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THE LAL MASJID TRAGEDY

AND THE
NEED FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

The tense and prolonged stand off between the Lal Masjid brigades and the
government, and the subsequent storming of the premises by the SSG
Commandos, could prove to be seminal insofar as the sensitive equation between
the State of Pakistan and the countrys religious organizations and militant outfits is
concerned. The Lal Masjid Crisis, which remained painfully the focus of attention of
the entire nation during the last six months, and culminated in the devastation of
the premises and deaths of a large number of its occupants and of the personnel of
the law enforcing agencies has, on the one hand, given a rude shock to the people
of Pakistan and, on the other, provided an occasion for some soul searching. There
are some questions to be asked and some decisions to be taken by the State and
the civil society.
At a perfunctory level, questions may be asked as to why, in the first instance, such
a situation was allowed to develop in the very heart of Pakistans Capital? Why did
not the law enforcing agencies intervene when the kidnapping of the citizens, police
personnel and even the foreign nationals was becoming a routine activity? Why did
the State appeared to be a silent spectator when the leadership of the Lal Masjid
was repeatedly making its intentions clear that since the State had failed to enforce
religious and social morality, the students of its seminary would act as the
vigilantes and the conscience keepers of the nation? Why were the culprits not
taken to task for ransacking video shops, trespassing private property and
threatening women folk driving cars on the street of Islamabad? Last, but not least,
why was the government silent when the Ghazi brothers gave calls for enforcement
of Sharia and launching Jihad if the State did not do so? People were wondering if
the silence of the government over such blatantly illegal acts was a sign of
weakness, a lack of direction, paralysis of decision-making or even some
mysterious collusion of the intelligence agencies.
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Still more important it is to inquire why over the years our civil society has been
transformed from a tolerant and harmonious entity to one which has become
vulnerable to the forces of violence and disintegration. What could explain this
metamorphosis?
Religion has, no doubt, remained an important aspect of our lives. But, it was
generally considered to be a matter of personal faith. Coercive proselytising and
bigotry were not the features of our civic society. No doubt, on a few occasions the
State was confronted by mass agitations, prompted by the religious Ulemas. Yet
the element of religious militancy was not there. The first of these was the anti-
Ahmadi agitation in 1953 which took the then government by surprise. However,
there was no clear cut agenda behind this agitation and there were no long term
repercussions once the agitation subsided. Again, in 1974, there was a long drawn
and violent agitation demanding that the Ahmadis be declared non-Muslims. Mr.
Bhutto conceded this demand and the unrest subsided. In 1977, a mass movement
was launched against rigging in the general elections which, soon, assumed
religious overtones demanding enforcement of Nizam-e-Mustafa. In an attempt to
take the wind out of this movement, Mr. Bhutto announced certain steps like the
Prohibition of liquor, ban on horse racing and gambling and declaring Friday as
public holiday.
While the agitation in 1953 did not have any implications on the structures of our
civil society, those in 1974 and 1977 definitely accentuated the influence of
religious leadership in Pakistan. Yet even then the religious organisations had not
turned into armed outfits.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was, perhaps, the watershed insofar as the
influence of clergy and the sectarian organisations in Pakistan is concerned. In the
U.S. war plans to counter the Soviet ingress in the region, Pakistan, as a front line
state, was not only to be the conduit for the supply of arms and ammunition to the
Mujahideen but also a training ground and launching pad for them.
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Another two developments during this period were equally significant. Firstly, Gen
Zia-ul-Haq, immediately after overthrowing Mr. Bhutto, declared that during the
prolonged and violent agitation against him in the summer of 1977 people had
voiced their desire for the enforcement of Shariah. Actually, this greatly suited him
as he was looking for a badly needed legitimacy. He hastened to take steps to that
end. Legislation on Hadood ordinances, putting in place a system of Zakat and
Usher, introduction of Nizam-e-Salat, establishment of Shariat Courts, interest free
Islamic banking, recognition of academic degrees by the Madaris and their overall
patronage could be cited as examples which were, to a great extent, aimed at
winning the support of the religious lobby. To his credit, he succeeded in carving
out a national constituency for himself. It will be pertinent to point out here that
during this period, the Jamat-e-Islami was an important component of Zia regime.
Simultaneously, Zias era also witnessed an ominous development of far reaching
consequences. In the wake of the Afghan war and insurgency in the occupied
Kashmir some of the Muslim Countries started providing patronage and financial
support to the Jihadi organisations. These organisations were using the madaris for
recruiting paid volunteers for Jihad. Young men, mostly from poor rural population
were tempted and motivated to join these outfits for monetary succour and, much
greater reward in the life hereafter. The large flow of funds and patronage by
General Zia explains the unprecedented growth of the Madaris during 1980s. While
the Madaris may not necessarily have been the training grounds for such armed
volunteers, these had an undeniable nexus with the training camps, particularly in
the tribal areas of the N.W.F.P and Azad Kashmir. Foreign nationals from some of
the Muslim countries also joined these outfits.
As if this in itself was not a serious development, sectarian ploarisation also
accentuated during this period. The flow of huge amount of funds from Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, Libya and Iran had a direct bearing on our sectarian fault lines.
Citizenry in Pakistan was traditionally follower of Hanafi Fiqah. But now Whahbi and
Salafi schools of thought started gaining influence. The followers of Fiqqah-e-
Jafferia also became more affirmative in response to this sectarian onslaught
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against them. Thus, we saw the growth of Laskar-e-Jhangvi, Laskar-e-Tayyaba, the
Sipah-e-Sahaba, the Sipah-e-Muhammad and Jaish-e-Muhammad etc., all of whom
embarked on a sectarian vendetta against each other.
Target killing of prominent religious personalities, and the retaliation that followed,
became a menacing feature of our everyday lives. Ruefully, none of the
government in 1980s and 1990s showed the vision to comprehend the seriousness
of these developments, or commitment to confront the situation. Rather than
adopting a proactive strategy, the state machinery generally reacted as and when
the sectarian violence became more sporadic.
While in 1980s, the growth of these militants was confined to Jihad in Afghanistan
against the infidel Russians, and in occupied Kashmir, as a response to the Indian
armys repression, developments in 1990s provided new impetus to the Islamic
radicalism. The genocide of the Bosnian Muslims by the Serbs, to which the
Christian West showed unpardonable indifference, also contributed greatly to the
growth of militant Islamic radicalism. The ideology Islamic radicalism propounded
by Hasan Al-Banna (1906-49) a protagonist of Salafi School of thought, advocated,
alongwith spiritual purification, a pro-active and aggressive approach to achieve
socio-political goals, and even to confront the Sate if it was not in line with its
philosophy. The Muslim Brotherhood IKhwan-ul-Muslimin founded by him in Egypt
in 1928 gained unprecedented ascendancy in a number of Arab and African
countries and provided a role model for others to follow. In Pakistan the Salafi
School of thought has gained considerable ground during the last quarter of a
century.
Simultaneously, it may not be far fetched to discern the seeds of a clash of
civilization in the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in the wake of President Bushs
call for crusade. By becoming an American ally in this Crusade, General
Musharraf is being perceived as an avowed enemy by the protagonists of Islamic
radicalism. Regrettably, the decision making in this Confrontation has remained
with him alone as he has chosen not to allow the main stream political leadership to
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participate in the decision making. At the same time, and rather unfortunately, our
ecclesiastical elite has equally failed to find out the causes responsible for the
decadence of Pan-Islamic Society. Rather than encouraging free intellectual inquiry,
as provided for in the institution of Ijtehad, it has become increasingly intolerant
and tends to seek solutions in fundamentalism, forsaking the pristine qualities of
Islam.
In the aftermath of mayhem in the Lal Masjid and its seminary, a violent reaction
by the religious organizations and even Al-Qaeeda elements appears to be an
ominous possibility. Obviously, the state will not be a silent spectator. This is bound
to have very serious repercussions for Pakistan. It is of paramount importance to
take certain short-term and long-term steps to control this alarming situation.
Some of these could be as follows:-
i) Government must constitute a high level Commission of inquiry, headed
by a judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan to inquire into the Lal Masjid
tragedy.
ii) The entire episode should also be debated in the Parliament as it is the
highest forum of peoples representatives. During the entire crisis, people
of Pakistan were not taken into confidence. The situation was discussed in
the Cabinet in a prefunctory manner and as a mere formality only a few
hours before the final crackdown.
iii) The Lal Masjid episode points to a strong possibility of a number of
Madaris having a nexus with the armed outfits. A systematic survey of the
Madaris all over the country must be undertaken to pin point those who
are suspected of such links.
iv) It is necessary not only to find out about the sources of the funding of the
Madaris, but also to monitor the same regularly. Those who fail to show
the sources of their funding should be proceeded against.
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v) The curriculae of the Madaris must also be overseen by the Ministries of
Religious Affairs and Education in order to discourage Sectarian hatred
and bigotry and to ensure that a useful human resource is being
developed.
vi) It is well known that children of low income families join the Madaris as
these provide free education, board and lodge. Steps be taken to attract
children to alternative stream of education which could offer better
prospect in practical life.
vii) Use of loud speaker in mosques and Madaris must be discouraged.
Government has already legislated this, but the law is not being enforced.
viii) There is a common perception that General Musharraf alone is pitched
against the militant religious elements at the behest of United States of
America, and the political and religious leadership as well as other stake
holders of civil society are not associated. It is, therefore, necessary to
meaningfully involve entire national leadership in building up a consensus
and preparing a joint strategy to control this menace. This will be possible
only if we have a genuine democratic set up in the country.

A.Z.K Sherdil