http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/cybercrime/203501.

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GR No. 203501, Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v. Aquino III, et al.
Nature:
Petition for Prohibition to prohibit and enjoin respondent members of the Executive Department from
implementing various provisions of RA 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.

Facts:
This petition was filed on October 5, 2012 by the Philippine Bar Association, Inc. (PBA), the oldest
voluntary organization of lawyers in the country, represented by its immediate past President, Ronald
Oliver Solis, and its Trustee and Chairperson of its Committee on Public Issues, Rodel A. Cruz, in defense
of the Rule of Law and the rights of individuals against the excesses of State Power.

PBA claims it has a legal interest in filing the petition as its membership is made up of lawyers who rely
on information and communication technology (ICT) in their privileged communication with their clients
as well as with each other through the PBA website and thus are in danger of sustaining an immediate
injury as a result of the implementation of the assailed provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of
2012. Further, PBA grounds its legal standing on its members being taxpayers and concerned citizens
and the transcendental and serious constitutional issues raised in its petition.

Issues:
Whether the following provisions of RA 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, violate the
Constitution
Sec. 4 (c) (4) referring to the unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in
the future;
the Sec. 5 referring to other offenses, i.e., willfully abetting or aiding in commission of any of the
offenses enumerated under the law (a) and/or the attempt to commit any of the said offenses (b);
Sec. 6 referring to crimes defined crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and
communications technologies where the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that
provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be;
Sec. 7 referring to the prosecution of offenses under the law without prejudice to any liability for
violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws;
Sec. 12 referring to the authorization given to law enforcement authorities, with due cause, to collect
and/or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time without prior judicial warrant,
sanction and/or approval; and
Sec. 19 referring to the restricting or blocking access by the Department of Justice (DOJ) upon finding
that a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of the law
Arguments:

Secs. 4 (c) 4 and 5 violate the constitutional rights to due process as well as freedom of speech and of
expression and of the press.
The inclusion in sec. 4 (c) 4 of the phrase use of computer systems as a means of committing libel is
vague, overbroad, and lacks the necessary standards for obedience by the citizenry and enforcement by
the State. This clearly results in a chilling effect on netizens and amounts to prior restraint of
protected speech.
N.B.: Chilling effect in constitutional law refers to the inhibition or discouragement of the legitimate
exercise of a constitutional right by the potential or threatened prosecution under, or application of, a
law or sanction. Prior restraint has been defined as an official governmental restriction on any form of
expression in advance of actual dissemination.
Further, the continuation in sec. 4 (c) 4 of the phrase or any other similar means which may be devised
in the future is also vague.
The which may be devised in the future virtually makes the provision an ex post facto law.
N.B.: An ex post facto law makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent
when done, criminal and punishes such an action.
*A+iding or abetting in sec. 5(a) is nothing more than a legal conclusion of the acts of aiding or abetting
and does not offer a definition of the same.
Sec. 5 (b) also fails to define what constitutes an attempt to commit a cybercrime.
Even using definitions under existing laws of aiding or abetting or attempt, the very nature of the
online environment requires a reasonable technical definition.
Vagueness caused by lack of concrete definitions under sec. 5 and constitutional defects of other
questionable provisions of the Cybercrime Law discussed in the petition cannot simply be cured by mere
issuances of implementing rules and regulations that follow no express standards set in the statute
itself.
Sec. 6 violates the Equal Protection Clause guaranteed in Art. III, sec. 1 of the Constitution. Equal
protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike.
Sec. 6, amounting to a highly aggravating circumstance, inexplicably discriminates against netizens, a
class of citizens who inhabit cyberspace.
This classification is not germane to the purpose of the law which is to protect and safeguard the
integrity of the computer and communications system and to allow free, easy, and intelligible access
to information through information communication technology (ICT).
Sec. 7, together with sec. 6, violates the rule on double jeopardy guaranteed in Art. III, sec. 21 of the
Constitution. Such right protects against a second or later prosecution for the same offense.
Either an individual suffers an aggravating circumstance due to the use of ICT in the commission of
crimes under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws OR is prosecuted for a crime clearly defined
under the Cybercrime Law.
Sec. 12 violates an individuals right to privacy of communication.
It allows a warrantless search and seizure of data involved in the transmission of information
Traffic data to be gathered under sec. 12 is not innocent or harmless information.
Sec. 12 lacks adequate standards for law enforcement agencies with respect to the gathering and
collection of data. Due cause that would justify the seizure of traffic data by law enforcement agencies
is not defined.
There is a dearth of safeguards against potential abuse by law enforcement agencies.
Where fundamental right to privacy is in danger of being violated, government must show a compelling
state interest. In this case, sec. 12 is at odds with sec. 2 which spoke of the need to protect and
safeguard the integrity of the integrity of computer, computer and communications systems, networks,
and databases, and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and data stored therein,
from all forms of misuse, abuse, and illegal access by making punishable under the law such conduct or
conducts.
Sec. 12 violates an individuals right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
It replaces the requirement of judicial probable cause determination with a unilateral executive
determination of due cause.
It allows the abhorrent situation of search and seizure first; judicial warrant to follow.
It amounts to a general warrant in favor of law enforcement agencies.
Whatever consent may be given to the service provider cannot be construed as a waiver against
obtrusive searches.
It contains no procedure to ensure effective separation of traffic from non-traffic data.
Sec. 19 violates the right to due process, against unlawful search and seizure, freedom of speech and of
expression.
It does not afford a citizen opportunity to rebut the DOJs finding, giving the latter sole and unfettered
discretion.
It amounts to a warrantless seizure of private property.

Prayer
Giving of due course to the petition,
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin respondents from implementing /enforcing sec. 4 (c)
(4), 5, 6, 7,12, and 19,
after due consideration on the merits,
questioned provisions be declared null and void for being unconstitutional,
respondents be permanently enjoined from implementing /enforcing sec. 4 (c) (4), 5, 6, 7,12, and 19,
and
other just and equitable relief.