Reform is not

Against Tradition:
Making Chieftaincy
Relevant in 21 Century
st

Sierra Leone

Campaign for Good Governance

Methodist Church Sierra Leone
Network Movement for Justice and Development
October 2009

Contents
Background
List of Acronyms
Executive Summary
Introduction: Why Reform the Chieftaincy System?
1 Legacies of “Indirect Rule”: Government Policy 
On Chieftaincy in the 20th Century
1.1 “Native Law and Custom”
1.2 Post-Colonial Patronage Politics and Legislative Stagnation
1.3 Lessons from History for a New Programme 
of Chieftaincy Reform
2 Talking About Chieftaincy in Sierra Leone Today 
2.1 Accountability and Good Governance
2.1.1 The Moral Contract between Chiefs and People
2.1.2 Case Study: The Biriwa Chieftaincy Election Crisis of 2006
2.1.3 Chieftaincy’s Crisis of Accountability
2.1.4 The Case for Universal Adult Suffrage in Chieftaincy Elections
2.2 Justice and Human Rights
2.2.1 Overlapping Spheres of Justice
2.2.2 Rural Community-Based Justice
2.2.3 Corruption and Conflict in the Local Justice System
2.2.4 Ways Forward for Improving the Local Justice System
2.3 Taxation and Representation
2.3.1 Chiefdoms and Local Councils
2.3.2 Case Study: Conflicts over Revenue Collection in 
Tonkolili District
2.3.3 Ways Forward for Improving the Local Government System
3 Strengths and Weaknesses of Recent Legislation 
on Chieftaincy
3.1 The Chieftaincy Act, 2009
3.2 The Local Courts Bill, 2008
3.3 The Local Government Act, 2004
4 Chieftaincy and Decentralization in other 
African Countries: What Lessons for Sierra Leone?
5 Recommendations and Conclusions
5.1 Accountability and Good Governance Reforms
5.2 Justice and Human Rights Reforms
5.3 Taxation and Representation Reforms
5.4 Conclusions
References
Persons, Organizations and Communities Consulted
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Background
1 This report is published by This report was commissioned by Campaign for Good The importance of stimulating debate on chieftaincy reflects
Partners in Conflict Governance (CGG); and Network Movement for Justice two wholly Sierra Leonean priorities. First, the overwhelming
2 Transformation (picot)
and Development (NMJD) and the Methodist Church Sierra message from post-war community dialogue sessions is
In collaboration with
3 Campaign for Good Leone (MCSL), who work together as Partners in Conflict that ordinary people want to see the chieftaincy system
Governance (cgg) Transformation (PICOT), to inform their advocacy campaign reformed, not abolished. Second, one Act directly affecting
10 in Freetown, October 2009 calling for reform of the chieftaincy system in Sierra Leone. chiefdom governance has recently been enacted: the
The following organisations Over the past years, chiefdom governance has been identified Chieftaincy Act, 2009; while another Bill, equally affecting
15 as a major issue by community members participating in chiefdom governance, is waiting to be enacted: the Local
are members of Partners in
Conflict Transformation: conflict transformation sessions facilitated by the partner Courts Bill, 2008. Additionally, the Sierra Leone government
15 1. Network Movement for organizations. During a one-week workshop in July 2007, is considering the Constitutional Review Committee’s
19 Justice and Development PICOT therefore decided to make chieftaincy reform its major recommendations for the addition of new clauses on
(NMJD)
23 advocacy focus. Reform at this level has the potential to effect chieftaincy in the Sierra Leonean Constitution. It has also
2. Methodist Church Sierra
Leone (MCSL) real change in the lives of the rural poor as it addresses root commissioned a departmental review of the Local
causes of poverty and exclusion rather than symptoms. Government Act, 2004, which establishes the division of
25 The failings of chiefdom governance have been highlighted functions between the chiefdoms and the town and district
in several recent reports commissioned by donor agencies. councils. Through their advocacy campaign, PICOT, CGG
25
While the present report is equally candid about these and other civil society organizations in Sierra Leone seek to
25 failings, its primary aim is to draw all interest groups, chiefs ensure that the voices and concerns of ordinary Sierra
26 included, into a debate about the institutional reforms Leoneans are taken into account during these important
29 that are needed to make the chiefdom governance more legislative and policy developments.
34 accountable, democratic, just, and focussed on development. The evidence cited in this report is drawn from published
37 The fundamental challenge for reform is to make chieftaincy sources, the authors’ fieldwork and community dialogue
37 relevant in Sierra Leone in the 21st century. Since the end sessions facilitated by the partner organizations. The authors
38 of the civil war, there have been numerous changes in would like to thank PICOT partners, CGG, Frances Fortune
Sierra Leoneans’ conceptions of governance, development, of Search for Common Ground and Marie-Luise Schueller of
39
accountability, justice and human rights. Some have attempted Christian Aid for their comments. They would also like to thank
42 to label these changes as “untraditional” and “un-Sierra Peter Muffu of Njala University and Marie-Luise Schueller of
43 Leonean.” However, there is nothing untraditional about Christian Aid for their assistance in editing and proof reading
43 women wanting better access to justice and governance, the first and final drafts.1
46 for there are many places in the country where women are The research was supported by Christian Aid, UK, with
chiefs, judges and lawyers. There is nothing untraditional funding from Irish Aid MAPS.
47 or un-Sierra Leonean about people from non-ruling houses
holding positions of authority, since there are many such
49 persons holding responsible positions within chiefdom
governance structures, local councils and central government.
There is nothing untraditional and un-Sierra Leonean about
49 chiefs being more accountable to their people, or of ensuring
52 that chiefs are insulated from the pressure to serve as party
53 political enforcers. These are not issues that should be seen
as opposing tradition. The resilience of traditional political
54 institutions depends on their ability to bring on board new
ideas and respond to emerging aspirations. Where institutions
are out of step with the aspirations of the people, they risk
56 losing the loyalty and respect of those that they are meant to
56 serve. The case for reform is therefore not a case against
tradition. It is rather a case for the continued relevance of
57
chieftaincy in a country that yearns for better governance,
58 fairer justice systems, socio-economic development and
58 greater accountability.
59
60
1. Thanks also to Renee Zandvliet , CGG intern, for editing and proof
reading the first draft.
1
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
List of Acronyms Executive Summary
AFRC: Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Why Reform the Chieftaincy system?
APC: All Peoples Congress Chieftaincy remains a key cultural and political institution in
Sierra Leone. However, recent public consultations have
BKM: Bureh-Kasseh-Makonteh Chiefdom
revealed a general crisis of confidence in the system of
CCFC: Central Chiefdom Finance Clerk
governance through which chiefs exercise local authority.
CDC: Chiefdom Development Committee Many Sierra Leoneans, chiefs included, have acknowledged
CDF: Civil Defense Forces that the failings of the chieftaincy system were among the root
causes of the recent civil war.
CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
Reform of the chieftaincy system is nevertheless faced
CGG: Campaign for Good Governance
with numerous obstacles, both institutional and political. The
CGRP: Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme system was originally designed for the purpose of colonial
CPI: Chiefdom Police Inspector “indirect rule”, a regime under which chiefs were allowed to
rule over their subjects according to “native law and custom”
CSO: Civil Society Organization
with supervision from above. Many commentators, including
DecSec: Decentralization Secretariat
the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),
IDP: Internally Displaced Person argue that the control exerted by the colonial administration
IRCBP: Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project over chiefs had a negative impact on their relationship with
their people. Chiefs served the central government first and
LGA: Local Government Act
foremost and often used their colonially wrought powers to
MIALGRA: Ministry for Internal Affairs, Local Government & Rural Affairs
exploit their people for private gain.
NEC: National Electoral Commission It was Sierra Leone’s misfortune that post-colonial
NMJD: Network Movement for Justice and Development governments tended to use chiefs in exactly the same manner
as their colonial predecessors: as instruments for maintaining
NGO: Non Governmental Organization
political control over the countryside. Party-political rivalries,
NPRC: National Provisional Ruling Council
particularly the rivalry between the Sierra Leone Peoples Party
MCSL: Methodist Church Sierra Leone (SLPP) and All Peoples Congress (APC), intensified this trend.
ONS: Office of National Security Whichever party had the ascendency in a particular area relied
on chiefs to mobilize the rural vote in its favour. When in power,
PICOT: Partners in Conflict Transformation
both of the leading parties were inclined to speak publicly
PC: Paramount Chief
of chieftaincy as if it was a completely traditional system of
PMDC: People’s Movement for Democratic Change governance that was above politics. But in practice, central
PPRC: Political Parties Registration Office government actively sought to control chiefs using laws
RUF: Revolutionary United Front inherited from the colonial era.
Since the war, the resurgence of multi-party democracy
SLP: Sierra Leone Police
has also seen the revival of party political co-option of chiefs.
SLPP: Sierra Leone People’s Party Some international donor agencies working in Sierra Leone
TA: Tribal Authorities have come to regard the obstacles facing chieftaincy reform
TDC: Tonkolili District Council as intractable and recommend starting afresh with more
modern institutions of local government. However, chieftaincy
TRC: Truth and Reconciliation Commission
is protected from abolition by the 1991 Constitution and, in
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme spite of widespread anger and resentment towards chiefs’
VDC: Village Development Committee authoritarian behaviour over the years, the vast majority of
Sierra Leoneans still respect the institution of chieftaincy and
WDC: Ward Development Committee
want to see it continue.
YKK: Yakemo Kpukumu Krim
2 3
Clearly, the first step for meaningful reform of the chieftaincy
system is to repair the relationship between chiefs and their
people and to protect that relationship from political interference
from above. Chiefs remain to be convinced that reform is in their
best interests and many complain that “tradition” is sacrosanct.
Yet many of the powers and functions attached to chieftaincy are
demonstrably not traditional. Just as government is continually
refining laws and policies to ensure that the state system
is operating efficiently, serving the nation and moving with
the times, so should the functions attached to chieftaincy be
subjected to critical examination and reformed if need be.
Indeed, the Government of Sierra Leone is even now
passing laws that will have a significant impact on chiefdom
governance. These laws include the Chieftaincy Act, 2009, the
Local Courts Bill, 2008 and the Local Government Act, 2004.
The latter Act is currently undergoing an internal government
review. With this legislation in progress, there is every reason
for chiefs to join a national discussion about the future of their
institution. The fundamental challenge for chieftaincy reform
is to make the institution relevant in Sierra Leone in the 21st
century. Where institutions are out of step with the aspirations
of the people, they risk losing the loyalty and respect of
those that they are meant to serve. The case for reform is
therefore not a case against tradition. It is rather a case for
the continued relevance of chieftaincy in a country that
yearns for better governance, fairer justice systems, socio-
economic development and greater accountability.
Chieftaincy reform, we argue, cannot work unless it takes
the voices of ordinary people fully into account. For that
reason, it must address the following priority principles:
1. Accountability and Good Governance
Ordinary people want to have greater say in the decision
making process in the chiefdoms. They also want to see
more democratic and transparent chieftaincy elections so
that they can be confident that the winners are genuinely
committed to the welfare and development of the
communities they represent.
2. Justice and Human Rights
Ordinary people want to have confidence that when they
take a dispute to a chief or a case to the Local Court, they will
receive justice irrespective of their age, gender or social status.
3. Taxation and Representation
When ordinary people pay their taxes to local authorities,
they want to see a tangible return in the form of services and
development investment.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Lessons from History
The failings of an authoritarian model of Chieftaincy
Several important lessons for chieftaincy reform can be
found in history. First, colonial “indirect rule” helped to
create an authoritarian model of chieftaincy that has arguably
never been “traditional”. Successive governments of Sierra
Leone have supported this model, believing oligarchy [i.e.
rule by a small elite] to be necessary for the maintenance
of law and order at the local level. This model overlooks
the vital role that cooperation and consensus have always
played in maintaining social order at the grassroots.
Whenever governments have been faced with evidence
that the authoritarian model of chieftaincy creates conflict,
their habitual response has been to put the blame on the
protestors. Yet if chiefs are going to return to their traditional
communitarian role as the TRC Report recommends, the
authoritarian model of chieftaincy will have to go.
Overlapping systems of local governance
Second, Successive governments’ determination not to
compromise “native law and custom” often meant that
when reforms in chiefdom governance did take place, they
lacked coherence and sustainability. For example, the “native
administration” reforms of the 1930s sought to add local
government functions to the governing councils of chiefdoms
(Tribal Authorities) without any real consideration of whether
these bodies had the capacity to manage these functions.
Furthermore, taxpayer representatives were originally
included in Tribal Authorities with the intention of making these
bodies more democratic. Yet the expanded Tribal Authorities
became too large to function effectively as decision-making
forums and their key administrative functions were eventually
transferred to self-recruiting Chiefdom Committees. Another
approach was to introduce new institutions to satisfy social
groups (e.g. miners and wage workers) who were demanding
modern governance yet leave chiefdom institutions intact to
serve communities of poor farmers. That policy created two
overlapping systems of justice and the institutional separation
of local revenue collection (chiefdoms) from service delivery
(District Councils). Clearly, the primary objective of chieftaincy
reform must be the creation of a fully integrated local
government system.
4 5
Central Government Interference
in Chieftaincy Affairs
Third, the British colonial authorities arrogated to themselves
the task of supervising chiefdom governance, which meant
that, in the final analysis, executive interpretations of
“native law and custom” always enjoyed priority over the
interpretations of chiefs and their people. Since native law and
custom could not, by definition, be regulated directly by the
statute, the colonial authorities effectively licensed themselves
to intervene in chiefdom affairs whenever they saw it fit.
National governments have carried on that tradition even in the
post-civil war era. Clearly, legislative reforms aimed at making
chiefdom governance more accountable, just, respecting
of human rights and effective in delivering services and
development inputs must also aim to protect chiefs and rural
people from excessive and unaccountable central government
interference in their affairs.
Talking About Chieftaincy in
Sierra Leone Today
The analysis continues with an examination of the views of
different stakeholders on chieftaincy issues in present-day
Sierra Leone.
Accountability and Good Governance Issues
Applying the principle of accountability to relations between
chiefs and their subjects might appear problematic, given
that a Paramount Chief’s primary claim to rule is his or her
hereditary right. However, many rural people still consider
chiefs to be bound by a moral contract with them and it is this
contract that they want to see restored.
Case studies of the Biriwa chieftaincy election of 2006
and the Bureh-Kasseh-Makonteh (BKM) chieftaincy election
of 2002 illustrate chieftaincy’s current accountability crisis. In
the Biriwa case, government officials revised the Chiefdom
Councillor list without consulting the chiefdom people,
accepted inflated tax assessments, made revisions to the List
that clearly favoured one candidate and prioritized their own
interpretation of local customs and traditions. When it refused
to respond to local protests, bringing in armed security to
ensure the completion of the election, local secret societies
imposed ritual curfews on bush paths and the Court Barray,
forcing the election to reconvene elsewhere. The Biriwa
election also prompted a confrontation between the National
Electoral Commission (NEC) and the Local Government
Ministry, which eventually led to a controversial High Court
ruling stating that chiefdom elections were not “public”
elections and therefore outside NEC’s constitutional remit.
In the BKM case, government officials also accepted inflated
tax assessments, authorized a “ghost” chiefdom section and
upheld a colonial-era rotational crowning agreement that had
only been signed by one faction in the chiefdom.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
The first accountability issue emerging from these cases is that Justice and Human Rights Issues
many chiefdom residents, youth and women in particular, are There are no explicit provisions in the general law about the
reduced to the role of bystanders at chieftaincy elections as local administration of justice by chiefs. The Local Courts
ruling houses and their elite supporters struggle for ascendency.
Act, 1963, states that these Courts have primary jurisdiction
Second, insofar as they were designed to introduce
to “hear and determine civil cases governed by customary
taxpayer (and thus popular) representation to Chiefdom
law” and that it is an offence to any person to “exercise or
Councils, the old rules for allocating Chiefdom Councillors to
attempt to exercise judicial powers” within their territorial
localities on a ratio of one councillor for every 20 taxpayers
jurisdiction. But since Section 176(3) of the Laws of Sierra
have become a manifest failure. Many chiefs insist on
Leone 1965 makes provision for the existence of the statutes
appointing taxpayer representatives to Chiefdom Councils
and common law, Paramount Chiefs have retained a role
because it helps them to secure the support of community
as the final arbiters of justice in communities governed by
patrons and opinion formers and ensure that upwardly mobile
customary law.
chiefdom residents remain tied to the system of authority
The present system of justice therefore creates
based on chieftaincy. Yet, the fundamental problem with this
overlapping spheres of authority. In remote rural
system of patronage is that it excludes youths, women and
communities, chiefs represent by far the most accessible
poorer chiefdom residents and often contradicts shared ideas
resolvers of disputes and dispensers of justice. Paramount
of “community” that enable chiefs to maintain social order in
Chiefs, Section Chiefs and Village Chiefs often hold informal
the first place. courts where they adjudicate cases, levy fees, impose
Third, local factional rivalries would clearly not have such a fines or other punishments. But they also adjudicate intra-
disruptive effect on chiefdom governance if it were not for the community disputes where little or no money is involved.
excessive and unaccountable power government continues Another feature of this community-based justice system
to hold over chieftaincy affairs. Chieftaincy politics remains is the strong moral pressure on individuals not to involve
focussed on winning the favour of central government rather outsiders in disputes. Yet even in remote rural areas there are
than winning the support of the people. people who prefer to look beyond chiefs for justice: traders,
teachers and others who, by virtue of their work, education
The Case for Universal Adult Suffrage
and community of origin, prefer to bring cases before the
in Chieftaincy Elections
Local Courts and Magistrate’s Courts.
Universal adult suffrage in chieftaincy elections could help to
Community based justice only works effectively where
resolve chieftaincy’s current crisis of accountability.
there is a moral consensus. Unfortunately, there are many
First, it would bring an end to politically motivated inflation
signs that this consensus has come under severe strain in
of local tax assessments and fraudulent manipulation of
rural Sierra Leone in recent years. Part of the problem is chiefs’
Chiefdom Councillor lists.
over-zealous enforcement of their subjects’ “community”
Second, since women are now expected to pay local tax
obligations, especially unpaid labour. They also use their own
under decentralization, the numbers of assessed taxpayers
judicial authority and the Local Courts to inflict punishments
in all chiefdoms are already increasing substantially. If the old
on community people who defy their authority. Another
1:20 ratio of Councillors to taxpayers is retained it will produce
element of the problem is that many chiefs and Local Court
Chiefdom Councils that are too large to be able to meet and
functionaries have come to rely on the local justice system as
conduct business effectively in one place (e.g. a Court Barray).
a source of private income.
Third, it would place responsibility for managing chieftaincy
elections firmly in the hands of the NEC and curtail abuse of
the government’s colonially wrought power to arbitrate on
matters of “customary law and usage” in chieftaincy elections.
The whole point of universal adult suffrage in chieftaincy
elections is to bring chiefs back in touch with the communities
they represent, to give them a mandate to “stand firm and do
something better for the people” as one rural youth put it. The
idea that the public cannot be trusted to vote responsibly for
their political leaders really should have no place in a modern
democracy. Again, the argument comes back to the point
that if all Sierra Leonean citizens have the right to vote for the
President, there is no good reason why they should not vote
for their chiefs.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Ways Forward for Improving the Local Justice System
First, it is very unlikely that corruption in the Local Courts
and Chiefs’ judicial hearings will diminish until Local Court
functionaries and chiefs cease to rely so heavily on fees and
fines for private income. Providing adequate salaries for Local
Court functionaries, Chiefdom Police and chiefs and a proper
salary structure for all ranks of chief (i.e. Village Chiefs and
Section Chiefs should receive proper salaries, not rebates on
local tax collections) is essential.
Second, the idea enshrined in the Chiefdom Councils
Act (Cap.61 of the Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960), that chiefs
should maintain order in their localities simply by exercising
their authority as chiefs, is a throwback to colonial “indirect
rule” and needs to be revised to reflect 21st century realities.
The law should recognize that chiefs of all ranks play a key
role in mediating problems and disputes at the community
level, including disputes between community members and
outside parties
Third, the interface between customary law and state law
needs to be better defined. Customary law in Sierra Leone
must be restated. Restatement basically entails writing
down laws and their usages in one document. This process
is different from codification, which entails entrusting binding
legal force to the laws so documented. Codifying customary
law would freeze it and deny it the flexibility that is its defining
characteristic. A restatement of customary laws and usages
would improve all justice practitioners’ knowledge of these
laws, and generate more informed understanding of the social
context in which they are applicable.
Taxation and Representation Issues
The Relationship between Chiefdom Councils
and District Councils
The Local Government Act (LGA) of 2004 establishes the
local councils as the highest authorities in their localities.
The LGA reinstates an old system whereby the local councils
claim a precept on revenues collected by the chiefdoms.
It also confirms the original law and order functions of
Chiefdom Councils as established by the Chiefdom Councils
Act and Provinces Lands Act (Caps. 61 and 122 of the Laws
of Sierra Leone, 1960).
This division of functions has tended to place the
chiefdoms and local councils in competition with one another.
By far the most pressing problem arising here concerns the
collection and usage of revenue. At present, local revenue
collection remains the primary responsibility of poorly trained
and infrequently remunerated Treasury Clerks and other
chiefdom functionaries.
6 7
Current problems between local councils and chiefdoms
over revenue collection are illustrated by a case study from
Tonkolili District. Since 2004, the rate of local tax in the District
has increased considerably, and is now a significant source
of revenue. Tonkolili District Council (TDC) is entitled to take a
percentage of local taxes and revenues from market dues, but
with so much money now becoming available, local Paramount
Chiefs are arguing that the tax paid by communities should be
reinvested in the development of those specific communities,
not the district as the whole.
In a public meeting held in November 2008, the TDC
leadership revealed that one chiefdom administration had
not paid anything into its bank account for two years, despite
collecting taxes over that time. Furthermore, nobody in the
district seemed to know where the 60% of local revenues
due to the chiefdoms was going. Functionaries employed
by chiefdom administrations (e.g. Chiefdom Police, Treasury
Clerks, etc) claimed that they were not being paid and Treasury
Clerks were frequently transferred from chiefdom to chiefdom
and didn’t have up-to-date records. It eventually emerged
that the Ministry for Internal Affairs, Local Government &
Rural Affairs (MIALGRA) in Freetown was still controlling
chiefdom financial accounts, summoning CCFCs and Treasury
Clerks to the capital every year to assist in the preparation
of budgets. Such practices contravene the clauses in the
Local Government Act that establish district councils as the
highest authorities in their localities with responsibility for
approving the annual budgets of chiefdom administrations and
overseeing the implementation of these budgets.
A Provincial Secretary interviewed in January 2009 later
revealed that revenue deposited in chiefdom administration
banks accounts is often used as a “hospitality” slush fund for
Minsters and other senior government figures when on visits to
rural areas. He concluded by observing that central government
will always side with the chiefs when they come into conflict
with the local councils because a Paramount Chief can still
deliver “40,000 votes” to a political party at election time.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Ways Forward for Improving the Local
Government System
Clearly, the present division of functions between the local
councils and the chiefdoms is untenable. The logical solution
might be that local councils take over responsibility for
collecting all revenues, but the political reality is that most rural
Sierra Leoneans’ primary loyalty is to their chiefdoms and they
would resist extending further powers to bureaucrats and
functionaries whom they are already inclined to distrust.
The only answer in the long term is that the chiefdoms
become fully integrated into the local government system.
Chiefdom Committees should take over the present functions
of Ward Development Committees and the new generation
of Village Development Committees (VDCs), which are more
representative of the interests of women and youth than
the hastily formed VDCs of the early post-war era, should
also be formalized as the bottom tier of the integrated local
government system.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Recent
Legislation Affecting Chieftaincy
The Chieftaincy Act, 2009
The primary purpose of this Act is to set out procedures for
electing Paramount Chiefs and Sub-Chiefs. The government’s
initiative in making these elections a specific subject of
legislation is to be applauded, as are the sections of the new
Act that seek to give paramount chieftaincy elections greater
protection from political interference from above. However,
the Chieftaincy Act, 2009 clearly does not go far enough in
terms of reforming the ills that have plagued the chieftaincy
system in the past.
In particular, the Act merely recapitulates existing
guidelines for using Chiefdom Councils as Electoral Colleges
in paramount chieftaincy elections. Section 4(3) of the
Act states that fraudulent inflation of taxpayer lists is an
offence. It also states that “irregularities” in the revision of
the gazetted Chiefdom Councillors list shall not constitute
grounds for invalidating an election. Here, the government
is acknowledging, tacitly, that fraud is commonplace in
the revision of Chiefdom Councillors lists. Yet it seems to
be worried that if legal challenges to election results were
permitted the whole Electoral College system could collapse.
If the system requires such protection, there is something
fundamentally wrong with it. Rather than seeking to protect
the old system, the government should have set about
reforming it.
Furthermore, the Act is either deficient or inconsistent on
several issues, both major and minor. The lack of clarity over
the role of the NEC in paramount chieftaincy elections is a
notable case in point. Section 4(4) of the Act states that: “The
revision of the Chiefdom Councillors List shall be undertaken by
the office of the Provincial Secretary in collaboration with the
National Electoral Commission (NEC)”.Are NEC officials going
to have access to the raw tax data in order to ensure that the
list is compiled in accordance with the rules, or are they going
to be asked to approve a list that has simply been updated to fill
vacancies caused by recent deaths of Councillors?
Finally, some sections of the Act continue to support
excessive central government control over chieftaincy
affairs. For example, the Act specifically states that Provincial
Secretaries should preside over chieftaincy elections in
their capacity as Declaration Officers and that government
recognises the validity of an election based on Provincial
Secretaries’ reports. In effect therefore, Provincial Secretaries
are both managing elections and monitoring them on behalf
of the government. It is not clear, however, who is monitoring
their performance.
The Local Courts Bill, 2008 and the Justice Sector
Reform Strategy
On paper, the Local Courts Bill, 2008 is a far more radical
piece of legislation than the Chieftaincy Act, 2009. In essence,
the Bill updates and expands upon the provisions of the
Local Courts Act, 1963 and subsequent amendments. The
radical feature of the Bill is to transfer the administration
of the Local courts from the Ministry responsible for Local
Government to the Ministry of Justice. The Chief Justice now
appoints the Court Chairman and all other functionaries after
consultation with the Judicial and Legal Service Commission,
as established by Section 140 of the Constitution.
The effect of the Local Courts Bill, 2008, is to separate the
local law courts completely from chiefdom administration.
For the first time in Sierra Leone’s history, the formal justice
system has been placed under one institutional umbrella,
breaking down old divisions created by colonial “indirect rule.”
The great advantage of this change is that a single authority
will take overall responsibility for the appointment, training
and terms and conditions of employment of all local law court
functionaries. Answering to a clear chain of command will
enable these functionaries to resist political leverage on their
decision making. With court revenues paid directly into the
government’s coffers and the government taking responsibility
for functionaries’ salaries, both the opportunity and incentive
for financial corruption in the local law courts should be
greatly reduced. The Local Courts Bill represents a historic
step forward in Sierra Leone’s system of governance, yet its
enactment continues to be delayed.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
The Local Government Act, 2004
The Local Government Act, 2004 is the oldest piece of
legislation considered in this report and is already the subject
of an internal governmental review. One of the main areas
earmarked for review is the division of functions between the
local councils and the chiefdoms. The root of the problem is
the old idea, inherited from colonial “indirect rule,” that the
chiefdoms are responsible for law and order while the local
councils are responsible for development. The Chieftaincy
Act, 2009, is now emphasizing that Paramount Chiefs should
serve as agents of development. If it achieves nothing else,
the review of the 2004 Act should seek to ensure that chiefs
become part of the local government system, not remain in
competition with it.
Chieftaincy and Decentralization in
other African Countries: What Lessons
for Sierra Leone?
There have been close links between Sierra Leone and Ghana
on policy relating to chieftaincy for many years. Many of the
colonial laws on chieftaincy in Sierra Leone were adapted from
existing laws enacted in Nigeria and Ghana (then Gold Coast).
More recently, Ghanaian and Ugandan experts have advised
the Sierra Leone Government on local government policy.
One of the striking differences between Sierra Leone and
Ghana and Uganda is that in these two countries, there is
no separate sphere of chiefdom governance responsible for
collecting tax and maintaining law and order. Both countries
have a system of elected councils that extend from the
district level right down to the village level. These councils
are responsible for collecting all local revenues and helping to
maintain national security. Chiefs have no formal role in them.
Both the intent and effect of chieftaincy legislation in
both countries is to place chiefs firmly within the realm of
civil society. Chiefs in Ghana and Uganda continue to wield
considerable influence in local and national affairs, but they do
so in their capacity as leaders and representatives of particular
communities. In Ghana, chiefs themselves often acknowledge
that their formal exclusion from party politics ensures that their
position as community leaders is not compromised. There are
clear benefits to both chiefs and their people when chieftaincy
remains a strictly civil institution. In Ghana in particular, there
are regional and national Houses of Chiefs whose duties
include advising any person or authority on matters relating
to chieftaincy and undertaking the study, interpretation and
codification of customary law. Another benefit of “civil”
chieftaincy is that it can become a corporate foundation for
community development. For example, the Kingdom of
Buganda is registered as a development agency and has been
able to secure funding from the Ugandan government and
international NGOs.
8 9
There are several lessons from these two countries here
for chieftaincy reform in Sierra Leone. First, while the
authors of this report are not recommending the removal of
chiefs from the local government system in the foreseeable
future, the experience of Ghana and Uganda emphasizes
that, where chieftaincy is concerned, there is a trade off
between formal political power and genuine community
representation. Second, an institutionally integrated local
government system is always going to be more efficient
in delivering services and responding to local development
needs than one in which functions are divided between
separate and competing institutions. Third, when chieftaincy
becomes a strictly civil institution, it is better placed to
develop its own special sphere of governance and adapt to
social and economic change. Fourth, freedom from political
work on behalf of the central state also allows chiefs to
take a lead in civil society organizations capable of attracting
external development funding.
Recommendations and Conclusions
A. Introduce Universal Adult Suffrage in Paramount
Chieftaincy Elections.
This will ensure that elections are truly democratic and
Paramount Chiefs are representative of all of their people.
If people are allowed to elect their chiefs, chiefs will become
accountable to the community, not to the brokers and
manipulators who seek to control chieftaincy elections.
Peace and security will therefore increase.
B. The NEC Supervises Paramount Chieftaincy
Elections
Paramount Chieftaincy elections are public elections and
should therefore be supervised by the NEC. This will allow
the NEC to carry out its constitutional mandate and help to
ensure that chieftaincy elections are free and fair and fully
regulated by the law. A list of aspirants should be published
well in advance of the election and their eligibility should
only be investigated when it is the subject of a formal written
challenge from a citizen of the chiefdom. Challenges should
be heard by the Local Courts and the Declaration of Rights
meeting should be abolished.
C. Incorporate the Chiefdom Committee as
a Local Government Body
The Chiefdom Committee, rather than the Chiefdom Council,
should be recognized in law as the governing body of the
chiefdom and its structure, roles and responsibilities must
be redefined to reflect this (see recommendation M). The
Chiefdom Council serves no useful function except as an
instrument of patronage and should be abolished.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
D. All Chiefs Receive Salaries I. Reform the Chiefdom Police
Chiefs of all ranks perform key roles in maintaining social The Chiefdom Police should be reformed into a rural auxiliary
order in rural areas (see recommendation G) and should police force, trained by the SLP but with less stringent entry
receive government salaries for this work. They should not qualifications. The new force should serve the local councils as
have to rely on community contributions to make up for time well as chiefdom authorities.
lost in securing their livelihoods and local taxes should pay
J. Enact the Local Courts Bill, 2008
for welfare services and development. Sub-Chiefs should
The Bill represents a key step in the reform of the chieftaincy
receive graded salaries and the rebate on local tax collection
system and the integration of chiefdom-level structures into
should be abolished.
the state system. It should be enacted without further delay.
E. Reincorporate the National Council of
K. Local Councils Take over Responsibility for all
Paramount Chiefs as a Body with Specific
Local Revenue Collection
Constitutional Responsibilities
District and Town Councils should become responsible for all
The National Council of Paramount Chiefs should be renamed
revenue collection, which should now fund welfare services
National Council of Chiefs and fully incorporated, based on the
and development activity.
model of the Ghanaian House of Chiefs. The new body should
be fully funded and work with the Law Reform Commission L. Extend Statutory Recognition to the
on the restatement of customary law, investigate land tenure New Generation of VDCs
reform in the Provinces and advise the Local Government Villages represent the bottom tier of local administration in rural
Ministry and NEC on matters pertaining to rotational crowning areas and statutory recognition of these structures will pave the
agreements and ruling house eligibility in chieftaincy elections. way for their incorporation into the local government system.
F. Establish a Chieftaincy Commission M. Replace Ward Development Committees with
This independent body will regulate chiefs’ salaries, develop VDCs and Reformed Chiefdom Committees
a code of conduct for chieftaincy and investigate complaints WDCs should be abolished and their functions returned
against chiefs raised by citizens. The Chieftaincy Commission to reformed Chiefdom Committees. The new Chiefdom
should have the power to recommend to the President that a Committee should comprise of the Paramount Chief
Commission of Inquiry into the conduct of a Paramount Chief (chairman), Speaker, Section Chiefs, Local Councillors
is necessary, but it must also be bound by law to forward representing wards wholly or partially located in the chiefdom
evidence of illegal activity on the part of bureaucrats and and 5 men and 5 women elected by the people. Chiefdom
private citizens to the relevant authorities. Committees should become part of the local government
system along with the VDCs and have development budgets
G. Extend Legal Recognition to Chiefs’ Leading
approved by the District Council. Committee members should
Role in Local Dispute Resolution
receive expenses for attending meetings.
This role should receive statutory recognition and should
There is nothing in these recommendations that would
be the basis upon which chiefs receive salaries (see
represent a radical departure from local governance practices
recommendation D). Clarifying this role will help to improve
in other African countries that have chieftaincy systems. On
liaison between chiefs, the police services and the formal court
the contrary, these recommendations would bring Sierra
system. Disputes over customary land rights are a special case
Leone more into line with the local governance systems now
and it is vital that these are properly recorded. Chiefs require
found in counties like Ghana and Uganda.
support from government in formalizing these adjudications.
H. Restate Customary Law
A restatement of customary laws and usages would improve
all justice practitioners’ knowledge of these laws, and generate
more informed understanding of the social context in which
they are applicable. This is work that should be done by the
upgraded National Council of Chiefs in partnerships with
Customary Law Officers and the Law Reform Commission.
Restatement is not codification and the purpose of the
exercise is to improve the performance of the justice system
rather than transform customary law into written law.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Introduction:
Why Reform the Chieftaincy system?
Chieftaincy remains a key cultural and political institution in
Sierra Leone. Formal government and business activity is
concentrated in Freetown and the mining areas and two thirds
of the population is scattered in small rural towns and farming
communities. There are few civil authorities readily accessible
to these rural communities other than chiefs. Even after
the inception of decentralization in 2004, chiefs continue to
represent the first point of contact with government for many
Sierra Leoneans.
Rural people still rely on chiefs to intercede on their behalf
with central government in Freetown and government still
uses chiefs to issue decrees to the people and to oversee
development programmes in their localities. The prevalence
of customary land tenure in the provinces also means that
chiefs, especially those of paramount rank, still play a vital
role in authorizing transfers of land ownership between
community members and supervising land leases taken out
by non-locals. Rural people still make a point of informing
chiefs about their family affairs, often inviting them to witness
the life-cycle ceremonies of family members (e.g. babies’
naming ceremonies, initiations and funerals). In rural areas,
many births, marriages, deaths and property transfers remain
unrecorded by the state. Chiefs’ capacity to “speak” for their
subjects therefore remains, for many, a major source of social
and economic security.
Chiefs’ continuing importance in grassroots governance
also derives from the African cultural idea that they are the
living embodiments of the histories and traditions that bind
local communities together. This idea did not disappear
during the recent civil war. For example, a group of Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Buya Romende Chiefdom in
Port Loko District were interviewed in a camp in Port Loko
town in November 2001. According to the manager of the
camp (an employee of the Norwegian Refugee Council), the
recently redeployed Sierra Leone Police had been extremely
helpful in providing security for the camp and had established
a temporary post there after some ex-combatants had been
discovered harassing the IDPs. But when the IDP group
was asked to pinpoint the changes that would give them
confidence to return home they stated that “The Paramount
Chief should return first”.“The police are around for everyone,”
they went on “but the Paramount Chief has been recognized
by the government for our chiefdom alone. If he comes back,
we will know that out ‘father’ has returned and we will go
back” (Fanthorpe, 2001).
But it is precisely because chiefs are still considered
integral to the social fabric of communities that they are
expected to govern in the community interest. If they deviate
from this norm, putting their own private interests and/or those
of outsiders ahead of their people, public dismay and anger is
particularly intense.
10
Community dialogue sessions facilitated by NGOs since
the end of the civil war have revealed the extent to which
chiefs’ governance has deviated from popular expectations in
recent years. Time and again, participants in these sessions
have claimed that chiefs, especially Paramount Chiefs, have
been abusing their authority. For example, chiefs have stood
accused of diverting external development support to their
own families and political supporters rather than the most
needy, entering into secret cartels with outside agencies
(e.g. foreign firms) to exploit local resources behind the backs
of their people, and using the Local Courts and informal
judicial hearings to suppress criticism of their governance,
seize property under disputed ownership for their own
use and generate income from fines that are often grossly
incommensurate with the offences committed.2 Reports also
continue to circulate that chiefs and religious leaders (e.g.
imams) at the village level are compelling people to work farms
for them without pay under the pretext that this represents
“communal labour”.3
Many Sierra Leoneans, chiefs included, now acknowledge
that these abuses have been driving able bodied young people
out of rural areas, and that during the civil war some of these
exiles joined militia groups and targeted chiefs and their
families in order to exact revenge. For example, Conciliation
Resources facilitated a series of public workshops on
governance in southern Sierra Leone at the end of the civil war.
One of their field reports outlines rural youths’ views on the
consequences of corrupt local justice:
This is an age-old problem in the community and is one of
the main factors underlying the war. These heavy fines cause
deep-seated grudges as well [as] force young people to flee
as they are unable to pay. The chiefs in the community are not
paid [by the government]. Therefore, they find their living from
conflict and the fines that it produces. Combining this practice
with other malpractices that chiefs enjoy has made chiefs a
target for victimisation by armed youth[s], as they themselves
feel victimised by the authorities.4
A summary report on this consultancy exercise went on
to observe that ‘many youth[s] joined the rebel war out of
frustration to be able to [exact] revenge on the chiefdom[s] for
all the bad governance that had been targeting them over the
years’ (Conciliation Resources, 2000:3).
2. For summaries of the testimonial evidence, see Conciliation
Resources (2000); Fanthorpe, Jay and Kamara (2002); Archibald and
Richards (2002); Fanthorpe (2003, 2004a); Manning, 2008.
3. Community Dialogue Session, Malenkay village, Tonkolili District,
January 2009.
4. Conciliation Resources, Report on Bumpeh Chiefdom
(Moyamba District) Consultation, 19th-20th January 2000, Paramount
Chiefs Restoration Unit, Governance Reform Secretariat, Ministry
of Presidential Affairs (PRU/GRS/MPA), Freetown.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Since the end of the war, Sierra Leone has seen a massive
influx of foreign aid, aimed at rehabilitating state institutions
and providing social and economic support to the Sierra
Leonean people. Governments of Sierra Leone have strongly
supported these international efforts, pledging to put the
corruption and political oppression of the past behind them.
To that end, they have overseen the return of multi-party
democracy and a decentralization programme whose primary
aim has been to “create a participatory local governance
structure where people (including previously marginalized
groups) can actively participate in the decision-making process
at the local level.”5 Over the last ten years, Sierra Leoneans
from all walks of life have become familiar with ideas about
good governance, accountability, transparency, justice and
human rights. Many of these ideas have now become part of
the language of everyday politics and have helped stimulate
what a recent World Bank report describes as a “remarkable
upsurge in self-organized social activism”, especially
among young people. This activism has taken the form of
business cooperatives, community development groups,
and occupational bodies like bike-riders and cassette sellers
associations (Peeters, et al, 2009:11).
Post-war reconstruction has impacted strongly on
relations between government and people. The return of
multi-party democracy has given many Sierra Leoneans
renewed confidence that a popular verdict on the performance
of governments can be expressed peacefully. Indeed, the
Presidential and Parliamentary elections of 2007 marked only
the second time in Sierra Leone’s history that an opposition
party was voted into power and the first time that such an
event did not prompt a military coup. Yet government is also
constantly reminding people of their civic responsibilities,
especially with regard to paying taxes. By law, all men over the
age of 21 years are liable for local tax, but the government has
recently decreed that all adult women are also liable. The local
tax rate in many districts is ten times higher than it was before
the decentralization programme started in 2004. Many people
living in rural areas now take the view that if principles of good
governance, democracy, accountability, transparency and
justice are priorities for central government and decentralized
councils, there is no good reason why they cannot also be
applied to the chiefdoms. At stake here is not only the quality
of local-level governance, but also Sierra Leone’s future peace
and prosperity.
5. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in
the Amount of SDR 16.8 Million (USD 25.12 Million Equivalent) to the
Government of Sierra Leone for an Institutional Reform and Capacity
Building Project, Report No. 28315-SL, April 2004, P. 27.
Reform of the chieftaincy system is nevertheless faced with
numerous obstacles, both institutional and political. Foremost
among these obstacles is the durability of a species of
patronage politics that exploits the legacy of colonial “indirect
rule”.As the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC) notes in its final report, Sierra Leone’s chieftaincy
system, like similar systems in other African colonies, was
designed from the outset to operate on principles distinct from
those of modern local government. In the early Sierra Leone
Protectorate, large pre-colonial polities were often broken
up into small colonial chiefdoms to facilitate the collection of
government tax and chiefs were allowed to rule their localities
only as long as they maintained law and order and fulfilled
colonial demands for labour and taxes. The TRC goes on to
argue that the control exerted by the colonial administration
over chiefs changed the traditional relationship between chiefs
and their people:
The overhaul of the structure of Chieftaincy was to have grave
implications on the ways in which traditional rulers related
to their subjects and on the socio-political organization of
the communities. The overbearing attitudes and behaviour
imbibed by the Chiefs from their colonial masters led to their
assuming new and overwhelming powers over their subjects.
Some of these measures, such as the ability to impose fines
or other punishments for errant behaviour, were retained long
into the post-colonial period and permanently defined the
negative perceptions of Chiefs among many of their subjects.
Indeed, these negative perceptions carried over into the
conflict in Sierra Leone in the 1990s as a partial explanation for
the brutality of the treatment meted out to Chiefs and other
figures of status or authority.6
After Independence, some African ex-colonies embarked
upon ambitious programmes of political modernization that
often had strong repercussions for chiefs. In Guinea for
example, chiefs were seen as functionaries of a discredited
colonial regime and there was widespread public support
for President Sékou Touré’s campaign to abolish chieftaincy
(Schmidt, 2005). In Ghana, the Kwame Nkrumah government
made a determined attempt to democratize local government,
eventually settling, after a bitter political battle, to alter the
legal basis of chieftaincy (Rathbone, 2000). In Sierra Leone,
however, national governments conserved an unreformed
chieftaincy system. Party-political rivalries, particularly the
growing rivalry between the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP)
and All Peoples Congress (APC), saw chieftaincy become a
political instrument. Whichever party had the ascendency in
a particular area relied on chiefs to mobilize the rural vote in
its favour. The 1965 Public Order Act empowered Paramount
Chiefs to disallow public meetings if they considered them
6. TRC Report, Vol.3a, paragraph 19.
11
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
detrimental to national security, public order, public safety
or public morality. These powers were routinely abused to
prevent opposition party activists from campaigning in party
strongholds (Cartwright, 1970:138-81). Yet, if a Paramount
Chief supported one party, members of rival ruling houses
currently out of power would declare support for the other
leading party in the hope that they would gain favours if there
was a change of government (Tangri, 1978a). Such strategies
ensured that chieftaincy politics would become interwoven
with national electoral politics. Observing these developments,
the political scientist Victor Minikin argued that in the first
decade after independence, Sierra Leone underwent a
relatively seamless transition from colonial indirect rule to
the ‘indirect’ participation of the rural masses in modern
democracy (Minikin, 1973).
Chiefs who had the favour of the ruling party were given
a virtually free rein to rule their localities as they saw fit. Many
exploited their positions for private gain, often seeking to
recoup the considerable outlay in bribes that had helped to
secure their elections in the first place. Yet the real power
always remained with the central regime. When in power,
both of the leading parties were inclined to speak publicly
of chieftaincy as if it was a completely traditional system of
governance that was above politics. But in practice, central
government actively sought to control chiefs using laws
inherited from the colonial era. A prime case in point is section
25 of the Provinces Act (Cap.60 of the Laws of Sierra Leone,
1960), which authorizes the deposition of paramount chiefs
on grounds of “subversive conduct”. Siaka Stevens’ one-party
regime used this law extensively in the 1970s and ‘80s to
control chiefs.
Another clause in the unreformed Provinces Act states
that both Paramount Chiefs and Chiefdom Councillors are
elected according to “native law”, subject to the approval
of the administrative officer presiding over their elections.
It thus remained extremely difficult for ordinary citizens to
challenge corrupt chieftaincy elections in the courts because
the adjudication of customary law in respect of chieftaincy
elections became the preserve of the Ministry responsible
for Local Government. Even today, ordinary people seeking
to challenge the results of paramount chieftaincy elections
have few options available to them except petitioning central
government. The government has no legal obligation to
respond to such petitions even when they present prima facie
evidence of corruption or procedural irregularity.
In the 1970s and ‘80s, the chieftaincy system became
locked into a downward spiral of exploitation and oppression.
This poisonous legacy was emphasized in nationwide
consultations on governance carried out by the Ministry of
Local Government in partnership with UNDP in 1998. The
report on these consultations notes that “the entire local
government structure broke down” during the Stevens era and
goes on to state that
12
…the Paramount Chiefs were reduced to mere agents of
the Central Government. They had to tow [sic] the line or
perish. Indeed, many, like Alikali Modu of Maforki, Bai Koblo
Pathbana of Lunsar, Masimera and Kumkanda of Loko
Masama, lost their thrones and in many areas, individuals
loyal to the ruling party were imposed on the people even
when they did not hail from recognized ruling houses.7
Since the war, chiefs themselves have acknowledged
that their governance must improve and many have taken
steps to re-establish harmonious relations with local youth.
For example, PICOT-trained paralegals interviewed in
Bumpeh Chiefdom in Bo district in December 2008 reported
that youths are now being included in village and section
meetings and that, as a result, many are now more inclined
to carry on living and working in rural areas rather than join
the exodus to the towns. In Masingbi in Tonkolili District, the
Paramount Chief has recently donated start up money to a
youth organization whose combined aims are to ensure that
local youth activism is led by the genuinely young and that
“communal labour” for public works is properly regulated
and rewarded with “food for work”.8
Yet the post-war resurgence of multi-party democracy
has also seen the revival of party political co-option of chiefs.
For example, the United State’s State Department country
report on human rights practices for Sierra Leone in 2006
noted several instances where Paramount Chiefs, supporting
the then ruling SLPP, harassed members and supporters of
the opposition APC and PMDC parties. Reported incidents
include the Niawa Lenga Paramount Chief’s summary
dismissal of a town chief for attending an APC party meeting,
the Sorogbema Paramount Chief’s suspension of four of his
section chiefs for attending a PMDC party meeting and a
Paramount Chief’s ejection of a woman from a local micro-
credit scheme because she could not produce an SLPP party
membership card.9 These problems have continued since
the change of government in 2007. Many Paramount Chiefs
now declared their support for the APC party. After the July
2008 local government elections, the registrar of the Political
Parties Registration Commission complained to the press
that “Paramount Chiefs are forcing their people to support
the APC government.”10 In one incident, the Paramount Chief
of Sandor chiefdom threatened to remove several sub-chiefs
7. Government of Sierra Leone and UNDP, Nation-Wide Consultative
Process (October – December 1998), Volume 1, Main Report, Freetown,
January 1999, p.4.
8. Interview, Kunike Youth Development Organization, Masingbi,
January 2009.
9. Country Report on Human Rights Practices, Sierra Leone, 2006,
US State Department, online at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2006/78756.htm
10. ‘PPRC Angry With SLPP, APC’, Concord Times, Freetown,
4 September 2008.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
if they allowed the female candidate contesting on behalf
of the SLPP to win the District Council seat in their ward.
He organized youth that disrupted campaign activities of the
female SLPP candidate.11
The TRC made a strong recommendation that the co-option
of chiefs by political parties must end:
The Commission calls for the return of Chiefs to their traditional
roles and functions. Their first and primary loyalty must be to
their subjects, not to party political bosses. The Commission
accordingly recommends the decoupling of Chiefs from
party politics. Their legal responsibilities and authority should
be closely examined to ensure that these accord with their
traditional roles. This recommendation is made for the serious
consideration of Government.12
Some international donor agencies working in Sierra
Leone have come to regard the obstacles facing chieftaincy
reform as intractable and recommend starting afresh
with more modern institutions of local government.13
However, chieftaincy is protected from abolition by the
1991 Constitution and, in spite of widespread anger and
resentment towards chiefs’ authoritarian behaviour over
the years, the vast majority of Sierra Leoneans still respect
the institution of chieftaincy and want to see it continue.
That sentiment has remained steadfast even in chieftaincy’s
darkest moments. For example, popular grievances against
chiefs’ governance boiled over into civil disorder in southern
Sierra Leone in the 1940s and in northern areas in the mid-
1950s. Some commentators consider these riots evidence of
an incipient “class” conflict in rural areas (e.g. Kilson, 1966)
and others suggest that they were a precursor of the recent
civil war (e.g. Hanlon, 2004). However, the Commission of
Inquiry into the northern riots found that while they had been
provoked by some chiefs’ despotic behaviour, the institution
of chieftaincy had not itself come under attack:
All our inquiries have demonstrated the respect in which the
office of chief – if not the office holder – is held. Witness after
witness has said that if the chief is kind, the people will work
for him...We find no evidence whatsoever that would support
any contention that a unit of local administration other than
a chiefdom should be adopted or is even possible. What is
required is that the Paramount chiefs in particular keep out
of party politics and devote themselves to their duties to
their people...14
11. Partners in Conflict Transformation (PICOT), MAPS 11 Annual report,
December 1st 2007 to November 30th 2008.
12. TRC Report, Vol. 2, paragraph 257.
13. For an analysis of these arguments, see Fanthorpe (2006), Jackson
(2007) and Sawyer (2008).
14. Government of Sierra Leone, Report of the Commission of Inquiry
into Disturbances in the Provinces (November 1955 to March 1956)
(London, 1956), p.150.
Similar conclusions were reached by the nationwide
consultative process facilitated by UNDP in 1998:
It was evident that throughout the country, the relationship
between traditional rulers and their subjects had become
strained over the years. Contributing factors as expressed
include the open partisan affiliation and the manifestly
unprogressive character of some chiefs. The cry for reform in
aspects of the institution of chieftaincy was overwhelming.
This was, however, tempered by the desire to see that the
institution regained its former glory and respect and that chiefs
are empowered to play their roles as vehicles of development
and progress in their chiefdoms.15
Clearly therefore, the first step for meaningful reform of
the chieftaincy system is to repair the relationship between
chiefs and their people and to protect that relationship from
political interference from above. Many chiefs oppose, on
grounds of principle, state-led reforms of institutions they
consider to be traditional. For example, in a recent interview
with the Chairman and executive committee members
of the National Council of Paramount Chiefs, the chiefs
acknowledged that “confusion” in chiefdom governance was
one of the causes of the recent civil war. Yet, they argued that
chieftaincy is a cultural institution, a product of traditions that
“stretch deep into the history of the country”. Culture, they
went on, is the “whole self of the man and cannot be built
with a new face.” In their view, pressure for reform in the
chieftaincy system comes from international development
agencies and Sierra Leoneans should not be forced to import
foreign governmental institutions “just because we don’t
have money”.16 Yet, many present-day problems in chiefdom
governance do not stem from the cultural institution of
chieftaincy itself, but from the powers and functions that
have been attached to it over the years by colonial and post-
colonial governments. The fundamental point being made by
the TRC Report is that many of these powers and functions
are explicitly not traditional: they were attached to chieftaincy
as a result of government policies that may no longer be
relevant to present day Sierra Leone. Just as government
is continually refining laws and policies to ensure that the
state system is operating efficiently, serving the nation and
moving with the times, so should the functions attached to
chieftaincy be subjected to critical examination and reformed
if need be.
15. Nationwide Consultative Process, p.23-4
16. Interview with PC Bai Koblo Queen II of Masimera Chiefdom
(Chairman, National Council of Paramount Chiefs), P.C. Alhaji Issa
Kamara-Koroma, Gallinas Perri Chiefdom, Pujehun District, PC Amadu
Kaikai, Kpanga Kabonde Chiefdom, Pujehun District, November 2008.
13
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Indeed, post-war reconstruction is still underway and the Sierra
Leone government is starting to pass laws and implement
sector-specific reform programmes that are clearly intended
to define chieftaincy’s place in the local government system
for many years to come. The process began with proposed
amendments to Section 72 of the 1991 Constitution, which
sought to add detail on the election of Paramount Chiefs, their
powers and duties and the circumstance of their depositions/
removal.17 This initiative was taken further by the Chieftaincy
Act, 2009, which is about to be enacted and represents the
first time in Sierra Leone’s history that procedures for electing
Paramount Chiefs and Sub-Chiefs have been detailed in
law. The Local Courts Bill, 2008, also about to be enacted,
places the Local Courts entirely under the supervision of the
Judiciary (rather than the Ministry of Local Government and
chiefdom administrations as previously). The new Bill is part of
a package of reforms aimed at improving local justice, building
the capacity of the Local Courts and Chiefdom Police, and
improving oversight of the local justice system.18 Finally, the
Local Government Act, 2004, has already provided for the
re-establishment of elected local government in Sierra Leone,
the devolution of central government functions to local councils,
and the division of functions between local councils and
chiefdom authorities. In essence, the 2004 Act revives the local
government system Sierra Leone inherited at Independence: a
two-tier system in which District and Town Councils are primarily
responsible for managing public services and development and
chiefdoms primarily responsible for maintaining law and order.
The new councils take a “precept” from taxes collected by
chiefdom authorities and oversee the chiefdoms’ administrative
budgets. Five years on, the weaknesses of the original Act,
particularly its provisions for the financing and staffing of the
new councils and the divisions of functions between the
decentralized councils and the chiefdoms, have prompted the
government to undertake a comprehensive internal review of its
provisions. This review, led by the Decentralisation Secretariat
(DecSec) is not yet complete.
Some Sierra Leonean commentators argue that chiefs
tend to oppose reform within their sphere of governance out
of an underlying fear that new legislation will only add to the
power central government holds over them.19 But since new
legislation is already appearing accompanied by very little
public consultation, there is all the more reason for chiefs to
join a national discussion about chieftaincy reform and to join
civil society groups in encouraging government to listen to
what community people are saying on the subject.
17. Government of Sierra Leone Report of the Commission to Review
the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991, January 2008
18. Government of Sierra Leone, Justice Sector Reform Strategy and
Investment Plan, 2008-2010, March 2008
19. Interview, Ambrose James, Search For Common Ground, Freetown,
December 2008.
14
This report identifies the reforms that will be needed if
chieftaincy in Sierra Leone is to remain relevant in 21st
century Sierra Leone. Chieftaincy reform, we argue, cannot
work unless it takes the voices of ordinary people fully into
account. For that reason, it must address the following
priority principles:
Accountability and Good Governance: Ordinary people
want to have greater say in the decision-making process in the
chiefdoms in order to ensure that decisions over the utilisation
of local resources, the allocation of development inputs and
the appointment of chiefdom functionaries (e.g. Treasury
Clerks) are made in the community interest. They also want
to see more democratic and transparent chieftaincy elections
so that they can be confident that the winners are genuinely
committed to the welfare of the communities they represent.
Justice and Human Rights: Ordinary people want to
have confidence that when they take a dispute to a chief or
a case to the Customary Law Court, they will receive justice
irrespective of their age, gender or social status. They
also want to see an end to exploitative summonsing fees,
administration fees and fines.
Taxation and Representation: When ordinary people
pay their taxes to local authorities, they want to see a return in
the form of services and development investment. They want
to be sure that their political representatives are managing
resources responsibly. They also want to see chiefdom
authorities and elected councillors cooperating effectively in
bringing development to their localities.
In making the case for specific reforms in the sphere
of chieftaincy this report aims to stimulate a new national
debate on the subject. Chapter 1 examines government
policy on chieftaincy in the 20th century and the lessons
it contains for any new programme of chieftaincy reform.
Chapter 2 analyses the views of stakeholders in the
chieftaincy system (i.e. government, chiefs, Civil Society
Organizations (CSOs) and ordinary people) in context and
highlights priority areas for reform. Chapter 3 examines the
strengths and weaknesses of recent legislation affecting
chiefdom governance in the light of these stakeholder views.
Chapter 4 explores the lessons Sierra Leone can learn from
chieftaincy reform and decentralization in Ghana and Uganda.
Chapter 5 sets out the reforms that are now needed to
secure the future of Sierra Leone’s chieftaincy system.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
1. Legacies of “Indirect Rule”:
Government Policy on Chieftaincy in the 20th Century
1.1 “Native Law and Custom”
As the TRC report notes, the chieftaincy system operating
in Sierra Leone today was originally designed to harness
indigenous African authorities to British colonial rule. For the
British, the attraction of ‘indirect rule’ in the Sierra Leone
Protectorate was that it represented government on the
cheap. If chiefs could be relied upon to maintain order in the
countryside, a small corps of colonial administrators could
serve in an oversight role and be spared the rigours, and costs,
of governing rural areas directly.
Central to the theory of “indirect rule” was that chiefs’
authority was established by “native law and custom”.Within
the colonial state, the limits of this authority was established by
distinguishing “natives” from “non-natives”; i.e. distinguishing
subjects of chiefs from citizens of the state (cf. Mamdani,
1996). The original Native Courts, over which Paramount Chiefs
presided, only had jurisdiction over “natives” (i.e. descendants
of the indigenous African population of the Protectorate and
neighbouring regions); Europeans and Krios (descendants of
liberated slaves) from Sierra Leone Colony were considered
“non-natives”.In the provinces, they were served by courts
presided over by British District Commissioners. Customary law
was nevertheless given primacy in respect of the Protectorate’s
main economic asset: land. Under the terms of the original
Protectorate Ordinance, as amended in 1897, all Protectorate
land was deemed inalienable to “non-natives” and the
regulation of local land rights (excluding mineral rights) was left,
by default, in the hands of chiefs.
It was apparent very early in the colonial era that the
distinction between “native” and “non-native” was particularly
problematic in Sierra Leone: a region with a long history
of indigenous African commerce, migration and cultural
interaction. One British District Commissioner complained in
a report of 1914 that the Native Courts of Paramount Chiefs
were “flagrantly corrupt” and “exist purely and simply for the
purpose of betting and for the extortion of outrageously high
court fees from suitors of little influence and standing.” He
went on to note that many residents of the Protectorate who
had set up their own businesses and who visited the Sierra
Leone Colony regularly were refusing to obey summonses to
chief’s courts. “Although such persons are usually sharply dealt
with”, he went on, “there is really little ground for surprise that
a native who possesses intelligence and initiative, who sees
justice properly administered in the District Commissioners’
Court, should revolt against the tribunal of his Chief.20
In spite of such misgivings, the British remained committed
to the principle of “indirect rule”. In the early colonial era,
chiefs’ powers over their subjects were bolstered rather than
reduced. Domestic slavery was allowed to continue and
20. Annual Report on the Railway District for the Year 1914
(Freetown, Government Printing Department, 1915).
chiefs’ right to tribute from their free subjects was guaranteed
in law. A subject who disobeyed their chief’s “lawful orders”,
or who left their chiefdom without first obtaining their chief’s
permission, became liable to prosecution in the District
Commissioners’ Courts.21
Yet the colonial authorities also reserved the right to
depose Paramount Chiefs whom they considered guilty of
maladministration. Indeed, officials on the ground never lost
sight of the fact that “native law and custom” served colonial
administrative ends and that their role as arbiters of “native
affairs” was founded, in the final analysis, upon a monopoly of
coercive force. As District Commissioner E.F. Sayers argued in
his annual report for Koinadugu District for the year 1922:
The Government took over things as they found them, under
a regime in which might was right, and decided political
boundaries accordingly. In some cases however, there
remains the souvenir of a legitimist but weaker cause. The
great advantage of the Government rule is its overwhelming
force, which can impose that great boon, stability. In my
opinion, what has been done should not be undone, but
abuses carefully pruned away. To do this, it is necessary at
one and the same time to respect the office of paramount
chief, but to carefully scrutinize the conduct of the holder of
this office, and where he proves unworthy, to punish him with
exemplary severity, even to the extent of ruthless deposition
and replacement.22
Successive governments of Sierra Leone, both colonial
and independent, have never really moved beyond this way
of thinking. Consequently, the contradictions of colonial
“indirect rule” continue to plague local governance. On the
one hand, the colonial authorities often spurned opportunities
for implementing socially progressive reforms in chiefdom
governance even when these had popular support. For
example, when the Sierra Leone Protectorate was first
established, the British authorities encouraged the principle
of hereditary succession to paramount chieftaincy, which
resulted in proliferation of local claims to “ruling house” status
(Barrows, 1977:80-2). Yet, strict hereditary succession to
chieftaincy represented a departure from pre-colonial tradition.
Sierra Leonean historians who have studied this era report
that pre-colonial chiefs often succeeded to office on the basis
of their personal qualities and the services they were able to
provide to local communities; not necessarily because they
were descended from previous chiefs (Abraham, 1978:274-
80). By the 1920s, increasingly fraught competition between
chiefdom ruling houses for the prize of paramount chieftaincy
had prompted the colonial authorities to experiment with
popular suffrage in paramount chieftaincy elections.
21. These measures were set out in the Protectorate Native Law
Ordinance of 1905.
22. Annual Report on the Northern Province for the Year 1922
(Freetown, Government Printing Department, 1922)
15
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Most of these experiments took place in the prosperous
Southern Province, where the spread of modern education and
wage employment was already beginning to foster more critical
public attitudes towards chieftaincy. Under these experiments,
British officials continued to meet with assessor chiefs and
chiefdom elders to identify chieftaincy aspirants with the best
hereditary credentials, but the final choice was put to a ballot of
the chiefdom people. In some cases, this ballot was restricted
to taxpayers (at that time, only family heads were registered for
the house tax) but in others it was open to every resident of a
chiefdom who attended the election meeting. Commenting on
these experiments in 1926, one British official noted that:
The four elections of Paramount Chiefs during the year
have been presided over by The Commissioner, Southern
Province, sitting with two assessor chiefs. Although bribery
and corruption will creep in at these elections...one receives
the definite impression this it is diminishing and that these
democratic elections have rightly superseded the intrigues
of an oligarchical nominating board sitting in camera. The
preliminary conferences held between the assessor chiefs and
the Tribal Authority, followed by an open election by houses [i.e.
taxpayers], is the one method open to the least objection and
is rapidly becoming recognized, appreciated and relied upon by
the people themselves.23
Yet the experiment was soon dropped. It was disliked by
chiefs and colonial officials, who feared that popular suffrage
in chieftaincy elections would threaten the patriarchal social
order they considered to be the foundation of “indirect rule”.
One colonial official warned that the experiments were already
providing young “upstarts” with opportunities to bribe their way
into power and warned against any policy that seeks to “graft
upon oligarchy [oligarchy = rule by a small elite group] principles
taken directly from a highly developed democracy but without
the safeguards that are essential for their safe working.”24
On the other hand, when the colonial authorities finally
conceded that chiefdom governance needed to be reformed
in order to keep pace with social and economic change in
the Protectorate, its precise strategy was to attempt to graft
new powers and functions onto chiefly oligarchies. A raft of
legislation, beginning in the late 1920s, added new powers and
functions to the governing councils of chiefdoms, then known
as Tribal Authorities. For example, the 1927 Protectorate Land
Ordinance assumed that all land in the provinces was “vested
in Tribal Authorities” and set about defining the conditions
under which external agencies (including the central state)
could lease chiefdom land. The Concessions Ordinance of
1931 granted Tribal Authorities the power to alienate land,
with government approval, in plots of up to 5,000 acres for
23. Annual Report on the Provincial Administration for the year 1926
(Freetown, Government Printing Department, 1927).
24. Annual Report on the Provincial Administration for the year 1925
(Freetown, Government Printing Department, 1926).
16
commercial cultivation. The Protectorate Ordinance of 1933
confirmed the Tribal Authority as the body that elects the
paramount chief, although it was silent on the constitution of
that body and the precise method for electing chiefs.
The key elements of this legislative programme were the
Native Administration ordinances, which were based on earlier
reforms instituted in the Gold Coast (Ghana) and Nigeria.25
These ordinances, passed in 1937, granted tax authority to Tribal
Authorities, provided for the creation of chiefdom treasuries
and charged Tribal Authorities with responsibility for drawing
up annual administrative budgets. Chiefs and chiefdom
functionaries were now to be paid salaries and obliged to waive
all rights to tribute. According to the Tribal Authorities Ordinance,
the primary duty of the Tribal Authority was “to maintain order
and good government in the area over which its authority
extends” and to “interpose for the purpose of preventing, and to
the best of its ability to prevent, the commission of any offence”.
It was the duty of native subjects ‘to do all that is reasonably
necessary” to give effect to any lawful order issued by their
chiefs. The Tribal Authority was also invested with powers to
prevent disturbances of the peace, environmental damage (e.g.
the pollution of water and the destruction of economic trees in
bush fires) and the spread of infectious diseases. It was also
empowered to compel chiefdom residents to register births
and deaths and cultivate land in order to ensure an adequate
supply of food. It was further empowered to pass bye-laws
pertaining to: a) the setting aside of land in or near a settlement
for development benefitting the community as a whole; b)
public services and amenities (e.g. slaughterhouses) provided
by the chiefdom authorities and fees in respect of these c) the
construction, repair and demolition of buildings in the chiefdom;
d) street and market trading in the chiefdom. 26
Remarkably, the new ordinances could not arrive at any
more precise definition of the Tribal Authority than: “the
Paramount Chief, the Chiefs, the councillors and men of note
elected by the people according to native law and custom.”
Visible again here is the extreme reluctance of the colonial
authorities to use statutory instruments to regulate institutions
deemed to be governed by “native law and custom”, whatever
new powers and functions were being attached to them.
Some concession to democratic principles was in fact made
by the inclusion of representatives of taxpayers on Tribal
Authorities (using a 1:40 ratio of Tribal Authority to taxpayers),
but this innovation was not itself a subject of legislation.
Rather, it was left to colonial officials on the ground to ensure
that ‘correct constitution’ of Tribal Authorities was achieved.27
25. Report by Mr. J.S. Fenton, O.B.E., District Commissioner, on a Visit
to Nigeria and on the Application of Principles of Native Administration
to the Protectorate of Sierra Leone (Freetown, Government Printing
Department, 1935).
26. Tribal Authorities Ordinance, 1937.
27. National Archives, London, CO267/679/2, H.R.R. Blood to Moyne,
30 April 1941.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
While the idea behind chiefdom tax was that the people Tribal Authorities also retained their primary functions in
could invest in their own development, almost all of chiefdom maintaining law and order, yet their capacity to perform even
revenue was, in practice, consumed by the salaries of chiefs these functions was called into question by growing civil
and chiefdom functionaries. This was a common problem unrest in rural areas in the late 1940s. Giving up rights to tribute
among “native administrations” in British colonial Africa in favour of fixed salaries had represented a loss of income for
(Kilson, 1966:24-33). In Sierra Leone, efforts to free up many Paramount Chiefs and some were continuing to collect
resources for development investment saw the amalgamation tribute even after they had agreed to institute the reform
of several small chiefdoms. The 217 chiefdoms existing in programme. These illegal demands provoked widespread
1937 were reduced to 148 by the time of independence in rioting and other forms of civil disobedience. Young men
1961.28 Some officials claimed at the time that chiefdom featured prominently in these protests, which prompted the
amalgamations were ‘restoring’ pre-colonial polities that had return of colonial anxieties that the old deference to chieftaincy
been broken up at the beginning of British rule to facilitate and patriarchy was breaking down. The administrative report on
the collection of colonial tax, although no effort was made to the Sierra Leone Protectorate for the year 1947 comments on
re-survey chiefdom boundaries.29 these riots as follows:
The inadequacy of this reform programme became clear
From all provinces complaints have come that [Paramount
within a decade of its inception. Chiefs’ implementation of the
Chiefs’] salaries are too low, but as long as the present
“native administration” reforms was kept discretionary in order
excessive number of chiefdom units continue it is impossible
to retain their support for the programme and 63 out of 199
to raise them appreciably with the result that there is always
chiefdoms remained unreformed at the end of 1948. These
a temptation for Paramount Chiefs to recoup themselves by
delays compromised the local services Tribal Authorities were
illicit means. Finding themselves unable to support the pomp
supposed to be managing, which by now included primary
and circumstance to which they feel themselves entitled, they
education and healthcare, agricultural extension and the
are all too apt to see a ready way out of their difficulties in the
construction and maintenance of local roads.
imposition of illegal levies, the holding of surreptitious courts,
The colonial government soon reached the conclusion
or the use of forced labour. Whether from a sense of loyalty
that, despite numerous chiefdom amalgamations, these
to the chiefdom, or from fear of the consequences, sufferers
units were too small and inefficiently run to succeed in the
from such abuses are generally slow in coming forward
role as service providers. New development investment was
with complaints until their grievances burst bounds and their
expected to come on stream after World War Two and the
disgruntlement becomes so widespread that only drastic
idea took hold that new institutions were required to manage
action can cure the ill.31
it. District Councils, originally a forum for chiefs, had already
been set up. Legislation passed in 1950 re-incorporated these The colonial government was therefore forced to return,
councils as elected local government bodies whose primary yet again, to the question of making chiefdom governance
duty was ‘to promote the development of the District and more democratic. For example, the annual report on the
the welfare of its people with the funds at its disposal’.30 Protectorate administration for 1948 notes that:
Furthermore, Local Tax Ordinance of 1954 provided for the
[Tribal Authorities] form the judicial and legislative body of the
replacement of the old government “house” tax with a
chiefdom and are the only political expression of the will of the
unified poll tax levied on all male residents of a chiefdom at
chiefdom. The oligarchic nature of this body has caused some
or over the apparent age of twenty-one years, plus any adult
misgiving and the importance of introducing younger and more
female carrying out a trade or business in the chiefdom. The
educated elements into it has long been realized.32
Tribal Authorities retained primary responsibility for collecting
this tax and other sources of local revenue (e.g. market dues
and hawkers’ licences), but the District Councils also claimed
a precept on revenues collected by the chiefdoms as part of
their own operating budgets.
28. The de-amalgamation of the Marampa and Masimera chiefdoms
shortly before the recent civil war raised the number of chiefdoms in
present day Sierra Leone to 149.
31. Annual Report on the Sierra Leone Protectorate for the year 1947
29. Report on the Sierra Leone Protectorate for the years 1949 and 1950 (Freetown, Government Printer, 1948)
(Freetown, Government Printer, 1952), p. 14.
32. Annual Report on the Sierra Leone Protectorate for the year 1948
30. District Councils Ordinance, 1950, section 14. (Freetown, Government Printer, 1949)
17
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Responding to a confidential query from the Colonial Office
in 1952, the Chief Commissioner for the Protectorate also
observed that:
..age might almost be said to be a necessary qualification
for membership of a Tribal Authority. Very few members are
probably under 40 years of age, and the only satisfactory way of
providing an opening for representatives of the more youthful
part of the community, would seem to be some form of popular
election. The question is one which requires a careful approach,
and even when the outline of such a development has been
agreed in principle, the arrangement and supervision of such
elections would still present plenty of difficulties. Nevertheless
it is in this direction that opinion is moving.33
Further outbreaks of rioting against chiefs in the Northern
Province in the mid-1950s finally prompted government action.
The Commission of Inquiry into these riots reported that not
least among the difficulties confronting the police (recently
deployed in the provinces) was the “existence in many areas
of a state of affairs better described as a civil war rather than a
disturbance”. Echoing the above noted administrative report for
1947, the Commissioners reported encountering:
 a degree of demoralisation among the people in their
…
customary institutions and in their approach to the statutory
duties with which they have been entrusted, which has
shocked us. Dishonesty has become accepted as a normal
ingredient of life to such an extent that no one has been
concerned to fight it or even complain about it. The ordinary
peasant or fisherman seems originally to have accepted a
degree of corruption which was tolerable; at a later stage he
has been cowed into accepting it; finally he has rebelled.34
The Commissioners recommended that Tribal Authorities
should be replaced by smaller and more representative bodies,
that chiefdoms should be allowed to deliver local services
(e.g. primary education and healthcare) rather than making all
social and development services the responsibility of District
Councils and that the District Councils should only use their
power of precept over local taxes for specific projects rather
than their general operating budgets.
These riots also highlighted the weakness of formal
institutions for administering justice and maintaining law and
order in the provinces. With chiefs controlling the local court
system, the only non-violent option available to ordinary people
seeking relief from injustices perpetrated by their chiefs was
to take complaints to officials of the colonial government. Yet
these officials still relied upon chiefs to keep order in
33. National Archives, London, CO554/242, secret report entitled
Tribal Authorities, 29 July 1952.
34. Government of Sierra Leone, Report of the Commission of Inquiry
into Disturbances in the Provinces (November 1955 to March 1956)
(London, 1956).
18
the countryside and were thus predisposed to treat these
complaints with scepticism (Barrows, 1971: 86-128). Justice
sector reform was in fact taking place in the provinces at the
time of the riots. The old District Commissioners’ Courts had
begun to be replaced by Magistrates Courts in the 1930s and
it had also become administrative policy to take Native Courts
out of Paramount Chiefs’ personal control and to appoint Court
Presidents to serve for limited terms. These Court Presidents
were elected by Tribal Authorities, subject to the approval of the
Provincial Commissioner. Uniformed police were deployed into
the provinces for the first time in 1954, replacing the old Court
Messenger service.
Yet the old legal dualisms of “indirect rule” were still
preserved in practice. The original government policy on the
uniformed police was that Tribal Authorities should retain
primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in rural
areas and that the police should concentrate on the urban
and mining areas where customary authority was weaker
and “non-natives” most likely to congregate.35 In 1959, the
chiefdoms went on to acquire their own dedicated police
force, charged with responsibility for detecting crime,
apprehending offenders, serving summonses and enforcing
orders issued by the Chiefdom Council. Yet, the Chiefdom
Police were never considered part of the national police
service and received no formal training from them. Rather,
they were trained at the District Offices and came under
the supervision of District Watch Committees comprising
of the District Officer (equivalent of the colonial District
Commissioner) and representatives from the uniformed
police and Chiefdom Councils in the district (Bondi 1976:65).
Reforms directed specifically at Tribal Authorities in the
wake of the riots were equally conservative. The Commission
of Inquiry’s recommendations concerning the relationship
between chiefdoms and District Councils were largely
ignored. In 1956, however, a sub-committee of the recently
Africanised Executive Council issued new instructions
regarding the composition of Tribal Authorities (Box 1).36
The instructions also cover chieftaincy elections and state
that only candidates descended from a ruling house may
stand for election as paramount chiefs and that descent
from a ruling house means descent in the male line from a
Paramount Chief, or a full brother of a Paramount Chief, who
has previously been recognized as a Paramount Chief of
the same chiefdom. It is also stated that “where tradition or
other circumstances make this advisable, permission may be
sought from the Governor in Council to depart from this rule”.
35. Government of Sierra Leone, The Introduction of the Police Force
into the Protectorate (Freetown, Government Printer, 1954).
36. The Sierra Leone government’s only surviving copy of the original
instructions, dating from 1958, is currently stored in the Provincial
Secretary’s Office in Kenema. Originally labelled a Secret Policy File,
it has since been made accessible to researchers and consultants.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
The Composition of Tribal Authorities
(1956 Guidelines)
1. The New Tribal Authority List will consist of:
a. The Paramount Chief, Acting Chief or Regent Chief,
speakers, section chiefs and section speakers and any
other customary officials who by virtue of their office are
included in the present Tribal Authority list.
b. The headmen of towns of 20 or more taxpayers.
c. One representative for every twenty tax payers in any
town additional to the first twenty.
d. One representative of neighbouring villages of less than
20 tax payers where such villages agree to group into units
of not less than twenty tax payers.
2. The appointment of representatives in paragraph 1(c) and
1(d) will be by vote of the taxpayers within the town or villages
and the representative shall be a taxpayer in the village or
group of villages which he is elected to represent.
3) In large towns, where sections are established under
recognized heads responsible for the collection of tax within
the section, each section will be regarded as a separate town
for the purpose of electing representatives under paragraphs
1(b) and (c) above.
4) Villages of less than 20 taxpayers unable to group under
paragraph 1(d) will lose their right of representation. Grouping
may only take place within sections of a chiefdom.
Source: Secret Policy File: EP/3/2 Election of Paramount
Chiefs, Provincial Secretary’s Office, Kenema.
Given the prevailing unrest in the provinces, these
instructions were remarkably conservative and not obviously
designed to “provide an opening for representatives of the
more youthful part of the community.” Amendments to
CAP 61 of the Laws of Sierra Leone (1960), passed after
Independence, established the legal status of elected Tribal
Authority members representing taxpayers on a ratio of 1:20
and of Tribal Authority members appointed directly by central
government. But the bulk of these instructions were treated
as “policy” and not passed into law. One set of the original
instructions survived the civil war in the Provincial Secretary’s
Office in Kenema. It is included in a file containing extensive
internal government correspondence on policy in relation to
chieftaincy elections. One of these discussion documents is
an essay written by Paramount Chief Kai Samba I of Nongowa
chiefdom in the early 1950s. PC Kai Samba was renowned
during his lifetime for his progressive political views. In his
essay he strongly advocated the re-introduction of taxpayer
suffrage in all chieftaincy elections, arguing that it was an
essential instrument for fighting bribery and corruption. The
government did not take up his suggestions. A Provincial
Secretary, commenting on the late Chief’s recommendations
in 1964, argued that taxpayers would constitute a large
electorate and thus “introduce the danger of mob rule” in
chieftaincy elections.37
The 1956 instructions were to govern procedure in
chieftaincy elections for the next 40 years. They went on to
serve as a basis for new guidelines broadcast (but again not
passed into law) by the government of President Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah in 2002.
1.2 Post-Colonial Patronage Politics
and Legislative Stagnation
The government’s cautious and somewhat secretive approach
towards reforms in chiefdom governance in the second half
of the 1950s was politically motivated. The Krio business and
professional elite of the old Sierra Leone Colony had long
considered themselves the group best equipped to govern
an independent Sierra Leone. But when the old Colony and
Protectorate where fully united under a single constitution in
1951, the balance of power shifted towards an emerging elite
of Protectorate origin, many of whom were educated members
of chiefly families. This new elite saw themselves as having a
greater right to govern Sierra Leone than the Krios because they
were the descendants of the country’s original African rulers.
Uniting under the banner of the SLPP, they took advantage
of the former Protectorate’s bigger population to win Sierra
Leone’s first national elections in 1957. The new government,
led by Prime Minster (later Sir) Milton Margai, remained fiercely
protective of chiefs’ interests, especially after Krio politicians
started to win bye-elections in riot-torn provincial constituencies
(Kilson, 1966: Cartwright, 1970; Clapham, 1982).
This protective attitude was made clear in the government’s
response to the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the
1955-56 riots. The government acknowledged that chiefs
had to put their house in order and move with the times,
but was more inclined to put the blame for the riots on the
“unsettlement following upon the [Second World] war, the
decline in moral standards in general and the undermining of
respect for law and order following on widespread discoveries
of diamonds and the economic consequences.” These factors,
the government claimed, had caused people in the south to
“detest and resent as extortion and oppression practices
which they had previously accepted as part of the custom
and the rights of their Chiefs”. People in the north, it went on,
had inculcated a similar attitude as a result of contact with
southerners during seasonal labour migration.38
37. Memo, PS Southern Province to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry
of the Interior, Freetown, 22 September 1964. Secret Policy File: EP/3/2
Election of Paramount Chiefs, Provincial Secretary’s Office, Kenema.
38. Statement of the Sierra Leone Government on the Report of the
Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in the Protectorate (November
1955-March 1956), (Freetown, Government Printer, 1956).
19
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
It may not have been the Margai government’s original
intention to use chieftaincy as an instrument of patronage
politics, but the combination of the highly centralized state
system bequeathed by the British, the persistence of rural
underdevelopment and the rise of party politics, virtually
guaranteed that outcome in the post-independence era.
As patronage politics took hold, formal government policy
on chiefdom affairs began to grind to a standstill and many
colonial laws were simply left on the statute. For example,
the 1927 Protectorate Land Ordinance and 1931 Concessions
Ordinance were incorporated into the Laws of Sierra Leone
(1960) as the Provinces Land Act (Cap 122) and Concessions
Act (Cap 120). The 1933 Protectorate Ordinance and 1937
Tribal Authorities Ordinance were likewise incorporated as the
Provinces Act (Cap 60) and Tribal Authorities Act (Cap 61).
Among these laws, only the Tribal Authorities Act
was amended after Independence. The bulk of these
amendments, enacted in one package in 1964, changed the
name of the chiefdom’s governing council from that of Tribal
Authority to Chiefdom Council and provided for the formal
recognition of the Chiefdom Committee as the executive
arm of the Chiefdom Council. According to the amendments,
the Chiefdom Committee membership comprised of
the Paramount Chief (Chairman), senior Speaker (Vice-
Chairman), the second Speaker (if any), two members from
each District Council ward in the chiefdom elected by the
chiefdom councillors, and a literate councillor nominated by
the local government Minister. The original idea behind ward
representatives had been to make elected District Councillors
ex officio members of Chiefdom Committees, but this was
watered down due to fears that councillors would interfere
politically in chiefdom affairs (Kilson, 1966:220).
Chiefdom Committees were originally formed on an ad
hoc basis in the mid-1950s as the government had began to
realize that (as the Commission of Inquiry into the 1955-56
riots had pointed out) including taxpayer representatives
on Tribal Authorities often made these bodies too large to
operate effectively as governing councils (Bondi, 1976:32).
The primary functions of the Chiefdom Committee, according
to the 1964 amendments, were: a) to prepare chiefdom
budgets and inspect chiefdom accounts on a regular basis;
b) negotiate contracts with external agencies; c) ensure
the proper collection of local revenues; d) approve the
appointment of chiefdom employees; e) devise chiefdom
bye-laws for consideration by the chiefdom council; f)
advise the chiefdom council generally on chiefdom affairs
and perform any other duties as may be delegated to it by
the Chiefdom Council. The Chiefdom Council remained
the legally recognized governing body of a chiefdom, and
continued to serve as an electoral college in paramount
chieftaincy elections.
20
Unfortunately, the establishment of unelected Chiefdom
Committees clearly undermined what had been the primary
rationale for introducing taxpayer representation on Tribal
Authorities/Chiefdom Councils in the first place: i.e. greater
public participation in chiefdom governance. The effect of
this amendment, whatever its drafters may have intended,
was to strengthen chiefly oligarchies (Viswasam, 1972:31).
From the very beginning, most ward representatives on
Chiefdom Committees were in fact Section Chiefs and they
continued to sit on these committees after the abolition of
the original District Councils in 1972. The amendments to the
original Tribal Authorities Act represent the last major piece
of legislation specifically focussing on chieftaincy prior to the
drafting of the Chieftaincy Act of 2009.
The trend towards increasing central government
control over chiefdom affairs in the post-colonial era was
also visible in the justice sector. The Local Courts Act, 1963,
finally jettisoned the distinction between “native” and “non-
native” in the administration of justice by replacing the old
Native Courts with Local Courts. The new courts retained
complete jurisdiction over customary law cases but were
also given the power to administer both civil and criminal law
in certain cases (e.g. debt recovery, disputes over property
ownership, petty larceny and assault) provided that the
value of disputed proprieties and the magnitude of crimes
(as measured by the punishments appropriate to them)
fell below specified thresholds. The Local Courts now had
jurisdiction over specific territories (usually chiefdoms or
sections of chiefdoms) rather than categories of persons and
their decisions could be appealed to the higher courts. Under
the Act, Court Presidents and Vice-Presidents were formally
appointed by the “Minister” responsible for the Local Courts
on the recommendation of Chiefdom Councils. Lesser court
functionaries (i.e. clerks and bailiffs) and Court Members
(local elders serving as advisors to the Local Court in return
for a nominal fee) were appointed directly by Chiefdom
Councils. The exercise of judicial power within the primary
jurisdiction of a Local Court was also outlawed. This provision
effectively rendered chiefs’ exercise of judicial authority
illegal, notwithstanding their unreformed statutory powers to
prevent the commission of offences and to ensure, generally,
that law and order prevailed in their chiefdoms.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
A government memo circulated to Provincial Secretaries in 1965
alleged that most Court Presidents were either close relatives
of Paramount Chiefs, and thus biased towards chiefs’ interests
in their judgements, or political rivals of Paramount Chiefs (i.e.
members of rival Ruling Houses) intent on using their mandates
as elected functionaries to challenge Paramount Chiefs’
authority (Barrows, 1971:144). Following this memo, authority to
nominate Court Presidents (later known as Court Chairmen) was
transferred from Chiefdom Councils to an ad hoc Local Court
Service Commission (LCSC), comprising of the Judicial Advisor
from the Ministry of Justice, the Provincial Secretary, the District
Officer and the Paramount Chief of the chiefdom concerned.
However, when Siaka Stevens’ APC regime came to power
in 1968 it became commonplace for central government to
appoint party activists as Local Court Chairmen, often with
no regard to the literacy and residency qualifications attached
to the position and contrary to the recommendations of the
LCSC. The Stevens government’s interest in using the Local
Courts as an instrument of political control was emphasised
in an amendment to the Local Courts Act passed in 1974. This
amendment clarified the definition of “Minister” in the original
Act to mean the “Minister responsible for the Interior”: a
security-orientated portfolio that included local government.
One researcher working in Sierra Leone at the time reported
that in the south in particular, APC supporters would usually
take their cases to Local Courts run by APC-appointed Court
Chairmen while SLPP supporters would usually take their
cases to Paramount Chiefs (Barrows, 1971:145). As the central
state began to unravel in the 1980s, responsibility to nominate
Local Court Chairmen defaulted back to Paramount Chiefs,
although the legislation remained unchanged.
The fundamental problem with the 1963 Act and subsequent
amendments was that it conserved the dualistic legal system
Sierra Leone had inherited from colonial “indirect rule” (Maru,
2005). For example, the Act provided the Local Courts with
jurisdiction over cases pertaining to the estates of deceased
persons when these were governed by customary law
(especially where chiefdom land was involved), but withdrew
this jurisdiction when such cases were governed by modern
law. In practice, matching a particular civil case to a particular
system of law always depended on which authorities – i.e.
Paramount Chiefs and Local Courts or Police and Magistrates’
Court – the case was brought to in the first instance. It remains
commonplace today for plaintiffs and defendants to manoeuvre
to have a case heard in whichever court they believe will offer
the best chance of a favourable verdict. Wealthy, well-educated
and politically well connected people have always enjoyed a
considerable advantage in such “justice shopping” (Fanthorpe,
2001). The suppressive effects of legal dualism on rural Sierra
Leoneans’ aspirations towards modernity and self-development
are as apparent today as they were in the above-noted
administrative report dating from 1914.39
39. See page 10, footnote 22.
The trend towards centralized control over chiefdom
governance continued further after the abolition of the District
Councils. These bodies had been a success at first, but after
a decade of operation they became severely hampered by
financial constraints. Overseas development grants had
come to an end in 1955 and government grants for capital
development and road maintenance became increasingly
unreliable. By the mid-1960s, many chiefdoms were
regularly defaulting on their precepts. Cut backs in services
and capital projects were unavoidable and some councils
saw their functions taken over by central government. The
councils were also undermined by patronage politics. Many
councillors remained loyal to their chiefdoms of origin and
competed to divert council resources to these localities.
Party political supporters were also given preferential
access to administrative jobs in the councils and external
contracts. Prodigious unauthorized expenditure was a regular
occurrence in all councils and repeated allegations of financial
mismanagement prompted frequent suspensions of council
business (Tangri, 1978b).
In 1970, the Stevens government set up a Local
Government Review Commission to analyse the local
government system. The Committee’s main recommendations
with regard to local structures were: a) both the Chiefdoms
and District Councils should be retained but must be
re-organized and improved; b) the Local Courts should come
under the supervision of the Chief Justice; c) the Chiefdom
Police should be gradually replaced by the state police; d) a
Local Government Service Commission should be set up to
control appointments; e) there should be a significant increase
in local taxes as soon as there was a “climate of opinion”
favourable to such increases (Bondi, 1976:7-8). However, the
Stevens government chose to abolish the District Councils and
ignored all the other recommendations.40 The law establishing
the District Councils was formally suspended in January 1972.
In a presidential address to parliament in June 1973,
President Stevens stated that it was his “government’s
intention to strengthen Chiefdom Administrations so that they
will play a significant role in our economic, social, and political
development”.At that time, the government was giving serious
consideration to using the Chiefdom Police as the basis for a
new internal security force. Many Chiefdom Police officers
were deployed in their home areas and the government’s
strategy was to take advantage of their local knowledge.
Ultimately however, Stevens opted for a modern paramilitary
force (Internal Security Unit, later renamed Special Security
Division), trained by Cuban and Chinese expatriates and served
by a vast network of local informers (Bondi, 1976:65-7).
40. In an interview in November 2005, the Director of Local Government
in the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development
stated that all copies of the final report of this Local Government Review
Commission had been lost.
21
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone

The Stevens government also commissioned a United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) study on chiefdom
governance with a view to making chiefdom institutions fit for
purpose as local government bodies and service providers.
The report, which appeared in 1972, was scathing about
the continuing dominance of policy inherited from colonial
“indirect rule” in Sierra Leone. The basis of this critique was
that the maintenance of law and order is really a central
government function and one that the centre should support
financially even when delegating it to the chiefdoms:
The principle of using traditional authorities and
customary law for the maintenance of social cohesion
is unexceptionable. The difficulties however arose from
the policy, quite unrelated to the above principle, that the
traditional authorities must also maintain themselves
out of local revenues. With the growing need of the rural
communities for welfare services two options were open
to the colonial government, either to set up a separate local
body in the chiefdom and transfer to it the local revenue
or to confer local government functions on the existing
authorities and take over financial liability for the law and
order function. Neither course was adopted. Instead local
functions were imposed on the chiefdoms in addition to the
law and order function and the local revenues proved to be
quite insufficient to sustain both. The colonial government
attempted to meet this problem by a system of local
government grants which resulted in the illogical position
whereby chiefdoms subsidised a central government
function and the central government subsidised local
government functions. The fact that the Chiefdom
Council was incapable of functioning as a local body and
that the Chiefdom Committee, left to itself, was equally
ineffective appears to have been lost sight of. In any case,
the Chiefdom Committee had neither the resources nor
the organization necessary for a local authority. When the
inevitable failure resulted, obsession with theory dictated
the establishment of District Councils without sufficient
consideration of whether the conditions necessary for the
growth of a second tier of rural local government existed.
The conferment of precepting powers on District Councils
and the subsequent diversion of government’s attention
away from the chiefdoms (so far as local government
functions were concerned) led to the present degenerate
state of chiefdom local government (Viswasam, 1972:41).
The report went on to make four key recommendations for
reforming chiefdom governance: a) the Chiefdom Committee,
not the Chiefdom Council, should be recognized as the
local authority of the chiefdom, with the Chiefdom Council
serving only as an electoral college in paramount chieftaincy
elections; b) the Chiefdom Committee should become a
legally constituted local government body with clearly defined
roles and responsibilities; c) most seats on the Chiefdom
Committee should, in the course of time, become elective; d)
central government should assume full financial responsibility
for the chiefdoms’ law and order function, paying the salaries
of Paramount chiefs, Chiefdom Police and Local Court
functionaries (Viswasam, 1972:69-70).
None of these recommendations were implemented.
On the contrary, the Stevens regime set about the further
strengthening of central government control over rural
administration. A series of amendments to the law on local
tax (notably the Chiefdom Treasuries Amendment Act of
1975) saw chiefdom finances placed under the full control of
the District Offices. The rate of local tax was fixed nationally,
and Chiefdom Committees could not instruct their Treasury
Clerks to draw salaries and expenses from chiefdom bank
accounts. Instead, Treasury Clerks were obliged to submit
vouchers to the Central Chiefdom Finance Clerks (CCFCs),
who were employees of central government working
out of the District Offices. Under the new arrangements,
the CCFCs controlled a Consolidated Revenue Fund for
all chiefdoms in a district. In the mid-1970s, the Auditor
General’s office issued a series of damning reports on the
management of these accounts, but the auditing process
itself had petered out by the end of that decade in a general
climate of de-bureaucratization (Clapham, 1976).
These changes effectively stripped away the last
vestiges of local government and service functionality from
the chiefdoms. In theory, Chiefdom Councils continued
to employ numerous salaried functionaries, which
included Local Court staff, Chiefdom Police, the Treasury
Clerk, revenue collectors, sanitary inspectors, Traditional
Birth Attendants and labourers. Many salaries of lesser
functionaries were not sufficient to cover living costs and
chiefdom work was often combined with farming or other
sources of income. They nevertheless had a considerable
symbolic value as rewards from “government” for public
service. In the 1980s, as Sierra Leone’s economy declined
and bureaucratic corruption became rife, salary payments
to chiefdom functionaries became increasingly intermittent.
Central government grants-in-aid to chiefdom administrations
continued, but the funds that actually reached the chiefdoms
were mainly used to settle arrears in Paramount Chiefs’
salaries. Many chiefdom functionaries, especially Chiefdom
Police, left their posts during this era (Fanthorpe, 2001). Those
that remained would often demand fees for their services from
ordinary people in lieu of regular salaries (Fanthorpe 2004a,
2004b). Local Court staff also converted judicial fees and
fines into private income (Conciliation Resources, 2000).
Like the Margai government thirty years earlier, the
Stevens’ government’s unwillingness to reform the
chieftaincy system was driven by politics. Stevens had
come to power pledging to introduce a ‘socialist pattern
of society’ and thus a stronger state. Yet his main political
strategy was to use the regulatory authority of the state
as a coercive instrument, taking advantage of the heavy
concentration of population and capital-generating activity
in Freetown and the mining areas. By co-opting all branches
of the executive, Stevens was able to distribute mining
licenses, import-export licenses and government contracts as
political favours. Laws and regulations were relaxed to favour
political supporters, yet rigorously enforced whenever it was
considered necessary to exclude rivals or punish dissent.
For the most part, Stevens left local political factions to fight
amongst themselves for the largesse his regime occasionally
saw fit to distribute. Yet, the success of this ‘shadow state’
strategy also depended on the excluded masses remaining
poor and politically divided and upon chieftaincy remaining an
effective instrument for maintaining social order among these
excluded populations (Clapham, 1982; Reno, 1995). As Sierra
Leone descended towards civil war, the conservation of
unreformed chieftaincy institutions seemed more and more
like a cynical strategy for insulating the governing elite from
popular accountability.
By the time war broke out in 1991, what little formal
administrative activity still taking place in the chiefdoms was
directly controlled by central government. Senior District
Officers and Provincial Secretaries continued to preside
over paramount chieftaincy elections and revise Chiefdom
Councillor lists every few years. Local tax continued to be
paid, despite the fact that it yielded scant returns in the
form of services. Indeed, most of the essential services
(particularly health and primary education) accessible to
rural people remained heavily dependent on the charity of
foreign religious missions and development NGOs. Even
so, there were other compelling reasons for local people to
carry on paying tax. First, it helped to ensure that their home
villages were represented on the Chiefdom Council and thus
provided them with a chance of influencing the outcome of
paramount chieftaincy elections. Second, rural travellers were
frequently asked to produce their local tax receipts at police
checkpoints on the main roads. These receipts consequently
became markers of local citizenship (Ferme, 1998).
1.3 Lessons from History for a New
Programme of Chieftaincy Reform
The history of government policy towards chieftaincy in
the 20th century contains some valuable lessons for a
new programme of chieftaincy reform. First, successive
governments of Sierra Leone, both colonial and post-colonial,
have always supported an authoritarian model of chieftaincy,
believing oligarchy to be necessary for the maintenance of
law and order. This authoritarian model overlooks the vital
role played by cooperation and consensus in maintaining
social order at the grassroots. These attributes of traditional
governance have been emphasized in numerous academic
studies. For example, some academics have argued that
cooperation is driven by the needs of economic survival in
remote rural areas (e.g. Richards, 1986). Other commentators
have focussed on cultural ideas that portray chiefs as pivots
of community life, who should ideally know all of their people
personally, be ready to supply wise advice when needed
and use their skills in public speaking to “cool hearts” when
disputes arise (e.g. Finnegan, 1963). One study has gone so
far as to argue that conflict arises in rural communities when
key decisions are made of the basis of technical-rational
criteria – e.g. allocating development resources on the basis of
population statistics and poverty assessments and choosing
political leaders by means of modern, winner-takes-all elections
– rather than the traditional modality of “hanging heads” and
reaching decisions through consensus (Ferme, 1998).
Whenever governments have been faced with evidence
that the authoritarian model of chieftaincy creates conflict, their
habitual response has been to put the blame on the protestors:
e.g. the young “upstarts” allegedly exploiting a widened
franchise in chieftaincy elections in the 1920s; the anti-chief
rioters in the 1950s whose actions were allegedly a symptom of
a “decline in moral standards” caused by the diamond mining
boom; the fears of “mob rule” in the 1960s that precluded
official consideration of full taxpayer suffrage in paramount
chieftaincy elections. Governments have also promoted this
conservative way of thinking for overtly political ends. For
example, the government of Sir Milton Margai was desperate
to circumvent a political alliance between the Freetown Krios
and provincial anti-chief protestors, while the Stevens regime
was keen to keep the rural masses beholden to chiefs while it
stripped the nation of its assets. The recent civil war presents
yet further evidence that the authoritarian model of chieftaincy
creates conflict. The failings of chiefdom governance may not
have been a direct cause of the war, but frequent attacks on
chiefs and chiefdom buildings (especially Court Barrays and
Treasury Clerks’ offices) are indicative of the depths of popular
resentment towards chiefdom authorities that had built up
in some areas. If chiefs are going to return to their traditional
communitarian roles as the TRC Report recommends, the
authoritarian model of chieftaincy will simply have to go.

22 23
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Second, successive governments’ determination not to
compromise “native law and custom” often meant that
when reforms did take place, they lacked coherence and
sustainability. For example, the “native administration”
reforms of the 1930s sought to add local government
functions to Tribal Authorities without any real consideration
of whether these bodies had the capacity to manage these
functions. Furthermore, taxpayer representatives were
originally included in Tribal Authorities with the intention of
making these bodies more democratic. Yet the expanded
Tribal Authorities became too large to function effectively as
decision-making forums and their key administrative functions
were eventually transferred to self-recruiting Chiefdom
Committees. The original objective of introducing democratic
principles in chiefdom governance was thus undermined.
Another approach was to introduce new institutions to satisfy
those social groups (e.g. miners and wage workers) that were
now demanding modern governance yet leave chiefdom
institutions intact to serve everyone else. That policy created
two overlapping systems of justice and the institutional
separation of local revenue collection (chiefdoms) from
service delivery (District Councils).
Furthermore, central governments have often, due
to politics, ignored perfectly logical and reasonable
recommendations for improving chiefdom-level governance.
For example, proposals to introduce full taxpayer suffrage
in paramount chieftaincy elections, and consultancy reports
advocating for the incorporation of Chiefdom Committees
as local government bodies, the introduction of an elective
element to Chiefdom Committees and the integration of
the Chiefdom Police into the national police service, have
all fallen on deaf ears. Clearly, the primary objective of any
future reform must be the creation of a fully integrated local
government system. Here, the question should not be how
local government can co-exist with traditional authority, but
how the unique qualities of chieftaincy (e.g. championing
community interests and resolving disputes) and can be put
to best use in local government.
Third, the British authorities arrogated to themselves the
task of supervising chiefdom governance, which meant that,
in the final analysis, colonial interpretations of “native law
and custom” always enjoyed priority over the interpretations
of chiefs and their people. Since “native law and custom”
could not, by definition, be regulated directly by the statute,
the colonial authorities effectively licensed themselves to
intervene in chiefdom affairs whenever they saw fit. It was in
this context that the Sierra Leonean historian Arthur Abraham
argued that there was never a coherent colonial policy
towards the chieftaincy system in Sierra Leone, merely a
series of ad hoc administrative interventions (Abraham, 1978).
24
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
2. Talking About Chieftaincy in Sierra Leone Today
The politicisation of chieftaincy in the post-colonial era saw
successive governments, the Stevens regime in particular,
revive the old colonial technique of controlling chieftaincy affairs
by means of administrative fiat (i.e. orders issued from an office
with executive or managerial authority under the guise of policy,
without necessarily having the force of law). With the statute
left largely unreformed, politically motivated interventions in
chiefdom governance were thus kept insulated from legal and
democratic challenge. Given the extent of government-led
changes to chiefdom governance since the earliest colonial
times, there can be little justification for opposing a present-
day reform programme on the grounds that it contravenes
“tradition”. Clearly however, legislative reforms aimed at making
chiefdom governance more accountable, just, respecting
of human rights and effective in delivering services and
development inputs must also aim to protect chiefs and rural
people from excessive and unaccountable central government
interference in their affairs. Culture and customary law will still
play an important role in rural life in the foreseeable future, but
the notion that the chiefdoms represent a separate sphere of
governance, regulated entirely by customary law, has no place
in a modern state. Like colonial “indirect rule”, it should be left Young woman voicing her concerns about the lack of popular
participation in Paramount Chieftaincy Elections; MCSL Community
behind in history. Dialogue Session, Kailahun District
The following analysis of the views of different stakeholders rural areas remain unwritten and the point being made here
on chieftaincy issues in present-day Sierra Leone is organized was that people continue to rely on chiefs to authorize their
according to the priority principles set out in the introduction: rights, prevent outside agencies from infringing upon them,
Accountability and Good Governance, Justice and Human and resolve disputes over them. The other side of this moral
Rights and Taxation and Representation. In recent years, senior contract is that chiefs are expected to commit themselves fully
members of the Sierra Leonean government have called the to the welfare of their communities and be involved in their
outputs of NGO-facilitated community consultations into day-to-day affairs.
question, expressing concerns that participants are merely Unlike chiefs at the village level, Paramount Chiefs cannot
responding to the promptings of foreign-trained facilitators.41 In possibly know all their subjects personally. Here however, the
order to answer these misgivings, outcomes of consultations moral contract takes on a symbolic character. As members
and interviews are linked to a broader contextual analysis of of Ruling Houses, Paramount Chiefs claim descent from pre-
post-war chieftaincy politics, illustrated with case studies. colonial rulers who authorized the original land and residence
rights of the ancestors of present-day chiefdom people. In
2.1 Accountability and Good Governance principle therefore, rights to chieftaincy are interlinked with
subjects’ social and economic rights and chiefs’ are expected
2.1.1 The Moral Contract between Chiefs and People
to respect subjects’ rights like their own. Another feature of
Applying the principle of accountability to relations between
that moral contract is that Paramount Chiefs are expected to
chiefs and their subjects might appear problematic, given that
serve as patrons of cultural activities in their chiefdoms, e.g.
Paramount Chiefs’ primary claim to rule is their hereditary right.
initiation ceremonies, funerals of Sub-Chiefs and other “big-
However, many rural people still consider chiefs to be bound by
men”, secret society masquerades and sacrifices to ancestral
a moral contract with them. During earlier fieldwork in 2002-
and non-human spirits that are believed to protect the welfare
03, one of the authors of this report asked several gatherings
of the chiefdom. There is more at stake here than mere
of chiefdom residents what attribute of chieftaincy was, in their
adherence to “tradition”, since these cultural activities also
view, the most important. The answer most frequently given
serve to reproduce chiefdoms as political communities within
was that “a chief knows a person’s right” (Fanthorpe, 2006).
a modern state still dominated by patronage politics. Public
Many social and economic rights (especially rights to land) in
trust in elected politicians, bureaucrats and security services
has still to recover from the rampant corruption of the pre-war
41. This view was strongly expressed by former Minster of Youth and
Sports Dennis Bright in an interview with a DFID research mission in years and the abject failure of the central authorities to protect
March 2003. civilians during the RUF war.
25
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Many rural people still consider Paramount Chiefs as the
authorities most likely to champion the interests of their
communities within government and to direct scarce services
and development resources back home. In a village discussion
group about a forthcoming chieftaincy election in Port Loko
District in October 2002, a male participant observed that:
A Paramount Chief has the right to stand firm and do
something better for the people. We are expecting that our
new chief will talk to the government for us. All messages from
government come through the Paramount Chief. A Paramount
Chief is the “people’s representative” in government.
An elderly female participant responded to this observation
by pointing out that:
 ur new chief should not be a chief that government imposes.
O Council list, based on the 2002 tax assessment, also allocated
If we have a Paramount Chief we can call our own, we will
make any number of sacrifices to work for him.
This moral contract also emerged strongly in a consultation
exercise commissioned by the DFID-funded Chiefdom
Governance Reform Programme (CGRP).42 For example,
according to one workshop report, participants identified
“service to their people” and “implementing the law for the
benefit of the people” as chiefs’ main responsibilities. They
also recommended that “politicians should keep their hands
off local administration”. In another workshop, participants
identified “protecting the chiefdom people from molestation
and other inhumane treatment from the hands of police and
other law enforcement agencies” as a leading responsibility
for Paramount Chiefs, while in a third workshop, participants
reported that a Paramount Chief must “love his/her subjects
without fear or favour”,“always protect the rights of citizens”
and “be honest in all dealings with the government authorities
for the welfare of his/her people.” In a fourth report, the
facilitators observed that the Paramount Chief had been
imposed on the chiefdom by the Stevens regime. They went
on to note that it was a local custom to invite newly elected
Paramount Chiefs to serve as patrons of local Wunde society
initiations, which enabled them to collect ceremonial offerings
thus recoup their election expenses. However, this Paramount
Chief had never once been invited to serve as a Wunde patron
during his twenty-five year rule.43
42. Between 1999 and 2001, the CGRP hosted workshops on
chieftaincy issues in more than seventy chiefdoms in southern and
central Sierra Leone. The project was original called the Paramount
Chiefs Restoration Programme, but the name was changed in its
second and final year of operation.
43. CGRP workshop reports for Kongbora Chiefdom, (May 2000),
Valunya Chiefdom (July 2000), Malen Chiefdom (June 2000) and
Gbo Chiefdom (May 2000). These workshop reports were originally
stored in the Paramount Chiefs Restoration Unit, Governance Reform
Secretariat at the Ministry of Presidential Affairs. This unit is now
closed, but copies of the reports are still held by the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, Local Government and Rural Affairs.
26
As this last example indicates, many of the cultural
institutions that serve to integrate chiefdoms as political
communities are fiercely protected from encroachment by
the central state and other outside agencies. Illiterate farmers
are well aware that government is dominated by highly
educated people who know modern laws and bureaucratic
procedures far better than they do. Since they can’t compete
on these terms, they use their cultural resources as political
weapons. As one Sierra Leonean NGO manager observed:
“the one thing an illiterate man can use to fight back against
corrupt politicians is his culture”.44 Another group of NGO
fieldworkers made similar observations when discussing
how difficult it remains to raise the topic of chieftaincy reform
in some isolated villages. The Poro society, they noted, is
still strongly involved in chieftaincy affairs in southern Sierra
Leone and decides certain cases in the bush where no
woman is allowed to enter. As one fieldworker observed,
“these things they hold firm to their chests and we could not
work in the chiefdoms if people thought we were coming to
destroy them.”45
2.1.2 Case Study: The Biriwa Chieftaincy Election
Crisis of 2006 46
Central government interference in chieftaincy elections
continues to provoke local outrage and the Biriwa chieftaincy
election crisis of 2006 is a notable case in point. The majority
of the chiefdom’s population are Limba speakers, but
substantial numbers of “stranger” Mandingo and Fula also
reside in the area. These two ethnic groups specialized,
historically, in long distance trading and livestock herding
and their populations are scattered widely throughout Sierra
Leone and neighbouring countries. While many present-day
Paramount Chiefs in Sierra Leone acknowledge Mandingo
or Fula ancestry, there are no Mandingo or Fula chiefdoms
as such. Biriwa contains Karina town, one of the oldest
Mandingo settlements in rural Sierra Leone. Karina has its
own section with seventeen large settlements. A second
Mandingo section, Balandugu, has eight villages. The Limba
speakers reside in the seven remaining sections, which
have more than two hundred villages. However, by virtue of
their trading speciality the Mandingo of Biriwa are in regular
contact with fellow Mandingo living elsewhere in Sierra
Leone and many of these people regard Karina town as an
ancestral home. The Mandingo population with an interest in
Biriwa chieftaincy politics is thus considerably larger than that
which is normally resident in the chiefdom at any one time.
44. Interview, Victor Kalie Kamara, Community Action for Progress
(CAP), Rokupr, November 2002.
45. Interview, NMJD fieldworkers, Bo, November 2008.
46. This case study is based on field research carried out by Richard
Fanthorpe during numerous visits to Biriwa Chiefdom between April
2003 and February 2009.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Bombali District has long been a heartland of APC support.
Inflated Tax Assessments, Biriwa Chiefdom
Bumban, the historic Biriwa capital, is the hometown of two
Post-war tax assessment in Biriwa chiefdom began in 2002.
leading APC members: a former Minister who now sits on the
The total number of tax payers assessed in the chiefdom
party’s executive committee and the current party Treasurer.
in 2002 was 8,782 as compared to 4,263 in 1985, a rise of
Kamabai, the present-day chiefdom capital, is the hometown
106%. Yet, according to census data, the population of the
of the APC Chairman of Bombali District Council and the
chiefdom grew by a mere 8% between 1985 and 2004.
birthplace of the mother of President Ernest Bai Koroma. While
Among the Limba, the greatest increases in recorded
Limba speakers in Biriwa remained staunchly supportive of the
taxpayers were in the headquarters sections. Kamabai section
APC when the civil war ended, the local Mandingo and Fula
recorded 596 taxpayers in 1985 and 1,125 in 2002, while the
speakers did not. Both ethnic groups were frequent targets
corresponding figures for Bumban section were 722 and
of the pre-war APC government’s “anti-stranger” drives in the
1,303. The Mandingo sections showed even larger increases.
diamond mining areas. After the war, the national leaderships
Balandugu section recorded 340 taxpayers in 1985 and 1.012
of both groups declared support for the SLPP government of
in 2002, while the corresponding figures for Karina section
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Former President Kabbah is a Mandingo
were 538 and 1,903. Furthermore, the revised Chiefdom
on his father’s side and had long been a supporter of the Sierra
Leonean Mandingo community.
130 Councillors to Karina section, although a 1:20 ratio of
In Biriwa, the paramount chieftaincy has rotated between
Councillors to taxpayers should only have produced 95.
the Limba ruling houses of Bumban and Kamabai since the
early colonial era. In the 1950s, aspirants from Karina began to
contest the Biriwa paramount chieftaincy, claiming that their
ancestors had helped to protect the chiefdom from war during The Biriwa Paramount Chief (from the Kalawa ruling house
of Bumban) died unexpectedly in 2003, but preparations
the pre-colonial era and that their ruling house was descended
to elect a new chief did not get underway until 2006. The
from a daughter of Suluku of Bumban, the famous late 19th
updated Chiefdom Councillor lists soon became a major point
century Biriwa Limba ruler. In a chieftaincy election held
of contention. Local tax had been assessed and collected in
1956, a Karina aspirant took advantage of a split in the vote
2004 under new rules that required all adult women to pay
between the Limba aspirants to poll the most votes, but the
local tax, but the Local Government Ministry insisted that an
British District Commissioner eventually ruled that a Mandingo
electoral college for the forthcoming election should be based
Paramount Chief was unacceptable in a Limba chiefdom and
on the flawed 2002 Chiefdom Councillor list. Furthermore,
ordered the election to be re-run (Fanthorpe, 1998). The old
when the updated list was gazetted in March 2006, it omitted
rotational succession arrangement between Bumban and
the names of 36 Limba ceremonial chiefs that had appeared
Kamabai ruling houses continued up to the civil war period.
on the original 2002 list. In Temne-speaking areas, chieftaincy
All factions in the chiefdom took advantage of the weak
is surrounded by considerable ceremony, led by numerous
state of local bureaucracy in the aftermath of civil war to inflate
male and female titled officials. These “ceremonial chiefs”
taxpayer assessments in their localities (Box 2). The Biriwa
have long been included in Temne Chiefdom Councils
chiefdom Treasury Clerk at that time lived in Makeni and
and the predecessor of the late Biriwa Paramount Chief
his monthly travel allowance of 5,000 Leones did not cover
had introduced the idea into his own chiefdom. All of the
even one return taxi fare from Makeni to Kamabai. When tax
Biriwa ceremonial chiefs were, of course, Limba-speaking
collection resumed in the chiefdom in 2002, he relied upon a
nominees of the Paramount Chief. They had appeared on
network of personal contacts to deliver tax assessment forms
several gazetted Biriwa Chiefdom Councillor lists, but with an
and receipt books to chiefdom authorities as and when they
election pending the government decided to remove them.
travelled to the chiefdom.47 Documents obtained from the
The Office of the President would later issue a statement
Treasury Clerk also indicated that the final assessment for
claiming that this action represented a bid to “adhere to the
Karina town included the names of 720 taxpayers who were
norms that existed about chieftaincy during the colonial era”.
not accounted for on the original assessment forms. With
Since there was no record of Limba ceremonial chiefs at
the local tax rate still set at the pre-war level of 500 Leones
Independence in 1961, the government had concluded that
per person, there was little to deter chieftaincy factions from
ceremonial chieftaincy could not be considered a “traditional”
manipulating the local tax system for political gain. On this
particular occasion, the Mandingo faction had seized an Limba institution. The statement also went on to note that
advantage over its Limba rivals. accepting this development would have “opened a floodgate
to the numerous ‘secret society’ members nationwide
insisting on their inclusion on the councillors list by virtue of
47. Interview, Biriwa Chiefdom Treasury Clerk, Makeni, March 2003
27
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
the membership of their societies”.48 The newly gazetted list
also added an extra 22 Chiefdom Councillors to Balandugu
section, the government’s explanation being that these were
representatives of Fula cattle herders who had only returned to
the chiefdom after 2002.
The local Limba-speakers were outraged by these
developments. Officials of the Local Government Ministry did
nothing illegal in modifying the Chiefdom Councillor list. Yet,
as the local Limba saw it, the government had declared that
their ceremonial chiefs were not in fact traditional authorities
while upholding the rights of Fula herders whom they did not
consider to be indigenes of the chiefdom. Furthermore, they
believed that the Ministry had insisted on using the 2002
revision of the Chiefdom Councillor list for the forthcoming
election in order to favour the SLPP-supporting Mandingos
and Fulas. Indeed, the sole Mandingo aspirant in the election
was a Freetown-based medical doctor and personal friend of
President Kabbah, whose declaration that Karina town was his
birthplace raised eyebrows even among neutral observers.
Local Government officials made three attempts to
complete the pre-election Declaration of Rights exercise
(Box 3, page 33), in the early months of 2006, all of which
were disrupted by violent arguments over the eligibility of
Mandingos to stand for election to the Biriwa paramount
chieftaincy and the right of Government to exclude Limba
ceremonial chiefs from the Chiefdom Councillor list.
Even though they still commanded a notional majority of
60 Chiefdom Councillors, the Limba aspirants and their
supporting Councillors decided to boycott the election entirely
and seek satisfaction for their grievances in the law courts.
Tensions in the chiefdom escalated as it became clear that
the government was determined to press ahead with the
election even though the Mandingo aspirant was now the sole
registered candidate. Reports began to circulate that the Limba
Gbangbani society, which the strictly Muslim Mandingo and
Fula rarely joined, was being used to impose ritual curfews on
roads and paths in the chiefdom, so as to prevent the passage
of Mandingos and Fulas across “Limba” land.
An attempt was made to hold the election on 28 July 2006,
in spite of the fact that a High Court Injunction restraining the
Mandingo candidate from standing had been granted hours
earlier. The Kamabai Court Barray was surrounded by police
and soldiers, armed with live ammunition and tear gas. While
vehement, possibly violent, protest from the local Limba had
been anticipated, it took a form against which government
agencies were completely unprepared. In Biriwa, as in most
present-day chiefdoms, women’s leaders (Mammy Queens)
48. Government of Sierra Leone, Office of the President, Government
Notice, Biriwa Paramount Chieftaincy Elections, 15 August, 2006
28
are considered chiefdom authorities. Each of the chiefdom’s
nine sections has a Mammy Queen with an overall leader
currently residing in Kamabai. The head Mammy Queen, along
with the Kamabai section Mammy Queen and the head of the
women’s Bondo society for the chiefdom, were among the
ceremonial chiefs omitted from the Chiefdom Councillor list
in the 2006 update. In full view of the security forces and the
Local Government officials and Chiefdom Councillors sitting
in the Barray, the head Mammy Queen and her supporters
surrounded the Barray and placed a Bondo curfew on it, forcing
all the men out.
Declaration of Rights
Ever since colonial times, the first stage in any chieftaincy
election has been an exercise known as the Declaration of
Rights. Here, aspirants declare their hereditary claims to
paramount chieftaincy at a special meeting of the Chiefdom
Council chaired by the Provincial Secretary. The meeting begins
with a roll call of Chiefdom Councillors, and if the list has not
already been updated (e.g. to replace deceased Councillors)
since the last official revision, changes will be agreed at this
time. With the assistance of assessor Paramount Chiefs (who
usually come from neighbouring chiefdoms), the Provincial
Secretary seeks to ensure that that aspirants belong to
ruling houses recognized by government, that government
guidelines on the eligibility of candidates (e.g. candidates must
belong to ruling houses through direct paternal lineage, they
cannot previously have served as Acting Paramount Chiefs
or Regent Chiefs and must not have any criminal convictions)
are adhered to and that rotational succession pacts between
ruling houses, if any, are honoured. The assembled Chiefdom
Councillors are consulted regularly during this vetting process
and it is they who make the final decision as to whether or
not a particular aspirant should be accepted as a candidate
in the election proper. Usually, a collective shout of approval
or disapproval is enough to decide the matter, with a vote
being taken only if the Council is split. In the past, the actual
election of the Paramount Chief took place immediately after
the completion of the Declaration of Rights, but the Local
Government Ministry now tends leave a few weeks’ gap
between the two events to ensure that all challenges and
complaints can be fairly dealt with and that failed aspirants and
their supporters do not disrupt election proceedings.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
One participant in this ritual explained later that the women
had taken matters into their own hands in order to protect their
men, since, as she put it, “soldiers shame to shoot women”.49
The head Mammy Queen also explained that she was the
daughter of the Kamabai Paramount Chief who, in 1953, had
built the Barray in the first place. As far as she was concerned,
it was a symbol of Kamabai’s status as the chiefdom
headquarters and she was not going to allow outsiders to
appropriate it.50 Indeed, it was a source of great satisfaction
to the local Limba that the women’s action had forced the
Provincial Secretary to reconvene the election in a cramped
market enclosure and that the formal recognition ceremony
for the new Paramount Chief, led by the President in January
2007, was held in a school assembly hall.
Within days of the election, the leading Limba aspirant,
already serving as the Senior Speaker of the chiefdom,
underwent the traditional ceremonies of chiefly investiture
in Bumban’s society bush. He was briefly detained by the
police, concerned that he was trying to usurp the authority
of the elected Paramount Chief. While he would in fact serve
as the de facto chief of the local Limba, he adopted the title
“Chairman of Biriwa Limba Customs and Secret Societies”.
By using that title he made his political point clear, yet
deflected any allegations of usurpation.51 The newly elected
Paramount Chief, who took the name Paramount Chief
Alimamy Moseray II, did not challenge his Limba rival,
spending most of his time abroad or in Freetown. The return
of an APC government in September 2007 made it a certainty
that the 2006 Biriwa election result would be annulled and the
election re-run. PC Alimamy Moseray was formally suspended
in November 2008, and the re-run election was still pending as
of September 2009.
The Biriwa election also prompted a confrontation between
the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the Local
Government Ministry. The NEC was granted an oversight
role in paramount chieftaincy elections by the then Attorney-
General Solomon Berewa in 2002 and the commission
went on to preside over more than 70 chieftaincy elections.
However, during the Biriwa Chieftaincy election, the NEC
called for a suspension of proceedings while the injunction
against the Mandingo candidate was still in force and while
local complaints over the updated Chiefdom Council list were
still being investigated. The NEC was also concerned over
the possibility of violence if the election went ahead before
these issues were resolved. However, the Local Government
Ministry ordered the NEC to hand over election materials if it
wasn’t prepared to resume the proceedings. The NEC
49. Interview, Isatu Pompoli, Section Mammy Queen, Bumban, May 2007.
50. Interview, Regina Posseh Kalawa, Head Mammy Queen, Kamabai,
May 2007
51. Interview, Chiefdom Speaker Alimany Alusine Seku Conteh,
Kamabai, May 2007
refused to comply with this order, citing its independence as
established by Section 32 of the 1991 Constitution and its
authority to conduct public elections under Section 33 of the
same Constitution.52
In November 2006, a team of judges led by Chief Justice
A.R.D. Renner-Thomas delivered a controversial ruling in the
Supreme Court in response to an appeal action brought by the
Limba ruling houses of Biriwa. He upheld an earlier High Court
ruling that the eligibility of aspirants in chieftaincy elections
was a matter of customary law, over which the courts had no
jurisdiction. He also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the
Biriwa chieftaincy election should be declared null and void
because it was conducted in contravention of Section 33 of
the 1991 Constitution. The Chief Justice ruled that paramount
chieftaincy elections did not constitute public elections
for which the NEC was expressly responsible because
a) chieftaincy elections were not mentioned specifically
in Section 33 of the Constitution and b) Section 72 of the
1991 Constitution establishes the supremacy of Parliament
in making provisions for managing paramount chieftaincy
elections. If legislators had intended for chieftaincy elections
to be covered by the provisions of Section 33, the Chief
Justice argued, they would have inserted an appropriate cross-
reference making that intent clear.53
2.1.3 Chieftaincy’s Crisis of Accountability
The Biriwa case illustrates the importance many Sierra
Leoneans still attach to the chiefdom as a source of political
identification and belonging. But it is also indicative of a
broader crisis of accountability that currently afflicts the
chieftaincy system. Further examples from Biriwa and other
chiefdoms illustrate the magnitude of this crisis.
First, there is no question that the Limba speakers of Biriwa
were united in opposing what they perceived to be central
government manipulation of the 2006 chieftaincy election for
partisan political ends. Yet, many residents of the chiefdom
remained little more than onlookers upon an elite contest.
On one side, the Supreme Court appeal was lodged by elite
descendants of Kamabai living in Freetown and the petition
that helped set in motion the annulment of the 2006 election
result, and suspension of PC Alimamy Moseray II, was drafted
by members of the APC party executive. Even the women
who placed the ritual curfew on the Court Barray were wives
and daughters of senior chiefs. On the other side, the Kabbah
government seemed to treat all criticism of its handling of
the election as a challenge to its sovereign authority, to be
answered with force if need be. Yet, PC Alimamy Moseray’s
52. Interview, Christiana Thorpe, NEC Commissioner, Freetown, May 2007.
53. The full text of this ruling was published in several Freetown
newspapers.
29
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
candidacy was merely the most recent among a series of
attempts by members of the Freetown elite to make political
capital out of Karina town’s historic status, and thereby
enhance the national profile of a small yet economically
powerful Mandingo community still struggling to shake off its
“stranger” image.54 Had the choice of a new Paramount Chief
been put to a popular vote in the chiefdom, the whole fiasco
would have been avoided.
Local youths’ frustration at their exclusion from chieftaincy
elections came out vividly in a group discussion held in
Kamabai in 2005. At that time, the youths’ main concern was
the lack of opportunity for paid employment in the town. They
were all born in the chiefdom and they were hoping that more
development projects would come to their area to provide
jobs. Yet they complained that when projects did come, chiefs
and elders reserved many benefits for themselves and gave
work to their “favourites”.The fundamental problem, as they
saw it, was that youths had no means of holding chiefs and
elders to account. In the old days, one youth observed, a
person who could pay tax for twenty people automatically
became a Chiefdom Councillor. But nowadays, “everyone pays
tax for themselves and the Town Chief chooses the TAs”.55
The situation was no better in respect of chieftaincy elections.
As another youth observed:
Crownings [i.e. chieftaincy elections] do not involve youths.
Elders meet to make a committee [i.e. Electoral College] and
only TAs have the right to vote for the chief. Youths can support
a person, but because they are not on the committee they
don’t have the right [to vote]. The elders just say: ‘chieftaincy
is not child’s play’. Sometimes the young men do not like a
Paramount Chief but they have no power to influence the
choice. Let the youths be involved in crownings.56
Male and female youths living in other parts of Sierra Leone
have expressed the same frustrations. For example, in a
community discussion group facilitated by MCSL in Kailahun
District in March 2008, a youth participant observed that:
We suffer from paramount chieftaincy elections because it is
only the TAs that are involved and we, the youths, are excluded.
It affects us because it is only the wishes of the TAs that are
fulfilled and not the youths, yet the population of youths is
far greater than the TAs. This can destroy our development
because our voices are not heard.
54. Other national politicians to claim descent from Karina include the
late diamond magnate Jamil Said Mohamed and former Vice-President
S.I. Koroma. See Koroma (1996:44).
55. In rural areas, Chiefdom Councillors are still known by the old
colonial name “Tribal Authorities”, often abbreviated to “TA”.
56. Youth discussion Group, Kamabai, November 2005.
30
A female participant in the same group echoed these
sentiments:
 he number of youths and women far outweighs the number
T
of TAs. Therefore, since women and youths pay taxes, they
should be accorded the right to vote for the Paramount Chief.
It affects the women because we pay taxes as men do but
why should we not be entitled to vote for the PC?
The very survival of communities is at stake here. For example,
another youth participant in the same MCSL-facilitated
discussion group observed:
The [chiefdom] authorities maltreat us at will and they often
say that if you are not pleased with their rule, then you can
willingly leave their chiefdoms. If a young person sees how
risky it is, then he or she will already be preparing to leave.
You can even find some villages that haven’t any young people
in them because they have all left.
To take another example, Kamabai served as an operational
base for RUF groups in the final stages of the civil war and
most of the youths who participated in discussions had been
conscripted at one time or another as trainee combatants,
labour gangers, load carriers and messengers. Local youths
had observed RUF personnel closely and felt that their
present situation was not so far removed from that which had
prompted those people to go to war. As the chiefdom’s youth
leader (Young Man’s Chief) observed, Sierra Leonean youth
is living under political authorities that are “not transparent”,
that have many “hidden agendas” and whose representatives
are only interested in “self-development.” Young people are
therefore inclined to say to themselves: “if no development
comes, I will look around and take what I want”.“That way of
thinking”, the youth leader concluded, “brings war”.57
Village Discussion Group, Massahun, Bo District, December 2008
57. Youth discussion Group, Kamabai, November 2005
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
A second session with the same group of youths took place
in January 2008. On this occasion, the youths reported that
their main concern, over and above the continuing lack of
employment opportunities, was the absence of a Paramount
Chief who could intercede with the government on their
behalf to bring development to the chiefdom. It is easy to
understand why the political imagination of these youths was
still captured by the ideal of the communitarian chief. At that
time, none of the three District Councillors representing wards
in the chiefdom actually resided there and Parliament had only
recently gone back to a constituency system after a decade
during which parliamentary seats were allocated on a district
basis. Yet it is the very commitment of rural people to this ideal
that leaves them vulnerable to exploitation by unscrupulous
elites. If that exploitation persists, it is only likely to provoke
further conflict.
Second, insofar as they were designed to introduce
taxpayer (and thus popular) representation to Chiefdom
Councils, the old guidelines (see Box 1, page 17) have been
a manifest failure. The formula for electing councillors is
fundamentally flawed. Take, for example, a hypothetical
case where Village A has 55 taxpayers, including the Village
Chief. Under the existing guidelines, the first 20 taxpayers
qualify the Village Chief to sit on the Chiefdom Council, while
the next 20 qualify the village to have an extra Councillor.
The remaining 15 taxpayers are insufficient in number to
qualify for a third Councillor, but if the guidelines are adhered
to correctly, all the taxpayers in the village should vote to
decide who shall serve as the extra Councillor and all are
therefore represented. Yet if villages are small, they must
organize themselves so that they can create “units” of
twenty taxpayers. Thus for example, Villages B, C and D with
a combined total of 15 taxpayers must seek out another
small village to bring the group’s total to at least 20. Since the
guidelines also allow for the division of a large settlement into
separate “sections” for the purpose of electing Councillors,
they have provided chiefdom authorities with a pretext for
grouping all chiefdom taxpayers into notional “units” of 20
and allocating Councillors to them.
This interpretation of the guidelines ensures that larger
and politically important settlements can maximise their
allocation of Councillors. In Village A for example, the final 15
taxpayers would be considered as an incipient “unit”, thereby
allowing the village to claim a third Councillor. The additional
five taxpayers completing this “unit” would be found
by grouping it with taxpayers living in other villages. This
interpretation also obviates the need for public elections of
Councillors, since in theory a “unit” of 20 taxpayers is small
enough to meet face to face to decide which of their number
should become the Councillor.
Such interpretations of the original guidelines are followed
everywhere. As a result, the organization of taxpayers
into notional “units” to qualify for Chiefdom Council
representation has become little more than a game of
numbers played by the authorities that manage the local tax
system (i.e. the Chiefdom Committee, Treasury Clerk and
CCFC) and authorize revisions of Chiefdom Councillor lists
(Provincial Secretary and Local Government Ministry). Chiefs
of all ranks are nevertheless inclined to defend the present
system because it also answers to other priorities. Chiefs at
the village and section level claim that they rely on Chiefdom
Councillors to help them maintain law and order in their
localities and therefore need to appoint responsible people.
As one Section Chief in Bombali District noted:
TAs must be appointed on the recommendation of their
Section Chiefs. In my section, I won’t recommend you if I don’t
know you to be a hard working person. Even the Paramount
Chief cannot recommend anyone to be a TA in my section. A TA
is a real citizen.58
A Village Chief made a similar point when contributing to a NMJD-
facilitated village discussion group. At one stage he observed that:
“TA means ‘chief’, as in Tribal Authority”.He also noted that:
The TA is the person that pays the tax for the other 19 people.
There are two TAs here in Massahun. Chiefdom authorities
will scrutinize TAs to see if they are working in the interests of
the people. If not, he or she will be changed automatically...
Removing TAs will create more workload for Village Chiefs. A
large village of 1,500 people would now have only one chief.59
It was clearly not the intent of the colonial architects of
the Chiefdom Councils that taxpayer representatives should
become an auxiliary class of chiefs, directly appointed by
chiefdom authorities. Yet some chiefs insist that their method
works best because it respects “tradition”.According to one
Paramount Chief for example, the number twenty represents
the indigenous (Mende) cultural concept of the “whole man”
(ten fingers and ten toes). Each “unit” of twenty tax payers
represented by a TA reflects, in his view, the traditional family
structure with the “whole man” at the head.60 However, the
days when most rural family heads were directly responsible
for the day-to-day welfare of twenty fully fledged adults are long
gone. In present-day Sierra Leone, people who have money are
constantly under pressure from their family networks to provide
them with support, but that is a different kind of relationship.
Social and economic life in rural areas is never static. Young
people move out in search of education and employment
58. Interview, Section Chief Yayah Conteh II, Bumban, December 2008.
59. Village Discussion Group, Massahun, Bo District, December 2008.
60. Interview with PC Bai Koblo Queen II of Masimera Chiefdom
(Chairman, National Council of Paramount Chiefs), PC Alhaji Issa Kamara-
Koroma, Gallinas Perri Chiefdom, Pujehun District, PC Amadu Kaikai,
Kpanga Kabonde Chiefdom, Pujehun District, November 2008.
31
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
while older people move in to take over the households and
family lands of late relatives. Traders offering credit to farmers
are active even in remote areas and locally born businessmen
who support the rural poor fairly can sometimes rival chiefs
as community figureheads. Many people that succeed in
government or business also take a keen interest in their home
communities, especially during national elections.
Given this situation, it is easy to understand why chiefs
insist on appointing taxpayer representatives to Chiefdom
Councils. It helps them to secure the support of community
patrons and opinion formers and ensure that upwardly mobile
chiefdom residents remain tied in, in a more general sense,
to the system of authority based on chieftaincy. For example,
one of the authors of this report spent several months working
with a Sierra Leonean NGO in Rokupr in Kambia District shortly
after the civil war. The managers of this NGO were supplying
relief inputs to their hometown on behalf of international
agencies. When local tax resumed in 2002 the local Section
Chief gave them a receipt book and asked them to pay tax on
behalf of their workers. After doing so, both were invited to join
the Chiefdom Council for a “fee” of 6,000 Leones each.61
Yet, the fundamental problem with this system of
patronage is that it excludes youths, women and poorer
chiefdom residents and often contradicts shared ideas of
“community” that enable chiefs to maintain social order
in the first place. In Rokupr for example, The Section Chief
was notorious for demanding contributions from Chiefdom
Councillors to cover his “expenses” and threatening to
remove their names from the gazetted Councillor list if they
refused to comply. He was equally notorious for distributing
Chiefdom Councillorships to store keepers, boat operators,
vehicle operators and government functionaries who were not
indigenes of the chiefdom. In a discussion with town residents,
many complained that these “strangers” answered only to
the Section Chief and District Officer and that the Chiefdom
Councillors representing them considered themselves to be
local “chiefs” on an equal footing with indigene Councillors.62
A driver working for the above-mentioned NGO later described
how he had been subjected to a “citizen’s arrest” by one of
these “stranger” Councillors for failing to produce a local tax
receipt on demand. He was released as soon as he managed
to convince the Chiefdom Police that he had left the receipt at
home, but the incident still rankled several months later. “I was
born in this chiefdom”,he complained, “and I told the man that I
know the very year, the month and the day that he first set foot
here. Why should he have authority over me in this chiefdom?”63
61. Interview, Victor Kalie Kamara, CAP, Rokupr, Kambia District,
December 2002
62. Discussion Group, Rokupr, Kambia District, October 2002. The same
problem has been reported in diamond mining districts, another area
where wealth is concentrated in the hands of non-indigenes. See Reno
(1995:55-103)
63. Interview, Deltha Kamara, Driver, CAP, Rokupr Kambia District,
October 2002.
32
In a village discussion group held in another part of the same
chiefdom, a female Chiefdom Councillor who had recently
seen her name deleted from the gazetted Chiefdom Councillor
list made the following remarks:
I paid local tax in this chiefdom for 23 years and because of
my hard work I was made a Chiefdom Councillor. But now we
seem to have a new system and my name has been removed
from the list. If a candidate for the throne [i.e. paramount
chieftaincy] comes, he pays the DO [i.e. District Officer] to
remove councillors from the list and add those who support
him. For now, Councillors are changed at will. A person up
to the age of 18 can vote for the President, but they cannot
vote for a Paramount Chief unless they are Councillors. If they
demand to vote they are told they are not old enough! Elders
are not willing to include the youths in chieftaincy business, but
if they act dishonestly, the youths will expose it. The youths are
not prepared to be used again as tools.64
Rural people are also demanding more representative
Chiefdom Committees. For example, action points raised in
the CGRP consultations included a) “the present Chiefdom
Committee is not functioning well, as they are all old [and]
lack initiatives for development”; 2) “Chiefdom Committee
members should all be replaced and provisions made for
representatives of women’s groups, CDF and youths”; 3)
“The female councillors are not selected for the Chiefdom
Committee. This has aroused feelings of neglect and low
esteem among the women who know that it is unfair.”65
Again, the message from all these testimonies is that unless
chiefs win back the respect of their people, and unless
the people can be confident that Chiefdom Councils and
Committees represent their interests, the community values
that underpin the entire system of local governance at the
chiefdom level will collapse.
Third, local factional rivalries would clearly not have such a
disruptive effect on chiefdom governance if it were not for the
excessive and unaccountable power government continues
to hold over chieftaincy affairs. Chieftaincy politics remains
focussed on winning the favour of central government rather
than winning the support of the people.
The Biriwa chieftaincy election is only one among several
recent chieftaincy elections to see government officials
authorize inflated Chiefdom Councillor lists and make other
questionable decisions. Another case in point is the chieftaincy
election in BKM chiefdom in December 2002.66 The salient
feature of this election was controversy over whether a
64. Village discussion Groups, Gbonkomaria, Kambia District,
October 2002.
65. CGRP workshop reports for Kpaka Chiefdom (May 2000),
Imperri Chiefdom (June 2000) and Peje Chiefdom (June 2000).
66. This case study is based on field research carried out by
Richard Fanthorpe between October and December 2002.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
rotational crowning agreement was in force. The small
Makonteh chiefdom had amalgamated with Bureh in 1946
without a specific agreement on crowning being drawn up.
Kasseh had joined in 1957 and its ruling houses subsequently
demanded an agreement to rotate the chieftaincy. However,
the three parties couldn’t agree as to which of them should
have the first turn. In 1959, an exasperated British District
Commissioner called a meeting in the Kasseh chiefdom
headquarters and drew up a declaration reserving the next
paramount chieftaincy for Kasseh. The declaration was signed
by Kasseh chiefs, but the other ruling houses boycotted
the meeting. The District Commissioner’s decree was not
honoured, and ruling houses from the largest of the three
ex-chiefdoms (Bureh) continued to win every subsequent
chieftaincy election until 2002.
The Contested BKM Chiefdom
Councillor List of 2002
The 1998 revision of the BKM Chiefdom Councillor list
showed that Bureh had 9 sections, 90 villages and 196
councillors, Makonteh had 3 sections, 40 villages and 87
councillors, and Kasseh had 5 sections, 70 villages, and
137 councillors. However, the October 2002 list, published
in the Gazette, showed that Bureh had 259 councillors,
Makonteh 153 councillors and Kasseh 355 councillors.
Historically one of the Bureh chiefdom sections was
comprised of the employees of a large Sierra Leone Produce
Marketing Board (SLPMB) palm oil mill. The mill was
destroyed during the civil war and this section was summarily
deleted from Bureh in the revised Chiefdom Councillor list.
A new “section”, comprising of entirely fictitious villages,
was listed in the Gazette under Kasseh. The Bureh ruling
houses petitioned the government over the revised list,
pointing out further that several of the Councillors listed
under Kasseh were well known local personalities (including
a former APC Vice-President of Sierra Leone) who were long
dead. This petition was ignored.
Source: Field research, R. Fanthorpe
In the run up to the December 2002 election, the Kasseh
ruling houses’ campaign to win the paramount chieftaincy of
the amalgamated chiefdom was led by a cabal of local traders
(including the Regent Chief), backed by a high ranking civil
servant and relative of a former Vice-President of Sierra Leone.
The government did not respond to the Bureh ruling houses’
petition claiming that the gazetted Chiefdom Councillor list
contained numerous frauds (Box 4). In the Declaration of
Rights meeting, the Provincial Secretary ruled that the Kasseh
declaration of 1959 represented a binding agreement and
disallowed Bureh and Makonteh aspirants from standing. He
promised to return in due course to arrange a new rotational
succession agreement between all three ex-chiefdoms,
but that promise was never kept. The Makonteh and Bureh
Chiefdom Councillors took some measure of revenge by
combined forces to defeat the candidate favoured by the civil
servant and the Regent Chief. The winning candidate was a
former CDF commander who was respected throughout the
amalgamated chiefdom. At the Declaration of Rights, more
might have been made of the fact that he had recently been
“adopted” by a local ruling house for the purposes of fighting
the election if the rival candidate supported by the civil servant
had not also been “adopted” by another ruling house in exactly
the same manner.
The enduring legacy of colonial “indirect rule” is apparent
in both the Biriwa and BKM cases. In the Supreme Court
ruling on the Biriwa case, the Chief Justice specifically cited
the provisions of Section 72 of the 1991 Constitution (i.e.
that Paramount Chieftaincy is established by customary law
and usage and that laws passed by Parliament governing
the election and removal of Paramount Chiefs should not be
inconsistent with custom), when arguing that customary law
had priority over matters of ruling house eligibility and that
decisions over the jurisdiction of the statute in chieftaincy
matters were the prerogative of Parliament. Implicit in this
ruling is the notion that Chieftaincy is an institution apart
from normal political affairs and that many of the protections
of citizens rights enshrined in the Constitution (including
the rights of all citizens above the age of 18 to vote in public
elections) do not apply to it.
33
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
But if the Supreme Court restrains itself from adjudicating on
matters of customary law, the Local Government Ministry has
no such concerns. Prior to the Biriwa controversy, the Kabbah
government had decreed that ruling houses established
after Independence in 1961 were no longer to be recognized,
arguing that it was necessary to uphold “traditional” ruling
houses untainted by the manipulations of the Stevens regime
in the 1970s and ‘80s. During the Biriwa controversy, the Local
Government Minister argued that since the Karina Mandingo
had contested elections in the 1950s, they must be considered
a legitimate “ruling house”. But he forgot to mention
that a British official had refused to recognize a winning
Karina candidate as Paramount Chief because the colonial
government had always considered Biriwa to be a “Limba”
chiefdom. The Minister also referred to a treaty of friendship
between the British and the Karina chiefs dating from the
1890s. While that treaty did indeed prove that chieftaincy in
Karina has a pre-colonial pedigree it did not, contrary to the
Minster’s claims, establish any connection between Karina
and the chieftaincy of Biriwa.67 In the BKM case there was
certainly justice in the Kasseh and Makonteh ruling houses’
claim that Bureh should not be allowed exclusive access
to the paramount chieftaincy just because it had the most
taxpayers. Yet the 1959 declaration on Kasseh’s right to fill
the next chieftaincy vacancy, signed by Kasseh chiefs alone,
represented very questionable grounds for barring Makonteh
as well as Bureh ruling houses from contesting the 2002
election. In both cases, colonial officials’ ad hoc interventions
in chieftaincy affairs provided their modern counterparts with
precedents for equally arbitrary rulings on chieftaincy elections.
Arbitrary government rulings on chieftaincy elections often
engender strong feelings of anger and injustice in rural areas.
People know when tricks are being played upon them. The
public has access to gazetted Chiefdom Councillor lists via the
Government Bookshop in Freetown and irregularities in gazetted
Chiefdom Councillor lists are widely discussed. Old government
records on colonial-era chieftaincy elections remain such
valuable political commodities that they have also been copied
extensively. After the destruction of government property during
the civil war, some private citizens now hold more complete
records on chiefdom histories than central government. Yet
when the name of a former Vice-President everyone knows to
be dead appears on a gazetted Chiefdom Councillor list, it is a
political signal to all concerned that the lies and fabrication of the
chieftaincy faction favoured by government have become the
government’s “truth”.With no satisfaction likely to be found in
the courts, all an aggrieved faction can do is petition the Local
Government Minister and other senior government figures in
the hope that it can induce a change of heart.
67. Government of Sierra Leone, Office of the President,
Government Notice, Biriwa Paramount Chieftaincy Elections, 15 August,
2006. The chieftaincy of Biriwa was the subject of a treaty originally
drawn up in 1841.
34
Paramount Chiefs who benefit from fraudulent or otherwise
unfair elections tend to alienate large numbers of their
people even before taking up office. More accountable to the
bureaucrats and politicians that arranged their election victories
than the communities they are supposed to represent,
they are susceptible to pressure from above to exploit their
customary authority over land and other local resources for
the benefit of their patrons. These are the very practices that
the above-noted TRC report condemned as being among the
root causes of the civil war. Clearly, the rights of chiefdom
people must now be fully protected by the statute. The
extension of that protection does not mean that chieftaincy
is under threat of abolition. Rather, it means that a legal and
constitutional distinction urgently needs to be established
between chieftaincy as a traditional institution and institutions
of governance at the chiefdom level, most of which ceased to
be traditional long ago.
2.1.4 The Case for Universal Adult Suffrage in
Chieftaincy Elections
As we have seen, introducing popular suffrage in chieftaincy
elections has been mooted in Sierra Leone since the
1920s. Governments, both colonial and post-colonial, have
long resisted this reform for ideological reasons and out
of cynical political calculation. Yet universal adult suffrage
in chieftaincy elections could help to resolve chieftaincy’s
current crisis of accountability. First, it would bring an end
to politically motivated inflation of local tax assessments
and fraudulent manipulation of Chiefdom Councillor lists.
Second, since women are now expected to pay local tax
under decentralization, the numbers of assessed taxpayers
in all chiefdoms are already increasing substantially. If the
old 1:20 ratio of Councillors to taxpayers is retained it will
produce Chiefdom Councils that are too large to be able to
meet and conduct business effectively in one place (e.g.
a Court Barray). The number of registered taxpayers in a
chiefdom is now nearing the number of registered voters,
the only differences being due to the respective ages of tax
liability and voter eligibility (21 years for taxpayers and 18
years for voters). If the ages of tax liability and voter eligibility
were harmonised in law, it would be easy to use the national
electoral register as a basis for voter registration in chieftaincy
elections, with additional safeguards (e.g. possession of
local tax receipts) in place to ensure that voters are genuine
residents of the chiefdom in which they are voting.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Third, these changes would place responsibility for managing
Action Points on Chieftaincy Elections,
chieftaincy elections firmly in the hands of the NEC and
CGRP Workshops, 1999-2000
curtail abuse of the government’s colonially wrought power
1. The Councillors who vote for [the] Paramount Chief
to arbitrate on matters of “customary law and usage” in
and Section Chiefs are not elected in accordance with the
chieftaincy elections. If candidates were registered by the
rules. People who are not eligible are included on the list
NEC ahead of an election, there would be no need for an old
of councillors by corrupt officials just to influence elections
fashioned Declaration of Rights exercise in which the Provincial
(Baoma Chiefdom, July 2000).
Secretary arrives in a motorcade and leads the process from a
high table while the aspirants and councillors sit below him in 2. Instead of Councillors voting for chiefs, let all taxpayers
the Court Barray (see photo). Early registration of candidates within the chiefdom who are indigenes vote (Wunde
would provide time for any challenges to their hereditary rights Chiefdom, July 2000).
claims to be thoroughly investigated and for the Provincial
3. Only candidates with birthright for holding the chieftaincy
Secretary and Assessor Chiefs to supply a pre-election report
should contest. The birthright question for each aspirant should
on matters pertaining to rotational succession agreements and
be answered by chiefdom people not Central Government
the ruling house legitimacy.
(Kamajei Chiefdom, June 2000).
4. The election of a Paramount Chief should no more be
interfered with by the Government. Each contestant must
come from a ruling house recognized by the people (Bendu
Cha Chiefdom, June 2000).
5. A system should be devised to ensure “one man one vote”
in chieftaincy elections (Mano Sakrim Chiefdom, June 2000)
6. The councillors who constitute the Electoral College for
election of Paramount Chief of the chiefdom [should] be
enlarged/broad based to include more youths and women
(Mano Dasse Chiefdom, December 1999)
7. The people of Nomo agreed that the election of future
Paramount Chiefs should be by universal suffrage involving
Aspirants seated before the Provincial Secretary and Assessor Chiefs. the people for the chiefdom (Nomo Chiefdom, July 2000)
Declaration of Rights, Kukuna, Bramaia Chiefdom, November 2002.
8. According to the teachers, youths civil groups and CDF,
There is no question that these measures would be popular the Paramount Chief should be from a ruling house and must
at community level. Outcomes of village discussion groups be elected by every taxpayer of the chiefdom, not the TAs or
and public workshops on desired reforms for chieftaincy Councillors alone (Nongowa Chiefdom, May 2000)
elections have been consistent on this matter for several years.
9. Election of Paramount Chief [should] be the business of
Compare for example, comments and recommendations
all taxpayers since councillors do not represent the wishes
emerging from the above-noted Chiefdom Governance
of the 19 people they represent (Sorogbema Chiefdom
Reform Programme (CGRP) consultations held shortly after
September, 2000)
the end of the civil war (Box 5) and those recently agreed
in discussion groups facilitated by CGG, NMJD and MCSL 10. Chieftaincy elections must be conducted by an Electoral
(Box 6). The consistent message in these discussion groups Commission, not by District Officers (Gallinhas Perri Chiefdom,
and workshops is that ordinary people want to be able to June 2000)
vote for their Paramount Chief, just like they vote for District
Councillors, Members of Parliament and the President. In
rural areas, women, youths and other people who are not
Chiefdom Councillors are expected to perform their civic
duties in obeying the law, engaging in productive activities,
paying taxes and performing communal labour. Consequently,
they feel it is an injustice that they can’t vote for the authorities
that still represent their first point of contact with government.
If people did not have respect for the institution of chieftaincy,
they would not feel so passionately on this issue.
35
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Action Points and Comments on
Chieftaincy Elections: CGG, NMJD and
MCSL facilitated discussion groups,
2008-2009
1. Since we are not allowed to vote for our PC, and he does
not feel accountable to us, no development activities are taken
forward that respond to our needs (Several groups, Kakua
Chiefdom, June to August 2008).
2. The Electoral College System disenfranchises us as women
and youths in the election of our local authorities (Fowaya, Peje
Bongre Chiefdom, February 2009).
3. If people vote for their MPs and [District] Councillor and
President, then why can’t they vote for their chiefs? (Several
groups, Kakua chiefdom, October 2008).
4. We want NEC to be conducting chieftaincy elections
(Segbwema, Njaluahun Chiefdom, March 2009).
5. Let the process [for electing Paramount Chiefs] be just
like voting for the President. Let all chieftaincy aspirants start
campaigning for votes like the Honourables [Members of
Parliament]; let them go and meet people on their farms
(Massahun, Kakua Chiefdom, December 2008).
6. If I reach 18 years and vote for the PC, the PC will respect
me (Massahun, Kakua Chiefdom, December 2008).
7. All participants agreed that the chieftaincy election that
obtains now is unfair. The T/A system (Electoral College) is
undemocratic and should be abolished (Kabala, Warra Warra
Yagalla Chiefdom, May 2009).
8. The sole responsibility should be given to the NEC for the
conduct of chieftaincy elections which is the body set up by
law (Binkolo, Safroko chiefdom, May 2009).
9. ...all participants endorsed the position of CSOs that the
election of Paramount Chiefs [should] be done through
universal adult suffrage and that TAs should be abolished.
However, they said that if it was impossible for every tax
payer to vote then every 10th taxpayer should become a TA
and those TAs should be democratically elected (Joru, Gaura
Chiefdom, May 2009).
10. All the participants agree that chieftaincy elections should
now be democratic wherein all taxpayers who have attained
the age of 18 years and above should vote (universal adult
suffrage). This was buttressed on the grounds that PCs/
Sub-Chiefs when elected have to govern everybody in the
chiefdom and not just the few TAs who elect them (Koidu,
Gbense Chiefdom, May 2009).
36
There is, at present, little support for the idea of universal adult
suffrage in chieftaincy elections among Paramount Chiefs.
One Paramount Chief argued that the British monarchy had
not changed for centuries, so why should the chieftaincy
system? “Immediately you accept adult suffrage”, he went on,
“the institution of chieftaincy starts breaking; the cracks have
come”68 Another Paramount Chief remarked that: “universal
suffrage in chieftaincy elections will not improve anything.
Money will become the main factor in deciding the winners
and they may not be the right people. An aspirant has to please
as many people as possible and under universal suffrage only
those with money will get elected.”69 A third Paramount Chief
argued that the present structure of chiefdom governance
can be made to work “if we are left alone to do our roles
without outside political interference”. But he also conceded
that the system for appointing TAs has “hiccoughs” and
has been politicised such that “people put more names [i.e.
inflate Councillor numbers] to get their supporters’ votes”. He
concluded that “we are looking forward to a system that can
reconstruct our governance and build its capacity”.70
It is understandable that Paramount Chiefs fear that
conceding one major reform in chiefdom governance could
open the door to a whole host of other reforms that could
marginalize them from the political process completely. But
since the statute already provides for the inclusion of taxpayer
representatives on Chiefdom Councils, there are no justifiable
grounds for arguing that universal adult suffrage in chieftaincy
elections is wrong because it does not respect “tradition”.
As we have seen, taxpayer representatives are regularly
appointed by chiefdom authorities, and some chiefs have
reinterpreted these representatives as traditional authorities.
But these reinterpretations are a product of politics, not of law
or democratic principle.
The whole point of universal adult suffrage in chieftaincy
elections is to bring chiefs back in touch with the communities
they represent, to give them a mandate to “stand firm and
do something better for the people”, as one youth informant
put it. The argument that universal adult suffrage in chieftaincy
elections would only ensure that the richest candidate always
wins, regardless of hereditary right, is remarkable given
the amount of bribery that currently goes on in chieftaincy
elections. Indeed, the Kabbah government specifically
outlawed the practice of “camping” Chiefdom Councillors at
chieftaincy elections (i.e. corralling them for the purpose of
bribery and coercion) in an effort to combat this problem. The
Paramount Chief who raised this argument went on to note
68. Interview with PC Bai Koblo Queen II of Masimera Chiefdom
(Chairman, National Council of Paramount Chiefs); P.C. Alhaji Issa
Kamara-Koroma, Gallinas Perri Chiefdom, Pujehun District; PC Amadu
Kaikai, Kpanga Kabonde Chiefdom, Pujehun District, November 2008.
69. Interview, Paramount Chief Thomas Kposowa, Bumpeh Ngao
Chiefdom, November 2008.
70. Interview, Paramount Chief Bai Sunthuba Osara III, Gbonkolenken
Chiefdom, December 2008.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
how, during his election campaign, some poor farmers had
rubbed their hands with glee in anticipation of the largesse he
and other aspirants would be obliged to distribute. Another
Paramount Chief, interviewed in 2005, was perhaps being
more honest over the issue when he observed that, under
universal adult suffrage, there would be too many people
for him to bribe to be sure of getting elected.71 As the chief’s
admission implies, widening the suffrage in chieftaincy
elections could serve to combat bribery and corruption rather
than increase it. This was certainly the view of participants
in one of the above-noted Chiefdom Governance Reform
Programme workshops. As the workshop report noted:
 he people are strongly advocating that PCs be elected by all
T
taxpayers. They argue that Councillors who vote for PCs do
not adequately represent the interest of the people. It would
be easy to manipulate a few people but not the majority.72
A further point often made by Paramount Chiefs is that
if everyone is allowed to vote in chieftaincy elections, local
residents would call relatives from Freetown and Kono to come
and vote, and the result would therefore be decided by people
not genuinely committed to the welfare of the chiefdom. A
bureaucrat, interviewed in 2002, expressed a similar view
when claiming that, under universal adult suffrage, “the street
boys in Bo would elect one of their own as Paramount Chief,”
apparently assuming that ruling houses would be abolished
too. There are echoes here of the arguments put forward by
British colonial officials in the 1920s to oppose a wider suffrage
in chieftaincy elections: that “native” Sierra Leoneans were not
yet ready for democracy and that a wider suffrage would only
benefit young “upstarts” who were only interested in becoming
chiefs to make money. These arguments were tendentious
even then, and the idea that the public cannot be trusted to vote
responsibly for their political leaders really should have no place
in a modern democracy. Again, the argument comes back to the
point that if all Sierra Leonean citizens have the right to vote for
the President, there is no good reason why they should not be
able to vote for their chiefs.
2.2 Justice and Human Rights
2.2.1 Overlapping Spheres of Justice
As we saw in Chapter 1, the primary responsibility of
Chiefdom Councils under the Chiefdom Councils Act (Cap
61 of the Laws of Sierra Lone, 1960) is to “maintain order
and good government” in their chiefdoms and do everything
within their reasonable power to prevent the commission
of offenses. However, the Local Courts Act, 1963, states
explicitly that Local Courts have primary jurisdiction to “hear
and determine civil cases governed by customary law” and
71. Interview, Paramount Chief Bai Sebora Kasanga II, Makeni,
October 2005.
72. CGRP workshop, Badjia Chiefdom, June 2000
that it is an offence to any person to “exercise or attempt to
exercise judicial powers” within their territorial jurisdiction.
Since the Local Courts are limited as to the civil and criminal
cases upon which they can adjudicate, their jurisdiction is
effectively subordinate to that of the Magistrate’s Courts and
higher courts. Where written law and customary law come
into conflict, written law is supposed to prevail. Cases heard in
a Local Court can be referred to a higher court and decisions
can also be appealed to a District Appeal Court, presided over
by a Magistrate assisted by customary law assessors. Each
Province has a Customary Law Officer who advises on referral
and assessment matters.
The appointment of party political activists as Local
Court Chairmen, noted in Chapter 1, ended with the demise
of the pre-war APC regime. In recent years, Paramount
Chiefs have been in the habit of appointing Local Court
Chairmen, expecting endorsement of their decisions by the
Local Government Ministry. Legally speaking, the situation
metamorphosed into a fiduciary relationship, in which the
Minister became the principal, and the Paramount Chiefs, the
agents. Therefore, even though the Paramount Chiefs do not
have the legal authority to appoint Court Chairmen, and even
though the Act does not expressly transfer the said authority to
them, by accepting Paramount Chiefs’ nominees for Chairmen
of Local Courts, the Minister ratified their actions, thereby
generating agency by ratification. Recently however, Provincial
Secretaries have begun to take back this power, sometimes
sacking Court Chairmen appointed by chiefs and making new
appointments. Paramount Chiefs are outraged by this change,
although Provincial Secretaries are operating in accordance
with the law as it currently stands.
There are no explicit provisions in the general law about
the local administration of justice by chiefs. Some Paramount
Chiefs argue that judicial decisions taken by them should not
be considered as unconstitutional or illegal. Section 176(3)
of the Laws of Sierra Leone, 1965, makes provision for the
existence of the statutes and common law. Common law in
that sense means the existing law and customary law, which
are applicable to particular communities in Sierra Leone. Some
of the powers exercised by Paramount chiefs in administering
the functions of their institution are established by customary
law and usage and the institution is protected from abolition
by means of legislative instruments such as Section 72(1) of
the 1991 Constitution. In theory therefore, in communities
governed by customary law Paramount Chiefs might be seen
as the final arbiters of justice comparable to the Supreme
Court, which means that whatever ruling the Paramount Chief
may issue, that decision is final.
37
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
In theory also, Paramount Chiefs have powers to banish
individuals from their chiefdoms. This power is enshrined
in Section 26(1) of the Provinces Act (Cap. 60 of the Laws
of Sierra Leone, 1960). However, Section 18 of the 1991
Constitution guarantees every citizen of Sierra Leone freedom
to move and settle in any part of the country without expulsion
or threat thereof and Section 171(15) of the Constitution
establishes the Constitution as the supreme law of Sierra
Leone. Section 26(1) of the Provinces Act has therefore ceased
to be pure law and any Paramount Chief evoking this provision
to banish a citizen from his chiefdom will be violating the
Constitution. Even so, the Paramount Chief of Kakua chiefdom
in Bo District banished popular radio broadcaster John Abu in
2006 and also threatened to banish a civil society activist called
Maxwell Kemokai.73
2.2.2 Rural Community-Based Justice
The present system of justice therefore creates several
overlapping spheres of authority. In some areas, conflict
between these spheres is limited due to the poverty and
geographical isolation of the local population. For example,
Biriwa chiefdom has a population of 30,000, many living in
small villages in remote hill country. The main Makeni-Kabala
highway runs along the foot of the hills and the three Local
Courts operating in the chiefdom are all based along this road.
The nearest Magistrate’s Court is in Makeni, 40 kilometres
distant from Kamabai, the Biriwa chiefdom headquarters.
There is no permanent Sierra Leone Police post in the
chiefdom. Two police officers usually travel up to Kamabai from
Makeni every day but don’t always stay overnight.
For most of the chiefdom’s residents, chiefs represent by
far the most accessible resolvers of disputes and dispensers
of justice. Paramount Chiefs, Section Chiefs and Village
Chiefs often hold informal courts where they adjudicate
cases, levy fees, impose fines or other punishments. In 2003
for example, the standard rate for a ‘country summons’ to
a Village Chief’s informal court in Biriwa was 500 Leones
(£0.15). The Local Courts on the main road charged 5,000
Leones for a summons and levied further charges for ‘hearing’,
‘service’ and ‘stationary’ that pushed protagonists’ potential
expenses (should they lose a case) towards 20,000 Leones
before any fines were taken into consideration.74 Many poor
farmers found these sums difficult to come by. For them, the
advantage in taking cases to a chief rather than the Local Court
was that justice is comparatively cheap and quick.
73. Field research, Abubakar Sidique Turay, December 2008
74. The material in this and following paragraphs is based on fieldwork
carried out by Richard Fanthorpe at various times between April 2003
and February 2009.
38
Section Chief’s Court, Bumban, May 2007
The dispute resolution work of one Section Chief in Biriwa
was observed over a ten day period in May 2007. He received
no salary and the rebate owing from the tax collected in his
section had not been paid for years. Yet on five of those ten
days, several hours of the chief’s time were taken up with
dispute adjudications. The first of these cases involved a
witchcraft accusation prompted by the sudden death of a child
in a remote village; the second was prompted by a violent
fist fight in a neighbouring village; the third was a complaint
brought by a mother that her young son-in-law had started an
affair with his wife’s younger sister; the fourth was a complaint
brought by an elder against a young man whom he accused
of having cleared a farm on his land without first asking
permission; the fifth was a complaint brought by a villager
against his younger kinsman whom he accused of growing
marijuana on family land. In each case, the Section Chief knew
all the people and families involved personally.
The largest sum of money offered to the Section Chief
during these hearings was two thousand Leones. However,
he received compensation for this work by calling section
people to farm a large swamp farm for him every year. This is
a common practice among chiefs in rural areas. While Sierra
Leone has ratified both International Labour Organization
Conventions on Forced Labour (Convention No. 29, the Forced
Labour Convention, and Convention No. 105, the Abolition
of Forced Labour), Section 19(2e) of the 1991 Constitution
excludes “communal labour or labour which forms part of
other civic obligation” from its definition of “Forced Labour.”
Clause 8(h) of the Chiefdom Councils Act (Cap 61 of the
Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960) also empowers chiefs to compel
their subjects (“natives”) to engage in productive farm work.
As long as chiefs demands for farm labour are accepted by
community people as compensation for their services to
that community, they are currently protected by the law, in
spite of the fact that the Native Administration Ordinances of
1937 were originally designed to render such arrangements
obsolete and unlawful. If salaries were paid to all ranks of
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
chiefs, it would no longer be a “civic obligation” to support
chiefs economically except through the general tax system.
Formal taxes offer much greater transparency than chiefs’ ad
hoc demands for labour and thus are better able to protect rural
citizens from exploitation.
The male and female secret societies play a leading role
in maintaining the moral contract that enables chiefs and
their people to exchange services. In many areas of Sierra
Leone, every child is initiated at puberty (sometimes earlier).
Initiates are taught skills and social behaviour specific to their
sex, including deference to chiefs and elders. Furthermore,
the powers that the societies control are also believed to be
morally discerning. Having been ritually transformed into adults
through the agency of these powers, initiates are required to
observe a range of laws and protocols in order to keep them in
balance. Many “society” laws are the same as general laws,
e.g. people should not curse, steal, fight, or kill. The societies
thus play a major role in maintaining law and order in rural areas
even when not in session (Fanthorpe, 2007).
Another feature of this community-based system of justice
is the strong moral pressure upon individuals not to involve
outsiders in disputes. A Regent Chief interviewed in 2001
observed that people living together in a rural village or town
are invariably relatives by marriage or descent, and feel they
have to get along with each other come what may. When a
person committing an offence pays compensation to an injured
party and begs forgiveness for a crime it allows people to put
the incident behind them. For that reason, he went on, the
traditional practice of ‘begging’ for forgiveness is not necessarily
considered immoral in rural areas even when it absolves an
offence that, under a Western system of justice, might demand
the severest punishment. It was this moral pressure, the Regent
Chief reasoned, that made rural people reluctant to bring cases
to the SLP. That action, he observed, would not only bring in
‘strangers’ to pry into the private affairs of a village, but also
shame the person accused of an offence. Going to the police,
the chief concluded, ‘makes an enemy for life’.75
“Communal labour” gang improving a bush road, Bumban, May 2007
75. Interview, Regent Chief, Kukuna, Bramaia Chiefdom, November 2001.
Yet even in a rural chiefdom like Biriwa there are people who
prefer to look beyond chiefs for justice. As noted above, the
chiefdom contains numerous Mandingo and Fula residents
who regularly exchange goods and services with the local
Limba but who do not join Limba secret societies and do
not consider themselves beholden to Limba chiefs. There
are also many residents of the chiefdom, both temporary
and permanent, Limba and non-Limba, who, by virtue of
their work, education, religious beliefs and personal choice,
are less integrated into the local community than others.
Many prefer to bring cases before the Local Courts and
Magistrate’s Courts. The Local Courts provide an essential
service for these social groups. For example, in their first
year of operation after the civil war (2003), the Local Courts
of Biriwa heard a mere 36 cases. Eighteen of these cases
concerned the recovery of debts and property and all involved
Limba versus non-Limba and/or locals versus non-locals.
Seven cases involved marriage disputes often accompanied
by allegations of “woman damage” (i.e. unauthorized sexual
contact). Again, four of these cases were brought by non-
locals seeking the return of locally born wives who had left
them to go and live with their families. The Local Courts
were also patronized by chiefs for the purpose of punishing
challenges to their authority. Two cases were brought by
chiefs against local youths for failing to answer to their
summonses and a further two cases were brought against
youths for committing “sacrilege” (kasseh), i.e. fighting in a
village in contravention of secret society laws.
2.2.3 Corruption and Conflict in the Local
Justice System
Community based justice only works effectively where there
is a moral consensus. Unfortunately, there are many signs
that this consensus has come under severe strain in rural
Sierra Leone in recent years. Part of the problem is chiefs’
over-zealous enforcement of their subjects’ “community”
obligations, especially unpaid labour. Unfair compulsion
of rural youths to perform “communal labour” has been a
hot topic in community consultations since the end of the
war (Fanthorpe, 2004a; Richards, Bah and Vincent, 2004)
and there is no sign as yet that the problem is abating. For
example, a NGO fieldworker, interviewed in Tonkolili District
in January 2009, spoke of how the Chief and Imam of the
village in which he worked expected villagers to work farms
for them every year. Youths who refused to comply with
these demands would be fined and if they showed any
further defiance, their families would be told that they would
be excluded from future aid distributions.
39
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
But the main element of the problem is that many chiefs
and Local Court functionaries have come to rely on the local
justice system as a source of private income. Only Paramount
Chiefs and Speakers receive salaries, and these are rarely
paid on time. Pending the implementation of the Local Courts
Bill, 2008 (see Chapter 3.2), Local Court functionaries are
supposedly paid out of general chiefdom revenues. However,
the management of chiefdom finances remains in disarray
(see section 2.3 below) and many do not receive salaries
at all. Many Court functionaries only work when there is a
case to be heard and find their main livelihoods in farming
(Richards, Bah and Vincent, 2004:6). For both chiefs and Local
Court functionaries, revenue from fines and fees represents
a major cash windfall and rarely finds its way into chiefdom
bank accounts. As a result, justice becomes a market in which
satisfaction usually goes to the highest bidder.
This problem was particularly acute at the end of the civil
war and was highlighted in the CGRP consultations (Box 7).
At that time, the local justice system not only suffered from
financial corruption but also political corruption. Workshop
participants accused chiefs of using the Local Courts to punish
anyone who defied their authority yet also ensuring that
family members and political allies were never summoned.
However, chiefs were also facing competition from a range
of other authorities intent on pursuing the same strategies:
Magistrates, Customary Law Officers, District Officers,
Provincial Secretaries and Members of Parliament. The
resulting erosion of public confidence in the justice system
is evident in the contribution of a young NGO worker in a
discussion groups held in Rokupr in Kambia District, October
2002. Unlike Kamabai in Biriwa, Rokupr is situated in an area
of intensive commercial farming, which supplies rice and
other produce to Freetown and Guinea. The area’s political
connections to Freetown are therefore much stronger than
those of Biriwa Chiefdom and the socio-economic profile of its
population more diverse. As the young man observed:
 ur problem in this country is that it is too centralized.
O
Freetown is everything. If somebody comes to this area from
outside, they do not regard the chief; they prefer to go to
Freetown. The chief is not given the power for people to find
out if he is an effective ruler. If you have a land issue, the chief
has a mandate to preside over the case. But the losers will
go to Freetown to contact the politicians and they will come
back and reverse the case. We have no guidelines on justice;
nobody knows where the law lies. Losers also go to the DO
[District Officer]. Instead of investigating the case, he will
transfer the case to Kambia [District Headquarters]. The door
has been opened to expeditors. If you don’t have connections
in Freetown, you can do nothing up-country. Everything costs
money and we are poor people.
40
Comments and Action Points on Local
Justice, CGRP Workshops, 2000
1. Leaders levy heavy fines not commensurate to crimes
committed by people. This has led to youths running away
to urban cities where rules are flexible (Badjia Chiefdom,
June 2000).
2. The Chiefs levy exorbitant fines for wife confessions,
“call name” or adultery, especially if the wives are those of
elders. This is a very nagging problem for the youth (Panga
Krim Chiefdom, May 2000).
3. [In group discussions] Chiefs were also accused of grossly
backing their relatives in disputes...In many cases, chiefs had
levied low fines where their relatives are involved but had
escalated such fines for people outside their family. To gain
respect of the people chiefs must exhibit maximum impartiality
in dealing with people. (Gorama Mende Chiefdom, July 2000).
4. ...the chief takes bribes from non-indigenous people in the
chiefdom for special protection and favouritism. As a result the
non-indigenes continue to violate chiefdom laws with impunity
(Falla Wondor Chiefdom, June 2000).
5. [The] Court Chairman is in conflict with [the] Court Clerk and
is frequently duped by [the] Court Clerk over court proceeds.
The court revenue is a source of conflict and mainly the Court
Chairman takes the lion’s share of these proceeds and is in
conflict with the [Court Members] over withholding payments
due to them. He also has problems with the Paramount Chief
if he doesn’t give revenue on demand. [The] Customary
Law Officer interferes with [the] Court by withdrawing cases
from the court to be settled (at greater expense) in Bo
(Gbo Chiefdom, May 2000).
6. There is no respect for Chiefdom Police since they are not
officially uniformed or attired. They have been reduced to the
rank of beggars with no money, no decent houses, no food and
so there is no regard for them in the chiefdom (Banta Mokelle
Chiefdom, July 2000).
7. The power of Chiefs is undermined by the Magistrate’s
Court. Cases already in [the] N.A. Court are withdraws and
taken to [the] Magistrate’s Court to the embarrassment of the
Chiefs (Nongowa Chiefdom, May 2000).
8. Seed rice and palm oil are produced in vast quantities in
this area. Consequently traders are drawn to the markets.
However the farm gate prices are very low. Traders can even
interfere in court business to ensure that the person being
fined has enough money to pay the fine to fight his case – at
extortionist prices. Traders have even been known to go so
far as to connive with the Court Chairmen to ensure that they
have first call on the cheapest produce (Bumpeh Chiefdom,
January 2000).
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Many of these problems are still affecting rural areas. For
example, in one recent case in Kenema District a young man
went to the Local Court in an attempt to win control over his
late father’s estate: a house situated at Tejan Street in Kenema
town. The plaintiff had only been 14 years old when his father
died and the defendant was his father’s surviving brother. The
house had been rented out to different persons, but now the
brother was attempting to seize the house. He was supported
in that plan by the plaintiff’s step-mother, who had born three
children with his late father. The step-mother had asked the
defendant to sell the house and to share proceeds with her.
But the plaintiff was now 18 years old and living in one of the
rooms in the house. He objected to the sale and the matter
was taken to the Local Court. However, the Paramount Chief
withdrew the matter from the Local Court and adjudicated it
himself. The Paramount Chief ordered the sale of the house.
He came to this decision by asking those in favour of the sale
to raise their hands and then those against to do the same. The
plaintiff was in the minority and the Paramount Chief ruled that
the house should be sold. It later emerged that the Paramount
Chief had bought the house himself to accommodate a relative
who was about to return from England. One and a half million
Leones were given to the Local Court Chairman to pass on to
the plaintiff as his own share.76
In another recent case, a Paramount Chief in Kailahun
District victimized a chiefdom resident for taking a case to the
police after the Chief himself had accepted bribes from a local
businessman to dismiss the resident’s complaint against
him. The complaint arose from a business arrangement
between a land owner and a chainsaw operator. Some
chainsaw owners asked the landowner for permission to fell
trees on his land, which was granted. Thirteen boards were
produced and the landowner was given three boards as
payment. After one month, one chainsaw operator returned
and continued to cut boards from the felled trees without the
landowner’s permission. When confronted by the landowner,
the chainsaw operator and his workers admitted that they
were cutting boards without his permission. The landowner
took the matter to the local Town Chief, claiming that the
chainsaw operator had been trespassing on his land and
stealing his property. The Town Chief reported the matter to
the Paramount Chief, who found in the chainsaw operator’s
favour and instructed the landowner to pay a total of Le
410,000 in fines for slander, summonsing fees and hearing
fees. The landowner subsequently reported the matter to
the Police who said that the case was a matter of larceny
which they should be dealing with and not the Paramount
Chief. This argument, however, did not sit well with the
Paramount Chief. The landowner was arrested and jailed by
the Paramount Chief for 14 days and told to pay Le 400,000
in further fines. After the 14 days, he was released and then
76. Field research, Abubakar Sidique Turay, December 2008
rearrested for failing to pay the sum demanded. Eventually,
the landowner, a poor farmer, had to borrow the money in
order to gain his freedom.77
The following testimony of a female Chiefdom Police
Officer provides a further example of the intimidation that
chiefdom residents can still suffer if they question the authority
of chiefs or attempt to use the local justice system to pursue
grievances against them:
 t the start of June, 2007, I had a confrontation with one of
A
the Sub-Chiefs in the chiefdom over the unfair treatment
of women in his locality. The matter was reported to the
Paramount Chief who, without investigating, ordered the roof
of my house to be uprooted as punishment for my action.
This was during the rainy season, and my entire belongings
got wet and eventually destroyed. My children and I had to
evacuate and sought refuge at my elder sister’s place. A few
weeks later, a senior Chiefdom Police Officer, (name withheld),
attacked and beat me up mercilessly (I suspect his act was
a machination). I decided to use the legal channel to secure
justice. Therefore, I had to summon him to the Local Court.
When the matter was called up for hearing, the Paramount
Chief intervened and asked the Court Chairman to dispose of
the case so that he (the Paramount Chief) could adjudicate over
it. For two months nothing was heard of my case. Sensing
that I was not going to get justice, I went to a women’s
rights organization in Bo for help. After some pressures from
this organization, the case was finally charged to the JPs’
[Justice of the Peace’s] Court in Bo. My hope of eventually
securing justice was again dashed when in the midst of the
proceedings, The Paramount Chief , for the second time, got
the court to dispose of my case. This became very frustrating
and I finally lost hope in the matter. To date, nothing has come
out of the case. Back in Jaiama, the Paramount Chief and other
chiefdom authorities continued to intimidate me and my family.
As a result, I transferred to another chiefdom in the far north of
Bo called Valunia, where I am currently resident.78
In these examples we can see several violations of
fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution, including
the rights to the protection of law and security of person
(Section 15a), protection from the deprivation of property
without compensation (Section 15d), freedom from unlawful
arrest and detention (Section 17) and protection from inhuman
or degrading treatment (Section 20). It is also apparent that
statutory guidelines on the jurisdictions of the various courts
are regularly flaunted, as are the guidelines on the magnitude
of the punishments Local Courts can hand down.
77. Field research, Abubakar Sidique Turay, December 2008.
78. Interview, female Chiefdom Police Officer, Valunia Chiefdom,
November 2008.
41
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
The adjudication of land disputes represents one type of
case over which chiefs, especially Paramount Chiefs, retain
close control.79 Here, chiefs can point to laws (notably the
preamble of the Provinces Land Act, Cap. 122 of the Laws
of Sierra Leone, 1960 and Section 28(d) Local Government
Act, 2004) which state that provincial land is “vested in”
and “held in trust for the people” by Chiefdom Councils
headed by Paramount Chiefs. In some areas, newly elected
Paramount Chiefs still undergo traditional cultural ceremonies
of investiture in which their lives are linked to the land, its
fertility and the health and wellbeing of its inhabitants. But
the problem with chiefs’ adjudication of land disputes is
that there is no formal mechanism to ensure that it is fair
and transparent.
For example, in Biriwa chiefdom farm land is apportioned
to villages. Families resident in these villages inherit specific
plots of land within these apportionments. In April 2003, the
most recent Limba Paramount Chief of Biriwa presided over
a land dispute between two villages. The essence of the case
was that the inhabitants of one village claimed that those
of another were encroaching on their ancestral land. The
case was complicated by the fact that the villagers accused
of encroachment were not residing in their settlement’s
original location; the village had moved to take advantage of
a roadside location several decades previously. The villagers
accused of encroachment argued that no knowledge of any
boundary agreement had been passed down to them by
their forefathers. The villagers complaining of encroachment
argued that there was no boundary agreement between
them because the encroaching villagers weren’t supposed to
be there in the first place! The Paramount Chief demanded
100,000 Leones from each party to hear the case. After
sending a delegation of elders to inspect the disputed land,
he decreed that the case was not resolvable and invited both
groups of villagers to try again with a new Paramount Chief
after he was dead. He did not return the hearing fee. The
details of the case were recorded by a local schoolteacher
on pages ripped out from a student exercise book. The notes
remained in his personal possession for several months but
he eventually lost them.80
79. In a recent survey of Local Court records in Kailahun, Pujehun,
Tonkolili and Koinadugu Districts, land cases were only recorded
in Kailahun District, representing 2.1% of all cases in that District;
see Koroma (2007).
80. This case was witnessed by Richard Fanthorpe in April 2003.
42
2.2.4 Ways Forward for Improving the
Local Justice System
The above discussion indicates that while chiefs still have an
important role to play in the local justice system, this role is in
urgent need of clarification.
First, it is very unlikely that corruption in the Local Courts
and Chiefs’ judicial hearings will diminish until Local Court
functionaries and chiefs cease to rely so heavily on fees and
fines for private income. As a Village Chief observed during a
discussion groups in Bo District in November 2008:
I am a farmer but I have to drop my cutlass whenever I am
summoned to the PC in Bo. I get to Bo and we all sit down in
the Court Barray to wait for the Paramount Chief and the DC
[“District Commissioner”, i.e. a Local Government Ministry
official.] As long as they are not there we sit down and sweat.
When they arrive we all stand up like school children and then
sit down again. We have to do what they tell us. Then we are
dismissed with no food and no (money for) transport. I come
home having lost a day of farming. So when I fine you 5,000
Leones for something am I going to refund it?
Providing adequate salaries for Local Court functionaries,
Chiefdom Police and chiefs and a proper salary structure
for all ranks of chief (i.e. Village Chiefs and Section Chiefs
should receive proper salaries, not rebates on local tax
collections) is more than just a strategy for combating corrupt
justice. The Sierra Leone government also needs to revisit
an issue of principle raised almost forty years ago by UNDP
consultant C. Viswasam: that in performing their statutory
duties in maintaining law and order in their localities, chiefs
are performing a service for the central state, which the state
must pay for. One obvious concern here is that if chiefs were
paid out of central government revenues rather than local
taxes, central governments’ political grip on them would only
increase. However, central government has been subsidizing,
and effectively controlling, chiefs’ salary payments for many
years. If it took over formal responsibility for chiefs’ salaries, the
mutual obligations of state and chiefs would at least become
more transparent.
Second, the idea enshrined in the Chiefdom Councils
Act (Cap.61 of the Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960), that chiefs
should maintain order in their localities simply by exercising
their authority as chiefs, is a throwback to colonial “indirect
rule” and needs to be revised to reflect 21st century
realities. The law should recognize that chiefs of all ranks
play a key role in mediating problems and disputes at the
community level, including disputes between community
members and outside parties. It would be unrealistic to
expect chiefs living in remote villages not to authorize
on-the-spot punishments for minor offences. But the law
should also protect the rural poor from being subjected to
corrupt and vindictive judgements in chiefs’ informal courts.
Institutional strengthening is crucial here. The Sierra Leone
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
government is already following the lead of NGOs in piloting
support to paralegal services and strengthening liaison
between chiefdom authorities and the SLP.81 Providing the
rural poor with a realistic opportunity of obtaining justice
independently of chiefs, should they wish to do so, would
help to re-establish chiefs in their role as community advisors
and mediators.
Institutional strengthening for better justice and security
should be strategic and multifaceted. For example, now that
the administration of the Local Courts is to be placed under the
Ministry of Justice (see Chapter 3.2), Local Court Chairmen
should cease to become political footballs between Paramount
Chiefs and Provincial Secretaries. As their appointments
gain legitimacy, senior bureaucrats and politicians will have
fewer pretexts for intervening in the local justice system. The
same principle should also apply to the Chiefdom Police, an
organization that has suffered badly from unpaid salaries, poor
equipment and low staff morale since the end of the civil war.
Placing the Chiefdom Police under the management of the
SLP will help to improve liaison and coordination between the
two organizations without compromising the integrity of the
Chiefdom Police as a community-based force with its own
methods of recruitment and training. This was indeed the
direction in which the above-mentioned Local Government
Review Commission was seeking to travel almost 40 years ago.
Third, as several recent studies have pointed out (e.g.
Alterman, et al, 2003), the interface between customary law
and state law needs to be better defined. In recent years,
the Justice Sector Development Programme has been
piloting the restatement of customary law in some districts.82
Restatement basically entails writing down laws and their
usages in one document. This process is different from
codification, which entails entrusting binding legal force to the
laws so documented. Codifying customary law would freeze
it and deny it the flexibility that is its defining characteristic. A
restatement of customary laws and usages would improve all
justice practitioners’ knowledge of these laws, and generate
more informed understanding of the social context in which
they are applicable.
Restatement of customary law is also urgently needed
given the numerous social protection laws that have been
appearing on the statute in recent years, notably the Child Rights
Act, 2007; The Devolution of Estates Act, 2007; the Domestic
Violence Act, 2007 and the Registration of Customary Marriages
and Divorce Act, 2009. All of these Acts impact on family and
property relations that, in the provinces, are currently governed
by customary law. However, these new laws reflect post-war
social changes and the level of local demand for them is a matter
to be determined rather than assumed.
81. Government of Sierra Leone, 2008. Justice Sector Reform and
Investment Plan: 2008-2010, Freetown, March 2008
82. Justice Sector Development Programme, Progress Report,
December 2006
Chiefs could play a leading role in this restatement process,
especially now that increasing numbers of Paramount Chiefs
have been educated to university level. Land is a special case
within that process, given the primacy of laws protecting
customary tenure of land in the provinces, the importance of
agriculture in the Sierra Leone economy and the recent efforts
of government to stimulate commercial investment in farming.
It is vital that land cases are properly recorded, not only to
safeguard the interests of poor farmers but also to establish a
body of legal precedents for the adjudication of appeals in the
higher courts.
2.3 Taxation and Representation
2.3.1 Chiefdoms and Local Councils
Democratic decentralization – the devolution of central
government functions to elected local authorities – was a
policy priority for Ahmad Tejan Kabbah’s Sierra Leone People’s
Party (SLPP) government when it was first elected in February
1996. Public consultations on this policy got underway in
Freetown and the provinces soon after the restoration of
civilian rule in February 1998. These consultations, facilitated
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
revealed strong grassroots support for decentralization, based
on a general understanding that exclusion from the processes
of government was a major source of poverty and insecurity in
rural areas. As the summary report notes:
 ierra Leoneans believe that the centralization of government
S
powers and functions over the past two and a half decades,
and the consequent exclusion of the majority of Sierra
Leoneans from the planning and management of development
activities that concern them, are among the root causes of
the many social ills within the country today. These include
violence, general indiscipline, corruption and poverty. There
was, therefore, a unanimous call for decentralization through
the restoration of appropriate local government institutions.83
District and Town Councils had been reactivated under
Committees of Management in 2000, but the Sierra Leone
Government and international donors decided upon further
public consultation and technical preparation. A second
Task Force on Decentralization and Local Government was
commissioned, and throughout 2003 it organized expert
seminars and consultancy studies on the modalities of
decentralization, plus a further series of public consultations in
the capital and provinces. The Sierra Leone Parliament passed
a new Local Government Act (LGA) in February 2004, which
paved the way for local elections the following May; the first in
Sierra Leone since the 1960s. Following the local
83. Republic of Sierra Leone and UNDP, Nation-Wide Consultative
Process (October-December,1998), Volume 1, Main Report, Freetown,
January 1999, pp. v-vi.
43
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
elections, the Sierra Leone government, again with donor
support, established a Decentralization Secretariat (DecSec)
to coordinate action among central government ministries and
provide training and other assistance to the new councils.
The LGA establishes the new councils as the highest
authorities in their localities. They have authority under the
Act to oversee the Chiefdom Councils in the performance
of any functions they may delegate to them, determine the
rate of local tax, approve the annual budgets of the Chiefdom
Councils and oversee the implementation of these budgets
(Section 20, Subsection 2, clauses h-j). The LGA reinstates
the old system whereby the local councils claim a precept
on revenues collected by the chiefdoms. Yet, the LGA also
confirms the original functions of Chiefdom Councils as
established by the Chiefdom Councils Act and Provinces Lands
Act (Caps. 61 and 122 of the Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960): a)
preventing the commission of offences; b) prohibiting illegal
gambling; c) making bye-laws and d) holding land in trust for
the people of the chiefdom (Section 28). The LGA also reserves
seats for Paramount Chiefs on local councils on a quota basis.
Many complications have arisen in the relationship
between the local councils and the chiefdoms.
First, international donors’ strong support for the
decentralization programme led many people in Sierra Lone to
believe that the new councils would become leading conduits
for development investment. Urbanised party members flocked
to rural areas to compete for nominations in the inaugural council
elections, often forcing locally based politicians to fight on
independent tickets (Brown, et al, 2006). Many among the first
intake of local councillors interpreted the provisions of the LGA
as giving them personal authority over Paramount Chiefs. For
the first time ever, Paramount chiefs now had serious political
rivals in their localities (Fanthorpe, 2006). In Makeni, for example,
the APC won control over the Town Council despite the local
Paramount Chief’s heavy canvassing on behalf of the SLPP. The
incoming Council Chairman issued a public condemnation of the
pre-decentralization management of local revenues, in which the
Paramount Chief had played a leading role. The latter retaliated
by announcing a policy of non-cooperation with the town
council. In a subsequent interview, the Paramount Chief argued
that he retained two key political advantages over local councils.
First, he held office for life while local councillors only served
four year terms; second as the person responsible for the
welfare of the land and people of his chiefdom, no development
activity could take place there without his knowledge and
permission.84 Another Paramount Chief was even more blunt
when remarking that whatever powers local councillors claim,
when they set foot in his chiefdom they were his “subjects”.85
84. Interview, Paramount Chief Bai Sebora Kasanga II, Makeni,
October 2005
85. Interview, Paramount Chief Bai Sunthuba Osara III, Yele,
Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, December 2008.
44
Five years on and the situation has settled down considerably,
at least on the surface. Early optimism within local councils
over the resources available to them has been replaced by
recurrent anxiety over securing adequate funding. The political
opportunists have moved on and in some areas, the 2008
intake of local councillors is considerably younger and more
community based than before (Fanthorpe, 2009). As a result
of these developments, local council activities have begun to
mesh, however informally, with the chieftaincy system and its
politics. In Biriwa chiefdom for example, the local councillor
representing the western ward is a Mandingo from Karina,
the councillor representing the southern ward is a member
of the Kamabai ruling house and a nephew of a former Biriwa
Paramount Chief, while the councillor for the northern ward,
the current Bombali District Council Chairman, is a descendant
of the Bumban ruling house on his mother’s side and the son
of a former Treasury Clerk who lived and worked in Kamabai
for most of his life. In neighbouring Tonkolili District, the current
Council Chairman is a descendant of a ruling house of one
chiefdom in the District, a fact he frequently mentions in
meetings with community people (Fanthorpe 2009).
Second, complications of a different nature have arisen in
relation to the Ward Development Committees (WDCs). The
LGA assigns functions to Ward Development Committees
(WDCs) that have long been part of the de facto functional
repertoire of the chiefdoms. These include mobilizing local
residents for the implementation of self-help and development
projects, providing a focal point for discussion of local
problems and needs (with a view to developing action plans
and making recommendations to higher authorities) and
organizing communal and voluntary work (Sections 95 and
96). According to the LGA, each WDC should be comprised
of the local councillor, Paramount Chief and no more than ten
ordinary members (of which five must be women) elected by
the ward residents in a public meeting.
The WDCs were designed to facilitate community
oversight over local development activities initiated by the
new councils. The WDC concept was strongly supported by
international donor agencies, many of whom believed that
chiefdom structures were unfit to manage development in
a fair and transparent manner.86 The Village Development
Committees (VDCs) that had been formed in response to early
post-war relief efforts had come under heavy criticism from
international NGO staff, the argument being that they were
dominated by patriarchal elites and were unrepresentative of
the interests of women, youths and the poorest community
members (e.g. Archibald and Richards, 2002). However,
no resources were made available for WDC elections and
many among the original intake of local councillors simply
nominated their WDCs. Inevitably, many current and former
WDC members in rural areas have close social and family ties
86. Interview, Sylvia Fletcher, United Nations Development Programme,
Freetown, October 2005
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
to chiefdom authorities. For example, the WDC member in
Bumban between 2004 and 2008 was the wife of the Bumban
Section Chief. Her successor in 2008 was the daughter of a
former Biriwa Paramount Chief and estranged wife of a senior
APC party official. Whether the WDCs have succeeded where
the early post-war VDCs failed is therefore open to question.
As early as 2005, members of DecSec staff were
reporting that many WDC members were refusing to attend
meetings without receiving per diems and travel expenses,
although neither were included in local council budgets.
Councillors were also complaining that they could not afford
to provide food and lodging for WDC members attending
meetings (Brown, et al, 2006). In some areas, the recent
intake of younger, more community based councillors has
benefitted WDCs, since their members are better placed to
liaise between communities and councillors. But even today,
WDCs remain most effective when they receive direct NGO
support and have been specifically included in the participatory
monitoring and evaluation of NGO projects (Fanthorpe, 2009).
Meanwhile, community life has moved on since the end of
the war and NGOs are helping to facilitate the formation of VDCs
that do in fact represent the interest of women, youths and the
poorest of the poor. For example, in village discussion groups in
Bo district, an NMJD-supported paralegal observed that “people
are beginning to accept change; they now accept, for example,
that women should be part of decision making”.He went on
to note that “youths are now being called to elders’ meetings
and whatever the outcome, it is agreed with them”.An NMJD
fieldworker added that villages now have elected VDCs that
include youth and women’s representatives. The fieldworkers
are working hard to forge links between VDCs and WDCs.87
Unlike WDCs, VDCs are not recognized in law. But
structures at this level are clearly necessary for effective
development administration, especially since villages remain
primary references of social identification and belonging and
since the populations served by WDCs number in thousands.
This point came out clearly in village discussion groups recently
facilitated by MCSL in Kailahun District. In one discussion,
villagers complained that the “WDC should be reporting their
meeting outcomes to we the community members which
they are not doing”. In another village, people complained
that “none of our community members was invited to the
WDC election in Ward 24, we are not happy about that” and
that “we need our VDC members to be on the WDC so that
development can be fostered”.88 Since villages represent the
bottom tier of chiefdom administration, there is an opportunity
here to begin the formal integration of chiefdom structures into
the local government system.
87. Village discussion group, Kpetema, Bumpeh Ngao Chiefdom,
Bo District, November 2008.
88. Village discussion groups, Yeikandor and Wonde villages,
Njaluahun Chiefdom, October 2008.
Third, by far the most pressing problem in the relationship
between the chiefdoms and local councils concerns the
collection and usage of revenue. Many chiefdoms still
employ, at least notionally, large numbers of functionaries
that include Treasury Clerks, Court Chairmen, Court Clerks,
Chiefdom Police, Traditional Birth Attendants, Health
Inspectors and labourers. While the local councils oversee
chiefdom administration finances, neither they nor the Local
Government Service Commission are responsible for hiring
these workers or monitoring their pay and conditions. That
responsibility, for all functionaries except Court Chairmen,
lies with the Chiefdom Councils. At present therefore, local
revenue collection remains the primary responsibility of poorly
trained and infrequently remunerated Treasury Clerks and
other chiefdom functionaries.
To complicate matters further, oversight over all aspects
of chiefdom administrations except finance and development
is now the responsibility of the Provincial Secretary, who took
over that role from the now defunct position of Senior District
Officer. Furthermore, the Central Chiefdom Finance Clerks
(CCFCs) remain in post. They are responsible for training
Treasury Clerks and producing chiefdom financial accounts
for auditing purposes. They are expected to work closely with
the local councils, but they remain, for the time being at least,
employees of central government.
Neither chiefs nor local councillors and council
administrations find the current revenue collecting
arrangements satisfactory. For example, the Paramount Chief
in Bumpeh Ngao Chiefdom claimed that the District Council
was not doing anything to earn the precept it takes from the
revenue collected in his chiefdom and that he and his people
were “discouraged”. Last year, he went on, Bumpeh paid the
highest precept of all chiefdoms in Bo District. Furthermore,
the District Council and the chiefdom are supposed to share
the ground rent paid by rutile mining companies working
in the chiefdom, but the chiefs claims that the chiefdom
never receives it.89 On the other side of the coin, a District
Council Chairman complained during an interview that
chiefdom authorities were regularly withholding revenues
from the local councils and that they were supported in
such practices by Provincial Secretaries and higher political
authorities in Freetown. As a result, the Councils are always
short of operating funds and unable to plan effectively
because, as he put it, “it is always difficult to budget on
another man’s pocket”. In a subsequent interview, he stated
that he was attempting to win government approval for the
transformation of the Chiefdom Police into a “District Police”
force capable of monitoring revenue collection effectively and
tracking down defaulters.90
89. Interview, Paramount Chief Thomas Kposowa, Bumpeh Ngao
Chiefdom, November 2008
90. Interviews, Eric Dura Sesay, Bombali District Council Chairman,
Makeni, October 2005 and December 2008
45
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
2.3.2 Case Study: Conflicts over Revenue
Collection in Tonkolili District91
Further illustration of the current problems between local
councils and chiefdoms over revenue collection is provided
by the following case study of Tonkolili District. Like other
local councils, Tonkolili District Council (TDC) has set the rate
of local tax at 5,000 Leones per person. Local tax has thus
become a significant revenue source. According to figures
obtained from the Tonkolili CCFC, the local tax collected in
the district was 166.6 Million Leones in 2005, 146.2 Million
in 2006, 96.6 Million in 2007, and 315.2 Million in 2008. The
greatly increased tax collection in 2008 reflects the efforts
of government agencies, including the police, to check the
public for tax receipts and ensure that every adult citizen has
paid. All revenues collected by the chiefdoms are now paid
into separate bank accounts, the only authorized signatories
for which are the Paramount Chief, Treasury Clerk, and Chief
Administrator (CA). It is only when the money is deposited and
properly accounted for that TDC can claim its precept.
In theory, TDC should receive 20% of market dues
and licence fee revenues and 40% of local tax. Of the
remaining 60% of the local tax take, 40% goes to chiefdom
administrations, 10% to the CCFC’s office and the remaining
10% to Village and Section Chiefs. With so much money
becoming available, Paramount Chiefs are now arguing that
the tax paid by communities should be reinvested in the
development of those specific communities, not the district
as a whole. In other words, they believe that chiefdom
administrations should keep all of the revenues they collect.
In a public meeting held in November 2008, the TDC
leadership revealed that one chiefdom administration
has not paid anything into its bank account for two years,
despite collecting revenues over that time.92 The Paramount
Chief of this particular chiefdom is a noted critic of the local
councils. When interviewed in April 2007 he argued at some
length that Donors and NGOs should be assisting chiefdom
administrations, not local councils. A highly educated man, he
became a leading advisor to President Koroma after the latter’s
election victory in September 2007. Inquiries among chiefdom
people revealed that the tax monies were still being held by
local Section Chiefs. The general view was that the Section
Chiefs would not have been so bold as to withhold the money
without the backing of the Paramount Chief.
91. This case study is based on field research carried out by
Richard Fanthorpe for Concern Worldwide in January and February 2009;
see Fanthorpe (2009).
92. Details of interviews in this and the next two paragraphs have been
withheld due to the sensitivity of the issues discussed.
46
It appeared that the Paramount Chief was exploiting his elite
political connections in withholding local tax monies, but
his stance also drew attention to the fact that nobody in the
district seemed to know where the 60% of local revenues
due to the chiefdoms is going. Functionaries employed by
chiefdom administrations (e.g. Chiefdom Police, Treasury
Clerks, etc) claim that they are not being paid, senior chiefs
are paid intermittently by central government and no services
are being delivered. Two Treasury Clerks were interviewed
during the research and both were asked if the old accounting
system of a) drawing up estimates of chiefdom administration
revenue and expenditure at the beginning of each year and b)
conducting a full audit of actual revenue and expenditure at
the end of each year was still followed. One answered that
the accounting period was now supposed to be three years
but that he was new in post and had not yet conducted an
audit. His predecessor had taken all the accounting records
with him when he had been transferred to another job the
previous year and all he had in his possession were bank
statements and a petty cash book. The other Treasury Clerk
answered in the same vein, only having been in post a few
months. When the same question was put to the CCFC, he
referred the matter back to the Treasury Clerks. After further
discussion with DecSec staff it eventually emerged that the
Ministry for Internal Affairs, Local Government & Rural Affairs
(MIALGRA) in Freetown is still controlling chiefdom financial
accounts, summoning CCFCs and Treasury Clerks to the
capital every year to assist in the preparation of budgets. Such
practices contravene the clauses in the Local Government
Act that establish district councils as the highest authorities
in their localities with responsibility for approving the annual
budgets of chiefdom administrations and overseeing the
implementation of these budgets.
Such lack of transparency sows mistrust. For example, it
was common knowledge in TDC that the Paramount Chief
who was refusing to pay tax distrusted the CCFC, who
also happened to be an indigene of his chiefdom. Under
decentralization, CCFCs no longer have authority to withdraw
money from chiefdom bank accounts, but the Paramount
Chief had previously accused the CCFC of doing just that.
The CCFC had been exonerated by a Ministerial inquiry team,
but the mistrust remained. Tensions also escalated when a
Treasury Clerk, who had been pursuing the Section Chiefs
to hand over the tax monies, died unexpectedly prompting
rumours of witchcraft. Eventually the Freetown press got hold
of the story and the negative publicity stung the Paramount
Chief into action. By late January 2009, word was circulating in
the District that the Paramount Chief had instructed his Section
Chiefs to release the tax money for deposit in the bank.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
The tax issue was also raised with the senior chiefs who
preside over the chiefdom while the Paramount Chief is away
in Freetown. They claimed that the tax collection had been
delayed because polygamous husbands had been struggling
to find the money to pay for their wives. It was suggested to
them that it would be easier to leave the task of collecting tax
to TDC. They were aghast at this idea, claiming that “Town and
Section Chiefs are the only ones who know their people”. If
a non-local person attempted to collect tax, they argued, the
people would simply run away from them. But by no means
all chiefdom authorities in the District are reluctant to pay over
taxes. Another chiefdom in the district paid over all the taxes
assessed for 2008 with exemplary promptness. When the
chiefdom authorities were interviewed, they claimed that the
community people had mobilized themselves to pay tax as
an expression of support for a highly respected Regent Chief.
They had shown a unity of purpose in performing their civic
duty and as far as they were concerned, it was now up to TDC
and the government to keep up their end of the bargain and
bring development to the chiefdom.93
Senior Chiefs, Kunike Barina Chiefdom, January 2009
93. Meeting with the chiefs and elders of Kunike Barina chiefdom,
Makali, January 2009
Yet, the Ministry has recently announced a freeze on chiefdom
bank accounts and decreed that the precept on local tax for the
year 2008 will be withheld from local councils and used to pay
arrears in paramount chiefs’ salaries. The legality of this decree
is questionable, although nobody in the local government
system appears to have challenged it publicly. Commenting
on this decree, a Provincial Secretary interviewed in January
2009 claimed that the Ministry had taken action because
the local councils were failing to bring development to the
chiefdoms. But he also made further disarmingly candid
remarks that indicate where the 60% of local revenues due
to chiefdom administrations are still going. He argued that
political accountability works differently in Sierra Leone as
compared to Western countries. Ministers and other senior
government figures expect to be royally entertained when they
visit rural areas. If they are not satisfied with local hospitality,
they will block development in that locality. Revenue deposited
in chiefdom administration bank accounts, he went on, is often
used as a “hospitality” slush fund for visiting dignitaries. He
concluded by observing that central government will always
side with the chiefs when they come into conflict with the local
councils because a Paramount Chief can still deliver “40,000
votes” to a political party at election time.94
2.3.3 Ways Forward for Improving the Local
Government System
As noted earlier, the government constantly reminds people
about their civic responsibilities, especially with regard to
paying taxes. Indeed, when he was first elected President
Ernest Bai Koroma made several speeches stressing the
importance of a “social contract” between government and
people, where citizens pay, either directly or via taxes, for
services provided by government. But such well meaning
sentiments are hollow if people pay their taxes and see no
visible return. Lack of transparency in financial administration
only breeds local suspicion that revenues are being consumed
by distant elites who have no legal or moral right to them. That
suspicion also exacerbates conflict between the chiefdoms
and the local councils.
Clearly, the present division of functions in which
chiefdoms are primarily responsible for collecting revenues
and the local councils responsible for delivering services and
development inputs is untenable. The logical solution might
be that local councils take over responsibility for collecting
all revenues, but the political reality is that most rural Sierra
Leoneans’ primary loyalty is to their chiefdoms and they
would resist extending further powers to bureaucrats and
functionaries whom they are already inclined to distrust.
94. Details of interview withheld
47
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
The above-noted Paramount Chief who refused to pay tax to
TDC strongly advocates for the return of planning and budget
making authority to the chiefdoms as established by the
original Chiefdom Treasuries Ordinance of 1937. Yet that is
no real solution to the revenue mobilisation problem. In their
present form, neither the Chiefdom Councils nor the Chiefdom
Committees are sufficiently representative of community
interest to retain public trust. Furthermore, and as C. Viswasam
pointed out nearly 40 years ago, they simply lack the capacity
to perform local government functions (Viswasam, 1972). One
Paramount Chief interviewed in May 2002 was very receptive
to the idea of an elected Chiefdom Committee, although
another Paramount Chief interviewed more recently argued
that such an innovation would simply “bring politics” into
these Committees, like the politics that currently plague the
Chiefdom Councils.95 But if chiefs want to be more involved in
the decentralized government system, they will have to make
concessions to institutional reform.
The only answer in the long term is that the chiefdoms
become more fully integrated into the local government
system. Senior members of DecSec lament what they call
the “missing bottom” of decentralization, i.e. the fact that
institutional reform has not extended down to the community
level. The problems experienced by WDCs shows that the
solution does not lie in creating new institutions whose
activities and functions overlap with those of chiefdom
institutions. Incorporating the new generation of VDCs into the
local government system has been noted already as a possible
way forward. Once that incorporation is underway, the task
of convincing chiefs of the merits of a more democratically
representative Chiefdom Committee, coordinating between
VDCs and District Councils, may be that much easier.
95. Interview, Paramount Chief Charles Caulker, Freetown, May 2002;
Interview, Paramount Chief Bai Sunthuba Osara III, Gbonkolenken
Chiefdom, December 2008.
48
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
3. Strengths and Weaknesses of Recent
Legislation Affecting Chieftaincy
3.1 The Chieftaincy Act 2009
The primary purpose of the Chieftaincy Act, 2009, is to set
out the procedures for electing and appointing Paramount
Chiefs and Sub-Chiefs. It builds upon guidelines for paramount
chieftaincy elections issued by the government of Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah in 2002 and represents the first time in Sierra Leone’s
history that these procedures have been detailed in law.
Much of the Act reiterates the status quo. For example,
Section 2 states that “the Chiefdom Councillors of the
Chiefdom shall elect a new Paramount Chief in the chiefdom in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and the customary
law of the chiefdom”. Section 3 provides for the appointment
of a Regent Chief by the Minister responsible for Local
Government in consultation with the Chiefdom Committee,
while Section 4 states that the Chiefdom Councillor list
should be specially revised for the purposes of the election
and include the Regent Chief, Speaker, Section Chiefs,
Court Chairmen, Ceremonial Chiefs (“where the paramount
chieftaincy in the chiefdom is by customary law linked with
secret societies”), Member of Parliament for the constituency
in which the chiefdom is situated, any government Minister
from the chiefdom and finally Chiefdom councillors
“representing every twenty taxpayers”.The 1956 guidelines
on the specifics of this representation (Box 1, p. 17) are not
included in the Act. Section 4(4) states that “The revision of the
Chiefdom Councillors’ List shall be undertaken by the office
of the Provincial Secretary in collaboration with the National
Electoral Commission (NEC)”.
Sections 5 and 6 reiterate the status quo in respect of
the Declaration of Rights meeting (see Box 3, p. 33). The
meeting is “convened by the Provincial Secretary” who serves
as Declaration Officer. In a departure from earlier practice,
Section 6(2) states that “where the chiefdom concerned is an
amalgamated chiefdom the Declaration Officer shall ensure
that the conduct of the election of a Paramount Chief for the
Chiefdom is done on a rotational crowning basis and further
ensure that the same is complied with.” This provision removes
the need for written proof of rotational crowning agreements96
but does not specify how rotational crowning will be organized.
Section 7 emphasises that “in any paramount chieftaincy
election, the responsibility of the Government is limited
only to the facilitation of the process so as to ensure that
the election is conducted in a fair and transparent manner”
and that: “no government Minister or other official, and
no political party, whether collectively or otherwise, shall
promote or show preference for the candidature of any
particular contestant in a paramount chieftaincy election”.
96. see BKM case study, box 4, page 41
Sections 8 and 9 deal with eligibility of candidates and reiterate
the status quo in requiring candidates to be born in wedlock
to a “rightful claimant in a recognized ruling house” or have
“direct paternal lineage” for such a claimant whether born
in wedlock or not. A recognized ruling house is now legally
defined as “one that has been established and in existence
as such at independence on 27th April, 1961”. Persons not
qualified to stand as candidates are also the same as before:
those with criminal convictions, deposed chiefs within 5 years
of their deposition and adopted children of ruling houses.
Sections 11 and 12 provide for the appointment of Assessor
Chiefs in chieftaincy elections. These Assessors are appointed
by the Minster responsible for local government.
Sections 13 to 17 deal with the acceptance of aspirants
as fully fledged candidates, with the provision that aspirants
whose qualifications have been disputed will be allowed to
stand as candidates providing their candidature is supported
by “the Provincial Secretary, the Assessor Chiefs and by
two-thirds of the Chiefdom Councillors present and voting
by secret ballot”.The Act recapitulates current practice in
the election process: 1) winning candidates should poll
55% of the votes and the runoffs should be decided by
simple majority; 2) when a new Paramount Chief is elected,
all Chiefdom Councillors sign an Attestation Document
signifying their agreement to recognize the new chief and
“obey his lawful order and instructions”; 3) the government
recognizes the election as valid when it accepts a report
from the Provincial Secretary signalling satisfaction with the
conduct of the election. Section 18 goes on to state that
“the validity of the election of any person as a Paramount
Chief may be challenged by any Chiefdom Councillor of the
chiefdom within seven days after the declaration of the result
of the election by a petition addressed to the High Court”. All
the grounds for challenge relate to the eligibility of candidates
as covered by Sections 8 and 9, except for a Section 18 (1b),
which provides for a challenge if “the election was otherwise
improper”. However, an earlier clause appears to rule out
challenges to election results on the basis of fraudulently
inflated taxpayer lists. Section 4(3) states that “subject to
paragraph (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 18, the election of
a Paramount Chief shall not be invalidated by any irregularity
in the revision on the Gazette List used for the election, but it
is an offence for any person compiling that list to knowingly
take into account an inflated number of taxpayers”.
49
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Sections 19 and 20 deal with the removal of Paramount
Chiefs and have been brought into line with Section 72 (4) of
the 1991 Constitution, which states that “a Paramount Chief
may be removed from office by the President for any gross
misconduct in the performance of the functions of his office
if after a public inquiry conducted under the Chairmanship of
a Judge of the High Court or a Justice of Appeal or a Justice
of the Supreme Court, the Commission of Inquiry makes an
adverse finding against the Paramount Chief, and the President
is of the opinion that it is in the public interest that the
Paramount Chief should be removed.” 97 Section 32 of the new
Act repeals Sections 5 and 25(c) of the Provinces Act (Cap. 60
of the Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960), which allow for the removal
of Paramount Chiefs for “subversive conduct.”
Sections 22-27 deal with the appointment and removal of
Speakers and Sub-Chiefs. In the past, Speakers were often
elected by Chiefdom Councillors but the new Act now states
that they shall be personal appointees of the Paramount Chief.
The rationale for this change, as explained by the Director of
Local Government in a meeting of the Task Force on Local
Government and Decentralization in 2003, was that some
elected Speakers were using their “mandate” to challenge the
authority of the Paramount Chief whenever he or she made an
unpopular decision.
The Act states that Section Chiefs shall be elected by the
Chiefdom Councillors in the relevant section and that Town
Chiefs shall be elected by the tax payers residing in the town.
It goes on to state, in respect of both Town Chiefs and Sections
Chiefs, that “if the Minister [of local Government] is satisfied
with the conduct of the election, the newly elected chief
shall be formally recognized by publication of the election in
the Gazette”.The Act goes on to state that Speakers, Section
Chiefs and Town Chiefs may be removed from office on the
recommendation of the Chiefdom Committee following
its investigation of complaints brought by the Paramount
Chief, Paramount Chief and Councillors and local tax payers
respectively. The Act specifies that appeals against removal are
to be dealt with in the first instance by the Provincial Secretary
with the final and binding decision resting with the Minister
responsible for local government.
97. The Constitutional Review Commission’s proposed amendment to
this Section is: “A Paramount Chief may be removed from office by the
President for any gross misconduct in the performance of the functions
of his office if after a public inquiry conducted under the Chairmanship of
a Judge of the High Court or a Justice of the Appeal Court or a Justice of
the Supreme Court, the Commission of Inquiry makes an adverse finding
against the Paramount Chief, and the President is of the opinion that it
is in the public interest that the Paramount Chief should be removed.
The report of the Commission of Enquiry shall, for the purposes of this
Constitution, be deemed to be a judgment of the High Court of Justice
and accordingly an appeal shall lie as of right from the Commission to
the Court of Appeal, and if thereafter the President is of the opinion that
it is in the public interest that the Paramount Chief should be removed, it
should be done accordingly.” See Report of the Commission to Review
the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991, January 2008.
50
Section 28 of the new Act states that “the Polling of any
Paramount Chieftaincy election shall be supervised by
the National Electoral Commission whose decision on an
electoral issue shall be final”. Section 29 lists the duties of
Paramount Chiefs as set out in the amendments to the 1991
Constitution: a) “supervise the collection of local tax and assist
the appropriate authority in the collection of other lawful taxes
to which members of his chiefdom are subject”; b) “use his
best ability to prevent the commission of offences within his
chiefdom and to maintain order and good government within
his chiefdom”; 3) “preserve or promote, as appropriate, and
to serve as the guardian of the customs and traditions of his
chiefdom”; 4) “to all intent and purposes a Paramount Chiefs
shall serve as an agent of development in his chiefdom”;
5) “to supervise the election of all Sub-Chiefs in his chiefdom”.
It is also stated that “for the purpose of his functions”, a
Paramount Chief shall “use his best ability to secure the
making of the appropriate bye-laws by the Chiefdom Council.
The government’s initiative in making the election of
Paramount Chiefs a specific subject of legislation is to be
applauded, and Section 7 of the new Act that seeks to give
paramount chieftaincy elections greater protection from
political interference is particularly welcome. However, the
Chieftaincy Act, 2009 clearly does not go far enough in terms
of reforming the ills that have been plaguing the chieftaincy
system in the past decades.
The failure of the government to reform the Electoral
College system in chieftaincy elections is particularly alarming.
As we saw in the previous chapter, case studies illustrate how
readily the present system for electing Paramount Chiefs is
abused. Control over Chiefdom Councillor lists is in the hands
of few people and they can easily be manipulated to favour
particular aspirants. A lack of consistent records of taxpayers
in a Chiefdom also makes it very easy to bloat the list of tax
payers. As a result, Chiefdom Councillors often do not function
as individuals conferring with those they represent to make
considered votes in paramount chieftaincy elections as much
as names and numbers on a list that are mobilized by groups
competing to control chieftaincy elections in pursuit of their
own selfish interests.
Section 4(3) states that fraudulent inflation of taxpayer lists
is an offence but also states that “irregularities” in the revision
of the gazetted Chiefdom Councillor list shall not constitute
grounds for invalidating an election. Here the government
is acknowledging, tacitly, that fraud is commonplace in the
revision of Chiefdom Councillor lists. Yet it seems to be worried
that if legal challenges to election results were permitted on
these grounds, the whole system for electing paramount
chiefs could collapse under the weight of these challenges.
If the system requires such protection, there is something
fundamentally wrong with it. Rather than protecting the
system from legal challenges the government should
have set about reforming it. Any system that prevents the
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
majority of local citizens from voting or their political leaders
is undemocratic. The Electoral College system is skewed in
favour of elderly males; women and youth are marginalized.
If the Chieftaincy system is to survive, political accountability
needs to shift downwards.
Furthermore, the Act is either deficient or inconsistent
on several issues, both major and minor. First, given that
the government has recently reported for the first time
on the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW), and given that there are female
Paramount Chiefs in some southern chiefdoms, the constant
reference to a Paramount Chief as “he” in the text of the Act
is unacceptably gender biased. Second, the provisions in the
Act regarding Ceremonial Chiefs do not solve the problem that
arose in the above-noted Biriwa case, where the government
decided that such chiefs were not part of Limba “custom” and
local Limba emphatically disagreed. It is certainly true that titled
officials with ceremonial duties connected to the death and
crowning of chiefs have a public profile in the Temne-speaking
area, but there are very few areas in Sierra Leone where
Paramount Chieftaincy is not “linked” with secret societies in
one way or another. Who therefore decides what is and what is
not “customary” for each chiefdom? Third, the same question
applies to the new provisions on rotational crowing. While
the removal of the requirement for written proof of rotational
crowning agreements is welcome, who now decides on the
order of rotation?
Fourth, while the Act states that a Paramount Chief should
serve as “an agent of development in his chiefdom”, there
is no mention in the Act whatsoever of the decentralized
councils. The LGA is explicit in establishing the District
Councils as the highest authorities in their localities with
primary responsibility for development. At first sight, this
clause might not appear controversial since Paramount
Chiefs are already members of WDCs and elect their own
representatives to sit on District Councils. However the new
Act does not make it clear whether Paramount Chiefs’ newly
specified functions as agents of development are a reflection
of their existing involvement in the District Council system or
whether it provides them with statutory license to engage
in development activities independent of District Council
oversight. Gaps and contradictions within local government
legislation have already created conflicts over roles and
responsibilities and the new Act seems to be multiplying them
rather than reducing them.
Fifth, similar gaps and contradictions appear in other
provisions of the Act. For example, the newly defined functions
assigned to Paramount Chiefs overlap with those assigned to
Chiefdom Councils under Cap.61 of the Laws of Sierra Leone,
1960. While this overlap reflects the fact that the Paramount
Chief is also the head of the Chiefdom Council, the Act appears
to be making the office of Paramount Chief a new focus of
these powers and functions at the expense of the Chiefdom
Council. All the historical evidence points to the fact that the
centralization of power at the chiefdom level creates division
and conflict and this section should not have been included
in the Act without further clarification of Paramount Chiefs’
powers vis a vis those of Chiefdom Councils as set out in Caps.
60 and 61 of the Laws of Sierra Leone (1960) and subsequent
amendments. Furthermore, why are Members of Parliament,
and Minsters who happen to have been born in a particular
chiefdom, included in Chiefdom Council lists by virtue of their
offices (which, incidentally, are hardly “customary” offices),
but not District and Town Councillors whose wards lie wholly or
partially within that chiefdom?
Sixth, why does the Act limit eligibility to challenge the
result of chieftaincy elections to Chiefdom Councillors? Surely
it is the right of all citizens to seek relief in the courts for their
legitimate grievances?
Further problems arise over the role of the NEC. With
respect to Section 4(4), it is not clear what form of “revision”
of the Chiefdom Council list is being referred to. Historically
revising the list entailed re-calculating the allocation of
Chiefdom Councillors to each locality in the chiefdom based
on the latest local tax assessments. But as we saw in the
Biriwa case, it can also mean adjusting and updating a
gazetted list based on a tax assessment made several years
earlier. Are NEC officials going to have access to the raw tax
data in order to ensure that the list is compiled in accordance
with the rules, or are they going to be asked to approve a
list that has simply been updated to fill vacancies caused by
recent deaths of Councillors? It is not clear whether the new
Act really achieves anything more than returning the NEC to
its pre-2006 role in observing paramount chieftaincy elections
and ensuring that the ballot of Chiefdom Councillors takes
place in a free and fair manner.
The Executive Secretary of the NEC, interviewed in
December 2008, argued that the NEC should have a much
stronger role in chieftaincy elections than the Act currently
allows. In the Commission’s view, the NEC should be on hand
to ensure that the candidates registered by the Provincial
Secretary actually go through the Declaration of Rights
process and meet the qualifications required by law. The
Commission also argues that the NEC should be taking the
lead in the registration of voters, meaning that the NEC should
be managing and authorizing the revision of Chiefdom Council
lists.98 Given the problems with chieftaincy elections detailed
in the last chapter, the case for handing over chieftaincy
elections to a professional election management body is
compelling. But the NEC would be even better placed to carry
out its constitutional mandate if the principle of universal adult
suffrage was introduced to paramount chieftaincy elections.
Again, the draft Chieftaincy Act does not go far enough to
ensure that paramount chieftaincy elections are free and fair.
98. Interview, Stephen Aiah Mattia, NEC Executive Secretary, Freetown,
December 2008.
51
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Finally, some sections of the Act continue to support excessive
central government control over chieftaincy affairs. For
example, the Act specifically states that Provincial Secretaries
should preside over chieftaincy elections in their capacity as
Declaration Officers and that government recognises the
validity of an election based on Provincial Secretaries’ reports.
In effect therefore, Provincial Secretaries are both managing
elections and monitoring them on behalf of the government. It
is not clear who is monitoring their performance.
Furthermore, while the Sierra Leone government’s
effort to standardize the appointment of sub-chiefs is to
be applauded, it is not clear why these community-level
elections should require the approval of the Ministry of Local
Government. It is doubtful whether provincial secretariats
have the administrative capacity to monitor the elections of
Town Chiefs and Section Chiefs in remote rural areas and
thus whether it is feasible to expect formal notification of
Sub-Chiefs’ elections to appear in the Gazette outside the
normal revision of Chiefdom Councillors lists every three
years. Yet the Act grants the Local Government Ministry the
power to annul the appointment of any Sub-Chief whose
election it considers unsatisfactory, without specifying the
grounds for that dissatisfaction or, it would appear, requiring
the Ministry to actually monitor that election. The Act goes
on to state that Speakers, Section Chiefs and Town Chiefs
may be removed from office on the recommendation of
the Chiefdom Committee following its investigation of
complaints brought by the Paramount Chief, Paramount Chief
and Councillors and local tax payers respectively. But since
a Paramount Chief is also the Chairman of the Chiefdom
Committee, he or she cannot bring personal complaints
against a Speaker or Section Chief for investigation by the
Committee without creating a conflict of interest. According
to the Act, appeals against the removal of Sub-Chiefs
from office are to be dealt with in the first instance by the
Provincial Secretary with the final and binding decision
resting with the local government Minister.
While the Act has some positive features, concern has to
remain that the government is intent on retaining direct control
over the chieftaincy system in order to carry on using it as an
instrument of political control over the countryside The present
system is fundamentally anti-democratic and facilitates the
very abuses of power that brought chieftaincy into discredit
before the recent civil war.
52
3.2 The Local Courts Bill, 2008 and the Justice
Sector Reform Strategy
On paper, the Local Courts Bill, 2008 is a far more radical piece
of legislation than the Chieftaincy Act 2009. In essence, the Bill
updates and expands upon the provisions of the Local Courts
Act, 1963 and subsequent amendments. The radical feature
of the Bill is to transfer the administration of Local Courts from
the Ministry responsible for Local Government to the Ministry
of Justice. The Chief Justice now appoints the Court Chairman
and all other functionaries after consultation with the Judicial
and Legal Service Commission.99
A Local Courts Service Committee will also be established
for each Province, for the purpose of advising the Commission
on appointments, transfers, promotions and dismissals of
officers and servants of Local Courts (Section 7 (1)). The
Committee is chaired by the resident High Court Judge of
the Province and consists of a Paramount Chief representing
the Council of Chiefs in the Province, a representative of the
Minister responsible for judicial affairs,, the Provincial Secretary,
a person with experience in the administration of Local Courts
and a representative of the District Council. Members of each
Local Courts Service Committee are appointed by the President.
While the Local Courts Service Committee has some
similarities with the Local Court Service Commission that
was established by the original Local Courts Act of 1963 (See
above, page 20), it is now less of an ad hoc body. It does
not therefore include the Paramount Chief of the particular
chiefdom in which court appointments are being made at
any given time. The Chiefdom Council no longer has a role
in appointing lesser court functionaries (i.e. Vice-Chairman,
Clerk of Court, Finance Clerk and Bailiff) and all fees, penalties,
fines, and other monies taken by the court are now to be paid
directly into the Consolidated Fund rather than chiefdom bank
accounts as before. The salaries of Court Chairmen and all
other functionaries are now to be paid out of the same Fund.
The Sierra Leone Government’s new Justice Sector
Reform Strategy recognizes the pivotal role played by chiefs
in the delivery of ‘primary’ justice.100 The strategy seeks to
improve the quality of ‘primary justice’ in the country through
activities that include training chiefs in basic concepts of
human rights, jurisdiction, appointment and tenure, and
basic record keeping. The 2008 strategy document also
acknowledges the chiefdom police as being in the frontline of
crime prevention in many local communities. It is expected
that the Ministry responsible for Local government will “clearly
define the roles and responsibilities of the Chiefdom Police,
train them to carry out these roles and responsibilities and
develop an effective performance management system.101
99. As established by section 140 of the Constitution
100. Primary justice is defined in the strategy as that delivered by local
courts and paramount chiefs’ courts.
101. Government of Sierra Leone, 2008. Justice Sector Reform and
Investment Plan: 2008-2010, Freetown, March 2008
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
The effect of the Local Courts Bill, 2008 is to separate the local
law courts completely from chiefdom administration. For the
first time in Sierra Leone’s history, the formal justice system
has been placed under one institutional umbrella, breaking
down old divisions created by colonial “indirect rule.” As
discussed above in Chapter 2.2.4, the great advantage of this
change is that a single authority will take overall responsibility
for the appointment, training and terms and conditions of
employment of all local law court functionaries. Answering
to a clear chain of command will enable these functionaries
to resist anyone seeking to exert political leverage on their
decision making. With court revenues paid directly into the
government’s coffers and the government taking responsibility
for functionaries’ salaries, both the opportunity and incentive
for financial corruption in the local law courts should be greatly
reduced. The Local Courts Bill is a historic step forward in
Sierra Leone’s system of governance and justice and the
sooner it is fully implemented the better.
However, there is no reason why the principles applied in
the new Bill cannot also be applied to the Chiefdom Police.
Looking at the situation logically, the agency that should be
taking the lead role in defining the roles and responsibilities of
the Chiefdom Police should by the SLP. Hopefully, the new Bill
can go on to set a precedent for further reforms of this kind.
3.3 The Local Government Act, 2004
The Local Government Act, 2004 is the oldest piece of
legislation considered in this report and is already the subject
of an internal governmental review. One of the main areas
earmarked for review is the division of functions between the
local councils and the chiefdoms.102 Clearly, the local revenue
collection system requires urgent attention and along with
it the overlap of functions between chiefdom structures and
WDCs. But the root of the problem is the old idea, inherited
from colonial “indirect rule”,that the chiefdoms are responsible
for law and order while the local councils are responsible for
development. As we have seen, the Chieftaincy Act, 2009 is
now emphasizing that Paramount Chiefs should serve as agents
of development. If it achieves nothing else, the review of the
2004 Act should seek to ensure that chiefs become part of the
local government system and not remain in competition with it.
102. Interview, Emmanuel Gaima, Director, DecSec, December 2008.
53
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
4. Chieftaincy and Decentralization in other African Countries:
What Lessons for Sierra Leone?
There have been close links between Sierra Leone and Ghana
on policy relating to chieftaincy for many years. Many of the
colonial laws on chieftaincy in Sierra Leone were adapted
from existing laws enacted in Ghana (Gold Coast). More
recently, former President Kabbah, then serving as an advisor
to the NPRC junta, led a delegation to Ghana to learn from
its experiences in planning and implementing democratic
decentralization. Ghanaian chieftaincy experts also provided
inputs into the short-lived Task Force on Chiefdom Governance
set up by the Kabbah government in 2006.103 Sierra Leone’s
post-war decentralization programme was also based on
lessons learned in Uganda, which is generally regarded
as having one of the most far reaching decentralization
programmes in the whole of Africa. As part of UNDP’s
assistance to the Sierra Leonean programme, the head of
the Ugandan Decentralisation Secretariat participated as
an advisor to the Kabbah government’s Task Force on Local
Government and Decentralization for 10 months in 2003.
One of the striking differences between Sierra Leone and
Ghana and Uganda is that in these two countries, there is
no separate sphere of chiefdom governance responsible for
collecting tax and maintaining law and order. Both countries
have a system of elected councils that extend from the
district level right down to the village level. These councils
are responsible for collecting all local revenues and helping
to maintain national security. Chiefs have no formal role
in them. In Ghana, 30% of all seats in local government
councils were reserved for chiefs until 1988, when the
Rawlings administration removed that privilege. One third
of the membership of District Assemblies is still appointed
by central government and traditional leaders are often
included in these appointments in their individual capacities
as respected community leaders (Crook, 2005). Section
246(f) of the Constitution of Uganda (1995) states explicitly
that: “a traditional leader or cultural leader shall not have or
exercise any administrative, legislative or executive powers
of Government or local government” and Section 246(3d)
states that: “no person shall be compelled to pay allegiance
or contribute to the cost of maintaining a traditional leader or
cultural leader.” The constitutions of both countries also exclude
chiefs from taking part in “active party politics” (Ghana) and
joining and participating in “partisan politics” (Uganda).
103. This Task Force ceased operations ahead of the 2007 Presidential
and Parliamentary elections and was not reactivated by the incoming
APC Government. It did not produce a public report.
54
Chieftaincy in both countries has a more corporate character
than chieftaincy in Sierra Leone, in the sense that chiefs
derive income from managing community assets attached
to their offices Section 246(3a) of the 1995 Constitution
of Uganda, drawn up two years after the institution
of chieftaincy was formally restored by the Museveni
administration, states that chieftaincy is a “corporation sole
with perpetual succession and with capacity to sue and be
sued and to hold assets or properties in trust for itself and
the people concerned. Ugandan chiefs derive income from
land rents, donations from external sources and voluntary
contributions from their subjects (Mukyala-Makiika, 1998).
Ghanaian chiefs have been collecting rents from stool and
skin lands since pre-colonial times.
Both the intent and effect of chieftaincy legislation in
both countries is to place chiefs firmly within the realm of
civil society. Chiefs in Ghana and Uganda continue to wield
considerable influence in local and national affairs, but they
do so in their capacity as leaders and representatives of
particular communities. In Ghana, chiefs themselves often
acknowledge that their formal exclusion from party politics
ensures that their position as community leaders is not
compromised. For example, according to Barimah Kwame
Nkyi, Omanhene of the Assin Traditional Area, “a chief swears
oath of office and allegiance to his people and indulgence in
active partisan politics will mean serving two masters and such
divided allegiance impairs the trust and the confidence that his
people have in him”. He argued further that a chief in partisan
politics may expose himself to the dictates of the party and
could be victimized should the party he supports lose power.
Furthermore, in an address to the National House of Chiefs
in 1996, its President noted: “On the participation of Chiefs in
politics, a Chief who dabbles in politics is likely to be treated
like a politician who could be hooted at or booed. This would
not only undermine his position but ultimately desecrate the
institution of chieftaincy as a whole” (Boafo-Arthur, 2001).
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
It might be argued that chiefs in Ghana and Uganda have
had little choice but to become leaders in civil society. Early
post-colonial governments in both countries were far more
ideologically driven than their counterparts in Sierra Leone and
specifically sought to quell the political influence of powerful
indigenous kingdoms (Asante in Ghana and Buganda in
Uganda) that had prospered under colonial “indirect rule.”
Larger and richer countries than Sierra Leone have the luxury
of not having to rely on chiefs to perform governmental
functions at the local level. Yet, there are clear benefits to both
chiefs and their people when chieftaincy remains a strictly
civil institution. In Ghana in particular, there are regional and
national Houses of Chiefs whose main duties, as established
by Section 272 of the Constitution are: a) to advise any
person or authority charged with any responsibility under
this Constitution or any other law for any matter relating to or
affecting chieftaincy; b) to undertake the progressive study,
interpretation and codification of customary law with a view
to evolving, in appropriate cases, a unified system of rules of
customary law, and compiling the customary laws and lines
of succession applicable to each stool or skin; c) undertake
an evaluation of traditional customs and usages with a view
to eliminating those customs and usages that are outmoded
and socially harmful d) perform such other function, not being
inconsistent with any function assigned to the House of Chiefs
of a region, as Parliament may refer to it. In other words, when
not burdened with the political and administrative work of the
central state, Ghanaian chiefs become free to develop their
own special sphere of governance.
Another benefit of “civil” chieftaincy is that it can become
a corporate foundation for community development. For
example, the Kingdom of Buganda, is registered as a
development agency and has been able to secure funding
from the Ugandan government and international NGOs.104
In Ghana, the World Bank has recently established a special
lending facility, known as the Learning and Innovation
Loan (LIL), whose main purpose is to “test approaches to
substantially integrate and improve deprived remote and rural
communities led by the traditional authority and help focus
the contributions/influence of traditional authorities in socio-
economic development” (Guri, 2006).
104. The Buganda Development Agency has a website at
www.buganda.or.ug.
There are several lessons here for chieftaincy reform in
Sierra Leone. First, while the authors of this report are
not recommending the removal of chiefs from the local
government system in the foreseeable future, the experience
of Ghana and Uganda emphasizes that, where chieftaincy is
concerned, there is a trade off between formal political power
and community representation. Second, an institutionally
integrated local government system is always going to be
more efficient in delivering services and responding to local
development needs than one in which functions are divided
between separate and competing institutions. Third, when
chieftaincy becomes a strictly civil institution, it is better
placed to develop its own special sphere of governance
and adapt to social and economic change. Fourth, freedom
from political work on behalf of the central state also allows
chiefs to take a lead in civil society organizations capable of
attracting external development funding. Finally, there is a
lively debate in both Ghana and Uganda over the relevance
of chieftaincy in a modern state and the role it should be
playing in the 21st century. Some chiefs continue to campaign
for greater involvement in the formal government system,
while modernizers argue that chieftaincy is retrogressive
and undemocratic and better left out of the state system.
Debate is healthy for democracy and chiefs are always likely
to win greater public support when they seek to demonstrate
their continuing relevance than simply relying on central
government to keep them in power.
55
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
5. Recommendations and Conclusions
The following recommendations 5.1 Accountability and Good Governance
Reforms
for reforming the chieftaincy
A. Introduce Universal Adult Suffrage in Paramount
system are based on the Chieftaincy elections.
evidence and analysis presented This will ensure that elections are truly democratic and
in the previous chapters. Paramount Chiefs are representative of all of their people.
If people are allowed to elect their chiefs, chiefs become
accountable to the community, not to the brokers and
manipulators who seek to control chieftaincy elections. Peace
and security will therefore increase.
B. The NEC Supervises Paramount Chieftaincy
Elections
Paramount Chieftaincy elections are public elections and
should therefore be supervised by the NEC. This will allow the
NEC to carry out its constitutional mandate and help to ensure
that chieftaincy elections are free and fair and fully regulated by
the law. A list of aspirants should be published well in advance
of the election and their eligibility should only be investigated
when it is the subject of a formal written challenge from a
citizen of the chiefdom. Challenges should be heard by the
Local Courts and the Declaration of Rights meeting should
be abolished.
C. Incorporate the Chiefdom Committee as a Local
Government Body
UNDP consultant C.Viswasam’s recommendations of
nearly 40 years ago must be implemented. The Chiefdom
Committee, rather than the Chiefdom Council, should be
recognized in law as the governing body of the chiefdom and
its structure, roles and responsibilities must be redefined
to reflect this (See recommendation M). The Chiefdom
Council serves no useful function except as an instrument of
patronage and should be abolished.
D. All Chiefs Receive Salaries
Chiefs of all ranks perform key roles in maintaining social order
in rural areas (see recommendation G) and should receive
government salaries for this work. They should not have to rely
on community contributions to make up for time lost in securing
their livelihoods and local taxes should pay for welfare services
and development. Sub-Chiefs should receive graded salaries
and the rebate on local tax collection should be abolished.
56
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
E. Reincorporate the National Council
of Paramount Chiefs as a Body with Specific
5.2 Justice and Human Rights
Recommendations
Constitutional Responsibilities
G. Extend Legal Recognition to Chiefs’ Leading
The National Council of Paramount Chiefs should be renamed
Role in Local Dispute Resolution
National Council of Chiefs and fully incorporated based on the
model of the Ghanaian House of Chiefs. The new body should
This role should receive statutory recognition and should
be fully funded and work with the Law Reform Commission on
be the basis upon which chiefs receive salaries (see
recommendation D). Clarifying this role will help to improve
the restatement of customary law, investigate land tenure reform
liaison between chiefs, the police services and the formal court
in the Provinces and advise the Local Government Ministry and
system. Disputes over customary land rights are a special case
NEC on matters pertaining to rotational crowning agreements and
and it is vital that these are properly recorded. Chiefs require
ruling house eligibility during chieftaincy elections.
support from government in formalizing these adjudications.
F. Establish a Chieftaincy Commission
This independent body will regulate chiefs’ salaries, develop
H. Restate Customary Law
A restatement of customary laws and usages would improve
a code of conduct for chieftaincy and investigate complaints
all justice practitioners’ knowledge of these laws, and generate
against chiefs raised by citizens. The Chieftaincy Commission
more informed understanding of the social context in which
should have the power to recommend to the President that a
they are applicable. This is work that should be done by the
Commission of Inquiry into the conduct of a Paramount Chief
upgraded National Council of Chiefs in partnerships with
is necessary, but it must also be bound by law to forward
Customary Law Officers and the Law Reform Commission.
evidence of illegal activity on the part of bureaucrats and
Restatement is not codification and the purpose of the
private citizens to the relevant authorities.
exercise is to improve the performance of the justice system
rather than transform customary law into written law.
I. Reform the Chiefdom Police
The Chiefdom Police should be reformed into a rural auxiliary
police force, trained by the SLP but with less stringent entry
qualifications. The new force should serve the local councils as
well as chiefdom authorities.
J. Enact the Local Courts Bill, 2008
The Bill represents a key step in the reform of the chieftaincy
system and the integration of chiefdom-level structures into
the state system. It should be enacted without delay.
57
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
5.3 Taxation and Representation
Recommendations
K. Local Councils Take over Responsibility for all
Local Revenue Collection
District and Town Councils should become responsible for all
revenue collection, which should now fund welfare services
and development activities.
L. Extend Statutory Recognition to the new
Generation of VDCs
Villages represent the bottom tier of local administration in
rural areas and statutory recognition of these structures will
pave the way for their incorporation into the local government
system.
M. Replace Ward Development Committees with
VDCs and Reformed Chiefdom Committees
WDCs should be abolished and their functions returned
to reformed Chiefdom Committees. The new Chiefdom
Committee should comprise of the Paramount Chief
(chairman), Speaker, Section Chiefs, Local Councillors
representing wards wholly or partially located in the chiefdom
and 5 men 5 women elected by the people. Chiefdom
Committees should become part of the local government
system along with the VDCs and have development budgets
approved by the District Council. Committee members should
receive expenses for attending meetings.
58
5.4 Conclusions
There is nothing in these recommendations that would
represent a radical departure from local governance practices
in other African countries that have chieftaincy systems.
On the contrary, these recommendations would bring Sierra
Leone more into line with the local governance systems now
found in counties like Ghana and Uganda. The authors of this
report do not anticipate that chiefs will cease to play a role in
the local government system in the foreseeable future, but
governance practices that simply reproduce the divisions
of colonial “indirect rule” have no place in a modern African
state. Even today, there is great respect in rural areas for
the institution of chieftaincy. It is up to chiefs, and the Sierra
Leone government, to reward that respect with a chieftaincy
that truly serves the people.
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
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59
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Persons, Organizations and Communities Consulted, 2008-9
Government of Sierra Leone
Dr Julius Sandy, Public Sector Reform Unit
Joe Lebbe, Director of Local Government, Ministry for Internal
Affairs, Local Government & Rural Affairs (2005)
Emmanuel Gaima, Decentralisation Secretariat
Christiana Thorpe, National Electoral Commission (2007)
Stephen Aiah Mattia, National Electoral Commission
Abraham John, Human Rights Commission
Vandie Nabie, Human Rights Commission
Local Government
Chairman, Bo District Council
Eric Dura Sesay, Chairman, Bombali District Council
(2005 and 2007)
Dr. Wusu Sannoh, Mayor, Bo
Chief Administrator, Pujehun District Council
Chief Administrator, Bo District Council
Deputy Chairman, Bo District Council
Finance Officer, Pujehun District Council
Paramount Chiefs and Speakers
PC Alhaji Issa Kamara-Koroma, Gallinas Perri Chiefdom,
Pujehun District
PC Amadu Kaikai, Kpanga Kabonde Chiefdom, Pujehun District
PC Bai Koblo Queen II, Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District
PC Thomas Kposowa, Bumpeh Ngao Chiefdom, Bo District
PC Bai Sunthuba Osara III, Gbonkolenken Chiefdom,
Tonkolili District
PC Bai Sebora Kasanga II, Makeni, Bombali District (2005)
PC Charles Caulker, Bumpeh Chiefdom, Moyamba District
(2002)
Alimany Alusine Seku Conteh, Chiefdom Speaker, Kamabai,
Bombali District (2007)
Sub-Chiefs and other Chiefdom Authorities
Regent Chief, Bramaia Chiefdom (2001)
Town Chief Osman Bangalie, Imperri Chiefdom,
Bonthe District
Isaac K. M. Sheriff, Caretaker Chief and Treasurer,
Imperri Chiefdom
Mohamed Sidi Ahmed, Youth Chairman Imperi Chiefdom
Isatu Pompoli, Section Mammy Queen, Bumban,
Bombali District (2007).
Regina Posseh Kalawa, Head Mammy Queen,
Kamabai, Bombali District (2007)
Yayah Conteh II, Section Chief, Bumban, Bombali District
Doris Alpha, Chiefdom Police, Valunia Chiefdom, Bo District
60
Reform is not Against Tradition Making Chieftaincy Relevant in 21st Century Sierra Leone
Other Chiefs This report was researched and written by
Chief Younge, Mende Tribal Headman, Freetown Richard Fanthorpe and Mohamed Gibril Sesay.
Chiefdom Functionaries
Treasury Clerk, Biriwa Chiefdom, Bombali District (2003) With contributions from Abubakar Sidique Turay
Treasury Clerk, Kunike Chiefdom (Justice and Human Rights section) and
Treasury Clerk, Kunike Barina Chiefdom Momo Taziff Koroma.
Central Chiefdom Finance Clerk, Tonkolili District
Community Discussions and Focus Groups
Youths, Kamabai, Biriwa Chiefdom, Bombali District
(2005 and 2007)
Massahun, Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District
Rokupr, Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District (2002)
Gbonkomaria, Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District, (2002)
Kpetema, Bumpeh Ngao Chiefdom, Bo District
Yeikandor and Wonde, Njaluahun Chiefdom, Kailahun District
Chiefdom Authorities, Makali, Kunike Barina Chiefdom
Fowaya, Peje Bongre Chiefdom, Kailahun District
Segbwema, Njaluahun Chiefdom, Kailahun District
Kabala, Warra Warra Yagalla Chiefdom, Koinadugu District
Binkolo, Safroko Chiefdom, Bombali District
Joru, Gaura Chiefdom, Kenema District
Koidu, Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District
Makeni, Bombali Sebora Chiefdom, Bombali District
CBOs
Kunike Youth Development Organization, Masingbi,
Tonkolili District
Market Traders, Bo
Bike Riders Association, Bo.
NGOs
Ngolo Katta, Centre for the Coordination of Youth Activities
Tennyson Williams, ActionAid
Ambrose James, Search For Common Ground
Frances Fortune, Search For Common Ground
Victor Kalie Kamara, CAP, Rokupr, Kambia District (2002)
Deltha Kamara, CAP, Rokupr, Kambia District (2002)
Community aminator, Focus Group, Network Movement
for Justice and Development
Musa Mewa, National Accountability Group
Brima Sheriff, Amnesty International-Sierra Leone
Donor Agencies
Chiara Bellini, European Union
Sylvia Fletcher, UNDP (2005)
Edward Kamara, UNDP
Grainne O’Neil – Irish Aid
Chris Gabelle, DFID
61
This report was commissioned by:
Campaign for Good Governance
Methodist Church Sierra Leone
Network Movement for Justice and Development

Supported by

Funded by Irish Aid MAPS

This document has been produced with the

financial assistance of Irish Aid. The contents of this
document are the sole responsibility of picot and
cgg and can under no circumstances be regarded
as reflecting the position of Irish Aid.