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Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK The Pacific Review Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpre20 Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review Shaun Narine a a St. Thomas University Version of record first published: 22 Aug 2008. To cite this article: Shaun Narine (2008): Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review, The Pacific Review, 21:4, 411-429 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512740802294689 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. The Pacic Review, Vol. 21 No. 4 December 2008: 411429 Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review Shaun Narine
Abstract This paper assesses the historical development of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). During its 40 year history, ASEANhas achieved limited success in inuencing the normative environment of Southeast Asia. ASEAN has helped shape institutional development in the Asia Pacic, particularly since the 1990s. It remains at the center of Asia Pacic regionalism. However, ASEANs diverse membership and its need to maintain the fundamental principle of non- intervention limit its ability to reform. ASEANs future is closely tied to its role in facilitating the emergence of China as a global power. Keywords ASEAN; non-intervention; reform; China; Asia Pacic institutions. Introduction Over its 40-year history (19672007), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has experienced considerable uctuations in its fortunes. It was most prominent during the 1980s as it organized the global campaign against Vietnams occupation of Cambodia. Its institutional nadir may have come in 199799, when ASEAN proved ineffective during the catastrophic East Asian economic crisis. Today, ASEANs international standing is on another upswing. It is at the center of a number of Asia Pacic regional initiatives, including the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), the Asia Pacic Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the East Asian Summit (EAS). It is discussing creating
Shaun Narine is an Associate Professor of International Relations at St. Thomas University,
New Brunswick, Canada. He has written extensively on ASEAN and institutionalism in the Asia Pacic. His current projects include a new book on ASEAN and a study of Chinese leadership in the Pacic region. Address: Shaun Narine, St. Thomas University, 51 Dineen Drive, Fredericton, NB. E3B 5G3, Canada. E-mail: narine@stu.ca The Pacic Review ISSN 0951-2748 print/ISSN 1470-1332 online C 2008 Taylor & Francis http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/09512740802294689 D o w n l o a d e d
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412 The Pacic Review an ASEAN Community. However, the environment in which ASEAN op- erates today is more complex than at any time in the organizations history. This paper examines ASEANs history from 1967 to the present. ASEAN has evolved in response to many external forces and inuences and has played a limited role in shaping the political and security environments in whichit operates. The following discussionexamines the nature of ASEANs inuence over its membership and the larger region. Theoretically, the pa- per accepts Collins (2007) argument that ASEAN is a security regime, as opposed to a security community. The operation of this regime is best ex- plained through the English school of international relations (ES) (Narine 2006). ASEAN is important in reinforcing the normative environment of the region. For now, ASEANs ability to inuence regional norms and act as a gateway for Chinas entry onto the global stage are functions that will sustain the organization into the future. Theoretical overview Of the mainstream theoretical approaches to institutions neo-realism, lib- eral institutionalism, and constructivism constructivism offers the most useful, though limited, analysis of ASEAN. Neo-realists regard ASEAN as irrelevant (Jones and Smith 2002). But they cannot explain why ASEANs members dedicate so much time and resources to something so meaning- less. Liberal institutionalists have a difcult time explaining exactly what ASEANs functions are. Constructivist analysts of ASEAN argue that the organization embodies and promotes certain key norms and practices in the Asia Pacic region (Acharya 2001; Eaton and Stubbs 2006). ASEANs power lies mostly in get- ting other states to adopt its rules of acceptable regional behavior. There is truth in this analysis, but the constructivist emphasis on shifts in identity to explain normative change (and vice versa) misjudges the nature of state in- teraction in Southeast Asia. In fact, contrary to what many observers claim, ASEANs core values often work against the development of a cohesive re- gional organization. ASEAN is a pluralistic community. ASEAN promotes cooperation between its members, but its values result in weak institutional structures (Emmerson 2005). ASEANs success has largely been based on its ability to organize its members around common interests that are reected in its values but shared values do not necessarily lead to a common identity. Collins argues that, while the transnational elites of ASEAN may enjoy a sense of belonging to a larger community, the people of the ASEAN states do not exhibit much of the we-feeling that is part of Deutschian security communities. Instead, ASEAN is a community based around the mutual benets of sharedrules, not a strong sense of collective identity (Collins 2007: 215). ASEANforms asecurityregime, whichfacilitates cooperationaround recognized rules to reduce uncertainty and advance longer-term interests (Ibid: 206). D o w n l o a d e d
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S. Narine: Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review 413 The ES captures this aspect of ASEAN very well. Despite its apparent similarities toconstructivismandeventoclassical realism, the ESoffers a dis- tinctive approach to international relations (Narine 2006; Buzan 2004). The ES emphasizes that international society, and the shared norms and values that underpin that society, is a normal state of affairs in international politics. The conict-prone, threat-dominated world of the realists, to which all main- stream, North American international relations (IR) theory responds, is a misinterpretation of the international realm. In fact, cooperation between self-interested states which is the key problem of most rationalist theory is both common and fairly easily sustained. The ASEAN states cooperate because any shared antipathy is outweighed by the advantages of working together. Understanding that rational, self-interested states will cooperate does not require positing a radical transformation/creation of regional iden- tity, which mainstream constructivists are prone to do. In fact, the sense of Southeast Asian regional identity remains relatively weak, but this reality does not preclude cooperation (Alagappa 2003; Severino 2006). The ES is decient in that it fails to recognize the extent to which domestic political considerations and concerns with nation-building shape the foreign policies of most developing states. ASEANs historical development bears this out. The single most important factor both driving and limiting ASEANs evolu- tion in its 40-year history has been its pursuit of policies that will strengthen the economic and political security of its member states (Narine 2004). ASEANs norms and practices Particular norms, values, and practices have evolved within, and dene, ASEAN. Amitav Acharya distinguishes ASEANs legal-rational from its socio-cultural norms. He denes legal-rational norms as: formal rational- istic principles of law. Socio-cultural norms are the basis of informal social controls and social habits (Acharya 2001: 24). ASEANs legal-rational norms are the following: (1) a prohibition against theuseof forceandacommitment tothepacic settlement of disputes, (2) re- gional autonomy, (3) the doctrine of non-interference, and (4) no military pacts and a preference for bilateral defense cooperation. These norms, with the exception of the last, are codied within ASEAN declarations and doc- uments. These norms are derived from the standard principles of the West- phalian state system. Indeed, the rst three norms all protect and reinforce the overarching norm of respect for state sovereignty. It is the commitment to non-interference, and all of the complications that emerge from this prin- ciple, that is at the heart of the controversies over ASEANs development today. Acommitment to sovereignty is common to most states, but a credible case can be made that ASEANs emphasis on non-intervention is distinctive (Haacke 2003: 5). Reputedly, ASEANs socio-cultural norms are particular to Southeast Asia (based on Malay cultural practices) and are designated the ASEAN D o w n l o a d e d
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414 The Pacic Review Way. They emphasize processes of consultation and consensus building, which are used to reach common organizational positions. The ASEAN Way stresses informality, organization minimalism, inclusiveness, intensive consultations leading to consensus and peaceful resolutions of disputes (S. Jayakumar quoted in Narine 2006: 204). The ASEAN Way encourages ASEAN to work around contentious issues rather than letting those prob- lems derail cooperation in other areas. ASEANs approach to regionalism has been very exible. If ASEAN members cannot agree on a common pol- icy they agree to go their separate ways, while couching their disagreements in language that obscures differences. The ASEAN minus X principle also allows member states to opt out of multilateral agreements with the op- tion of joining later, thereby preventing recalcitrant members fromblocking institutional progress. ASEANs early history The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was inaugurated on 8 August 1967. ASEANs founding members were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand the major non-Communist states of the region. ASEAN was assembled in the aftermath of Indonesias Kon- frontasi against Malaysia. The overthrow of President Sukarno brought Suharto to power and led to a change in Indonesias policies toward its neighbors (Turnbull 1999: 287312; Narine 2002b: 938). ASEAN served three functions: to alleviate intra-ASEAN tensions, to reduce the regional inuence of external actors, and to promote the socio- economic development of its members. Member states shared the belief that the greatest security threat facing them was foreign-backed communist insurgency. However, the ASEAN countries had different understandings of how best to pursue their objectives. Ostensibly, ASEAN was meant to promote regional peace and stability, largely through the pursuit of socio- economic goals (ASEAN 1967). In reality, the ASEAN states were con- cerned with security. ASEAN could not be a military alliance, since an al- liance required identifying some regional threat. Tension between ASEAN states also formed a barrier to security cooperation. Nonetheless, the reality of a common external threat played a signicant role in ASEANs creation. ASEANs evolution in response to external threats has remained a consis- tent motivating force behind ASEANs development over 40 years. During most of its rst decade, ASEAN accomplished relatively little. Tensions between member states threatened the organizations operation, but the withdrawal of American and British forces from the region, efforts by China and Russia to play larger roles in Southeast Asia, and the political impact of the VietnamWar compelled the ASEANstates to stay together. In November 1971, ASEAN committed Southeast Asia to becoming a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). ZOPFAN began as an in- dependent Malaysian effort to get the great powers to agree to the neutral- ization of Southeast Asia. For strategic reasons, most other ASEAN states D o w n l o a d e d
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S. Narine: Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review 415 disagreed with this initiative and ZOPFAN was the resulting compromise. ZOPFAN had no timetable for its implementation, and in recent years, the concept has beenabandoned(Haacke 2003: 734). ZOPFANexemplies the dynamics of ASEANs early years. The disparate interests and perspectives of its member states meant that most could not agree on fundamental poli- cies. Even so, they were able to present an apparently unied front to the world. The Bali Conference of February 1976 was motivated by the end of the VietnamWar in1975; the emergence of communist Vietnam, Laos, andCam- bodia; and uncertainties about the American commitment to the region. The Bali Conference was the rst meeting of the ASEAN heads of state. Out of the conference came two important documents: the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treat of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The Declaration addressed the economic side of security, dening four areas of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation. It also encouraged military coop- eration between the ASEAN states, albeit on a non-ASEAN basis. The TAC was a code of conduct for Southeast Asia. It obligated its signa- tories to settle disputes peacefully and prohibited the use of force between states. It was open to accession by non-ASEAN states. Vietnam rejected the TAC, however, as it felt that ASEAN was an American puppet. 1 Today, the TAC has grown to become one of the strongest symbols of ASEANs inu- ence in the Asia Pacic region. Its signatories now include all the Southeast Asian countries as well as China, India, Japan, and (with caveats) Australia. The Declaration of ASEAN Concord has been less successful. ASEAN has not enjoyed great success as an economic institution, a subject discussed below. The economic achievements of the ASEAN states happened inde- pendently of ASEAN, though ASEAN may have facilitated economic de- velopment by helping to create and maintain regional political stability. ASEAN and the invasion of Cambodia On 25 December 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, deposing the Khmer Rouge and solidifying the enmity of China, Cambodias primary patron. 2 In FebruaryMarch 1979, China launched a punitive attack on Vietnam. Chinas military was soundly defeated by the battle-hardened Vietnamese. China changed its tactics. It supported the Khmer Rouges guerilla war of attrition against Vietnam. To provide the KR with supplies, however, China needed the acquiescence of Thailand, the front line state bordering Cam- bodia. Thailand became a conduit for Chinese weapons to the KR. Thailand also secured a reiteration of US security guarantees from Washington. Thailand wanted the support of its ASEANallies in its confrontation with Vietnam. It argued that Vietnams invasion violated ASEANs TAC, primar- ily the obligations to respect sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force to settle regional disputes. The ASEANstates agreed on the principles at stake and the need to reverse the invasion, but their different strategic per- spectives created intra-ASEAN friction. Indonesia and Malaysia saw China D o w n l o a d e d
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416 The Pacic Review as the real long-term threat to the region and Vietnam as a potential ally in dealing with that greater problem. Singapore emphasized the Vietnamese invasion as an example of Soviet expansionism, in order to keep the United States engagedinthe region. The Philippines was committedtointernational law and did not want the invasion to go unpunished. Indonesia went along with Thailands plan because, after Konfrontasi, it needed to show that it could be a regional player. Indonesia regarded ASEAN as an instrument through which it could exert regional power. In- donesia recognized that Thailand would abandon ASEAN if the organiza- tion did not support it, disrupting ASEAN and pushing Thailand into closer alliance with China. Indonesia tempered its own interests for the sake of ASEAN solidarity, at least for a time. ASEAN tried hard to present a uni- ed front in dealing with Vietnam. However, the fa cade sometimes slipped, and the individual states different interests sometimes came through. From197990, ASEANwas at the forefront of international opposition to the Vietnamese invasion. ASEAN supported by the US and China orga- nizedoppositiontoVietnaminthe UnitedNations, denying the Vietnamese- installed government of Cambodia (the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea) its seat in the UN. ASEAN also became instrumental in organizing the mil- itary/political opposition to the Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom Penh, but its efforts were hobbled by the fact that the internationally reviled Khmer Rouge was the most effective opposition-ghting force. ASEANalso pursued diplomatic initiatives designed to end the conict. ASEAN spon- soredanInternational ConferenceonKampuchea(ICK) inNewYorkinJuly 1981. ASEAN discovered, however, that its genuine attempts to resolve the conict diplomatically were stymied by the United States and China, both of which wished to keep Vietnam and, by extension, the Soviet Union bogged down in Cambodia. The ICK ended with a statement of principles which were too inexible to be politically viable. Tensions within ASEAN were a continual part of the organizations re- lations at this time. Indonesia and Malaysia feared that the international efforts to punish Vietnam would drive Vietnam more tightly into the Soviet embrace or leave a weakened Vietnam more susceptible to Chinese inu- ence. In March 1980, Indonesia and Malaysia issued the Kuantan Declara- tion, which called on Vietnam to be free of Chinese and Soviet inuence in exchange for recognition of its legitimate interests. Thailand and Vietnam rejected this proposal. These different perspectives towards Vietnam fes- tered within ASEAN. Indonesia became frustrated with ASEANs policies, the constraints those policies placed upon its own initiatives, and its loss of inuence within ASEANto Thailand. To accommodate Indonesias growing impatience and diplomatic efforts, ASEAN designated it the interlocutor of ASEAN with Vietnam. By 1987, the Cold War began to thaw, and the major powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, and China) saw Vietnam/Cambodia as an inconve- nient obstacle to better relations. In 1988, a change in Thailands leadership led to a complete reversal in Thai policy towards Vietnam. The new Prime D o w n l o a d e d
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S. Narine: Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review 417 Minister Chatichai Choonhavan represented Thai business interests, which sought to establish commercial ties with Vietnam. Under his leadership, Thailand adopted the Indonesian position towards Vietnam but without consulting its ASEAN allies. As a result, it abandoned and undermined the ASEAN united front. The Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) was held in July 1989, and ended in failure as the various external parties to the conict were not yet ready to abandon their respective allies. ASEANwas further divided after the conference and Indonesia began to contemplate a separate peace with Cambodia and Vietnam, regardless of ASEAN policy. The permanent ve powers of the UN Security Council took charge of the Cambodian sit- uation. The Paris Peace Treaty, which ended the external dimension of the Vietnam/Cambodia conict, was signed on 22 October 1991. By that time, external actors wanted an end to the war, and Vietnam had begun to dra- matically improve its economic and political relationships with the ASEAN states, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. ASEANs handling of the Vietnam invasion of Cambodia was the high point of ASEANs unity and international effectiveness during its 40 years of existence. ASEANs members, for the most part, supported a coherent corporate position for a decade. The need to coordinate policy greatly im- proved intra-ASEAN cooperation and communication. ASEANs interna- tional prole and inuence increased enormously. However, there were sig- nicant unresolvedtensions betweentheASEANstates. Moreover, ASEAN was only one part of a diplomatic and political alliance shaped by the great powers (the United States, China, and the Soviet Union) and the exigen- cies of the Cold War. When relations between the great powers improved, they resolved the Vietnam situation. The Cambodian invasion illustrates ASEANs coming of age, but it also demonstrates the limits of small powers. Vietnam/Cambodia was the high point of ASEANs international inuence, but the organization was still only a supporting player in a complex drama. ASEAN in the postCold War era The end of the Cold War forced ASEAN to redesign itself and nd a new unifying purpose. The ASEAN states came to see the international political advantages of operating as group, and they were determined to maintain ASEAN as a functioning institution (Narine 2002b: 10138; Weatherbee 2005: 95100). In 1992, ASEAN reformed its institutional structure, for- malizing summit meetings, increasing the duties and rank of the ASEAN Secretary-General, and strengthening and improving the levels of interac- tionbetweenofcials at the highest levels of the ASEANstates. The ASEAN Secretariat, however, remained under-funded and largely incapable of inde- pendent action. In 1994, ASEAN held the rst meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF was the culmination of a process that began with non- ASEAN actors who argued that the postCold War Asia Pacic region D o w n l o a d e d
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418 The Pacic Review needed a security organization. ASEAN registered its propriety role in the ARF, insisting on the right to set the agenda and adapting the ASEAN Way of interaction (i.e., consensus building) to the proceedings of the ARF. ASEAN laid out a three-step program for the ARFs evolution into a more robust security structure: the ARFwoulddevelopcondence-building meth- ods, followedby preventive diplomacy, followedby conict resolution. These measures would evolve at their own pace. In the meantime, the ARF would be a forum in which the regional powers could interact (Narine 2002b: 102 13). This approach has evoked considerable criticism and frustration. Some observers condemn the ARF as little more than a talk shop. Some of the major security issues of the region, such as North Korea and Taiwan, have been kept off the ARF agenda. 3 On the other hand, the ARF has allowed state representatives to meet, often informally, to smooth over disagree- ments. China has strongly supported ASEANs role and methods in the ARF. Nonetheless, the overall efcacy of the institution is in question. The ARF is a long-term project, so assessing it over a 13-year period may not be fair. Still, ASEAN has invested a great deal of its prestige into the ARF, and it is the vehicle through which ASEAN hopes to affect the shaping of the regional security environment (Katsumata 2006). During the 1990s, ASEAN incorporated the rest of Southeast Asia. Viet- nam joined in 1995, Burma and Laos joined in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. There were several reasons for this rapid expansion. ASEAN believed that its voice would be enhanced in international fora if the organization spoke for the entire region. The best chances of getting the other mainland South- east Asian states to join was in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War and might be lost if ASEAN waited too long. The ASEAN states were particularly concerned about Burmas isolationist tendencies. The four new members made ASEAN home to more than 500 million people and more appealing as an economic destination. Finally, some of the key ASEANlead- ers, such as President Suharto of Indonesia and Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia viewed an expanded ASEAN as part of their legacies (Narine 2002b: 113). The disadvantages of expansion probably outweigh the advantages, as evidenced by the case of Burma. ASEAN argued that admitting Burma would allow it to engage in a process of constructive engagement with the authoritarian state, which might facilitate its political reform. This has not happened, and ASEAN has been saddled with an ongoing problem that is pushing ASEANs institutional limits and seriously compromising its international standing (Haacke 2003: 14150; Acharya 2001: 10813; Em- mers 2005). Cambodias political instability has also presented difculties to ASEAN. Vietnams inclusion has mostly been a positive event, particularly considering Vietnams history as ASEANs primary antagonist. The different levels of economic development between most of the old andnewASEANmembers havecomplicatedeconomic integration. Thenew D o w n l o a d e d
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S. Narine: Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review 419 members have demonstrated that their commitment to the ASEAN Com- munity is weak. These factors have made it doubly difcult for ASEAN to reform itself to deal with the regional problems of the twenty-rst century. In particular, efforts to reconsider ASEANs principle of non-intervention face especially strong opposition from the new members, though some es- tablished members have also opposed such reform. During the 1990s, ASEAN attempted to re-energize its economic ini- tiatives. In part, this was because ASEAN feared that the new Asia Pacic Economic Cooperation (APEC) forumwould undermine its primacy in East Asia andpromote economic policies disadvantageous tothe weaker regional economies. Thailand proposed the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1991, which was endorsed by the ASEAN summit in Singapore in 1992. AFTA is meant to provide a training ground for ASEAN business and a way to attract foreign investment to the region. ASEAN pursued AFTA for four reasons. These were: to provide ASEAN with a new purpose in the aftermath of the Cold War, to offset the growth of economic regionalism in other parts of the world and give AFTA members a greater voice and more economic clout in international economic negotiations, to make it easier for multinational corporations to establish themselves at the regional level, and to function as a regional investment area that attracts foreign investment and compete against China on a more equitable footing (Severino 2006: 22250). AFTAhas been a limited success story for ASEAN, and its gradual imple- mentation may be an example of the ASEAN Way at work in the realm of economics (Stubbs 2000). The ASEAN states have largely been successful in radically reducing tariffed trade and intra-ASEAN trade has increased, though much of that trade is between Singapore and a few other states. 4 Nonetheless, total intra-ASEANtrade remains relatively small, andregional businessmen do not see AFTA as being effective, or are unaware of it (Sev- erino 2006: 2478). Beyond this, other ASEAN efforts to construct regional economic zones have largely faltered due to political and economic tensions between the involved ASEAN states (Weatherbee 2005: 1116). Much of the impetus to push AFTA and other economic initiatives was in response to multiple international economic threats that emerged during the 1990s and early 2000s. Chinas rise as a global economic power was the sin- gle greatest force behind AFTAs continuing development. Throughout the 1990s, the deadline for AFTAs implementation kept being pushed forward as other international economic arrangements createdpressureonASEAN. 5 Recommitting themselves to AFTA was a major part of the ASEAN re- sponse to the Asian economic crisis of 199799. The East Asian economic crisis The East Asian economic crisis of 199799 undermined ASEANs inter- national image and revealed the weaknesses of ASEANs organizational model. The crisis started with Thailand and spread rapidly into the rest of D o w n l o a d e d
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420 The Pacic Review the region and beyond. ASEAN could not counter the crisis. The ASEAN states were disunited and even antagonistic in their dealings with each other. More than any other event, the crisis underlined the very limitations of the ASEAN Way and the ASEAN identity that was, supposedly, the product of decades of interaction (Freistein 2005: 1806). ASEAN was never designed to deal with regional nancial issues and lacked the institutional and economic resources necessary to handle the problem. Indeed, the expectations that it could deal with the crisis were un- reasonable and indicative of the international communitys misunderstand- ing of ASEAN. But this misunderstanding was fosteredby ASEAN. ASEAN had presented itself as a powerful and united political and economic bloc and haddone sobecause it recognizedthe political advantages of being perceived in this way by other states. The crisis indicated the extent to which Southeast Asia has become, in the minds of investors, a single economic unit. This re- ality created a new incentive for ASEAN to reform (Narine 2002a: 17994). The crisis weakened ASEAN in three ways. First, it shattered ASEANs condence in its own economic success, which had been the basis of its will- ingness tobe assertive onthe international stage. Second, ASEANs inability to respond to the crisis harmed its claims to be a credible economic institu- tion. Finally, the crisis introducedproblems that ASEANcouldnot face with- out violating the ASEAN Way, particularly the norm of non-interference (Ibid.). ASEAN did respond to the crisis. In December 1997, at the Second In- formal ASEAN summit in Malaysia, ASEAN issued the ASEAN Vision 2020 document, a list of declarations of intent to reinforce ASEAN princi- ples and community. In December 1998, ASEAN met in Hanoi and issued the Hanoi Plan of Action and the Statement on Bold Measures. The Hanoi Plan included an acceleration of the AFTA implementation date to 2002, implementation of the framework agreement for the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), and liberalization of trade in services. The ASEAN Secretariat was reformed, expanded, and given new responsibilities. However, it still lacks many of the resources necessary to carry out its new responsibilities (Freistein 2005:182). In November 1997, the ASEAN nance ministers met in Manila and pro- posed an ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP), which would monitor the economic fundamentals of the ASEAN states and provide an early warning in the event of economic difculties. At a second ASEAN nance minis- ters meeting in Jakarta in February 1998, the ministers agreed to establish the ASP in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The ASP would require ASEAN to comment upon the internal policies of its member states. However, the ASP has run into many problems, not the least being the reluctance of ASEAN states to share sensitive economic information, uncertainty about what in- formation has actually been compiled, and understafng in the ASEAN Secretariat (Narine 2002b: 1626). D o w n l o a d e d
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S. Narine: Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review 421 On 30 October 1998, ASEAN announced the creation of an ASEAN Ac- tion Plan on Social Safety Nets. In November 1999, Thailand proposed the creation of an ASEAN Troika a group consisting of the past, present, and future chairs of the ASEAN Standing Committee to address issues of regional peace and stability. However, the Troika was not a decision-making body and could only take on tasks that were explicitly assigned to it by ASEAN. In addition, it was forbidden to address issues that constitute the internal affairs of the ASEAN member countries. 6 Both of these measures illustrated ASEANs continuing problem: being an effective regional instru- ment required that it put aside its principle of non-intervention something that the ASEAN states, collectively, were unprepared to do (Freistein 2005: 182). This became especially clear when in July 1998, Thailand proposed that ASEAN engage in exible engagement the practice of ASEAN mem- bers discussing the domestic policies of other members when those policies had regional/cross-border implications. Thailands proposal was rejected by ASEAN states, which were afraid that allowing open criticism would even- tually cause the very tensions that ASEAN had been created to alleviate. A compromise allowed for enhanced interaction a process that permitted individual ASEAN states to comment on a neighbors domestic policies if those had regional effects, but would leave ASEANout of the equation. En- hanced interaction was tested immediately when Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines criticized Malaysia over its treatment of Anwar Ibrahim. This led to tensions and threats between Malaysia and its critics. ASEAN was not ready to abandon non-intervention as its core principle (Haacke 2003: 16590; Acharya 2001: 1526). Other events during the crisis period such as the regional haze and the East Timor situation further underlined ASEANs weaknesses. In 199798, ASEAN was incapable of addressing the choking air pollution that enveloped the region as the result of illegal forest burnings in Indone- sia. In 1999, East Timor voted for independence from Indonesia and was promptly enmeshed in violence instigated by Indonesian-backed militias. The United Nations eventually intervened, elding the UN interventionary (INTERFET International Force for East Timor) force led by Australia. Indonesia encouraged ASEAN states to participate in INTERFET, in or- der to reduce the Australian inuence. However, ASEANs inability to deal with East Timor by itself further damaged its international image. ASEAN asserted its right to primacy in the ARF, arguing that it had the right to man- age regional security. Yet, when faced with a major regional security issue dealing with its own member, it was unable to act. ASEAN in the post-crisis period In October 2003, ASEAN held the Second Bali Summit where it introduced the Second Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali II), a sequel to the 1976 D o w n l o a d e d
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422 The Pacic Review Declaration of ASEAN Concord. ASEAN announced its new long-term intention to create an ASEAN Community, based upon three pillars: the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Weatherbee 2005: 10710; Freistein 2005: 18697). The completion date for these pillars is 2015. The Economic Community is designed to make ASEAN an integrated single market and production base, building on AFTA, the AIA, and the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS). The Security Com- munity is envisaged to bring ASEANs political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and har- monious environment (ASEAN 2003). The ASC emphasizes ASEANs principles of non-intervention, but it also places considerable weight on ASEANs security structures, such as the TAC and the ARF, to create and maintain a peaceful regional environment. The Socio-Cultural Com- munity envisages a Southeast Asia bonded together in partnership as a community of caring societies (Ibid.). It promises to work toward building states that will provide basic social services and support to their poorest citizens. At the 11th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2005, the ASEAN lead- ers signed the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the ASEAN Charter. The charter is meant to be a constitutional document embodying fundamental principles, goals, objectives and structures of ASEAN cooperation capable of meeting the needs of the ASEAN Community and beyond (ASEAN 2005). The Eminent Persons Group (EPG) established to draft the char- ter presented its recommendations to the ASEAN Summit in Singapore in November of 2007. The EPG recommended the creation of a formal dis- pute mechanism to resolve political and economic issues; decision-making by majority vote, rather thanthe traditional consensus, inareas other thanse- curity and foreign policy; and monitoring mechanisms to gauge compliance on ASEANobjectives, principles, and policies. The EPGproposed sanctions against members in serious breach of ASEAN principles, including loss of membership rights and even expulsion. The ASEAN governments quickly rejected the idea of sanctions, however, and the charter body monitoring hu- man rights has no enforcement ability (Acharya 2007; Economist, 4 August 2007). Critics of the charter argue that it codies existing ASEAN norms of non-interference and practices of consultation and consensus, and repre- sents no meaningful institutional progress (Arnold 2007). Defenders argue that the dispute-settlement mechanism is a signicant step towards making ASEANa more effective organization and that the charter is already a max- imum achievement given the enormous diversity within ASEAN (Khalik 2008). Even so, the charter must be ratied by all of ASEANs members, and the Philippines has warned that it may effectively veto the charter unless Burma commits to democratic reforms. D o w n l o a d e d
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S. Narine: Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review 423 ASEANs survival and signicance may not lie within the organization but in its utility to China. During the crisis period, another crucial institutional structure was created. The ASEAN Plus Three (the three being China, Japan, and South Korea) began in 1997 as a consultative body meant to co- ordinate Asias meetings with Europe. The crisis turned the APT into far more. The APT identied areas of regional economic cooperation and, by 2000, had launched the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). The CMI is a series of currency swap agreements which builds on the ASEAN Swap Agreement (ASA), which was rst negotiated in 1977 (Park 2000). These swap agree- ments allow its partners to access specied amounts of foreign currency in the event of a crisis. Currently, collective foreign currency reserves in East Asia are nearly US$3 trillion (Masaki 2007). 7 The CMI was initially greeted with considerable skepticism, its critics pointing out that the various swap arrangements usually did not amount to enough money to actually protect a member state from a currency crisis. Nonetheless, since its inception, the total amount of the Bilateral Swap Arrangements (BSAs) worked out un- der the CMI come to more than US$80 billion and seem poised to increase further in value. The CMI was also originally envisioned to work in conjunc- tion with the IMF; there are signs, however, that it is becoming slightly more independent of the established international nancial order (Ibid. 2007). The APT has become the platform for an Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI). The ABMI is meant to offer Asian government bonds that can be purchased by Asian investors, thereby raising capital locally, putting the regions savings tobetter economic use, andreducing dependence onoutside capital (Amyx 2004). These various measures are still in a preliminary stage. What is important to note is how quickly the APT has become the foundation of a number of economic initiatives which arose in direct response to the Asian economic crisis. These measures are meant to protect Asian economies from the va- garies of a volatile international nancial and economic system. Some observers argue that the APT can be the basis of a larger East Asian community (Stubbs 2002). Others are more skeptical, arguing that the different interests of the ASEAN states, China and Japan, signicantly limit the possibilities of what the APT can become (Hund 2003). Still, the APT is the launching point of yet another East Asian community-building initiative, namely the East Asian Summit (EAS), which held its rst meeting in 2005. The EAS includes the APT states as well as India, Australia, and New Zealand. Signicantly, it excludes the United States, though Japan and Australia may act as American proxies. Since 1997, the most signicant institution building in the Asia Pa- cic has been driven by China. Beyond the measures associated with the APT, ASEAN and China have agreed to establish an ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA), which should come into effect by 2010. This development pushed ASEANs economic relations with Japan and South Korea, which are afraid of being left behind. At the same time, ASEANs trade with China has D o w n l o a d e d
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424 The Pacic Review increased exponentially every year, setting a record US$160 billion in 2006 andexceeding US$200 billionin2007, three years aheadof schedule (Crispin 2007; Yan 2008). Chinas emergence has presented problems and oppor- tunities to ASEAN. The ASEAN states are afraid of being economically marginalized by Chinas booming economy, and much of Chinas ASEAN diplomacy is directed at addressing this concern (Ba 2003). Chinas support has been critically important for ASEANs efforts to maintain a promi- nent role in the regional institutional framework. China agrees with the ASEAN Way of interaction, seeing the benets of a consensus-oriented ap- proach to its own interests. Arguably, China is learning from ASEAN (Ba 2006). At the same time, ASEAN nds itself being less of a master in its own house. It is one actor in a region lled with much larger powers that do not necessarily recognize ASEANs authority. The United States, in particular, maybeintheprocess of tryingtoassembleacoalitionof like-mindedregional states (Japan, Australia, and India) into an alliance that will contain China, even as it is paying less attention to Asian regional institutions (Jain 2007; Koyakutty 2007). The anti-Muslim tenor of the US War on Terror has damaged American standing in Muslim Southeast Asia. Moreover, the US xation on terrorism has led it to focus on its regional military posture, to the neglect of other important political and economic issues. The overall effect of these policies has been to enhance Chinas regional standing, at the expense of American authority (Overholt 2008: 16986, 22362). Discussion and analysis After 40 years, what has ASEAN accomplished and where is it going? Is the organization a twentieth century, Cold War relic, the members of which cling to outdated notions of sovereignty and the mechanisms of which are incapable of dealing with the challenges of the twenty-rst century? Or has ASEAN risen to the occasion and implemented measures that will enable it to reform its structures and strengthen its internal cohesion (Acharya 2007; Akya 2006)? Alternatively, does ASEANs true power lie in its ability to inuence the normative environment of the Asia Pacic (Eaton and Stubbs 2006)? ASEAN supporters who expect the organization to evolve into a rela- tively structured institution will be disappointed. ASEAN has never aspired to be a European Union. Political and economic amalgamation is not a long-term goal. Nonetheless, ASEANs use of the phrase ASEAN Com- munity implies a desire to move from the unstructured institution of the past into something more formal and legally binding. Many advocates of ASEAN reform recognize the need to revise the non-interference principle because they understand that the activities ASEAN is supposed to facilitate economic integration, nancial monitoring, and political oversight re- quire an institutional structure that can, at the least, alert its members as to D o w n l o a d e d
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S. Narine: Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review 425 the regional effects of their domestic policies. However, this kind of institu- tional development is unlikely to occur. The ASEAN Charter gives juridical personality to ASEAN, but it also codies ASEANs traditional norms and practices, reinforcing ideas of non-intervention. The global environment may have changed a great deal since 1967, but ASEAN states remain developing-world countries that see themselves as fragile entities locked in a struggle to become functioning and stable nation- states. 8 Most ASEANstates remaindominatedby narrowelites. Historically, the raison d etre of ASEANwas to further the state-building process by cre- ating a regional environment conducive to development. Different ASEAN states have followed different strategies in trying to achieve this goal. But the goal remains the same: to create a functioning state (Weatherbee 2005; Narine 2004). ASEANs role in this process has changed precisely because the percep- tion of howto facilitate the state-building process has altered. In a globalized world, where export-oriented economic development is the most rapid way to development, ASEAN needs to be more than just a mouthpiece for its members. If they truly wish to enjoy the benets of regionalism, then they must function as a region. This means increasing ASEANs ability to oper- ate, sacricing some sovereignty to the organization, and making short-term sacrices for the good of the region. Most ASEANcountries are unprepared to do this. The original ASEAN states are more developed and capable today than they were 40 years ago. However, problems of state capacity, corruption, ethnic and religious tensions, separatism, and territorial disputes (to name a few) remain. In many states, the threat of communism has been replaced by the threat of revolutionary Islam. Most ASEAN states remain tentative democracies. Advocates of ASEAN reform have made the irrefutable ar- gument that the regions ability to manage twenty-rst century security and political and economic forces requires ASEAN to function as an effective institutional structure. But making this point does not mean that this can be done. Even if the ASEAN-6 could agree to pool some elements of sovereignty within ASEAN, the CLMV states, which are at a much lower level of eco- nomic and political development, would never agree to such a change in the organizations mandate. There may be ways around this. A multi-tiered ASEAN, where different members need to meet different expectations, is possible. But these sorts of measures weaken ASEANs coherence and can- not beusedineverycircumstance. Burma, for example, will remainapolitical problem for ASEAN until its government reforms or the country is ejected from ASEAN. 9 Can ASEAN become a security community? Collins argues that civil so- ciety must be brought into ASEAN if a true regional identity is to evolve. Severino agrees, arguing that ASEANs greatest potential for development lies inits efforts create a socio-cultural community. It is only throughcreating D o w n l o a d e d
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426 The Pacic Review a community of shared values that ASEAN can continue its development (Severino 2006: 36870). Developing such a sense of regional community is a long-term project that relies upon extensive cross-cultural contacts, eco- nomic ties, and shared political and cultural values. Even then, interdepen- dence does not assure peace between states. In the short-term, ASEANs future is guaranteed by the role that the in- stitution plays in mediating between the great powers. In particular, Chinas support of ASEAN gives the organizations members a reason to keep the institution alive and active. Nonetheless, Chinas role could backre as the emerging giant establishes separate relationships with the individual ASEAN states that could tear at the fabric of the institution. This is most apparent in the close China-Burma relationship, even as Burma presents more problems for ASEAN. Acharya notes: The fact that the regions most powerful players (includ- ing China, India and the United States) show deference to ASEAN by par- ticipating in (ASEANs) forums demonstrates that ASEAN still matters (Acharya 2007). While ASEANs mediating role between the great powers is important, the organization aspires to be more than just an instrument that facilitates great power contact. ASEANs continuing role as a purveyor of regional norms seems assured. As Eaton and Stubbs note, this is a formof power in which ASEANis gifted. In keeping with ES and constructivist analyses, norms do matter. However, even here, ASEANis at risk. The intra-ASEANconsensus is breaking down around what values the organization is supposed to represent and the values it promotes do not necessarily further regional unity. Conclusion ASEAN remains an important actor in the Asia Pacic, but at present, it is probably incapable of truly extensive reform. This has been seen time and time again as ASEAN expresses ambitious aspirations but then proves incapable of acting on its ambitions. ASEANs limitations are necessary and reect far deeper issues revolving around state-building within Southeast Asia. The institution will remain important because of its diplomatic role in facilitating the emergence of China onto the world stage. But this is not a role that can help the internal evolution of ASEAN. However, like the Vietnam invasion of Cambodia, ASEANs diplomatic role in the larger world may be enough to keep the organization together while the more subtle and important work of community building continues. Notes 1 To underline this point, in 1978 Vietnam proposed its own counterpart to ZOP- FAN ZOGIPAN, the Zone of Genuine Independence, Peace, and Neutrality. D o w n l o a d e d
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S. Narine: Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review 427 2 At the time, Cambodia had been renamed Kampuchea by its Khmer Rouge government. 3 Note that North Korea joined the ARF in 2000. 4 Intra-ASEAN trade is around 23 percent of total ASEAN trade, but when Singa- pore is factored out altogether, it drops to about 5 percent (Narine 2002a: 132). 5 For example, the Uruguay Round of GATT, completed in 1993, called for larger tariff cuts in a shorter time than AFTA. The North American Free Trade Agree- ment (NAFTA) came into effect in 1994 and the Single European Act in 1992 (Narine 2002b: 129). 6 Press release fromThailands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, quoted in Narine (2002: 165). 7 China and Japan, combined, account for US$2.1 trillion. 8 See Mydans and Arnolds (2007) New York Times interview with Lee Kuan Yew in which he describes Singapores survival as remaining uncertain and fragile. 9 Burmas initial rejection of international aid in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis (3 May 2008), which killed more than 100,000 people, and the international con- demnation this evoked, is another example of the problem that the regime poses for ASEANs international standing (BBC News, Burma Eases Restrictions on Aid, accessedat http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacic/7394410.stm, 11 May 2008; Economist, 4 August 2007). References Acharya, A. (2001) Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, London: Routledge. (2007) ASEAN at 40: mid-life rejuvenation?, Foreignaffairs.org, 15 August; accessed at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070815faupdate86481/amitav- acharya/asean-at-40-mid-life-rejuvenation.html, 2 June 2008. Akya, C. (2006) Mid-life crisis for ASEAN, Asia Times online, 16 December; accessed at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast Asia/HL16Ae01.html, 2 June 2008. Alagappa, M. (2003) Constructing security order in Asia: conceptions and issues, in M. Alagappa (ed) Asian Security Order, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 70105. Amyx, J. (2004) A regional bond market for East Asia? The evolving political dy- namics of regional nancial cooperation, Pacic Economic Paper no. 342, Australia National University. Arnold, W. (2007) Historic ASEAN Charter reveals divisions, International Her- ald Tribune, 20 November; accessed at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/ 11/20/asia/asean.php, 2 June 2008. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967) The ASEAN Declara- tion, 8 August; accessed at http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm, 2 June 2008. (2005) Chairmans statement of the ninth ASEAN Plus Three Summit, 12 December; accessed at http://www.aseansec.org/18042.htm, 2 June 2008. (n.d.) Declaration of ASEAN Concord II; accessed at http://www.aseansec. org/15159.htm, 2 June 2008. Ba, A. (2003) China and ASEAN: renavigating relations for a 21st century Asia, Asian Survey, 43(4): 62247. (2006) Whos socializing whom? Complex engagement in Sino-ASEAN re- lations, Pacic Review 19(2): 15779. Buzan, B. (2004) From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. D o w n l o a d e d
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