CASE NO.

1
1. A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC September 11, 2001
RE: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 140 OF THE RULES OF
COURT RE: DISCIPLINE OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES
The Court resolved to APPROVE the amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court regarding the discipline of Justices and Judges, so as to read as follows:
RULE 140
DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES OF REGULAR AND SPECIAL COURTS AND
JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN
SECTION 1. How instituted. - Proceedings for the discipline of judges of regular and
special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be
instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by
affidavits of person who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by
documents which may substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint,
supported by public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing
and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of
standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
SEC. 2. Action on the complaint. - If the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, a
copy thereof shall be served upon the respondent, and he shall be required to comment
within ten (10) days from the date of service. Otherwise, the same shall be dismissed.
SEC. 3. By whom complaint investigated. - Upon the filing of the respondent's comment,
or upon the expiration of the time for filing the same and unless other pleadings or
documents are required, the Court shall refer the matter to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation or assign the case for
investigation, report, and recommendation to a retired member of the Supreme Court, if
the respondent is a Justice of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, or to a Justice
of the Court of Appeals, if the respondent is a Judge of a Regional Trial Court or of a
special court of equivalent rank, or to a Judge of the Regional Trial Court if the
respondent is a Judge of an inferior court.
SEC. 4. Hearing. - the investigating Justice or Judge shall set a day of the hearing and
send notice thereof to both parties. At such hearing the parties may present oral and
documentary evidence. If, after due notice, the respondent fails to appear, the
investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety (90)
days from the date of its commencement or within such extension as the Supreme Court
may grant.
SEC. 5. Report. - Within thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the
investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing
findings of fact and recommendation. The report shall be accompanied by the record
containing the evidence and the pleadings filed by the parties. The report shall be
confidential and shall be for the exclusive use of the Court.
SEC. 6. Action. - The Court shall take such action on the report as the facts and the law
may warrant.
SEC. 7. Classification of charges. - Administrative charges are classified as serious, less
serious, or light.
SEC. 8. Serious charges. - Serious charges include:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No.
3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court
in an appropriate proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt;
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the
court;
8. Immorality;
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
10. Partisan political activities; and
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits.
SEC. 9. Less Serious Charges. - Less serious charges include:
1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case;
2. Frequently and unjustified absences without leave or habitual tardiness;
3. Unauthorized practice of law;
4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars;
5. Receiving additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law;
6. Untruthful statements in the certificate of service; and
7. Simple Misconduct.
SEC. 10. Light Charges. - Light charges include:
1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;
2. Gambling in public;
3. Fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with pending case/cases in his court; and
4. Undue delay in the submission of monthly reports.
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall
be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor
more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with warning.
SEC. 12. Confidentiality of proceedings. - Proceedings against Judges of regular and
special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan shall be
private and confidential, but a copy of the decision or resolution of the court shall be
attached to the record of the respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator










CASE NO. 3

A.M. NO. 03-10-01-SC
RESOLUTION PRESCRIBING MEASURES TO PROTECT MEMBERS OF THE
JUDICIARY FROM BASELESS AND UNFOUNDED ADMINISTRATIVE
COMPLAINTS
WHEREAS, statistics will show that the Supreme Court has disciplined numerous
members of the Judiciary as part of its efforts to cleanse its ranks and improve the
administration of justice;

WHEREAS, data also show that in many instances losing litigants or disgruntled
lawyers filed clearly unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal cases against
members of the Judiciary for purposes of harassing them; putting them to shame, public
ridicule or contempt; or preventing; or delaying the release of their retirement benefits;

WHEREAS, the filing of clearly unfounded or malicious complaints seriously affects the
efficiency of the members of Judiciary in administering fair, speedy and impartial justice;

WHEREAS, effective measures are necessary to prevent or at least, discourage the filing
of such cases, to protect the orderly administration of justice.

NOW, THEREFORE, as one of such measures, the Court RESOLVES that:
1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court Administrator, an
administrative complaint against any Justice of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan or
any Judge of the lower courts filed in connection with a case in court is shown to be
clearly unfounded and baseless and intended to harass the respondent, such a finding
should be included in the report and recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator. If the recommendation is approved or affirmed by the Court, the
complainant may be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of
court. If the complainant is a lawyer, he may further be required to show cause why he or
she should not be administratively sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer of
the court.
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a
Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year before
such filing; and (c) shownprima facie that it is intended to harass the respondent, it must
forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the Court
Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10) days from
receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and recommendation not later
than thirty (30) days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall act on the
recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement of the respondent, or, if it is
not possible to do so, within six (6) months from such date without prejudice to the
release of the retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be withheld,
taking into account the gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.



CASE NO. 4

ELISA V. VENTEREZ vs. ATTY. RODRIGO R. COSME
A. C. No. 7421
October 10, 2007

FACTS:
Complainants contracted the legal services of respondent for Declaration of Ownership
with Damages. The MTC ruled against the complainants. Respondent received a copy of
the said Decision on 3 March 2004. Complainants alleged that they directed the
respondent to either file a Motion for Reconsideration or a Notice of Appeal, but
respondent failed or refused to do so. Elisa V. Venterez was constrained to contract
another lawyer to prepare the Motion for Reconsideration. It must be stressed that the
said motion was signed by complainant Elisa V. Venterez herself as the said lawyer did
not enter his appearance. The said Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Respondent
was not furnished a copy of the denial of the motion per a Certification issued by Clerk of
Court II Zenaida C. de Vera. A Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution was filed by
the plaintiffs in the civil case but respondent never bothered to file an opposition to or
any comment on the said motion despite receipt thereof. The motion was eventually
granted.

For his defense, respondent averred that Salvador Ramirez (the son of one of the
complainants, Inocencia V. Ramirez), informed him that he [was] withdrawing the case
from the respondent because he already engaged another lawyer to take over the case, so
respondent gave the records of the case to him.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent committed culpable negligence in handling complainants case,
as would warrant disciplinary action.

RULING:
No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client,
but once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause
and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Among the fundamental
rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and
executory. A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his services
without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Any
dereliction of duty by a counsel affects the client.This means that his client is entitled to
the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.

Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to
conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to
abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its
final adjudication arises only from the client's written consent or from a good cause.

His professional relations as a lawyer with his clients are not terminated by the simple
turnover of the records of the case to his clients.
CASE NO. 5

FLORIDO VS. FLORIDO
420 SCRA 132
January 20, 2004


FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James
Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly
violating his oath as a lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and
bogus Court of Appeals Resolution.

Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido, the complainant, averred that she was the legitimate
spouse of the respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido, the respondent, but because of the
estranged relation, they lived separately. They have two children whom the complainant
has the custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage; meanwhile
there, was another related case pending in the Court of Appeals.

Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainants residence
in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor
children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged
Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for
temporary child custody.

Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her
that he had not received any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court
of Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the
resolution closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November
29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to
respondent. The complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a
certification dated January 18, 2005
[
from the Court of Appeals stating that no such
resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had
been issued.


ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Florido was liable for making false court resolution.

HELD:
Yes. A lawyer who used a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals is presumed to
have participated in its fabrication. Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer.
The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value
what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of
verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition
then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a clients cause,
it must never be at the expense of the truth.



CASE NO. 6

MERCADO VS. ATTY. VITRIOLO
A.C. NO. 5108
May 26, 2005

FACTS:
Rosa F. Mercado, the complainant, filed a disbarrement case against Atty. Julito D.
Vitriolo. The latter was a collaborating counsel of the complainant in her previous
annulment of marriage case.

The issue arose when the respondent filed a criminal action against complainant before
the office of the City Prosecutor for violation of Ariticles 171 and 172 of public
document) of the Revised Penal Code.
5
Respondent alleged that complainant made false
entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More
specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is
married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized on
April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their
marriage took place on April 11, 1978.

Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public
document disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for
annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted
complainant Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She claimed that, in filing
the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and
confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred. On the other hand
respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates
of live birth which are public documents and in no way connected with the confidence
taken during the engagement of respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the
complainant confided to him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the
annulment case. Nothing was said about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth
certificates of her two daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division
of CHED and are accessible to anyone.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent violated the client and lawyer privileged.

HELD:
No. The Court use the following factors in resolving the issue presented:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client
relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on
privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the
lawyer or the latter declines the employment.
23
The reason for this is to make the
prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that
what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be
equally free to obtain information from the prospective client.
24


(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of
disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the
client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose
for which it was given.

3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights
or obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney
for the purpose of seeking legal advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal
advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.

Applying all these rules to the case at bar, the Court held that the evidence on record
failed to substantiate complainant's allegations. The Court noted that complainant did not
even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her
claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contended that
respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal
action against her for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint
disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. She
did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her complaint.
The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the
complainant must prove.

Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from
the complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by
respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was
any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such confidential information is a
crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege. The
burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the
privilege.










CASE NO.7:

PFEIDER VS. PALANCA, AC 927
September 28, 1970

In the matter of the complaint for disbarment of Attorney Potenciano A. Palanca

FACTS:
William Pfleider, the complainant, alleged that he retained the services of Palanca. The
relations between the two must have attained such a high level of mutual trust that on
October 10, 1969, Pfleider and his wife leased to Palanca a 1,328 hectare agricultural
land in Hinobaan, Negros Occidental, known as the Hacienda Asia, for a period of ten
years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the
lease rentals would be paid to Pfleider, and the remainder would be delivered by Palanca
to Pfleider's listed creditors.

The arrangement worked smoothly until October 14, 1969 when the rupture came with
the filing by Pfleider of a civil suit against Palanca for rescission of the contract of lease
on the ground of alleged default in the payment of rentals.

Pfleider filed an administrative charge against Atty. Palanca. He alleged that with regard
to the charged estafa filed against him, he instructed Atty.Palanca to offer a settlement in
the sum of P10, 000. Atty. Palanca told him that the case was settled, but to his surprised,
the same was not settled and the money was appropriated by the former. Pfleider also
averred Atty. Palanca had fraudulently charged the sum of P5, 000.00 (which he
supposedly had left with the City Court in Dumaguete) to his rental account with Pfleider
as part payment of the lease rentals of the Hacienda Asia having paid, for the account of
Pfleider, one Samuel Guintos the sum of P866.50 when the latter would swear that he had
received only the sum of P86.50.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Palanca may be disbarred.

HELD:
No. In sum, the Court was satisfied and held that nothing in written complaint for
disbarment against Palanca and in his reply to Palanca's answer supports a prima
facie finding of such misconduct in office by Palanca as would warrant further
proceedings in this case.

Pfleider delivered the list of his creditors to Palanca not because of the professional
relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement. A violation
therefore of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more
of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his
client. Moreover, Pfleider failed to controvert Palanca's claim that there was no such
thing as a "confidential" list of creditors and that the list of creditors referred to by
Pfleider was the same list which forms part of the pleadings in civil case 9187 (the action
for rescission of the lease contract) now, pending between the complainant and the
respondent lawyer, and therefore is embraced within the category of public records open
to the perusal of persons properly interested therein.
CASE NO. 8

IN RE: BIRAOGA
AM. NO. 09-2-19-SC
February 24, 2009

In re: Undated letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraoga, Petitioner in Biraoga vs. Nograles and
Limkaichong, G.R. No. 179120.

FACTS:
During its session on July 15, 2008, the Court En Banc continued its deliberations on the
draft of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. COMELEC,
Villando v. COMELEC, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles .
On July 22, 2008, the En Banc deliberated on Justice Carpios Reflections which had in
the meantime been circulated to the members of the Court. As a result, the En Banc
unanimously decided to push through and set the date for holding oral arguments on the
Limkaichong case on August 26, 2008.

On December 9, 2008, Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and
Limkaichong, G.R. No. 179120, held a press conference at the Barrio Fiesta Restaurant in
Maria Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila, and circulated to the media an undated letter signed
by him, together with what appeared to be a xerox copy of the unpromulgated ponencia.

Noting that the unauthorized release of a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia infringed
on the confidential internal deliberations. The Court created an Investigation Committee
to track the source of the leakage in the transmission of the unpromulgated decision of
the Supreme Court. One of the Committees finding pointed that the leak came from the
office of Justice Reyes. The latter was not formally charged but the Committee concluded
that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon
erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance
of the law or misconduct.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Justice Reyes was guilty of gross misconduct because of leakage.

HELD:
The Supreme Court finds the report of the Investigating Committee created to investigate
the unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the
consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, Villando v. COMELEC, Biraogo v.
Nograles and Paras v. Nograles, well taken and holds Justice Reyes for GRAVE
MISCONDUCT for leaking a confidential internal document of the Court, imposing a
FINE of P500,000.00, to be charged against his retirement benefits, disqualifying him
from holding any office or employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government including government-owned or controlled corporations, and likewise
directing him to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar in light of the aforementioned findings.The Court finds the above-quoted report
well taken. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, this per curiam
decision was reached after deliberation of the Court En Banc by a unanimous decision of
all the members of the Court except for two (2) Justices who are on official leave.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS the findings and
APPROVES WITH MODIFICATION the Recommendations of the Investigating
Committee as follows: (1) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) is held liable for GRAVE
MISCONDUCT for leaking a confidential internal document of the Court and he is
FINED P500,000.00, to be charged against his retirement benefits, and disqualified to
hold any office or employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government
including government-owned or controlled corporations; furthermore, Justice Ruben T.
Reyes is directed to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this
Decision why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar in light of the
aforementioned findings. (2) Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del Rosario are
held liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and are ordered to pay the FINE in the
amount of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively. [In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Louis
C. Biraogo, 580 SCRA 106(2009)]




































CASE NO. 9

2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS., B.M NO. 1222, FEBRUARY 4, 2004

FACTS:

On September 22, 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law,
Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, was apprised
of a rumored leakage in the examination on the subject. After making his own inquiries,
Justice Vitug reported the matter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and to the other
members of the Court, recommending that the bar examination on the subject be nullified
and that an investigation be conducted forthwith.
The Court adopted the recommendation of Justice Vitug, and resolved to nullify the
examination in Mercantile Law and to hold another examination on October 04, 2003 at
eight oclock in the evening at the De La Salle University, Taft Avenue, Manila. The
resolution was issued without prejudice to any action that the Court would further take on
the matter.
The Investigating Committee was tasked to determine and identify the source of leakage,
the parties responsible therefor or who might have benefited therefrom, recommend
sanctions against all those found to have been responsible for, or who would have
benefited from, the incident in question and to recommend measures to the Court to
safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations.
On 15 January 2004, the Investigating Committee submitted its report and
recommendation to the Court. The Committee finds that the leaked test questions in
Mercantile Law were the questions which the examiner, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos,
had prepared and submitted to Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chairman of the 2003 Bar
Examinations Committee. The questions constituted 82% of the questions asked in the
examination in Mercantile Law in the morning of September 21, 2003, in some cases
with slight changes which were not substantial and in other cases exactly as proposed by
Atty. Balgos. The culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgos computer
without the latters knowledge and consent, and who faxed them to other persons, was
Atty. Balgos legal assistant, Attorney Danilo De Guzman, who voluntarily confessed the
deed to the Investigating Committee. De Guzman revealed that he faxed the test
questions, with the help of his secretary Reynita Villasis, to his fraternity brods.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Danilo De Guzman shall be disbarred for the leakage in Mercantile
law examination.

HELD:

Yes. By transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some members of the
Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit and to given them undue
advantage over the other examiners in the mercantile law examination, De Guzman
abetted cheating or dishonesty by his fraternity brothers in the examination, which is
violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for members of the Bar, which provide:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Canon 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. He
violated the law instead of promoting respect for it and degraded the noble profession of
law instead of upholding its dignity and integrity. His actuations impaired public respect
for the Court, and damaged the integrity of the bar examinations as the final measure of a
law graduates academic preparedness to embark upon the practice of law.





































CASE NO. 10

DOMINADOR P. BURBE vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA
AC No. 99-634. June 10, 2002


FACTS:
On September 1998, respondent agreed to legally represent petitioner Dominador Burbe
in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract. In
consequence to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared the demand letter and
some other legal papers, for which services he was accordingly paid and an amount of
P25,000.00 for the required filing fee. A week later, petitioner was informed by the
respondent that the complaint had already been filed in court, and that he should receive
notice of its progress. The petitioner waited for several months for the notice from the
court but there was no progress in the case, he was also inquired repeatedly in the
respondents Law Office, however he was told to just wait.

The petitioner decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with the draft of Atty.
Magultas complaint to personally verify the progress of the case, and there told that
there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on his behalf, copy
of the Certification dated May 27, 1999. As such, the petitioner confronted the latter. The
respondent admitted that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the
money for the filing fee for his own purpose he offered to reimburse him by issuing two
(2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and
P8,000.00.

The petitioner filed a case against Atty. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and
oppressive conduct. The respondent denied the allegations and alleged that he was never
been paid by complainant for his acceptance and legal fees and that the amount he had
paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee


ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Magulta is liable for misrepresentation of funds given to
him for the filing fee.


HELD:
YES. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold
in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional
ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. It may be
true that they have a lien upon the clients funds, documents and other papers that have
lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of
such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their
duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct. In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their
clients interest within the bounds of law.
Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee
entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that
the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.














































CASE NO. 11

DOMINADOR P. BURBE vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA
AC No. 99-634. June 10, 2002


FACTS:
On September 1998, respondent agreed to legally represent petitioner Dominador Burbe
in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract. In
consequence to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared the demand letter and
some other legal papers, for which services he was accordingly paid and an amount of
P25,000.00 for the required filing fee. A week later, petitioner was informed by the
respondent that the complaint had already been filed in court, and that he should receive
notice of its progress. The petitioner waited for several months for the notice from the
court but there was no progress in the case, he was also inquired repeatedly in the
respondents Law Office, however he was told to just wait.

The petitioner decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with the draft of Atty.
Magultas complaint to personally verify the progress of the case, and there told that
there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on his behalf, copy
of the Certification dated May 27, 1999. As such, the petitioner confronted the latter. The
respondent admitted that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the
money for the filing fee for his own purpose he offered to reimburse him by issuing two
(2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and
P8,000.00.

The petitioner filed a case against Atty. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and
oppressive conduct. The respondent denied the allegations and alleged that he was never
been paid by complainant for his acceptance and legal fees and that the amount he had
paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee


ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Magulta is liable for misrepresentation of funds given to
him for the filing fee.


HELD:
YES. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold
in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional
ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. It may be
true that they have a lien upon the clients funds, documents and other papers that have
lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of
such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their
duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct. In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their
clients interest within the bounds of law.

Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee
entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that
the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.











































CASE NO. 12

JOSE A. RIVERA vs. ATTY. NAPOLEON CORRAL
A.C. No. 3548. July 4, 2002


FACTS:

On September 1, 1990, Jose A. Rivera instituted a Complaint for Disbarment charging
Atty. Napoleon Corral with Malpractice and Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the
Philippine Bar. The complaint alleges that Atty. Napoleon Corral violated the proper
norms/ethics as a lawyer by tampering with particularly by personally and manually
changing entries in the courts record without the Courts prior knowledge and
permission when he went to Office of the Clerk of Court, Branch 7, Bacolod City and
changed the date February 23, 1990 to February 29, 1990. Realizing later that there is no
29th in February 1990, he filed a REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS MANIFESTATION
claiming therein that he received the Decision not on February 29, 1990 but on the 28
th
of
February 1990. In the consequence thereof, Atty. Napoleon Corral filed a MOTION TO
DISMISS, alleging that the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the case at
issue.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) held an investigation, report and recommendation
on Atty. Napoleons conduct of desire on suppressing the truth. Thereafter, Investigating
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez submitted his report on August 21, 1997 finding
respondent guilty as charged and recommended his suspension from the practice of law
for six (6) months.


ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is liable for altering the material dates on the Notice of
Appeal.

HELD:
YES. Rules 1.01 and Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 1.01
states in no uncertain terms that: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. More specifically, Rule 19.01 mandates that a lawyer
shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and
shall not present, participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain
improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

Altering the material dates to make it appear that the Notice of Appeal was timely filed,
respondent committed an act of dishonesty. Under pertinent rules dishonesty constitutes
grave misconduct upon which the Court, in a recent case imposed a one-year suspension
on respondent therein. Such misconduct warrants a similar penalty for the Court cannot
tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.




CASE NO. 13

A N N O T A T I O N
THE BAR EXAMINATIONS SCANDALSA RE-EXAMINATION OF BAR
EXAMINATIONS AS A QUALIFYING PROCESS
By
JORGE R. COQUIA*

I. Introduction
The per curiam Resolution of the Supreme Court in RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS,
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER IN THE SUPREME COURT BAR SCANDAL, Bar
Matter No. 1222, February 4, 2004 is the seventh major incident of Bar Examinations
scandals or irregularities since Bar Examinations for the admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines was introduced in the early 1990s. (For History and Analysis of Bare
Examinations in the Philippines, See Vicente Mendoza, Towards Meaningful Reforms in
the Bar Examinations, 77 Phil. Law Journal 239 [2003])

II. The Bar Examinations Scandal
The first Bar scandal case was In Re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 (1928). Unable to obtain
a passing grade for the second time in the 1928 Bar Examinations, Felipe Del Rosario
filed a petition with the Supreme Court for the revision of his test booklets, claiming a
mistake in the correction of his grades. Acting in good faith, the Supreme Court granted
the petition and Del Rosario was admitted to the Bar. Upon investigation conducted by
the City Fiscal of Manila, it was found that there was a connivance between Felipe Del
Rosario and Juan Villaflor, a Supreme Court employee in the manipulation of his grades.
Both were charged with falsification of a public document. Villaflor pleaded not guilty.
For lack of evidence, Del Rosario was acquitted.

But the acquittal of Felipe Del Rosario from the criminal case did not absolve him from
responsibility in the disbarment proceedings instituted against Del Rosario. Justice
George Malcolm, the ponente in the decision said that It was asking a great deal of the
Members of the Court to have them believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware
of the illegal machination which led to the fabrication of his examination papers of which
he was the sole beneficiary. To admit, Felipe Del Rosario would be tantamount to a
declaration of professional purity which the Court was totally unable to pronounce.
The Court then ruled: The practice of law is not an absolute right to be granted to every
one who demands it, but a privilege to be extended or withheld in exercise of a sound
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct of which
merely enables one to escape the penalties of our criminal law. It would be a disgrace to
the judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the Court, to
clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence and then to permit him to hold himself
out as a duly authorized member of the Bar. (Citing In Re: Terrel, 2 Phil. 286).
Felipe del Rosario was forthwith, ordered to surrender his attorneys certificate to the
Clerk of Court.

III. The Estela Romualdez Case
The second Bar Examinations scandal is the case of People vs. Romualdez, 57 Phil. 148
(1932) which led to the resignation of the Supreme Court Associate Justice Norberto
Romualdez.
Estela Romualdez, Secretary of Justice Romualdez and Luis Mabunay, a Bar candidate in
the 1926 Bar Examinations were both convicted of falsification of public documents.
Justice Romualdez was then the Chairman of the 1926 Bar Examinations. At that time,
aside from the Committee of Bar Examiners, a Committee of Correctors was also
appointed. The work of the Committee of Bar Examiners was to prepare the test
questions on their respective subjects and a memorandum of authorities and legal
provisions as well as jurisprudence as sources of the questions. The work of reviewing
and grading the test booklets was entrusted to the Committee of Correctors who were
furnished the notes and set of rules.
The list of successful candidates including Luis Mabunay who purportedly obtained a
grade of 75% was published by the Supreme Court. It was discovered, however, after an
investigation that the grade of Luis Mabunay was actually 63% in Civil Law but was
crossed out and a handwritten grade of 75% was placed. Mabunays grade of 58% in
Remedial Law was crossed out and instead a grade of 64% was placed. With the said
changes, Mabunay obtained an average of 75%. In the said examination, the Supreme
Court considered the Grade of 70% as 75% as passing average.
The Court found that Estela Romualdez made the changes in the grades, without
authorization from the correctors much less from the Committee of Bar Examiners.
Estela Romualdez admitted that she made the changes to correct the injustice committed
on Mabunay who should have passed the examination.
In affirming the conviction of Estela Romualdez for falsification of public documents, the
Supreme Court through Justice Vickers, held that the alterations on the test booklets is a
judicial question which can only be authorized by the Court. The alteration made by the
accused Romualdez to make it appear that the correctors had participated therein and
increasing the grades without her initials is falsification of public documents.
The Court found as preposterous the defense of good faith claimed by Estela Romualdez
that she made the alterations without the knowledge or consent of Luis Mabunay.
The Court cited its ruling in In Re: Felipe Del Rosario rejecting a similar contention, that
the beneficiary in the alteration was innocent.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that on March 3, 1927, Luis Mabunay withdrew
P600 from his bank account in the Philippine Trust Company and on March 7, 1927,
Estela Romualdez deposited P510 in her bank account with the Bank of the Philippine
Islands. Luis Mabunay was accordingly found guilty as an accomplice.

IV. The Angel Parazo Case
After the 1948 Bar Examinations News Reporter Angel Parazo published an item which
was a banner headline in the newspaper Star Reporter that there was a leakage before the
examinations, the news item caused an uproar among the Bar applicants.
Disturbed by the news item, Justice Sabino Padilla, who was the chairman of the
Committee on Bar Examinations ordered an investigation. Summoned by the Court,
Angel Parazo admitted said news item but declined to reveal the source of his
information, invoking Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 53 which provided that newsmen cannot
be compelled to reveal the source of their news report unless the Court on a Committee of
Congress which summoned him to testify finds that such revelation is demanded by the
interest of the State.

Threatened with contempt of Court, Parazo still refused to reveal his source of his news
item. The Supreme Court ruled that the matter of the admission to the Bar Examinations
involves the interest of the State and held Parazo in contempt of court.
Ordinarily, Parazo should have been imprisoned indefinitely until he complied with the
order of the Court. In view of his young age, Parazo was confined in jail for one day.
According to the Court, the charges of anomaly in the Bar Examinations, if not
thoroughly cleared, would throw a cloud of suspicion on the reputation of not only the
graduates of Law but also of the entire legal profession and the Supreme Court.
As a result of the Parazo case (In Re: Parazo, 82 Phil. 230 [1948]), Republic Act No. 53
was amended by Rep. Act No. 1477 wherein the words Interest of the State have been
changed to National Security.

V. The 1971 Bar Examinations Irregularities
The 1971 Bar Examinations incidents resulted in the three administrative investigations.
In In Re: Victorio Lanuevo, 66 SCRA 245 (1975), Oscar Landicho, a newspaperman,
who took the Bar Examinations held that year, addressed a confidential letter to the Court
requesting the investigation why the grades of Bar Candidate No. 984 in the subjects of
Political and Public International Law, Civil Law and Remedial Law, Mercantile Law
and Criminal Law were raised with the initials of the respective examiners. The said Bar
test booklets were on the table of Victorio Lanuevo, the Bar Confidant of the Supreme
Court. Candidate 984 was Ramon E. Galang who already flunked in the five Bar
Examinations.

Upon investigation, the Supreme Court found that Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo
brought the five test booklets of Galang to Bar Examiners Bernardo Pardo, Ramon
Pamatilan, Lawyers Manuel Manuel Tomacruz, Manuel Montecillo, Fidel Manalo and
Guillermo Pardo who rechecked the grades of Galang. Alleging that he had the authority
to do so with the raising of his grades. Galang obtained 74% which the Supreme Court
considered as 75% as passing average at that time.

It was further found that Galang did not mention a pending criminal case in the City
Court in Manila in his application to take the Bar Examinations. For this reason, the
Court found that Galang lacked good moral character. Since Ramon E. Galang already
took oath as a lawyer, the Court ordered his disbarment. (In Re: Ramon E. Galang, Adm.
Matter No. 1168, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 245 [1975]). Victorio Lanuevo, the Bar
Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court was also disbarred. (In Re: Victorio D. Lanuevo,
Former Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 1162, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 245 [1965])
There being no proof that the five aforesaid Bar Examiners received any consideration
for increasing the grades of Ramon E. Galang, and in view of their manifestation of good
faith, the Court found no basis of the imposition of any disciplinary action on them.
Nevertheless, the Court was constrained to remind the said examiners that their
participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest
consideration of public interestabsolute purity of the proceedings are so required to
exercise the greatest or outmost care and vigilance in the performance of their duties
relative thereto.

VI. The Ericta Case
The most sensational Bar Examinations anomaly involved the son of then Associate
Justice Vicente Ericta who took the Bar Examinations in 1982. Before the release of the
results of the Bar Examinations, one way or another, Justice Ericta was able to learn that
the name of his son was not included among the list of successful candidates. With the
assistance of Associate Justices Ramon Fernandez and Ramon Aquino, who were his
classmates belonged to the U.P. Law Class of 1939, they were able to find out that of the
answer to the last question in one bar subject, was not counted, and if considered Justice
Erictas son would have passed the examination.
The matter was referred to the Examiner of the subject who agreed to give credit to the
said answer. With the said arrangement, Justice Erictas son obtained a passing grade.
Associate Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera, the Chairman of the Bar Committee who felt
that the change adversely affected the integrity of Bar Examinations, objected and
reported the matter to the Court based on the rule, that once the Bar Examinations
Committee submitted its report to the Court, any re-evaluation of grades should be
addressed to the Court. Neither any member of the Committee or Bar Examiner can
change the grades without the authority of the whole court.
There is no official record of the incident and no case was involved in the incident but it
turned out to be the most publicized bar examinations anomaly. President Ferdinand
Marcos took a hand of the incident and requested all the members of the Supreme Court
to tender their resignations, which they did. One banner headline of a national newspaper
reported that the country had no Supreme Court for several days. President Marcos
accepted the resignation of Associate Justices Vicente Ericta, and Ramon Fernandez. A
newspaper reported that Justice Erictas son offered to take the next Bar Examinations
but Chief Justice Enrique Fernando said that there is no need for it as he already passed
the Bar Examinations.

VII. The Purisima Case
After the results of the Bar Examinations of 2001 were published, it was revealed that a
nephew of Associate Justice Fidel Purisima, then the Chairman of the Committee on Bar
Examinations, took the examinations. Members of the Court were shocked with the
revelations and it was indeed found that the son of RTC Retired Judge of Manila, Amante
Purisima, a brother of Justice Purisima, took the Bar Examinations which he passed.
Apparently, the Court did not believe the allegation of Justice Fidel Purisima that he did
not know that his nephew took the Bar Examinations.
It was only when the list of successful Bar candidates result was obtained when he
learned that his nephew took the Bar Examinations.
The Court was not convinced of Justice Purisimas explanation and, forthwith, imposed a
fine on him to be deducted from his honorarium as Chairman of the Committee on Bar
Examinations. The Court did not allow his nephew to take his oath as a member of the
Bar.

A group of lawyers filed a petition with the Supreme Court to conduct a further
investigation of the incident alleging, among others, that a more severe disciplinary
action should have been imposed on those involved in the case.
VIII. The Leakage of Bar Examinations Questions in 2003
Admittedly, there was a leakage of the test questions in Mercantile Law in the Bar
Examinations in 2003, all due to the carelessness of Bar Examiner Marcial Balgos who
drafted the questions in his computer machine. Lawyer Danilo de Guzman, member of
the legal staff of the Balgos and Perez Law Office downloaded the test questions drafted
by Atty. Balgos and faxed them to his Law Fraternity brothers without the knowledge of
Atty. Balgos being informed of the leakage. The Court, upon the recommendation of
Associate Justice Jose Vitug, nullified the examination in Mercantile Law.


IX. Another Examination on the Subject was Scheduled on October 4, 2003
In view of the objection or the objection of the Philippine Association of Law Schools the
examinees and various sectors, the new examination was not cancelled. The Court instead
ordered the weight of Mercantile Law to be allocated proportionately to the remaining
seven subjects.
Upon investigation by the Committee composed of three retired members of the Supreme
Court, it was found that there was indeed a leakage of the test questions in Mercantile
Law adopting the results found by the said committee.
The Supreme Court ordered the disbarment of Atty. Danilo De Guzman. Marcial O.T.
Balgos was reprimanded and disentitled from receiving any honorarium as Bar Examiner.
The Court further directed the National Bureau of Investigation to undertake further
investigation to determine the liabilities of Danilo de Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre
Atienza, Ronny Garvina, Erwin Tan, Randy Iigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and
Allan Guiapa for their participation in the Bar Examinations Leakage.

X. Conclusion
Legal education in the Philippines is basically Bar-oriented, that is, the focus of training
students is to pass the Bar Examinations, but not necessarily to educate one to be a
member of the noble profession and as officer of the court with a mission that justice is
achieved. What should be a mere device to measure the moral fitness and competence of
a law graduate to be admitted to the practice of law. The Bar Examination has been
transformed into a monster that holds it viselike grip on law schools, law professors,
students and Bar review institutions. (F.R.P. Romero, The Challenges to the Legal
Education in the Philippines cited in Coquia, Legal Profession, 2d. Ed. 65, p. 197)
To pass the Bar Examinations at all cost is the aim of most law students. Thus, ill-
prepared students are tempted to devise means, legal or illegal, proper or improper. Thus,
there are so far eight major scandals or anomalies since the time Bar Examinations was
adopted as a qualifying process. While Bar Examinations are qualifying tests,
undoubtedly important, it is not a test to end all tests (I. Cortes, Legal Education: The Bar
Examinations as a Qualifying Process in Essays on Legal Education, PUP Law Center,
PTS, cited in Coquia, Legal Profession.
The Bar Examinations has acquired in the popular mind a mystique and assumed such a
dominant place in the legal education subculture as too obscure other objectives
ostensibly pursued. It has been invested with glamour but has not been untouched by
scandals. (Cortes, the Law Curriculum, Assessment and Recommendation in the Light of
a Developing Society)
It does not look nice at all that during the period of Bar Review even the prestigious law
schools organize groups to go around for tips of probable questions to be asked. One way
or another they are able to identify the examiners which were supposed to be
confidential.

XI. Bar Examinations as Now Conducted is a Not Sure Means of Determining the
Competence of Candidates
Is there no uniform rule in the formulation of Bar questions? The Chairmen of the
Committee are free to select the Bar Examiners. But most often those selected are not
sufficiently competent enough on the subject assigned to them. There is no means of
determining on whether the answers to the questions of the examiners are correct. In one
instance, when the professors in Civil Law were invited to answer the questions given in
the Bar Examination, the examiner with his answers would have flunked if he took the
combined professors.
Only recently a question in International Law was asked on a subject which have been
long obsolete.
Lastly, it is very obvious that legal education provided is grossly inadequate. The results
of the Bar Examinations since 1982 show that only one-third of the graduates certified by
law schools as candidates to be admitted to the practice of law pass the Bar
Examinations. It is such a waste of time, effort and expenses of more than 400 more than
2/3 of the graduates of law schools take up law course but cannot pass the Bar
Examinations. (See Tabulation or Passing Average in Bar Examinations from 1946 to
2002 in Coquia, Legal Profession, DGS)
There is something wrong in the legal education of law schools which allowed to
graduate thousands of students but only less than third pass.
There is a need of closer supervision of law schools. The more than forty law schools are
subject to administrative supervision of the Bureau of Higher Education of the
Department of Education and Culture as regards their operation. But ultimately, the
quality of education regarding the passing of the Bar Examinations is regulated by the
Supreme Court as it prescribes the subjects to be taken in the Bar Examinations. With due
respect, it is on this matter that closer supervision should be provided by the Court itself.
It is obvious that the Supreme Court is performing an effective supervision to see to it
that a high quality of legal education is provided. The Supreme Court, busy as it is in
judicial functions, hardly has the time and facilities for this purpose.

XII. A Move to Abolish the Bar Examinations
There has been a move to abolish the Bar Examinations. There must be strict
requirements of accreditation of law schools. Many states in the United States follow the
English system of Legal Education with close supervision of law schools as the students
are promoted every year until they are granted the diploma after graduation.
In addition, students undergo legal clerkship in accredited law firms before they are
admitted to practice law. Malaysia and Singapore follows the said system cited in Cortes,
Legal Education: The Bar Examinations as a Qualifying Process, Coquia, Legal
Profession, 2nd Edition, p. 147.

















CASE NO. 14

IN RE FELIPE DEL ROSARIO
52 PHIL 399

FACTS:
Felipe Del Rosario was a candidate in the bar examination who failed for the second
time in 1925. He presented himself for the succeeding bar examination in 1926 and again
was unable to obtain the required rating. Then on 29 March 1927, he authorized the filing
of a motion for the revision of his papers for 1925 based on alleged mistake in the
computation of his grades. The Court granted this motion and admitted him to the bar.

HOWEVER, a subsequent investigation by the city fiscal uncovered that Del Rosario,
together with one Juan Villaflor, a former employee of the Supreme Court, falsified some
documents to make it appear that Del Rosario actually passed the 1925 bar exams. The
two were subsequently charged with falsification. Villaflor was convicted as he pleaded
guilty but Del Rosario was acquitted for lack of evidence. The fiscal however
recommended Del Rosario to surrender his certificate of attorney.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Felipe Del Rosario can be stripped off of his certificate of attorney.

HELD:
Yes. The practice of law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who demands it,
but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of the sound discretion. The
standard of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the judiciary to receive
one whose integrity is questionable as an office of the court, to clothe him with all the
prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly
authorized member of the bar.



















CASE NO. 15

ESTELAROMUALDEZ CASE
57 PHIL 148

FACTS:
The accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabuhay were charged with the crime of
falsification of public and official documents.

The accused Estela Romualdez was the secretary of Honorable Norberto Romualdez, one
of the Justices of the Supreme Court. The latter was then the Head of the Bar
Examination Committee. Because of such functions, she had under her care the
computations and other papers and documents for the admission of the candidate to the
Bar held in the month of August and September 1926. At that time, aside from the
Committee of Bar Examiners, a Committee of Correctors was also appointed. The work
of the Committee of Bar Examiners was to prepare the test questions on their respective
subjects and a memorandum of authorities and legal provisions as well as jurisprudence
as sources of the questions. The work of reviewing and grading the test booklets were
entrusted to the Committee of Correctors who were furnished the notes and set of rules.

The information filed alleged that the accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay
conspired together and erased the grade of 58% given by the correctors to the
composition in Remedial Law and replaced it and, instead, wrote 64%. She also crossed
out and replaced the grade of the latter in Civil law from 63% and wrote 75%. With the
said changes, Mabunay obtained an average of 75%. In the said examination, the
Supreme Court considered the Grade of 70% as 75% as passing average.

The accused Estela Romualdez contended that she has the authority to make such
alteration, both in her capacity as the private secretary of the Chairman of the
Examination Committee and as the correctors and at the same time supervisor of the
Correctors. The authority was given by the then Chairman himself, Justice Norberto
Romualdez. She further contended that she did not know Luis Mabuhay and the first
time he saw him was on the first day of the trial. Furthermore, she alleged that her
revision of the compositions of her co-accused was due only and solely to a happy
coincidence.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Estela Romualdez was guilty of Falsification; and
2. Whether Estela Romualdez was authorized to make the alterations.

HELD:
1. Yes. The acts of the accused Estela Romualdez were covered by paragraphs 2, 3
and 6 of article 300 of the Penal Code. She made the alterations in the grades
given by the "correctors" in the papers in question in such a way as to make it
appear that said "correctors" had participated therein, because she blotted out the
grades of the "correctors" and wrote new and increased grades opposite their
initials, without indicating by her own initials that she had made the alterations.
She, in that way, attributed to the "correctors" statements other than those in fact
made by them.
2. No. If it be admitted that the accused E. R. was given the authority which she
claims to have received, nevertheless she was not authorized to change the grades
now in question because when she made the changes she already knew that the
papers belonged to her co-accused.

The Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee was presumed to have discharged his
duties in accordance with the law and it was inconceivable that he would without any
warrant of law give or attempt to give the accused Estela Romualdez the unlimited
authority which she claimed to have received, thereby enabling her to alter at will any
grade on any paper, without making any record thereof or any report to anybody. The
mere statement of such claim showed that it was preposterous.






































CASE NO. 16

IN RE PARAZO
82 PHIL. 230
DECEMBER 03, 1948

FACTS:
Angel Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general
circulation, made a story and published a new in the said local circulation regarding an
alleged leakage in some subjects in the 1948 Bar Examinations. He further alleged that
the said leakage was disseminated a week before the scheduled examination.

The news caught the attention of the Supreme Court. The Court called Mr. Parazo for
questioning and investigation. During such investigation, he testified under oath and
admitted that he was the author of the news item; that he wrote the story and had it
published in good faith; he knew the persons who gave the information which formed the
basis of his publication, but he declined to reveal their names because the information
given to him in confidence; and the informants did not wish to be identified.

The Court, acting through their authorized investigators, informed Mr. Parazo that this
was a serious matter involving the confidence of the public in the regularity and
cleanliness of the bar examinations, pleading with and urging him to reveal the names of
his informant so that the former could start and conduct the necessary investigation, bust
Mr. Parazo consistently refused to make the revelation. He contended and invoked
Section 1, RA No. 53 which provides that the publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter
of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of any general circulation cannot be compelled
to reveal the source of any news report or information appearing the said publication
which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court of a
House or Committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of
the State.

Despite the plea of the Court, he did not give his sources and he was cited committed
contempt of court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Bar Examinations anomaly was within the meaning of
interest of the state.
2. Whether or not the Court may adopt measures to preserve the integrity of the legal
profession.



HELD:
1. Yes. The present case falls and may be included within the meaning of the phrase
interest of the state, involving as it does, not only the interests of students and
graduates of the law schools and colleges. and. of the entire legal profession of
this country as well as the good name and reputation of the members of the
Committee of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court
having charge of and connection with said examinations, but also the highest
Tribunal of the land itself which represents one of the three coordinate and
independent branches or departments of the Philippine Government.

It is of public knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions obtaining
in this country, or the great demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as compared
to other professions, is the most popular in these islands. The predominantly greater
number of members of the Bar, schools and colleges of law as compared to those of other
learned professions, attest to this fact. And one important thing to bear in mind is that the
Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial
fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of the Government,
draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or
insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with
wide and general interest and national importance.

2. Yes. In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1, of
Republic Act No. 53 to this Court, we have the inherent power of courts in
general, specially of the Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial
Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity,
and render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in
the present case, the investigation of charges of error, abuse or misconduct of
their officials and subordinates, including lawyers, who are officers of the Court.




























CASE NO. 17
VICTOR LAMUEVO CASE
66 SCRA 245 August 29, 1975

FACTS:
This was a disbarment matter with regard to Attorney Victorio Lanuevo, the Bar
Confidant for the 1971 Bar Examinations. Supreme Court received a confidential letter
that speaks of the exam notebooks of an examinee named Ramon Galang who has been
re-evaluated and re-corrected such that he hurdled the Bar Exams and was admitted to the
Bar.

Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang
back to the respective examiners for re-evalution or re-checking. The five examiners
admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant,
stating that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed
only in his particular subject and was on the borderline of passing. Ramon Galang was
able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevos move but the exam results bears
that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).
Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on
Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU.

The five examiners were led by Lanuevo to believe that it is the Bar Committees regular
activity that when an examinee has failed in one subject alone, the rest he passed, the
examiner in that subject which he flunked will review his exam notebook.
Afterwards, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties, including that of a house in BF
Homes, which was never declared in his declaration of assets and liabilities.

ISSUE:
Wether or not Lanuevo was guilty of defrauding the examiners such that Galang passed
the Bar.

HELD:
Yes. It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent
Lanuevos well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing
separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed
only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the
before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major
subjects and in two (2) minor subjects which under no circumstances or standard could
it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of
passing.

The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of
the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no business
evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon
the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He
cannot presume to know better than the examiner.

AS TO GALANGS CRIM CASE: The concealment of an attorney in his application to
take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an
alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well settled.
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who demands it,
but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The
standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of the criminal law.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he
passed the Bar, the Court have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his
attorneys certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys.





































CASE NO. 18

ERICTA CASE,JULY 18, 1975
July 29, 1972

FACTS:
On 10 November 1971, Assistant Fiscal Melencio S. Pea of Quezon City filed an
information with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City accusing two defendant of a
crime he designates as "Robbery Hold-up" The case was set for arraignment on
December 13, 1971. The two (2) defendants, namely, Remigio Nadonga y Manahan and
Rolando Tupaz y Hernandez were detention prisoners. Both were arraigned on December
13, 1971. Because they had no counsel, the Court appointed Atty. Abelardo Andal as
their counsel de-oficio. Upon their arraignment, both defendants pleaded guilty.
Thereupon, upon motion of Atty. Abelardo Andal, the defendants were allowed to prove
the additional mitigating circumstance of drunkenness. Defendant Remigio took the
witness stand to prove drunkenness. After his testimony the fiscal did not ask for a
chance to present rebuttal evidence and the case was submitted for decision. Hence,a
judgment of conviction was forthwith rendered and promulgated in open Court after the
plea of guilty.

The complainant in this case, Delfin M. Tobias, is the offended party in the above
criminal case. He questioned the penalty imposed by the respondent judge. He averred
that there was unusual consideration given to the accused because he provided a lenient
penalty for the defendants who pleaded guilty and who have mitigating circumstances in
their favor.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent judge gave undue favor to the defendants.

HELD:
No. The specific allegations, in their totality, to follow the thinking of complainant,
would demonstrate a lack in the fund of legal expertise of respondent Judge as well as a
predilection in favor of the accused indicative of his bias. With respect to the first charge
of leniency, the law allows leniency in the imposition of the penalty to defendants who
plead guilty and who have mitigating circumstances in their favor. Under the law,
respondent Judge could have imposed upon the defendants even as low a penalty as four
(4) months and one (1) day. But he did not. He imposed a penalty of one (1) year. Thus,
respondent Judge was not exactly very lenient. Even if he was, the penalty imposed was
within the range fixed by law. Complainant claims he has evidence of recidivism and use
of motor vehicle against the defendants. He should have so informed the fiscal before the
filing of the information in order that it could have been properly alleged. The
information filed alleges no aggravating circumstances. No further attention need be paid
to the second charge that respondent Judge did not notify the offended party as to when
the arraignment was set. Clearly the law does not so require. Nor did respondent Judge
incur any failure to comply with a duty the law imposes on him when he did not sent a
copy of his decision to the offended party. Equally so, there is no merit to the alleged
grievance of the offended party that while the information charges Robbery Hold-up,
the decision found the accused guilty of robbery merely. [Tobias vs. Ericta, 46 SCRA
83(1972)]
CASE NO. 19
RE: 1999 BAR EXAMINATIONS
B.M. Nos. 979 and 986
December 10, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner was conditionally admitted to take the 1999 Bar Examinations. Like many
others he was directed to submit the required certification of completion of the pre-bar
review course within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations. He passed the
1999 Examinations. But the Court disqualified him from becoming a member of the
Philippine Bar and declared his examinations null and void on two (2) grounds: (a)
Petitioner failed to submit the required certificate of completion of the pre-bar review
course under oath for his conditional admission to the 1999 Bar Examinations; and (b) He
committed a serious act of dishonesty which rendered him unfit to become a member of
the Philippine Bar when he made it appear in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar
Examinations that he took his pre-bar review course at the Philippine Law School (PLS)
when, as certified by Acting Registrar Rasalie G. Kapauan, PLS had not offered such
course since 1967.
On 2 July 2002 he filed a Motion for Due Process stating, his reasons why in his Petition
to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations it was stated that he was enrolled in and regularly
attending the pre-bar review course at the PLS and not at the University of Santo Tomas
(UST) where he in fact took the said course as evidenced by the Certification dated 22
July 1999 of Dean Amado L. Damayuga of the UST Faculty of Civil Law. He explained
that upon obtaining a "ready-made form" of the Petition and affixing his signature on the
space provided therefor, he requested his schoolmate/friend Ms. Lilian A. Felipe to fill up
the form, have it notarized and then to file it for him with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC). Being "consumed with his preparations for the upcoming bar examinations,"
petitioner admitted that he did not have the opportunity to check the veracity of the
information supplied by Ms. Felipe. He further averred that on 26 July 1999, a week after
the filing of the Petition to take the bar, he (thru Ms. Felipe) submitted the Certification
of Completion of the Pre-Bar Review to prove that he actually enrolled and attended the
pre-bar review course in UST.
He also explained that he did not submit the required certification of completion of the
pre-bar review course within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations
because he thought that it was already unnecessary in view of the Certification of
Completion issued by Dean Dimayuga which not only attested to his enrollment in UST
but also his completion of the pre-bar review course.
In a letter, retired Judge Purisima expressed his concern for his son and stated that his son
took the pre-bar review course in UST and that he entry in his sons Petition that he took
it in PLS is a "self-evident clerical error." He then poised the question that if there was
really a falsehood and forgery which would have been a fatal defect, why then was his
son issued permit to take the 1999 Bar examinations?


ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner now allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and be admitted to
the Philippine Bar.
HELD:
Yes. Pursuant to the Court Resolution of 1 October 2002, the OBC conducted a summary
hearing on 30 October 2002 during which the Bar Confidant asked clarificatory questions
from petitioner who appeared together with his father, retired Judge Purisima, and Ms.
Lilian Felipe.
OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation the pertinent portions of which are
quoted hereunder: "Considering petitioners explanation fortified by unquestionably
genuine documents in support thereof, we respectfully submit that petitioner should be
given the benefit of the doubt.
As regards petitioners failure to submit within sixty days the required certification of
completion of the pre-bar review course, his explanation that there was no need for him
to submit another certification because the July 22, 1999 Certification of Dean Dimayuga
certified not only his enrollment but also his completion of the course, is impressed with
truth.
























CASE NO. 20:

BAR EXAM IN 2003, 586 SCRA 372

Re: 2003 Bar Examinations Atty. Danilo De Guzman, 586 SCRA 372
April 24, 2009

FACTS:
Atty. Danilo De Guzman filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 10
November 2008. He prayed that the Court, in the exercise of equity and compassion,
grant the petitioner for his reinstatatement as a member in good standing in the Philippine
Bar.

Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which unfortunately,
compromised the integrity of the bar examinations. As could be borne from the records of
the investigation, he cooperated fully in the investigation conducted and took personal
responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos,
to the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar examinees for the unforeseen and unintended
effects of his actions.

Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the said
humbling experience to make him a better person. Meanwhile, as part of his Petition,
petitioner submitted the following testimonials and endorsements of various individuals
and entities

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Danilo De Guzman may be reinstated as a member in good standing
in the Philippine Bar.

HELD:
Yes. Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders; In
cases where the Supreme Court had deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of
disbarment imposed on the lawyer, it had taken into account the remorse of the disbarred
lawyer and the conduct of his public life during his years outside of the bar. Petitioner has
sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the gravity of his
transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his
disbarment towards public service, particularly with the Peoples Law Enforcement
Board. The attestations submitted by his peers in the community and other esteemed
members of the legal profession, such as retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar
Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the
ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his positive impact on
society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.

Petitioners subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if
he were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer
would redound to the general good and more than mitigate the stain on his
record. Compassion to the petitioner is warranted.


CASE NO. 21


NUEZ vs. CRUZ-APAO
A.M. No. CA-05-18-P
April 12, 2005

FACTS:
The complaint arose out of respondents solicitation of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez (Complainant) in exchange for a speedy and favorable
decision of the latters pending case in the Court of Appeals.
Complainant earlier sought the assistance of Imbestigador. The crew of the TV program
accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for
extortion. Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was
still asking for the money and to set up a meeting with her. Upon learning that
respondents offer of a favorable decision in exchange for One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) was still standing, the plan for the entrapment operation was formulated
by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.
During the hearing of this case, respondent would like the court to believe that she never
had any intention of committing a crime, that the offer of a million pesos for a favorable
decision came from complainant and that it was complainant and the law enforcers who
instigated the whole incident.
When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in complainants
cellphone and which reflected her cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were
not incriminating but claimed she did not remember those that clearly showed she was
transacting with complainant.
Respondent thus stated that she met with complainant only to tell the latter to stop calling
and texting her, not to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as pre-arranged.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the Cruz-Apao is guilty of grave misconduct.


HELD:
If indeed, respondent had no intention of committing any wrongdoing, it escapes the
Court why she had to make up stories merely to test if complainant could make good on
his alleged boast that he could come up with a million pesos. It is not in accord with
ordinary human experience for an honest government employee to make up stories that
would make party-litigants believe that court decisions may be bought and sold.
Respondent having worked for the government for twenty four (24) years, nineteen (19)
of which have been in the CA, should have known very well that court employees are
held to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity. Their conduct should at all times
be above suspicion. As held by this Court in a number of cases, The conduct or behavior
of all officials of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the Presiding
Judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must, at all times be characterized by among others, strict
propriety and decorum in order to earn and maintain the respect of the public for the
judiciary.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Elvira Cruz-Apao is found GUILTY of
GRAVE MISCONDUCT and violation of SECTIONS 1 and 2 of the CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR COURT PERSONNEL and is accordingly DISMISSED from
government service, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, instrumentality or
agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. Her
retirement and all benefits except accrued leave credits are hereby FORFEITED.










































CASE NO. 22

ASPIRAS vs. ABALOS
A.M. No. OCA-01-6
September 3, 2003

FACTS:
Dominador V. Aspiras is a former policeman who is at present detained at the Maximum
Security Compound of the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City. Aspiras filed a
complaint against Esmeralda Abalos charging her with estafa, claiming that he gave
respondent P52,000 in consideration of his acquittal in a case for murder which has been
appealed to this Court.

The letter-complaint alleged that Dominador V. Aspiras became acquainted with
respondents husband, SPO4 Jing Abalos, while the latter was visiting another inmate in
the New Bilibid Prisons. Respondents husband allegedly informed him, Aspiras, that his
wife was working in the Records Section of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
and that she may be able to help complainant secure an acquittal from his case which was
then on appeal. Because of complainants desire to become a free man, he decided to
avail of the offer. However, complainant balked when respondents husband informed
him that he would need to pay them a total sum of P100,000 for the job. Complainant
then pleaded if he could just pay instead P80,000.

After several weeks of haggling, respondents husband finally agreed to the lower
amount. In three separate occasions, complainant gave respondent a total amount of
P52,000. However, on April 29, 2000, complainant received this Courts decision
affirming the ruling of the trial court finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of the murder and sentencing him to suffer penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence,
complainant wrote the said letter-complaint to this Court charging respondent for
allegedly deceiving him into giving her money in exchange for his acquittal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of serious misconduct.

HELD:
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.Public service requires utmost
integrity and strictest discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all times the highest
sense of honesty and integrity. The administration of justice is a sacred task. By the very
nature of their duties and responsibilities, all those involved in it must faithfully adhere
to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle solemnly enshrined in the Constitution that
a public office is a public trust; and that all public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct, at all
times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but must also be above
suspicion. Indeed, every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity,
uprightness, and honesty.

In the case at bar, the issuance of the promissory note by respondent is a clear admission
that she received the amount of P52,000 from complainant, which sustains complainants
allegations that he paid her the amount on the promise that as an employee of this Court,
she had the capacity to influence the outcome of his case. The evidence presented is
adequate for the purpose of these proceedings. In an administrative proceeding, only
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.







































CASE NO. 23

MIRANO vs. SAAVEDRA
A.M. No. P-89-383
August 4, 1993

FACTS:
This administrative case was initiated by a complaint filed by Atty. Antonio G. Mirano,
Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Makati, Branch 142, against respondent Marilyn O.
Saavedra, former stenographic reporter of the same court, for falsification of daily time
records. Respondent Saavedra is presently employed in the Senate as Legislative Staff
Officer IV.

Respondent was formerly the court stenographer of the RTC. Judge Arsenio M. Gonong
of said court issued Administrative Order No. 62 ordering the cancellation of
respondents appointment and inclusion as court stenographer in the plantilla of said trial
court, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate administrative charge.
However, the administrative case did not proceed because respondent tendered her
resignation, which was subsequently accepted by Judge Gonong and indorsed to the
Supreme Court.4 In the meantime, respondent applied for and was allowed to transfer to
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142, and started to discharge her duties
therein as a stenographic reporter.

A verified complaint was filed by Atty. Mirano with the Office of the Court
Administrator against respondent charging her with misrepresentation, dishonesty or lack
of candor by falsifying her daily time records.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of misrepresentation and dishonesty.

HELD:
Public service requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline. A public servant must
exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. The administration of
justice is a sacred task. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, all those
involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle
solemnly enshrined in the 1987 Constitution that a public office is a public trust; and all
public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. The conduct and behavior of
everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety
and decorum but, above all else, must be above suspicion. Indeed, every employee of the
judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.

Under Memorandum Circular No. 30 of the Civil Service Commission, dated July 20,
1989, falsification of an official document is considered a grave offense which warrants
the penalty of dismissal. That factual situation and legal sanction are involved in this case
before us.

WHEREFORE, respondent Marilyn O. Saavedra is hereby DISMISSED from the
government service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.













































CASE NO. 24

YRASTORZA, SR. vs. LATIZA, Court Aide
A.M. No. P-02-1610.
November 27, 2003

FACTS:
Judge Yrastorza, presiding judge of RTC-Branch 14, issued Memo addressed to Michael
A. Latiza, Court Aide of the same court. The Memo stated that respondent was absent for
work without leave on 13, 20, 21, and 22 August 2001 and did not notify the office of the
reason for such absences. The co-employees of respondent saw him at the Palace of
Justice loitering and reeking of liquor. Respondents actuations being detrimental to the
service, Judge Yrastorza gave respondent seventy-two hours from receipt of the Memo to
explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him.

In her Affidavit dated, Deguilmo, Clerk of Court, stated that respondent was absent
without filing an application for leave. Deguilmo further stated that on 20 August 2001
respondent did not show up for work from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon but went to the office
at past noontime to get something from his office drawer. Deguilmo noticed respondent
to be unusually flushed in the face (reddened) and that he reeked with liquor.
In her Affidavit, Salvador, Stenographer of the same court, stated that respondent was at
the main door inside the Palace of Justice. Salvador took the occasion to remind
respondent of his unpaid bill for long distance calls he made using the office phone.
Salvador noticed that respondents face was red, his eyes were sleepy and he smelled
of liquor.

Respondent, with the assistance of Atty. Porio of the Public Attorneys Office, submitted
a written explanation that he was under emotional stress and could hardly sleep well
because of some family problems. Respondent admitted his absences from 20 August
to 24 August 2001 because my 8-month-old child had a fever and I had barely enough
money to spend for our food and medicines. Respondent admitted that he was at the
vicinity of the Palace of Justice on 20 August 2001 because he was looking for
moneylenders who could extend credit to him. Respondent admitted he had a few drinks
at home before he went to the Palace of Justice because it was the only way where I
could approach moneylenders courageously and without shame.

In his written explanation, respondent claimed he sent his wife to the office on 24 August
2001 to inform the clerk of court of the reason for his absence. Respondent also claimed
that he prepared his application for leave for 20 August 2001 to 24 August 2001.
However, respondent alleged that he was not able to submit his leave application sooner
for approval because he could not produce a medical certificate for his son whom he did
not bring to a doctor for lack of money. Respondent likewise admitted that he forgot to
file his application for leave of absence for 13 August 2001. Respondent asked for
compassion and understanding of his present predicament. Attached to his explanation
were his applications for leave of absence for 13, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 August 2001,
which he submitted for approval by the presiding judge.



ISSUE:
Whether or not Latiza is guilty of misconduct.

HELD:
Court employees bear the burden of observing exacting standards of ethics and morality.
This is the price one pays for the honor of working in the judiciary. Those who are part of
the machinery dispensing justice, from the lowliest clerk to the presiding judge, must
conduct themselves with utmost decorum and propriety to maintain the publics faith and
respect for the judiciary. Improper behavior, particularly during office hours, exhibits not
only a paucity of professionalism at the workplace but also a great disrespect to the court
itself. Such demeanor is a failure of circumspection demanded of every public official
and employee.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Michael A. Latiza guilty of simple misconduct and
fine him Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000). This amount may be deducted from whatever
benefits respondent is still entitled after his voluntary resignation.

































CASE NO. 25

ADMIN CASE AGAINST ATTY. OCCENA
JULY 3, 2002

FACTS:

Under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the late Ogan, his residuary estate was
divided among his seven children. One of them, Necitas Ogan-Occea, was named in the
will as executrix of the estate. As such, she retained her husband, Atty. Samuel C.
Occea, as her lawyer. The settlement of the estate have been pending for thirteen (13)
years when it was transferred under the sala of Judge Ruiz who found out that the
principal cause of delay was the failure of Atty. Occea to obey lawful court orders such
as the submission of the latest inventory of all securities of the estate, take possession of
all certificates of stocks or their replacements belonging to the estate and as well as its
inventory, and by willfully prolonging the litigation through his various maneuvers, such
as instituting actions for Atty. Occeas claim for attorneys fee and filing other cases
before the court thus prolonging the settlement of the case.

ISSUE:

Did Occeas acts constitute a gross violation of his oath as a lawyer?

HELD:

Yes. Atty. Occeas acts of disobeying lawful court orders and willfully prolonging the
litigation through his maneuvers constitute a gross violation of his lawyers oath that he
will not willingly sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit or delay no man for money of
malice.




















CASE NO. 26

DAYAN STA. ANA CHRISTIAN NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. VS.
ESPIRITU
495 SCRA 420

FACTS:

Officers and members of the Dayan Sta. Ana Christian Neighborhood Association Inc.
sought the services of respondent regarding a consolidated ejectment case where they
were being sued as officers and members of the association. Complainants lost, however,
and respondent advised them to file a supersedeas bond to stay their eviction and so they
entrusted payment therefore to respondent. He receipted erroneously in the amount of
P86,666.72 instead of the more than P200,000 but was corrected afterwards. Association
President Minerva Genato then made a verbal demand for respondent to return the
remaining balance, upon which respondent delivered a personal check for P141,904.00 in
the name of Atty. Leonardo Ocampo. Check bounced for insufficiency of funds so
Ocampo sent a demand letter to Genato to make good the payment of the check. A
number of demand letters were again sent to respondent. An Information charging
respondent with estafa was liikewise filed. For his part, respondent argued that the
amount if P141, 904.00 and not P206, 497.00 was meant as payment of the subject
property, he insisted that the instant administrative complaint must be dismissed.

ISSUE:

Did respondent violate the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD:

Yes. It is clear that respondent misappropriated the money which his clients, herein
complainants, had entrusted to him for a specific purpose, and such act cannot be
countenanced. Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from his client.

A lawyer should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his
professional capacity, because a high degree of fidelity and good faith on his part is
exacted. In Parias v. Paguinto, the Court had the occasion to state that money entrusted
to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the
case must immediately be returned to the client on demand. Indeed, a lawyer has no
right to unilaterally appropriate his or her clients money.










CASE NO. 27

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, INC. vs. ATTY. LEOVIGILDO H. MIJARES III
605 SCRA 93

FACTS:

This disbarment case is about the need for a lawyer to account for funds entrusted to him
by his client. Arellano University, Inc. engaged the services of respondent Leovigildo
H.Mijares III, to secure a certificate of title covering a dried up portion of the Estero
deSan Miguel that the University had been occupying. The property was the subject of a
Deed of Exchange dated October 1, 1958 between the City of Manila and the University.
The University alleged that it gave him all the documents he needed to accomplish
hiswork. Later, Mijares asked the University for and was given P500,000.00 on top of his
attorneys fees, supposedly to cover the expenses for "facilitation and processing." Hein
turn promised to give the money back in case he was unable to get the work done.
Mijares informed the University that he already completed Phase I of the titling of the
property. The University requested Mijares for copies of the MMDA approval but he
unjustifiably failed to comply despite his clients repeated demands. Then he made
himself scarce, prompting the University to withdraw all the cases it had entrusted tohim
and demand the return of the P500,000.00 it gave him. The University wrote Mijares by
registered letter, formally terminating his services in the titling matter and demanding the
return of the P500,000.00. But the letter could not be served because he changed office
address without telling the University. Eventually, the University found his new address
and served him its letter on January 2, 2006. Mijares personally received it yet he did not
return the money asked of him.

ISSUE:
Is Atty. Mijares guilty of misappropriating the P500,000.00 that his client, the University,
entrusted to him for use in facilitating and processing the titling of a property that it
claimed?

HELD:
Yes, respondent Mijares is guilty of misappropriating the P500,000.00 that his client, the
University, entrusted to him for use in facilitating and processing the titling of a property
that it claimed.

Every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client such
that he must promptly account for whatever money or property his client may have
entrusted to him. As a mere trustee of said money or property, he must hold them
separate from that of his own and make sure that they are used for their intended purpose.
If not used, he must return the money or property immediately to his client upon demand,
otherwise the lawyer shall be presumed to have misappropriated the same in violation of
the trust reposed on him. A lawyers conversion of funds entrusted to him is a gross
violation of professional ethics. The Court is not, therefore, inclined to let him off with
the penalty of indefinite suspension which is another way of saying he can resume his
practice after a time if here turns the money and makes a promise to shape up.
CASE NO. 28

HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.
G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009

Doctrine:
A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause.

FACTS:

PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA)
No. 43 converted into an IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for
Mandamus against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to
sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as the latter has complied with all the
legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, into an
IFMA. The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for
Mandamus with the trial court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969
Document signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest
Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.

ISSUE:

Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by
which the government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA)

HELD:

NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract
within the purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying.

We declared: Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive
action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause
of the Constitution. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause,
which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
cannot be invoked. The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a
contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its
concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the
State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration,
development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.










CASE NO. 29

JUAN PABLO P. BONDOC v. JUDGE DIVINA LUZ P. AQUINO-SIMBULAN
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2204, 26 October 2009


FACTS:
Former representative of Pampanga Juan Pablo P. Bondoc (Bondoc) charged Judge
Divina Luz P. Aquino-Simbulan (Simbulan) with partiality, gross ignorance of the law,
and gross misconduct in the handling of the criminal cases for violation of R.A. 3019 and
falsification of public documents against Spouses Salvador and Flordeliz Totaan
(accused).

Bondoc alleged that Judge Simbulan, after having issued an order suspending the accused
pendent lite, asked the lawyers of the parties to approach the bench and suggested that
the cases be settled because she did not want the accused to be administratively
suspended. That at the continuation of the pre-trial, Judge Simbulan asked the accused
to choose a date and promised to accommodate the accused in order to effect a speedy
trial in view of their suspension. Bondoc also alleged that on the same day, Judge
Simbulan directed Atty. Lanee Cui-David (Lanee) to be prepared for the hearing of the
cases since accused had been suspended upon motion of Private Prosecutor Stephen
David (Stephen), Atty. Lanees husband and co-counsel for Bondoc in the criminal cases.
It was also averred that Judge Simbulan never carried out the suspension order against the
accused and that despite Atty. Lanees explanation that Atty. Militante (Ombudsman
Investigator) refused to testify on the ground that the substance of her testimony is
covered by official documents, Judge Simbulan issued an order requiring Atty. Militante
to explain why she should not be cited in contempt for failure to follow lawful orders of
the court. In the supplemental complaint, Bondoc charged Judge Simbulan with conduct
unbecoming of a judge for her denial of private prosecutors motion foe her inhibition.

Judge Simbulan, in her Comment, stated that she did not fast track the resolution of the
case but it was her habit to act fast on all cases before her. She also denied the charge of
partiality for her failure to act on the suspension claiming that it was private prosecutors
duty to file a motion to cite responsible heads of government agencies for indirect
contempt for their failure to implement the lawful orders of the court. Judge Simbulan
also explained that her persistence in requiring Atty. Militantes appearance was due to
the misunderstanding between Atty. Militante and the private prosecutors, therefore, she
wants to find out the truth.

In Bondocs Opposition to the Comment, it was stated that Judge Simbulan refused to
answer the serious charges of partiality, abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming of a
judge. In Judges Simbulans rejoinder, she requested that Bondoc be made to show
cause why he should not be cited in contempt of court, and Attys. Stephen and Lanee to
show cause why they should not be administratively sanctioned as members of the bar
and officers of the court.

The complaint against Judge Simbulan was dismissed, hence, OCA recommended that
Attys. Stephen and Lanee be cited for indirect contempt since the complaint against
Judge Simbulan could not have been filed without the active prodding and instigation of
the lawyers and that private prosecutors were the primary sources of the allegations
contained therein which Bondoc did not personally witness.


HELD:

Lawyers have the duty not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.

Attys. Stephen and Lanee David crossed the line of accepted and protected conduct as
members of the bar and as officers of the court in the filing of the administrative
complaint against the respondent. As the OCA noted, while the complaint was filed in
the name of former Representative Juan Pablo P. Bondoc, he never really appeared in
court and could not have woven the tale of unfair treatment in the complaint which spoke
of intricate courtroom proceedings. The complainant thus relied primarily on the
information relayed to him by his lawyers for the particulars of the complaint. More to
the point, the two lawyers can reasonably be considered to have authored the allegations
in their clients complaint.

Nothing is inherently wrong with the complainants dependence on Attys. Stephen and
Lanee David for the substance of the complaint. Nonetheless, as officers of the court,
counsels are expected to be as truthful and as objective as possible in providing
information to their client regarding developments in the courtroom. Needless to say,
they owe candor, fairness and good faith to the court. In these regards, Attys. Stephen and
Lanee David proved to be wanting.

From the pre-trial records quoted below, we find sufficient justification for the
conclusion that the information Attys. Stephen and Lanee David supplied their client was
patently misleading and slanted to cover up their gross shortcomings as lawyers, as the
respondent aptly put it. On four occasions, private prosecutors never appeared before the
court prepared. No proof was presented to corroborate the charge that the respondent
sought to have the criminal cases settled; neither was there a showing that the respondent
fast tracked the cases to favor the accused.

The defense of Attys. Stephen and Lanee David that what they did is just a consequence
of their commitment to their client can hardly exculpate them. A clients cause does not
permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always
keep in perspective that since they are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of
society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration
of justice. As a lawyer, he is an officer of the court with the duty to uphold its dignity and
authority and not promote distrust in the administration of justice.









CASE NO. 30

MARIA EARL BEVERLY C. CENIZA VS. ATTY. VIVIAN G. RUBIA
A.C. NO. 6166. OCTOBER 2, 2009


FACTS:
On May 3, 2002, Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza, complainant, sought the legal services of
the Atty. Vivian G. Rubia, respondent, in regard to the share of her mother-in-law in the
estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza. As she had no money to pay for attorney's fees since
her mother-in-law would arrive from the United States only in June 2002, respondent
made her sign a promissory note for P32,000.00, which amount was lent by Domingo
Natavio. After her mother-in-law arrived and paid the loan, respondent furnished them a
copy of the complaint for partition and recovery of ownership/possession representing
legitime but with no docket number on it. They kept on following up the progress of the
complaint. However, three months lapsed before respondent informed them that it was
already filed in court. It was then that they received a copy of the complaint with "Civil
Case No. 4198" and a rubber stamped "RECEIVED" thereon. However, when
complainant verified the status of the case with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao del Sur, she was informed that no case with said title and docket number
was filed.

Further, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
intending to file the complaint in Davao del Sur when the properties to be recovered were
located in Koronadal, South Cotabato and Malungon, Sarangani Province, in violation of
the rule on venue that real actions shall be filed in the place where the property is
situated. Complainant also alleged that respondent forged the signature of her husband,
Carlito C. Ceniza, in the Affidavit of Loss attached to a petition for the issuance of a new
owner's duplicate certificate of title filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos
City, Branch 20, in Misc. Case No. 114-2202. On July 25, 2003 filed with the Office of
the Bar Confidant, Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian G. Rubia with
grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and falsification of public documents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 18 and Canon 22 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.


HELD:
Yes. In accusing respondent of falsification of public document, complainant alleged that
respondent misrepresented to her that the complaint was already filed in court, when in
fact, upon verification with the Regional Trial Court Clerk of Court, it was not. Such
misrepresentation is shown by the copy of the complaint with a stamped "RECEIVED"
and docket number thereon. Apart from said allegations, complainant has not proferred
any proof tending to show that respondent deliberately falsified a public document.

A perusal of the records shows that complainant's evidence consists solely of her
Affidavit-Complaint and the annexes attached therewith. She did not appear in all the
mandatory conferences set by the investigating commissioner in order to give respondent
the chance to test the veracity of her assertions. It is one thing to allege gross misconduct,
ignorance of the law or falsification of public document and another to demonstrate by
evidence the specific acts constituting the same.

Indeed, complainant has no way of knowing the surrounding circumstances behind the
filing of the complaint by respondent's staff because she was not present when the same
was filed with the trial court. Complainant failed to disprove by preponderant evidence
respondent's claim that the case was not filed but was in fact withdrawn after it was
stamped with "RECEIVED" and assigned with a docket number. The Supreme Court find
this explanation satisfactory and plausible considering that the stamp did not bear the
signature of the receiving court personnel, which is normally done when pleadings are
received by the court. Further, the certification of the RTC Clerk of Court that the
complaint was not filed and that "CIVIL CASE NO. 4198" pertained to another case, did
not diminish the truthfulness of respondent's claim, but even tended to bolster it.
Necessarily, as the complaint was not filed, docket number "4198" indicated in the copy
of the complaint was assigned to another case thereafter filed in court. Thus, for lack of
preponderant evidence, the investigating commissioner's ruling that respondent was
guilty of falsification of public document, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, has
no factual basis to stand on.

However, the Supreme Court finds that respondent committed some acts for which she
should be disciplined or administratively sanctioned. The Supreme Court found nothing
illegal or reprehensible in respondent's act of charging an acceptance fee of P32,000.00,
which amount appears to be reasonable under the circumstances. The impropriety lies in
the fact that she suggested that complainant borrow money from Domingo Natavio for
the payment thereof. This act impresses upon the Court that respondent would do nothing
to the cause of complainant's mother-in-law unless payment of the acceptance fee is
made. Her duty to render legal services to her client with competence and diligence
should not depend on the payment of acceptance fee, which was in this case promised to
be paid upon the arrival of complainant's mother-in-law in June 2002, or barely a month
after respondent accepted the case.

Respondent's transgression is compounded further when she severed the lawyer-client
relationship due to overwhelming workload demanded by her new employer Nakayama
Group of Companies, which constrained her to return the money received as well as the
records of the case, thereby leaving her client with no representation. Standing alone,
heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of her services. Moreover,
respondent failed to maintain an open line of communication with her client regarding the
status of their complaint. Clearly, respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath which imposes
upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice, Rules 18.03
and 18.04 of Canon 18, and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.








CASE NO. 31

PALM V. ATTY. ILEDAN
602 SCRA 12


FACTS:
Palm is the president of Comtech, which hired Atty. Iledan as its retained counsel. She
filed a case of disbarment against Atty. Iledan for breach of the attorney-client privilege
and conflict of interests.

The basis of the claim of breach occurred during a meeting. Atty. Iledan claimed that the
stockholders meeting cannot take place via teleconferencing because they have yet to
amend the by-laws of the corporation to allow such mode of communications. Palm
claims this was a breach of the attorney-client privilege of confidentiality.

The basis of the conflict of interests stemmed from Atty. Iledan being the counsel of
Soledad who was filed with an estafa case by Comtech.


ISSUE:
Was Atty. Iledan guilty of breach? How about conflict of interests?

HELD:
No. Although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate by-laws may
have been given to respondent, it could not be considered a confidential information. The
amendment, repeal or adoption of new by-laws may be effected by the board of
directors or trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and the owners of at least a majority of
the outstanding capital stock, or at least a majority of members of a non-stock
corporation.It means the stockholders are aware of the proposed amendments to the by-
laws. Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new by-laws is made, copies of
the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and attached to the original articles of incorporation and by-laws.The
documents are public records and could not be considered confidential.

It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential. Since the
proposed amendments must be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and
copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with the SEC, the information could not
have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during
the stockholders meeting could not be considered a violation of his clients secrets and
confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The Court also finds no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a
case filed by Comtech. The case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case
filed by Comtech against its former officer. There was nothing in the records that
would show that respondent used against Comtech any confidential information
acquired while he was still Comtechs retained counsel. Further, respondent made the
representation after the termination of his retainer agreement with Comtech. A lawyers
immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the
lawyers employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer
the duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the
former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has
terminated.











































CASE NO. 32

IMELDA BIDES-ULASO vs. ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA
601 SCRA 184


FACTS:

Atty. Lacsamana was the counsel of Irene Bides (Bides) when the latter filed a civil
action in the RTC in Pasig City against complainant Imelda Bides-Ulaso (Ulaso), her

Bides amended a complaint to demand the declaration of nullity of the deed of
sale pertaining to the parcel of land which Bides was the registered owner. Bides averred
that Ulaso had taken her owners certificate of title during her absence from her residence
and that Ulaso had then caused the transfer of the property to herself through the
fraudulent execution of the deed of sale.

Through the respondent as her counsel, Bides opposed the motion to dismiss claiming an
inadvertent mistake committed in relation to the signature appearing above the printed
name of the affiant, but offering the excuse that the defective amended verification and
affidavit of non-forum shopping had actually been only a sample-draft intended to
instruct Irene Mallari, the respondents new secretary, on where Bides, as affiant, should
sign. Bides also claimed that the respondents signature above the printed name of the
affiant had not been intended to replace the signature of Bides as the affiant; that the
correct amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping to be appended to the
amended complaint due to her (Bides) delayed arrival from her home province of Abra;
and that Mallari had failed to replace the defective document with the
correct amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping.
[6]


Ulaso initiated this proceeding against the respondent on March 2, 2005, praying for the
latters disbarment due to her act of signing the amended verification and affidavit of
non-forum shopping .

Bides and Ulaso entered into a compromise agreement to settle the criminal case for
falsification, whereby Bides agreed to drop the criminal charge against Ulaso in exchange
for, among others, Ulasos withdrawal of the disbarment complaint against the
respondent.The MeTC approved the compromise agreement.

ISSUE:
Does the signing and the notarization of the verification and certification against forum
shopping for Irene Bides constitute actionable misconduct?

HELD:
Being a lawyer commissioned as a notary, the respondent was mandated to discharge
with fidelity the sacred duties appertaining to her notarial office. Such duties being
dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest, she could not disregard the
requirements and solemnities of the Notarial Law. It was emphatically her primary duty
as a lawyer-notary to obey the laws of the land and to promote respect for the law and
legal processes. She was expected to be in the forefront in the observance and
maintenance of the rule of law. She ought to have remembered that a graver
responsibility was placed upon her shoulders by virtue of her being a lawyer.

The respondent was suspended from her practice of law for three months, as the IBP
recommended.