ORI GI NAL PAPER

Southeast Asian water conflictsfrom a political

geography perspective
Yvonne Klpper
Published online: 19 June 2008
#
Springer-Verlag 2008
Abstract This article analyzes water-related conflicts in Southeast Asia and draws
the attention to controversial damand hydropowerschemes. It focuses on three
dam projects in Thailand, Laos and Burma that are all interwoven by different
characteristics of development assistance. But they also slightly differ in terms of the
implementation stage, the geopolitical setting, the socio-economical frameworks and
the actors involved. Against this analytical background, the approach unveils the
complexity of internationalising conflicts that are created under the influence of the
ongoing globalisation and by multiple actors involved, their networks, strategies and
power relations. Scarcity of resourcessecuring energy by development assis-
tance provides a brief introduction by drawing the main global configurations.
Energy supply and poverty alleviationnew dams in Southeast Asia zooms in on
the specific stage by mirroring dam disputes in Southeast Asia (SEA). Based on
these fundamentals, in Different damsdiverse actors and conflict potentials the
case studies are reconstructed to highlight the multiplicity of dam-projects and
inherent controversies. Conclusionnew conflict frameworks require new instru-
ments of dispute resolution offers an outlook on conceptual ideas on how to deal
with future dam disputes under the auspices of development assistance.
Abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank
APMDM Anti-Pak Mun Dam Movement
AOP Assembly of the Poor
DA Development Assistance
Egat Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand
ERI EarthRights International
AEJ (2008) 6:325343
DOI 10.1007/s10308-008-0187-x
NO187; No of Pages
Y. Klpper (*)
Department of Political and Social Geography, Prof. Reuber, University of Mnster,
Robert-Koch-Strae 26, 48149 Mnster, Germany
e-mail: yvonne_kloepper@yahoo.de
URL: http://www.uni-muenster.de/Geographie/
Y. Klpper
Friedelstrae 24, 12047 Berlin, Germany
GoL Government of Laos
IRN International Rivers Network
LDC Less/ Least Developed Country
MRC Mekong River Commission
MW Megawatt(s)
NGO(s) Non Governmental Organisation(s)
NT2 Nam Theun 2 Dam
NTPC Nam Theun 2 Power Company Ltd.
SEA Southeast Asia
SEARIN Southeast Asia Rivers Network
SWC Salween Watch Coalition
TERRA Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance
WCD World Commission on Dams
Scarcity of resourcessecuring energy by development assistance
The Mekong Region is an emerging economic area and a new frontier for
resource development. [...] But some trends also indicate the onset of increased
competition and possible tensions in the region, especially given the important roles
of China and Thailand in the Mekong region. (Son 2007).
Hardly a day passes by without the media reminding us of the critical nature of
globally rising energy demands and worsening climate changeboth of which seem
to have reached critical stages. Hence experts are calling for all nations to secure their
energy supplies and the necessary, scarce natural resources like oil, gas and water. In
consequence, most of the developed nations place the issue on their political agenda
and closely link it with geopolitical security matters and development assistance
(DA). The DA often adopts neo-colonialand neo-liberalfeatures, as the sought
after natural resources are especially found in developing countries (LDCs)
1
.
What is newand for Western countries probably even more challengingis the
fact that other (formerly) developing nations such as China, India and Thailand are
entering the DA-arena as well
2
. Out of this situation emerges a global footrace for
energy resources that certainly has become a sensitive issue as it touches
economical, socio-political and ecological spheres. In consequence more resource
conflicts are arising and tensions occur on quite diverse spatial levels. They are
shaped by multiple features and sometimes even lead to wars. Hence it can be
concluded that resource conflicts today represent a global phenomenon and
symbolize a crucial issue (Klare 2001).
Water in particularas an essential and irreplaceable basis for lifeis becoming
rare. As it is not tied to a certain place, water can flow through (and therefore is
shared by) several riparian states. Thus, water constitutes an international resource
that has become increasingly disputed at the international scale over the last decades
1
As the term developing countries is linked with a negative connotation, the United Nations introduced
the phrase less/least developed countries (LDCs) that is used in the following (Nohlen 2000, p. 23).
2
Without doubt, China currently is the most influential agency (cf. Different damsdiverse actors and
conflict potentials). For further information see e.g. Beattie and Yeh (2007) and Lawrence and Middleton
(2007).
326 Y. Klpper
(Dore 2003)
3
. Predominantly in LDCs, the water crisis and its various consequences
are regarded as symptom and cause for social discrimination and poverty. Thus
water resource users at all scales frequently find themselves in direct competition
for this economic and life-sustaining resourcein turn creating tensions, and indeed
conflict, over water. (Giordano and Wolf 2003, p. 163).
The Asian setting appears particularly critical, as the region hosts more than 50%
of the worlds populationwhile occupying only 36% of the global water resources.
And taking a closer look at SEA, it appears that although this region possesses
several large rivers, it is periodically hit by fatal floods and extreme droughtsdue
to a fairly poor water (mis-) management on distinct levels (Diouf 2007; Unesco
2003)
4
. In consequence, this situation leads to huge socio-economic inequities and
the destruction of ecosystems upon which local communities depend. Hence SEA is
already running beyond its ecological means. [...] And water is one of the most
symbolic cases of this deficit. (Rae Kwon Chung; cited by Fuller 2006, p. 1)
5
.
Energy supply and poverty alleviationnew dams in Southeast Asia
Past and current tendencies
From this backdrop, the article draws attention to disputes over dams and hydropower
production in SEA. Here, particularly the dam building on international rivers and their
main tributaries has led to controversies again and again. Since the early 1960s, the
primary construction-goals were power generation, irrigation and flood protection. Until
recently, the socio-ecological basisespecially of dams affecting peoples livelihood
was not taken into account. In consequence, the latter often got seriously damaged by the
dams (Scudder 2005)
6
. After having erected many hydropower schemes under the DA-
paradigm of economic growth and modernisation, the late 1990s and early 2000s
brought along a decade of stagnation. Mainly responsible for this deadlock and the
Anti-Dam Fashion in DA was the rising public awareness of the huge negative socio-
ecological impacts of dams. This analysis was supported by the report of the World
Commission on Dams (WCD), whereupon even the World Bank withdrew from new
dam projects for a couple of years (Khagram 2004, p. 812)
7
.
3
The actors that play a crucial role in the controversies have become internationalised accordingly. Hence
these two important conflict-constituents build the focal point of the analysis (cf. Different dams
diverse actors and conflict potentials and Conclusionnew conflict frameworks require new
instruments of dispute resolution).
4
To meet the need for a credible and effective river basin management organisation, the Mekong River
Commission (MRC) was established. But as it is only obliged to provide the member-states with legally non-
binding recommendations and guidelines, the MRC faces a crisis of legitimacy and relevancy (Miller 2003).
5
Due to predicted population growth and climatic change, experts estimate that this conflict potential will
worsen in the future (Elhance 1999; Pearce 2006; Shiva 2002).
6
See also Dore (2001), Lang et al. (2000) and Usher (1997).
7
The WCD was an interdisciplinary panel of dam opponents and supporters. Co-financed by the World
Bank, it conducted a worldwide study on consequences of dams (Bosshard 2005). The WCD concluded
that in (too) many cases there has been paid an unacceptable and often unnecessary price to secure mainly
economic benefits of dams, especially in social and environmental terms, by people displaced, by
communities downstream, by taxpayers and by the natural environment. (WCD 2000, p. XXVIII).
Southeast Asian water conflictsfrom a political geography perspective 327
But recently dam-building is experiencing a revival through DA: Dams are once
again on the agenda and are promoted as engines for development, poverty
alleviation and sustainable, climate friendly energy generation (Porter 2007). Under
banners like Water for Responsible Growth, dam leviathans are built again
primarily in LDCs of Africa, Asia and especially SEAwhere dam experts
predicted a huge hydropower potential. Projects have been re-invented and are
now packaged as sustainable, participatory, equitable, integrated, and so on,
incorporating the language of development discourse and critique. (Miller 2003,
pp. 1314; World Bank 2006).
They are either developed by traditional Western DA-agencies, or by newly
arisen actors from countries like China and Thailand (Schneider and Richter 2007)
8
.
Besides geopolitical purposes, the lofty goal is to build dams in the LDCs by using
DA and to export the bulk of produced energy to neighbouring countries that are in
need of power. The LDCs in turn usually are obliged to use the here from received
revenues for programmes on poverty reduction (Lang 2004, pp. 67).
The dam constellation of Thailand and its neighbours
The portrayed state of affairs gets highlighted by focussing on the constellation of
Thailand and its riparian states Burma and Laos: Since the early 1960s, about 25 large
dams have been implemented in Thailandmostly all by centralised government.
Following a neo-liberal path of modernised development paradigms, these large scale
projects were supported byand built in cooperation withpowerful protagonists like
(inter-) national dam constructing companies, multi- and bilateral financial institutions
and the energy industry. As our economy was growing so fast in the 1950s and 60s, we
were in desperate need for projects on development and infrastructure. Dams wereand
I think, they still area great source for energy. Thats why we from Egat built many
dams. And that was very easy until the 1980s. (Interview rH39; cf. Yuthana 2008).
The ongoing process of Thai-democratisation led to the consolidation of a solid
civil society. Out of this, a strong movement of local peoples organizations emerged
and formed specific Terrains of Resistance (Routledge 1997). The groups received
wide support by (international) Non-Governmental-Organisations (NGOs), scien-
tists, activists and the media (cf. The Pak Mun Dama classic national terrains of
resistance). Until now, they increasingly defend themselves against dam projects
and other development schemes threatening their livelihood and natural basis
many times being quite successful. Therefore, Thailand has built the dispute-arena
over dam projects for a long period and the pro-dam protagonists today face
difficulties in legitimizing nationwide dam projects (Baker 1999; Connors 2003).
Due to the 1997 Asian Crisis, the need for energy and dams vanished from
economic and political agendas. But while recovering from this crunchtogether
with an ongoing geopolitical repositioning and reshuffling in SEA under the pressure
8
Sometimes these competing actors even conduct joint ventures such as the Nam Theun 2 in Laos (see
below). At the (media) forefront of pushing dams are the international development banks like the World
Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB). They are strongly backed by the dam building industries,
consultants, governments of the LDCsand increasingly by the private sector (cf. Different dams
diverse actors and conflict potentials).
328 Y. Klpper
of globalisation and regionalisationThailand now again faces a rising need for
electricity (Lang 2004, Lohmann 1998)
9
. In consequence the Thai administration
and the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (Egat) are seeking new energy-
options to feed this increasing demand. As Thailand faces rising costs for gasits
primary source of energythe responsible actors are pursuing a new strategy that is
characterized by specific neo-colonial features:
Under the patronage of DA and regional economic collaboration, Thailand swaps
the conflictive issue of securing affordable energy to adjoining poor countries. And
as hydropower is (once again) regarded as an inexpensive and sustainable power-
source, Laos and Burma are the Thai prioritydue to their huge potential for dams.
To buy power from neighbouring countries is our top choice to secure power to
meet Thailand's growing demand, particularly in case as we are unable to build more
power plants. (Interview nG57).
Accordingly, Thailand adopts the donor role by fostering dam projects as foreign
aidoften jointly cooperated with Western DA-agencies. In the next step, Thailand
imports the therewith generated electricity at a fixed low pricewhile Laos and
Burma in turn receive revenues and development stimuli (Fahn 2003; Tara 2008).
Hence the Thais speak of a Win-Win-Situation for all parties involved, whereas at
the same time avoiding tensions at home. Southeast Asia is the region [with] a
status as one of the worlds resource hot spots. [And] Thailand can be described as
the most powerful local economic force in the region that has major resource
development interests within the boundaries of its basin neighbours. Neighbouring
countries are increasingly becoming the water resource frontiers of Thailand.
(Hirsch and Cheong 1996, p. 38; cf. Lang 2004, p. 80).
Another goal for the Thai protagonists is to strengthen their geopolitical standing
in the region, as Thailand sees itself more and more confronted with a soaring
economic pressure from China. Beijing has expanded its search for energy, minerals
and markets. And it has also pulled its smaller Southeast Asian neighbours firmly
into its orbit with aid, trade and investment. (Irn 2008). The Thai-strategy gets
strong support by the Laotian and Burmese governments, as both countries want to
overcome poverty. They are obsessed to achieve the goal by converting into the
power batteries of SEA (Irn 2007)thus pushing for a good deal of more dams
(Bartle 2005; Fullbrook 2007)
10
.
Different damsdiverse actors and conflict potentials
This briefly illustrated constellation is shaped by multilayered struggles that become
best visible through a more detailed examination of different dams. Hence, it appears
worthwhile to take a closer look on the conflict-prone interdependence of dams and
9
Although energy experts are accusing the government and the power industry of constantly over-
predicting the energy requirement on purpose (Greacen and Footner 2006).
10
Furthermore it is backed by eager plans of Asian governments to establish a Mekong Power Grid that
is currently pushed forward. If realized, the grid would interconnect the power-lines of riparian Mekong
countriesthus, transforming Thailand into the power hub and energy broker of SEA (Osborne 2007;
Ryder 2003).
Southeast Asian water conflictsfrom a political geography perspective 329
DA as it is presented in SEA. Therefore, the paper draws the attention to
reconstructing three consciously chosen dam stories in order to further elaborate
multiple attributes of this sensitive topic. These case studies slightly differ, as all of
them currently face different implementation stages. Consequently, they each
provide specific opportunities to reflect the relevant facets in terms of influencing
institutional frameworks, actors involved and (possible) conflict-features
11
. To
bestow an orientation at first, the dams locations are displayed in Fig. 1.
The Pak Mun Dama classic national terrains of resistance
Brief overview of striking Pak Mun characteristics
The dam lies at the confluence of the rivers Mekong and Mun in Northeastern
Thailandgenerally perceived as the Thai-almshouse. After many years of
emerging and vanishing plans, the government, Egat and World Bank agreed in
the early 1990s to realize the multipurpose, run-of-river Pak Mun dam. Although
the project faced local and national resistance, the contested dam was finally built.
But albeit construction ended in 1994, the protagonists still have to cope with
numerous disputesdue to several troubling, unsolved problems (Blake 2006).
Hence, the dam provides a long, conflict-prone chronicle that even made
supporters question the dam by stating, that it was a mistake of the World Bank
to get involved. Pak Mun was such a very small project that wasnt even needed in
Thailand. And all the current social problems should have been foreseeable. So I
guess there was a kind of automatism that couldnt be stopped anymore, once it was
launcheddue to some questionable insider relationships. (Interview iF84). At the
end, Pak Mun gained notoriety in two respects: On the one hand embodying a failed
dam, while on the other hand representing the landmark of a strong civil society
movement in Thailand which achieved the renunciation of dams in the nation. Thus,
Pak Mun became a well-known, outstanding resistance-symbol against DA-related
projects in SEAeven nowadays.
Planning and construction of the damthe conflict
Although plans existed since the 1960s, Pak Mun gained in importance merely
because of special interest politics during the 1980s: As the then weak government
was in desperate need for gaining support, it decided to build a prestigious dam
justified by rising energy demand, economic strength and poverty reduction. Thus,
dam supporters speeded up the project and rushed it through a process of
questionable political channels and impact studies (Foran 2006; Kraisak 2002).
Coming to the final construction decision in 1991, the dam fell into the transition
period from classical DA-Era under the banner of modernisation-paradigm to the
emerging sustainable development concept. Hence, the project was approved amid
the peak of rising anti-dam building sentiments in the countrywhen Egats policy
11
Due to space limitations of this article, the complex dam-biographies are only presented in a nutshell
here.
330 Y. Klpper
was most scrutinized. Consequently the people started to protest and fight against it
immediately upon the beginning of the construction. (Interview nH60).
Then the conflict-lines loomed on two spatial spheres: both on a horizontal-local
level between neighbouring Pak Mun supporterssponsored by Egat and
opponents on the ground, and on a vertical-national level between governmental
decision-makers and local antagonists (cf. Fig. 2). By unifying to the Anti-Pak Mun
Dam Movement (APMDM), the opponents gained strong support through
Fig. 1 Location of the case studies (Source: United Nations (2004), modified by the author)
Southeast Asian water conflictsfrom a political geography perspective 331
scientists, NGOs, activists and the media (Kanokrat 2003)
12
. Consequently, Egat and
the government were exposed to multiple obstacles and forced to the negotiating
table frequentlyresulting in rising expenditures and time lags
13
.
For the dispute, also the WCD-report played a vital role as it included Pak Mun as
one of eight case-studies worldwide (cf. Past and current tendencies). The WCD
compared the intended outcomes with actual results of the hydropower damand
scientifically confirmed in 2000 the failure of Pak Mun. This has long been
concealed by Egat and denied by the World Bankbut the WCD exposed that if all
the benefits and costs were adequately addressed, it is unlikely that the project would
have been built in the current context. (Kunurat et al. 2000, p. XI).
Accordingly, both conflict-lines worsened as none of the several governments
involved appeared able to resolve the deadlock. Even the 2001 election pledge of
Thaksin to perform an impact study and to settle the struggle did not find its way out
of the tricky impasse. Instead it led to again reigniting disputes. Hence, at the end
this interference even deepened the actors fault, as the government decided against
the scientists suggestion by commanding the annual floodgates opened for only
4 months in order to enable fisheries (Foran 2006)
14
.
12
The APMDM merged in the nationwide Assembly of the Poor (AOP) which even received
international attention as it conducted longsome protest campswell-known as Villages of the Poorin
front of Bangkoks government house (Missingham 2003).
13
Besides compensation issues and exploding costs, particularly the serious problems with declining
fisheries was the main point of concern, as the local majority was dependent upon this (Blake 2006).
Hence, the lions share of the workforce was obliged to become migrant labourers in consequence
leading to a worsening social disruption of the local society-structure (Foran 2006).
Fig. 2 Multiplying levels of dam conflicts in Southeast Asia (Source: authors own design 2008)
14
The scientific recommendation was to constantly open the gates, as even without the Pak Mun Dam
there would be no problem in terms of the power generation and power security. And we have proved that
the local income would increase quite a lot with the opening. (Interview rS14).
332 Y. Klpper
Present situation of Pak Munlessons learned and continued conflicts
Even until today Pak Mun has become a focal point of conflictnot only
nationally but internationallyas everybody sees what a disaster the decision was.
(Interview nH60). Although Egat and government officials call Pak Mun a wrap, the
disputes still continueparticularly due to annual recurrences of the discussion on
the dam gates opening. The latest of these clashes lingered on for 4 months in 2007
and was only settled dissatisfactory. Mainly responsible for the impasse, are the two
intertwined conflict lines mentioned above as those are still present. This leads to a
worsening local rift, because of the way in which Egat and the government tried to
construct the dam and handled the conflict. (Interview rS14).
Particularly the scientists, NGOs and activists declared Pak Mun a failure as it did
not fulfil any of its original promises. Instead of providing development and energy,
the overpriced project bequeathed an economically and socially destructed region.
Hence, experts doubt whether any reasonable solution can be found in the
foreseeable future as the protagonists goals are contradictory (Foran 2006).
Due to several challenges, the parties involved faced during the implementation,
they finally all draw their lessons out of the Pak Mun experience. Pak Mun served
as catalyser for everybody involved in terms of drawing individual lessons. And it
helped to empower democratic structures so that the Thai speak up for their rights.
But dam opponents also know now that they still need to raise more resistance
against such projects. (Interview iM66)
15
.
The probably most important conclusion about Pak Muns strong resistance was for
many involved that it forced the dam supporters to stop any further projects on Thai
ground. In consequence, the dam is also seen to be responsible for todays strategic
shift of Thai-dam builders. Thus, critics fear that the Pak Mun story laid the ground for
the export of large dams environmental and social problems to the other countries
where people might have a more difficult time protesting, but the Thai-actors are not
responsible for complying with international standards. The furore over Pak Mun has
blocked new dam construction in Thailand, prompting Egat, to back hydro-electric
projects in neighbouring Laos and Burmaout of the reach of Thai environ-
mentalists. (Interview rS14).
Based on this assumption, the reconstructions of the Nam Theun 2 and Salween
dams might provide evidence.
The Nam Theun 2 Dam in Laosbuilding the perfect dam under a new
development assistance framework
Nam Theun 2 at a glance
In reference to Thailands strategy, the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) is conveniently
situated close to the Thai-Lao Border. The project reflects a trans-basin scheme,
15
One striking lesson was the consonantly agreement for a necessarily more transparent process including
participation of the (affected) population as well as to perform detailed studies upon expectable
environmental and socioeconomic impacts. Subsequently, quite a number of those lessons were taken into
consideration in planning following dam projects. For detailed lessons learned see Blake (2006), Foran
(2006), Kanokrat (2003).
Southeast Asian water conflictsfrom a political geography perspective 333
diverting the flow of the Theun River down to the Xe Bang Fai Riverboth main
Laotian Mekong-tributaries (cf. Fig. 1).
Due to numerous reasons, the planning has been disputed particularly on
international scale that lead to massive delays. But in 2005 supporters finally agreed
to build the $1.6 billion NT2-damin order to serve as vehicle on the road of Laotian
development. Hence, the 1.070 MW-project is currently under construction
scheduled to be completed in 2009. The scheme already contains an agreement
between the government of Laos (GoL) and Egat. This stipulates delivery of 95% of
the generated electricity to Thailand at a fixed, low rate over the upcoming 25 years. In
turn, the constructorsmainly the World Bankoblige the GoL to invest the
generated income of approximately $ 2 billion to alleviate the striking Laotian poverty.
Thus, the NT2 Power Company (NTPC) promotes this single largest infrastructure
project ever undertaken in Laos as win-win-solution for all parties involved
(Tribollet 2006).
First and foremost, ADB and World Bankas the main backers of the project
are eager to realize this dam
16
. After facing several setbacks, they are in need of a
successful dam story. Hence, the NT2 supporters established a PR-machine and
spent about 10% of the project costs to absorb the immense socio-ecological
consequences in order to create a prestigious platinum project. We believe that a
sound approach to selling hydroelectricity, supported by improved government
policies, is the best way for the country to increase the amount of money it can
invest in health, education and basic infrastructure for the benefit of the poor.
(Wolfensohn cited in Imhof 2005: 1; World Bank 2005).
Ambitious planning and constructionprestigious re-entry into dam building
Although the project was first conceived in 1970, it only gained momentum since
1993. Nevertheless, it was not before 2005 that NT2 finally received green light: the
Asian Crisis, the increasing negative image of dams and the broad scrutiny given by
the WCD to dams caused long delays
17
. Thus, the project reflects the first of the
new, post-WCD dam era that also marks the first involvement of the World Bank,
after stepping out of such schemes for several years (Blake 2006).
Besides the mentioned poverty reduction and power supply, the NT2 is
particularly intended to serve as role model for economic and geopolitical reasons.
Accordingly, the construction consortium wants to legitimize several future projects
by creating the NT2 as the perfect dam. On the other hand, the development banks
16
The World Bank plays a crucial role for the go-ahead as international private investors made their
involvement dependent on a risk guarantee from the bank. Accordingly, the model is a publicprivate
Joint Venture which the World Bank hopes to deploy for other dams, too (World Bank 2005).
17
Furthermore, several controversies over the projects design accounted for the setback. These struggles
occurred between NT2 proponents and opponentsmainly international NGOs like International Rivers
Network (IRN) and Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA). Finally the
disputes ended in unaccountable numbers of studies as the bank, together with [...] developers of the NT2
project, undertook years of studies assessing alternatives and best options [...]. It is also why NT2, has had
the most extensive consultations process in the history of the country. (Porter 2005).
334 Y. Klpper
and Thai protagonists are afraid of (further) losing their geo-strategic and
commercial standing in SEAas China is gaining more and more influence here
18
.
Especially the World Bank depends on a successful dam project nowadays. And I
guess nowhere else in the world it would be so easy to build a dam like NT2 than
here in Laos. (Interview nH60)
19
.
As Laos offers limited political space for civil society resistance, the dam-
opposition primarily wasand still iscarried by a couple of international agents.
Hence, the conflict-arena became internationalised and proceeded primarily on
horizontal-linear levels (cf. Conclusionnew conflict frameworks require new
instruments of dispute resolution). Shortly after opposing NGOs realised their
inability to stop the scheme, many of them backed out from their NT2-involvement.
But NGOs such as IRN decided against withdrawal and switched to a watchdog-
strategy. In this manner, IRN hopes to contribute to realising the project in most
appropriate ways for the affected people and the environment. We discovered that
somebody has to play the watchdog, if you cannot prevent the dam. Hence we look
very closely on the development on the ground. And if we think the dam
construction doesnt adhere to the social and environmental aspects, we immediately
try to raise alarm. (Interview iN58).
Thus, after initially protesting against shady plans and the oppression of the local
population, the main resistance currently focusses on the complex social and ecological
issues surrounding the NT2s construction. Particularly the questionable resettlement-
handling and the contentious treatment of deforestation that joint the setup of the Nakai-
Nam Theun Biodiversity Conservation Area, are in the limelightand have attracted
numerous controversies over the past decade (Bechstedt 2006)
20
.
The challenging NT2 currently thrives and prospersso do conflict lines
Whilst construction is proceeding on time, the environmental and social programs
implementations are lagging behind. NT2 is 70 percent complete and on track to
begin operations in 2009. [But] there have been challenges in making sure the social
19
Besides the political structure and economic surroundings, the site-specific geographical premises are
unique. There is a 350m high plateauthe Nakai Plateauwhich can supply the main head, meaning
you can go for a relatively small dam and get huge output of energy down the plateau.[...] God has done
half of the work for us. Therefore we do not have to build a 350 meters bigger and higher dam.
(Interview iE62).
18
From their view, the recently increasing Chinese DAengagement in Asia and Africa demonstrates
that these concerns seem justifiable. The growing Chinese influence is unveiled for instance by the fact
that the China Development Bank covers a loan budget bigger than the World Banks and ADBs
combined accounts (Beattie and Yeh 2007). Hence, NT2-proponents legitimize their involvement by
stating that if the ADB and World Bank would not build dams like NT2, these dams would be
constructed by Chinese banks and companies anyway. (Interview iF32).
20
The projects socio-ecological blueprint appears indeed promising (Shivakumar 2007; Tribollet 2006).
But the relocation performance of roughly 6,200 people and the realisation of environmental safeguards
are watched critically (Schuettler 2008). Furthermore, the dams anticipated negative impacts upon
ecology and approximately 100,000 affected people living downstream along the Xe Bang Fai River was
taken into account only marginally until recently (Bechstedt 2006).
Southeast Asian water conflictsfrom a political geography perspective 335
and environmental aspects progressed at the same rate as the construction.
(Schuettler 2008).
Consequently, the latter are still major themes for dispute. And by virtue of several
factors, a considerable increase of conflict lines can be identified: Among the ongoing
struggle between NGOs and NT2-constructors on the horizontal-international level,
various tensions are emerging within the dam-builders network
21
. And as the
decision-makers only show limited willingness to address existing problemsand
instead prefer gloss over the internal conflictssome (formerly) executive staff
change sides in order to ally with dam-opponents such as IRN, hoping to better raise
the issue this way (Interview iF61; cf. Conclusionnew conflict frameworks
require new instruments of dispute resolution).
Nevertheless the NTPC and World Bank are still holding up NT2 as an excellent
example of an integrated, holistic approach that enables poverty alleviation
although its development effectiveness continues to be questioned. It therefore
remains contestedeven within the NT2-constructions consortium. Still, the
protagonists remain keen on presenting the project as a role model of perfect dam-
building in the media and in public, as especially the World Bank is under
considerable strain. The NT2 is a high-risk project with significant reputational risk
for the Bank. (Shivakumar 2007).
The Salween dams on the ThaiBurmese borderquestionable dam schemes kept
confidential
The Salween dams
The planned Salween dam projects are located straight on or close to the Thai
Burma Border on Burmese ground (cf. Fig. 1). The region is ecologically unique and
partly protected by Salween Wildlife Sanctuary and Salween National Park. All
together, the existing schemes envision construction of a cascade of (at least) four
dams, with two of them in advanced planning-stages
22
: The Tasang dam is a public
private ThaiBurmese joint venturewith Chinese enterprises most likely to join.
Tasang has a capacity of about 7.000 MWhence a really huge, big dam, with a 7-
times bigger capacity than the NT2. (Interview nG30, The Nation 2007).
The further downstream located, 1,200 MW Hat Gyi dam marks cooperation
between Egat and the Burmese regime that is also in search of private (Chinese)
investors. All of the schemes have in common that about 85% of the electricity
output would be exported to Thailand and that they are kept fairly secret. It is
interesting how little there is in the media here about what is happening on the
Salween. Egat obviously wants everything low-key with as little publicity as
21
Main reasons are the internally rising discontent regarding the socio-ecological performance as well as
the behaviour of specific protagonistspredominantly GoL and poorly skilled NTPC-staff (Shivakumar
2007).
22
Thus, preparatory building measures are already underway. Besides these projects, China also plans to
construct up to 13 dams on their Salween partbut faces rising environmental resistances (Nguyen and
Amin 2007).
336 Y. Klpper
possible. (Interview nN85). The plans also appear most sensitive regarding the
geopolitical situation, as well as ecological and Human Rights issues (Luntharimar
2003). In close relation to NT2, the Salween supporters try to legitimate the
projects with similar DA-objectives, while the major goal seems to be motivated
primary economically (see above). They [=Burma] need development, so
Thailand as strategic partner with Burma, should cooperate closely with Rangoon
to bring about modernisation and economic prosperity in the country for mutual
benefit. (Achara 2004).
But in striking contrast to the NT2, these projects feature quite differing actors
networks due to the global geopolitical situation. Furthermore, the dams possess a
stronger local resistance movement on both sides of the borderhence providing a
good deal more conflict-lines.
Hydropower plansgeopolitically sensitive and controversial
Although studies identified tremendous hydropower potential since the 1950s, the
Salween embodies the longest free-flowing river in SEA until today. Similar to NT2,
ideas firmed up only from the 1980s ondue to growing regionalisation and rising
energy demands of neighbouring countries
23
. By signing the obligatory bilateral
power purchase agreements, Salween projects recently gained momentum in order
to produce lowest cost electricity supply with very little impact on Thailand.
(Luntharimar 2003, p. 31). Hence, the confidential schemes count among the new,
neo-colonial era of dam-building. However, other than in Laos, the projects are
pushed ahead particularly by newly arising Thai and Chinese DA-actors. As the
Western strategy of sanctioning Burma rules out their participation, classical DA-
agents such as the World Bank are not involvedalthough some of these
protagonists definitely favour the Salween schemes (Interview iF35)
24
. Moreover,
traditional dam opponents are keeping away, toothus weakening the resistance.
Purposely absent, interestingly, are the conservation organisations, institutional
bodies and watchdogs that dominate the playing field of Salweens neighbour, the
Mekong. (Zao 2008).
Besides purchasing energy and increase revenues, the dams are essential to the
supporters for several reasons: The Thais want to gain prestige in order to strengthen
their weakened geopolitical and economic standing in competition to China. For the
Burmese Junta, the dams offer a good legitimisation to tackle distracting problems
with ethnic minoritiesas all projects are located in volatile areas where battles
between Burmese troops and ethnic forces continue since six decades already. The
23
So far, hydropower accounts for about one-third of Burmas mere 1,500 MWelectricity production. The
Salween-dams would add up to 16,000 MW of capacity (Bartle 2005).
24
Just the ADB forms an exception through indirectly supporting the Tasang dam, as this is (as well as the
NT2) part of the planned Mekong Power Gridwhich is an ADB promoted program. They funded the
feasibility study for the design of the dam as it would fit perfectly into the idea of Regional Economic
Cooperation for Power Development. (Interview iN44; cf. The dam constellation of Thailand and its
neighbours).
Southeast Asian water conflictsfrom a political geography perspective 337
junta is just advancing their plan to squeeze the Karen and other minorities into
submission. (Interview iA42; Pianporn 2007).
The political systems of both countries provide specific spaces for local resistance
although quite limited in Burma. Consequently in contrast to Laos, opponents are raising
voiceseven inside coercive Burma. Hence, the Salween-supporters find themselves
exposed to (sometimes deadly) hurdles on vertical conflict-levels (Wolff 2006). And as
the combatants get (narrow) international support from various ethnic groups along the
river, human rights activists, environmentalists, scientists and NGOs, the string of
struggle gets internationalised here, too
25
. However, as the plans are either kept secret
or are praised by Egat, resistance proves difficult. To strengthen its potential, the
opponents formed a network called Salween Watch Coalition (SWC) and try to
employ distinct strategies in order to resist the dams on different scales
26
. In their
criticism they particularly doubt the dams locations will lead to a secure power supply
for Thailand. They also blame the Thai-protagonists for partnering with one of the
most repressive regimes in the world, as this reflects a misconception of development
that will inevitably lead to accusation by the international community (Pianporn 2007;
Transboundarywaters 2004).
The current state of affairspushing ahead despite imponderabilia
Thai developers pigeonholed the Salween-projects after the 2006-coup. But recently
the new elected government pushes ahead for the dams again under the revived pro-
Burma economic policy. Consequently, in March 2008 Thailands ExportImport-
Bank agreed to hand out a four-billion-baht loan for Tasang dam, which had been
put on hold since 2005 (Bangkok Post 2008).
This decision dashed the hope of dam-opponents, as they believed to be able to
prevent the projects because of the international public outcry after the Burmese
saffron uprising (Tunya 2007)
27
. Nevertheless the SWC keeps on resisting. And
since they worry that the dam-developers will not adhere to international
implementation-standards, their strategy is widened to also demand criteria such
as a legal mechanism to ensure public participation in decision-making, mitigation
efforts, and to achieve best international practice. (Zao 2008).
Hence, the vertical-international conflict-line is still present. But furthermore,
two horizontal dispute-spheres are emerging. On the one hand, struggles appear on
the local level between dam supporters and opponents, as Egat pursues a dam
propaganda similar to what it did at Pak Muninstead of discussing the pros and
cons of the projects. This already results in rudimentary rifts among the local
25
The NGOs are mainly TERRA and Southeast Asia Rivers Network (SEARIN) from Thailand, as well
as the American-based EarthRights International (ERI).
26
On international scale they try to raise awareness upon the dams negative aspects e.g. by publishing
books, maintaining a website and initiating Salween Action Days. On national Thai-scale in turn, the
priority is to cooperate with the media, in order to question Thai energy demands and to frighten the
population by giving warnings of a rising Burmese refugee wave to Thailand because of the dams
(Pianporn 2007).
27
Another setback was the assassination of one of the Karens outstanding leaders in Thailand, as he
strongly defeated the dams (Tada 2008).
338 Y. Klpper
population (Interviews lP21 & nH60; cf. The Pak Mun Dama classic national
terrains of resistance). Other controversies arise on the vertical-international
space, because Burmese decision-makers start to play Thai-actors off against
Chinese-protagonists in order to obtain the best economic output possible (The
Nation 2007).
In conclusion, various question-marks still surround the Salween dams
development and the related conflict degrees. These include possibilities for political
change in Burma that might even invite classical dam-actors such as the World Bank
to engage.
Conclusionnew conflict frameworks require new instruments of dispute
resolution
Lighting up diverse dam patterns
The case-studies presented provide a multi-faceted insight into the topic and enable a
comparative analysis of dams in various stages. Although the projects are all
interwoven by altering DA-features, they differ slightly in terms of geopolitical
settings, socio-economical frameworks and protagonists involved. Hence, the dam-
stories grant the opportunity of contrasting varying actors networks and unveiling
the multiple conflict potentials on diverse spatial levels.
Albeit other influencing variablesand even though suffering a setback after the
WCDthe DA still plays the crucial role in legitimizing dams. Only the paradigms
DA-protagonists refer to have changed: from growth and modernisation to
sustainable energy security, poverty reduction and geopolitical issues. The most
essential modification is the expansion of actors involved. Due to this proliferation,
the DA-struggle for resources and strategic standings is increasingly shaped by
newly arising, powerful characters from e.g. Thailand and China. Consequently, both
the traditional protagonists and the new developers are currently in search for
their roles and positions. Thus, they sometimes build dams in co-operation, while
competing in others.
As the global tendency presumes a rising power demandthat obviously leads to
pursue more dams in LDCs with huge hydro-potentials like Burma and Laosa
growing potential for conflicts between the actor-networks needs to be expected, too.
Characteristic traits of actor networks in dam conflicts
The analysis reveals that actors are linked in strategic and usually loosely structured
networks, while sharing similar objectives. Regarding the various dam projects,
these associations are quite distinctive. Nevertheless, they are all culture-specific and
follow institutionally structured patterns. Furthermore, they all exist at overlapping
(inter-) national scalesand the protagonists networks seem to become even more
complex in the wake of an ongoing globalisation.
But the associations are also characterized by a prevailing, deadlocked perception
of a stereotypical good and bad actors dichotomy. This slant gets tightened through
Southeast Asian water conflictsfrom a political geography perspective 339
actors own cognitions of the others respectively
28
. What seems even more
essential is the fact thatalthough the awareness of this bearing is presentmost of
the protagonists are not willing to minimize the resulting conflict potentials. This is
underlined by the fact that only marginal interfaces do exist, where actors are eager
to cooperateor even switch sides. For many involved parties, it seems more
important to hold on the dichotomic black-and-white thinking, rather than trying to
overcome it and intend to collaborate in order to handle dams in more sophisticated
ways (see below).
In SEA, Thailand serves somehow as the base of diverse, powerful actors that are
seeking hydropower in riparian stateswith international DA-protagonists support-
ing them. On the other hand, it serves as the spring-board for actors opposing this
evolution. They resist the neo-colonial strategy in order to stop dams, or at least
achieve a more balanced development with a better recognition of socio-ecological
issueswherein they appear sometimes quite influential, too. Hence, all involved
obviously use the relatively free and democratic political Thai space, to resistor
to expandcontroversial dams in the neighbourhood.
Internationalising and multiplying dam projects conflict lines
The three outlined dam-stories give an idea of the intrinsic conflict-diversity at dam
projects that depend on various parameters. Moreover, the analysis unveils the
tendency to more manifold and higher conflict-arenas: they get increasingly
internationalised under the banners of globalising DA and regionalisation-efforts.
Correspondingly, the conflict-lines multiply. In the next step, these tendencies
strongly influence the overall context of dam-buildingas it is depicted in Fig. 2:
Furthermore, the publics and the mass medias perceptions of controversies play
a complementary, crucial role in this framework. In consequence, particularly the
conflicts between competing and dichotomising actor networks shape the powerful
medial construction and public awareness. Thus, for instance the vertical
controversies at the Pak Mun and the (internationalised) horizontal disputes at the
NT2 are present(ed). But geopolitically sensitive struggleslike the Salween project
or network-internal disputes as in case of the NT2-buildersare also negotiated
beyond these perceptions, or rather suppressed.
Outlines on how to avoid future dam conflicts
There are various approaches at hand to handle resource disputese.g. the concepts
of Conflict Governance, 3rd-Party Intervener and Intercultural Mediation
(Deutsch and Coleman 2000; Weller 2007). Some broad strategies to stopor at
least minimisethe inherent dispute-potentials and to overcome such difficult
situations can be provided.
28
For instance, the locally affected people, activists, peoples organizations and NGOs seeing themselves
as the good ones and the governments, development banks, consultants, dam builders, financiers and
other DA-agents as the bad guysand vice versa.
340 Y. Klpper
As the concepts stated above are often criticised for being too technical, the WCD
for instance deployed a rights and risks based approach that provides a more
political foundation and is directed particularly to dam disputes (WCD 2000).
But in this authors view, these approaches target too much the development of a
generalising recipe to handle conflicts. In doing so, the concepts are construed
single-edgedhence tending to overlook the complex shape of the dam projects.
Thus, they fall short of accommodating the diverse actors interests present in the
dam-building. They run the risk of disregarding various important patterns that
influence the emergence of controversies and its conflictive process.
In this respect, it appears essential to overcome the search forand application of
these universalising conflict-resolution models that need to be questioned. In fact, more
promisingand challengingit seems to broaden the analytical horizon in order to
recognise the various structures and facets of the conflict and its frameworks. Based on
such an increased awareness, a toolbox should be deployed which provides a diverse
set of instruments and mechanisms. These in turn can be launched and applied
individuallydepending on the patterns and shape of the (potential) dam conflict.
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