1

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8


Baniel Cheinilo


Abstiact

This aiticle ievisits }igen Babeimas's long-lasting engagement with the tiauition of
natuial law anu aigues that his woik is unique in the contempoiaiy context because
it takes place without seeking to sevei all possible connections to natuial law. Its
goals aie then twofolu. 0n the one hanu, the aiticle ieconstiucts what Babeimas
unueistanus by natuial law in oiuei to account foi its wiuei ielevance as an
intellectual iesouice in mouein social theoiy; on the othei, it ieassesses the natuial
law elements that still iesiue in Babeimas's thinking. The aiticle staits by ievisiting
Babeimas's uefinition of natuial law anu its iole in moueinity's claim to noimative
self-founuation. The seconu section focuses on the iole Babeimas gives to sociology
as the uiscipline thiough which the theoiy of communicative action was
systematically elaboiateu. Being simultaneously an empiiical appioach !"# a
noimative theoiy of mouein society, the sociological tiauition is thus ieconstiucteu
in connection iathei than in opposition to natuial law. The last pait tuins to the
univeisalistic founuations of Babeimas's social theoiy as way of iecoveiing its
moment of 'unconuitionality'. As they centie on the question of univeisalism, all the
thiee sections come togethei in the iuea that Babeimas's social theoiy is best
uepicteu as %&'()*(!%+,'-.!/ "!(01!/ /!2.

Keywoius: }igen Babeimas, social theoiy, sociology, natuial law, moueinity,
univeisalism


}igen Babeimas's fifty yeais engagement with the philosophical, sociological anu
noimative founuations of mouein social anu political thought is the most
accomplisheu of his geneiation. It is then of paiticulai inteiest that, as we shall see
below, ovei the yeais explicitly Babeimas has aigueu that the tiauition of natuial
law iemains of ciucial impoitance in coming to teims with mouein intellectual
challenges. To be suie, Babeimas' engagement with natuial law is attempteu fiom
the point of view of mouein social theoiy. Bis stance is that we ought to embiace
fully moueinity's scientific uevelopments although without suiienueiing to
positivistic iestiictions, must leain to hanule the tension between the uesciiptive
anu noimative tasks that aie insciibeu in the unueistanuing social life, anu while
iemaining committeu to the ienovation of the univeisalistic oiientation that is
cential to the tiauition of natuial law, we will only be able to uo so if we avoiu
iesoiting back to iueas of fiist philosophy oi the ethical contemplation of the goou

*
Foithcoming in 3&01"!/ &4 5/!''-.!/ 6&.-&/&7, 2u1S, special issue on social theoiy anu natuial law
euiteu by Baniel Cheinilo anu Robeit Fine.

2
life. Yet Babeimas's long-teim intellectual pioject still "**#' to be ieassesseu moie
fully in ielation to the natuial law tiauition (Fine 2uu1: 28).
1


The main goal of oui special issue is to aigue foi the neeu to iecast the
inteiielationships between mouein social theoiy anu natuial law. At a geneial level,
Babeimas's pioject seeks to bieak fiee fiom the metaphysical buiuen of pievious
natuial law. But this still leaves unansweieu the question of assessing how
successful mouein social theoiy has actually been in accomplishing that task. What
makes Babeimas's woik paiticulaily impoitant, inueeu unique, in contempoiaiy
uebates is that it takes place 2-(+&0( &8'*''-9*/, '**:-"7 (& '*9*1 !// %&''-8/*
.&""*.(-&"' (& "!(01!/ /!2 - Babeimas acknowleuges a uebt oi even family
iesemblance with what he calls 1!(-&"!/ natuial law. This makes his engagement
with natuial law bettei equippeu to auvance a kinu of .1-(-;0* of natuial law that is
moie sophisticateu than that of moie vocal appioaches which, because they
obsessively sevei all possible connections to natuial law, cannot ultimately uelivei it
(Luhmann 199S, Roity 1989). While below I will not be offeiing a conventionally
Babeimasian aigument about communicative action anu uemociatic uelibeiation
anu the public spheie, the social theoiy this aiticle embiaces is ueeply embeuueu in
anu inueeu pays tiibute to Babeimas's intellectual oiientation.

Babeimas aigues that the uecline of natuial law in moueinity is the integiateu
iesult of thiee uiffeient challenges foi which it has founu no answeis: teleological
appioaches to histoiy incieasingly lose empiiical plausibility; substantive iueas of
human natuie that weie useu to establish the uefinitive content of piactical ieason
iun into all kinus of justificatoiy uifficulties, anu the pluialism of complex societies
makes the unciitical iecouise to one's own cultuial tiauitions pioblematic. To
Babeimas, one of social theoiy's eaily motives that iemains valiu in the piesent is
that of bieaking fiee fiom those tiauitions which, because they offei an exteinal oi
objectivist moue of aigumentation, aie bounu to iemain conseivative anu backwaiu
looking in theii noimative implications. In moueinity, because of the absence of
institutions whose legitimation can be unpioblematically taken foi gianteu,
inuiviuuals cannot 0/(-)!(*/, uelegate iesponsibility foi theii noimative uecisions.
But this is of couise only one siue of the stoiy because the view that noimative
ieflections aie no longei meaningful anu even possible - as auvocateu by positivism,
postmoueinism anu postcolonialism alike - poses in Babeimas's view as gieat an
intellectual thieat as conseivative natuial law. 0ne way of chaiacteiising
Babeimas's position may then be to aigue that, although he uoes not see natuial law
as uiiectly ielevant in the *<%/!"!(-&" of the stiuctuial uevelopment of moueinity,
he unueistanus that natuial law has iemaineu a ciucial "&1)!(-9* iesouice at the
level of its intellectual founuations. Theie is a piinciple of impaitiality that social
theoiy inheiits fiom natuial law anu which is cential, both uesciiptively anu
noimatively, to many of moueinity's most ciucial institutions: scientific autonomy,

1
A paitial assessment of the natuial law elements in Babeimas's legal theoiy can be founu in a
special issue of =!(-& 301-' (vol. 12, Num. 4, 1999) uevoteu to the uiscussion of >*(2**" ?!.(' !"#
@&1)'.

S
the iule of law, piivate anu public life, constitutional uemociacy, anu open public
spheie.

We can ieconstiuct Babeimas's acknowleugements about the inteiconnections
between his woik, anu mouein social theoiy moie geneially, anu natuial law.
Inueeu, as we shall exploie in some uetail below, this exploiation is a constant of his
intellectual caieei: iight fiom A+*&1, !"# B1!<-' (Babeimas 1974 |196Sj) anu A+*
6(10.(01!/ A1!"'4&1)!(-&" &4 (+* B08/-. 6%+*1* (Babeimas 1989 |1968j), thiough
>*(2**" ?!.(' !"# @&1)' (Babeimas 1996 |1992j) to his most iecent woik of the
past uecaue on cosmopolitanism, human iights, ieligion, anu 'human natuie'
(Babeimas 2uu1a, 2uuSa, 2uu6, 2uu8). In the opening pages of >*(2**" ?!.(' !"#
@&1)', foi instance, he explicates thus the iole of the tiauition of natuial law in
moueinity's noimative self-founuation:

In connection with questions iaiseu by mouein natuial law, I attempt to
show +&2 the olu piomise of a self-oiganizing community of fiee anu equal
citizens .!" be ieconceiveu unuei the conuitions of complex societies (...)
Recasting the basic concepts of "piactical ieason" in teims of a
"communicative iationality" +!' (+* !#9!"(!7* &4 "&( .0((-"7 '&.-!/ (+*&1, &44
41&) (+* -''0*' !"# !"'2*1' #*9*/&%*# -" %1!.(-.!/ %+-/&'&%+, 41&) C1-'(&(/* (&
D*7*/. In fact, it is fai fiom cleai that the piice we have to pay foi the
piemises of postmetaphysical thinking must be an inuiffeience to such
questions, which in any case continue to be felt within the lifewoilu
(Babeimas 1996: 7-9, my italics)

In his moie iecent >*(2**" @!(01!/-') !"# =*/-7-&", the aigument is taken one step
fuithei as natuial law now plays an explicit iole in both the self-uesciiption of his
philosophical jouiney anu the positive chaiacteiisation of its ultimate noimative
oiientation:

I unueistanu political libeialism (which I uefenu in the specific foim of
Kantian iepublicanism) as a nonieligious, post-metaphysical justification of
the noimative founuations of constitutional uemociacy. A+-' (+*&1, -'
'-(0!(*# -" (+* (1!#-(-&" &4 1!(-&"!/ "!(01!/ /!2 that *'.+*2' (+* '(1&"7
.&')&/&7-.!/ &1 '&(*1-&/&7-.!/ !''0)%(-&"' &4 ./!''-.!/ !"# 1*/-7-&0' "!(01!/
/!2 (.) The post-Kantian justification of libeial constitutional piinciples in
the twentieth centuiy hau less tiouble with the iemnants of objective natuial
law (anu the mateiial ethics of values) than with histoiicist anu empiiicist
foims of ciiticism (Babeimas 2uu8: 1u2-S, my italics)

Ny goal in this aiticle is then twofolu. 0n the one hanu, I shoulu like to ieconstiuct
what Babeimas unueistanus by natuial law in oiuei to account foi its wiuei
ielevance as an intellectual iesouice in mouein social theoiy; on the othei, I aim to
unpack anu then ieassess the natuial law elements that still iesiue in Babeimas's
own thinking. In teims of stiuctuie, the aiticle staits by ievisiting Babeimas's
uefinition of natuial law anu its iole in moueinity's claim to noimative self-

4
founuation. The seconu section focuses on the iole Babeimas gives to sociology as
the uiscipline thiough which the theoiy of communicative action was systematically
elaboiateu. Being simultaneously an empiiical appioach !"# a noimative theoiy of
mouein society, the sociological tiauition is thus ieconstiucteu in connection iathei
than in opposition to natuial law. In the last pait I tuin to the univeisalistic
founuations of Babeimas's social theoiy as way of iecoveiing its 'natuial law
moment' - its moment of unconuitionality. To the extent that they all examine the
univeisalistic oiientation of his thinking fiom uiffeient angles, the thiee sections
come togethei in the iuea that Babeimas's social theoiy may be best uepicteu as
%&'()*(!%+,'-.!/ "!(01!/ /!2.

+9:;<=>?@ A=: ?B; ?C9 ?<A:>?>9=D 9E =A?F<AG GAC

Natuial law is a long-stanuing philosophical tiauition in the West that neeus to be
tiaceu back befoie the iise of moueinity.
2
Babeimas accepts that it is a highly
heteiogeneous uoctiine whose funuamental split is that between tiauitional natuial
law (in its uieek, Roman anu Chiistian vaiiants) anu mouein oi iational natuial law
- which he sees as having evolveu fiom Bobbes to Begel via Rousseau anu Kant
(Babeimas 1996: 4S-4). In the context of a iecent uiscussion about the iuea of
human uignity, foi instance, Babeimas elaboiates on this uistinction by aiguing that
while tiauitional natuial law hau a stiong sense of the univeisality of the human
species, it misseu the iuea of the inuiviuual as an inviolable moial agent. Tiauittional
natuial law:

uevelopeu well a .&//*.(-9* notion of #-7"-(!' +0)!"!, but it was explaineu in
teims of a uistinguisheu ontological status of human beings in the cosmos (...)
The supeiioi value of the species might have justifieu some kinu of species
piotection but not the inviolability of the uignity of the human peison as a
souice of noimative claims (...) the ielative supeiioiity of humanity anu its
membeis must be ieplaceu by the absolute woith of any peison. The issue is
the 0"-;0* 2&1(+ of each peison (Babeimas 2u1u: 47S-4)

This aigument on the impoitance of inuiviuuality is something that Babeimas has
aiguably inheiiteu fiom Kant's (1997) mouein natuial law. Aftei the categoiical
impeiative, inuiviuual human beings aie moial agents foi whom the iational
acceptability of moial piopositions is 0/(-)!(*/, unuelegable. 0nly affecteu paities
themselves can give assent to those uecisions that uiiectly affect theii couises of
action while, in tuin, the justifications they give must iise above subjective
piefeiences anu be able to caiiy potential univeisal agieement. Noimative claims in
moueinity aie pulleu in two uiffeient anu often-conflicting uiiections. They aie valiu

2
The liteiatuie on natuial law is of couise enoimous. 0n the histoiy of natuial law, see Bloch (1996)
u'Entieves (197u), Baakonssen (1996), Lowith (1964), Rommen (1998) anu Stiauss (1974). 0n the
ielationships between social theoiy anu natuial law, see Fine (2uu2 anu his contiibution to this
volume), Rose (2uu9), Chiis Thoinhill's contiibution to this special issue. Fuithei suppoit foi the
main theses of this aiticle can be founu in Cheinilo (2u1S).

S
'objectively' insofai as they ought to be able to achieve geneial acceptance, but they
must also anu simultaneously be founu acceptable 'subjectively' by inuiviuuals
themselves in theii paiticulai sociocultuial lifewoilus. valiu moial noims equally
piesuppose the univeisality of the human species as a whole anu the paiticulai
living conuitions of inuiviuual human beings. Tiauitional natuial law has tenueu to
emphasise the foimei - thence its conseivative intimations - while social theoiy has
concentiateu on the lattei - thence its ielativistic tenuencies. Quite iightly,
Babeimas iejects both extiemes anu seeks to make both subjective anu objective
claims woik togethei.

Babeimas's most explicit account of the iole of the mouein natuial law in the iise of
moueinity is aiguably founu in his eaily 'Natuial Law anu Revolution' fiom 196SE
This essay explicates the iole of natuial law uuiing the Ameiican anu Fiench
ievolutions of the late eighteenth centuiy; that is, in the context of the inauguiation
of political moueinity. It is an inteiiogation into the iole of natuial law in
moueinity's founuational act of noimative self-constitution. In teims of the inteinal
uevelopment of Babeimas's thinking, moieovei, it anticipates some of his latei
engagement with natuial law in the fiist pait of >*(2**" ?!.(' !"# @&1)'.

The immanentist oiientation of iational natuial law lenus itself to the kinu of
tiansfoimative politics that inauguiate moueinity. We witness an impoitant change
in the way in which natuial law aiguments staiteu to be useu at the time: '|tjhe
appeal to ./!''-.!/ Natuial Law |@!(011*.+(j was not as ievolutionaiy as the appeal
to )&#*1" Natuial Law has come to be' (Babeimas 1974: 8S, my italics). We aie in
the piesence of an intellectual tiauition whose noimative content coulu somehow
be tuineu upsiue uown: what was pieviously useu to uefenu the olu status quo
coulu now be useu to piomote social change. At the onset of political moueinity,
then, both the Ameiican anu Fiench ievolutionaiy movements appealeu to natuial
law as they sought to give centiality to an iuea of 40"#!)*"(!/ 1-7+(': 'the act by
which the positivization of Natuial Rights |@!(011*.+(j was initiateu, in Ameiica as
well as in Fiance, was a ueclaiation of funuamental iights' (Babeimas 1974: 8S).
S


The impoitance of the two ueclaiations can haiuly be exaggeiateu - Babeimas's
own latei inteiest in the key position of constitutional texts in the moial anu
political self-unueistanuing of mouein political communities systematically
highlights the founuational piinciples upon which mouein constitutions aie
establisheu (Babeimas 2uu1b). But in this eaily piece Babeimas emphasises the
uiffeiences in how both ueclaiations weie constiueu anu justifieu. Theii
compaiison makes appaient a funuamental ambivalence in the iole of natuial law
aiguments in moueinity. Thus, although in 'both cases a .&"'(-(0(-&" is set up which
iemains within the fiamewoik of the ueclaieu funuamental iights', they aie in fact
in puisuit of iathei uiffeient political goals: '|wjith theii iecouise to the Rights of

S
Although in the English tianslation the teims 'natuial law' anu 'natuial iights' aie useu
inteichangeably, in the oiiginal ueiman euition Babeimas (1978: 92-94) uses only '@!(011*.+('. I
have inseiteu the teim in these fiist two quotations, but will not be uoing so below.

6
Nan, the Ameiican colonists want to legitimize theii inuepenuence fiom the Biitish
Empiie; the Fiench to legitimize the oveithiow of the ancient iegime' (Babeimas
1974: 87). The uiffeient ioles of the ueclaiations of funuamental iights aie
expiesseu fuithei by the position they occupy in theii iespective texts: while the
ueclaiation of iights pieceues 'the Fiench Constitution as a pieamble' it is 'meiely
attacheu to the Ameiican Constitution as amenuments'. As the Ameiican Bill of
Rights pioviues 'anothei basis of legitimation foi the tiauitional substance of iights;
the Fiench ueclaiation, in contiast, is intenueu to asseit positively foi the fiist time
a funuamentally new system of iights' (Babeimas 1974: 87).

Babeimas aigues that in the Ameiican tiauition natuial law is conceiveu in a
funuamentally natuialistic fashion. Natuial law ought to iestoie a sense of natuial
justice that now appeaieu unuei thieat because of the violation of tiauitional values,
piactices anu institutions. The piinciples to which the Ameiican Revolution
appealeu weie the &1-7-"!/ 'iights of man' - that is, anthiopologically giounueu
iueas of human natuie such as the neeu foi self-uefence anu piivate piopeity. Foi
the founuing figuies of the Ameiican Revolution, 'the iights of man coinciue with the
piinciples of society unuei the common name of Laws of Natuie', theiefoie the
'positivization of Natuial Law is not a mattei of ievolution' (Babeimas 1974: 9S).
Babeimas calls this the libeial unueistanuing of natuial law because it is baseu on
the iuea of negative fieeuom - the state's main function is to pievent inuiviuuals
fiom infiinging upon each othei's piivate spheies of action: '|njatuial iights will
finu theii ieliable counteipait in the laws of tiaue anu commeice, but these laws aie
obeyeu by piivate peisons because this is immeuiately in theii inteiest anu not
because the state imposes foimal laws unuei the thieat of punishment' (Babeimas
1974: 9S).

The appeals to natuial law uuiing the Fiench Revolution aie of a uiffeient kinu
because theie the ueclaiation uiu not take 'the foim of a ueuuction fiom piinciples,
foi a iight was the 1*'0/( of a contiact anu not a %1-".-%/* fiom which tiue
statements coulu be ueuuceu' (Babeimas 1974: 96, my italics). Ciucially, Babeimas
claims that these paiticipatoiy featuies aie key to account foi the political iole of
natuial law aiguments in eighteenth centuiy Fiance:

Fieeuom anu equality, anu in consequence also life, secuiity anu happiness,
these citizens uo not owe to the automatism, secuieu by piivate law, of eithei
natuial iights oi social inteicouise baseu in natuie. Rathei, that these
piinciples of fieeuom anu equality cannot be violateu is baseu solely on the
stiuctuie of the 9&/&"(F 7F"F1!/*, although this will as the %&09&-1 '&09*1!-"
is fiee to enact whatevei laws it likes - as long as they aie laws (Babeimas
1974: 98)

In this foimulation, the uefinition anu latei implementation of newly establisheu
funuamental iights is only to be attempteu in paiticipatoiy, if not necessaiily
uemociatic, fashion. The twin piinciples of the 7*"*1!/ 2-// anu %&%0/!1 '&9*1*-7"(,
can only be caiiieu out as political acts: 'the social contiact iequiies uenatuiing an

7
oiiginal natuial existence to make it a moial one; the contiact is a moial one as such'
(Babeimas 1974: 1u6). To be suie, we witness this uistinction between a 'natuial'
anu a 'social' veision of natuial law in uiffeient veisions: libeial anu iepublican,
negative anu positive libeity, inuiviuualistic anu communitaiian. But we aie well
auviseu to look at them in iueal-typical fashion iathei than as the autonomous
evolution of two uiffeient philosophies of natuial law, oi inueeu as an empiiical
account of the actual implementation of political piinciples (Wellmei 1998). All
conceptions of mouein natuial law, fiom Bobbes to Begel via Kant anu Rousseau,
have hau to ueal with the uual, natuial anu social, founuation of oui shaieu
humanity as the basis foi the question of how is mouein social oiuei possible
(Cheinilo 2u1S). At the same time, howevei, a majoi tension of mouein political
thought is now maue appaient: the iauically uemociatic piinciple that uoes not
accept exteinal limitations to the outcome of fiee political uelibeiations can only be
implementeu if anu when inuiviuuals aie conceiveu of as beaieis of funuamental
anu inviolable iights whose oiigin aie in fact piepolitical anu cannot be
uiscietionaiily mouifieu by the legislatoi. These 40"#!)*"(!/ iights aie natuial
iathei than socially constiucteu but aie socially iathei than natuially actualiseu.

This ieconstiuction of natuial law in the 196us has since become the basis of
Babeimas's legal theoiy as uevelopeu in >*(2**" ?!.(' !"# @&1)'. Theie, Babeimas
takes up again the iuea of two sepaiate stianus of mouein oi iational natuial law.
The fiist emphasises the intiinsic piepolitical qualities of ceitain 'natuial' iights that
all inuiviuual human beings possess qua inuiviuual human beings. This libeial
unueistanuing of natuial law takes human iights as its centie anu asceitains that
the main iole of the state is that of secuiing these basic iights. The seconu stianu
centies on the iuea of the people as a politically constituteu community thiough an
imaginaiy yet voluntaiy contiact. This iepublican veision of natuial law coheies on
the notion of populai soveieignty anu the state is now in chaige of fosteiing political
paiticipation on an equal legal footing. Both stianus aie equally impoitant foi
uiscouise theoiy of law anu uemociacy in Babeimas's justification of the .&G
&1-7-"!/-(, of human iights anu populai soveieignty in moueinity's noimative self-
unueistanuing: '|tjhe two iueas of human iight anu populai soveieignty have
ueteimineu the noimative self-unueistanuing of constitutional uemociacy up to the
piesent uay' (Babeimas 1996: 94). Bowevei fai the piocess of ue-tiauitionalisation
of mouein societies has moveu on, it is still the case that two of the most
funuamental piinciples of noimative self-unueistanuing in moueinity iemain
ueeply embeuueu in these vaiiants of mouein natuial law: 'human iights anu the
piinciple of populai soveieignty still constitute the '&/* -#*!' that can justify mouein
law. These two iueas iepiesent the piecipitate left behinu, so to speak, once the
noimative substance of an ethos embeuueu in ieligious anu metaphysical tiauitions
has been foiceu thiough the filtei of posttiauitional justification' (Babeimas 1996:
99, my italics).

Theie aie thus two co-oiiginal foims of mouein natuial law that emeige out of
uiffeient unueistanuings of how mouein social life is to be justifieu noimatively.
Theii co-oiiginality in moueinity is in one sense histoiical, as theii aiticulation can

8
be uateu ioughly at the same time uuiing the Ameiican anu Fiench Revolutions by
the enu of the eighteenth centuiy. But to this histoiical claim Babeimas now auus
the pioposition that they aie conceptually anu noimatively co-uepenuent. The
oiganisation of mouein political communities piesupposes *;0!//, human iights
anu populai soveieignty - not least because the iuea of the mouein inuiviuual
iequiies that we conceptualise %1-9!(* anu %08/-. autonomy as coteiminous: neithei
foim of autonomy shoulu act as a mouel foi, noi be suboiuinateu to, the othei
(Babeimas 1996: 1u4).
S
Yet aftei having asceitaineu theii co-oiiginality anu co-
uepenuence, pioblems aiise in fully accounting foi this stiong thesis (Spectei 2u1u:
17S-9). Accoiuing stiictly equal status to human iights anu populai soveieignty
cieates the uifficulty of how to explain the socio-histoiically (immanent) oiigins of
human iights in ielation to wheie uo theii (tianscenuental) noimative valiuity
ultimately come fiom. As Babeimas uoes not want to get caught in the puiely
objectivistic moue of aigumentation of tiauitional natuial law, which woulu allow
foi a 'fiim' justification foi human iights only at the piice of theii being intiouuceu
'exteinally' unuei unacceptable 'metaphysical' teims, then the legitimacy of human
iights can lie only inteinally - i.e. in inuiviuuals mutually gianting themselves these
iights communicatively in an open anu non-coeicive mannei. In >*(2**" ?!.(' !"#
@&1)', this tension is intiouuceu thus:

The scope of citizens' public autonomy is not iestiicteu by natuial oi moial
iights just waiting to be put into effect, noi is the inuiviuual's piivate
autonomy meiely instiumentalizeu foi the puiposes of populai soveieignty.
Nothing is given piioi to the citizen's piactice of self-ueteimination othei
than the uiscouise piinciple, which is built into the conuitions of
communicative association in geneial, anu the legal meuium as such
(Babeimas 1996: 127-8)

We will leave until the final section of this aiticle the uiscussion of what this 'othei
than the uiscouise piinciple' actually entails; now, I shoulu like to explicate this
tension fuithei in ielation to the uiscussion on human uignity we have alieauy
mentioneu. Buman uignity can become the coie of mouein human iights, aigues
Babeimas, because of its thick noimative uensity. But human uignity must iemain
giounueu on the piinciple of populai soveieignty because it is nevei fully
inuepenuent fiom what inuiviuuals, as citizens, make of it in political uiscouise: '|ajs
a mouein /*7!/ concept, human uignity is associateu with the status that citizens
assume in the '*/4G.1*!(*# political oiuei. As auuiessees, citizens can come to enjoy
the iights that piotect theii human uignity only by fiist uniting as authois of the
uemociatic unueitaking of establishing anu maintaining a political oiuei baseu on
human iights' (Babeimas 2u1u: 47S).


S
Babeimas's (1996: 84) ciitique of Kant's /*7!/ theoiy centies on the fact that while Kant accepts the
histoiical co-oiiginality between public anu piivate autonomy, he is not piepaieu to giant theii
conceptual co-uepenuence anu mouels the foimei on the lattei.

9
The ciitical challenge is now fully appaient. Buman iights neeu to be,
simultaneouslyH %1*'0%%&'*# !' (+* 8!'-' of oui mutual iecognition of human beings
as beaieis of a univeisal uignity anu I0'(-4-*# !' (+* &0(.&)* of a uemociatically
oiganiseu political community. It is still howevei uncleai how this can actually be
accomplisheu: eithei human iights aie univeisal in a stiong sense, in which case
they iemain at least paitly -"#*%*"#*"( fiom populai soveieignty anu theii
justifications can be ueemeu pioblematic in the sense of falling below the thiesholu
of uemociatic (anu inueeu postmetaphysical) justifications. 0i, conveisely, human
iights aie always #*%*"#*"( on populai soveieignty, in which case we neeu to
iemain open to the possibility at least of public uelibeiation aiiiving at a uiffeient
outcome about theii noimative status - foi instance, in teims of tempoiaiy
iestiictions to civil oi political iights in times of 'ciises'. Bistoiically as well as
analytically, accoiuing stiictly equal weight to both human iights anu populai
soveieignty iemains necessaiy but pioblematic. To be suie, theie is moie than
inteinal consistency at stake heie. 0niveisalism iemains the conuition of possibility
of mouein noimative thinking via its twin notions of human iights anu populai
soveieignty. We expect oui moial thinking (anu to a laige extent also legal noims)
to be objectively valiu anu subjectively acceptable. Babeimas's ieconstiuction of
mouein natuial law via its libeial anu iepublican stianus cieates a fiamewoik
within which it becomes possible to ieflect moie cleaily about human iights anu
populai soveieignty but, even if unintentionally, it simultaneously ieinfoices theii
tieatment as mutually opposeu.

,9H>9G9I@ A=: ?B; J<9KG;L 9E ?B; =9<LA?>M; >= L9:;<=>?@

The uepth anu bieauth of Babeimas's intellectual pioject uefies single uisciplinaiy
iuentifications. Thus, while sociology is not the axis on which Babeimas's
intellectual pioject ultimately coheies, a funuamental insight of his engagement
with the sociological tiauition is that of making explicit its inteiconnections with
mouein natuial law.

In A+*&1, &4 5&))0"-.!(-9* C.(-&", Babeimas (1984a, 1987) tuins explicitly to
sociology as the uiscipline that offeis the most systematic attempt to combine
empiiical uesciiption, theoietical explanation anu noimative ciitique of mouein
social life. This is somewhat a iuptuie fiom what he hau uone befoie, as philosophy
anu juiispiuuence weie Babeimas's oiiginal uisciplinaiy backgiounu anu inteiests.
Apait fiom one eaily aiticle to be uiscusseu below, up to the publication of A+*&1, &4
5&))0"-.!(-9* C.(-&" in 1981 the engagement with sociology hau iemaineu
ielatively maiginal.
4
Nouelleu as it is on Paisons' (1968) eaily A+* 6(10.(01* &4
6&.-!/ C.(-&", as an account of the sociological tiauition A+*&1, &4 5&))0"-.!(-9*
C.(-&" is a masteipiece in sociological theoiy in its somewhat naiiow uisciplinaiy
sense. Babeimas's key uistinction of system anu lifewoilu, anu the centiality he

4
See, howevei, a shoit anu iathei conventional ciitique of Paisons (Babeimas 1988: 4S-S2).
Paiauigmatic in this context is of couise the uebate with Niklas Luhmann (Babeimas anu Luhmann
1971).

1u
gives to the cooiuination of social action, aie both funuamentally sociological.
Equally sociological is the unueistanuing of A+*&1, &4 5&))0"-.!(-9* C.(-&" as a
geneial theoiy of mouein society with a ciitical intent. 0nueistanuing moueinity
iequiies us to auuiess uesciiptive anu noimative tasks, anu in Babeimas's view that
is what makes sociology unique among the mouein uisciplines uevoteu to the stuuy
of social life: 'alone among the uisciplines of social science, sociology has ietaineu its
ielations to the pioblems of society as a whole. Whatevei else it has become, it has
always iemaineu a theoiy of society as well' (Babeimas 1984a: S). Sociology
emeigeu anu has iemaineu committeu to keep holu of its scientificexplanatoiy anu
philosophicalnoimative uimensions. Both planes neeu to be kept analytically apait
so that they can talk to anu leain fiom each othei. The philosophical unueipinnings
of this claim will be explicateu in the next section when we uiscuss Babeimas's
unueistanuing of the postmetaphysical. Now I shoulu like to focus on some
implications of looking at the sociological tiauition in this fashion.

Wiiting in the late 199us, Babeimas opens the cential aiticle of his essays on A+*
B&'("!(-&"!/ 5&"'(*//!(-&" with the claim that 'sociology still has to come to teims
with the uisappointment ovei the impotence of the obligatoiy moment of natuial
law'. Be paitly explicates this by quoting appiovingly fiom the woik of ueiman
sociologist Siegfiieu Lanushut who, in his J1-(-: #*1 6&K-&/&7-* of 1929, hau aigueu
that '"|sjociety" is nothing moie than the title meant to encompass the tensions,
contiauictions, anu ambiguities, that aiise fiom the iealization of the iueals of
fieeuom anu equality' (Babeimas 2uu1a: S9). This is consistent with what we have
uiscusseu so fai: "&1)!(-9* questions about human iights (equality) anu populai
soveieignty (fieeuom oi autonomy) aie cential to the emeigence of mouein society
anu mouein sociology. In A+*&1, !"# B1!<-' Babeimas hau alieauy aigueu that
sociology's key theoiem of the social as an emeigent ontological uomain is itself
ueeply iooteu in natuial law; 'society' becomes the name of 'the subject which
oiganizes the inteiielationships of human life as a whole. It can neithei be
unueistoou as a goveinment which sanctions a legal oiuei (.) noi as that union of
inuiviuuals themselves, which confionts the goveinment as a contiacting paity'
(Babeimas 1974: 1uS).

The connections between sociology anu natuial law aie in fact the staiting point of
an eaily aiticle on A+* .1-(-.!/ !"# .&"'*19!(-9* (!':' &4 '&.-&/&7,.
S
Babeimas begins
his ieconstiuction with eighteenth-centuiy Scottish moial philosophy anu aigues
that this tiauition saw as its main task to unueistanu society's cuiient social issues
in the context of long-teim histoiical tienus that weie still being conceiveu as pait
of "!(01!/ histoiy. This pioto-sociology sought to make iecommenuations to meet
contempoiaiy society's most piessing issues. Foou-shoitages, poveity anu uecaying
moial values weie to be auuiesseu by piomoting the fuithei auvancement of
%1&71*''-9* social tienus as well as by pushing foi the .&"'*19!(-9* ieinvigoiation of

S
Babeimas' piece is not incluueu in the English veision of A+*&1, !"# B1!<-' fiom which I have been
quoting so fai (Babeimas 1974). The following quotations aie my own tianslation fiom the ueiman
euition (Babeimas 1978).

11
tiauitional values anu institutions. Stateu as an intiactable conflict between
'authoiity anu utility'H the cieative solution that in Babeimas's view Auam Smith,
Auam Feiguson anu }ohn Nillai all shaieu was foi sociology to take 'only the paity
of natuial histoiy that society itself has uiscoveieu anu conceptualiseu' (Babeimas
1978: 292). In othei woius, while they suppoiteu the iuea that the ieoiganisation of
society was necessaiy (thus embiacing sociology's ciitical tasks), the only giounus
on which they founu this was viable weie those iefoims that coulu be justifieu by a
pie-ieflexive iecouise to tiauition anu past authoiity (thus making sociology also a
conseivative pioject). Scottish moial philosopheis unueistoou that the solution to
human pioblems lay in human inteivention in human affaiis but theii ueepei
conception of human histoiy was still that of natuial histoiy. Sociology was
simultaneously ciitical anu conseivative.
6


In the post-ievolutionaiy context of eaily 19
th
centuiy Fiance, sociology coulu still
be iegaiueu as simultaneously ciitical anu conseivative: 'sociology as a science of
the ciisis is then split fiom its inception. It has equally emeigeu fiom the spiiit of
the ievolution as fiom the one of the iestoiation; each camp of the civil wai claimeu
it foi itself' (Babeimas 1978: 29S). 0wing to the explicitly %&/-(-.!/ chaiactei of both
the Revolution anu the Napoleonic iestoiation, social affaiis coulu no longei be seen
as pait of natuial histoiy. Rathei, fiom now on social life is iegaiueu as the
immanent iesult of social action itselfE The challenge foi the conseivative position
was to 1*'(&1* the legitimacy of a political iegime which, although it saw itself as
beyonu the mouein neeu foi uemociatic legitimisation, was now being foiceu to
appeal foi suppoit to a ieasoning public opinion. The uifficulties foi the piogiessive
camp weie equally vexing because, aftei the Teiioi, they hau to uemonstiate that a
uemociatic iepublic was able to achieve a peaceful anu stable ieoiganisation of
society. As it iemaineu useful to both political camps, sociology uevelopeu with this
constitutive noimative split at its coie.
7


By the miuule of the 2u
th
centuiy sociology hau giown uefinitively sceptical of 'the
concept of a natuial histoiy of humanity that piogiesses towaius its impiovement
that once hau goufatheieu sociology' (Babeimas 1978: SuS-4). Key tenuencies in
contempoiaiy sociology at the time such as positivism anu technociatic uecisionism
shaieu the view that, in oiuei to become fully mouein anu scientific, sociology must
abanuon all noimative conceins. But the piice foi this (paitial) gain in scientific
cieuentials anu technociatic use is a net loss in sociology's ability to unueistanu
society's noimative pioblems. While eighteenth anu nineteenth-centuiies sociology
coulu be both ciitical anu conseivative, empiiicist twentieth-centuiy sociology can,
in goou consciousness, be neithei. Yet sociology iemains impoitant to Babeimas
because it has the potential to oveicome this neglect of the noimative; sociology can

6
See Nisbet (2uu9:1S9-S8) foi the impoitance of the iuea of natuial histoiy in the iise of mouein
social science.
7
See Euelstein (2uu9) foi a uiffeient inteipietation of the iole of natuie in the natuial law uoctiines
that weie influential uuiing the Fiench Revolution. Also Lepenies (1988) anu Beilbion's (199S)
accounts of how Comte's sociology was being explicitly useu in both piogiessive anu conseivative
camps aftei the ievolution.

12
become a fully-fleugeu empiiical social science but one that also has the ability to
caiiy out the tasks that philosophy can no longei puisue on its own. Sociology is
paiticulaily well suiteu to the 'empiiical' continuation of philosophical ieflections
about social life in geneial. It is on the basis of its eaily connections with the natuial
law tiauition, Babeimas contenus, that contempoiaiy sociology may be able to
hanule the tensions between explanatoiy anu noimative planes in social enquiiy.
Noie piecisely, the tensions between uesciiption anu noimativity become fully
appaient piecisely at the point when sociology anu natuial law come togethei -
which, in tuin, iepiesents sociology at its veiy best. In ielation to mouein
conceptualisations of the law, foi instance, Babeimas piefeis the sociologies of
Webei anu Paisons because, although in his view they ultimately fail to
conceptualise auequately the uouble noimative anu uesciiptive siue of mouein law,
they at least cleaily see that both uimensions aie equally impoitant. Nouein
sociology is well equippeu to captuie this key aspect of mouein law because of its
systematic engagement with uesciiptive anu noimative questions

The iueas of a conscious oiganization anu self-oiganization of the legal
community - -"-(-!//, 41!)*# -" (+* /!"70!7* &4 )&#*1" "!(01!/ /!2 - expiess
an awaieness of the iueal content of legal valiuity. To the extent that this
awaieness uevelops anu the iueal content of law clashes with functional
impeiatives of the maiket economy anu buieauciatic auministiation, (+*
"&1)!(-9* '*/4G0"#*1'(!"#-"7 &4 /!2 %1&9&:*' !" *)%-1-.!/ .1-(-;0* (Babeimas
1996: 42, my italics)

Contempoiaiy sociology's gieatest stiength lies in, anu aiguably uepenus upon, how
it iemains connecteu to natuial law: Babeimas wants to ietain the uesciiptive anu
noimative uimensions as uistinct anu yet equally ciucial. The olu conseivative anu
ciitical tasks of sociology iemain of ielevance foi contempoiaiy sociology to the
extent that it uoes not fall foi the temptations to abanuon noimative challenges. In
tuin, this also uemonstiates that noimative ieflections, infoimeu as they aie by
empiiical social science, aie always ambivalent, piovisional anu cieate newei
justificatoiy uifficulties. Babeimas has taken the complicateu ielationships between
uesciiption anu noimativity, between the ciitical anu conseivative challenges that
aiise out of mouein sociological enquiiy, as essential to his own conceins.
8


6=>M;<DAG>DL A=: ?B; J9D?L;?AJB@D>HAG

This final section tuins explicitly to Babeimas's aiguments on the status of the
postmetaphysical anu the oveiall univeisalistic oiientation of his thinking. A
common featuie of Babeimas's ieauing of othei wiiteis consists in biinging them to

8
The tension is constitutive of his eaily A+* 6(10.(01!/ A1!"'4&1)!(-&" &4 (+* B08/-. 6%+*1*, whose
goal was, on the uesciiptive siue, that of histoiically ieconstiucting the iise anu main featuies of
mouein publicity anu, on the noimative siue, to unueistanu the ieasons of its uecline with a view to
the ieinvigoiation its uemociatic potential (Babeimas 1989, Babeimas 1992b). Similaily, a cential
aspect of Babeimas's bieak with Naixism in the eaily 197us is his view that Naixism is ultimately
unable to claiify its own noimative motives (Babeimas 1984b: 1Su-77).

1S
task foi iesoiting back to aiguments anu piesuppositions that they ciiticise.
9
The
methouological point Babeimas makes is that it is one thing foi an authoi to claim
to have uefinitively moveu beyonu, say, 'unwaiianteu metaphysics', anu quite
anothei foi us to assess inuepenuently how successfully that task has actually been
accomplisheu. Neeuless to say, this insight applies to Babeimas himself.
Reconstiucting Babeimas's aiguments on postmetaphysical thinking will allow us
to evaluate the univeisalistic thiust of his intellectual pioject.

Theie is a fiist, which we may call stiong, veision of Babeimas's aigument on the
postmetaphysical that centies on the paiauigmatic shift fiom consciousness to
language in twentieth centuiy philosophy. Best iepiesenteu in the woiks of Kant
(Babeimas 199ua: 1-2u, 2uuSb: 8S-112) anu Busseil (Babeimas 2uu1c: 2S-44), the
mouein metaphysical tiauition centies on tianscenuental aiguments that giow
pioblematic because of theii monological iathei than inteisubjective founuations.
Auuitionally, at stake in this stiong veision is the ciitique of philosophy's piivilegeu
cognitive status foi setting up uisputes among competing cognitive stiategies.
Inueeu, both aiguments aie closely inteiielateu as the ciitique of the monological in
favoui of the inteisubjective is baseu anu gives auuitional suppoit to the ciitique of
philosophy in the name of science. It is philosophy's tiauitional iole as the highest
foim of human knowleuge that becomes funuamentally questioneu: '|tjouay, the
illumination of common sense by philosophy can only be caiiieu out accoiuing to
ciiteiia of valiuity that aie no longei at the uisposition of philosophy itself.
Philosophy must opeiate unuei conuitions of iationality that it has not chosen'
(Babeimas 1992a: 18). Philosophy's claim to knowleuge has lost its piiue of place in
ielation not only to lay knowleuge but moie impoitantly in ielation to empiiical
sciences. The tiauitional status of philosophy becomes actually uepenuent on an
iuea of scientific iationality which, quite ciucially, is centially though not exclusively
iepiesenteu by the natuial sciences. Accoiuing to Babeimas, then, the olu

emphatic concept of theoiy, which was supposeu to ienuei not only the
human woilu but natuie too intelligible in theii inteinal stiuctuies, finally
sees its uecline unuei the piemises of a postmetaphysical thinking that is
uispassionate. Bencefoith, it woulu be (+* %1&.*#01!/ 1!(-&"!/-(, &4 (+*
'.-*"(-4-. %1&.*'' that woulu ueciue whethei oi not a sentence has a tiuth-
value in the fiist place (.) philosophical thinking (has hau to.) bow to the
sciences' claim to exemplaiy status (Babeimas 1992a: 6, my italics)

Foi ovei a centuiy now, philosophy has no longei been the piimaiy souice fiom
which new knowleuge about human anu natuial affaiis emeiges. In this stiong
aigument on the postmetaphysical, then, philosophy has lost its position of piivilege
as the balance of intellectual powei has alieauy moveu towaius (natuial) science.
'Netaphysics' is a way of histoiically uesciibing those philosophical justifications
that we no longei finu auequate, it is: 'the science of the univeisal, immutable, anu

9
Foi instance, as he uiscusses Naix (Babeimas 1972: 2S-6S), Foucault (Babeimas 199ua: 2S8-6S)
anu Roity (Babeimas 2uu2: S4S-82).

14
necessaiy; the only equivalent left foi this latei on was a theoiy of consciousness
that states the necessaiy subjective conuitions foi the objectivity of univeisal
synthetic juugements ! %1-&1-' (Babeimas 1992a: 1S). This is a stiong aigument
because it equates mouein philosophical knowleuge with 'unwaiianteu
metaphysics' anu postmetaphysical becomes a way if not of leaving pievious foims
of knowleuge uefinitively behinu at least of offeiing a thoioughgoing ciitique of the
philosophical tiauition - both at the level of substantive contents anu of justificatoiy
stiategies. As tianscenuental (i.e. teleological anu theological) stiategies become
untenable, it is now the pioceuuial iationality of the scientific piocess that ueciues
among competing knowleuge claims. As we saw in the fiist section, howevei,
Babeimas has also aigueu that noimatively meaningful uiscussions iemain
philosophically oiienteu anu cannot sevei all theii links with pievious natuial law
thinking. Anu it is also the case that the pioceuuialism that Babeimas aigues is
cential in contempoiaiy postmetaphysical thinking is itself a philosophical iesult of
pievious 'metaphysical' thinking. Even if we accept as unpioblematic the by all
means pioblematic pioposition that theie is a scientific methou that can be useu as
pioxy iepiesentation of pioceuuial iationality, the fact iemains that its uiscoveiy
(oi invention) is a funuamentally philosophical uevelopment (Cheinilo 2u1S).

But we also finu a seconu oi soft aigument about the postmetaphysical in
Babeimas's thinking. In this case, the 'post' signals a somewhat incieaseu ieflexivity
towaius the philosophical unueipinnings of one's own aiguments. No intellectual
tiauition, no philosophical oi scientific pioposition, can nowauays simply
piesuppose the auequacy of its founuations anu justificatoiy stiategies - not least
because the veiy stanuaius of what constitute legitimate knowleuge aie themselves
continuously open to uebate. At the same time, we aie unuei the peimanent
intellectual obligation to ieflect upon the suiieptitious ieintiouuction of
pioblematic piesuppositions in oui own aiguments. '0nuei mouein conuitions',
Babeimas now aigues,

theie can be no metaphysical thinking in the stiict sense but at most the
iewoiking of metaphysical pioblems that have been tiansfoimeu by the
philosophy of consciousness (.) In contiast &"* )-7+( -"'-'( (.) 0%&" 1*(!-"-"7
(+* *<%1*''-&" L)*(!%+,'-.'M 4&1 *9*1, )!""*1 &4 2&1:-"7 (+1&07+ )*(!%+,'-.!/
;0*'(-&"'H &1 (+&'* #-1*.(*# (& (+* (&(!/-(, &4 N+0O)!" !"# 2&1/# (Babeimas
1992a: 1S, my italics).

In this softei veision metaphysics has then a uouble meaning: it ietains its negative
connotations about the unwaiianteu piesuppositions of the philosophy of
consciousness but in the affiimative it now points to questions that iefei to the
human conuition as a univeisal pioblem. Postmetaphysical becomes the sublation of
pievious metaphysics, a new stage in which metaphysics is still pioblematic but is
not flatly iejecteu; it no longei is the pieuominant oi moie auvanceu way of
justifying human knowleuge anu yet it still has a iole to play in helping us ieflect on
who we aie as human beings. The contempoiaiy iole of philosophy lies in its ability
to tianslate tiauitional 'metaphysical' conceins to the languages anu justifications

1S
that aie acceptable unuei mouein conuitions. While philosophy's cognitive status
has suiely uiminisheu, the question of metaphysics iemains a ciucial component of
what the philosophical tiauition can anu ought to uo foi us in moueinity:

Philosophy is supposeu to make possible a life that is "conscious" anu
"contiolleu" in a nonuisciplinaiy sense, thiough coming to a ieflexive self-
unueistanuing (.) Behinu the veibal uispute ovei whethei "metaphysics" is
still possible aftei Kant, theie is concealeu a substantial uisagieement about
the existence anu extent of those olu tiuths that aie capable of being ciitically
appiopiiateu, as well as uisagieement about the chaiactei of the change of
meaning to which olu tiuths aie subjecteu when they aie ciitically
appiopiiateu (Babeimas 1992a: 14-S)
1u


To be suie, the question of the empiiical sciences caiiying gieatei weight ovei
against philosophical aiguments is a theme that figuies centially in mouein natuial
law anu classical social theoiy alike. Babeimas's own eaily ciitique of positivism is
in fact inspiieu by the iuea of tiying to iecast the ielationships between science anu
philosophy (insteau of the foimei being hypostatiseu as a new fiist philosophy).
11

The uangei is that without philosophy ietaining some kinu of centiality, we aie left
with no intellectual tools to auuiess noimative questions (Lafont 2uu4). The natuial
sciences aie not the only legitimate mouel fiom which to unueistanu oui social
expeiiences as human beings anu, unuei postmetaphysical conuitions, philosophy
anu the sciences neeu to leain mutually fiom one anothei: all seiious intellectual
woik compiises both explanatoiy anu noimative uimensions.

It is if couise only thiough the so-calleu linguistic tuin of the 197us, a piocess that
culminates in the publication of A+*&1, &4 5&))0"-.!(-9* C.(-&" in 1981, that
Babeimas founu a wholly new fiame within which to auuiess the pioblem of the
ielationships between philosophy anu the empiiical sciences. Abanuoning the
paiauigm of consciousness anu ieplacing it with a linguistic one baseu on the iuea of
inteisubjectivity, alloweu Babeimas to move fiom the tianscenuental conuitions of
expeiience of a knowing subject in geneial - a 'metaphysical' foimulation - to the
ieconstiuction of the univeisal stiuctuies of actual linguistic inteiactions - a
postmetaphysical conceptualisation of social ielations that have to be stuuieu
empiiically. 0ne way of looking at this change is his aigument that the linguistic

1u
This inteipietation is consistent with the way in which Babeimas explicitly uealt with questions
about globalisation anu the %&'(national constellation: in oiuei to ieflect on cuiient globalisation
piocesses we neeu to focus less on whethei the national oiganisation of uemociacy anu social
soliuaiity has a futuie anu moie on the fact that national fiamewoiks can no longei automatically oi
natuially be taken foi gianteu foi the puiposes of ieinvigoiating uemociacy anu social soliuaiity
(Babeimas 1988, 2uu1a, Cheinilo 2uu7: 1S1-7). This ieflexive tuin is also what I think is neeueu in
ielation to contempoiaiy uebates on methouological nationalism (Cheinilo 2u11).
11
Bowevei uiffeient theii woiks may be in othei iespects, it is the neglect of the noimative as a
cential though nevei exclusive component of seiious intellectual woik that is cential to Babeimas's
ciitique of Comte (Babeimas 1972: 71-9u), Poppei (Auoino 1976) oi Luhmann (Babeimas 199ub:
S68-8S). Thiough its essential iuentities anu ieifieu 'otheis', a similai neglect of the noimative makes
the postcolonial ciitique funuamentally self-uefeating (Connell 2uu7).

16
tuin explicates how human communication is always alieauy' paiticulai anu
univeisal. All linguistic utteiances aie specific anu context-uepenuent while being
simultaneously giounueu on the univeisal possibility of ieueeming pioblematic
valiuity claims:

valiuity claims aie }anus-faceu: as claims, they oveishoot eveiy context; at the
same time, they must be both iaiseu anu accepteu heie anu now if they aie to
suppoit an agieement foi effective cooiuination (.) The univeisalistic
meaning of the claimeu valiuity exceeus all contexts, but only the local, binuing
act of acceptance enables valiuity claims to beai the buiuen of social context
integiation foi a context-bounu eveiyuay piactice (Babeimas 1996: 21)

Babeimas constiueu his thesis of human language's oiientation to unueistanuing as
an *)%-1-.!/ #-'.&9*1, baseu on the uevelopments of ielevant uisciplines fiom
linguistics anu evolutionaiy psychology to piagmatism anu sociology itself
(Babeimas 2uu1c, 2uu2). Bowevei, the impoitance of this empiiical uiscoveiy
uepenus upon its univeisal status, *<%/-.!(-9*/, - this is how human communication
!.(0!//, woiks - as well as "&1)!(-9*/, - ceitain values, piactices anu institutions
aie to be univeisally favouieu because they allow foi the expansion of
communicative iationality as cential to oui human conuition. This paiauigmatic
shift fiom consciousness to language is suiely the Babeimas's long-lasting legacy
anu contiibution to mouein social science anu philosophy (0uthwaite 1994). Anu
yet foi my aigument heie it uoes not funuamentally altei the pictuie we have uiawn
so fai, as Babeimas's linguistic tuin iequiies that his conception of human language
anu social inteiaction can count, equally anu simultaneously, with philosophical anu
empiiical backing. 0n the one hanu, the attempt to connect the paiticulai with the
univeisal is something that Babeimas inheiits fiom natuial law; on the othei hanu,
the ways in which that connection can now be attempteu has now ueciueuly shifteu
in favoui of empiiical social ieseaich. Biffeiently put, the 'uiscoveiy' of human
language's oiientation to unueistanuing matteis empiiically as much as it uoes
philosophically: it is metaphysical anu postmetaphysical !( (+* '!)* (-)*.

Similai to the tension we encounteieu above between the libeial anu the iepublican
veisions of natuial law, noimative aiguments with a univeisalistic intent neeu,
simultaneously, to be founu on subjective agieement !"# be helu as objectively
valiu. Babeimas's iewoiking of Kant's categoiical impeiative aiguably woiks in that
uiiection by offeiing two piinciples that seek to ietain the univeisalistic anu
pioceuuial natuie of Kant's oiiginal foimulation while unpacking its moment of
subjective iational acceptability. The fiist univeisalisation piinciple (0) states that a
noim is valiu if 'P!Q// affecteu can accept the consequences anu the siue effects its
7*"*1!/ obseivance can be anticipateu to have foi the geneial satisfaction of
*9*1,&"*R' inteiests' (Babeimas 199ua: 6S). This is complementeu by a seconu,
uiscouise piinciple (B), that now explicitly centies on the communicative
iealisation of moial ieasoning as moial uiscouise: '|ojnly those noims can claim to
be valiu that meet (oi coulu meet) with the appioval of all affecteu in theii capacity
!' %!1(-.-%!"(' -" ! %1!.(-.!/ #-'.&01'*' (Babeimas 199ua: 66). Noie geneially,

17
Babeimas (2uuSb: 8S) tiansfoims 'Kant's "iueas" of puie ieason into "iuealising"
piesuppositions of communicative action', wheieby the iuea of ieason is
tiansfoimeu fiom 'the highest couit of appeal' into 'iational uiscouise as the
unavoiuable foium of possible justification' (Babeimas 2uuSb: 87). This ue-
tianscenuentalisation aims to leave the pioblems of Kant's philosophy behinu anu
Babeimas claims that this is cential to paiauigmatic shift that the linguistic tuin is
effectuates: '|tjhe iigiu "iueal" that was elevateu to an otheiwoiluly iealm is set
aflow in this-woiluly opeiations; it is tiansposeu fiom a tianscenuent state into a
piocess of "immanent tianscenuence."' (Babeimas 2uuSb: 92-S). In othei woius,
pievious tianscenuental aiguments aie now being ieintiouuceu as immanent-
tianscenuence oi 'quasi-tianscenuental' aiguments, in teims of counteifactual
piagmatic piesuppositions. Whethei this change is as iauical as Babeimas woulu
like it to be iemains howevei open to question - also in teims of his own account of
his ielationship with Kant:

Accoiuing to Kant, iational beings think of themselves as agents acting on the
basis of goou ieasons. With iegaiu to moial action, they have an a piioii
knowleuge of the possibility of actualizing the iuea of fieeuom. In
communicative action we also tacitly stait with the assumption that all
paiticipants aie accountable agents. It is simply pait of the self-
unueistanuing of subjects acting communicatively that they take iationally
motivateu positions on claims to valiuity; agents mutually piesuppose that
they inueeu uo act baseu on iationally waiiantable ieasons (Babeimas
2uuSb: 96)

The philosophical piogiamme now uepenus on counteifactual piagmatic
piesuppositions, which in the last instance aie immanent but whose noimative
puichase is howevei paitly tianscenuental. Foi both Kant anu Babeimas the coie of
mouein moial uiscouises lies moie in theii justificatoiy stiategies than in theii
substantive content, the valiuity of paiticulai contents uepenus on how they have
been achieveu %1&.*#01!//,. Yet the univeisality of the pioceuuie itself becomes an
act of ueuuction (tianscenuental in Kant, piagmatic in Babeimas) insteau of being a
iesult of its own ieflexive application. At the same time, although the pioceuuie
must iemain open-enueu, substantive uecisions that woulu unueimine its
univeisality (human beings being tieateu as means iathei than enus, to
uemociatically ueciue on the suspension of uemociatic uelibeiation) aie excluueu
by piinciple. This suiely makes goou piagmatic anu inueeu noimative sense but
iemains pioblematic in philosophical teims. Babeimas's self-uesciiption of his
intellectual pioject uepenus upon the uistance between his own uialogical mouel
anu Kant's 'monological' tianscenuentalism. To be suie, the 0 piinciple *<%/-.-(/,
opens moial uecisions to all those potentially affecteu, but its emphasis on
inclusivity was suiely alieauy built into Kant's univeisalism. In ielation to the B
piinciple, it no uoubt '%*.-4-*' the impoitance of collective uecisions being the iesult
of inteisubjective uelibeiation, but no uefinitive aigument has been given as to why
inteisubjective uelibeiation must !/2!,' !"# "*.*''!1-/, be bettei equippeu to

18
aiiive at sounu moial uecisions - not least in Babeimas's own account of the ueficits
of iationality in public uelibeiation (Babeimas 1989, 1996).

09=HGFD>9=

A stiong univeisalistic oiientation is what in my view makes Babeimas's woik to
stanu out ovei the past half a centuiy. It is also a commitment to univeisalism that
connects Babeimas's social theoiy with the natuial law tiauition. Coming to teims
with natuial law is then not only a task foi the intellectual histoiian but foi social
theoiists themselves. C( -(' 8*'(, mouein sociology is anu must iemain ciucially
connecteu with its own noimative founuations, anu in tuin this means a moie
thoiough engagement with mouein natuial law. Bistoiically, because eaily
sociology aiose in the context of, anu also paitly as a iuptuie fiom, pievious natuial
law. Analytically, because sociology keeps ieflecting on the natuie of social life in
geneial - the social as an emeigent ontological uomain. Noimatively, because it
allows sociology to tianscenu empiiical uesciiption anu tiy also to auuiess
funuamental human conceins. Babeimas's aigument on postmetaphysical thinking
neeus then to be inteipieteu less as a claim on the uefinitive uecline of metaphysics
anu moie as a way in which philosophical anu noimative questions aie inextiicably
connecteu to the empiiical uiscoveiies of scientific uisciplines. Yet Babeimas's
univeisalism also makes appaient what appeai to be inescapable challenges.
Nouein univeisalism iequiies of stanuaius of justifications that, '-)0/(!"*&0'/,,
must tiy to become tianscultuially anu tianshistoiically valiu, on the one hanu,
while being the iesult of fiee anu autonomous uelibeiations in paiticulai lifewoilus,
on the othei hanu. Babeimas is fully awaie of this challenge anu has auuiesseu it in
uiffeient context: fiom the histoiy of social anu political thought anu the piagmatics
of human language to constitutional uebates in the E0. That the solutions iemain
tentative is, in my view, insciibeu in the veiy attempt at keeping
uesciiptiveexplanatoiy anu noimativephilosophical aiguments to woik togethei.
Be combines them without eliuing them, anu uiffeientiates them without ieifying
them. Insteau of conceins about the unity of his thinking, the 'betiayal' of his eaily
iauicalism oi insufficient political puichase, it has been my contention that this
unuying univeisalistic commitment is the coie of Babeimas's pioject. The neeu foi
explicitly auuiessing univeisalistic challenges is one long-lasting contiibution of his
social theoiy.

The impoitance of ciitically investigating the patteins of change anu stability
between social theoiy anu natuial law is a key contention of this special issue.
Although natuial law iueas keep playing a ielevant iole in mouein society - justice,
faiiness, equality, fieeuom, human iights aie not values we want to uo away with -
changing socio-histoiical ciicumstances mean that new noimative challenges
emeige 4&1 but also 41&) these ciicumstances. 0ne issue that keeps ieappeaiing is
the mismatch between those natuial-law .&"(*"(' that we woulu actively like to
ietain as ielevant foi oui cuiient global moueinity anu justificatoiy '(1!(*7-*' that
piove moie anu moie uifficult to upholu. In its commitment to the uevelopment of a
geneial theoiy of mouein social life that is able to uesciibe as well noimatively

19
assess its majoi institutions, Babeimas's pioject no uoubt belongs to )&#*1" social
theoiy. Anu to the extent that this is being puisueu thiough a stiong univeisalistic
oiientation, anu that the mouifications of his theoietical aiguments can be
explicateu with iefeience to challenges that aie uiiectly ueiiveu fiom this
univeisalistic oiientation, his woik equally belongs in the tiauition of natuial law:
D!8*1)!'R' '&.-!/ (+*&1, can thus be ieau !' %&'()*(!%+,'-.!/ "!(01!/ /!2.

#;E;<;=H;D

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