MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL, BULACAN,

petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, in his
capacity as the Presiding Judge, Branch IV,
Baliuag, Bulacan, The PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of
Bulacan, MARGARITA D. VDA. DE IMPERIO,
ADORACION IMPERIO, RODOLFO IMPERIO,
CONRADO IMPERIO, ERNESTO IMPERIO,
ALFREDO IMPERIO, CARLOS IMPERIO, JR., JUAN
IMPERIO and SPOUSES MARCELO PINEDA and
LUCILA PONGCO, respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D. Vda. de
Imperio, et al. vs. Municipal Government of San
Miguel, Bulacan, et al.", the then Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, on April 28, 1978, rendered
judgment holding herein petitioner municipality liable
to private respondents, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendant
Municipal Government of San Miguel
Bulacan, represented by Mayor Mar
Marcelo G. Aure and its Municipal
Treasurer:
1. ordering the partial revocation of the
Deed of Donation signed by the
deceased Carlos Imperio in favor of the
Municipality of San Miguel Bulacan,
dated October 27, 1947 insofar as Lots
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Block 11 of
Subdivision Plan Psd-20831 are
concerned, with an aggregate total area
of 4,646 square meters, which lots are
among those covered and described
under TCT No. T-1831 of the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan in the name of the
Municipal Government of San Miguel
Bulacan,
2. ordering the defendant to execute
the corresponding Deed of
Reconveyance over the aforementioned
five lots in favor of the plaintiffs in the
proportion of the undivided one-half
() share in the name of plaintiffs
Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio,
Adoracion, Rodolfo, Conrado, Ernesto,
Alfredo, Carlos, Jr. and Juan, all
surnamed Imperio, and the remaining
undivided one-half () share in favor of
plaintiffs uses Marcelo E. Pineda and
Lucila Pongco;
3. ordering the defendant municipality
to pay to the plaintiffs in the proportion
mentioned in the immediately preceding
paragraph the sum of P64,440.00
corresponding to the rentals it has
collected from the occupants for their
use and occupation of the premises
from 1970 up to and including 1975,
plus interest thereon at the legal rate
from January 1970 until fully paid;
4. ordering the restoration of ownership
and possession over the five lots in
question in favor of the plaintiffs in the
same proportion aforementioned;
5. ordering the defendant to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P3,000.00 for
attomey's fees; and to pay the cost of
suit.
The counterclaim of the defendant is
hereby ordered dismissed for lack of
evidence presented to substantiate the
same.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 11-12, Rollo)
The foregoing judgment became final when herein
petitioner's appeal was dismissed due to its failure to
file the record on appeal on time. The dismissal was
affirmed by the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
SP-12118 and by this Court in G.R. No. 59938.
Thereafter, herein private respondents moved for
issuance of a writ of execution for the satisfaction of
the judgment. Respondent judge, on July 27, 1982,
issued an order, to wit:
Considering that an entry of judgment
had already been made on June 14,
1982 in G. R. No. L-59938 and;
Considering further that there is no
opposition to plaintiffs' motion for
execution dated July 23, 1983;
Let a writ of execution be so issued, as
prayed for in the aforestated motion.
(p. 10, Rollo)
Petitioner, on July 30, 1982, filed a Motion to Quash
the writ of execution on the ground that the
municipality's property or funds are all public funds
exempt from execution. The said motion to quash was,
however, denied by the respondent judge in an order
dated August 23, 1982 and the alias writ of execution
stands in full force and effect.
On September 13, 1982, respondent judge issued an
order which in part, states:
It is clear and evident from the
foregoing that defendant has more than
enough funds to meet its judgment
obligation. Municipal Treasurer Miguel
C, Roura of San Miguel, Bulacan and
Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan Agustin
O. Talavera are therefor hereby ordered
to comply with the money judgment
rendered by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao
against said municipality. In like
manner, the municipal authorities of
San Miguel, Bulacan are likewise
ordered to desist from plaintiffs' legal
possession of the property already
returned to plaintiffs by virtue of the
alias writ of execution.
Finally, defendants are hereby given an
inextendible period of ten (10) days
from receipt of a copy of this order by
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Bulacan within which to submit their
written compliance, (p. 24, Rollo)
When the treasurers (provincial and municipal) failed
to comply with the order of September 13, 1982,
respondent judge issued an order for their arrest and
that they will be release only upon compliance thereof.
Hence, the present petition on the issue whether the
funds of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan, in the
hands of the provincial and municipal treasurers of
Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively, are public funds
which are exempt from execution for the satisfaction of
the money judgment in Civil Case No. 604-B.
Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject
to levy and execution. The reason for this was
explained in the case of Municipality of Paoay vs.
Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 "that they are held in trust for
the people, intended and used for the accomplishment
of the purposes for which municipal corporations are
created, and that to subject said properties and public
funds to execution would materially impede, even
defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose."
And, in Tantoco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil.
52, it was held that "it is the settled doctrine of the law
that not only the public property but also the taxes and
public revenues of such corporations Cannot be seized
under execution against them, either in the treasury or
when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes,
and the proceeds of such judgments in the hands of
officers of the law, are not subject to execution unless
so declared by statute." Thus, it is clear that all the
funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the
Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as those in
the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan,
are also public funds and as such they are exempt
from execution.
Besides, Presidential Decree No. 477, known as "The
Decree on Local Fiscal Administration", Section 2 (a),
provides:
SEC. 2. Fundamental Principles. Local
government financial affairs,
transactions, and operations shall be
governed by the fundamental principles
set forth hereunder:
(a) No money shall be paid out of the
treasury except in pursuance of a lawful
appropriation or other specific statutory
authority.
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise stated, there must be a corresponding
appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed
by the Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the
municipality may be paid out. In the case at bar, it has
not been shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has
passed an ordinance to this effect.
Furthermore, Section 15, Rule 39 of the New Rules of
Court, outlines the procedure for the enforcement of
money judgment:
(a) By levying on all the property of the
debtor, whether real or personal, not
otherwise exempt from execution, or
only on such part of the property as is
sufficient to satisfy the judgment and
accruing cost, if he has more than
sufficient property for the purpose;
(b) By selling the property levied upon;
(c) By paying the judgment-creditor so
much of the proceeds as will satisfy the
judgment and accruing costs; and
(d) By delivering to the judgment-
debtor the excess, if any, unless
otherwise, directed by judgment or
order of the court.
The foregoing has not been followed in the case at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and the order of
respondent judge, dated July 27, 1982, granting
issuance of a writ of execution; the alias writ of
execution, dated July 27, 1982; and the order of
respondent judge, dated September 13, 1982,
directing the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan and the
Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Bulacan to comply
with the money judgments, are SET ASIDE; and
respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing
the writ of execution.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 107271. September 10, 2003]
CITY OF CALOOCAN and NORMA M. ABRACIA,
petitioners, vs. HON. MAURO T. ALLARDE,
Presiding Judge of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan
City, ALBERTO A. CASTILLO, Deputy Sheriff of
Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, and DELFINA
HERNANDEZ SANTIAGO and PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK (PNB), respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the decision[1]
dated August 31, 1992, of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. SP No. 27423, ordering the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 123, to implement an alias writ
of execution dated January 16, 1992. The dispositive
portion read as follows:
WHEREFORE the petition is hereby granted ordering
the Regional Trial Court of Kaloocan City, Branch 123,
to immediately effect the alias writ of execution dated
January 16, 1992 without further delay.
Counsel for the respondents are warned that a
repetition of their contemptuous act to delay the
execution of a final and executory judgment will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.[2]
It is important to state at the outset that the dispute
between petitioner and private respondent has been
litigated thrice before this Court: first, in G.R. No. L-
39288-89, entitled Heirs of Abelardo Palomique, et al.
vs. Marcial Samson, et al., decided on January 31,
1985; second, in G.R. No. 98366, entitled City
Government of Caloocan vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
resolved on May 16, 1991, and third, in G.R. No.
102625, entitled Santiago vs. Sto. Tomas, et al.,
decided on August 1, 1995. This is not to mention the
numerous concurrent efforts by the City Government
of Caloocan to seek relief from other judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies. The present petition for certiorari is the
fourth time we are called upon to resolve the dispute.
The factual and procedural antecedents follow.
Sometime in 1972, Marcial Samson, City Mayor of
Caloocan City, through Ordinance No. 1749, abolished
the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17
other positions from the plantilla of the local
government of Caloocan. Then Assistant City
Administrator Delfina Hernandez Santiago and the 17
affected employees of the City Government assailed
the legality of the abolition before the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City, Branch 33.
In 1973, the CFI declared the abolition illegal and
ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed
employees and the payment of their back salaries and
other emoluments. The City Government of Caloocan
appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondent Santiago
and her co-parties moved for the dismissal of the
appeal for being dilatory and frivolous but the
appellate court denied their motion. Thus, they
elevated the case on certiorari before this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. L-39288-89, Heirs of Abelardo
Palomique, et al. vs. Marcial Samson, et al. In our
Resolution dated January 31, 1985, we held that the
appellate court erred in not dismissing the appeal,
and that the appeal of the City Government of
Caloocan was frivolous and dilatory. In due time, the
resolution lapsed into finality and entry of judgment
was made on February 27, 1985.
In 1986, the City Government of Caloocan paid
respondent Santiago P75,083.37 in partial payment of
her backwages, thereby leaving a balance of
P530,761.91. Her co-parties were paid in full.[3] In
1987, the City of Caloocan appropriated funds for her
unpaid back salaries. This was included in
Supplemental Budget No. 3 for the fiscal year 1987.
Surprisingly, however, the City later refused to release
the money to respondent Santiago.
Respondent Santiago exerted effort for the execution
of the remainder of the money judgment but she met
stiff opposition from the City Government of Caloocan.
On February 12, 1991, Judge Mauro T. Allarde, RTC of
Caloocan City, Branch 123, issued a writ of execution
for the payment of the remainder of respondent
Santiagos back salaries and other emoluments.[4]
For the second time, the City Government of Caloocan
went up to the Court of Appeals and filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction to stop the trial
court from enforcing the writ of execution. The CA
dismissed the petition and affirmed the order of
issuance of the writ of execution.[5] One of the issues
raised and resolved therein was the extent to which
back salaries and emoluments were due to respondent
Santiago. The appellate court held that she was
entitled to her salaries from October, 1983 to
December, 1986.
And for the second time, the City Government of
Caloocan appealed to this Court in G.R. No. 98366,
City Government of Caloocan vs. Court of Appeals, et
al. The petition was dismissed, through our Resolution
of May 16, 1991, for having been filed late and for
failure to show any reversible error on the part of the
Court of Appeals. The resolution subsequently attained
finality and the corresponding entry of judgment was
made on July 29, 1991.
On motion of private respondent Santiago, Judge
Mauro T. Allarde ordered the issuance of an alias writ
of execution on March 3, 1992. The City Government
of Caloocan moved to reconsider the order, insisting in
the main that respondent Santiago was not entitled to
backwages from 1983 to 1986. The court a quo denied
the motion and forthwith issued the alias writ of
execution. Unfazed, the City Government of Caloocan
filed a motion to quash the writ, maintaining that the
money judgment sought to be enforced should not
have included salaries and allowances for the years
1983-1986. The trial court likewise denied the motion.
On July 27, 1992, Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo levied and
sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the
City Government of Caloocan, with plate no. SBH-165,
for P100,000. The proceeds of the sale were turned
over to respondent Santiago in partial satisfaction of
her claim, thereby leaving a balance of P439,377.14,
inclusive of interest. Petitioners filed a motion
questioning the validity of the auction sale of the
vehicle with plate no. SBH-165, and a supplemental
motion maintaining that the properties of the
municipality were exempt from execution. In his Order
dated October 1, 1992, Judge Allarde denied both
motions and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule
at public auction three more vehicles of the City of
Caloocan - [6]
ONE (1) Unit Motor Vehicle (Hunter Station Wagon);
Motor No. C-240-199629; Chassis No. MBB-910369C;
ONE (1) Unit Motor Vehicle (Hunter Series 11-Diesel);
Engine No. 4FB1-174328, Chassis No. MBB-910345C;
Plate No. SDL-653;
ONE (1) Unit Motor Vehicle (Hunter Series 11-Diesel);
Engine No. 4FB-165196; Chassis No. MBB 910349C.
All the vehicles, including that previously sold in the
auction sale, were owned by the City and assigned for
the use of herein petitioner Norma Abracia, Division
Superintendent of Caloocan City, and other officials of
the Division of City Schools.
Meanwhile, the City Government of Caloocan sought
clarification from the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
on whether respondent Santiago was considered to
have rendered services from 1983-1986 as to be
entitled to backwages for that period. In its Resolution
No. 91-1124, the CSC ruled in the negative.
On November 22, 1991, private respondent Santiago
challenged the CSC resolution before this Court in G.R.
No. 102625, Santiago vs. Sto. Tomas, et al. On July 8,
1993, we initially dismissed the petition for lack of
merit; however, we reconsidered the dismissal of the
petition in our Resolution dated August 1, 1995, this
time ruling in favor of respondent Santiago:
The issue of petitioner Santiagos right to back salaries
for the period from October 1983 to December 1986
having been resolved in G.R. No. 98366 on 16 May
1991, CSC Resolution No. 91-1124 promulgated later
on 24 September 1991 in particular, its ruling on the
extent of backwages due petitioner Santiago was in
fact moot and academic at the time of its
promulgation. CSC Resolution No. 91-1124 could not,
of course, set aside what had been judicially decided
with finality x x x x the court considers that resort by
the City Government of Caloocan to respondent CSC
was but another attempt to deprive petitioner Santiago
of her claim to back salaries x x x and a continuation of
the Citys abuse and misuse of the rules of judicial
procedure. The Citys acts have resulted in wasting the
precious time and resources of the courts and
respondent CSC. (Underscoring supplied).
On October 5, 1992, the City Council of Caloocan
passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, which
included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by
respondent Santiago as back salaries, plus interest.[7]
Pursuant to the subject ordinance, Judge Allarde issued
an order dated November 10, 1992, decreeing that:
WHEREFORE, the City Treasurer (of Caloocan),
Norberto Azarcon is hereby ordered to deliver to this
Court within five (5) days from receipt hereof, (a)
managers check covering the amount of P439,378.00
representing the back salaries of petitioner Delfina H.
Santiago in accordance with Ordinance No. 0134 S.
1992 and pursuant to the final and executory decision
in these cases.
Then Caloocan Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr., however,
refused to sign the check intended as payment for
respondent Santiagos claims. This, despite the fact
that he was one of the signatories of the ordinance
authorizing such payment. On April 29, 1993, Judge
Allarde issued another order directing the Acting City
Mayor of Caloocan, Reynaldo O. Malonzo, to sign the
check which had been pending before the Office of the
Mayor since December 11, 1992. Acting City Mayor
Malonzo informed the trial court that he could not
comply with the order since the subject check was not
formally turned over to him by the City Mayor who
went on official leave of absence on April 15, 1993,
and that he doubted whether he had authority to sign
the same.[8]
Thus, in an order dated May 7, 1993, Judge Allarde
ordered Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo to immediately
garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan
corresponding to the claim of respondent Santiago.[9]
On the same day, Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo served a
copy of the Notice of Garnishment on the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), Sangandaan Branch, Caloocan
City. When PNB immediately notified the City of
Caloocan of the Notice of Garnishment, the City
Treasurer sent a letter-advice informing PNB that the
order of garnishment was illegal, with a warning that
it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be
caused by the withholding of the funds of the city.
PNB opted to comply with the order of Judge Allarde
and released to the Sheriff a managers check
amounting to P439,378. After 21 long years, the claim
of private respondent Santiago was finally settled in
full.
On June 4, 1993, however, while the instant petition
was pending, the City Government of Caloocan filed
yet another motion with this Court, a Motion to Declare
in Contempt of Court; to Set Aside the Garnishment
and Administrative Complaint against Judge Allarde,
respondent Santiago and PNB. Subsequently, the City
Government of Caloocan filed a Supplemental Petition
formally impleading PNB as a party-respondent in this
case.
The instant petition for certiorari is directed this time
against the validity of the garnishment of the funds of
the City of Caloocan, as well as the validity of the levy
and sale of the motor vehicles belonging to the City of
Caloocan. More specifically, petitioners insist that
Judge Allarde gravely abused his discretion in:
(a) ordering the garnishment of the funds of the City of
Caloocan deposited with the PNB, since it is settled
that public funds are beyond the reach of garnishment
and even with the appropriation passed by the City
Council, the authority of the Mayor is still needed for
the release of the appropriation;
(b) ordering the levy and sale at public auction of three
(3) motor vehicles owned by the City of Caloocan,
which vehicles are necessary for public use and cannot
be attached nor sold in an execution sale to satisfy a
money judgment against the City of Caloocan;
(c) peremptorily denying petitioner City of Caloocans
urgent motions to vacate and set aside the auction sale
of the motor vehicle with PLATE NO. SBH-165,
notwithstanding that the auction sale by the Sheriff
was tainted with serious irregularities, more
particularly:
i. non-compliance with the mandatory posting of the
notice of sale;
ii. non-observance of the procedure that a sale through
public auction has to be made and consummated at
the time of the auction, at the designated place and
upon actual payment of the purchase price by the
winning bidder;
iii. violation of Sec. 21, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to
the effect that sale of personal property capable of
manual delivery must be sold within the view of those
attending the sale; and,
iv. the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale contained false
narration of facts respecting the actual time of the
public auction;
(d) the enforcement of the levy made by the Sheriff
covering the three (3) motor vehicles based on an alias
writ that has long expired.
The petition has absolutely no merit. The trial court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in
implementing the alias writ of execution to settle the
claim of respondent Santiago, the satisfaction of which
petitioner had been maliciously evading for 21 years.
Petitioner argues that the garnishment of its funds in
PNB was invalid inasmuch as these were public funds
and thus exempt from execution. Garnishment is
considered a specie of attachment by means of which
the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of
the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money
owed by such third person or garnishee to the
defendant.[10]
The rule is and has always been that all government
funds deposited in the PNB or any other official
depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its
agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or
special deposit, remain government funds and may not
be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a
corresponding appropriation as required by law:[11]
Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from
suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the
judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the
state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at
liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the
judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a
judgment against the state. Such statutes do not
authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy
judgments recovered, and only convey an implication
that the legislature will recognize such judgment as
final and make provision for the satisfaction
thereof.[12]
The rule is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. The functions and public services rendered by
the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by
law.[13]
However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-
defined exception, that is, when there is a
corresponding appropriation as required by law.
Otherwise stated, the rule on the immunity of public
funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply
where the funds sought to be levied under execution
are already allocated by law specifically for the
satisfaction of the money judgment against the
government. In such a case, the monetary judgment
may be legally enforced by judicial processes.
Thus, in the similar case of Pasay City Government, et
al. vs. CFI of Manila, Br. X, et al.,[14] where
petitioners challenged the trial courts order garnishing
its funds in payment of the contract price for the
construction of the City Hall, we ruled that, while
government funds deposited in the PNB are exempt
from execution or garnishment, this rule does not
apply if an ordinance has already been enacted for the
payment of the Citys obligations
Upon the issuance of the writ of execution, the
petitioner-appellants moved for its quashal alleging
among other things the exemption of the government
from execution. This move on the part of petitioner-
appellants is at first glance laudable for all
government funds deposited with the Philippine
National Bank by any agency or instrumentality of the
government, whether by way of general or special
deposit, remain government funds and may not be
subject to garnishment or levy. But inasmuch as an
ordinance has already been enacted expressly
appropriating the amount of P613,096.00 as payment
to the respondent-appellee, then the herein case is
covered by the exception to the general rule x x x x
In the instant case, the City Council of Caloocan
already approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134,
Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14
for respondent Santiagos back salaries plus interest.
Thus this case fell squarely within the exception. For all
intents and purposes, Ordinance No. 0134, Series of
1992, was the corresponding appropriation as
required by law. The sum indicated in the ordinance
for Santiago were deemed automatically segregated
from the other budgetary allocations of the City of
Caloocan and earmarked solely for the Citys monetary
obligation to her. The judgment of the trial court could
then be validly enforced against such funds.
Indeed, this conclusion is further buttressed by the
Certification issued on December 23, 1992 by Norberto
C. Azarcon, City Treasurer of Caloocan:
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that according to the records available
in this Office the claim for backwages of the HON.
JUDGE DELFINA H. SANTIAGO has been properly
obligated and can be collected in accordance with
existing accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
This is to certify further that in case the claim is not
collected within the present fiscal year, such claim shall
be entered in the books of Accounts Payable and can
still be collected in the next fiscal year x x x x
(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners reliance on Municipality of Makati vs. Court
of Appeals, et al.,[15] and Commissioner of Public
Highways vs. San Diego,[16] does not help their
cause.[17] Both cases implicitly affirmed that public
funds may be garnished if there is a statute which
appropriated the amount so garnished. Thus, in
Municipality of Makati, citing San Diego, we
unequivocally held that:
In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public
funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless
otherwise provided by statute x x x x
Similarly, we cannot agree with petitioners argument
that the appropriation ordinance of the City Council did
not authorize PNB to release the funds because only
the City Mayor could authorize the release thereof. A
valid appropriation of public funds lifts its exemption
from execution. Here, the appropriation passed by the
City Council of Caloocan providing for the payment of
backwages to respondent was duly approved and
signed by both the council and then Mayor Macario
Asistio, Jr. The mayors signature approving the budget
ordinance was his assent to the appropriation of funds
for respondent Santiagos backwages. If he did not
agree with such allocation, he could have vetoed the
item pursuant to Section 55 of the Local Government
Code.[18] There was no such veto.
In view of the foregoing discourse, we dismiss
petitioners unfounded assertion, probably made more
out of sheer ignorance of prevailing jurisprudence than
a deliberate attempt to mislead us, that the rule that
public funds (are) beyond the reach of levy and
garnishment is not qualified by any condition.[19]
We now come to the issue of the legality of the levy on
the three motor vehicles belonging to the City of
Caloocan which petitioners claimed to be exempt from
execution, and which levy was based on an alias writ
that had purportedly expired. Suffice it to say that
Judge Allarde, in his Order dated November 10,
1992,[20] already lifted the levy on the three vehicles,
thereby formally discharging them from the jurisdiction
of the court and turning them over to the City
Government of Caloocan:
x x x x the levy of the three (3) vehicles made by
Sheriff Alberto Castillo pursuant to the Orders of this
Court dated October 1 and 8, 1992 is hereby lifted and
the said Sheriff is hereby ordered to return the same
to the City Government in view of the satisfaction of
the decision in these cases x x x x
It is thus unnecessary for us to discuss a moot issue.
We turn to the third issue raised by petitioners that the
auction sale by Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo of the motor
vehicle with plate no. SBH-165 was tainted with
serious irregularities. We need not emphasize that the
sheriff enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of the functions of his office. This
presumption prevails in the absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary and cannot be overcome by
bare and self-serving allegations. The petitioners failed
to convince us that the auction sale conducted by the
sheriff indeed suffered from fatal flaws. No evidence
was adduced to prove that the sheriff had been remiss
in the performance of his duties during the public
auction sale. Indeed it would be injudicious for us to
assume, as petitioners want us to do, that the sheriff
failed to follow the established procedures governing
public auctions.
On the contrary, a review of the records shows that
the sheriff complied with the rules on public auction.
The sale of the Citys vehicle was made publicly in front
of the Caloocan City Hall on the date fixed in the notice
July 27, 1992. In fact, petitioners in their Motion to
Declare in Contempt of Court; to Set Aside the
Garnishment and Administrative Complaint admitted as
much:
On July 27, 1992, by virtue of an alias writ of
execution issued by the respondent court, a vehicle
owned by the petitioner xxx was levied and sold at
public auction for the amount of P100,000.00 and
which amount was immediately delivered to the private
respondent x x x x[21]
Hence, petitioners cannot now be heard to impugn the
validity of the auction sale.
Petitioners, in desperation, likewise make much of the
proceedings before the trial court on October 8, 1992,
wherein petitioner Norma Abracia, Superintendent of
the Division of City Schools of Caloocan, was
commanded to appear and show cause why she should
not be cited in contempt for delaying the execution of
judgment. This was in connection with her failure (or
refusal) to surrender the three motor vehicles assigned
to the Division of City Schools to the custody of the
sheriff. Petitioner Abracia, assisted by Mr. Ricardo
Nagpacan of the Division of City Schools, appeared
during the hearing but requested a ten-day period
within which to refer the matter of contempt to a
counsel of her choice. The request was denied by
Judge Allarde in his assailed order dated October 8,
1992. Thus petitioner Abracia claimed, inter alia, that:
(a) she was denied due process; (b) the silence of the
order of Judge Allarde on her request for time violated
an orderly and faithful recording of the proceedings,
and (c) she was coerced into agreeing to surrender the
vehicles.
We do not think so. What violates due process is the
absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. That
opportunity, the Court is convinced, was sufficiently
accorded to petitioner Abracia. She was notified of the
contempt charge against her; she was effectively
assisted by counsel when she appeared during the
hearing on October 8, 1992; and she was afforded
ample opportunity to answer and refute the charge
against her. The circumstance that she opted not to
avail of her chance to be heard on that occasion by
asking for an extension of time within which to hire a
counsel of her choice, a request denied by the trial
court, did not transgress nor deprive her of her right to
due process.
Significantly, during the hearing on October 8, 1992,
Mr. Nagpacan manifested in open court that, after
conferring with petitioner Abracia, the latter was
willing to surrender these vehicles into the custody of
the sheriff on the condition that the standing motion
(for contempt) be withdrawn.[22] Her decision was
made freely and voluntarily, and after conferring with
her counsel. Moreover, it was petitioner Abracia herself
who imposed the condition that respondent Santiago
should withdraw her motion for contempt in exchange
for her promise to surrender the subject vehicles.
Thus, petitioner Abracias claim that she was coerced
into surrendering the vehicles had no basis.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that there indeed
existed certain legal infirmities in connection with the
assailed orders of Judge Allarde, still, considering the
totality of circumstances of this case, the nullification
of the contested orders would be way out of line. For
21 long years, starting 1972 when this controversy
started up to 1993 when her claim was fully paid out of
the garnished funds of the City of Caloocan,
respondent Santiago was cruelly and unjustly deprived
of what was due her. It would be, at the very least,
merciless and unchristian to make private respondent
refund the City of Caloocan the amount already paid to
her, only to force her to go through the same
nightmare all over again.
At any rate, of paramount importance to us is that
justice has been served. No right of the public was
violated and public interest was preserved.
Finally, we cannot simply pass over in silence the
deplorable act of the former Mayor of Caloocan City in
refusing to sign the check in payment of the Citys
obligation to private respondent. It was an open
defiance of judicial processes, smacking of political
arrogance, and a direct violation of the very ordinance
he himself approved. Our Resolution in G.R. No.
98366, City Government of Caloocan vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., dated May 16, 1991, dismissing the
petition of the City of Caloocan assailing the issuance
of a writ of execution by the trial court, already
resolved with finality all impediments to the execution
of judgment in this case. Yet, the City Government of
Caloocan, in a blatant display of malice and bad faith,
refused to comply with the decision. Now, it has the
temerity to come to this Court once more and continue
inflicting injustice on a hapless citizen, as if all the
harm and prejudice it has already heaped upon
respondent Santiago are still not enough.
This Court will not condone the repudiation of just
obligations contracted by municipal corporations. On
the contrary, we will extend our aid and every judicial
facility to any citizen in the enforcement of just and
valid claims against abusive local government units.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for
utter lack of merit. The assailed orders of the trial
court dated October 1, 1992, October 8, 1992 and May
7, 1993, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
Petitioners and their counsels are hereby warned
against filing any more pleadings in connection with
the issues already resolved with finality herein and in
related cases.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.