IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

BRUNSWICK DIVISION
LEO MUNDY, *
Plaintiff, *
*
v. * CV 213-128
*
KAREN HAMBRIGHT and VALERIE *
HEPBURN, *
*
Defendants. *
ORDER
Presently pending before the Court are Defendants Karen
Hambright ("Hambright") and Valerie Hepburn's ("Hepburn")
(collectively "Defendants") motions to dismiss Plaintiff Leo
Mundy's ("Plaintiff") complaint. Upon due consideration,
Hambright's motion (doc. no. 9) is DENIED, and Hepburn's motion
(doc. no. 10) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
This action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, arises
from the alleged ransacking of Plaintiff's residence. The
relevant factual allegations in the complaint, taken as true and
with all reasonable inferences drawn in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff, follow.
Plaintiff was an Associate Professor of Sociology at
Coastal College of Georgia ("CCGA") from August 1, 2009, until
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his resignation on April 2, 2012. (Compl. K 7.) CCGA is a
public university. (Id. ff 5-6.) During the times relevant to
this action, Hambright was the Dean of the School of Arts,
Humanities, and Social Sciences at CCGA and was Plaintiff's
direct supervisor. (Id. Uf 5, 9.) During the same time,
Hepburn was the President of CCGA. (Id. H 6.)
In March of 2012, Hepburn informed Plaintiff by letter that
he would not be awarded tenure at CCGA. (Id. H 8.) Thereafter,
Hambright admitted to Plaintiff in a meeting that the
administration had assisted two other candidates regarding their
tenure applications. (Id. H 9.) Following the meeting,
Plaintiff informed Hambright that he intended to formally
complain to Hepburn regarding this preferential treatment. (See
id. H1I 9-10.) In response, Hambright twice threatened to kill
Plaintiff for "threatening her career." (See id. HU 11-13.)
"[F]earing for his life," Plaintiff emailed a letter of
resignation to Hepburn on or about April 2, 2012, and "fled the
area[.]" (Id. H 14.) Hepburn, "frustrated about [Plaintiff's]
abrupt resignation" during the academic semester, "instructed
the faculty under her supervision to track [him] down[.]" (Id.
H 15.) Hepburn also instructed Hambright to enter and search
Plaintiff's home even though the CCGA police informed her that
she was not authorized to conduct such a search. (Id. UH 15-
16.)
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On or about April 2, 2012, Hambright obtained a key to
Plaintiff's residence from Curt Spires ("Spires"), another CCGA
faculty member. (Id. H 17.) Hambright entered Plaintiff's home
and "conducted a thorough and invasive search" consistent with
Hepburn's instructions.1 (Id. H 18.) This search was conducted
without a search warrant. (Id. U 15.) Hambright later informed
other CCGA faculty and administration of her actions, and no one
objected to the propriety of her actions. (See id. H 18.)
Hambright notified Plaintiff of these events by letter written
on CCGA letterhead.2 (Id. H 19.) Hambright attached a copy of
Plaintiff's house key to the letter as proof that she had indeed
entered and searched his residence. (Id. H 20.)
On August 28, 2013, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint.
He raised only one claim: that Defendants, purporting to carry
out their duties as officials of a public university, were
liable under 1983 for violating his rights protected by the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments "by planning and carrying out
the unreasonable and invasive search of [his] home[.]" (Compl.
H1I 25-27.) In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff requests
declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive
damages, attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation, and
prejudgment and post-judgment interest.
1 As a part of this search, Hambright examined Plaintiff's toothbrush
"to determine how recently he had brushed his teeth." (Id. H 18.)
2 In the letter, Hambright allegedly stated that "[Plaintiff] had
'betrayed' her, made a strange reference to a magic acorn, and planted a red
lipstick kiss under the signature line." (Id. H 19.)
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On September 23, 2013, Hambright filed her motion to
dismiss Plaintiff's claims against her. Hepburn filed her
motion to dismiss the next day. The time for filing materials in
opposition has expired, and the motions are ripe for
consideration.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
court tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not whether
the plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits. Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) . The court must accept as true
all facts alleged in the complaint and construe all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
Hoffman-Pugh v. Ramsey, 312 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002).
The court, however, need not accept the complaint's legal
conclusions as true, only its well-pled facts. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
A complaint also must "contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, *to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.'" Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The plaintiff is required to plead
"factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Id. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a
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*probability requirement, ' but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.
III. DISCUSSION
42 U.S.C. 1983 does not itself create any substantive
legal rights; instead, it only provides "a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred."3 Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To sustain a claim under 1983,
the plaintiff must establish that he was "deprived of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and
that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state
law." Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50
(1999).
Defendants argue that dismissal is warranted because the
complaint's allegations fail to show that they were plausibly
acting under color of state law. Further, Hepburn raises three
additional arguments in support of her motion to dismiss. In
42 U.S.C. 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ....
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terms of sequencing, the Court will first address the parties'
"under color of state law" arguments before turning to Hepburn's
remaining contentions.
A. Under Color of State Law
In support of their motions to dismiss, Defendants attempt
to divorce their conduct from their duties and obligations as
state officials, likening it to purely private endeavors. They
claim that their positions as President of CCGA and Dean of
CCGA's School of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences did not
clothe them with any authority to enter and search Plaintiff's
home or to direct anyone to do the same. In contrast, Plaintiff
contends that Defendants were acting under color of law not
simply because they held their positions at CCGA; rather, it was
because they misused the authority of their positions to effect
the search. He points out that "[w]hile a private employer could
have abused her authority to harm a similarly situated private
employee, that private employer would not have accomplished her
violative act through power vested in her by the state." (PL's
Resp. in Opp'n to Def. Hepburn's Mot. to Dismiss at 10 (emphasis
in original); see also PL's Opp'n to Def. Hambright's Mot. to
Dismiss at 9-10 .)
For a 1983 claim, "[t]he traditional definition of acting
under color of state law requires that a defendant . . . have
exercised power *possessed by virtue of state law and made
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possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the
authority of state law.'" West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49
(1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
(1941) ). Further, " [a] person acts under color of state law
when [s]he acts with authority possessed by virtue of [her]
employment with the state or when the manner of [her] conduct
makes clear that [s]he was asserting the authority granted [her]
and not acting in the role of a private person." Myers v.
Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks and punctuation omitted) (citing Williams v.
United States, 341 U.S. 97, 100 (1951); Griffin v. City of Opa-
Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001)); see West, 487 U.S.
at 50 ("[G]enerally, a public employee acts under color of state
law while acting in [her] official capacity or while exercising
[her] responsibilities pursuant to state law."). A state
official need not act specifically pursuant to the authority of
law granted to her; an act is effected under color of state law
if the state official commits the act "under pretense of law."
Butler v. Sheriff of Palm Beach Cnty. , 685 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11th
Cir. 2012); see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 110 (1945)
(plurality opinion) ("It is clear that under xcolor' of law
means under 'pretense' of law.").
"Not all acts by state employees are acts under color of
law[.]" Myers, 713 F.3d at 1329 (citing Almand v. DeKalb Cnty.,
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Ga., 103 F.3d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir. 1997)). The Eleventh
Circuit has explained that "[t]he dispositive issue is whether
the official was acting pursuant to the power [she] possessed by
state authority or acting only as a private individual."
Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1523 (11th Cir.
1995). With these guidelines in mind, courts assess the
totality of the circumstances and have considered whether there
is a sufficient nexus between a defendant's duties and
obligations as a state official and the alleged abuse of
authority. See Griffin, 261 F.3d at 1303, 1306; Hackett v.
Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1356 (N.D. Ga.
2002); see also Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 494 (10th Cir.
1995) ("[I]t is the plaintiff's burden to . . . establish [] the
existence of 'a real nexus' between the defendant's conduct and
the defendant's 'badge' of state authority in order to
demonstrate action was taken 'under color of state law.'").
Here, the totality of the factual allegations in the
complaint and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom show
that Defendants were plausibly acting under color of state law.
Hambright was the Dean of the School in which Plaintiff taught
and was Plaintiff's direct supervisor. Hambright was directly
responsible for Plaintiff as a part of her duties as Dean to
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manage and oversee the faculty and administration in her school.4
As the President of CCGA, a public state university, Hepburn
wielded substantial authority in managing and overseeing its
faculty and administration. Further, Hepburn authored the
letter to Plaintiff stating that he had been denied tenure
because she also possessed authority over employment matters.
By extension, Plaintiff was a subordinate of Hepburn and under
her authority.
Plaintiff's abrupt, mid-term resignation arguably falls
well within the ambit of Hepburn's authority regarding faculty
oversight and employment matters and of Hambright's authority
regarding faculty and administration oversight at the School of
Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. Thus, Hepburn exercised
at least the pretense of this authority by directing the faculty
to track down Plaintiff and instructing Hambright to enter and
search Plaintiff's residence. Hambright, fulfilling her roles
as Dean and Hepburn's subordinate, exercised at least the
pretense of her authority by securing the key from Spires and
searching Plaintiff's home. That no one objected to Hambright's
actions strengthens the inference that Defendants were, at a
4 Hambright points out that "Plaintiff can, in fact, point to no Georgia
law that allows college professors to enter the home of former college
professors without permission!] under any circumstances." (Def. Hambright's
Br. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 8-9.) However, this Circuit has established
that a state official need not act pursuant to a specific grant of power and
may act "under pretense of law" for her conduct to be considered under color
of state law. See, e.g., Butler, 685 F.3d at 1268.
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minimum, acting under the pretense of their authority as
President and Dean of CCGA in directing and realizing the search
of Plaintiff's home.5
Further, the complaint's allegations evince a sufficient
nexus between the search of Plaintiff's home and Defendants'
duties and obligations as President and Dean at CCGA. As
already noted, Hepburn wielded significant control over CCGA's
faculty and administration. Similarly, Hambright wielded
control over the faculty and staff in the School of Arts,
Humanities, and Social Sciences. Further, addressing
Plaintiff's abrupt, mid-term resignation and departure
implicates employment and faculty oversight issues, matters
arguably within Defendants' spheres of authority. Accordingly,
the complaint shows that Defendants' actions regarding the
search of Plaintiff's home were plausibly part and parcel of
their attempts to address a faculty and employment matter and
thus demonstrate a sufficient nexus between Defendants' actions
and their duties and obligations as state officials.
Based upon the foregoing, the complaint's allegations are
sufficient to show that Defendants plausibly acted under color
of state law in directing and conducting the search of
5 Hepburn notes that "any employer, including a private employer, could
have done what [Defendants] did." (Def. Hepburn's Br. in Supp. Mot. to
Dismiss at 11.) Her attempts to recast her actions as private conduct prove
unfruitful. The dispositive inquiry is not whether a defendant's actions can
be replicated in a private context but rather whether a state official lends
the authority of her position, and thereby the authority of the State, to her
actions. See Myers, 713 F.3d at 1329-30; Griffin, 261 F.3d at 1303-07.
10
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Plaintiff's residence. Further, because Hambright only
challenges that she was acting under color of law state law in
committing the alleged acts underlying Plaintiff's 1983 claim,
Hambright's motion to dismiss is DENIED.
B. Hepburn's Remaining Arguments in Her Motion to Dismiss
Hepburn also contends that Plaintiff's prayer for
injunctive relief should be dismissed, that the complaint fails
to show that she plausibly violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment
rights, and that she is entitled to qualified immunity. The
Court will address each issue in turn.
1) Injunctive Relief
Hepburn contends that Plaintiff's prayer for injunctive
relief is premature at this time. Plaintiff agrees but requests
that the Court only dismiss his prayers for injunctive relief
against Hepburn without prejudice so that, if warranted, he
could later reassert them. Because Hepburn consents to this
result, Plaintiff's prayers for injunctive relief against
Hepburn are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2) Fourth Amendment Violation
The Fourth Amendment, incorporated by and made applicable
to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 694 n.2 (1981),
protects w[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
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searches and seizures[.]" A valid Fourth Amendment claim for an
unreasonable search has three elements.6 First, the complaint
must show that a state actor plausibly infringed on "an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable." O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987)
(citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
Second, courts must determine whether the alleged search
conducted was reasonable, which "depends on the context within
which a search takes place." Id. at 719 (citing New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985)). This inquiry requires
"balanc [ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance
of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."
Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983);
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)). Third, the
complaint must allege a causal connection between the
defendant's actions and the constitutional deprivation.7
6 In addition to the substantive requirements imposed by the Fourth
Amendment, a valid claim brought under the Fourteenth Amendment requires a
showing of "state action." See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924
(1982). A deprivation of federal rights constitutes state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment when it is "caused by the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the state . . . or by a person for whom the state is
responsible . . . [and] the party charged with the deprivation must be a
person who may fairly be said to be a state actor." Id. at 937; see West, 487
U.S. at 49. Although courts note "the possibility that action under color of
state law might not always constitute state action," Almand, 103 F.3d at 1513
n.7, a finding that a state official acted "under color state law," such as
here, satisfies the state action requirement, see Lugar, 457 U.S. at 929.
7 This Court has observed:
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Here, the complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a
plausible Fourth Amendment claim for an unreasonable search.
First, the complaint shows that Hambright's entry into and
search of Plaintiff's home infringed on a reasonable expectation
of privacy. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178
(1984) (w[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment
has stressed xthe overriding respect for the sanctity of the
home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins
of the Republic.'" (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
601 (1980) ) . Second, based on the context laid out in the
complaint and in light of the strong protections offered to
one's private property from state invasions, the search of
Plaintiff's residence cannot be considered reasonable. See
0' Connor, 480 U.S. at 720 (w[I]t is settled . . . that 'except
in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of
private property without proper consent is unreasonable unless
Section 1983 provides for liability against a person who
"subjects, or causes to be subjected," someone to the deprivation
of federally established rights. Thus, liability can be incurred
either directly or indirectly. Arnold v. IBM Corp., 637 F.2d
1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981) . But in any event, "causation is an
essential element of a section 1983 cause of action." Greffey v.
Alabama Dep't of Corr., 996 F. Supp. 1368, 1377 (N.D. Ala. 1998)
(quoting Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986)).
And with claims of indirect deprivation, like the claim against
[Hepburn], the plaintiff must show that the defendant proximately
caused the deprivation by "setting in motion a series of acts by
others which the [defendant knew] or reasonably should [have
known] would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury."
Arnold, 637 F.2d at 1355 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,
743-44 (9th Cir. 1978)).
Myers v. Bowman, No. l:09-cv-155, doc. no. 80, at 30-31 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 21,
2011) (first alteration added).
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it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.'" (quoting
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 370 (1968)); see Oliver, 466
U.S. at 178. Here, Hepburn allegedly directed the search of
Plaintiff's home without a warrant or authorization from the
CCGA police department. Further, the complaint shows no
circumstances that could justify the warrantless search.8 See
generally O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 720. Third, the complaint
satisfies the causation prong because it alleges that Hepburn
directed Hambright to conduct the allegedly unlawful search of
Plaintiff's home. See Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235
(11th Cir. 2003) ("A causal connection can also be established
by facts which support an inference that the supervisor directed
the subordinates to act unlawfully . . . ."); cf. Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (observing that 1983 "should be
8 Hepburn's argument that she and Hambright obtained valid consent by
obtaining the key from Spires is erroneous. Although Hepburn correctly
points out that consent may be obtained from a third party who possess common
authority over the premises, such common authority "rests 'on mutual use of
property by persons generally having joint access or control for most
purposes . ' The burden of establishing that common authority rests
upon the State." Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). Here, the
complaint fails to show that Spires maintained any form of common authority
over Plaintiff's residence and that he could thereby consent to the search of
Plaintiff's residence.
In addition, Hepburn's argument that "it was objectively reasonable for
Hambright to believe she had third party consent when she was provided with a
key to Plaintiff's home" is unpersuasive. (Def. Hepburn's Br. in Supp. Mot.
to Dismiss at 14.) First, the CCGA police informed Hepburn that she was not
authorized to conduct a search of Plaintiff's residence. Second, that Spires
had a key to Plaintiff's home is of dubious value, and there are no other
indicia of Spires's common authority over Plaintiff's residence. Third, it
is telling that the complaint consistently refers to the residence as
Plaintiff's home and that Hepburn embraces this characterization in her
briefing. Accordingly, the proposition that Hambright could reasonably
believe that she had the consent of a third party who had common authority
over Plaintiff's home is untenable at this stage in the proceedings.
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read against the background of tort liability that makes a man
responsible for the natural consequences of his actions").
Based upon the foregoing, the complaint alleges a plausible
claim that Hepburn deprived Plaintiff's rights as protected by
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.
3) Qualified Immunity
The Court rejects the assertion that Hepburn is entitled to
qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government
officials performing discretionary functions from being sued in
their individual capacities. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609
(1999). Public officials are shielded under qualified immunity
so far as "their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982). Qualified immunity is a question of law for the court.
Post v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.
1993) .
The Eleventh Circuit utilizes a two-part analysis for this
defense. First, the defendant official must prove that she was
acting within the scope of her discretionary authority when the
allegedly wrongful acts occurred. Hartsfield v. Lemacks, 50
F.3d 950, 953 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Holloman ex. rel.
Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265-67 (11th Cir. 2004)
(discussing the "discretionary authority" requirement). If the
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defendant meets this burden, then "the plaintiff must show that:
(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this
right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation." Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1158
(11th Cir. 2010) (punctuation omitted) (quoting Holloman, 370
F.3d at 1264). "A right is clearly established if, in light of
already-existing law, the unlawfulness of the conduct is
apparent, and if a constitutional rule applies with obvious
clarity to give an official fair warning that violating that
right is actionable." Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1255
(11th Cir. 2005) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Hepburn is not entitled to qualified immunity because the
complaint adequately alleges a violation of Plaintiff's clearly
established rights. First, for the reasons previously
discussed, the complaint provides sufficient factual content to
show that Hepburn plausibly violated Plaintiff's Fourth
Amendment rights. Second, this right had been clearly
established at the time of the violation. The Eleventh Circuit
has "identified three ways in which the law can give [a state
official] 'fair and clear notice' that [her] conduct is
unconstitutional." Bates v. Harvey, 518 F.3d 1233, 1248 (11th
Cir. 2008). Under the second method, "a broad principle found
in the case law can 'establish clearly the law applicable to a
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specific set of facts facing a government official' when the
principle is set for xwith obvious clarity to the point that
every objectively reasonable government official facing the
circumstances would know that the official's conduct did violate
federal law when the official acted.'" Id. (quoting Vinyard v.
Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002)).
This second method is appropriate in this case. The
Supreme Court has readily recognized
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment.
The Amendment reflects the recognition of the Framers
that certain enclaves should be free from arbitrary
government interference. For example, the Court since
the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed
"the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home
that has been embedded in our tradition since the
origins of the Republic."
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 601) . In
addition, the complaint demonstrates that a warrantless search
was not justified. See Bates, 518 F.3d at 1243. Hepburn fails
to articulate an exigent circumstance that would have warranted
a search of Plaintiff's home, nor can the Court find one from
the face of the complaint. Moreover, as explained supra, the
allegations show that Hepburn could not have reasonably
concluded that she received consent to search Plaintiff's
residence by a person with authority to give such consent. Cf.
id. at 1242 ("Qualified immunity protects [state officials] from
1983 suits for civil damages arising from the discharge of
17
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their discretionary functions, 'as long as their actions could
reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are
alleged to have violated.'" (emphasis added) (quoting Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)). Finally, it is clearly
established that the acts committed by a state official
exercising at least the pretense of her authority constitutes
state action. See, e.g. , West, 487 U.S. at 50; Griffin, 261
F.3d at 1307; see also Almand, 103 F.3d at 1513 n.7. In sum,
the allegations in the complaint sufficiently demonstrate that
Hepburn had fair notice that the search of Plaintiff's home
violated his constitutional rights.
Based upon the foregoing, Hepburn has failed to demonstrate
that dismissal of Plaintiff's 1983 claim against her is
warranted. Accordingly, to the extent as provided in the
foregoing, Hepburn's motion to dismiss is DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Hambright's motion to
dismiss (doc. no. 9) is DENIED, and Hepburn's motion to dismiss
(doc. no. 10) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It is
hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's prayers for injunctive relief
18
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against Hepburn are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
proceed on his 1983 claim against Defendants.9
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this
2014.
Plaintiff may
day of June,
HONORABLE J. RANDAL HALL
UNITE STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
9 Of course, the conclusions in this Order should not be construed as
any ruling or commentary on whether Plaintiff will ultimately prevail on his
claim. This Order merely finds that the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint
withstand Defendants' motions to dismiss.
19
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