context of al-
Qaidas identification of Australia as a legitimate target on seven separate occasions,
and its threats and actions intended to damage Western economies in particular the
oil and gas industry.

From 11 September 2001 Al-Qaida and associated groups have consistently indicated
a target intention in the energy sector. They have made public statements threatening
primarily the global oil industry, and conducted numerous attacks on oil facilities and
personnel in the Middle East. Al-Qaida has long regarded maritime targets as

12
attractive and have articulated plans to cripple the petroleum industry with sea-based
attacks against large oil tankers.

Intensifying terrorist activity by al-Qaida and associated groups against oil and gas
infrastructure in the Middle East has created uncertainty, and combined with other oil
market dynamics is capable of pushing oil prices up into price bands that cause
damage to global economic growth. Past terrorist attacks on the oil and gas industry
have successfully affected the energy sectors operating costs with increased
protective security and insurance costs for affected multinational oil and gas
companies.

To date, al-Qaida and associated groups have almost exclusively focused their
attention in the energy sector on oil. However, like oil, the gas industry is integral to
the global economy and has similar production and transportation networks involving
volatile materials. Terrorist groups could focus attention on gas infrastructure in the
future as it offers comparable consequences and requires similar capabilities.

Within Southeast Asia gas production far exceeds oil production and while terrorists
operating in the Middle East have targeted the oil industry in their region to inflict
symbolic damage on the global economy, terrorists operating in Southeast Asia may
target gas infrastructure for similar reasons.

Terrorist groups operating in Southeast Asia are not yet known to have undertaken or
planned attacks using methodologies that would seriously damage offshore oil and gas
platforms. However in light of al-Qaidas transnational network and emerging
affiliations between regional terrorist groups, such as J emaah Isamiyah (J I) and the
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), as evidenced by transfer of technology and expertise, it is
possible that precedents used in attacks on offshore oil and gas infrastructure in the
Middle East could be transferred and applied by groups in Southeast Asia in the
future.

Political sensitivities surrounding disputed ownership of oil and gas deposits in the
Asia Pacific region coupled with increasing demands on existing supplies from
growing Asia-Pacific economies may also increase the perceived target value of oil
and gas infrastructure in the region. Australias long term commitment to the
exploration and recovery of oil and gas in the NWS and J PDA, and the proximity of
these offshore facilities to countries with active terrorist groups who view Australia as
a priority target is a significant factor in Australias regional maritime threat
environment.

In November 2001, Usama bin Laden condemned Australias role in East Timors
separation from the Islamic world and al-Qaida and J I may view the development
of the Timor Sea oil and gas fields by Australia and Timor-Leste as another example
of the West exploiting an Islamic resource.

In addition to potential safety and environmental consequences, a terrorist attack on
an offshore oil and gas facility would have broader ramifications for Australias
regional security and economic well being. An attack could weaken international
confidence and damage future foreign investment in Australias energy industries.
Indirect effects may include short-term oil price instability; pressure on joint offshore

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development and security arrangements between Timor-Leste and Australia; potential
reluctance to work on offshore facilities; attendant bad publicity; and the imposition
of additional security and hiring costs to operators of offshore-related or maritime-
related enterprises.

Australian Oil and Gas Preventive Security Regime
The National Counter Terrorism Plan (NCTP) outlines the responsibilities, the
authorities and the mechanisms to manage acts of terrorism and their consequences
within Australia and in relation to Australias offshore oil and gas interests. National
Counter-Terrorism incident management provides an enhanced capacity for normal
border protection and law enforcement requirements provided by all relevant
jurisdictions.

The Australian Government seeks to enhance the protection of offshore oil and gas
facilities from terrorist and other security threats through an integrated approach
across jurisdictions, between government agencies and with the oil and gas industry to
ensure adequate prevention and preparedness.

A J oint Offshore Protection Command (J OPC) has been established and is responsible
for the implementation, coordination and management of Australian maritime domain
awareness and security. J OPC can draw, as necessary, on the full range of the
Australian Defence Force and Customs capabilities.

Based on cooperative international arrangements, including with neighbouring
countries, the Australian Government also intends to establish an Australian Maritime
Information System (AMIS). This will extend Australias maritime domain
awareness to 1,000 nautical miles from Australias coastline. The AMIS will be
managed by J OPC with a key focus on protecting Australias oil and gas facilities
through enhanced offshore maritime security.

The direct protection of each offshore platform through the provision of appropriate
on-site security measures is an industry responsibility and represents a key element in
the Governments integrated approach to enhanced offshore maritime security. In-
line with the Prime Ministers announcement of 15 December 2004, the MTSA will
extend security regulation of Australian ports, port facilities and ships to apply to
offshore oil and gas facilities. This task is being managed by the Department of
Transport and Regional Services in consultation with J OPC, for implementation by 30
September 2005.

Offshore Oil and Gas security environment
The first attempt by al-Qa'ida to attack shipping took place in J anuary 2000 in Yemen
against the US warship USS Sullivans. The attack failed when the explosives-laden
boat to be used for the attack sank soon after launching. Since then al-Qa'ida has
successfully carried out suicide attacks against the USS Cole and the French oil tanker
MV Limburg. Al-Qaida and its affiliates are innovative and will continue to seek out
a variety of targets. In choosing a target for attack they are likely to consider the
potential for mass casualties, economic impact, symbolism of the attack, media

14
imagery likely to be generated, the accessibility and vulnerability of a given target and
the opportunity for attack.

Although undertaking an attack at sea is more difficult and less attractive to terrorists
than land based attacks, which are more accessible to the media, the cost to the oil and
gas industry and the spectacle of a damaged platform or burning ship make them
viable terrorist targets. Accidents on oil and gas platforms, such as the explosions on
the P36 offshore platform in Brazil in 2001 or the Piper Alpha platform off the UK
coast near Aberdeen in 1988 have demonstrated the devastating consequences of such
damage and the high level of publicity that such spectacular images attract.

Offshore oil and gas facilities have several unique features that act as deterrents to
terrorist attacks: the degree in difficulty in damaging a robust structure with safety
shut-down procedures; the logistics in reconnoitring and attacking an isolated facility;
and a generally small crew size with limited potential for inflicting mass casualties.
However the isolated, open water location of offshore facilities also makes them
inherently vulnerable to attack, with large distances from significant emergency
interdiction and response capabilities.

Scenarios for attacks
Each method of attack used in the following scenarios involves a high degree of
difficulty given the location, size and complexity of the infrastructure.

Fixed and floating offshore oil and gas facilities could suffer major damage through a
number of attack methods:

Direct attack;
Armed Intrusion;
Hijacked vessels/aircraft;
Sabotage; and
Underwater attacks.

Direct Attack

Boat Borne Improvised Explosive Device (BBIED)
There are a number of methods by which a direct attack could be undertaken against
offshore oil and gas infrastructure. While past actions cannot be taken as a guide to
future attacks there has been a focus by al-Qaida on the oil industry and navy using
small, explosive-laden boats, referred to as Boat Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
(BBIED). In April 2004, al-Qaida associates conducted a multiple BBIED attack
against the al-Basrah and the Khor-al Amaya terminals off southern Iraq which
successfully damaged one terminal.

The subsea infrastructure associated with offshore oil and gas facilities form natural
reefs that attract fish and with them, fishermen. Indonesian fishing vessels regularly
sail close to FPSOs/FSOs and fixed platforms in the Timor Sea and have been known
to approach platforms seeking assistance or supplies. The majority of small fishing
vessels are from the island of Roti at the southern end of West Timor and some come
from Sulawesi and Surabaya on J ava. This places oil and gas facilities in the J PDA

15
less than a days sailing by motorised boat from these islands. Larger and faster
fishing ships that are capable of cold storage, referred to as Ice ships, regularly sail
down from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Thailand to this area.

The familiarity and frequency of the fishing boats presence in the J PDA, without
incident, has led to a degree of complacency by some in the assessment of potential
security threat posed by them. It is feasible for terrorists to put an explosive-laden
motorised boat alongside a stationary FPSO and detonate it using either a suicide
bomber, a timing delay device or two-way radio to detonate the explosives. Pirates
already disguise their vessels as fishing vessels to avoid inspection in the Malacca
Straits and terrorists could imitate their behaviours. Crews would have difficulty
differentiating between an innocent fishing vessel and a vessel with malicious intent
and capability, and therefore may not have the opportunity to perform an emergency
shutdown, request assistance or otherwise prevent an attack. Operators do institute
advance shutdown procedures at a distance of ten nautical miles if an approaching
vessel does not respond to repeated radio communications, is clearly in distress and is
of significant size and speed. However this primarily exists to prevent large scale
collision, and is generally not implemented when smaller vessels breach the 500m
exclusion zone.

Most motorised fishing vessels between 8 to 16 metres in length would be able to
match the speed of a moving oil or gas tanker even while carrying sufficient quantities
of explosives to cause damage. The BBIED attacks against the stationary USS Cole
and MV Limburg demonstrated that small vessels with little hold capacity could be
effectively used in this type of attack. The USS Cole was attacked using a modified
dinghy carrying 227 kilograms of explosives. The French-owned VLCC, MV
Limburg had an eight meter wide hole blown in the side using a BBIED in this type of
attack and although the blast did not sink the carrier it was sufficient to rupture the
outer and reinforced inner hull, spilling 90,000 barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of
Aden. If more than one fishing vessel was used to transport explosives close to the
target, the blast may be sufficient to sink a vessel. An explosion of this type could
cause LPG to explode and oil and LNG to burn, however LNG is less likely to
explode. An additional danger to a ruptured LNG tank is the extreme cold of the
liquid which can cause metal of the ships hull to become brittle and fracture.

While there is currently no information about specific threats to J PDA facilities, the
pre-existence of maritime terrorism in the region, and links between al-Qaida and
regional terrorist organisations, creates the potential for an attack. This should be
taken into consideration when tasking maritime surveillance and identifying and
implementing offshore security measures.

Indonesian fishing vessels are much less frequently encountered in NWS waters and
their presence near an offshore facility or security regulated port boundary has raised
alarm and a police response in the past. However it is common for recreational
fishermen to be within close proximity to NWSV facilities, which could provide a
cover for reconnaissance, or launching an attack by terrorists. The threat posed by
itinerant fishing vessels near the platforms in Bass Strait is mitigated by the harsh
maritime conditions that impede recreational fishing in this area and the operational
capability of individuals without appropriate clothing, equipment and suitable boats.
In addition, the relative close proximity of the NWSV and Bass Strait platforms to the

16
Australian coastline provides faster Australian air and/or water-borne response in a
threat situation.

Stand-Off weapons
A fishing vessel could provide a platform for a skilled operator using a stand-off
weapon to accurately target a platform or FPSO using a man portable military
weapon, such as short range rockets or mortars. Such an attack would generate high-
impact imagery if fuel ignited. The only effective mitigation strategy for the threat
posed by stand-off weapons is adequate surveillance and broader counter-proliferation
efforts. High explosives and other weaponry to undertake direct attacks are available
in Indonesia and the Philippines and could be transported within the region.
Additionally, Indonesian waterborne and airborne patrols have limited detection and
response capabilities.

The remote location of offshore oil and gas facilities in the J PDA and NWS would
preclude a timely water-borne or airborne response and diminish the effectiveness of
prevention or interdiction measures. Offshore facilities should rely on emergency
evacuation and shutdown procedures if a terrorist attack occurs. Offshore facility
response vessels reacting to suspicious water-borne activity should be aware that
illegal fishing vessels are often equipped with basic defences to prevent boarding,
including vertical spikes along the sides of the boat and can make up to 20 knots in
open waters.

To mount a direct attack on a permanent fixed platform, with a high expectation of
success, would require some familiarity with the type of installation. If sufficient
explosives were detonated at a structurally vulnerable point on the platform they
could cause significant damage to the foundations and result in lengthy and costly
repairs. If pre-production gas on a platform was ignited a large explosion and
casualties could result.

Larger fixed targets such as the North Rankin platform would be a more attractive
target than smaller platforms, with a greater likelihood of spectacular imagery and
high media coverage and economic cost. The potential for inflicting mass casualties
on a platform is limited by the number of personnel present at any given time and well
practiced evacuation techniques including the use of Bruker escape craft would also
mitigate the likelihood of casualties in an emergency. To cause extensive damage and
delays to a production a terrorist would need expertise in the facilitys operations to
identify points of vulnerability in the exploration and/or recovery network.

It would be more difficult for terrorists to target the Bass Strait platforms over more
accessible and vulnerable targets closer to Southeast Asia, where surveillance,
planning and operational activities could be more readily conducted. Inclement and
unpredictable weather and sea patterns in the Bass Strait would also act as a deterrent
to a direct attack.

Armed Intrusion - Pirates
Piracy is common in many areas around Southeast Asia, particularly in the Malacca
Straits and off the Indian subcontinent and the Horn of Africa. Australian ships

17
passing through these areas, or while in port in these areas, should be aware they are
potential targets of pirates and terrorist groups. To date there is no evidence linking
piracy and terrorism. The intent and capability of pirates and terrorists differ and
accordingly so does the likelihood and consequences of these attacks occurring. Acts
of piracy are generally profit motivated and focus on kidnap and theft, whereas acts of
terrorism are ideologically and politically motivated and focus on undertaking attacks
that result in large scale infrastructure destruction, economic disruption and media
attention.

Approximately 20 per cent of all piracy incidents involve oil or gas tankers in the
Malacca Straits, however to date no Australian flagged tankers have been involved.
In general very few Australian tankers transit these shipping lanes, utilising alternate
trade routes to reach their destinations. Typically, ships are boarded by pirates when
they have slowed to navigate narrow passages and the crew is concentrating on
navigation and collision avoidance. Although pirates generally operate close to shore
they have boarded ships in the open sea and in one case while the ship was making 12
knots. If pirates in Southeast Asia expanded their current area of operation to include
the waters south of Indonesia, isolated and stationary FPSOs could be considered
attractive targets for theft or kidnap purposes.

The most recent attack on a gas tanker occurred on 11 April 2005 on the Kyose Maru
product tanker in the Malacca Straits where pirates boarded the vessel and stole
$5,000. On 12 February 2005, 35 pirates armed with machine guns and rocket
launchers seized a fully-laden gas tanker in the Malacca Strait. The 1,289-tonne
Indonesian-owned MT Tri Samudra was carrying a cargo of methane gas. The
motivation appears to have been criminal extortion.

The increasing tactical sophistication of pirate attacks has the potential to attract
terrorist groups wishing to improve their capacity for undertaking water-borne attacks.
While their different business objectives have to date resulted in a separation of
pirate/terrorist interests, there is concern that terrorists could pose as members of
pirate gangs to gain experience in the operation of large vessels in crowded shipping
lanes for future terrorist attacks.

Armed Intrusion - Terrorists
Where a terrorist attack against Australian interests was planned to take place in open
waters it is likely that it would be mounted from a base where al-Qaida and
associates have a support base. In Southeast Asia, the Filipino ASG has shown itself
capable of boarding ships underway close to shore to take hostages or conduct
robbery, and in February 2004 the group claimed responsibility for a bomb that sunk a
large ferry in the waters off Manila and killed at least 100 people. The terrorist
organisation Liberation Tigers of Talim Eelam (LTTE) have developed a
sophisticated open water attack capability against ships in Sri Lankan waters, however
they do not directly threaten Australian interests within the region.

The crude oil tanker MV Nivosa is the only Australian registered ship that journeys
regularly to Middle Eastern ports and could be directly or indirectly targeted in this
region as part of al-Qaidas campaign against the oil and gas industry and/or
Australian interests.

18
Once terrorists have boarded a vessel they could inflict significant damage in several
ways. The vessel could be sunk or otherwise damaged, for example a fire could be set
in the engine room, or the vessel could be used as a weapon. To date no attempt has
been made to do this, however the devastation caused by a floating bomb in a
harbour, such as the 1947 Texas City incident could be emulated by the deliberate
ignition of fuel by a suicide hijacker. This type of operation would be easier to carry
out on an older oil tanker as the design features and safety systems of modern vessels
work against this. It would be a complicated task for even skilled terrorists to rig an
LNG tanker to explode, although the likelihood can not be dismissed as the images
and flow-on financial consequences would be significant.

Petroleum tankers pose a greater risk as their cargo is highly flammable, visiting more
than 20 ports around Australia including all capital city ports. Substantial, but
localized, damage and pollution would probably be the physical result of an explosion
based attack and the economic impact is likely to be substantial especially if shipping
lanes are blocked. Re-dredging shipping lanes or creating new ones would cause
significant delays in shipping timetables and impose high costs on the oil and gas
industry.

Hijacked vessels and aircraft
A hijacked tanker could be used to ram a platform, FPSO, FSO or another tanker
loaded with explosive cargo, with significant blast, fire and casualty consequences. If
monitored, the regularity of offtake tankers to the Bayu-Undan platform and LNG
tankers travelling from Burrup Peninsula to J apan could provide a schedule for
potential attack planning purposes.

Boarding and hijacking a platform and then destroying it with explosives could be
attempted but would require a mix of water-borne assault and demolition skills not yet
observed in al-Qaida associated organisations. Vessels would have difficulty pulling
alongside or underneath a platform, particularly because of the swirling currents
caused by the pylons.

All substantial offshore oil and gas facilities are vulnerable to attack by hijacked
aircraft. There are no preventive measures that offshore facilities can reasonably take
to prevent such an attack. Platforms are easily identifiable from the air although they
do not present a large target area. Surveillance of the airspace from the platforms and
coastwatch air patrols could provide early warning of an airborne attack although
response time would be limited.

Tender vessels that service manned platforms regularly depart from the Port of
Darwin. The vessels moor against the platforms and cranes lift supplies on to the
deck of the platform. A hijacked tender vessel could be used by terrorists as a cover
to moor alongside an offshore facility without causing undue alarm and launch an
attack. While port authorities require passenger lists of all arriving vessels, there is no
physical screening of workers on tender vessels that regularly visit the offshore
facilities. At present there is also no CCTV to monitor the loading and unloading of
these vessels whilst in port.

19
In February 2005, a foreign national working on-board a foreign flagged tender vessel
attacked the vessels captain with a knife whilst it was moored within 500m of a
platform 450km north-west of Darwin. A similar scenario involving a terrorist/s
posing as a tender vessel crew member could have serious consequences especially
with the time delayed interdiction response from Australia.

Sabotage
Like most onshore facilities, offshore facilities could be vulnerable to acts of sabotage
or theft against its physical and network infrastructure by trusted insiders either
working individually or with hostile third parties such as terrorist groups.
Motivations for such actions could include personal commitment to cause, financial
desperation, psychological instability or dissatisfaction with an employer.

A trusted insider could conceivably sabotage parts of a facility, or assist others with
such activities by providing knowledge of vulnerabilities and/or physical assistance.
A trusted insider could represent an attractive target for recruitment by a terrorist
group with the intent to attack an offshore facility. Former employees or contractors
who worked on offshore facilities could also retain useful knowledge in planning an
attack. A vetting process across industry would reduce companys exposure to
installing insiders with hostile intent.

To limit opportunities for sabotage or direct attack by individuals who work on
offshore facilities, or on the construction of the platforms/pipelines in the Timor Sea,
individuals should be subjected to adequate passenger and bag screening
arrangements at their last port of call prior to arriving on the platforms. All personnel
working on the offshore NWSV facilities and the Bass Strait Platforms are screened
prior to arriving on the facilities in accordance with company policy.

The majority of workers in the J PDA are transferred by helicopter from Dili airport to
the platforms, which takes approximately 90 minutes. The workers who arrive at Dili
airport from Australia are subjected to 100 per cent passenger and bag screening in
Australia before they transit to the helicopter clearing and departure zone which is
located within the grounds of Dili airport. Local joiners, who mainly fly in to Dili
from J akarta or Bali (often not on the same day) are not subject to the same passenger
and bag screening requirements prior to arriving at the helicopter clearing zone.
However oil and gas companies conduct random drug and alcohol testing and bag
checking of all workers prior to boarding the helicopters.

Underwater attack
Underwater attacks could be launched to target subsea platform foundations or
pipelines that run along the seabed or connect FPSOs and platforms to subsea well-
heads. There have been recent media reports of training in underwater capability by
terrorists but underwater demolition attacks require specialised skills and equipment
that have not been demonstrated to date. Specialised depth-sensitive explosives could
be deployed from surface vessels, although operator proficiency, environmental
conditions and accuracy would be major mitigating factors.

20
Internationally, pipelines have been targeted for terrorist attack, although there are no
known successful attacks on underwater pipelines. The extended and isolated nature
of the pipelines from offshore facilities in both the Timor Sea and NWS to onshore
facilities at Darwin and Karratha respectively, make it effectively impossible to guard
them. However, the threat to offshore pipelines is reduced by the depth at which they
traverse the seabed (an average depth of 100m) presenting a significant degree of
difficulty for would-be attackers.

Computer network attack
Any computer network is at threat from malicious software, recreational hackers,
criminal hackers and hacktivists. Networks connected to the Internet will be regularly
scanned and probed for vulnerabilities, and be vulnerable to new computer viruses
and worms.

Increasingly, operators of critical infrastructure are ensuring that there is an air gap
between control and command networks and any public networks. Accordingly,
terrorists groups would require physical access to a command and control network to
be able to successfully conduct computer network attack to disrupt operations. In
some instances, individual platforms have their own command and control centres and
power generators that run off the oil and gas processed by the platform.

April 2005

21
Attachment A Offshore Oil and Gas Security Assessment
Process

The Offshore Oil and Gas Security Assessment Process is essentially comprised of 4
key elements (see figure 1): -

1. Intelligence inputs classified information from ASIO and the National
Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC) or other sources such as police, including
national sectoral and specific threat assessments.

2. Oil and Gas Risk Context Statement an unclassified document prepared
from classified threat information which describes the nature of the security
environment it provides the context for transport operators risk assessments.

3. Security Assessments we encourage risk assessments to be conducted in
accordance with the AS/NZ4360:2004 Risk Management Standard. The
assessment process identifies, analyses and evaluates risks as well as possible
risk treatments. It supports the development of locally specific security plans.
The risk management context steps are detailed in Attachment B.

4. Security plans describes security arrangements to meet desired security
outcomes. The plans should set out the preventive and mitigating strategies
the measures, policies and practices - that treat the risks identified during the
risk assessment process.

This approach is supported by a range of guidance materials, including the Offshore
Oil and Gas Assessment Guidance Paper and Guide to Preparing a Security Plan.

Figure 1: Offshore Oil and Gas Security Assessment Process

Delivery of OffshoreOil andGas Security Outcomes
(Mitigationstrategies)
OffshoreOil andGas Security Plans
OffshoreOil andGas
AssessmentGuidanceMaterials

OTS ProvideOffshore
Oil andGas RiskContextStatement
IntelligenceInputs
ASIO threat assessment
OffshoreOil andGas Operators SecurityRiskAssessments
Offshore Oil and Gas Security Assessment Process

22

Security Assessments: Defining Threat and Risk

The difference between Threats and Risks is a common area of misunderstanding and
needs to be understood in order to develop effective risk assessments.

A Threat is a potential source of harm. It is a declaration of an intention to cause
harm or the determination (or assessment) that a hazard may cause harm. This
document refers to transnational terrorist security threats only - not other forms of
threats such as natural disasters or global economic downturns and other non security
incidents.

Risks, the chance of something happening that will have an impact upon objectives. A
Risk rating is determined by the measurement of consequences and likelihood.

Security Risk Assessments consider the manner in which threats may manifest
themselves as a risk event, the possible consequences, and the likelihood of potential
risk events occurring. The following exemplifies the threat/risk relationship.

RISKS CATEGORY THREAT (Source of Harm) POSSIBLE RISK
EVENT/S
Direct Attack Fishing vessels within 500m
exclusion zone
Eg. A BBIED detonates
in close proximity to an
offshore facility.
Hijacking Pirates or Terrorists with water-
borne capacity
Eg. Oil or LNG tanker
hijacked and used as a
weapon.
Sabotage Disgruntled Insiders or sleepers
(employees, contractors, etc).
Eg. Interference to
services, or sabotage of
platform, critical
equipment and
infrastructure.

Resolution of Suspicious Activities

Personnel employed in the oil and gas industry should be alert to the importance of
reporting and/or resolving any event or activity that appears to be unusual or
suspicious. There is evidence to support the fact that a significant number of major
terrorist attacks have been marked by employees or bystanders in the attack
environment stating after the event that their suspicions had been raised by some
unusual activity which in hindsight was the perpetrators conducting pre-attack
intelligence. The nature of this type of activity is typically mundane, albeit unusual,
and therefore often goes unreported at the time.

Industry personnel should maintain a heightened level of awareness with regard to
unusual activity occurring in their work or transit areas. Any unusual behaviour that
cannot be satisfactorily explained should be reported to company security officers

23
and/or police. Particular attention should be paid to details such as names and
descriptions of suspicious persons, and vessel/vehicle identification markers.

24
Attachment B General risk areas for consideration when
preparing security risk assessments

The Offshore Oil and Gas Facility Risk Assessment Guidance paper sets out an
indicative process for security assessments based on the Australian / New Zealand
4360:2004 Risk Management Standard. Operators of security regulated facilities may
wish to use this process to complete a security assessment of their operations.

When conducting a security risk assessment in the current security environment,
terrorism should be considered in all its possible forms. Operators of oil and gas
facilities should give consideration to the following general risk areas relevant to their
security assessment to ensure adequate coverage of actual and potential risks to their
assets, operations and activities. This list is indicative only and is not intended to be
an exhaustive list of possible security threats.

Bomb or explosive device, including suicide bombings;
Hijacking and hostage sieges;
Deliberate infringement of exclusion zones;
Sabotage;
Arson;
Blockage of transport routes;
Tampering with supplies, essential equipment or systems;
Unauthorised access or use of various equipment;
Unauthorised access to secure areas;
Use of industry transport to carry those intending to cause a security incident
and their equipment;
Use of a mode of industry transport or industry facility infrastructure as a
weapon or a means to cause damage or destruction; and
Use of a ship, helicopter or aircraft to transport explosives, hazardous goods or
weapons.

The Offshore Oil and Gas Facility Security Assessments Guidance Paper provides
additional information to assist industry participants to complete their security risk
assessments.

25
Attachment C Some politically motivated attacks on oil and
gas targets.

Attacks on offshore infrastructure

April 2004 al-Qaida associates conducted a multiple Boat Borne Improvised
Explosive Device (BBIED) attack against two offshore oil loading platforms, al Basra
and Khor-al Amaya, south of Basra, Iraq. Coalition naval forces and Basra security
interdicted the attack, limiting damage to only one platform, which returned to
operation within days. Three sailors died in the attack.

25 April 2004 Several people, including two Americans, are shot dead by attackers
aboard a boat that is returning from the Chevron Texaco oil platform in Nigeria.

27 J une 1999 A Shell oil platform off the coast of Nigeria was stormed by armed
local anti-oil industry activists, who caused unspecified damage and kidnapped three
foreign nationals, including an Australian. Other incidents have reportedly occurred
in Nigeria as recently as this year, including the occupation of platforms by striking
workers being held hostage by local gangs storming platforms, and attacks on foreign
platform workers in transit.

Attacks on oil and gas tankers

12 March 2005 - A gang of 35 pirates armed with machine guns and rocket launchers
seized a fully-laden gas tanker in the Malacca Strait. The 1,289-tonne Indonesian-
owned MT Tri Samudra was carrying a cargo of methane gas from Samarinda in
Kalimantan province on Borneo island to Belawan on Sumatra island when it was
boarded in the early evening. The ship was subsequently released but the captain and
chief engineer were kidnapped and a ransom was demanded. The ship's owners
believe the pirates were rebels from the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

06 Oct 2002 - French registered super tanker MV Limburg is attacked by al-Qa'ida
members in a small boat filled with explosives. The ship is extensively damaged and a
crew member killed. The attackers are also killed in what was evidently a suicide
mission.

Attacks on onshore oil and gas infrastructure

8 J anuary 2005 Tribesmen attack a state-run natural gas facility in the Baluchistan
Province of Pakistan, setting fire to a portion of the national pipeline network.

20 December 2003 Rocket propelled grenades hit storage tanks in southern
Baghdad, and the resulting fires burn about 2.6 million gallons of petroleum.

21 September 2002 In Lagos, Nigeria, Ijaw militants capture six Royal-Dutch Shell
oil facilities and one Chevron Texaco facility, and threaten to invade dozens more.
The seizures halt the daily production and export of 350,000 barrels of oil. The action

26
was intended to force President Olusegun Odasanjos government to change electoral
boundaries in 10 wards of Delta States Warri region.

Attacks on Pipelines*

11 J anuary 2005 - Repeated attacks on the Sui gas pipeline in Pakistan, which
accounts for 45% of Pakistans gas production, caused significant financial losses and
disruption for industry.

8 J anuary 2005 An attack is made on a pipeline running from Iraqs northern oil
fields to Bayji in the Safrah area. Two guard posts for an oil protection force are also
blown up around the same area and one guard is wounded.

25 August 2004 Eight parallel pipelines that link the Rumaila oilfields to the Zubayr
1 pumping station are hit in Berjasiya, 32km south west of Basra, Iraq when a bomb
explodes under a bridge and causes it to collapse.

18 April 2003 - Explosives set off by the Karen National Union rebel group damaged
two gas pipelines in Myanmar.

*There have been no recorded attacks on subsea pipelines.

Attacks on Oil and Gas Company Employees

29 May 2004 - At least 22 people are killed and several taken hostage in Khobar,
Saudi Arabia, in an attack on a compound housing the offices of foreign oil
companies.

21 November 2003 - Three oil workers from ExxonMobil are kidnapped in the Aceh
province of Indonesia, allegedly by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). They were
released on the 26 November.

7 May 2001 - In Sanni, Pakistan, armed militants attack a vehicle convoy on an oil
exploration mission, killing one person and injuring three others, including a Chinese
engineer working for the Chinese oil and gas exploration company, BGP.

27
Attachment D - Useful Information Links
Australia
http://www.dotars.gov.au - Department of Transport and Regional Services
http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/ - National Security Australia
http://www.asio.gov.au/Media/comp.htm Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation (ASIO) media releases.
http://www.ag.gov.au/ - Attorney General's Department
http://www.dfat.gov.au/travel Smart Traveller travel advice and company specific
security assessments
http://www.smh.com.au/specials/security/index.html Sydney Morning Herald Anti-
Terror Watch
www.industry.gov.au Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources
www.doir.wa.gov.au WA Department of Industry and Resources
http://www.ga.gov.au Geoscience Australia
http://www.nopsa.gov.au/ - National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority
http://www.amsa.gov.au - Australian Maritime Safety Authority
http://www.aapma.org.au/members.php3 - The Association of Australian Ports and
Marine Authorities Incorporated
http://www.shippingaustralia.com.au/News.asp - Shipping Australia - Latest News
http://www.ampa.asn.au/Members/news.aspx - Australian Marine Pilots Association

International/Asia Pacific
http://www.iccwbo.org/ccs/imb_piracy/weekly_piracy_report.asp International
Commercial Crime Services Weekly Piracy Report
http://www.imo.org/home.asp - International Maritime Organization
http://www.iaphworldports.org/top.htm - International Association of Ports &
Harbours
http://www.mgn.com/ - Maritime Global News
http://www.ds-osac.org/news.cfm - Overseas Security Advisory Council
http://www.unwire.org/ - United Nations News Wire
http://www.opec.org The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
http://www.oecd.org/ OECD

United Kingdom
http://www.dti.gov.uk UK Department of Trade and Energy
http://www.oilandgas.org.uk/ - United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association

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