Nicomachean Ethics

Book 2, Chapter 1
VIRTUE, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its
birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires exerience and time!, while moral virtue
comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike! is one that is formed b" a slight
variation from the word ethos (habit!# $rom this it is also lain that none of the moral virtues arises in
us b" nature% for nothing that exists b" nature can form a habit contrar" to its nature# $or instance the
stone which b" nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move uwards, not even if one tries
to train it b" throwing it u ten thousand times% nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can
an"thing else that b" nature behaves in one wa" be trained to behave in another# &either b" nature,
then, nor contrar" to nature do the virtues arise in us% rather we are adated b" nature to receive them,
and are made erfect b" habit#
'gain, of all the things that come to us b" nature we first acquire the otentialit" and later exhibit the
activit" (this is lain in the case of the senses% for it was not b" often seeing or often hearing that we
got these senses, but on the contrar" we had them before we used them, and did not come to have
them b" using them!% but the virtues we get b" first exercising them, as also haens in the case of the
arts as well# $or the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn b" doing them, e#g# men
become builders b" building and l"rela"ers b" la"ing the l"re% so too we become (ust b" doing (ust
acts, temerate b" doing temerate acts, brave b" doing brave acts#
This is confirmed b" what haens in states% for legislators make the citi)ens good b" forming habits
in them, and this is the wish of ever" legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it
is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one#
'gain, it is from the same causes and b" the same means that ever" virtue is both roduced and
destro"ed, and similarl" ever" art% for it is from la"ing the l"re that both good and bad l"re*la"ers
are roduced# 'nd the corresonding statement is true of builders and of all the rest% men will be good
or bad builders as a result of building well or badl"# $or if this were not so, there would have been no
need of a teacher, but all men would have been born good or bad at their craft# This, then, is the case
with the virtues also% b" doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become (ust
or un(ust, and b" doing the acts that we do in the resence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear
or confidence, we become brave or cowardl"# The same is true of aetites and feelings of anger%
some men become temerate and good*temered, others self*indulgent and irascible, b" behaving in
one wa" or the other in the aroriate circumstances# Thus, in one word, states of character arise out
of like activities# This is wh" the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind% it is because the states
of character corresond to the differences between these# It makes no small difference, then, whether
we form habits of one kind or of another from our ver" "outh% it makes a ver" great difference, or
rather all the difference#
Book 2, Chapter 2
+ince, then, the resent inquir" does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others (for we are
inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquir"
would have been of no use!, we must examine the nature of actions, namel" how we ought to do them%
for these determine also the nature of the states of character that are roduced, as we have said# &ow,
that we must act according to the right rule is a common rincile and must be assumed ** it will be
discussed later, i#e# both what the right rule is, and how it is related to the other virtues# ,ut this must
be agreed uon beforehand, that the whole account of matters of conduct must be given in outline and
not recisel", as we said at the ver" beginning that the accounts we demand must be in accordance
with the sub(ect*matter% matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no
fixit", an" more than matters of health# The general account being of this nature, the account of
articular cases is "et more lacking in exactness% for the" do not fall under an" art or recet but the
agents themselves must in each case consider what is aroriate to the occasion, as haens also in
the art of medicine or of navigation#
,ut though our resent account is of this nature we must give what hel we can# $irst, then, let us
consider this, that it is the nature of such things to be destro"ed b" defect and excess, as we see in the
case of strength and of health (for to gain light on things imercetible we must use the evidence of
sensible things!% both excessive and defective exercise destro"s the strength, and similarl" drink or
food which is above or below a certain amount destro"s the health, while that which is roortionate
both roduces and increases and reserves it# +o too is it, then, in the case of temerance and courage
and the other virtues# $or the man who flies from and fears ever"thing and does not stand his ground
against an"thing becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to meet ever"
danger becomes rash% and similarl" the man who indulges in ever" leasure and abstains from none
becomes self*indulgent, while the man who shuns ever" leasure, as boors do, becomes in a wa"
insensible% temerance and courage, then, are destro"ed b" excess and defect, and reserved b" the
mean#
,ut not onl" are the sources and causes of their origination and growth the same as those of their
destruction, but also the shere of their actuali)ation will be the same% for this is also true of the things
which are more evident to sense, e#g# of strength% it is roduced b" taking much food and undergoing
much exertion, and it is the strong man that will be most able to do these things# +o too is it with the
virtues% b" abstaining from leasures we become temerate, and it is when we have become so that we
are most able to abstain from them% and similarl" too in the case of courage% for b" being habituated to
desise things that are terrible and to stand our ground against them we become brave, and it is when
we have become so that we shall be most able to stand our ground against them#
Book 2, Chapter 3
-e must take as a sign of states of character the leasure or ain that ensues on acts% for the man who
abstains from bodil" leasures and delights in this ver" fact is temerate, while the man who is
anno"ed at it is self*indulgent, and he who stands his ground against things that are terrible and
delights in this or at least is not ained is brave, while the man who is ained is a coward# $or moral
excellence is concerned with leasures and ains% it is on account of the leasure that we do bad
things, and on account of the ain that we abstain from noble ones# .ence we ought to have been
brought u in a articular wa" from our ver" "outh, as /lato sa"s, so as both to delight in and to be
ained b" the things that we ought% for this is the right education#
'gain, if the virtues are concerned with actions and assions, and ever" assion and ever" action is
accomanied b" leasure and ain, for this reason also virtue will be concerned with leasures and
ains# This is indicated also b" the fact that unishment is inflicted b" these means% for it is a kind of
cure, and it is the nature of cures to be effected b" contraries#
'gain, as we said but latel", ever" state of soul has a nature relative to and concerned with the kind of
things b" which it tends to be made worse or better% but it is b" reason of leasures and ains that men
become bad, b" ursuing and avoiding these ** either the leasures and ains the" ought not or when
the" ought not or as the" ought not, or b" going wrong in one of the other similar wa"s that ma" be
distinguished# .ence men even define the virtues as certain states of imassivit" and rest% not well,
however, because the" seak absolutel", and do not sa" 0as one ought0 and 0as one ought not0 and 0when
one ought or ought not0, and the other things that ma" be added# -e assume, then, that this kind of
excellence tends to do what is best with regard to leasures and ains, and vice does the contrar"#
The following facts also ma" show us that virtue and vice are concerned with these same things# There
being three ob(ects of choice and three of avoidance, the noble, the advantageous, the leasant, and
their contraries, the base, the in(urious, the ainful, about all of these the good man tends to go right
and the bad man to go wrong, and eseciall" about leasure% for this is common to the animals, and
also it accomanies all ob(ects of choice% for even the noble and the advantageous aear leasant#
'gain, it has grown u with us all from our infanc"% this is wh" it is difficult to rub off this assion,
engrained as it is in our life# 'nd we measure even our actions, some of us more and others less, b" the
rule of leasure and ain# $or this reason, then, our whole inquir" must be about these% for to feel
delight and ain rightl" or wrongl" has no small effect on our actions#
'gain, it is harder to fight with leasure than with anger, to use .eraclitus0 hrase0, but both art and
virtue are alwa"s concerned with what is harder% for even the good is better when it is harder#
Therefore for this reason also the whole concern both of virtue and of olitical science is with
leasures and ains% for the man who uses these well will be good, he who uses them badl" bad#
That virtue, then, is concerned with leasures and ains, and that b" the acts from which it arises it is
both increased and, if the" are done differentl", destro"ed, and that the acts from which it arose are
those in which it actuali)es itself ** let this be taken as said#