195 The Gulf of Guinea The New Danger Zone English

THE GULF OF GUINEA: THE NEW DANGER ZONE
Africa Report N195 12 December 2012

Translation from French

TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
II. A STRATEGIC REGION IN THE GRIP OF INSECURITY ...................................... 2
A. RENEWED STRATEGIC INTEREST IN NATURAL RESOURCES .......................................................... 2
B. A CONTEXT FAVOURABLE TO MARITIME CRIME ......................................................................... 3
C. WEAK MARITIME POLICIES .......................................................................................................... 4
III.NIGERIA: EPICENTRE OF VIOLENCE AT SEA ...................................................... 6
A. POOR GOVERNANCE AND MARITIME CRIME ................................................................................ 6
1. A leaky oil sector ......................................................................................................................... 6
2. The rise in economic crime .......................................................................................................... 7
3. State capacity hampered by corruption ........................................................................................ 8
4. The Niger Delta ............................................................................................................................ 8
D. THE INCREASE IN CRIME SINCE 2009 ........................................................................................... 9
1. The amnestys limited impact ...................................................................................................... 9
2. Crime onshore enables crime offshore ....................................................................................... 10
3. Stronger but insufficient government response ......................................................................... 11
E. FUTURE THREATS TO MARITIME SECURITY ............................................................................... 12
1. Subcontracting security .............................................................................................................. 12
2. Amnesty, unemployment and unrest in the north ...................................................................... 12
IV.THE SPREAD OF CRIME ACROSS THE REGION ................................................ 13
A. POLITICAL GANGSTERISM IN BAKASSI ....................................................................................... 13
B. MARITIME RAIDS ....................................................................................................................... 14
C. PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS ........................................................................................................ 15
1. Danger off the Benin coast ........................................................................................................ 15
2. Togo within range ...................................................................................................................... 17
3. Ghana at risk .............................................................................................................................. 18
V. REGIONAL COOPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT ..................... 18
A. UNEQUAL REGIONAL COOPERATION .......................................................................................... 19
1. The beginning of a strategy in Central Africa ............................................................................ 19
2. West Africa plays catch-up ........................................................................................................ 20
B. NASCENT INTER-REGIONAL COOPERATION ................................................................................ 21
C. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT: IN SEARCH OF COORDINATION ........................................................ 21
VI.MOVING BEYOND A PURELY SECURITY APPROACH ..................................... 23
A. THE NEED FOR LONG-TERM REFORMS ....................................................................................... 23
1. Improving economic governance ............................................................................................... 24
2. Boosting development on the coast ........................................................................................... 24
3. Strengthening maritime law enforcement .................................................................................. 24
B. FIGHTING PIRACY ON LAND AND SEA ........................................................................................ 25
1. Dissuading pirates: A joint task of state and private actors ....................................................... 25
2. Arresting pirates ......................................................................................................................... 26
C. THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT COOPERATION ......................................................... 27
1. Making the region take responsibility for its own security ........................................................ 27
2. Coordinating international support ............................................................................................ 28
VII.CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 29

APPENDICES
A. MAP OF THE GULF OF GUINEA ......................................................................................................... 30
B. MAP OF THE NIGER DELTA .............................................................................................................. 31
C. MAP OF THE ECCAS MARITIME ZONES .......................................................................................... 32
D. NIGER DELTA TIMELINE .................................................................................................................. 33
E. PIRACY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE .................................................... 35
F. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 37
G. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2009 ..................................................... 38
H. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 40

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Within a decade, the Gulf of Guinea has become one of
the most dangerous maritime areas in the world. Maritime
insecurity is a major regional problem that is compromis-
ing the development of this strategic economic area and
threatening maritime trade in the short term and the sta-
bility of coastal states in the long term. Initially taken by
surprise, the regions governments are now aware of the
problem and the UN is organising a summit meeting on the
issue. In order to avoid violent transnational crime desta-
bilising the maritime economy and coastal states, as it has
done on the East African coast, these states must fill the
security vacuum in their territorial waters and provide a
collective response to this danger. Gulf of Guinea countries
must press for dynamic cooperation between the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
take the initiative in promoting security and adopt a new
approach based on improving not only security but also
economic governance.
The recent discovery of offshore hydrocarbon deposits
has increased the geostrategic importance of the Gulf of
Guinea. After neglecting their maritime zones for many
years, Gulf of Guinea states are now aware of their weak-
ness. On the international front, renewed Western interest
in the region is accompanied by similar interest from emerg-
ing nations. In this context, the rise in maritime crime has
increased collective concern in a region where, for decades,
the problems of sovereignty and territorial control have
only been posed on dry land.
The Niger Delta region in Nigeria was the initial epicentre
of maritime crime. For decades, oil production has para-
doxically created poverty. As social tensions and environ-
mental pollution increased, oil income has, in large part,
only benefited the central government, oil companies and
local elites. Those excluded from the system turned to vio-
lent opposition. Forced to bypass the state to gain access to
even a fraction of this wealth, they have organised illegal
activities, including siphoning of crude oil, clandestine re-
fining and illegal fuel trade. The constant increase in the
value of the industry has allowed these activities to prosper
and economic crime to spread.
The weakness and general inadequacy of the maritime
policies of Gulf of Guinea states and the lack of coopera-
tion between them have allowed criminal networks to di-
versify their activities and gradually extend them away
from the Nigerian coast and out on to the high seas. Crime
does not affect only the oil industry; it has diversified to
include piracy and increasingly audacious and well-planned
seaborne raids. Criminal groups have learned quickly and,
taking advantage of troubled socio-political situations, have
appeared along the coasts of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea,
So Tom and Prncipe, Benin and Togo.
Having recovered from the initial surprise, Gulf of Guinea
states and Western countries are exploring how best to deal
with the problem before it causes wider instability. States
and regional organisations have launched specific operations
and are formulating strategies to improve security. The most
affected states aim to build navies and increase resources
for coastal policing in the hope of deterring criminals.
At the regional level, within the framework of its peace
and security policies, ECCAS has created a regional mari-
time security centre and organised joint training exercises.
However, states find it hard to organise joint funding or co-
ordinate their efforts. Maritime policies are embryonic and
symbolic and states are unable to maintain a continuous
presence at sea. In the case of ECOWAS, maritime cooper-
ation is still in its infancy and is hampered by political ten-
sions and distrust of neighbouring states toward Nigeria.
At the inter-regional level, cooperation between ECCAS
and ECOWAS would allow regional patrols to exercise
the right of pursuit beyond maritime borders. However,
inter-regional discussions have only just begun and polit-
ical tensions hamper efforts to promote practical coopera-
tion. Meanwhile, Western powers (U.S., France, UK) and
emerging nations (Brazil, China, India, South Africa) with
economic interests in the region are providing financial
support and security expertise to assist local initiatives.
The institutionalisation of regional cooperation and the
increase of international initiatives must not obscure the
fact that rising crime in the Gulf of Guinea is mainly due
The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone
Crisis Group Africa Report N195, 12 December 2012 Page ii

to poor governance. Most states in the region have been
unable to control economic activities in their maritime
zones and in international waters and ensure the devel-
opment of their shorelines. This collective failure has cre-
ated a major opportunity for criminal networks that feed
on the needs and grievances of local communities. A range
of urgent measures is needed to reverse this trend: reforms
to improve governance of the economy and security sector,
comprehensive and effective maritime public policies and
practical regional cooperation beyond declarations of in-
tent. A long-term response is needed because, although
piracy is a recent phenomenon in the region, its root causes
are much deeper.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Governments of the Gulf of Guinea States
(Cte dIvoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria,
Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, So Tom and
Prncipe, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic
Republic of Congo and Angola):
1. Prioritise the fight against maritime crime by creating
an inter-ministerial committee in each country to draw
up a national maritime strategy to tackle the immediate
threat and the root causes of the problem. These com-
mittees should include at least the ministers of social
affairs, foreign affairs, defence, interior, transport, econ-
omy, labour, fishing and natural resources.
To combat the root causes of maritime crime
2. Combat crime in the hydrocarbons and shipping sec-
tors by conducting research into the illegal fuel trade
in order to identify the companies involved in illegal
activities.
3. Boost job creation along the coast, in particular by
protecting artisanal fishing, stimulating the local fish
processing industry, providing professional training
to vulnerable sectors of the population (former com-
batants and unemployed youth) and reinvesting assets
seized from fuel smugglers in development projects.
4. Strengthen maritime law enforcement through profes-
sionalisation of naval forces, maritime law enforcement
bodies and port authorities, which should increase their
technological capacity and intelligence networks to
monitor all activities in their exclusive economic zones.
To strengthen anti-piracy policies at sea and on land
5. Maintain constant navy patrols in mooring zones and
territorial waters and carry out regular surveillance
flights.
6. Work closely with the UNs International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) and shipping industry to draw up
best management practices advising ship owners, cap-
tains and crews on anti-piracy measures.
7. Set up a national inter-agency anti-piracy task force
to investigate, arrest and prosecute pirate gangs on
land and at sea.
8. Accede to all necessary international legal instruments,
including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2005 Protocol to the Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, integrate these conven-
tions into national law and train personnel responsible for
implementing them, especially in the judicial system.
To strengthen cooperation
9. Sign bilateral agreements at the presidential level be-
tween direct neighbours to facilitate extraditions and
enable close cooperation between navies, maritime
administration agencies and police forces in counter-
piracy work.
10. Organise in the near future joint surveillance opera-
tions in especially dangerous zones:
a) Nigeria, Benin and Togo should agree to expand
the joint Operation Prosperity to include Togos
territorial waters; and
b) Nigeria and Cameroon should conduct joint pa-
trols on their maritime borders.
11. Participate fully in efforts by ECCAS and ECOWAS
to draw up a regional maritime security strategy and
share resources.
12. Strengthen inter-regional cooperation by:
a) organising a Gulf of Guinea summit at which heads
of state should sign the Memorandum of Under-
standing between ECCAS and ECOWAS on Mari-
time Security in the Central and Western Maritime
Region and the Multilateral Agreement on Coop-
eration to Suppress Illicit Maritime Activities in
West and Central Africa; and
b) turning the Maritime Trade Information Sharing
Centre (MTISC) to be set up in Ghana into an in-
formation collection and dissemination tool for
the Gulf of Guinea and transforming the regional
training service for maritime security planned by
ECCAS into a training centre for the whole region.
Crisis Group Africa Report N195, 12 December 2012 Page iii

To International Partners:
13. Coordinate international support through a multina-
tional maritime affairs committee for each country and
ensure that foreign interventions are aligned with na-
tional strategies.
14. Assist national maritime affairs committees in design-
ing comprehensive maritime policies that address the
immediate threat and root causes of maritime crime;
and support coastal states in their efforts to create jobs.
15. Impress upon Gulf of Guinea states the need to treat
piracy as a transnational organised crime that demands
a coordinated response including naval operations, in-
vestigative police work and prosecution of suspects;
and design programs to strengthen the capacities of all
maritime law enforcement agencies.
To the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
and Interpol:
16. Advise and assist with tracking financial flows to Gulf
of Guinea states as part of investigations into pirate
organisations and the smuggling of hydrocarbons.
Dakar/Nairobi/Brussels, 12 December 2012

I. INTRODUCTION
Maritime crime, along with the rise in radical Islam in the
Sahel, is one of the two major threats emerging in Africa.
1

The Gulf of Guinea is one of the worlds most dangerous
maritime zones.
2
Pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia
still exceed those off Africas west coast in frequency,
range and cost to international shipping, but maritime in-
security in the Gulf of Guinea has grown rapidly in recent
years.
3
The international community is only now becom-
ing aware of the dangerous repercussions of violent crime
at sea on both development and the global economy.
The Gulf of Guinea states vary considerably in size, pop-
ulation, wealth and institutional and political stability.
The economies of Nigeria, Cameroon and Ghana are much
bigger than those of Benin, Togo and So Tom and Prn-
cipe. However, to a greater or lesser extent they all struggle
to assert their authority over their territory, particularly their
territorial waters.
For decades thieves have attacked commercial traffic in
the waters off Nigeria. Violence escalated during the Ni-
ger Delta insurgency, at its peak between 2006 and 2009,
and from 2007 began to spread along the coast to Nige-
rias eastern neighbours.
4
In 2011, Benin and states to the

1
This view is shared by a lot of organisations. For instance, dur-
ing an interview, an ECOWAS official referred to piracy in the
Gulf of Guinea and radical Islam as the two rising threats for
the continent. Crisis Group interview, ECOWAS official, 5 Oc-
tober 2012.
2
According to the International Maritime Bureau, the Gulf of
Guinea is one of three areas that suffer from piracy. The others
are the Gulf of Aden and South East Asia. www.icc-ccs.org/
piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map. Attacks are common,
the most recent being in September 2012 on a Singapore oil
tanker near the Nigerian coast. See Nigerian navy frees hi-
jacked Singapore owned oil-tanker, BBC, 6 September 2012.
3
See Appendix E for a comparison of maritime insecurity in
the Gulf of Guinea and off the coast of Somalia. Also see The
economic cost of Somali piracy 2011, One Earth Future Foun-
dation, 2012.
4
For more on Niger Delta unrest, see Crisis Group Africa Re-
ports N115, The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigerias Delta Un-
rest, 3 August 2006; N118, Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis, 28
September 2006; N135, Nigeria: Ending Unrest in the Niger
Delta, 5 December 2007; Africa Briefings N54, Nigeria: Ogo-
west were also hit by pirate attacks. The mobilisation of
naval forces by unprepared coastal states may have slowed
the growth of the problem but attacks continue and their
perpetrators remain at large. The first half of 2012 saw an
increase in attacks off Nigeria.
5
The regions loss of reve-
nue from maritime trade, fishing and port fees and, above
all, the loss of human life warrant a careful analysis of the
reasons for maritime insecurity.
After the Crisis Group report on ECCAS, which high-
lighted the maritime insecurity affecting Cameroon, Gabon
and Equatorial Guinea,
6
this new report extends the scope
of the analysis to cover the high geostrategic stakes at play
in the Gulf of Guinea region as a whole. These are linked
especially to its rich reserves of fossil fuels and its role as a
vital access point to many coastal and landlocked countries
in West and Central Africa. This report explains how weak
governance in the region has allowed illicit activities to
flourish at sea and create an enabling environment for vio-
lent crime. In Nigeria, poor economic governance has turned
oil wealth into a curse and the country into the epicentre of
violence at sea. A lack of preparedness and even negligence
in neighbouring countries has allowed violence to spread
first east, then west.
This report assesses how coastal states, their international
partners and private companies have responded to grow-
ing insecurity. It highlights progress in and obstacles to
regional cooperation and identifies shortcomings in the
international communitys efforts to help. Finally, based
on this analysis, the report makes recommendations at the
national, regional and international levels for a long-term
response to a recent problem with deep roots.

ni Land after Shell, 18 September 2008; and N60, Nigeria:
Seizing the Moment in the Niger Delta, 30 April 2009.
5
Piracy increasing in West Africa, latest report shows, Inter-
national Maritime Bureau (IMB), 23 April 2012.
6
See Crisis Group Africa Report N181, Implementing Peace
and Security Architecture (I): Central Africa, 7 November 2011.
Crisis Group Africa Report N195, 12 December 2012 Page 2

II. A STRATEGIC REGION IN THE GRIP
OF INSECURITY
Maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea
7
is taking place in
the context of renewed geostrategic interest in the region,
which is rich in natural resources but weakened by many
overt and latent conflicts.
The gulfs raw materials and hydrocarbons make it an in-
creasingly coveted zone and attract the attention of many
actors: local communities claiming rights of use and a share
of the wealth generated by these resources; states anxious
to ensure sovereign control; and private companies that
have been operating there for some time. The poor gov-
ernance that to different degrees characterises all Gulf of
Guinea countries has greatly increased this interest while
justifying and amplifying concerns raised by the recent
worsening of maritime crime. This is the latest in a long
list of problems that have plagued the region for decades:
extreme poverty, political exclusion, local rebellions and
the criminal penetration of an increasing part of the local
economy.
A. RENEWED STRATEGIC INTEREST IN
NATURAL RESOURCES
International interest in the Gulf of Guinea, which has
been economic since the eighteenth century,
8
has signifi-
cantly increased in recent years due to the discovery of
considerable oil and natural gas deposits along the coast
and offshore. Some countries with deposits that previously
attracted few international actors have recently become the
focus of multiple and growing interest. International pres-

7
There are several definitions of the Gulf of Guinea. Histori-
cally, it is the slave coast and covered the coastal regions of
what is now Cte dIvoire, Ghana, Benin and Togo as well as
the Niger Delta. Geographically, it is the Atlantic coast stretch-
ing from Senegal to Angola. Institutionally (mainly used for the
purposes of this report), it includes the eight members of the
Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) created in 1999: Angola,
Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Ni-
geria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and So Tom
and Prncipe. The research conducted for this report also covers
Ghana, Togo and Benin because of the recent expansion of pi-
racy westwards. For more on the different conceptions of the
Gulf of Guinea, see Alexis Riols, Piraterie et brigandage mari-
time dans le Golfe de Guine, Centre dtudes suprieures de
la marine, Paris, 2011, p. 7.
8
The region played an important role in the triangular trade. Its
large population made it a market for European products and it
was an ideal place for acquiring slaves. Throughout the period
of the slave trade, many of the captives sent to the Americas were
taken from along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea. See Pierre
Kipr, Sur la priodisation de lhistoire de lAfrique de lOuest:
le Golfe de Guine (Paris, 2004), p. 187.
ence (mainly Western) was previously limited to France,
which has ties with its former colonies, and to some Eu-
ropean companies with interests in the Nigerian oil sector.
American influence was distant and limited while that of
Spain and Portugal only manifested itself in the linguistic
field. However, the U.S.s new energy policy takes the
Gulf of Guinea into account and emerging powers such as
China, India, Brazil and South Africa have displayed their
interest as well as many private actors, including transna-
tional companies, international institutions and lobbies.
9

In the 1960s, proven hydrocarbon deposits were confined,
in order of importance, to Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Came-
roon, Cte dIvoire and Congo-Brazzaville. Although
some studies conducted at the beginning of the 1970s in-
dicated the existence of deposits throughout the regions
waters, few Western companies received encouragement
from their governments to begin operations.
10
At that time,
Western oil policy mainly focused on onshore deposits in
the Middle East, with large offshore extraction being lim-
ited to the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf of Guinea only be-
came a focus for strategic investment as the conflict in the
Middle East pushed major consumers into diversifying
their supplies at the end of the 1980s. The emergence of big
new consumers, such as China, India and Brazil, also in-
creased overall global interest in the regions crude oil.
11

The Gulf of Guinea is currently the leading sub-Saharan
African oil production region and home of the continents
main oil-producing countries: Nigeria, Angola and Equa-
torial Guinea.
12
The Gulf of Guinea alone produces around
five million barrels of oil per day (bpd) out of the total of
nine million barrels produced in sub-Saharan Africa.
13
Its
oil reserves are mainly offshore and can be exploited and
transported along direct maritime routes toward the U.S.,
Asia and Europe.
The Gulf of Guinea has become one of the main sources
of oil and gas imported by Europe, the U.S., China, India

9
See Jonathan Ndoutoume Ngome, Le Golfe de Guine au
centre des convoitises mondiales, Diplomatie, no. 56 (May-
June 2012), pp. 72-74, and Come Damien Georges Awoumou,
Le Golfe de Guine face aux convoitises, presentation made
at the 11th CODESRIA General Assembly, Maputo, 6-10
December 2005, available at http://www.codesria.org/IMG/
pdf/awoumou.pdf.
10
On the history of the oil industry in the Gulf of Guinea and
the Western presence, see Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Oil and
Politics in the Gulf of Guinea (London, 2007).
11
Ibid.
12
Didier Ortolland and Jean-Pierre Pirat, Atlas des espaces ma-
ritimes (Paris, 2010), p. 58.
13
Ibid.

and Brazil.
14
Nigeria has been the leading regional pro-
ducer for several decades, but is being increasingly caught
up by Angola and even Equatorial Guinea. As new discov-
eries are announced, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Cte dIvoire,
Congo-Brazzaville, Cameroon and Gabon are hoping to
become or are already becoming big producers, making the
entire region an enormous oil and natural gas field. Invest-
ments by Western oil companies are rising. In January 2002,
the U.S. established an African Oil Policy Initiative Group
composed of members of the administration, Congress, the
State Department and oil companies. This group recom-
mended that the Gulf of Guinea be elevated to the status of
a zone of vital interest and that Washington create a com-
mand structure for U.S. forces in the region and examine
the possibility of establishing a military base there.
15

Following these recommendations, between 2002 and
2008, American companies increased their investments in
the region. The national energy plan prepared by the U.S.
in 2001 after the 11-September terrorist attacks stated that
Africa will supply 25 per cent of U.S. oil needs by 2015.
Since 2002, the China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) and the China Petrochemical Corporation (SINO-
PEC) have begun operations in Gabon, Nigeria, Angola and
Equatorial Guinea. The Brazilian company PETROBRAS
is increasingly showing interest in Angola.
16

This renewed international interest is accompanied by a
military rapprochement strategy. Since 2003, the U.S. has
deployed part of its Mediterranean fleet to the area and
has concluded agreements with Cameroon, Gabon and
Equatorial Guinea allowing U.S. forces to use their air-
port facilities.
17
Meanwhile, France has strengthened its
partnership with Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea
and Congo-Brazzaville to help them protect their coast-
lines and oil installations.
18

After hydrocarbons, fishing resources are the second most
important maritime natural resource in the Gulf of Guinea.
The first waves of African migration toward the Gulf of

14
The main destinations of these flows are the U.S. (about 1.5
million bpd), Europe (one million bpd), China (850,000 bpd)
and India (330,000 bpd). Ibid.
15
See African oil: A priority for US national security and Afri-
can development, Symposium proceedings, Institute for Ad-
vanced Strategies and Political Studies, Washington DC, 25
January 2002.
16
While Brazilian President Lula visited four countries in the
Gulf of Guinea (Cameroon, Angola, Gabon, So Tom and Prn-
cipe). These visits resulted in the signature of oil contracts. See
Awoumou, op. cit.
17
Crisis Group interview, expert in maritime security, ECCAS,
Libreville, 27 January 2012.
18
See Awoumou, op. cit.
Guinea were drawn by these resources.
19
The fishermen
settled in the marshy coastal zones, intermingling with the
local population and creating a mixed economy of farmers
(usually indigenous peoples) and fishing communities.
20

The latter currently face competition from foreign indus-
trial fishing, which is increasingly present.
21

Even though it is not worth nearly as much as agricultural
products or oil and gas, fish is the second highest export
of many Gulf of Guinea states, as in Nigeria for example
(3 per cent). According to the Gulf of Guinea Regional
Fishing Commission,
22
the region has an annual potential
of one million tonnes of sea fish and 800,000 tonnes of
inland fisheries.
23
However, the sector is affected by mar-
itime insecurity. An increase in the number of attacks on
trawlers has led to a reduction in this activity,
24
causing
an increase in the price of fish on the local market.
25
The
sector is also neglected by national governments and their
foreign partners, who are more interested in hydrocarbons.
B. A CONTEXT FAVOURABLE TO
MARITIME CRIME
The growth of maritime crime is caused by structural
problems such as poverty, socio-political tension and the
grievances of local communities.
26
The extent of piracy is
an indicator of the radicalisation and willingness to turn

19
This was especially true of the Bakassi peninsula, awarded to
Cameroon, but settled by many fishermen from Nigeria and Benin.
20
On the history of fishing in the Gulf of Guinea, see P. Jorion,
Going out or staying home. Seasonal movements and migra-
tion strategies among Xwla and Anlo-Ewe Fishermen, Mari-
time Anthropology Studies, vol. 1, no. 2 (1988), pp. 129-155.
21
Crisis Group interviews, fishing communities, Sawa, Douala,
Bonaberi, 7 December 2011 and president of a fishing commu-
nity association, Libreville, 24 January 2012.
22
Regional Fisheries Committee for the Gulf of Guinea (COREP)
is an ECCAS body created to protect and promote the fishing
interests of member states.
23
Crisis Group interview, ECCAS fishing expert, Libreville, 26
January 2012.
24
Criminal groups also recruit among fishing communities,
which have an excellent knowledge of the coastal waters of the
Gulf of Guinea. Attracted by the possibility of easy money and
facing competition from foreign ships, local fishing communi-
ties believe it makes more financial sense to sell their boats to
pirates or work for them. Crisis Group interview, ECCAS mari-
time security expert, Libreville, 23 January 2012.
25
Paradoxically, despite the Gulf of Guineas fishing potential,
much of the fish supplying the local market is imported because
of the undeveloped nature of the fish processing industry. Crisis
Group interview, ECCAS fishing expert, Libreville, 26 January
2012.
26
Michel Luntumbue, Piraterie et inscurit dans le Golfe de
Guine: dfis et enjeux dune gouvernance maritime rgionale,
analytical memo, Group for Research and Information on Peace
and Security, 30 September 2011.

to crime of frustrated populations. Other factors are the
regions densely populated conurbations, porous borders,
quarrels between states and their inability to stop illegal
trade in arms, oil and drugs.
The rise in maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea is mainly
due to the poverty of the great majority of the population
alongside a wealthy elite. There is a lack of transparency
about what happens to the profits from the oil industry and
other resources, which are monopolised by the ruling elites
and foreign private companies. The inequitable distribution
of wealth means that economic disparities are blatant.
In most of these countries, the extraction of hydrocarbons
is accompanied by the continuous degradation of the
coastal environment, which hampers agriculture, stock-
raising and fishing, threatening the traditional livelihoods
of the local populations. As a consequence, these com-
munities are increasingly tempted to engage in illegal ac-
tivities in order to survive. This initially took the form of
illegal trade of various types of goods: oil diverted from
its normal supply routes, drug trafficking, etc. However,
an increase in economic activity along the coast accom-
panied by poor governance gave impetus to the criminali-
sation of the Gulf of Guineas economy. As a result, smug-
gling networks became more sophisticated and started to
deal arms, illegal oil dealers started to attack ships, former
delinquents became armed activists in the pay of gangs
and fishermen abandoned their trade to become pirates.
The dense conurbations along the coast helped to create the
conditions for an increase in crime. The Gulf of Guineas
many port cities and capitals are among the most densely
populated on the continent.
27
Urban disorder, the result of
continuous migration from the interior to the coast, is ex-
acerbated by economic disparities and recurrent political
conflicts.
28
In some countries, immigration causes tension
between indigenous peoples and settlers,
29
as well as re-

27
Including Lagos (estimated population ten million), Douala
and Accra (three million), Calabar and Port-Harcourt (two mil-
lion), Cotonou and Pointe-Noire (one million).
28
These conflicts occur repeatedly and are linked to political,
ethnic and religious tensions or increases in the cost of living.
Coastal cities like Douala, Port-Gentil, Lom and Libreville are
generally considered to be opposition strongholds. For more on
political urban violence in sub-Saharan Africa, see Marc-Antoine
Prouse de Montclos, Migration force et urbanisation de crise.
LAfrique subsaharienne dans une perspective historique, Au-
trepart, no. 55 (2010), pp. 3-18.
29
In addition to riots and electoral violence, these conflicts spo-
radically oppose indigenous and non-indigenous, nation-
als and foreigners, traders and consumers and different re-
ligious faiths. The difference between these categories is not
always clear. Sparked by routine disputes, they quickly spiral
into armed clashes between groups, followed by military inter-
vention, which is always denounced by the parties in dispute.
sentment toward the governing elite about access to re-
sources. These tensions can be more or less latent, depend-
ing on the degree of government control and on political re-
sponses. In Nigeria, they provoked violent opposition from
the community.
30
In all cases, they indicate the existence
of discontent and are fertile grounds for recruitment by
pirate gangs.
Border disputes between Gulf of Guinea states have mul-
tiplied since the discovery of oil, leading to states being
unable to exercise authority over some areas, which then
serve as bases for illegal activities.
31
These disputes also
hamper cooperation between security forces and hinder
the application of the right of hot pursuit. In many areas,
pirates take advantage of the geographical characteristics
of the coast (islands, peninsulas and mangroves with dif-
ficult access that makes them ideal hiding places). They
know the terrain better than the coastguards and can there-
fore operate in total freedom.
C. WEAK MARITIME POLICIES
For a long time, Gulf of Guinea states have neglected to
exercise authority over their territorial waters because
they perceived insecurity as a land-based phenomenon.
Security policies only included the sea insofar as it was
relevant to specific border disputes.
Most of these states only observed their seas from the
shore. This was also due to a failure to demarcate mari-
time borders in the Gulf of Guinea in line with the Mon-
tego Bay Convention.
32
Until the end of the 1990s, very

The conflicts are sometimes stirred up by local politicians. In
Lagos, Christians and Muslims regularly clash. In January
2012, they took the form of violent protests against the increase
in fuel prices. In Douala (February 2008, December 2011, Jan-
uary 2012), political and social tensions regularly degenerate
into riots. In Libreville, Cotonou, Malabo and Bata, they take
the form of targeted attacks against traders of foreign origin
suspected of excessively raising their prices.
30
The Biafran secession and demands for independence in the
Niger Delta were supported by local populations because they felt
they were being invaded, with high immigration from other
regions of the country. See Marc-Antoine Prouse de Montclos,
Le Delta du Niger en tat dinsurrection in Bertrand Badie
and Dominique Vidal (dir.), LEtat du monde 2011 (Paris, 2010),
pp. 285-289, and Crisis Group Report, The Swamps of Insur-
gency, op. cit.
31
For example, the mouth of the River Akwayaf, the Bakassi
peninsula and many creeks, notably the Man of War Sound.
See Akono Antangana, Le problme de dlimitations des es-
paces maritimes en Afrique centrale, Revue africaine dtudes
politiques et stratgiques, no. 4 (2007), pp. 243-259.
32
Adopted in 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, known as the Montego Bay Convention, is one of
the foundations of the law of the sea. It established a typology

few maritime borders between coastal states in the Gulf
of Guinea had been demarcated,
33
except between Came-
roon and Nigeria because of the dispute over Bakassi.
34

Although the attitude of states to their territorial waters
has changed since the recent discovery of oil, few of them
have allocated substantial resources to formulating mari-
time policies. Apart from port infrastructure, which is a
source of tax revenue, the merchant and military navies
remain underdeveloped and usually symbolic. It is thus
not surprising to see the vacuum filled by criminals and
pirates, who are more accustomed to being at sea than the
navies of coastal states.
35

The regions governments have different policies on mari-
time insecurity because they do not all suffer from its im-
pact in the same way. For some, maritime insecurity is a
true scourge that endangers part of the national economy
and requires the deployment of armed forces. For others,
it takes the form of relatively small-scale transborder crime
that does not threaten to destabilise the country. For a third
group, insecurity is above all a land-based phenomenon
with the maritime dimension being no more than an epi-
phenomenon.
This diversity as well as the differences in financial re-
sources available to countries explain the imbalance in the
naval capacity of Gulf of Guinea states. The first countries
which felt the economic impact of maritime crime tried to
create a navy, including coastguards. Nigeria is the leader
in the field both in terms of equipment and numbers, with
a naval force of about 15,000 men, about fifteen Defender
launches, a dozen patrol vessels to guard maritime instal-
lations, ten coastal patrol vessels and a few amphibious
landing craft. The Nigerian navys annual budget is about

and a system for demarcating maritime borders and defined the
general principles of the exploitation of sea resources. See Al-
bert-Didier Ogoulat, Gostratgie et polmologie dans lespace
atlantique. Le cas du Golfe de Guine, available at http://
www.stratisc.org/Strategique_80_Ogoula.htm.
33
See Antangana, op. cit.
34
The Bakassi peninsula is located between south west Came-
roon and the Nigerian state of Cross River, to the north of the
Bay of Biafra and in the heart of the River Del Rey estuary. This
territory of 665 sq km extends 65km along Akwayafe River and
below Mount Cameroon. Bakassi is composed of four main
strips of land (Pelican, Fiari, Erong and Bakassi), each subdi-
vided into many islands encircled by creeks. The area is mainly
covered with mangroves and is ideally located to control ship-
ping in the Gulf of Guinea. Most of Bakassis population com-
prises Nigerian fishing communities. For more on the history of
the Bakassi dispute, read Crisis Group Africa Report N160,
Cameroon: Fragile State?, 25 May 2010, p. 27. See the map of
the Niger Delta in Appendix B.
35
Crisis Group interview, ECCAS expert on maritime security,
20 per cent of that of the defence ministry.
36
The maritime
forces of other countries are generally symbolic, with their
navies having less than 1,000 men and fleets of less than
ten launches.
The equipment of these naval forces is generally a miscel-
lany of materials in more or less good condition bought
from or donated by Western partners. The buoy-layers used
by Ghana were supplied by the U.S. as part of their mili-
tary aid agreement. Nigeria has acquired second-hand ships
from various shipbuilders.
37
However, Cameroon, Gabon,
Ghana and Equatorial Guinea have made efforts in recent
years to recruit personnel, acquire new equipment and train
their navies.
In July 2012, the Ghanaian government took delivery of
two German warships. The country also acquired four
Chinese ships to strengthen the patrols protecting off-
shore oil fields.
38
The Cameroonian navy has about 2,000
men to monitor its coasts and respond to attacks. The Ga-
bon navy is smaller; it acquired four coastal launches with
a range of 800 nautical miles in 2010.
39
Finally, Equatorial
Guinea bought a warship and an Antonov fighter plane in
2009 to keep watch on its coasts.
40

36
See www.nigerianavy.gov.ng.
37
See Augustus Vogel, Marine et garde-ctes: dfinir les rles
des forces africaines charges de la scurit maritime, Bulletin
de la scurit africaine, no. 2, December 2009.
38
Le gouvernement du Ghana a pris livraison de deux navires
de guerre allemands, Xinhua, 30 July 2012.
39
Crisis Group interview, expert on maritime security, ECCAS,
40
See La Guine quatoriale soffre un navire de guerre et un
avion de chasse pour ses 41 ans dindpendance, African Press
Agency (APA), 13 October 2009.

III. NIGERIA: EPICENTRE OF VIOLENCE
AT SEA
For decades piracy and armed robbery at sea have been
common off the coast of Nigeria, amid extreme poverty,
high oil revenue, poor regulation of maritime activity, cor-
rupt government and a long history of political violence
in the Niger Delta.
41
Maritime crime spread from Nigerian
waters to the whole region. Criminal gangs continue to ex-
ploit Nigerias poor governance of the maritime domain
and use violence to enrich themselves; and they show little
sign of stopping.
The oil, gas, shipping and fishing industries, concentrated
along the countrys coast, attract criminals. In the south-
eastern Niger Delta area, both onshore and offshore oil
companies extract crude oil and natural gas for export.
The industries and legions of expat workers bring in and
create considerable wealth. Offshore traffic is heavy.
Tankers transporting oil, liquefied natural gas and refined
petroleum products stay in the ports while service and
supply boats shuttle between the land and offshore instal-
lations.
42
Container ships arrive with imported goods to
supply the countrys over 170 million inhabitants. Arti-
sanal fishermen ply the waters close to shore while com-
mercial trawlers fish farther out.
43
Petty thieves target
what they can quickly and easily carry away, namely cash,
equipment, ships stores and crews belongings. More or-
ganised and better equipped criminal gangs take cargo too:
fish, imported goods, oil and petroleum products.
D. POOR GOVERNANCE AND
MARITIME CRIME
Chronic poor governance of maritime economic activity
has given rise to a host of illicit practices within the oil,
shipping and fishing industries, both onshore and offshore.
At sea a thriving cash-based black market has grown that

41
In 1979, armed thieves attacked a Danish cargo ship 3 nautical
miles (5.5km) from Lagos. They killed the ships master,
wounded all fourteen crew members and stole the cargo. Africa
confronts unchecked piracy on both west and east coasts, The
Cutting Edge, 7 December 2009. According to the UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), armed robbery at sea is
theft within 12 nautical miles (22.2km) from land (ie, within
territorial waters) whereas piracy is armed theft in international
waters beyond the 12 nautical mile mark. See articles 3 and 101
of UNCLOS, 10 December 1982.
42
Nigerias main ports are at Lagos in the south west and at Warri,
Port Harcourt and Calabar in the south-eastern Niger Delta. See
maps in Appendices A and B.
43
Before piracy decimated the commercial fishing business, it
was Nigerias second largest non-hydrocarbon export industry
after cocoa. Africa confronts unchecked piracy on both west and
east coasts, op. cit.
radiates from Nigeria into the rest of the Gulf of Guinea.
The large quantities of cash carried on board lure thieves
while the presence of unscrupulous buyers makes it rela-
tively easy for thieves to sell stolen goods. Corruption in the
Nigerian maritime administration, navy and law enforce-
ment agencies undermines their already limited capacity
to counter violent crime.
44

While thieves target licit and illicit operators alike, crimi-
nal practices within these three industries oil and gas,
shipping and fishing significantly increase both the in-
centive and opportunity for piracy. The theft or bunker-
ing of crude oil from pipelines crisscrossing the Niger
Delta and its transport and sale to buyers waiting in tankers
offshore has become a large-scale business. In February
2012, Shell estimated oil companies were losing 150,000
bpd.
45
While some stolen crude is refined illegally in Ni-
geria, most is exported. Once at sea the oil may be traded
and transferred to other tankers before being taken to other
West African countries where there are refineries Ghana,
46

Cameroon and Cte dIvoire in particular and other des-
tinations around the world, including India, the Far East
and the countries of the former Soviet Union.
47
Profits from
exporting oil illegally are used by criminal gangs to launch
pirate attacks on other vessels.
1. A leaky oil sector
The illegal trade in refined petroleum products off Nige-
ria is even more rife than that of crude oil and creates a
major incentive for piracy.
48
Nigeria has four refineries
but all work far below their full capacity due to a lack of
maintenance and poor management, forcing the state to
import most of the fuel it needs. Very large tankers known

44
See the chapter Corruption and culpability in Crisis Group
Report, Fuelling in the Niger Delta Crisis, op. cit., pp. 16-22,
and Everyones in on the Game: Corruption and Human Rights
Abuses by the Nigeria Police Force, Human Rights Watch, 17
August 2010.
45
Losing 150,000 barrels per day of crude to theft Shell, Daily
Trust, 21 February 2012. Others in the industry say it could be
as high as 200,000 bpd. Crisis Group interview, oil company
staff, Abuja, 11 February 2012.
46
See Ghana navy arrests tanker with hijacked crude, Ghana
Web, 10 March 2012.
47
Crisis Group interview, oil company official, Abuja, 11 Feb-
ruary 2012. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) cites
China, North Korea, Israel and South Africa as frequently men-
tioned destination countries. See Oil from Nigeria to the world
in Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa:
a Threat Assessment, UNODC, July 2009, pp. 19-26.
48
The refined petroleum products most commonly traded are
Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) or petrol, primarily used to power
light road vehicles, Automotive Gas Oil (AGO) or diesel and
Hybrid Hoffman Kiln (HHK) or kerosene, intended primarily
for domestic use.

as motherships holding some 60,000 metric tonnes of
fuel come from Europe and elsewhere and, too big to enter
port, moor offshore. Nigerian companies charter smaller
tankers holding 5,000 to 10,000 metric tonnes to ferry
the fuel from the mothership to tanks onshore, from where
it is distributed to filling stations.
To maintain a fixed, low price for consumers, the gov-
ernment has for a long time paid a subsidy to fuel import-
ing and distributing companies so they can buy at interna-
tional market rates but sell for less at the pump. But on 1
January 2012, the government removed the fuel subsidy
on the grounds that it fostered corruption and was a burden
on the economy. The fuel price jumped from 65 to 141 Nai-
ra (from about 40 to 90 cents) per litre and mass protests
broke out across the country. After negotiations, the gov-
ernment agreed to continue paying part of the subsidy tem-
porarily, reducing the fuel price to 97 Naira (about 60 cents)
per litre. While most Nigerians see the subsidy as one of
the few benefits of oil production, the abuse of this system
is one of the main drivers of illegal fuel trading at sea.
That fuel is cheaper in Nigeria than elsewhere in the re-
gion is a major incentive for smugglers to buy fuel at sub-
sidised rates in Nigeria and sell it in nearby countries,
particularly Benin, Togo, Cameroon, the Central African
Republic, Chad and Niger.
49
They can offer a lower price
than official suppliers and still make a profit. Contraband
fuel leaves Nigeria by land and by sea, to be offloaded at
illegal jetties or deserted beaches.
50
Smugglers also find a
ready market at sea as ships use diesel to run their en-
gines and onboard generators. Since Nigeria does not
regulate refuelling, ships can buy fuel from any source.
51

In January 2012, the House of Representatives inquiry
into the subsidy scheme for the period 2009-2011 found
that the system was fraught with endemic corruption and
entrenched inefficiency.
52
It revealed that the govern-

49
According to an executive in the oil industry, in Benin, in
2000, oil smuggled into the country represented about 5 per
cent of the national consumption. In 2011, that had risen to 95
per cent and forced all but one official importer to leave the coun-
try. Crisis Group interview, petrol industry official, Cotonou, 1
February 2012. See also Oil from Nigeria to the world, op.
cit., p. 22.
50
Large wooden boats are known to offload contraband fuel in
plastic jerrycans at isolated beaches around Grand Popo in Benin
and Hilakondji in Togo. Crisis Group interview, petrol industry
official, Cotonou, 1 February 2012.
51
Crisis Group interview, Indigenous Ship Owners Association
of Nigeria (ISAN) representative, Lagos, 7 February 2012.
52
Report of the ad-hoc committee to verify and determine the
actual subsidy requirements and monitor the implementation of
the subsidy regime in Nigeria, Resolution no. (HR.1/2012),
House of Representatives, 18 April 2012, p. 5. Available at
www.africaintelligence.com/images/Nigeria_subsidies.pdf.
ment had been paying subsidy on 59 million litres of fuel
per day while the country had been consuming only 35
million, and recommended that inquiries be launched into
private companies and public agencies.
53
In the autumn of
2012, the Commission on Economic and Financial Crimes
arrested petrol distributors. Those arraigned have pleaded
not guilty to the charges.
54

2. The rise in economic crime
With large quantities of refined petroleum products es-
caping official channels, a parallel and illicit trade has
burgeoned in the Gulf of Guinea, concentrated off Nigeria.
Traders based anywhere in the world can arrange deals re-
motely. They only have to charter a tanker and provide
the owner and captain with the necessary technical infor-
mation: where and when to pick up and offload cargo and
how much. Ship owners, captain and crew may never know
the sellers or buyers identity or the cargos provenance.
55

Opportunistic captains and crews also make illegal profit.
56

They may deliver less than the amount due, claiming the
difference was left in the pipes or spilled during transfer,
in order to sell it later.
57
In offloading, it can sometimes be
difficult to pump out all the fuel from the tanker, so crews
collect what is left and sell it on the black market. Crews
are also known to exchange fuel for goods food, alcohol,
cigarettes, DVDs sold by tradesmen shuttling among
vessels as they wait offshore.
58

The thriving illegal trade of refined petroleum products
creates strong incentives for piracy. Pirates target the
large amounts of cash used for illegal deals as well as the
fuel, which they can then sell on the black market.
59
The

53
Ibid. For figures on subsidy payments and fuel consumption
released by the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency
(PPPRA), see Well compel authorities to implement subsidy
probe report, The Nation, 6 February 2012. Many of those
identified in the committee report strongly denied any wrong-
doing. See ibid and Nigeria fuel subsidy report reveals $6bn
fraud, BBC, 24 April 2012.
54
Fuel subsidy scam: EFCC declare marketers wanted, press
release, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, 7 Sep-
tember 2012; Nigeria : Fuel subsidy scam EFCC arraigns 13
oil marketers, AllAfrica, 6 October 2012.
55
Crisis Group interview, former harbour master, Cotonou, 27
January 2012.
56
Crisis Group interview, ISAN representative, Lagos, 7 Feb-
ruary 2012.
57
Crisis Group interview, Nigerian Maritime Administration
and Safety Agency (NIMASA) representative, Lagos, 3 Febru-
ary 2012.
58
Crisis Group interview, Benin navy officer, Cotonou, 27 Jan-
uary 2012.
59
Tankers doing legal business carry at least $10,000 on board
with which to pay part of the crews salaries (the rest is paid on
shore), for provisions and transactions in port. Crisis Group in-

ship-to-ship transfer of fuel also provides an excellent
opportunity for pirates to attack as both ships are immobi-
lised for several hours. Since many of the victims of piracy
are involved in illicit activities, they are much less likely
to report crimes to the Nigerian navy or law enforcement
agencies, thus increasing pirates chances of success. In
addition, illicit vessels often do not have or have turned
off their Automated Identification Systems (AIS) which
identify them to national authorities on shore. The latter
can still see the ships on radar but they remain anonymous.
Illegal fishing off Nigeria and several other neighbouring
countries also creates an environment conducive to pira-
cy.
60
Widespread fishing by commercial trawlers close to
shore zones reserved for artisanal fishing is destroying
underwater habitats and eroding the livelihoods of coastal
communities. This increases the likelihood of fishermen
turning to crime.
61

Although the law requires trawlers to bring their catch
back to shore for registration before export, some crews,
with or without the knowledge of their employers, sell fish,
especially species they are not authorised to catch, to illegal
traders sailing refrigerated vessels.
62
Trawlers thus carry
more cash than they usually would, becoming more attrac-
tive targets for pirates.
3. State capacity hampered by corruption
Nigerias navy and maritime administration agencies are
facing serious problems of capacity and corruption. A
lack of government investment has left them both under-
manned and under-equipped. In 2005, high-ranking navy
commanders were dismissed for involvement in oil theft
and illegal trading.
63
In October 2009, a former chair of
the Nigerian Ports Authority and other managers were
convicted on charges related to contract splitting and abuse

terview, Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)
officer, London, 20 December 2011.
60
The Nigerian Trawler Owners Association (NITOA) reports
that Asian and European fishing vessels, bigger than those used
by Nigerians, enter Nigerian waters and take most of the avail-
able fish, including the immature ones thereby preventing stocks
from regenerating. Crisis Group interview, NITOA officer, La-
gos, 8 February 2012. For more on illegal fishing in the Gulf of
Guinea, see reports by the Environmental Justice Foundation
(EJF).
61
See Illegal fishing plunders and strains West Africa, Reuters,
15 March 2012.
62
Crisis Group interview, NIMASA representative, Lagos, 3
February 2012.
63
Nigeria: conviction of admirals confirms navy role in oil
theft, Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 6
January 2005.
of office but they were acquitted on charges related to in-
flating contracts.
64

The result of such institutional weakness and endemic
corruption is a low level of maritime regulation and secu-
rity response both at sea and in Nigerian ports. Ship own-
ers complain that, eight times out of ten, their distress calls
go unanswered.
65
U.S. coastguards visiting Nigeria to check
compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility
Security (ISPS) code found inadequate security, which
accounted for the high crime rate in ports.
66

Such weak maritime governance has allowed armed rob-
bery at sea and acts of piracy to grow steadily in tandem
with economic activity at sea.Since the early 2000s, at-
tacks have increased dramatically, first on fishing vessels
whose decks are close to the water and thus relatively
easy to board and then on tankers and other cargo ves-
sels.
67
This rapid rise in violence at sea off the coast of
Nigeria was driven in large part by the escalation of in-
surgency and crime in the Niger Delta.
4. The Niger Delta
The Niger Delta insurgency, at its height between 2006
and 2009, caused violent crime at sea to grow in frequen-
cy, scale and sophistication.
68
Trouble began in the 1990s,

64
Appeal court affirms Bode Georges conviction, The Will,
21 January 2011. The former chairman has always maintained
his innocence. Ill not seek presidential pardon Bode George,
Vanguard, 25 January 2012.
65
ruary 2012. The IMB also reports a lack of response to distress
calls during pirate attacks in Nigerian waters. In one incident
on 16 January 2012, the master of a tanker in Lagos anchorage
who discovered two heavily armed pirates on deck contacted
the Navy but received no response. The pirates hijacked the
ship for five days and stole the crews and ships cash, personal
belongings and some cargo. Piracy and armed robbery against
ships, Report for the period 1 January 31 March 2012, Inter-
national Maritime Bureau (IMB), April 2012.
66
The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code
is a 2004 amendment to the international Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) Convention (1974/1988) on minimum security re-
quirements for ships, ports and government agencies. U.S.
threatens country over ports insecurity, Vanguard, 9 March
2012.
67
Crisis Group interviews, NIMASA officer, Lagos, 3 February
2012; NITOA officer, Lagos, 8 February 2012. See also Arild
Nodland, Guns, oil, and cake: maritime security in the Gulf
of Guinea in Elleman, Forbes and Rosenburg (eds.), Piracy
and maritime crime: historical and modern case studies, Naval
War College Newport Papers 35, 2010, p. 195.
68
Although the reliability of piracy statistics can be questioned,
the number of pirate attacks off Nigeria reported to the IMB
rose markedly during the insurgency, at its height from 2006 to

caused by social discontent with the unequal distribution
of oil revenues at the expense of the great majority of the
people, who still live in extreme poverty and have little
access to essential public services.
69
Popular frustration is
also driven by the environmental damage caused by the
oil industry, which has destroyed livelihoods by killing
fish and making land infertile.
The peaceful movement of the 1990s turned into a revolt
and sparked an arms race between rival criminal gangs
for control of territory, aided by corrupt politicians who
wanted a share of the lucrative oil trade. The latter also
wanted to raise the spectre of insecurity to consolidate
their power and were ready to pay criminal groups to in-
timidate voters and opponents. The creation of the Move-
ment for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in
2005 signalled a new stage in the violence. Crimes in-
cluded the theft of oil and other goods, attacks on fishing
boats
70
and kidnappings.
71
However, it is impossible to
establish a clear distinction between insurgents and crim-
inals because some of them seek to make a demonstration
of political force while making financial gains.
72

In order to limit the costs of vandalism and kidnappings,
oil companies concentrated their exploration and produc-
tion activities at sea. Far from accepting defeat, insur-
gents and criminals adapted to the new situation and ex-
tended their activities seawards. They quickly discovered
new opportunities for becoming wealthy and developed
the expertise necessary to commit more audacious crimes.
Attacks were concentrated at sea off the delta but also
spread as far as Lagos.
During the insurgency, maritime insecurity was worst off
the delta near Warri, Port Harcourt and Calabar in par-
ticular but piracy also increased off Lagos, where attacks
were closer to shore (within 20 nautical miles or 37km),
aimed purely at financial gain and less successful and co-
ordinated than those in the south east. There were no kid-

mid-2009. In 2005 there were sixteen, in 2006 twelve, in 2007
42, in 2008 40, in 2009 29. IMB annual reports, 2005-2009.
69
See Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010, Nigerian National Bu-
reau of Statistics, January 2012 and UN Niger Delta Human
Development Report, United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP).
70
According to a security expert, 293 incidents of piracy against
fishing boats were recorded off the Nigerian coast between
2003 and 2008. Crisis Group interviews, oil company security
manager, Port Harcourt, February 2012; NITOA official, Lagos,
8 February 2012. See Security Council press release, SC/10558,
27 February 2012.
71
199 people were kidnapped in 2007 according to security ex-
perts. Crisis Group interviews, oil company security manager,
Abuja and Port Harcourt, February 2012.
72
See The lull before the storm, maritime piracy and election
violence in the Niger Delta, Risk Intelligence, 15 March 2011.
nappings for ransom.
73
These attacks were carried out by
local criminals familiar with the waters, but increased se-
curity measures by oil companies in the delta and military
pressure by the Joint Task Force (JTF), a unit composed
of the army, navy and police, encouraged opportunists from
the delta to seek softer targets further west.
74
Similarity
between the languages of the Ijaw people in the Niger Delta
and Ilaje of the Lagos area may also have enabled coop-
eration and the transfer of knowledge and tactics.
75

E. THE INCREASE IN CRIME SINCE 2009
The government managed to persuade most insurgents to
put down their arms by launching a major military strike
against rebel camps in May 2009 and offering amnesty in
June.
76
The amnesty program, which includes monthly
stipends and vocational training for repentant fighters, has
reduced political violence. Criminal gangs, however, have
continued to operate on land and sea.
77
The government
has taken steps to galvanise its response but limited capaci-
ty, corruption and inter-agency squabbles undermine its
efforts.
1. The amnestys limited impact
The amnesty program was part of the then-President
Umaru Musa YarAduas efforts to appease the rebels.
78

He incorporated them into the state structure and enabled
them to continue making money legally. Thousands of
combatants came out of the creeks to register,
79
but the
amnesty did not stop all militant violence. On 12 July 2009,

73
Nodland, Guns, oil, and cake, op. cit., p. 196.
74
ruary 2012.
75
Crisis Group interviews, oil company security manager, Abuja,
13 February 2012; former community conflict mediator, Port
Harcourt, 16 February 2012.
76
Alexis Riols, Piraterie et brigandage dans le golfe de Guine,
Centre dtudes suprieures de la marine, October 2010, p. 26.
77
Acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off Nigeria reported
to the IMB decreased from 40 in 2008, to 29 in 2009, nineteen
in 2010 and ten in 2011. With 21 attacks reported in the first nine
months of 2012, attacks are once again increasing. See IMB
annual reports for 2008-2011 and its most recent report: Piracy
and armed robbery against ships, Report for the period 1 Janu-
ary to 30 September, October 2012.
78
Kathryn Nwajiaku-Dahou, The politics of amnesty in the
Niger Delta: challenges ahead, Institut franais des relations
internationales (IFRI), December 2010.
79
In the first 60-day window, 6 August 4 October 2009,
20,192 self-declared militants signed up for amnesty. Some
who initially failed to disarm later felt they had missed out and
persuaded the government to admit them to the process. In No-
vember 2010, another 6,166 signed up, making a total of 26,358.
Crisis Group interview, amnesty program officer, Abuja, 13
February 2012.

MEND dynamited the Atlas Cove jetty in Lagos, killing
five people. This first attack outside the delta proved the
groups firepower. Attacks claimed by MEND continued
into late 2010 and included car bombs in Abuja in October.
However, when the government finally started vocational
training in Nigeria and later abroad and began distributing
monthly stipends of 65,000 Naira (about $400) for each
militant, attacks on oil installations and kidnapping of ex-
patriate workers fell.
80

But the amnesty failed to hold back rising crime in the
delta. A criminal culture that developed before and during
the insurgency remains intact and loose criminal networks
continue to operate with the same verve and impunity. Oil
bunkering has risen.
81
It is particularly bad around Nembe
in Bayelsa state.
82
As the international price of oil climbs,
selling stolen oil becomes all the more lucrative.
83
Many
more illegal refineries have cropped up, some technically
advanced.
84
The partial removal of the fuel subsidy in early
2012 and subsequent rise in fuel price enables illegal re-
finers to sell their product at a higher price. More and more
Nigerians are being kidnapped for ransom particularly in
Delta, Rivers and Abia states. Bandits frequently hold up
traffic on the deltas intercity roads. Bank robberies in Port
Harcourt, a well-known danger in the run-up to Christmas,
were in late 2011 notably more frequent, violent, bold
and better armed than in previous years.
85

On the deltas waterways too, armed robbery remains a
threat. In the creeks, particularly on the Port Harcourt-
Nembe axis around Nembe and Brass, gangs hold up pas-
senger boats to steal valuables, boats and their motors. On
occasion they abduct and rape women.
86
On the estuaries
and rivers, attackers continue to target commercial traffic

80
The general maritime security off Bonny Island, Rivers state
and in the previously risky area around the Bonny fairway buoy
improved markedly. However, three to four expatriates continue
to be kidnapped each year. Crisis Group interview, oil company
security manager, Abuja, 11 February 2012.
81
Crisis Group interview, Niger Delta researcher, Abuja, 10
February 2012.
82
In December 2011, bunkering became so intense in this area
that Shell temporarily shut down operations there. Crisis Group
interview, Shell security manager, Port Harcourt, 15 February
2012.
83
According to the Central Bank of Nigeria, Bonny Light, the
kind of crude oil extracted from the Niger Delta, was trading
for about $60 a barrel in 2006. By early 2012, the price had in-
creased to about $127. www.cenbank.org.
84
Crisis Group interviews, oil company security managers,
Abuja and Port Harcourt, February 2012.
85
Crisis Group interviews, Port Harcourt residents, Port Har-
court, February 2012.
86
Crisis Group interview, chairman of a union for passenger
boat workers, Port Harcourt, 15 February 2012.
and oil company supply vessels. The Calabar River is par-
ticularly dangerous.
87

2. Crime onshore enables crime offshore
Unfettered crime onshore and in the creeks allows gangs
to become richer and better prepare themselves to commit
crime offshore. Since the proceeds from crime, including
piracy, trickle down to benefit delta communities, inhab-
itants provide pirates with moral and material support. Pi-
rates have continued to raid local commercial traffic and
fishing trawlers,
88
but they are increasingly concentrating
their attacks on tankers. The more organised groups hi-
jack them for extended periods of time two days to two
weeks to steal their cargo, which they then sell on the
black market. This began during the insurgency, picked
up in 2009 and intensified in 2011 and 2012.
Most attacks have taken place off Lagos and in 2011 off
Cotonou, Benin. Chronic congestion in Lagos ports forces
many vessels to wait offshore for a berth to become availa-
ble. Some vessels have reduced crews to cut down on oper-
ational costs and are therefore more vulnerable. That some
hijacked vessels end up off the Niger Delta suggests that
delta-based groups are involved or that Lagos-based pi-
rates collaborate with those in the delta.
89

The groups that plan and execute these hijacks are organ-
ised and well connected. Their ability to target tankers
carrying out a ship-to-ship transfer indicates they often
know the transfer is going to take place beforehand.
90
Pi-
rates use traders or prostitutes as spies to sail close to or
board moored vessels and inspect their cargo and access
points.
91
While pirates who raid vessels for cash and valua-
bles are often very violent toward the crew, those who hi-
jack tankers are usually disciplined and cause little physi-

87
Crisis Group interview, oil company security manager, Abuja,
11 February 2012.
88
While in 2004, 36 trawler companies were using almost 300
vessels, in 2011, less than ten remained, sailing about 120 ves-
sels. Most have either gone out of business or moved to other
West African countries. Crisis Group interview, NITOA mem-
ber, Lagos, 8 February 2012.
89
Crisis Group interview, oil company security manager, Abuja,
11 February 2012. On 3 March 2011, pirates hijacked a tanker
off Cotonou. They first told the captain to sail to 60 nautical
miles (111km) off Gabon but, having failed to offload the cargo
there, ordered him to sail to a location off Warri, Delta state.
When that rendezvous also failed they sailed back west and
speed boats came to fetch them 3 nautical miles (5.6km) off
Badagri, a town between Lagos and the Benin border. Annual
piracy report 2011, IMB.
90
ruary 2012.
91
Crisis Group interview, maritime security company staff, Port

cal harm.
92
Pirates are necessarily in contact with buyers
or brokers operating in the illegal fuel trade.
Hijackers have considerable human, material and finan-
cial resources. Between five and 30 men in up to five speed
boats approach the target tanker. Speed boats, typically
capable of 50 to 60 knots (about 90 to 110km per hour),
are faster and more manoeuvrable than tankers. Pirates
are investing their spoils in faster boats that can go greater
distances and attacks are now taking place farther from
shore, between 50 and 110 nautical miles (93 to 204km).
93

Some pirates also use trawlers and other vessels as moth-
erships with which to travel further out to sea before launch-
ing speed boats.
94
Pirates are heavily armed, including
with AK-47s, machine-guns and rocket launchers.
95
They
have sufficient communications equipment to coordinate
a rendezvous with a second tanker far out to sea. They also
have the expertise needed to board a ship, take control,
navigate and carry out or oversee a ship-to-ship transfer.
The full extent of the piracy problem is hard to evaluate
as many victims do not report such crimes. If the ships
losses are small and unlikely to be covered by insurance,
the ship owner may decide not to waste time and money
going into port to report the crime. Some of them do not
report attacks to protect their reputation and future profits
or because doing so is also likely to push up insurance
premiums for both ship owners and charterers. Those in-
volved in illegal practices are even less likely to report
acts of piracy, for fear their own crimes are discovered.
3. Stronger but insufficient government response
The government has taken steps to boost its response to
maritime insecurity but remains unable to prevent attacks.
96

Off Lagos, concrete efforts by the navy and the Nigerian
Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA)
in 2011 to crackdown on illegal shipping and piracy by

92
Crisis Group interview, military attach, Abuja, 9 February
2012. On 13 February 2012, eight pirates boarded a cargo ship
about 110 nautical miles (about 204km) off Lagos. In the pro-
cess of stealing the ships safe they shot and killed the captain.
Another crew member died trying to escape.
93
Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Lagos, 3 February 2012.
Of the eleven pirate attacks off Nigeria and Benin reported to
the IMB from January to March 2012, six took place between
70 and 110 nautical miles (between 130 and 204km) offshore.
See Report for the period 1 January 31 March 2012, op. cit.
94
West Africa: expert in mothership warning, Bergen Risk
Solutions, 16 January 2012.
95
Crisis Group interview, naval officer, Cotonou, 27 January
2012.
96
The Nigerian navy is increasing its presence in the delta, es-
pecially in the Bonny/Akassa/Escravos area. Navy begins fresh
offensive against piracy, oil theft, Guardian (Nigeria), 11 No-
vember 2012.
increasing patrols and identifying suspect vessels have
reduced attacks close to shore.
97
In the Niger Delta, the
navy tries to control the creeks and territorial waters from
a handful of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).
98
If com-
mercial shippers are willing to pay, the navy will provide an
escort for vessels as they approach shore.
99
The govern-
ment has signalled its intention to introduce legislation
that will allow ships to carry privately contracted armed
guards.
100

For a long time, Nigeria has been receiving support from
partners, the U.S. in particular, to strengthen its navy
and has been steadily increasing spending on the armed
forces.
101
In 2012, it will devote more resources to acquir-
ing new boats and aircraft for the navy.
102
Major oil com-
panies, however, recognising the navys weakness, increas-
ingly employ private maritime security companies to escort
their supply boats and patrol around offshore installations.
It is an increasingly common arrangement for a private con-
tractor to provide and maintain boats and crew while the
navy provides weapons and personnel to operate them.
103

Renewed efforts to reinforce Nigerias maritime security
are being undermined by internal competition for access to
resources. The Presidential Implementation Committee on
Maritime Safety and Security (PICOMSS) was set up in
2004 to implement the International Ship and Port Facility
Security (ISPS) code. A bill that would have incorporated
it into a new Maritime Security Agency (MASECA) and
thus endowed it with greater authority to control maritime
traffic and collect taxes came up against the opposition of
the navy and NIMASA, which feared it would deprive

97
Crisis Group interviews, shipping and oil company staff, La-
gos, February 2012. In August 2011, NIMASA established a
new unit that works directly with navy boats and one navy heli-
copter to apprehend vessels operating illegally in Lagos anchor-
age, an area ten nautical miles (18.5km) wide and ten nautical
miles long. Crisis Group interview, NIMASA officer, Lagos, 8
February 2012.
98
The navy has FOBs at several strategic locations including
Warri, Port Harcourt and Calabar. It recently set up a new one
at Ikot Abasi in Akwa Ibom state. Crisis Group interview, mari-
time security company staff, Port Harcourt, 14 February 2012.
99
Crisis Group interview, commercial shipping company, Lagos,
8 February 2012.
100
FG moves to improve maritime security, Daily Times, 13
April 2012.
101
On U.S. support to the Nigerian navy, see Section V.C. Ni-
geria spent $1.9 billion on defence in 2009, $2.1 billion in 2010
and $2.8 billion in 2011. Nigerias defence budget approves
dozens of Navy acquisitions, Defence Web, 20 February 2012.
102
Ibid. At the beginning of September 2012, Nigeria acquired
ten patrol boats to strengthen its navy. Nigeria acquires 10 pa-
trol boats for oil rich Niger Delta, Xinhua, 8 September 2012.
103
Some private contractors also have the equipment to carry out
maritime surveillance. Crisis Group interview, maritime security
company staff, Port Harcourt, 14 February 2012.

them of responsibilities and budget share. The House of
Representatives had passed the bill and the Senate was
considering it when, in early January 2012, the presidency
ordered it be withdrawn.
104
PICOMSS is unlikely to re-
ceive new powers but continues to operate a maritime sur-
veillance system parallel to the navys.
105
Rivalry between
these agencies creates needless duplication of work and
blocks information sharing.
F. FUTURE THREATS TO MARITIME SECURITY
There are three types of threat. The first stems from the
governments decision to employ private contractors of
questionable reliability to assist the navy and maritime
authorities. The second stems from the risk that the am-
nesty program will only have a short-term impact and not
resolve the problem of violence in the delta. The third
stems from the increase in violence in the north of the
country.
1. Subcontracting security
In early January 2012, the Nigerian authorities used a pri-
vate company, Global West Vessel Specialist Nigeria
Ltd, to work with NIMASA and the navy to monitor and
patrol Nigerias maritime domain and enforce payment of
taxes. The contract is for ten years and worth $103.4 mil-
lion.
106
According to the Nigerian press, the company is
alleged to have links with a suspected former MEND
leader.
107

104
Crisis Group interview, PICOMSS officer, Abuja, 9 Febru-
ary 2012.
105
See Admiral Ola Saad Ibrahim, Piracy and maritime secu-
rity in Nigeria, The Guardian (Nigeria), 8 February 2012.
106
The transport ministry memorandum presenting the contract
is entitled Award of contract for the strategic concessioning
partnership with NIMASA to provide platforms for tracking
ships and cargoes, enforce regulatory compliance and surveil-
lance of the entire Nigerian maritime domain. See a copy of the
agreement reprinted in annex A of Outsourcing Maritime Se-
curity: Is former MEND commander Tompolo involved?,
Special Report, Bergen Risk Solutions, 7 February 2012. NI-
MASA confirmed this agreement with Global West, emphasis-
ing the contract was based on performance criteria and that it
would allow an increase of fiscal receipts from the relevant
administrations. NIMASA: Why were partnering Global West
on maritime security, This Day, 9 March 2012.
107
Tompolo tackles security of Nigerian waters, Vanguard, 4
September 2012 and Nigeria: payments to Tompolo, others is
legitimizing militancy, AllAfrica, 27 August 2012. Subcon-
tracting security to former militants from the delta seems also
to include land installations. Nigerias former oil bandits now
collect government cash, The Wall Street Journal, 22 August
2012.
Critics say it is a risk to outsource national security re-
sponsibilities to a private company that will put its own
financial interests first, especially one that is perceived as
maintaining connections to former militants. NIMASA
insists Global West will not be ensuring maritime security
but rather providing boats for it and the navy to use.
108

2. Amnesty, unemployment and unrest
in the north
Recent attacks raise the spectre of renewed insurgency in
the Niger Delta.
109
A new wave of violence would risk
boosting the criminal economy and creating an environ-
ment more favourable to the funding, organisation and
use of piracy by criminal gangs.
The amnesty has not lessened massive injustice in the
delta. Most inhabitants still live in poverty and suffer the
oil industrys ill effects on the environment while the
governing elite becomes richer, often through corruption.
The amnesty and the granting of surveillance and waste
management contracts to local communities sends out a
message that violence or the threat of it will be rewarded.
A new generation of unemployed young men growing up
in the delta may prove to be quick learners. As an oil
company official said, theres a thin line between a
community issue and a security issue.
110

The amnesty did not appease all former militants. Some
still demand to be included in the amnesty program that
has so far registered about 30,000 people; others outright
reject it and say they will continue to fight. Mid-ranking
commanders who did not benefit to the same degree as
their more famous and powerful superiors are especially
keen to keep fighting.
111
Even those participating in the

108
NIMASA also says the point of the contract is to speed up
slow procurement procedures. Crisis Group interview, NIMASA
officer, Lagos, 8 February 2012. Crisis Groups attempts to
contact Global West were unanswered.
109
On 4 February 2012, a group claiming to be from MEND
blew up a sea pipeline belonging to the Italian company Eni.
On 1 March, MEND claimed responsibility for the murder of
four police officers who were patrolling the River Nembe in
Bayelsa state. Early on 13 April, the movement attacked anoth-
er of Enis installations in Bayelsa. Militants claim attack on
Nigeria Eni oil pipeline, Reuters, 5 February 2012; Nigerias
MEND claims fatal attack on police, Al Jazeera, 2 March 2012 ;
Eni oil pipeline attacked in Nigeria delta, Reuters, 13 April
2012.
110
Crisis Group interview, oil company security manager, Port
111
A militant leader, formerly a mid-ranking commander under
Asari, swore that as soon as our boy, President Jonathan, fin-
ishes his term, he will continue to cripple the oil industry. Crisis
Group interview, former militant commander, Port Harcourt, 16
February 2012. See The lull before the storm, op. cit.

amnesty may soon be tempted to turn back to crime as the
program, while offering training, has enabled very few to
find jobs.
112
The payment of monthly stipends will have
to stop at some point.
113
Furthermore, if power changes
hands at the next elections in 2015, a new president will
most likely be less sympathetic to the delta groups than
Goodluck Jonathan, who comes from the region. There is
no guarantee his replacement would maintain the lucrative
state contracts that have so far appeased militant leaders.
Boko Harams violent campaign in the north could also
precipitate renewed violence in the south.
114
Some mili-
tants feel it is drawing the governments attention away
from the deltas grievances. Those who claimed an attack
on a gas pipeline on 4 February 2012 said it was a re-
minder of our presence.
115
Among the deltas security
community there are rumours of new militant camps.
116

The governments ability to deal effectively with renewed
violence in the delta would be seriously constrained by
the need to quell insecurity in the north. The Joint Task
Force is still present in the delta, but its new Operation
Pulo Shield is reoriented to countering oil bunkering and
illegal refining, not insurgency.
117

112
Crisis Group interview, amnesty program officer, Abuja, 13
February 2012. Most former militants would like to work in the
oil and gas sector but given the specialised nature of the work
and the level of automation after the initial construction stage,
there are not enough opportunities for them. Crisis Group inter-
view, diplomat, Lagos, 3 February 2012.
113
The initial end date of 2015 is now under review. Crisis Group
interview, amnesty program officer, Abuja, 13 February 2012.
Also see Post-amnesty programme may end 2013, This Day
Live, 31 January 2011.
114
Boko Haram is a radical Islamist group that has carried out
scores of bomb attacks and shootings, mainly in the predomi-
nately Muslim north, which have killed more than 1,000 people
since mid-2009. See Crisis Group Africa Report N168, North-
ern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, 20 December 2010.
115
Nigerian militants attack Eni oil pipeline in delta, Reuters,
6 February 2012.
116
Crisis Group interviews, oil company security managers,
Port Harcourt, 14-15 February 2012.
117
Pulo means oil in Ijaw. JTF restructures, now Operation
Pulo Shield, Sweet Crude, 9 January 2012.
IV. THE SPREAD OF CRIME ACROSS
THE REGION
The geography of maritime insecurity now extends to the
whole region, from Cte dIvoire to Angola according
to the ECCAS secretary general.
118
In the short term, in
addition to Nigeria, the maritime zones most affected are
Bakassi, Benin, Togo and Ghana. Although profit is the
dominant motive in most attacks and kidnappings, politi-
cal demands are sometimes made. Moreover, countries no
longer hesitate to view maritime attacks as external at-
tempts at destabilisation. Criminal activities can be divided
into three main categories: the spread of political gangster-
ism from the Niger Delta to the Bakassi peninsula; seaborne
raids; and increasingly sophisticated acts of piracy.
A. POLITICAL GANGSTERISM IN BAKASSI
The first manifestations of maritime crime in Cameroon
occurred in 1987. They were restricted to the maritime
border with Nigeria, in the Bight of Biafra. Initially, at-
tacks had a purely financial motivation: burglaries at port
and oil installations, siphoning of crude, unauthorised
fishing in controlled zones, attacks on fishing boats.
119

Crime became less frequent in 1993 with the emergence
of a dispute and then sporadic clashes between Cameroon
and Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula. Yaound and
Abuja henceforth considered the area to be a sensitive zone
in terms of maritime security.
120
Cameroon declared the
coast near Nigeria to be a war zone and placed it under ar-
my control. The incidence of crime fell sharply between
1993 and 2006 and the only common crimes were burgla-
ries and other offenses in the ports of Douala, Limb and
the seaside resort of Kribi.
121

The first major manifestation of the spread of crime from
the Niger Delta appeared after the 2007 Green Tree
Agreement, which returned Bakassi to Cameroon, in ac-
cordance with the ruling by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ).
122
The number of attacks and ambushes

118
Piracy and armed robberies are a threat in the Gulf of Guinea,
from Cte dIvoire to Angola quoted in Branle-bas de combat
contre la piraterie maritime, Gabon Review, 26 October 2012.
In October 2012, a tanker was attacked off Cte dIvoire.
Greek-operated tanker goes missing in Gulf of Guinea, Reuters,
8 October 2012. Piracy off West Africa doubles, News 24, 27
October 2012.
119
Crisis Group interviews, port authority, Douala, 5 December
2011.
120
Navy: Why Bakassi buffer zone is porous, This Day, 6
November 2012.
121
Crisis Group interviews, port authority, Douala, 5 December
2011.
122
In October 2004, after proceedings that lasted several years,
the ICJ awarded Bakassi to Cameroon. With a view to imple-

along the Cameroonian coast increased. They were led by
armed groups of the self-proclaimed Bakassi Freedom
Fighters (BFF), opposed to the peninsulas return to Came-
roon. Originally composed of members of the Ijaw com-
munity, the ethnic majority group in Bakassi, the BFF
followed the example of self-defence groups in the Niger
Delta and claimed they were acting to defend themselves
against the Nigerian and Cameroonian authorities. They
put forward the same political motive as fighters in the
Niger Delta, namely that they were defending the inter-
ests of a group that had been betrayed. However, the BFF
were not so much interested in denouncing government
collusion with the oil companies as preventing the possible
expulsion of the Ijaw communities and allies from an area
very rich in fishing resources.
123

Moreover, the BFFs political demands concealed other,
less noble objectives: maintaining control of the lucrative
trade of oil and drugs in Bakassi. The path taken by the
group shows the range of interests behind its creation. As
illegal trade increased on the peninsula, the situation be-
came more confused and the combatant groups have split
following mutual accusations of treason and corruption.
In November 2007, twenty Cameroonian soldiers were
killed in Issangele creek, Bakassi. The attack was initial-
ly attributed to MEND, but Bakassi combatants claimed
responsibility saying they wanted to sound a warning after
the arrest of some of their comrades a few days before.
124

In October 2008, another major attack was launched when
individuals travelling on speed boats attacked the SS Sa-
gitta, a French tanker sailing near Limb. They took ten
hostages, including seven French citizens, two Cameroo-
nians and one Tunisian. This attack was preceded by an
attack on the Cameroonian army in June 2008. Then, on
two occasions, in December 2010 and February 2011, rep-
resentatives of the authorities (including two sub-prefects)
were abducted by attackers claiming to be members of
the BFF.
In 2009, the BFF operations commander, Ebi Dari, and
one of his generals left the group after suspicions had
been raised about betrayal and the misappropriation of
funds. They announced their surrender to the Came-
roonian authorities and asked for a pardon from Presi-
dent Paul Biya. Another radical leader, called Atikpee,

menting this decision, a joint commission of the two countries
was given responsibility for organising a gradual return, taking
into account the status of the majority of the population, who
are Nigerian in origin. The Green Tree Agreement gave the Ni-
gerian population of Bakassi the choice of leaving the peninsula
or remaining, with or without acquiring Cameroonian citizenship.
123
Crisis Group interviews, members of the Ijaw community,
Bakassi, 5-12 December 2011.
124
Une vingtaine de soldats camerounais tus Bakassi,
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 13 November 2007.
proclaimed himself leader of the movement before sur-
rendering as well.
125
The BFFs current leadership is un-
clear and claimed by different military leaders, some
saying to be still active while others repented and put
down their arms or negotiated their surrender with the
Cameroonian authorities.
126
Most combatants are spread
among relatively uncoordinated but extremely dangerous
and violent small groups, such as the African Marine Com-
mando (AMC), which control maritime crime and illegal
trade of petrol, arms and drugs.
127

In response, Cameroon has combined military deployment
in the field with infiltration of the armed groups. To counter
their mobility and capacity to quickly extend their reach,
the authorities launched Operation Galilee, which involved
deploying a Rapid Intervention Brigade (BIR), a unit
equipped with speed boats. The government also launched
a military surveillance program off the coast and territorial
waters using radar and radio with an operational centre in
Douala. This has been all the more necessary because, in
spite of strong pressure from Bakassi residents, the Nige-
rian governments recent decision not to contest the return
of Bakassi to Cameroon closed the legal battle but did not
completely close the political battle, which might encour-
age violent local demands.
128

B. MARITIME RAIDS
The years 2008 and 2009 were notable for the intensifica-
tion of bank robberies in Cameroon and a spectacular at-
tack on the Equatorial Guinea presidential residence at
Malabo by seaborne armed groups. The bank robberies in
Cameroon started in September 2008 in the coastal town
of Limb. Organised like a military operation and involv-

125
Bakassi Freedom Fighters reportedly apologize and propose
ceasefire with Cameroon, APA, 14 August 2009 and Militant
groups surrender arms in C-River, Vanguard, 27 September
2009.
126
Some BFF members also took advantage of the Nigerian am-
nesty law to hand in their weapons to the Cross River state au-
thorities. Crisis Group interview, Cameroon military intelligence
officer, Bakassi, 5-12 December 2011.
127
The extreme violence of their actions, often carried out with
heavy weapons, showed how dangerous these groups can be. In
February 2011, the AMC took the Bakassi subprefect hostage
and offered his release in exchange for a ransom. A short time
before, another subprefect was abducted and executed by his
kidnappers. Crisis Group telephone interview, expert from a
security company, November 2012.
128
Despite internal pressures, the Nigerian government decided
not to appeal against the decision but it considered negotiations
with Cameroon to buy back Bakassi. Le Nigria ne fera pas
appel pour rcuprer la pninsule de Bakassi cde au Came-
roun, Slate Afrique, 9 October 2012. Nigeria mulls buying back
Bakassi from Cameroon, P.M. News Nigeria, 9 October 2012.

ing dozens of attackers equipped with heavy weapons,
this series of attacks left a dozen people dead.
In October 2008, a failed bank robbery in Kribi was fol-
lowed by the arrest of Cameroonian attackers, which in-
dicates that the attacks were not only carried out by Nige-
rians. In March 2011, ten people, including nine pirates,
were killed in a clash between pirates and the BIR after a
bank robbery in Douala, South Cameroons main city. The
confrontation took place at sea, near an oil production zone
off Bakassi.
129

In February 2009, Equatorial Guinea experienced its first
large-scale attack. About 50 armed men on speed boats led
a raid against the presidential palace in Malabo on Bioko
Island. At first, this attack was reported as an attempted
coup led by the political opposition in cooperation with
MEND, because documents found on the arrested and
killed attackers seemed to indicate that they were from the
Niger Delta. However, a few days later, MEND denied
any involvement.
130
After also blaming locals and the Equa-
torial Guinean opposition in exile, the government accused
Cameroon because the attackers were reportedly wearing
Cameroonian army uniforms.
131

Questioning of the arrested attackers and investigations
conducted by the authorities of Equatorial Guinea, Came-
roon and Nigeria indicated that the attack had no political
motive and was apparently organised by criminals who
had confused the presidential palace with a bank or had
thought that large sums of money had been stored there.
132

A few days before, the press had reported the theft of a
suitcase of banknotes from the Malabo presidential resi-
dence.
133
However, in August 2010, the Equatorial Guin-
ea authorities announced death sentences for four people,
including former members of the security forces, for their
role in the February 2009 attack.
134
This raised again the
hypothesis of an attempt to destabilise the government.
No matter how this episode is interpreted, it showed for
the first time that it was possible to plan a large-scale at-
tack against one of the regions countries, and the security
services noted the existence of seaborne armed groups
able to act along the whole length of the Gulf of Guinea.

129
Cameroun: dix morts Bakassi, AFP, 21 March 2011.
130
Attaques contre la Guine quatoriale: le groupe nigrian
du MEND dment tre impliqu, AFP, 17 February 2009.
131
Les Bakassi Freedom Fighters attaquent la Guine quato-
riale, camer.be, 19 February 2010.
132
Banditisme ou tentative de coup dEtat ?, Radio France
internationale, 17 February 2009.
133
Riols, Piraterie et brigandage maritime dans le Golfe de Gui-
ne, op. cit., p. 7
134
Quatre condamnations mort pour lassaut du palais prsi-
dentiel, AFP, 22 August 2010.
Following this spectacular attack, and although it had so
far been spared from similar attacks, Gabon strengthened
its surveillance patrols of villages and fishing communi-
ties suspected of sheltering criminals or providing them
with information about the movements of coastguards.
Gabonese policy consisted of infiltrating fishing commu-
nities while strengthening its navy.
C. PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS
Between 2007 and 2011, there were an estimated 150
cases of maritime piracy to the east of the Niger Delta,
mainly off the Cameroonian coast.
135
In most cases, the
attackers were equipped with heavy weapons and rocket
launchers. According to the authorities, most of the at-
tacks were planned in Nigeria or Bakassi by groups that
did not have permanent bases in the mangroves, where
living conditions can be extremely difficult. Arms were
supplied by a network of traffickers with links to groups in
the Niger Delta, but also allegedly by accomplices within
the security services.
136

1. Danger off the Benin coast
In early 2011, several years after maritime crime began to
increase in the eastern gulf, pirate attacks peaked off the
coast of Benin, Nigerias western neighbour.
137
Pirates
attacked frequently for several months, attracted by the
large number of tankers and able to exploit the weakness
of Benins navy.
At the end of 2010, dozens of vessels were moored off
Cotonou; some were waiting for berths at Cotonou or La-
gos, while others were there to change crew, pick up sup-
plies, or carry out licit or illicit ship-to-ship transfers of
refined petroleum products.
138
Some ship owners and crews

135
Joseph Vincent Ntuda Ebode, La nouvelle posture gopoli-
tique du Cameroun et la lutte contre la piraterie dans le Golfe
de Guine in Joseph Vincent Ntuda Ebode (dir.), Piraterie et
terrorisme: de nouveaux dfis scuritaires en Afrique centrale
(Yaound, 2009), pp. 43-81.
136
Crisis Group interview, Cameroon military intelligence of-
ficer, Bakassi, 5-12 December 2011.
137
In 2010 there were no reported pirate attacks off Benin but
in 2011 the IMB recorded twenty, all but one of which took
place between March and September. See Piracy and armed
robbery against ships, Report for the period 1 January 30 Sep-
tember 2011 and Piracy and armed robbery against ships,
Report for the period 1 January 31 December 2011, IMB.
Illustrating the problem of underreporting, the head of Benins
navy, Maxime Ahoyo, said there were 35 attacks off his countrys
coast in 2011. Retour timide des navires, Xinhua, 4 March
2012.
138
The Central Bank of Nigeria stipulates that fuel importers
only qualify for payment in foreign exchange if they load their
products outside Nigerias territorial waters. Therefore, the

thought Cotonou to be safer than Lagos.
139
The efforts of
Nigerian navy and NIMASA to exercise tighter control
on shipping in Nigerian waters also encouraged tankers in-
volved in illicit fuel trading to stay in Benins waters to
avoid scrutiny.
Pirates almost always targeted tankers.
140
In all successful
reported attacks pirates stole the ships cash, stores or
crews belongings. In successful hijack operations, they
forced the crew to sail away from the point of attack and
stole fuel worth between $2 million and $6 million.
141

Academics and experts believe that, in view of the high
rate of similar attacks off Nigeria before and during 2011,
pirate attacks off Benin are most likely masterminded and
executed principally by Nigerians.
142
They have the neces-
sary intelligence network, boats, firepower and technical
know-how to execute such hijacks and sell stolen fuel.
143

That pirates made telephone calls to Nigerian numbers from
ships hijacked off Benin supports this theory.
144
However,
the involvement of Benin nationals is very likely as pirates
need to seek information from local fishermen, waterborne
traders and fuel smugglers. The shared history, culture
and language of Yoruba communities on both sides of the
border encourage such collaboration.
145

motherships of foreign companies selling fuel to Nigerian im-
porters moor off Cotonou or Lom and transfer fuel to Nigerian
companies smaller tankers, which then transport it to Lagos.
These ship-to-ship transfers are illegal since no port duties or
levies are paid to any country. Report of the ad-hoc committee
to verify and determine the actual subsidy requirements and
monitor the implementation of the subsidy regime in Nigeria,
Resolution No. (HR.1/2012), House of Representatives, 18
April 2012, p. 22. Available at www.africaintelligence.com
/images/Nigeria_subsidies.pdf.
139
Crisis Group interviews, Benin navy and port authorities,
Cotonou, February 2012.
140
All twenty attacks off Benin in 2011 reported to the IMB
were on tankers. Piracy and armed robbery against ships, re-
port for the period 1 January 31 December 2011, op. cit.
141
See Lloyds Market Association website: www.lmalloyds.
com. Of the twenty attacks off Benin in 2011 reported to the
IMB, nine involved pirates hijacking a tanker to an unknown
location. Ibid.
142
Global pirate attacks down in first quarter, Nigeria risk
grows, Reuters, 23 April 2012. Crisis Group telephone inter-
view, expert from a security company, November 2012.
143
In 2011, attacks reported off Benin took place from 4 to 67
nautical miles (7.4 to 124km) offshore. Piracy and armed rob-
bery against ships, report for the period 1 January 31 Decem-
ber 2011, op. cit.
144
Crisis Group interview, IMB officer, London, 8 December
2011.
145
Crisis Group interview, academic, Lagos, 3 February 2012.
During an attack on a tanker off Cotonou on 24 November 2009,
the only one reported to the IMB that year, crew members cap-
tured one of the attackers, an individual from Seme-Krake
There were many opportunities for pirates to attack tank-
ers off Benin due to the high frequency of ship-to-ship
transfers.
146
For most of 2011, there was scarcely any dan-
ger of being caught. The Nigerian navy did not have the
right to operate in Benins waters while the Benin navys
ability to respond was negligible. Its fleet consisted of two
old patrol ships that were no longer working and two De-
fender patrol boats just over eight-metres-long donated by
the U.S. in early 2010.
147

The 2011 attacks off Benin and the subsequent rise in in-
surance premiums for ship owners and charterers caused
most maritime traffic previously operating there to moor
off Lom instead, the capital of Togo.
148
Benin has re-
ported a 70 per cent decrease in the number of ships ar-
riving in Cotonou port since the beginning of 2012.
149

However, a series of problems in the management of the
port that made using it more expensive and time consum-
ing also explains why many container ships decided to
dock at Lom.
150

Realising his navys inadequacy and the damage to the
economy, Benins president, Yayi Boni, asked for help
from Nigeria and the UN Security Council.
151
While visit-
ing the U.S. in July and France in November 2011, he ap-

Plage, a village on the Benin-Nigeria border, born to a Nigerian
father and a mother from Benin. Crisis Group interview, former
Cotonou harbour master, Cotonou, 27 January 2012.
146
Of the twenty attacks off Benin in 2011 reported to the IMB,
seven took place on tankers while they were carrying out ship-
to-ship transfers and four on tankers preparing to do so. In an
incident on 24 June 2011, the crew had removed the razor wire
protecting the vessel to be able to transfer their cargo. Piracy
and armed robbery against ships, report for the period 1 January
31 December 2011, op. cit.
147
Until late September 2011, the Benin navy tried to keep one
of the two Defenders in the water at all times to deter pirate at-
tacks. Crisis Group interview, Benin naval officer, Cotonou, 27
January 2012.
148
On 1 August 2011, the Joint War Committee, which com-
prises representatives from the Lloyds Market Association and
International Underwriting Association of Insurers, added Be-
nins waters to its areas listed as vulnerable to hull war, strikes,
terrorism and related perils. Nigerias waters were already on
the list. This declaration enabled insurers to raise their premiums.
See Hull war, strikes, terrorism and related perils listed are-
as, Joint War Committee, JWLA18, 1 August 2011 accessible
at www.lmalloyds.com.
149
UN says piracy off Africas west coast is increasing, be-
coming more violent, The Washington Post, 28 February
2012.
150
Crisis Group interview, shipping company staff, Cotonou,
31 January 2012.
151
Benin collects about 100 billion CFA francs (about $218
million) or some 40 per cent of government revenues from port
activities each year. Benin acquires three new coastal patrol
craft, Defence Web, 3 April 2012.

pealed to Barack Obama and Nicolas Sarkozy.
152
On 28
September 2011, Nigeria and Benin together launched
Operation Prosperity to deter pirate attacks. Abuja quick-
ly mobilised and was willing to invest heavily in the op-
eration because piracy is as much a problem for Nigeria
as it is for Benin and large quantities of goods are imported
to Nigeria through Cotonou.
153
Operation Prosperity was
initially intended to last six months, until the end of March
2012, but it has been extended indefinitely.
Nigerian navy ships and helicopters created a relatively
effective deterrent that has generated a drop in pirate at-
tacks in Benins waters.
154
The joint operation also regu-
lates shipping. For the first time, ships moor off Cotonou
in designated areas, making it easier for the navies to pro-
tect them.
155
Shipping companies can also pay the Benin
navy for escorts and armed guards on board. Vessels found
to be violating the law are handed over to the Benin navy,
fined 25 million CFA francs (about $50,000) and escorted
from Benin waters.
156

The operation is supposed to give Benin time to reinforce
its own maritime security capabilities. The navy and air
force are waiting for several boats and planes to be deliv-
ered.
157
However, a lack of coordination and leadership

152
Crisis Group interview, U.S. diplomat, Cotonou, 30 January
2012.
153
About half the goods that transit through Cotonou Port go to
Nigeria. Congestion in Lagos Port and higher import taxes on
goods such as rice, cooking oil and fabrics intended to help local
industry cause importers to use Cotonou Port. Much then goes
through Niger to reduce taxes further. Crisis Group interviews,
shipping company staff, Cotonou, 31 January 2012.
154
The operational zone runs from the fairway buoy off Lagos
to Benins maritime border with Togo (85 nautical miles or about
157km) and extends 20 nautical miles (37km) out to sea. The
Nigerian navy has assigned to the operation one war ship, three
ballistic boats and two Augusta maritime helicopters fitted with
cameras. NIMASA also provides two vessels. The Benin navy
has devoted its two Defender patrol boats and one patrol ship,
recently repaired. Crisis Group interviews, Nigerian defence
attach, Benin navy chief, Cotonou, 1 February 2012.
155
Ships pay between 2,500 and 3,500 for fourteen days
moorage. Crisis Group interview, shipping agent, Cotonou, 30
January 2012.
156
Half the money goes to the treasury, a quarter to the navy
(enabling its recent office refurbishment) and a quarter to the
civilian maritime administration. Crisis Group interview, head
of the Benin navy, Cotonou, 1 February 2012.
157
At Frances encouragement, Benin bought three 32-metre-
long patrol ships from French manufacturer OCEA. France will
help train the navy on how to use its new boats. Benin has also
requested a third Defender boat from the U.S. and bought two
Grand Duc surveillance aircraft to increase maritime domain
awareness. Crisis Group interviews, head of the Benin navy,
Cotonou, 1 February 2012. See Benin acquires three new coastal
patrol craft, Defence Web, 3 April 2012.
among the navy and government departments hinders the
creation of a cohesive security response.
158
There is no
consensus on how to move forward and progress towards
a national maritime security strategy has been slow.
159

2. Togo within range
Piracy off the coast of Benin has boosted shipping in To-
golese waters and business at Lom port, but piracy as
well.
160
A spate of attempted attacks in September-October
2011 on many tankers, an attempted attack in February
2012 and a successful hijack of an oil tanker on 28 April
show Togolese waters are not safe.
161
The government re-
sponse has been more coordinated than in Benin with the
navy and the transport ministry working together relatively
smoothly.
162
But Togo is still sorely unprepared.
163
If the
problem grew, it would be unable to cope. With pirates
operating nearby in the waters off Nigeria and Benin and
a healthy fuel smuggling network in the country, pirates

158
In September 2011, Benin created an inter-ministerial mari-
time security committee but the military, transport ministry and
port authorities still vie for the lead. Crisis Group telephone in-
terview, military adviser, Brussels, 16 January 2012.
159
The operation continues because Benin is unable to exercise
control of its territorial waters. The regions governments also
plan to extend the operation to Togolese waters. Crisis Group
email correspondence, Nigerian navy officer, 2 April 2012.
160
70 to 80 ships crowded the waters off Lom from August to
September 2011. Operation Prosperity enabled some ships to
return to Benin so that number had dropped to less than 50 by
early 2012. Crisis Group interview, Lom harbour master, Lom,
25 January 2012. Togolese authorities have made the most of
the new traffic. Since mid-2011, they charge ships mooring or
carrying out ship-to-ship transfers offshore a fee of one million
CFA francs (just under $2,000) each two weeks. Crisis Group
interview, shipping agent, Lom, 25 January 2012.
161
The IMB says there were more attacks and attempted attacks
off Togo between January and September 2012 than during the
previous five years. Report for the period 1 January 30 Sep-
tember, op. cit.; Togolese Navy thwarts pirate attack, De-
fence Web, 13 February 2012; and Pirates hijack oil tanker off
Togo, Defence Web, 4 May 2012.
162
Crisis Group telephone interview, military adviser, Brussels,
16 January 2012.
163
The navy is composed of several hundred men, has two 30
to 40-year-old patrol boats that rarely leave harbour and two
Defender boats donated by the U.S. with which it carries out
night patrols. It provides onboard armed guards if ship owners
are willing to pay. The gendarmeries fifteen-man maritime bri-
gade also has a small boat with which to patrol close to shore.
Crisis Group interviews, head of the navy and maritime bri-
gade, French defence attach, Lom, January 2012. The U.S.
will provide another patrol boat slightly larger than the Defenders.
Crisis Group interview, U.S. diplomat, Lom, 25 January 2012.

could develop their connections and operations in Togo if
it remained a weak spot.
164

3. Ghana at risk
Pirates have not yet launched an attack off the coast of
Ghana, Togos western neighbour, but the country has al-
ready suffered collateral damage from piracy and its new-
found oil resources puts it at risk.
165
A pirate attack dam-
aged a pipeline in Togo and caused important power cuts
in Ghana.
166
In late 2010, the Jubilee field, 106km off-
shore near the maritime border with Cte dIvoire, came
on-stream just three years after its discovery. Well aware
that realising Ghanas oil potential is critical for his coun-
trys development, the late president, John Atta Mills, had
decided to beef up the navy and air force.
167
However, a
dispute with Cte dIvoire over their shared maritime
border already threatens to tie up the oil in lengthy nego-
tiations,
168
and a lack of clarity remains on the share of
responsibilities between military and civilian actors in-
cluding the navy, police, defence ministry and Ghana
Maritime Authority.
169

The development of Ghanas oil industry will attract man-
power from throughout the region, including Nigeria, which
will create security problems. The high concentration of
Nigerians in the port city of Takoradi has already earned

164
Besides the overland traffic of fuel from Benin, smugglers
also go out to tankers to buy fuel. They often come ashore at the
uncontrolled shoreline near the Benin-Togo border. Crisis
Group interviews, maritime administration, Lom, 23 January
2012; navy head, Lom, 23 January 2012; fisherman, Lom, 26
January 2012.
165
In 2011, the IMB reported two minor security incidents off
Takoradi, one of Ghanas two main ports, in which thieves with
machetes boarded and stole ships stores. Report for the period
1 January 31 December 2011, op. cit.
166
Pirates cut off the gas, Africa Energy Intelligence, 12 Sep-
tember 2012.
167
On 20 February 2012, the navy commissioned four new
Chinese-made fast patrol boats and it is waiting for two ex-
German navy fast attack craft currently being refitted in Ger-
many. The air force is buying three new surveillance aircraft
and a new maritime police force is being created. To improve
maritime domain awareness, the Ghana Maritime Authority
(GMA) is setting up a Vessel Traffic Management Information
System (VTMIS). Crisis Group interviews, GMA director, Ac-
cra, 17 January 2012; diplomat, Accra, 18 January 2012. See
Four new vessels for navy to secure countrys maritime bounda-
ries, Ghana government press release, 21 February 2012.
168
Relations between Ghana and Cte dIvoire are strained
since the Ivorian post-election crisis, during which Ghana did
not support the elected president, Alassane Ouattara, in his battle
with the deposed president Laurent Gbagbo. Oil: Nation eager
to remain master of its own destiny, Financial Times, 14 De-
cember 2011.
169
Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Accra, 18 January 2012.
one area the nickname of Little Lagos and police inves-
tigations have revealed organised crime networks linking
the two countries.
170

Government and international oil companies also risk
feeding a perception among local communities that the oil
is bringing more harm than good. Antagonism is growing
between fishermen who want to catch fish attracted to the
light from oil rigs and the navy and oil companies intent
on keeping them outside a one nautical mile (1.85km) ex-
clusion zone. The navy has also been heavy-handed in en-
forcing fishing regulations onshore.
171
These hostilities
could cause the government to lose valuable allies in the
fight against maritime crime fishermen can be the eyes
and ears of limited law enforcement agencies and make
locals more likely to collaborate with foreign criminals or
take the initiative themselves. Avoiding these risks is the
responsibility of government and foreign oil companies.
172

170
Ghana says seized guns and ammo headed to Nigeria,
Reuters, 11 January 2012.
171
Crisis Group interviews, diplomat, Accra, 18 January 2012;
academic at the Regional Maritime University, Accra, 2 March
2012. Commercial fishing in zones close to shore reserved for
artisanal fishing is straining local livelihoods. Crisis Group in-
terviews, international researchers, Accra, 20 March 2012.
172
Tullow Oil, the company part running the Jubilee field, is
helping the Ghana Maritime Authority, which in turn is sup-
porting the navy, including with human rights training. Crisis
Group interview, Tullow security manager, Accra, 19 January
2012.

V. REGIONAL COOPERATION AND
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
The regionalisation of piracy and maritime crime in the
Gulf of Guinea highlights the need for a collective re-
sponse. The vulnerability of the countries concerned is a
consequence of weak national institutions, a lack of co-
operation and the absence, until recently, of any involve-
ment by the regional institutions responsible for peace
and security. The nature of maritime crime in the Gulf of
Guinea, which takes place in the territorial waters of
coastal states, means they have to be at the forefront of
the fight because external actors can only intervene in in-
ternational waters. In this context, regional cooperation
with international support is the best possible response.
However, cooperation will not suffice without a clear and
coherent direction.
A. UNEQUAL REGIONAL COOPERATION
Although the Economic Community of Central African
States (ECCAS) has made some progress in terms of in-
stitutional development and pooling of resources, the
same cannot be said of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), where turf wars and a general
distrust of Nigeria hold back the emergence of a clear and
firm regional response to maritime insecurity.
1. The beginning of a strategy in Central Africa
In accordance with its mandate to promote peace and se-
curity,
173
ECCAS began work on formulating a security
strategy for the Gulf of Guinea in October 2009.
174
Its
strategy is based on two elements: first, the creation of a
Regional Coordination Centre for the Maritime Security
of Central Africa (CRESMAC), which is tasked with pool-
ing the military and civilian skills of member countries and,
second, the promotion of synergy between the Gulf of

173
The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) states that
one of the organisations objectives is to coordinate and har-
monize the policies between the existing and future Regional
Economic Communities (RECs) for the gradual attainment of
the objectives of the Union. The AU informally maintains the
principle of subsidiarity by virtue of which it should give way
to RECs when its expertise is not necessary. In Central Africa,
ECCAS is supposed to contribute to the continental peace and
security architecture, for example, by establishing one of five
brigades in the AUs future peacekeeping force, under consid-
eration since 2002. See article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the
AU, 11 July 2001 and Crisis Group Report, Implementing Peace
and Security Architecture (I): Central Africa, op. cit.
174
On the history of this sub-regional security initiative, see
ibid, pp. 15-16.
Guinea Commission and ECOWAS.
175
ECCASs strategy
has six objectives: information sharing and management;
joint surveillance of maritime space; harmonisation of ac-
tions at sea; introduction of a regional maritime tax; ac-
quisition of equipment for joint use; and the institutionali-
sation of a periodic maritime conference. CRESMAC was
established in Pointe-Noire in the Republic of Congo, and
is funded with a regional maritime tax, the modalities of
which remain to be decided, and with budgetary contribu-
tions from member countries.
Because of the immensity of the area that requires protec-
tion, ECCAS has divided it into three geographical zones,
A, B and D, stretching from Angola to the maritime borders
of Nigeria and Cameroon.
176
Zone D, which covers Came-
roon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and So Tom and Prn-
cipe, is the most at risk from maritime insecurity. In May
2009, the main countries concerned signed an agreement on
maritime surveillance in the zone. The agreement was fol-
lowed by the beginning of joint patrols and the adoption
of a plan called SECMAR1, followed by SECMAR2.
According to ECCAS, the SECMAR plans facilitated an
inventory of naval resources of member countries and the
opening of a multinational coordination centre in Douala,
responsible for liaison between the radar stations of par-
ticipating countries and their marine operational centres.
177

In the long term, the SECMAR plans aim to open up ter-
ritorial waters to the ships of participating countries (an-
chorage, the right of hot pursuit and the use of arms against
pirates) as well as to carry out joint operations involving
international partners.
178

The security operations planned for zone D include coop-
eration between navies, whose capacities nonetheless re-
main limited. The four countries in zone D only have four
patrol boats between them
179
while the Corymbe mission

175
See Protocole sur la gestion de la stratgie de scurisation
des intrts vitaux en mer articule autour du COPAX et favo-
risant une synergie avec la Commission du Golfe de Guine et la
Communaut conomique des Etats de lAfrique occidentale,
ECCAS, Kinshasa, 24 October 2009.
176
See Appendix C.
177
Crisis Group interview, expert on Gulf of Guinea, ECCAS,
178
Operations called Obangame express organised by the
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) form part of its African
Partnership Station (APS). Nigeria, France, Belgium and Spain
also participate in these operations, which take the form of emer-
gency simulation exercises: hostage taking, pursuit of arms or
drug traffickers, securing oil platforms, etc. The latest exercise
took place in February 2012.
179
Crisis Group interview, expert on Gulf of Guinea, ECCAS,

deployed by France alone has the same number of vessels.
180

Joint patrols, surveillance and the right of hot pursuit be-
tween member states also require greater complementarity
of naval and air management resources in the Gulf of Guinea
and the creation of a regional training school.
2. West Africa plays catch-up
ECOWAS is far behind its sister body, ECCAS, in foster-
ing cooperation among its members on maritime affairs.
The sudden rise of piracy off Benin in 2011 was a reality
check; it proved maritime security is not just a problem
for Nigeria but also for other member states, both coastal
and landlocked.
With support from partners such as the UK, the ECO-
WAS Commission is taking its first steps to stimulate and
harmonise its members maritime policies.
181
Its recently
established maritime security office is drafting a strategy
that highlights the need for member states to embrace a
more integrated governance approach to maritime af-
fairs.
182
Encouragingly it emphasises continuous infor-
mation sharing and underlines the need to improve oil and
gas governance as a means to prevent conflict. ECOWAS,
actively trying to replicate the ECCAS model, also plans
to delineate three operational zones with a coordination
centre within each. Zone E, the pilot zone or laboratory
zone, created in early September 2012 in Lom, includes
Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Niger.
183
The plan envisages that
countries in each zone will pool resources and take joint
responsibility for their maritime security.
184

180
Since 1990, France has maintained a permanent presence in
the Gulf of Guinea, within the framework of Mission Corymbe.
The missions dual objective is to maintain cooperation with
the regions countries, especially those with which Paris has
defence agreements, and defend Frances economic interests
(including its oil companies). Crisis Group interviews, French
military adviser in the Gabon navy, Libreville, 21 January
2012.
181
The UK provided funding for an ECOWAS maritime security
officer for two years. A Nigerian naval officer took up this po-
sition in November 2011. The UK also funded an ECOWAS
maritime security seminar in early 2012. Crisis Group interview,
UK diplomat, Abuja, 9 February 2012.
182
The ten strategic areas are maritime awareness; maritime
security; maritime safety; environmental issues; establishment
of a maritime governance framework; maritime surveillance
network; information network; maritime education, training and
development; maritime research; and other maritime related is-
sues. A draft ECOWAS integrated maritime strategy, version
shared with Crisis Group mid-March 2012.
183
See Cte ouest-africaine: vers la cration dune zone pilote
de scurit maritime, Afriquejet, 2 September 2012.
184
Crisis Group interview, ECOWAS maritime security officer,
Abuja, 9 February 2012.
Cooperation on maritime governance in West Africa is
limited by some of the same factors that hold back broad-
er regional economic and political integration. West Afri-
can leaders are anxious to maintain their sovereign rights
to govern within their territory. Weaker countries are wary
that stronger neighbours, in particular Nigeria, the regional
hegemon, would take advantage if they were to concede
elements of national sovereignty for the sake of regional
integration. The regions many conflicts, including those
that have caused insecurity to spill across borders, high-
light the need for regional integration in security matters
but also provoke among states a knee-jerk reaction to dis-
tance themselves from their neighbours problems for fear
of contamination.
Tense relations between some neighbouring coastal states
hamper information sharing. The maritime border dispute
between Ghana and Cte dIvoire makes cooperation on
maritime governance and security particularly difficult.
Coastal states, some colonised by France, others by Brit-
ain, have different working languages, bureaucracies and
cultures that hinder communication and trust between
elites, even if the same tribal groups live on both sides of
the border. Since navies often have more boats and there-
fore greater capacity to act on the sea than civilian author-
ities, they tend to take the lead on maritime affairs. Oper-
ational problems between different communications sys-
tems and a military culture of confidentiality also impede
information exchange between coastal states.
185

ECOWAS should provide an institutional forum in which
member states can find solutions to overcome some of
these problems. However, it has limitations of its own.
The ECOWAS Commission, as an intergovernmental
secretariat, has very little leeway to shape its members
maritime policies and practices. Its draft strategy is merely
a set of guidelines and common principles from which
members may take inspiration.
186
With bilateral and trilat-
eral efforts already underway to stop the rise in piracy,
heads of state may be worried that elevating the response
to the regional level would divert the influx of extra inter-
national support to ECOWAS.
187
Donors too, conscious
that achieving consensus for a regional response will take

185
That some neighbouring navies are poorly prepared to com-
municate with each other was illustrated in November 2011.
The Ghanaian navy received a distress call from an oil barge on
fire off the coast of Benin and wanted to inform the Togolese
navy. It did not have the right telephone number and had to call
the airport control tower in Lom, which informed the navy.
Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Lom, 25 January 2012.
186
A draft ECOWAS integrated maritime strategy, op. cit. p. 3.
187
Crisis Group interview, ECOWAS maritime security officer,
Abuja, 9 February 2012.

a long time, doubt the organisations usefulness in the
short or medium term.
188

B. NASCENT INTER-REGIONAL COOPERATION
The institutional frameworks for inter-regional coopera-
tion in maritime affairs have had difficulties to move be-
yond agreements on paper. Aiming to ensure a cost-effec-
tive shipping service high on safety and low on pollution,
the Maritime Organisation for West and Central Africa
(MOWCA) was set up in 1975 first as a Ministerial
Conference of West and Central African States on Mari-
time Transport (MINCONMAR), and then institutional-
ised as such in 1999.
189
It has been working with the In-
ternational Maritime Organisation (IMO) since 2003 to
establish an integrated coast guard function network to
facilitate regional coordination. But MOWCA has been
unable to implement the project because it works primari-
ly through transport ministers whose voices in maritime
affairs are weaker than those of the militaries, and who
fear that the creation of coast guards would diminish their
own responsibilities and budgets. MOWCAs attempt to
set up a Regional Maritime Development Bank in Nigeria
has also stalled due to a lack of will among members to
provide the start-up money.
190

Meanwhile, the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) es-
tablished in 1999 aims to harmonise the policies of mem-
ber states on peace and security, the management of oil
and natural resources, transport and the free circulation of
people and goods. Its founding treaty focuses on open and
latent conflicts over natural resources.
191
However, the
Commission is struggling to be more than a declaration of
intent. Its creation had been held up by the Bakassi dis-
pute between Cameroon and Nigeria, and its institutional
development has been blocked since then by political ten-
sions. Cameroon was not very interested initially by an
institution that it suspected would be used by Nigeria to
resolve border conflicts in its favour. The other member
countries feared the hegemony of Nigeria and Angola,
powers likely to influence the sharing of resources to
their advantage. Nigeria would like to play a leadership
role in the Gulf of Guinea, but such ambitions come up

188
Crisis Group interviews, donor representatives, Accra, Lo-
m, Cotonou, Lagos, Abuja, January and February 2012.
189
See MOWCAs website: www.amssa.net/framework/
MOWCA.aspx.
190
Regional maritime development bank headquarters wasting
away, This Day, 18 February 2012.
191
Article 2 of the Treaty defines the Commission as a frame-
work for cooperation and development as well as for pre-
vention, management and resolution of conflicts relating to the
economic and commercial exploitation on natural resources
within territorial borders and in exclusive economic zones of
member states.
against the tacit opposition of other countries who fear
this troublesome partner.
However, the proximity of Nigeria to zone D has made
cooperation between ECCAS and ECOWAS necessary,
especially in cases where individuals commit crimes along
the coasts of ECCAS countries and find refuge in Nigerian
waters. As other countries distrust Nigeria, a political so-
lution depends on making arrangements between the three
regional institutions ECCAS, ECOWAS and the Gulf of
Guinea Commission rather than between the states in
zone D and Abuja.
192
In this respect, the Gulf of Guinea
Commission has recently organised a conference on the
issue and is supportive of a regional peace, security and
development strategy.
193

The advantage of such a configuration would be to neu-
tralise the hegemonic desires of a country by imposing
community rules, but also to make agreements concluded
between states that are members of the three institutions
immediately applicable, notably with regard to the pursuit
of criminals outside maritime borders. It also aims to de-
fine the modalities for extradition as well as facilitating
judicial procedures against criminals, whatever their na-
tionality. However, until now, discussions between ECO-
WAS and ECCAS have not resulted in an agreement on a
legal and operational framework for cooperation.
C. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT: IN SEARCH OF
COORDINATION
Given the strategic interests of both rich and developing
countries in the Gulf of Guinea, the recent deterioration in
maritime security has provoked a rapid increase in sup-
port from foreign partners. Through a plethora of initia-
tives, traditional donors, the U.S., UK and France in par-
ticular, and emerging ones, including China and Brazil,
have demonstrated their will to help local powers counter
the threat of violent crime at sea.
194
But not all encourage
the right approach to the problem and a lack of coordina-
tion undermines good intentions.
Support often comes in the form of capacity building for
naval forces, including training, equipment and boats to
boost their maritime domain awareness and capacity to
deter attacks and respond rapidly. Nigeria refused to host
a base for the U.S.s Africa Command (AFRICOM), but

192
Which has already taken part in Obangame express exer-
cises.
193
Luanda declaration on peace and security in the Gulf of
Guinea, Luanda, 29 November 2012.
194
China has funded the purchase of boats while Brazil was in-
volved in the multinational training exercise, Obangame Ex-
press 2012, organised by the U.S. in Calabar, Nigeria in Febru-
ary 2012.

the U.S. navy regularly visits the country to train Nigerian
counterparts through its Africa Partnership Station pro-
gram. Since 2007, the U.S. has been improving the coun-
trys Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC)
by helping to set up radar, radio equipment and Automated
Identification Systems (AIS) at several sites along the coast.
The U.S. has also donated at least five boats, most recently
the former U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Chase, commissioned
as NNS Thunder in February 2012.
195
It also supports mari-
time security exercises, like for example the recent Opera-
tion Hot Pursuit involving the navies of Togo and Benin.
196

France supports its former colonies bilaterally, including
through the work of advisers to military chiefs. In mid-
2011 it also began a three-year project to help Benin, To-
go and Ghana draw up national maritime security strate-
gies, train civilians and armies and improve coordination
between the three neighbours. Called ASECMAR (Support
for Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea), the project
was later enlarged to include Nigeria, Cte dIvoire and
Guinea.
197
It seeks to strengthen state sovereignty by im-
proving the capacities of their internal security administra-
tion and their maritime capacities by promoting regional
coordination.
198

The UK, in addition to bilateral support, is backing the
Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), an
association of oil companies that ship hydrocarbons, in its
efforts to set up a Maritime Trade Information Sharing
Centre (MTISC) in Ghana. The centre collects and dis-
seminates information on security incidents in the whole
of the Gulf of Guinea via a secure website. The public-
private partnership model is based on experience of man-
aging shipping in the waters off Somalia.
199
In September
2011, China gave Benin 4 million for the purchase of a
patrol boat.
200

The U.S., UK and France have all tried to encourage
stronger cooperation among Gulf of Guinea states. The
U.S. has organised two multinational naval training exer-
cises called Obangame Express: one at Douala, Came-
roon in March 2011, another at Calabar, Nigeria in Feb-

195
Crisis Group interviews, U.S. diplomats and defence attach,
Lagos and Abuja, February 2012.
196
Les bases marines du Togo et du Bnin se prparent faire
face la piraterie dans le golfe de Guine, Afriquinfos, 19 Sep-
tember 2012.
197
France is putting 800,000 into the project. Crisis Group in-
terview, French defence attach, Lom, 24 January 2012.
198
Crisis Group interview, official responsible for coordinating
the fight against piracy, French foreign ministry, Paris, 9 May
2012.
199
Crisis Group interview, OCIMF staff, London, 20 December
2011.
200
Nigerian, Benin navies capture pirates; to receive gunboats,
Defence Web, 17 November 2011.
ruary 2012. U.S. and French warships stationed in the
Gulf of Guinea to train local navies also deter piracy and,
on some occasions, offer assistance to ships attacked by
pirates.
201

Discussions at the UN Security Council and the Novem-
ber 2011 report of a UN assessment mission to the region
have helped draw attention to the problem.
202
The UN
plans to provide technical support to coastal states and
shipping companies through the IMO and the UN Office
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). It also plans to help mo-
bilise resources and organise a summit at which heads of
all Gulf of Guinea states are to agree on a comprehensive
strategy to counter maritime insecurity.
203
The EU, in ad-
dition to commissioning many studies on Gulf of Guinea
piracy, also leads a Port Cooperation Programme (SEA-
COP) in several West African countries, which aims to
curb drug trafficking from Latin America to Europe by
strengthening national and regional maritime control.
204

With a variety of donors working on multiple projects at
national and regional levels, a lack of communication and
coordination among them limits their impact. It risks du-
plicating efforts, concentrating too much on some ele-
ments and causing incoherence in beneficiary countries
approaches to maritime security. In order to benefit as much
as possible from donors heightened interest, coastal states

201
On 13 March 2012, a French warship off Lagos received a
broadcast from the IMB that armed pirates had attacked a bulk
cargo ship 110 nautical miles (about 204km) off Lagos and
went to help. On arrival the French found the pirates had already
left but escorted the ship to Lagos port. On 22 March 2012, a
U.S. warship offered assistance to a tanker being chased by pi-
rates about 100 nautical miles (about 185km) south west of
Bonny Island, Nigeria. www.icc-ccs.org.
202
In October 2011, while Nigeria held the presidency of the
UN Security Council, President of Benin Boni Yayi wrote let-
ters to all members to ensure the smooth passing of resolution
2018 on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The Secretary-General
sent an assessment mission to the region in November 2011 to
examine the piracy threat. In late February 2012, the Security
Council under the Togolese presidency met again on the issue
and put out a second resolution. See Security Council Resolu-
tion 2018, S/RES/2018, 31 October 2011; Report of the United
Nations assessment mission on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (7
to 24 November 2011), S/2012/45, 19 January 2012; and Se-
curity Council Resolution 2039, S/RES/2039, 29 February
2012.
203
Report of the United Nations assessment mission on piracy
in the Gulf of Guinea (7 to 24 November 2011), S/2012/45, 19
January 2012, p. 9.
204
Crisis Group telephone interview, EU military official, 16
January 2012. See Long-term responses to global security
threats, European Commission, 2011, pp. 12-13.

do not divulge other sources of support. Foreign partners
recognise their efforts could be better coordinated.
205

Support from multiple international actors makes it harder
to ensure local ownership of strategies and initiatives to
increase maritime security.
206
This is more a problem in
smaller countries which have less experience at sea. The
prospect of substantial donor support is also causing de-
partments in cash-strapped governments to compete for
resources,
207
which hinders inter-agency cooperation, gives
external support the form of organised chaos and under-
mines work toward a multi-sectoral approach to maritime
governance and security.
It is clearly necessary to build capacity among the regions
underdeveloped navies and maritime police forces. But
overemphasis on defence treats piracy purely as a security
problem rather than a form of organised crime and a symp-
tom of deeper governance problems onshore, namely short-
comings in the distribution of resources, economic inequity
and corruption. Oil and gas companies generally respond
to piracy by strengthening their defences, which also en-
courages a narrow, security-minded approach.

205
Some partners are unaware of what the others are doing.
Crisis Group interviews, British, French and U.S. diplomats,
Accra, Lom, Cotonou, Lagos, Abuja, January-February 2012.
206
Nigeria does not want a situation like that in the Gulf of
Aden in which Western powers plan and execute the security
response. Crisis Group interview, Nigerian delegation to the
UN, New York, 28 November 2011.
207
Crisis Group interviews, donor representatives, Accra, Lom,
Cotonou, Lagos, Abuja, January-February 2012.
VI. MOVING BEYOND A PURELY
SECURITY-BASED APPROACH
As demonstrated by the general consensus on the need to
organise a regional summit on the problem, the regions
states clearly consider the fight against piracy as a priority,
but this requires addressing the root causes of the violence.
Long-term policies are indispensable in order to improve
economic governance of industries that fully or partly take
place at sea, boost economic development along the coast
and strengthen maritime law enforcement. Efforts must
focus on Nigeria, the epicentre of maritime violence, and
especially on the Niger Delta, where poverty, corruption
and crime create a fertile ground for piracy.
Violence in the Gulf of Guinea has reached todays wor-
rying levels because affected countries have neglected or
ignored their maritime domains. They must no longer re-
strict their approach to land and take responsibility for all
that takes place within the 200 nautical mile limit of their
exclusive economic zones (EEZs).
Heads of state should take the lead in launching a strate-
gic, multi-sectoral and comprehensive response in their
countries that addresses both the root causes and manifes-
tations of maritime crime. They should set up and preside
over inter-ministerial maritime affairs committees capable
of developing and implementing national maritime security
strategies. The committee should at a minimum include
ministers of social affairs, foreign affairs, defence, interior,
transport, economy, labour, environment, fishing and nat-
ural resources and ensure that relevant agencies and depart-
ments coordinate fully at the policy and operational levels.
To tackle piracy, Gulf of Guinea states need to see it not
just as a security problem but as a form of transnational or-
ganised crime. They must work with the private sector to
mitigate the risk to maritime traffic and proactively inves-
tigate and prosecute pirate gangs. The crimes transnational
nature demands close bilateral, regional and inter-regional
cooperation. Regional maritime security strategies should
guide national actors and provide the basis for coordinated
support by the international community.
A. THE NEED FOR LONG-TERM REFORMS
Violence in the Gulf of Guinea is a symptom of profound
and complex governance problems. The states of the re-
gion have failed to manage the industries that partly or
fully operate at sea, guarantee the socio-economic welfare
of coastal communities or enforce the law in territorial or
international waters. These failures have encouraged and
created opportunities for pirates. To address the root causes
therefore requires long-term policies that are closely re-

lated to each other: economic governance, development
and law enforcement at sea.
1. Improving economic governance
Poor economic governance of the hydrocarbons and ship-
ping industries has allowed the development of illegal
offshore trade in crude oil and refined petroleum. It has
also enabled the elites to grow rich, often through corrup-
tion, while the majority remain poor. Such inequality is a
major cause of crime along the coast and, according to
the Gulf of Guinea Commission, there is a link between
oil trafficking and the rise of violent pirate attacks in the
region.
208
A core part of gulf states maritime security
strategies should be focused on eliminating opportunities
for corruption and ensuring that proceeds benefit those
most in need. Nigeria, where most of the stolen oil and
fuel comes from, is at the heart of the problem, but regu-
lations should also be tightened in other producer and
consumer countries to close down opportunities for sell-
ing and refining stolen goods. Following the example of
Nigeria, which is trying to clean up its oil industry, the
other countries should form a commission of inquiry into
their national oil market and introduce controls over the
provenance of fuel in order to identify smuggling networks
and dishonest economic actors.
Nigerias Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
(EFCC)
209
has begun an overhaul of the distribution sector
and made arrests, but the extent of corruption and misman-
agement in the energy sector demands a complete over-
haul of the sector. The National Assembly should finalise
and pass the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) and implement
recommendations in KPMGs 2010 audit of the Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).
210
Given Nige-
rians strong resistance to an eventual subsidy removal, the
government should do this gradually and accompany the
move with a clearly communicated strategy to reinvest sav-
ings in popular and visible development projects.
2. Boosting development on the coast
Poverty and the lack of a viable livelihood push those liv-
ing in coastal communities to turn to crime. The need is
most urgent in the Niger Delta where a criminal culture is

208
Luanda declaration on peace and security in the Gulf of
Guinea, op. cit., article 14, p. 3.
209
For more information on the commission, see www.efcc
nigeria.org.
210
The government presented the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB)
to the National Assembly in 2008. It is designed to replace out-
dated legislation, much of which dates from the 1960s and 1970s,
and comprehensively reform the oil sector. Vested interests in
the Nigerian oil sector threatened by the bill have delayed its
passage.
most engrained, but all coastal states need to take steps to
improve living standards and create job opportunities along
the shore. This means investing in services that enable eco-
nomic growth such as roads, electricity, water, health and
education. Coastal states should ensure that the strength-
ening of the maritime domain is a central tenet of their de-
velopment plans in order to benefit both coastal communi-
ties directly and state revenues. The potential of this sector,
as in much of Africa, remains largely untapped.
211

Gulf of Guinea states should encourage artisanal and
commercial fishing. Artisanal fishing provides employ-
ment for thousands along the coast and, as the main source
of protein for coastal communities, plays a crucial role in
ensuring food security. With declining fish stocks and oil
and gas exploration and production limiting access in some
areas, governments need to ensure fishing benefits the
poorest and most vulnerable, notably by preventing local
and foreign commercial fishers from encroaching on zones
close to shore set aside for artisanal fishing. In addition,
governments should work to build trust and communication
between fishery authorities and community stakeholders
to better understand the challenges the latter face and im-
plement reforms to overcome them.
212
To support commer-
cial fishing for export, states should encourage and support
local companies in the fish processing industry to achieve
international standards thereby increasing export profits.
Coastal states and international oil and gas companies
have a shared responsibility to guarantee natural resource
extraction directly benefits local communities through job
creation, infrastructure projects and social welfare. In the
Niger Delta, creating jobs is the only way to ensure for-
mer militants who have benefited from vocational train-
ing in the amnesty scheme do not return to crime. The
amnesty program should work with the oil and gas indus-
try to create apprenticeships. State governments and oil
companies should provide entrepreneurial training for
former militants and other jobless youth.
3. Strengthening maritime law enforcement
Weak law enforcement in the Gulf of Guinea has allowed
maritime crime to proliferate. Trafficking in oil, petrole-
um products, arms, drugs and people and illegal fishing
create a favourable environment for violent crime. To
curtail these activities, gulf states maritime security strate-

211
See Mthuli Ncube and Michael Lyon Baker, Beyond pirates
and drugs: Unlocking Africas maritime potential and economic
development, Africa Security Review, vol. 20, no.1 (March
2011), pp. 60-69.
212
For an in-depth case study of the challenges involved in
fisheries management and appropriate policy responses in west-
ern Ghana, see Finegold et al., Western region fisheries sector
review, World Fish Center, December 2010.

gies should prioritise the strengthening and professionalisa-
tion of naval forces, maritime law enforcement bodies, port
authorities and maritime administration agencies. In part-
nership with donors, states should build capacity in these
organs through transparent recruitment, training (including
at regional maritime universities in Accra and Abidjan) and
the purchase of up-to-date and technologically advanced
tools. The heads of all such bodies should enforce a zero-
tolerance policy to corruption.
In Nigeria, EFCC should create a special unit dedicated to
investigating corruption in the maritime sector. The ship-
ping industry, civil society and foreign partners should
also closely scrutinise the alleged growing role played by
security companies as they take on duties assisting the
navy and NIMASA.
In order to extend the rule of law onto the sea, all states
need to develop comprehensive maritime domain aware-
ness. They need to enhance monitoring in their exclusive
economic zones to detect faster illicit activities and secu-
rity risks. Each state should prioritise developing its own
national surveillance system so that navies, maritime po-
lice, port authorities and maritime administration agen-
cies can provide a full picture of activity on the countrys
waters. In Nigeria, the navy and PICOMMS should merge
their parallel surveillance systems.
Naval staff and civilians should be trained in the use and
upkeep of this equipment and analysis of the information
it provides. Operators should be trained to identify possible
pirate boats by their type and behaviour.
213
The air force
and navy should be involved in information sharing.
To suppress illegal fuel trading, gulf states should insist
all tankers in their exclusive economic zones prove the
legal provenance of their cargo and refuel from accredited
suppliers. The Nigerian government should also pursue
work with major oil companies to investigate the possibility
of fingerprinting oil, enabling companies and authorities
to identify and trace stolen oil.
214

To limit the opportunities for pirates to conduct recon-
naissance operations, port authorities and maritime agen-
cies should carefully control the passage of small boats
shuttling between shore and ships to deliver crews, equip-

213
By studying normal shipping and fishing patterns, authorities
can better identify suspicious behaviour. Crisis Group inter-
view, maritime expert, Regional Maritime University, Accra, 2
March 2012.
214
See the Legal Oil website (www.legaloil.com). Research
institutes and major oil companies have worked on their own
methods of identifying and tracing crude oil but to date none
has proven sufficiently reliable to use on a large scale. Judith
Burdin Asuni, Blood oil in the Niger Delta, Special Report
229, U.S. Institute for Peace, August 2009, pp. 8-9.
ment or sell goods. To reduce incentives and opportunities
for piracy and safeguard the livelihoods of fishing commu-
nities, the navies and civilian administrations of gulf states
as well as international partners should increase efforts to
eliminate illegal fishing. This means using advanced tech-
nology and the help of artisanal fishermen to locate and ap-
prehend illegal foreign fishing vessels. Perpetrators should
be tried in the countries where they are caught or sent for
prosecution in their country of origin.
B. FIGHTING PIRACY ON LAND AND SEA
The international communitys experience in fighting pi-
racy off the coast of Somalia illustrates that preventing
pirates from attacking commercial vessels is only part of
the solution.
215
Reducing piracy requires dissuading and
arresting the organised criminal groups that finance, or-
chestrate and execute attacks. This means solid intelligence
and police work on land and sea.
216
The Gulf of Guinea
states are in a better position than Somalia to work on their
security and the onus is on them to play a leading role in
the fight against piracy.
1. Dissuading pirates: A joint task of state
and private actors
The most urgent challenge for coastal states is mitigating
the risk of pirate attacks so that commercial traffic can
continue to operate. To dissuade attacks, state and private
actors (oil, shipping and fishing companies) need to work
together and in good intelligence. The former must pro-
vide permanent surveillance of their territorial waters and
the latter must adopt defence systems for their vessels.
Operational surveillance
Naval forces should protect commercial traffic as best as
they can and deter attacks by means of a visible presence
on the water and a rapid response to attacks when they
happen. They should maintain patrols in mooring zones
and territorial waters especially at night. Given that pirate
attacks are happening farther and farther out, those navies
with capable ships should also patrol in international wa-
ters. Regular surveillance flights should also be used to

215
See Appendix E.
216
The naval force protecting the Gulf of Aden recently decided
to strike pirate strongholds on the shore. EU navy, helicopters
strike pirate supply center, Associated Press, 15 May 2012.
The president of Djibouti emphasised that the roots of piracy
are on land: La piraterie maritime au large de la Somalie ne
peut tre combattue qu partir de la terre et cest la seule faon
dradiquer cette menace globale, quoted in Hassan Djama
Farah, Djibouti : un hub anti-piraterie et un acteur principal de
la mdiation dans la crise somalienne, Diplomatie, no. 56
(May-June 2012), p. 45.

deter pirates. Navies and maritime police forces should
prepare to respond rapidly when attacks are reported.
This means ensuring that officers are listening to the dis-
tress channel 24 hours a day and that emergency response
procedures are well-practised. Navies should keep fast
launches ready at all times to respond to attacks close to
shore.
Commercial traffic can help state forces by communi-
cating frequently with the local navy and port authorities
by radio and by ensuring their Automated Identification
System (AIS) is turned on at all times. This will enable
authorities on shore to monitor their passage. They should
report all attacks, security incidents and sightings of sus-
picious craft to local navies, national maritime authorities
and the IMB piracy reporting centre. This is the only way
coastal states and the international community can under-
stand the full extent of the security problem and mount an
appropriate response.
Dissuasive measures by private companies
Ship owners should take measures to defend their ships
against attacks. Best practices identified by the shipping
industry include 24-hour watch keeping, on-deck lighting,
razor wire around the ship and a fortified safe room or
citadel to which crew can retreat in case pirates manage
to board. Ships coming to port or anchorage should re-
main at least 50 nautical miles (93km) offshore until a pi-
lot and berth are available. The IMO in consultation with
the shipping industry and naval forces should agree on
best practices and a code of conduct tailored to the threats
in the Gulf of Guinea. In the meantime, industry should
refer to the Best Management Practices 4 (BMP 4) that
advise how to avoid, deter or delay attacks off the coast
of Somalia.
217

Seafarers should not carry arms themselves but where
possible, as in Benin and Togo, ship owners should pay
armed naval personnel to keep guard on board. Despite
the risk of starting an arms race with pirates and private
security companies, the U.S. and NATO have cited an in-
crease in the use of privately contracted armed guards by
ships transiting the Gulf of Aden as a critical factor in the
decrease of successful hijacks in the region in 2011.
218

The UK has also recently reversed its policy to allow UK
flagged ships off the coast of Somalia to carry armed

217
This manual is available at www.imo.org.
218
US sees armed guards as deterrents to EA piracy, The East
African, 31 March 2012. Guards, razor wire help keep Somali
pirates at bay NATO, Reuters, 3 April 2012.
guards.
219
The IMO takes no position but leaves the deci-
sion to flag states in consultation with ship owners.
220

The perceived success of private armed guards off the
Horn of Africa is likely to encourage coastal states in the
Gulf of Guinea and ship owners, charterers and captains
operating in the region to seriously contemplate this op-
tion.
221
It should nonetheless remain a last resort because
of the risk that more arms at sea will escalate violence and
in light of the questionable legality of ships carrying armed
personnel. To mitigate the risk, the IMO in consultation
with the shipping and maritime security industry should
set up an international accreditation process through which
private security companies can prove their experience and
reliability.
222

2. Arresting pirates
In addition to protecting maritime traffic, gulf states
should proactively seek to apprehend and imprison those
involved in piracy. This includes small groups who carry
out opportunistic raids close to shore as well as transna-
tional organised criminal networks capable of sophisticat-
ed hijack operations. Navies, maritime police, other law
enforcement bodies and the judicial system must establish
smooth working relationships to imprison perpetrators.
The Somali experience has shown the crucial role of co-
ordination between states and between military actors and
the oil industry, but also the importance of information
sharing between all actors. Gulf states should consider
setting up a dedicated multi-service anti-piracy task force
including naval intelligence and the police. Recognising
that pirates move freely across borders, state authorities
must cooperate.

219
On 30 October 2011, the UK said it would change its policy
of forbidding UK flagged ships from carrying private armed
guards in the high-risk area off Somalia and on 6 December
2011 the department for transport issued guidance for doing so.
Change in UK policy on employing armed guards to protect
against Somali piracy, press release, UK Department for
Transport, 6 December 2011.
220
See Piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the
coast of Somalia, IMO, Resolution A.1044 (27), 20 December
2011, p. 5.
221
Nigeria is taking steps to domesticate the necessary interna-
tional laws to allow the carriage of armed guards in its waters.
FG moves to improve maritime security, Daily Times, 13
April 2012.
222
The UK is setting up its own national accreditation system
for UK-based maritime security companies and those working
on UK flagged ships. Several maritime security industry asso-
ciations are also developing their own schemes. However, an
international system endorsed by the IMO is necessary to set a
universally recognised standard. Crisis Group email correspond-
ence, UK Foreign Office expert, 14 May 2012.

Investigations on land and sea should aim to discover pi-
rates land bases, stores of boats, arms and means of com-
munication and identify sources of equipment, finances
and intelligence. In order to collect as much information
as possible, investigators should establish strong relations
with all maritime operators including oil, shipping and
fishing companies, shipping agents, maritime security com-
panies and in particular artisanal fishermen. The latter live
and work in coastal communities and are well placed to
provide valuable information on criminal activities.
In the Niger Delta, security forces and law enforcement
agencies should work to break up both pirate gangs and
organised criminal networks that bunker oil from pipe-
lines for local refining or sale offshore. Profits from this
business feed the deltas criminal economy. The Joint Task
Forces Operation Pulo Shield should work closely with
the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission to expose
the masterminds and financers behind the bunkering and
piracy syndicates.
223

The successful prosecution and imprisonment of arrested
pirates is essential to deter others. Coastal states should
accede to all necessary international legal instruments that
outlaw piracy, including the 1982 UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2005 Protocols to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation. They should integrate
these conventions into national law. It is also crucial that
they have the judicial capacity needed to try suspected pi-
rates.
224
They should ask the IMO and international mari-
time law experts for assistance in updating their anti-piracy
legislation. Coastal states should also ensure that naval
forces, law enforcement agencies and civilian agencies are
kept abreast of new legislation and enforce it accordingly.
C. THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE AND
EFFICIENT COOPERATION
Strengthening maritime cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea
includes three main objectives: quickly operationalise co-
operation within regional institutions (ECCAS and ECO-
WAS), develop genuine inter-regional synergy between the
two organisations and achieve more effective coordina-
tion of international support. The international conference
on piracy in the region, for which preparations are under-

223
For more detailed discussion on how to solve the deltas many
problems, see Crisis Group Africa reports listed in footnote 4.
224
Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS), any state can assert jurisdiction to try suspected pirates
in their courts but it must have up-to-date legislation consistent
with international law. See Piracy off the coast of Somalia,
UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 5 January
2012, p. 46.
way, should be held as soon as possible in the presence of
the heads of state concerned.
1. Making the region take responsibility
for its own security
The transnational nature of maritime crime in the Gulf of
Guinea makes bilateral, regional and inter-regional coop-
eration essential components of a comprehensive response.
To ensure close working relationships between naval forces,
law enforcement bodies and civilian agencies between di-
rect neighbours, heads of state should hold bilateral talks
and sign cooperation agreements. This demonstration of po-
litical will at the highest level is critical to ensure smooth
information sharing at the operational level. Bilateral talks
between heads of state are also necessary to achieve agree-
ment on sensitive matters that bear on state sovereignty
such as the right to pursue criminals into the waters of neigh-
bouring states and extradition agreements.
ECCAS and ECOWAS should lead on regional and inter-
regional collaboration. The Gulf of Guinea Commission is
neither effective nor sufficiently inclusive.
225
The initia-
tive of MOWCA and the IMO to set up an integrated coast
guard network has come up against seemingly insurmount-
able obstacles. However, ECCAS and ECOWAS should
espouse MOWCAs goals and seek to achieve them through
their own regional strategies.
226

As ECCAS and ECOWAS are political forums in which
heads of state are the highest authority, they can ensure
maritime security is elevated to the political level. By
bringing together all member states affected by maritime
violence, both coastal and landlocked, they provide an
opportunity for members to agree on a common vision for
fighting maritime crime that should lead to concrete pro-
jects and coordinated security efforts for high-risk zones.
Regional cooperation is also necessary for countries of
varying capacities to pool resources.
227

225
The Gulf of Guinea Commission does not include Benin and
Togo, both of which have witnessed pirate attacks in their waters.
The headquarters of the commission is located in Luanda, which
is why it is seen as being under Angolas influence.
226
The goals of the integrated coastguard function network in-
clude the enhancement of maritime safety, security, environ-
mental protection, law enforcement and economic development.
Report of IMO/MOWCA meeting to progress the implementa-
tion of an integrated coast guard function network for West and
Central African countries, Accra, Ghana, 13-17 December 2010,
IMO, January 2011.
227
In South East Asia, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
(ReCAAP) has proved critical in allowing stronger states to help
less equipped states with training, equipment, technology and

Defining a common vision
The two regional organisations should prioritise the much
anticipated summit of Gulf of Guinea heads of state. Be-
fore the summit, which is currently being prepared, member
states of ECOWAS and ECCAS should agree on two key
documents to be signed by heads of state: the Memoran-
dum of Understanding between ECCAS and ECOWAS
on Maritime Security in the Central and Western Maritime
Region and the Multilateral Agreement on Cooperation to
Suppress Illicit Maritime Activities in West and Central
Africa.
228

ECOWAS should quickly finalise its maritime strategy,
which involves the demarcation of operational zones and
a maritime security coordination centre in West Africa.
As with ECCAS, this centre should improve knowledge
of the maritime domain in the western part of the Gulf of
Guinea.
With the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the two regional
organisations should also start a joint discussion on fund-
ing regional maritime security. In Central Africa, the
countries in zone D, which are all oil producers, should
create a mechanism to fund the SECMAR plan in addi-
tion to the budgetary contribution of states, the payment
of which is sometimes irregular.
229
An alternative solution
could be the creation of a tax on hydrocarbon exports or a
regional maritime tax to be used to durably fund joint se-
curity operations at sea. This solution, which has already
been advocated by ECCAS countries, should be quickly
implemented in order to make SECMAR plan operational;
and ECOWAS could also consider it.
Coordinating security efforts by using special zones
Operation Prosperity, while not preventing all pirate at-
tacks, has improved security in Benins waters. Given the
weakness of Benins and Togos navies and recent attacks
off Lom, the operation should be extended to include
Togolese waters after getting some feedback and pro-
longed until the countries navies are able to take over.

reducing once high levels of piracy. Crisis Group interview,
IMB official, London, 8 December 2011.
228
ECCAS and ECOWAS delegations discussed these two doc-
uments at the two joint meetings in Germany in July 2011 and
in Benin at the end of March 2012. At the latter, they decided
to continue internal consultations before starting the adoption
process. Maritime Safety and Security in West and Central
Africa, Executive Summary, summary of issues raised at the
ECCAS-ECOWAS Maritime Safety and Security seminar on
27-29 March 2012 in Cotonou, Benin, Africa Center for Strategic
Studies, April 2012.
229
For more on the funding problems of ECCAS, see Crisis Group
Report, Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (I):
Central Africa, op. cit., p. 13.
Similarly, Nigeria and Cameroon should strengthen with-
out delay security and law enforcement in their border
zone. The recent commitments made during discussions
of the joint Cameroon-Nigeria commissions were im-
portant stages, but must be translated into action. In July
2011, the two countries agreed to definitively resolve the
issue of the demarcation of their land and maritime bor-
ders and strengthen cooperation against armed groups and
criminal networks.
Pooling resources
CEEACS SECMAR plans, for example, should be ac-
companied by the creation of a regional maritime security
school in order to improve and pool the knowledge and
intelligence of the seas. In time, this school, which should
be located in Pointe-Noire to promote maximum coopera-
tion with CRESMAC, could welcome nationals from all
Gulf of Guinea countries.

In order to improve surveillance and the prompt dissemi-
nation of security information to interested parties, ECCAS
and ECOWAS states should seriously consider adopting
the Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre (MTISC),
to be set up in Ghana, as an inter-regional information shar-
ing centre. It uses a model of collecting information from
state and industry sources that has proved successful off the
coast of Somalia.
2. Coordinating international support
The Gulf of Guinea states cannot overcome maritime se-
curity challenges without the support of international
partners. To render that support most effective and long-
lasting, partners should help them address the root causes
of violence at sea. Donors should therefore not restrict
themselves to a purely security-based approach but should
broaden their cooperation strategies with gulf states to in-
clude economic governance, development, law enforcement
and security, while involving all concerned ministries and
agencies. States and donors should collectively identify
capacity building needs and distribute tasks according to
donors willingness and areas of expertise.
In addressing the root causes of maritime crime, partners
should concentrate development efforts along the coast,
particularly by supporting job creation in the Niger Delta.
They should demand greater transparency in the oil and
gas industry. The UK and U.S. in particular should press
the Nigerian government to pass the Petroleum Industry
Bill (PIB) as a foundation for sector-wide reform and in-
vest more in the countrys refineries. In addition, donors
should cooperate with the regions countries that are inves-
tigating economic operators whose companies and assets
are in the northern hemisphere.

In supporting a comprehensive regional response to piracy,
partners should impress upon Gulf of Guinea states that
piracy is a form of organised crime and, therefore, will
not be solved simply by increasing states military presence
at sea. Consequently, their maritime security support pro-
grams should be designed like the ASECMAR project, and
include assistance with training and equipment for all agen-
cies responsible for regulating and maintaining order at sea
(maritime administration agencies, port authorities, navies,
maritime police forces, the courts).
The UNODC and INTERPOL should help gulf states,
and especially Nigeria, in their fight against transnational
organised crime networks. In particular, they should ad-
vise and assist with tracking financial flows. INTERPOLs
Maritime Piracy Task Force, which already works on evi-
dence collection, data exchange and capacity building to
bring Somali pirates to justice, should expand its operations
to the Gulf of Guinea.
To ensure that all partners share this same vision, speak
with a unified voice and provide coordinated support,
they should form multinational maritime affairs commit-
tees in each country and, in discussion with host states,
decide how to make their efforts complementary in order
to avoid duplication and competing offers of materials
and training.
VII. CONCLUSION
Each new discovery of oil reserves in the Gulf of Guinea
increases its geostrategic importance. But until now coun-
tries in the region and international oil companies have
paid no attention to the effect poor governance of the
business is having on the social and economic environ-
ment. The rapid increase of violence at sea in recent years
is the natural outcome of decades of neglect, social ma-
laise and economic disorder that characterise Nigerias
coastline. For coastal states and their international part-
ners, mitigating the risk of pirate attacks on shipments is
a very small part of the challenge. They must accept that
unless they make headway in addressing root causes on
land and introduce long-term reforms, piracy will continue
to plague the Gulf of Guinea for many years to come.
Dakar/Nairobi/Brussels, 12 December 2012


APPENDIX A

MAP OF THE GULF OF GUINEA


APPENDIX B

MAP OF THE NIGER DELTA


APPENDIX C

MAP OF THE ECCAS MARITIME ZONES

Source: Rle des organisations rgionales dans le maintien de la paix exprience de la Ceeac, ECCAS presentation.

APPENDIX D

NIGER DELTA TIMELINE

1937 British colonists began oil ex-
ploration in Nigeria.
1956 Shell discovered Nigerias first
oil deposit in what is now Bayelsa state
in the Niger Delta.
1960 Nigeria became independent
from the UK.
1966 Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro, the
deltas first post-colonial rebel, led a
small and unsuccessful revolt under the
banner of the Niger Delta Peoples
Republic.
1971 Nigeria became a member of
the Organisation of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC) after nationalis-
ing the oil industry via the creation of
the Nigerian National Oil Corporation
(NNOC).
1973 The oil price shock and sub-
sequent sustained rise in the price of oil
caused Nigerias economy to boom.
Nigerian revenue from the oil industry
leapt from $2.1 billion in 1972 to $11.2
billion in 1974. Since then the coun-
trys economy has depended heavily on
oil exports from the Niger Delta.
1975 The federal government raised
its share of mineral wealth from 50 per
cent to 80 per cent. Subsequent gov-
ernments further centralised oil reve-
nues so that by the 1990s the federal
governments share was over 97 per
cent.
1979 President Obasanjo issued the
Land Use Decree stating all subsoil
minerals, including oil, were the prop-
erty of the people of all Nigeria, not
just those from the minerals area of
origin.
1989 The first Gulf War led to an-
other spike in Nigerian oil revenues,
reaffirming the deltas strategic im-
portance.
1990 Writer and businessman Ken
Saro-Wiwa helped to establish the
Movement for the Survival of the
Ogoni People (MOSOP) which adopt-
ed a bill of rights calling for political
autonomy.
1993 MOSOPs activities caused
Shell to cease oil production in Ogoni
citing intimidation of its employees.
The federal government subsequently
created the Rivers State Internal Secu-
rity Task Force Unit and launched a
crackdown on Ogoni dissenters.
1995 A special military tribunal tried
sixteen MOSOP members for killing
four faction leaders. It convicted nine,
including Saro-Wiwa, who were exe-
cuted. Human Rights Watch said the
trials procedures blatantly violated
international standards of due process.
2001 The Niger Delta Development
Commission (NDDC) was established
to alleviate the developmental and eco-
logical problems facing oil-producing
communities.
August 2003 The Joint Task Forces
Operation Restore Hope was offi-
cially established in the Niger Delta. It
consisted of men from the army, navy,
air force, police, mobile-police and the
State Security Service (SSS). Its man-
date was to stop violence, secure oil
installations and neutralise the threat to
the oil industry.
September 2003 Delta militant Mu-
jahid Dokubo-Asari responded to
flawed elections in Rivers state by ini-
tiating a campaign of insurgency.
October 2004 Following govern-
ment peace accords with rival militias,
Dokubo-Asari agreed to disarm, rather
than face the government alone.
2005 Asari and civilian activists ac-
cused President Obasanjo of presiding
over a civilian dictatorship. Nigerian
authorities alleged that Asari called for
the disintegration of the Nigerian state
in a newspaper interview. He was sub-
sequently arrested.
2006 Delta militants calling them-
selves the Movement for the Emanci-
pation of the Niger Delta (MEND) be-
gan attacks on oil facilities. In January,
they kidnapped and later released four
foreign hostages. In February, militants
stepped up attacks in an apparent retal-
iation against military operations in the
delta, taking nine more hostages and
destroying part of an export terminal.
The militants claimed to be partly
fighting for the release of Dokubo-
Asari and demanded from Shell $1.5
billion in compensation for environ-
mental damage.
September 2007 Suspected militant
leader Henry Okah was arrested in An-
gola, prompting MEND to pull out of
peace talks with the government.
February 2008 Okah was extradited
to Nigeria to face treason charges.
19 June 2008 Delta militants at-
tacked Bonga, a $3.6 billion floating
production, storage and offloading
(FPSO) vessel and deep-water sub-sea
facility 120km off the coast.
14 August 2008 Nigeria completed
the handover of the disputed Bakassi
Peninsula to Cameroon.
10 September 2008 The federal
government created a ministry of Niger
Delta affairs.
13 September 2008 A government
raid on three villages in Rivers state
Soku, Kula and Tombia sparked an
escalation of violence to levels only
seen during the initial phases of the in-
surgency.
14 September 2008 After two days
of gun battles with security forces,
MEND declared an oil war in the
delta.
October 2008 A chief in Forcados,
Delta state, called on the Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)
to investigate the Joint Task Forces
past and present leadership, which, he
claimed, had been collaborating with
oil thieves.
15 May 2009 - MEND declared an
all-out war in the Niger Delta and
repeated its call for oil firms to evacu-
ate staff following what it claimed was
a campaign of aerial bombardment on
suspected MEND camps by the mili-
tary.

25 June 2009 President YarAdua
offered an amnesty to gunmen in the
Niger Delta, including Henry Okah.
12 July 2009 MEND launched their
first attack outside the Niger Delta, dy-
namiting the Atlas Cove Jetty in Lagos.
August 2009 The Niger Delta Am-
nesty Programme was launched. From
August to October just over 26,000
young people registered for training.
1 October 2009 Ateke Tom, whose
men had carried out frequent attacks on
oil installations, agreed to halt fighting
and take an unconditional pardon. Oth-
er commanders, Government Tompolo,
Soboma Jackrich, Ebikabowei Victor
Ben and Farah Dagogo, also laid down
their arms.
16 October 2009 MEND ended its
three-month old ceasefire and threat-
ened to resume attacks. Nine days later
the group reinstated the ceasefire to
allow peace talks with the government.
30 January 2010 MEND called off
its ceasefire, threatening to unleash an
all-out assault on the oil industry.
5 May 2010 President YarAdua
died after months of incapacitation.
Vice President Goodluck Jonathan,
former Governor of Bayelsa state, as-
sumed the presidency.
18 April 2011 Goodluck Jonathan,
born in what is now Bayelsa state, won
presidential elections. Violence in the
north of the country ensued.
1 January 2012 The government
removed the fuel subsidy.
9-13 January 2012 Protesters
marched in protest against the fuel sub-
sidy removal until the government
agreed to partially reinstate it.
4 February 2012 A militant group
claiming to be MEND blew up an off-
shore oil pipeline belonging to an Ital-
ian company, Eni.


APPENDIX E

PIRACY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

Now that some are calling for a strategy for continental
maritime security,
230
an analysis of efforts to counter So-
mali piracy can provide important lessons that can help
Africa and the international community fight piracy on
the west coast.
Over the last decade, pirate attacks have risen dramatical-
ly off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden, the Ara-
bian Sea and the Indian Ocean.
231
Some pirates maintain
they began as fishermen who took up arms to protect their
livelihoods from irresponsible foreign fishing vessels op-
erating in Somali waters. While this narrative may con-
tain a grain of truth, most of the estimated 1,500 to 3,000
young Somalis involved in piracy are more likely oppor-
tunistic criminals lured by the large profits to be made
from hijacking and holding for ransom the crews of
commercial vessels in one of the worlds busiest shipping
lanes.
232
Somali investors put up the capital that pirates
need to launch attacks and reap their share of the spoils.
233

Ransoms, demanded in cash, have increased from an av-
erage of $600,000 in 2007 to close to $5 million in
2011.
234

The rapid rise in the frequency, audacity and geographic
spread of Somali piracy drew international attention away
from already poor maritime security off Nigerias coast.
Attacks off Somalia are much more frequent than in the
Gulf of Guinea. In 2011 the IMB reported 237 ships at-
tacked off Somalia and 28 successfully hijacked com-
pared to 53 acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the
Gulf of Guinea.
235
The area affected by Somali piracy is
also far greater than the danger zones in the Gulf of

230
Security. Is Africas maritime strategy all at sea? IRIN, 22
October 2012.
231
For more see, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N64, Somalia:
The Trouble with Puntland, 12 August 2009.
232
About 28,000 ships (40 per cent of world shipping) pass
through these waters each year. Piracy off the coast of Soma-
lia, UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 5
January 2012, pp. 13-15.
233
For an example of how profits are split, see Annex 4.3:
Case study: pirates and finances the Hobyo-Harardheere
business model, in Report of the Monitoring Group on So-
malia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916
(2010), S/2011/334, 18 July 2011, pp. 228-229.
234
Piracy off the coast of Somalia, UK House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee, 5 January 2012, p. 55.
235
Report for the period 1 January 31 December 2011, In-
ternational Maritime Bureau, op. cit., 2012.
Guinea.
236
By using motherships, Somali pirates have
been able to launch attacks more than 1,700 nautical
miles (3,148km) from their land bases, as far as the Indi-
an and Mozambican coasts.
237
The farthest that attacks
have been recorded off Nigeria is around 120 nautical
miles (about 222km).
The international community realised from the start that
Somalia was in no position to counter the piracy threat
itself. Over 30 states are now involved in three multina-
tional naval operations (led by the EU, NATO and the
U.S. respectively) and a number of independent unilateral
initiatives to deter and suppress piracy. As Gulf of Guinea
states have greater capacities than Somalia, the interna-
tional community is keen that they should take the lead in
designing and implementing their own counter-piracy
measures.
In 2011 the number of attempted pirate attacks off Soma-
lia continued to grow but the proportion of successful hi-
jacks fell.
238
A combination of stronger patrolling and a
reinforcement of ships self-defence have proved effec-
tive but these measures are not addressing the root causes
of the problem.
239
Indeed, while combined naval efforts
have created a safe corridor for ships through the Gulf of
Aden, pirates have responded by launching more attacks
further offshore, in particular on oil tankers towards the
Gulf and Middle East.
240

236
The internationally recognised high-risk area extends from
the Suez Canal and the straits of Hormuz in the north to latitude
10S (just north of the Tanzania-Mozambique border) and lon-
gitude 78E (in line with the tip of India). Piracy off the coast
of Somalia, op. cit., p. 23.
237
Piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the
coast of Somalia, International Maritime Organisation, op. cit.,
p. 5.
238
Piracy off the coast of Somalia, op. cit., p. 30.
239
The International Maritime Bureau has produced a best
practices manual on how to improve defence against pirates.
See www.imo.org.
240
The economic cost of Somali piracy 2011, One Earth Fu-
ture Foundation, 2012, p. 37.
Crisis Group Program Report NTK, TK Month 2012 Page 36

This experience bears important lessons and warnings for
those tackling piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The effec-
tiveness of the multinational naval operations points to
the critical importance of coordination between nations
and between the industry and military actors. Information
sharing and dissemination through the Maritime Security
Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) and the UK Maritime
Trade Operations (UKMTO) office in Dubai have pro-
vided effective early warning and rapid response mecha-
nisms. Industry has played its part by developing Best
Management Practices (BMPs) for ships transiting the ar-
ea.
In 2011, more and more ships opted to carry armed
guards to deter and repel boarders; a measure widely seen
as cardinal in reducing the number of successful hi-
jacks.
241
The growing acceptability and recognised effec-
tiveness of carrying armed private security personnel off
Somalia is likely to influence the shipping industrys re-
sponse to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
242
However, al-
lowing the carriage and use of arms by private security
companies carries grave risks which, in a weakly gov-
erned environment such as the Gulf of Guinea, could be
fatal. National and international actors need to be alert to
this and take steps to mitigate the risk.
The Somalia experience clearly shows the solution to pi-
racy lies on land.
243
While international efforts have re-
duced the risk of hijack,
244
the lack of state authority and
rule of law in Somalia has allowed investors to continue
financing pirate attacks and pirates to maintain land ba-
ses. This underlines the importance of tackling the root
causes on land of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, namely
poor governance.

241
US sees armed guards as deterrents to EA piracy, The
East African, 31 March 2012. Guards, razor wire help keep
Somali pirates at bay NATO, Reuters, 3 April 2012.
242
In late 2011, the UK, having previously opposed the car-
riage of armed guards, adopted a neutral stance and issued
guidelines to shipping companies for doing so in exceptional
circumstances.
243
On this issue, see Hugues Eudeline, Contenir la piraterie :
des rponses complexes face une menace persistante, Institut
franais des relations internationales, Focus stratgique no. 40,
November 2012.
244
IMB reports drop in Somali piracy, but warns against com-
placency, IMB, 22 October 2012.

APPENDIX F

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an inde-
pendent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some
130 staff members on five continents, working through
field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and
resolve deadly conflict.
Crisis Groups approach is grounded in field research. Teams
of political analysts are located within or close by countries
at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent con-
flict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it
produces analytical reports containing practical recommen-
dations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis
Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly
bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of
play in all the most significant situations of conflict or po-
tential conflict around the world.
Crisis Groups reports and briefing papers are distributed
widely by email and made available simultaneously on the
website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely
with governments and those who influence them, including
the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate
support for its policy prescriptions.
The Crisis Group Board which includes prominent figures
from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media
is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and
recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers
around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former U.S.
Undersecretary of State and Ambassador Thomas Pickering.
Its President and Chief Executive since July 2009 has been
Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.
Crisis Groups international headquarters is in Brussels, and
the organisation has offices or representation in 34 locations:
Abuja, Bangkok, Beijing, Beirut, Bishkek, Bogot, Bujum-
bura, Cairo, Dakar, Damascus, Dubai, Gaza, Guatemala
City, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Jerusalem, Johannesburg,
Kabul, Kathmandu, London, Moscow, Nairobi, New York,
Port-au-Prince, Pristina, Rabat, Sanaa, Sarajevo, Seoul, Tbilisi,
Tripoli, Tunis and Washington DC. Crisis Group currently
covers some 70 areas of actual or potential conflict across four
continents. In Africa, this includes, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Cte dIvoire,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbab-
we; in Asia, Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kash-
mir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Nepal, North Korea,
Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan,
Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in
Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyp-
rus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, North Caucasus, Serbia
and Turkey; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria,
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon,
Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Western Sahara and Yemen;
and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Colombia, Guate-
mala, Haiti and Venezuela.
Crisis Group receives financial support from a wide range of
governments, institutional foundations, and private sources.
The following governmental departments and agencies have
provided funding in recent years: Australian Agency for In-
ternational Development, Austrian Development Agency,
Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International
Development Agency, Canadian International Development
Research Centre, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union Instru-
ment for Stability, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ger-
man Federal Foreign Office, Irish Aid, Principality of Liech-
tenstein, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New
Zealand Agency for International Development, Royal Nor-
wegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency, Swedish Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs,
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom De-
partment for International Development, U.S. Agency for
International Development.
The following institutional and private foundations have pro-
vided funding in recent years: Adessium Foundation, Car-
negie Corporation of New York, Elders Foundation, William
and Flora Hewlett Foundation, Humanity United, Henry
Luce Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foun-
dation, Oak Foundation, Open Society Foundations, Plough-
shares Fund, Radcliffe Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund,
Stanley Foundation, The Charitable Foundation, Tinker Foun-
dation Incorporated.
December 2012


APPENDIX G

CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2009

Central Africa
Chad: Powder Keg in the East, Africa
Report N149, 15 April 2009 (also avail-
able in French).
Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding
Strategy, Africa Report N150, 11 May
2009 (also available in French).
Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to
Disarm the FDLR, Africa Report N151,
9 July 2009 (also available in French).
Burundi: russir lintgration des FNL,
Africa Briefing N63, 30 July 2009.
Chad: Escaping from the Oil Trap, Africa
Briefing N65, 26 August 2009 (also
available in French).
CAR: Keeping the Dialogue Alive, Africa
Briefing N69, 12 January 2010 (also
Burundi: Ensuring Credible Elections,
Africa Report N155, 12 February 2010
(also available in French).
Libye/Tchad: au-del dune politique
dinfluence, Africa Briefing N71, 23
March 2010 (also available in Arabic).
Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda,
Africa Briefing N73, 8 April 2010 (also
Chad: Beyond Superficial Stability, Africa
Report N162, 17 August 2010 (only
Congo: No Stability in Kivu Despite a
Rapprochement with Rwanda, Africa
Report N165, 16 November 2010 (also
Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the
Central African Republic, Africa Report
N167, 16 December 2010 (also
Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to
Political Impasse, Africa Report N169,
7 February 2011 (also available in
French).
Le Nord-ouest du Tchad: la prochaine zone
haut risque ?, Africa Briefing N78,
17 February 2011.
Congo: The Electoral Dilemma, Africa
Report N175, 5 May 2011 (also
Congo: The Electoral Process Seen from
the East, Africa Briefing N80, 5
September 2011 (also available in
French).
Africa without Qaddafi: The Case of Chad,
Africa Report N180, 21 October 2011
Implementing Peace and Security
Architecture (I): Central Africa, Africa
The Lords Resistance Army: End Game?,
Africa Report N182, 17 November
2011.
Burundi: A Deepening Corruption Crisis,
Africa Report N185, 21 March 2012
Black Gold in the Congo: Threat to
Stability or Development Opportunity?,
Africa Report N188, 11 July 2012 (also
Eastern Congo: Why Stabilisation Failed,
Africa Briefing N91, 4 October 2012
Burundi: Bye-bye Arusha? Africa Report
N192, 25 October 2012 (only available
in French).
The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger
Zone, Africa Report N195, 12
December 2012 (only available in
French).
Eastern Congo: The ADF-Nalus Lost
Rebellion, Africa Briefing N93, 19
December 2012 (only available in
French).
Horn of Africa
Sudan: Justice, Peace and the ICC, Africa
Report N152, 17 July 2009.
Somalia: The Trouble with Puntland,
Africa Briefing N64, 12 August 2009.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its
Discontents, Africa Report N153, 4
September 2009.
Somaliland: A Way out of the Electoral
Crisis, Africa Briefing N67, 7 Decem-
ber 2009.
Sudan: Preventing Implosion, Africa
Briefing N68, 17 December 2009.
Jongleis Tribal Conflicts: Countering
Insecurity in South Sudan, Africa Report
N154, 23 December 2009.
Rigged Elections in Darfur and the Conse-
quences of a Probable NCP Victory in
Sudan, Africa Briefing N72, 30 March
2010.
LRA: A Regional Strategy Beyond Killing
Kony, Africa Report N157, 28 April
Sudan: Regional Perspectives on the
Prospect of Southern Independence,
Africa Report N159, 6 May 2010.
Somalias Divided Islamists, Africa
Briefing N74, 18 May 2010 (also
available in Somali).
Sudan: Defining the North-South Border,
Africa Briefing N75, 2 September
2010.
Eritrea: The Siege State, Africa Report
N163, 21 September 2010.
Negotiating Sudans North-South Future,
Africa Briefing N76, 23 November
2010.
Somalia: The Transitional Government on
Life Support, Africa Report N170, 21
February 2011.
Politics and Transition in the New South
Sudan, Africa Briefing N172, 4 April
2011.
Divisions in Sudans Ruling Party and the
Threat to the Countrys Stability, Africa
Report N174, 4 May 2011.
South Sudan: Compounding Instability in
Unity State, Africa Report N179, 17
October 2011 (also available in
Chinese).
Kenya: Impact of the ICC Proceedings,
Africa Briefing N84, 9 January 2012.
Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation,
Africa Briefing N85, 25 January 2012.
The Kenyan Military Intervention in
Somalia, Africa Report N184, 15
February 2012.
Somalia: An Opportunity that Should Not
Be Missed, Africa Briefing N87, 22
February 2012.
Chinas New Courtship in South Sudan,
Africa Report N186, 4 April 2012.
Uganda: No Resolution to Growing
Tensions, Africa Report N187, 5 April
2012.
Ethiopia After Meles, Africa Briefing N89,
22 August 2012.
Assessing Turkeys Role in Somalia, Africa
Briefing N92, 8 October 2012.
Sudan: Major Reform or More War, Africa
Report N194, 29 November 2012.
SouthernAfrica
Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Govern-
ment, Africa Briefing N59, 20 April
2009.
Zimbabwe: Political and Security Chal-
lenges to the Transition, Africa Briefing
N70, 3 March 2010.
Madagascar: sortir du cycle de crises,
Africa Report N156, 18 March 2010.

Madagascar: la crise un tournant
critique ?, Africa Report N166, 18
November 2010.
Zimbabwe: The Road to Reform or Another
Dead End, Africa Report N173, 27
April 2011.
Resistance and Denial: Zimbabwes Stalled
Reform Agenda, Africa Briefing N82,
16 November 2011.
Zimbabwes Sanctions Standoff, Africa
Briefing N86, 6 February 2012 (also
available in Chinese).
Implementing Peace and Security
Architecture (II): Southern Africa,
Africa Report N191, 15 October 2012.
West Africa
Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security
Sector Reform, Africa Report N148,
13 January 2009.
Guinea-Bissau: Building a Real Stability
Pact, Africa Briefing N57, 29 January
Guinea: The Transition Has Only Just
Begun, Africa Briefing N58, 5 March
Nigeria: Seizing the Moment in the Niger
Delta, Africa Briefing N60, 30 April
2009.
Guinea-Bissau: Beyond Rule of the Gun,
Africa Briefing N61, 25 June 2009
(also available in Portuguese).
Cte dIvoire: Whats Needed to End the
Crisis, Africa Briefing N62, 2 July
Guinea: Military Rule Must End, Africa
Briefing N66, 16 October 2009 (also
Cte dIvoire: scuriser le processus lec-
toral, Africa Report N158, 5 May 2010.
Cameroon: Fragile State?, Africa Report
N160, 25 May 2010 (also available in
French).
Cameroon: The Dangers of a Fracturing
Regime, Africa Report N161, 24 June
Guinea: Reforming the Army, Africa
Report N164, 23 September 2010 (also
Cte dIvoire: Sortir enfin de lornire ?,
Africa Briefing N77, 25 November
2010.
Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict,
Africa Report N168, 20 December
2010.
Nigerias Elections: Reversing the
Degeneration?, Africa Briefing N79, 24
February 2011.
Cte dIvoire: Is War the Only Option?,
Africa Report N171, 3 March 2011
A Critical Period for Ensuring Stability in
Cte dIvoire, Africa Report N176, 1
August 2011 (also available in French).
Liberia: How Sustainable Is the Recovery?,
Africa Report N177, 19 August 2011.
Guinea: Putting the Transition Back on
Track, Africa Report N178, 23
September 2011.
Cte dIvoire: Continuing the Recovery,
Africa Briefing N83, 16 December
Au-del des compromis: les perspectives de
rforme en Guine-Bissau, Africa Report
N183, 23 January 2012 (also available
in Portuguese).
Liberia: Time for Much-Delayed
Reconciliation and Reform, Africa
Briefing N88, 12 June 2012.
Mali: Avoiding Escalation, Africa Report
N189, 18 July 2012 (also available in
French).
Beyond Turf Wars: Managing the Post-
Coup Transition in Guinea-Bissau,
Africa Report N190, 17 August 2012
Mali: The Need for Determined and
Coordinated International Action, Africa
Briefing N90, 24 September 2012 (also
Cte dIvoire: Defusing Tensions, Africa
Curbing Violence in Nigeria (I): The Jos
Crisis, Africa Report N196, 17
December 2012.
Yemen: Enduring Conflicts, Threatened
Transition, Middle East Report N125, 3
July 2012 (also available in Arabic).
Dj Vu All Over Again: Iraqs Escalating
Political Crisis, Middle East Report
N126, 30 July 2012 (also available in
Arabic).
Iraqs Secular Opposition: The Rise and
Decline of Al-Iraqiya, Middle East
Report N127, 31 July 2012 (also
available in Arabic).


APPENDIX H

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES

CHAI R
Thomas R Pickering
Former U.S. Undersecretary of State;
Ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel,
Jordan, El Salvador and Nigeria
PRESI DENT & CEO
Louise Arbour
Former UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda
VI CE-CHAI RS
Ayo Obe
Legal Practitioner, Lagos, Nigeria
Ghassan Salam
Dean, Paris School of International Affairs,
Sciences Po
EXECUTI VE COMMI TTEE
Morton Abramowitz
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
and Ambassador to Turkey
Cheryl Carolus
Former South African High Commissioner to
the UK and Secretary General of the ANC
Maria Livanos Cattaui
Former Secretary-General of the International
Chamber of Commerce
Yoichi Funabashi
Chairman of the Rebuild Japan Initiative; Former
Editor-in-Chief, The Asahi Shimbun
Frank Giustra
President & CEO, Fiore Financial Corporation
Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown
Former UN Deputy Secretary-General and
Administrator of the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP)
Moiss Nam
Senior Associate, International Economics
Program, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace; Former Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy
George Soros
Chairman, Open Society Institute
Pr Stenbck
Former Foreign Minister of Finland
OTHER BOARD MEMBERS
Kofi Annan
Former Secretary-General of the United Nations;
Nobel Peace Prize (2001)
Nahum Barnea
Chief Columnist for Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel
Samuel Berger
Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group LLC;
Former U.S. National Security Adviser
Emma Bonino
Vice President of the Italian Senate; Former
Minister of International Trade and European
Affairs of Italy and European Commissioner
for Humanitarian Aid
Micheline Calmy-Rey
Former President of the Swiss Confederation
and Foreign Affairs Minister
Wesley Clark
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander
Sheila Coronel
Toni Stabile Professor of Practice in Investigative
Journalism; Director, Toni Stabile Center for Inves-
tigative Journalism, Columbia University, U.S.
Mark Eyskens
Former Prime Minister of Belgium
Nabil Fahmy
Former Ambassador of Egypt to the U.S. and
Japan; Founding Dean, School of Public Affairs,
American University in Cairo
Joschka Fischer
Former Foreign Minister of Germany
Lykke Friis
Former Climate & Energy Minister and Minister
of Gender Equality of Denmark; Former Prorec-
tor at the University of Copenhagen
Jean-Marie Guhenno
Arnold Saltzman Professor of War and Peace
Studies, Columbia University; Former UN Under-
Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
Carla Hills
Former U.S. Secretary of Housing and U.S.
Trade Representative
Lena Hjelm-Walln
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister of Sweden
Mo Ibrahim
Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim Foundation;
Founder, Celtel International
Igor Ivanov
Former Foreign Minister of the Russian
Federation
Asma Jahangir
President of the Supreme Court Bar Association
of Pakistan, Former UN Special Rapporteur on
the Freedom of Religion or Belief
Wadah Khanfar
Co-Founder, Al Sharq Forum; Former Director
General, Al Jazeera Network
Wim Kok
Former Prime Minister of the Netherlands
Ricardo Lagos
Former President of Chile
Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Former International Secretary of PEN
International; Novelist and journalist, U.S.
Lalit Mansingh
Former Foreign Secretary of India, Ambassador
to the U.S. and High Commissioner to the UK
Benjamin Mkapa
Former President of Tanzania
Laurence Parisot
President, French Business Confederation
(MEDEF)
Karim Raslan
Founder, Managing Director and Chief Executive
Officer of KRA Group
Paul Reynolds
President & Chief Executive Officer, Canaccord
Financial Inc.
Javier Solana
Former EU High Representative for the Common
Foreign and Security Policy, NATO Secretary-
General and Foreign Minister of Spain
Liv Monica Stubholt
Senior Vice President for Strategy and Commu-
nication, Kvaerner ASA; Former State Secretary
for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Lawrence Summers
Former Director of the US National Economic
Council and Secretary of the U.S. Treasury;
President Emeritus of Harvard University
Wang Jisi
Dean, School of International Studies, Peking
University; Member, Foreign Policy Advisory
Committee of the Chinese Foreign Ministry
Wu Jianmin
Executive Vice Chairman, China Institute for
Innovation and Development Strategy; Member,
Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of the
Chinese Foreign Ministry; Former Ambassador
of China to the UN (Geneva) and France
Lionel Zinsou
CEO, PAI Partners


PRESI DENT S COUNCI L
A distinguished group of individual and corporate donors providing essential support and expertise to Crisis Group.
Dow Chemical
Mala Gaonkar
Frank Holmes
Steve Killelea
George Landegger
McKinsey & Company
Ford Nicholson & Lisa Wolverton
Harry Pokrandt
Shearman & Sterling LLP
Ian Telfer
White & Case LLP
Neil Woodyer
I NTERNATI ONAL ADVI SORY COUNCI L
Individual and corporate supporters who play a key role in Crisis Groups efforts to prevent deadly conflict.
Anglo American PLC
APCO Worldwide Inc.
Ryan Beedie
Stanley Bergman & Edward
Bergman
BP
Chevron
Neil & Sandra DeFeo Family
Foundation
Equinox Partners
Neemat Frem
FTI Consulting
Seth & Jane Ginns
Alan Griffiths
Rita E. Hauser
George Kellner
Faisel Khan
Zelmira Koch Polk
Elliott Kulick
Harriet Mouchly-Weiss
Nringslivets
Internationella Rd (NIR)
International Council of
Swedish Industry
Griff Norquist
Ana Luisa Ponti & Geoffrey
R. Hoguet
Kerry Propper
Michael L. Riordan
Shell
Nina Solarz
Horst Sporer
Statoil
Talisman Energy
Tilleke & Gibbins
Kevin Torudag
Yap Merkezi Construction
and Industry Inc.
Stelios S. Zavvos
SENI OR ADVI SERS
Former Board Members who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on (to the
extent consistent with any other office they may be holding at the time).
Martti Ahtisaari
Chairman Emeritus
George Mitchell
Chairman Emeritus
Gareth Evans
President Emeritus
Kenneth Adelman
Adnan Abu Odeh
HRH Prince Turki al-Faisal
Hushang Ansary
scar Arias
Ersin Arolu
Richard Armitage
Diego Arria
Zainab Bangura
Shlomo Ben-Ami
Christoph Bertram
Alan Blinken
Lakhdar Brahimi
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Kim Campbell
Jorge Castaeda
Naresh Chandra
Eugene Chien
Joaquim Alberto Chissano
Victor Chu
Mong Joon Chung
Pat Cox
Gianfranco DellAlba
Jacques Delors
Alain Destexhe
Mou-Shih Ding
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
Gernot Erler
Marika Fahln
Stanley Fischer
Malcolm Fraser
I.K. Gujral
Swanee Hunt
Max Jakobson
James V. Kimsey
Aleksander Kwasniewski
Todung Mulya Lubis
Allan J. MacEachen
Graa Machel
Jessica T. Mathews
Nobuo Matsunaga
Barbara McDougall
Matthew McHugh
Mikls Nmeth
Christine Ockrent
Timothy Ong
Olara Otunnu
Lord (Christopher) Patten
Shimon Peres
Victor Pinchuk
Surin Pitsuwan
Cyril Ramaphosa
Fidel V. Ramos
George Robertson
Michel Rocard
Volker Rhe
Gler Sabanc
Mohamed Sahnoun
Salim A. Salim
Douglas Schoen
Christian Schwarz-Schilling
Michael Sohlman
Thorvald Stoltenberg
Leo Tindemans
Ed van Thijn
Simone Veil
Shirley Williams
Grigory Yavlinski
Uta Zapf
Ernesto Zedillo

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