People vs. Sunico, et al (C.A., 50 o.g.

5880)
Facts:
The accused were election inspectorsand poll clerks whose duty among others wasto transfer the names of excess
voters in otherprecincts to the list of a newly created precinct.Several voters were omitted in the list.Because their names
were not in the list, someof them were not allowed to vote. The accusedwere prosecuted for violation of Secs. 11
and1! of the "evised #lection $ode. Theaccused claimed that they made the omissionin good faith.The trial court
seemed to %elieve thatnotwithstanding the fact that the accusedcommitted in good faith the serious offensecharged, the
latter are criminally responsi%letherefor, %ecause such offense is malumprohi%itum, and, conse&uently, the
actconstituting the same need not %e committedwith malice or criminal intent to %e punisha%le.
'eld:
The acts of the accused cannot %emerely mala prohi%ita ( they are mala per se .The omission or failure to include a
voter)sname in the registry list of voters is not onlywrong %ecause it is prohi%ited* it is wrong perse %ecause it
disenfranchises a voter andviolates one of his fundamental rights. 'ence,for such act to %e punisha%le, it must %e
shownthat it has %een committed with malice. Thereis no clear showing in the instant case that theaccused intentionally,
willfully and maliciouslyomitted or failed to include in the registry list ofvoters the names of those voters. They cannot%e
punished criminally.
+
the "evised #lection $ode, as far as its penalprovisions are concerned, is a special law, it%eing not a part of the ",$ or
its amendments.
G.R. No. L-42288 February 16, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLN!S, plaintiff(appellee,
vs.
"ORNELIO #$ON, defendant(appellant.
Gervasio Diaz for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
%I"&ERS, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of -udge Braulio Be.asa in the $ourt of First /nstance of $api0, finding the defendant
guilty of a violation of section 112 of the #lection 3aw and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for thirty days and to
pay a fine of ,4, with su%sidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The facts as found %y the trial .udge are as follows:
5 eso de las once de la ma6ana del dia 4 de .unio de 17!1, mientras se cele%rahan las elecciones generales en
el precinto electoral numero 1, situado en el Barrio de 5ranguel del 8unicipio de ,ilar, ,rovincia de $api0, el
a&ui acusado fue sorprendido por -ose #. 9esiderio, &ue era entonces el representante del 9epartamento del
/nterior para inspecionar las elecciones generales en la ,rovincia de $api0, y por el comandante de la
$onsta%ularia F.B. 5gdamag &ue i%a en a&uella ocasion con el citado -ose #. 9esiderio, portando en su cinto el
revolver Colt de cali%re !:, ;o. 174!<:, #xhi%it 5, dentro del cerco &ue rodea%a el edificio destinado para el
citado colegio electoral numero 1 y a una distancia de :: metros del referido colegio electoral. /nmediatament
-ose #. 9esiderio se incauto del revolver en cuestion.
3a defensa, por medio del testimonio de -ose 9. Benliro y de 9ioscoro Buenvenida, trato de esta%lecer &ue el
a&ui acusado paro en la calle &ue da%a frente al colegio electoral numero 1 a invitacion de dicho -ose 9. Benliro
y con el o%.eto de suplicarle al mencionado acusado para llevar a su casa a los electores del citado -ose 9.
Benliro &ue ya ha%ian terminado de votar, y &ue cuando llegaron -ose #. 9esidierio y el comadante F.B.
5gdamag, el a&ui acusado esta%a en la calle. 9esde el colegio electoral hasta el sitio en &ue, segun dichos
testigos, esta%a el acusado cuando se le &uito el revolver #xhi%it a, hay una distancia de := metros.
5ppellant>s attorney makes the following assignments of error:
1. #l -u0gado a quo erro al declarar &ue el apelante fue sorprendido con su revolver dentro del cerco de la casa
escuela del Barrio de 5ranguel, 8unicipio de ,ilar, &ue fue ha%ilitado como colegio electoral.
:. #l -u0gado a quo erro al declarar al apelante culpa%le de la infraccion de la 3ey #lectoral &uerrellada y, por
consiguiente, al condenarle a prision y multa.
5s to the &uestion of fact raised %y the first assignment of error, it is sufficient to say that the record shows that %oth -ose
#. 9esiderio, a representative of the 9epartment of the /nterior, and 8a.or 5gdamag of the ,hilippine $onsta%ulary, who
had %een designated to supervise the elections in the ,rovince of $api0, testified positively that the defendant was within
the fence surrounding the polling place when 9esiderio took possession of the revolver the defendant was carrying. This
also disposes of that part of the argument under the second assignment of error %ased on the theory that the defendant
was in a pu%lic road, where he had a right to %e, when he was arrested. The latter part of the argument under the second
assignment of error is that if it %e conceded that the defendant went inside of the fence, he is nevertheless not guilty of a
violation of the #lection 3aw, %ecause he was called %y a friend and merely approached him to find out what he wanted
and had no interest in the election* that there were many people in the pu%lic road in front of the polling place, and the
defendant could not leave his revolver in his automo%ile, which he himself was driving, without running the risk of losing it
and there%y incurring in a violation of the law.
5s to the contention that the defendant could not leave his revolver in his automo%ile without the risk of losing it %ecause
he was alone, it is sufficient to say that under the circumstances it was not necessary for the defendant to leave his
automo%ile merely %ecause some%ody standing near the polling place had called him, nor does the record show that it
was necessary for the defendant to carry arms on that occasion.
The Solicitor(?eneral argues that since the ?overnment does not especially construct %uildings for electoral precincts
%ut merely utili0es whatever %uilding there may %e availa%le, and all election precincts are within fifty meters from some
road, a literal application of the law would %e a%surd, %ecause mem%ers of the police force or $onsta%ulary in pursuit of
a criminal would %e included in that prohi%ition and could not use the road in &uestion if they were carrying firearms* that
people living in the vicinity of electoral precincts would %e prohi%ited from cleaning or handling their firearms within their
own residences on registration and election days*
That the o%.ect of the 3egislature was merely to prohi%it the display of firearms with intention to influence in any way the
free and voluntary exercise of suffrage*
That if the real o%.ect of the 3egislature was to insure the free exercise of suffrage, the prohi%ition in &uestion should only
%e applied when the facts reveal that the carrying of the firearms was intended for the purpose of using them directly or
indirectly to influence the free choice of the electors @citing the decision of this court in the case of ,eople vs. Ardeleon
B?.". ;o. !14!2, promulgated ;ovem%er :, 17:7, not reportedC, where a policeman, who had %een sent to a polling
place to preserve order on the re&uest of the chairman of the %oard of election inspectors, was ac&uittedD* that in the
case at %ar there is no evidence that the defendant went to the election precinct either to vote or to work for the
candidacy of anyone, %ut on the other hand the evidence shows that the defendant had no intention to go to the electoral
precinct* that he was merely passing along the road in front of the %uilding where the election was %eing held when a
friend of his called him* that while in the strict, narrow interpretation of the law the defendant is guilty, it would %e inhuman
and unreasona%le to convict him.
Ee cannot accept the reasons advanced %y the Solicitor(?eneral for the ac&uittal of the defendant. The law which the
defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. /t may %e conceded that
the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any other way, %ut when he got out of his
automo%ile and carried his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling place, he committed the act complained
of, and he committed it willfully. The act prohi%ited %y the #lection 3aw was complete. The intention to intimidate the
voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the offense. Anless such an offender
actually makes use of his revolver, it would %e extremely difficult, if not impossi%le, to prove that he intended to intimidate
the voters.
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must %e a criminal intent, %ut in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the
prohi%ited act was intentionally done. F$are must %e exercised in distinguishing the difference %etween the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. ...F @A.S. vs. ?o $hico, 11 ,hil., 1:<.D
Ehile it is true that, as a rule and on principles of a%stract .ustice, men are not and should not %e held criminally
responsi%le for acts committed %y them without guilty knowledge and criminal or at least evil intent @Bishop>s ;ew
$rim. 3aw, vol. /, sec. :<2D, the courts have always recogni0ed the power of the legislature, on grounds of pu%lic
policy and compelled %y necessity, Fthe great master of thingsF, to for%id in a limited class of cases the doing of
certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. @A.S. vs. ?o $hico,
11 ,hil., 1:<* A.S. vs. 5h $hong, 14 ,hil., 1<<.D /n such cases no .udicial authority has the power to re&uire, in
the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to %e shown. @A.S. vs. Siy $ong Bieng and $o Gong, !
,hil., 4==.D
The cases suggested %y the Solicitor(?eneral do not seem to us to present any difficulty in the enforcement of the law. /f
a man with a revolver merely passes along a pu%lic road on election day, within fifty meters of a polling place, he does
not violate the provision of law in &uestion, %ecause he had no intent to perpetrate the act prohi%ited, and the same thing
would %e true of a peace officer in pursuing a criminal* nor would the prohi%ition extend to persons living within fifty
meters of a polling place, who merely clean or handle their firearms within their own residences on election day, as they
would not %e carrying firearms within the contemplation of the law* and as to the decision in the case of People vs.
Urdeleon, supra, we have recently held in the case of People vs. !re" and De#racia @p. 127, anteD, that a policeman
who goes to a polling place on the re&uest of the %oard of election inspectors for the purpose of maintaining order is
authori0ed %y law to carry his arms.
/f we were to adopt the specious reasoning that the appellant should %e ac&uitted %ecause it was not proved that he tried
to influence or intended to influence the mind of any voter, any%ody could sell intoxicating li&uor or hold a cockfight or a
horse race on election day with impunity.
5s to the severity of the minimum penalty provided %y law for a violation of the provision in &uestion, that is a matter for
the $hief #xecutive or the 3egislature.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.
vance$a" C.%." Street" bad Santos" and Hull" %%." concur.
G.R. No. 4963, '.S. (. Go ")*+o, 14 P)*,. 128
"epu%lic of the ,hilippines
S'PRE-E "O'RT
8anila
EN #N"
Se./e0ber 15, 1919
G.R. No. 4963
THE 'NITE! STTES, plaintiff(appellee,
vs.
GO "HI"O, defendant(appellant.
Gibbs and Gale for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harve! for appellee.
-ORELN!, %.&
The defendant is charged with the violation of section 1 of 5ct ;o. 1272 of the ,hilippine $ommission, which reads as
follows:
5ny person who shall expose, or cause or permit to %e exposed, to pu%lic view on his own premises, or who shall
expose, or cause to %e exposed, to pu%lic view, either on his own premises or elsewhere, any flag, %anner, em%lem, or
device used during the late insurrection in the ,hilippine /slands to designate or identify those in armed re%ellion against
the Anited States, or any flag, %anner, em%lem, or device used or adopted at any time %y the pu%lic enemies of the
Anited States in the ,hilippine /sland for the purpose of pu%lic disorder or of re%ellion or insurrection against the authority
of the Anited States in the ,hilippine /slands, or any flag, %anner, em%lem, or device of the Gatipunan Society, or which is
commonly known as such, shall %e punished %y a fine of not less that five hundred pesos for more than five thousand
pesos, or %y imprisonment for not less than three months nor more than five years, or %y %oth such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
The defendant was tried in the $ourt of First /nstance of the city of 8anila on the <th day of Septem%er, 17<. 5fter
hearing the evidence adduced the court ad.udged the defendant guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him under
that .udgment to pay a fine of ,4, ,hilippine currency, and to pay the costs of the action, and to suffer su%sidiary
imprisonment during the time and in the form and in the place prescri%ed %y law until said fine should %e paid. From that
.udgment and sentence the defendant appealed to this court.
5 careful examination of the record %rought to this court discloses the following facts:
That on or a%out the 1th day of 5ugust, 17<, in the city of 8anila, the appellant ?o $hico displayed in one of the
windows and one of the show cases of his store, ;o. <7 $alle "osario, a num%er of medallions, in the form of a small
%utton, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of #milio 5guinaldo, and the flag or %anner or
device used during the late insurrection in the ,hilippine /slands to designate and identify those in armed insurrection
against the Anited States. Hn the day previous to the one a%ove set forth the appellant had purchased the stock of
goods in said store, of which the medallions formed a part, at a pu%lic sale made under authority of the sheriff of the city
of 8anila. Hn the day in &uestion, the 1th of 5ugust aforesaid, the appellant was arranging his stock of goods for the
purpose of displaying them to the pu%lic and in so doing placed in his showcase and in one of the windows of his store
the medallions descri%ed. The appellant was ignorant of the existence of a law against the display of the medallions in
&uestion and had conse&uently no corrupt intention. The facts a%ove stated are admitted.
The appellant rests his right to ac&uittal upon two propositions:
First. That %efore a conviction under the law cited can %e had, a criminal intent upon the part of the accused must %e
proved %eyond a reasona%le dou%t.
Second. That the prohi%ition of the law is directed against the use of the identical %anners, devices, or em%lems actually
used during the ,hilippine insurrection %y those in armed re%ellion against the Anited States.
/n the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with the criminal intent. /n many
crimes, made such %y statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This
is necessarily so. /f it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would %e su%stantially worthless. /t would %e
impossi%le of execution. /n many cases the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect which the
statute seeks to avoid. /n those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result whether
the intention of the person performing the act is good or %ad. The case at %ar is a perfect illustration of this. The display
of a flag or em%lem used particularly within a recent period, %y the enemies of the ?overnment tends to incite resistance
to governmental functions and insurrection against governmental authority .ust as effectively if made in the %est of good
faith as if made with the most corrupt intent. The display itself, without the intervention of any other factor, is the evil. /t is
&uite different from that large class of crimes, made such %y the common law or %y statute, in which the in.urious effect
upon the pu%lic depends upon the corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act. /f 5 discharges a loaded gun and
kills B, the interest which society has in the act depends, not upon B>s death, upon the intention with which 5
consummated the act. /f the gun were discharged intentionally, with the purpose of accomplishing the death of B, then
society has %een in.ured and its security violated* %ut if the gun was discharged accidentally on the part of 5, then
society, strictly speaking, has no concern in the matter, even though the death of B results. The reason for this is that 5
does not %ecome a danger to society and institutions until he %ecomes a person with a corrupt mind. The mere discharge
of the gun and the death of B do not of themselves make him so. Eith those two facts must go the corrupt intent to kill. /n
the case at %ar, however, the evil to society and the ?overnmental does not depend upon the state of mind of the one
who displays the %anner, %ut upon the effect which that display has upon the pu%lic mind. /n the one case the pu%lic is
affected %y the intention of the actor* in the other %y the act itself.
/t is stated in volume 1: of $yc., page 11<, that I
The legislature, however, may for%id the doing of an act and make its commission a crime without regard to the intent of
the doer, and if such an intention appears the courts must give it effect although the intention may have %een innocent.
Ehether or not in a given case the statute is to %e so construed is to %e determined %y the court %y considering the
su%.ect(matter of the prohi%ition as well as the language of the statute, and thus ascertaining the intention of the
legislature.
/n the case of The ,eople vs. Gi%ler @12 ;. J., !:1D the defendant was charged with the sale of adulterated milk under a
statute reading as follows:
;o person or persons shall sell or exchange or expose for sale or exchange any impure, unhealthy, adulterated, of
unwholesome milk.
/t was proved in that case that one Kande%urg purchased at the defendant>s store 1 pint of milk which was shown to
contain a very small percentage of water more than that permitted %y the statute. There was no dispute a%out the facts,
%ut the o%.ection made %y the defendant was that he was not allowed, upon the trial, to show an a%sence of criminal
intent, or to go the .ury upon the &uestion whether it existed, %ut was condemned under a charge from the court which
made his intent totally immaterial and his guilt consist in having sold the adulterated article whether he knew it or not and
however carefully he may have sought to keep on hand and sell the genuine article.
The opinion of the court in that case says:
5s the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no elements of the offense. The act alone, irrespective of its motive,
constitutes the crime.
xxx xxx xxx
/t is notorious that the adulteration of food products has grown to proportions so enormous as to menace the health and
safety of the people. /ngenuity keeps pace with greed, and the careless and heedless consumers are exposed to
increasing perils. To redress such evils is a plain duty %ut a difficult task. #xperience has taught the lesson that
repressive measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer>s knowledge or of his intent to deceive
and defraud are of title use and rarely accomplish their purpose. Such an emergency may .ustify legislation which throws
upon the seller the entire responsi%ility of the purity and soundness of what he sells and compels him to know and
certain.
/n the case of ?ardner vs. The ,eople @2: ;. J., :77D the &uestion arose under a statute which provided that an
inspector of elections of the city of ;ew Jork should not %e removed from office except Fafter notice in writing to the
officer sought to %e removed, which notice shall set forth clearly and distinctly the reasons for his removal,F and further
provided that any person who removed such an officer without such notice should %e guilty of a misdemeanor. 5n officer
named Sheridan was removed %y ?ardener, the defendant, without notice. ?ardener was arrested and convicted of a
misdemeanor under the statute. 'e appealed from the .udgment of conviction and the opinion from which the following
&uotation is made was written upon the decision of that appeal. $hief -ustice $hurch, writing the opinion of the court,
says in relation to criminal intent:
/n short, the defense was an honest misconstruction of the law under legal device. The court ruled out the evidence
offered, and held that intentionally doing the act prohi%ited constituted the offense. /t is &uite clear that the facts offered to
%e shown, if true, would relieve the defendant from the imputation of a corrupt intent, and, indeed, from any intent to
violate the statute. The defendants made a mistake of law. Such mistakes do not excuse the commission of prohi%ited
acts. FThe rule on the su%.ect appears to %e, that in acts mala in se, intent governs %ut in those mala prohi%it a, the only
in&uiry is, has the law %een violatedL
xxx xxx xxx
The authorities seem to esta%lish that sustain and indictment for doing a prohi%ited act, it is sufficient to prove that the act
was knowingly and intentionally done.
xxx xxx xxx
/n this case, if the defendants could have shown that they %elieved that in fact notice had %een given to the inspector,
although it had not, they would not have %een guilty of the offense, %ecause the intention to do the act would have %een
wanting. Their plea is: True, we intended to remove the inspector without notice, %ut we thought the law permitted it. This
was a mistake of law, and is not strictly a defense.
xxx xxx xxx
/f the offense is merely technical, the punishment can %e made correspondingly nominal* while a rule re&uiring proof of a
criminal intent to violate the statute, independent of an intent to do the act which the statute declares shall constitute the
offense, would, in many cases, prevent the restraining influence which the statute was designed to secure.
/n the case of Fiedler vs. 9arrin @4 ;.J., 1!=D the court says:
But when an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.
/n the case of The $ommonwealth vs. 8urphy @124 8ass., 22D the court says:
/n general, it may %e said that there must %e malus animus, or a criminal intent. But there is a large class of cases in
which, on grounds of pu%lic policy, certain acts are made punisha%le without proof that the defendant understands the
facts that give character to his act.
/n such cases it is deemed %est to re&uire every%ody at his peril to ascertain whether his act comes within the legislative
prohi%ition.
xxx xxx xxx
$onsidering the nature of the offense, the purpose to %e accomplished, the practical methods availa%le for the
enforcement of the law, and such other matters as throw light upon the meaning of the language, the &uestion in
interpreting a criminal statute is whether the intention of the legislature was to make knowledge of the facts an essential
element of the offense, or to put upon everyone the %urden of finding out whether his contemplated act is prohi%ited, and
of refraining from it if it is.
/n the case of 'alsted vs. The State @11 ;. -. 3., 44:* !: 5m. "ep., :1=D, the &uestion of a criminal intent arose under a
statute, under which the defendant was convicted of a crime, providing that if any township committee or other %ody shall
dis%urse or vote for the dis%ursement of pu%lic moneys in excess of appropriations made for the purpose, the persons
constituting such %oard shall %e guilty of a crime. The defendant was one who violated this law %y voting to incur
o%ligations in excess of the appropriation. 'e was convicted and appealed and the opinion from which the &uotation is
taken was written upon a decision of that appeal. That court says:
Ehen the State had closed, the defense offered to show that the defendant, in aiding in the passage and effectuation of
the resolution which / have pronounced to %e illegal, did so under the advice of counsel and in good faith, and from pure
and honest motives, and that he therein exercise due care and caution.
xxx xxx xxx
5s there is an undou%ted competency in the lawmaker to declare an act criminal, irrespective of the knowledge or motive
of the doer of such act, there can %e of necessity, no .udicial authority having the power to re&uire, in the enforcement of
the law, such knowledge or motive to %e shown. /n such instances the entire function of the court is to find out the
intention of the legislature, and to enforce the law in a%solute conformity to such intention. 5nd in looking over the
decided cases on the su%.ect it will %e found that in the considered ad.udications this in&uiry has %een the .udicial guide.
/n the case of "ex vs. Hgden @2 $. M ,., 2!1* :4 #. $. 3., 211D, the prisoner was indicted for unlawfully transposing from
one piece of wrought plate to another the lion-poisson contrary to the statutes. /t was conceded that the act was done
without any fraudulent intention. The court said:
There are no words in the act of ,arliament referring to any fraudulent intention. The words of it are, >Shall transpose or
remove, or cause of procure to %e transposed or removed, from one piece of wrought plate to another.
/n the case of The State vs. 8cBrayer @7< ;. $., 2:!D the court stated:
/t is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent to violate the criminal law is an essential ingredient in every criminal
offense, and that where is an a%sence of such intent there is no offense* this is especially true as to statutory offenses.
Ehen the statute plainly for%ids an act to %e done, and it is done %y some person, the law implies conclusively the guilty
intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law he violates. Ehen the language is plain
and positive, and the offense is not made to depend upon the positive, willful intent and purpose, nothing is left to
interpretation.
/n the case of the $ommonwealth vs. Eeiss @1!7 ,a. St., :1=D, the &uestion arose on an appeal %y the defendant from a
.udgment re&uiring him to pay a penalty for a violation of the statute of the State which provided that any person would
%e lia%le to pay a penalty Fwho shall manufacture, sell, or offer or expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to
sell,F oleomargarine, etc. 5t the trial the defendant re&uested the court to instruct the in.ury that if they %elieved, from the
evidence, that the defendant did not knowingly furnish or authori0e to %e furnished, or knew of there furnished, to any of
his customers any oleomargarine, %ut, as far as he knew, furnished genuine %utter, then the verdict must %e for the
defendant. The court refused to make the charge as re&uested and that is the only point upon which the defendant
appealed.
The court says:
The prohi%ition is a%solute and general* it could not %e expressed in terms more explicit and comprehensive. The
statutory definition of the offense em%races no word implying that the for%idden act shall %e done knowingly or willfully,
and if it did, the designed purpose of the act would %e practically defeated. The intention of the legislature is plain, that
persons engaged in the traffic so engage in it at their peril and that they can not set up their ignorance of the nature and
&ualities of the commodities they sell, as a defense.
The following authorities are to the same effect: State vs. ?ould @1 /a., !=1D* $ommonwealth vs. Farren @7 5llen, 1<7D*
$ommonwealth vs. ;ichols @1 5llen, 177D* $ommonwealth vs. Boyton @: 5llen, 12D* Eharton>s $riminal 3aw, section
:11:* $ommonwealth vs. Sellers @1! ,a., !:D* ! ?reenleaf on #vidence, section :1* Farrell vs. The State @!: Hhio
State, 142D* Beekman vs.5nthony @42 8iss., 112D* The ,eople vs. "o%y @4: 8ich., 4==D.
/t is clear from the authorities cited that in the act under consideration the legislature did not intend that a criminal intent
should %e a necessary element of the crime. The statutory definition of the offense em%races no word implying that the
prohi%ited act shall %e done knowingly or willfully. The wording is plain. The 5ct means what it says. ;othing is left to the
interpretation.
$are must %e exercised in distiguishing the differences %etween the intent to commit the crime and the intent to
perpetrate the act. The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime* %ut he did intend to commit an act, and the
act is, %y the very nature of things, the crime itself I intent and all. The wording of the law is such that the intent and the
act are insepara%le. The act is the crime. The accused intended to put the device in his window. ;othing more is re&uired
to commit the crime.
Ee do not %elieve that the second proposition of the accused, namely, that the law is applica%le only to the identical
%anners, etc., actually used in the late insurrection, and not to duplicates of those %anners, can %e sustained.
/t is impossi%le that the $ommission should have intended to prohi%it the display of the flag or flags actually used in the
insurrection, and, at the same time, permit exact duplicates thereof @saving, perhaps, si0eD to %e displayed without
hindrance. /n the case %efore us, to say that the display of a certain %anner is a crime and that the display of its exact
duplicate is not is to say nonsense. The rules governing the interpretation of statutes are rules of construction not
destruction. To give the interpretation contended for %y the appellant would, as to this particular provision, nullify the
statute altogether.
The words Fused during the late insurrection in the ,hilippine /slands to designate or identity those in armed re%ellion
against the Anited StatesF mean not only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, %ut any flag which is of that
type. This description refers not to a particular flag, %ut to a type of flag. That phrase was used %ecause there was and is
no other way of descri%ing that type of flag. Ehile different words might %e employed, according to the taste of the
draftsman, the method of description would have to %e the same. There is no concrete word known %y which that flag
could %e aptly or properly descri%ed. There was no opportunity, within the scope of a legislative enactment, to descri%e
the physical details. /t had no characteristics whatever, apart from its use in the insurrection, %y which it could, in such
enactment, %e identified. The great and the only characteristic which it had upon the which the $ommission could sei0e
as a means of description and identification was the fact that it was used in the insurrection. There was, therefore,
a%solutely no way in which the $ommission could, in the 5ct, descri%e the flag except %y reciting where and how it was
used. /t must not %e forgotten that the $ommission, %y the words and phrases used, was not attempting to descri%e a
particular flag, %ut a type of flag. They were not descri%ing a flag used upon a particular field or in a certain %attle, %ut a
type of flag used %y an army I a flag under which many persons rallied and which stirred their sentiments and feelings
wherever seen or in whatever form it appeared. /t is a mere incident of description that the flag was used upon a
particular field or in a particular %attle. They were descri%ing the flag not a flag. /t has a &uality and significance and an
entity apart from any place where or form in which it was used.
3anguage is rarely so free from am%iguity as to %e incapa%le of %eing used in more than one sense, and the literal
interpretation of a statute may lead to an a%surdity or evidently fail to give the real intent of the legislature. Ehen this is
the case, resort is had to the principle that the spirit of a law controls the letter, so that a thing which is within the intention
of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter, and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is
not within the statute unless it %e within the intention of the makers, and the statute should %e construed as to advance
the remedy and suppress the mischief contemplated %y the framers. @A. S. vs. Gir%y, = Eall., 1<=* State Bolden, 1= 3a.,
112, 11<* A.S. vs. Buchanan, 7 Fed. "ep., 2<7* ?reen vs. Gemp, 1! 8ass., 414* 3ake Shore ". ". $o. vs. "oach, < ;.
J., !!7* 9elafield vs. Brady, 1< ;. J., 4:1 9oyle vs. 9oyle, 4 Hhio State, !!.D
The intention of the legislature and the o%.ect aimed at, %eing the fundamental in&uiry in .udicial construction, are to
control the literal interpretation of particular language in a statute, and language capa%le of more than one meaning is to
%e taken in that sense which will harmoni0e with such intention and o%.ect, and effect the purpose of the enactment. @:2
5m. M #ng. #ncy. of 3aw., 2:.D
3iterally hundreds of cases might %e cited to sustain this proposition.
The pream%le is no part of the statute, %ut as setting out the o%.ect and intention of the legislature, it is considered in the
construction of an act. Therefore, whenever there is am%iguity, or wherever the words of the act have more than one
meaning, and there is no dou%t as to the su%.ect(matter to which they are to %e applied, the pream%le may %e used.F @A.
S. vs. Anion ,acific ". ". $o., 71 A. S., =:* ,latt vs. Anion ,acific ". ". $o., 77 A. S., 1<* 8yer vs. Eestern $ar $o.,
1: A. S., 1* 'oly Trinity $hurch vs. A. S., 11! A. S., 14=* $oosaw 8ining $o. vs.South $arolina, 111 A. S., 44*
$ohn vs. Barrett, 4 $al., 174* Barnes vs. -ones, 41 $al., !!* Field vs. ?ooding, 12 8ass., !1* ,eople vs. 8olineaux,
1 ;. J., 11!* Smith vs. The ,eople, 1= ;. J., !!* The ,eople vs. 9avenport, 71 ;.J., 41=* The ,eople vs. H>Brien, 111
;.J., 1D
The statute, then, %eing penal, must %e construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the
defendant and at the same time preserve the o%vious intention of the legislature. /f the language %e plain, it will %e
construed as it reads, and the words of the statute given their full meaning* if am%iguous, the court will lean more
strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the statute were remedial. /n %oth cases it will endeavor to effect
su%stantial .ustice.F @Bolles vs. Huting $o., 1=4 A. S., :2:, :24* A. S. vs. Eilt%erger, 4 Eheat., =2, 74* A. S. vs. "eese,
7: A. S., :11D
/t is said that notwithstanding this rule @the penal statutes must %e construde strictlyD the intention of the lawmakers must
govern in the construction of penal as well as other statutes. This is true, %ut this is not a new, independent rule which
su%verts the old. /t is a modification of the known maxim and amounts to this (( that though penal statutes are to %e
construed strictly, they are not %e construed so strictly as to defeat the o%vious purpose of the legislature. @A.
S. vs. Eilt%erger, 4 Eheat., =2* Taylor vs. ?oodwin, 3. ". 1, N. B. $iv., ::<.D
/n the latter case it was held that under a statute which imposed a penalty for Ffuriously driving any sort of carriageF a
person could %e convicted for immoderately driving a %icycle.
/t is presumed that the legislature intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as will render then operative and
effective, and to prevent persons from eluding or defeating them. 5ccordingly, in case of any dou%t or o%scurity, the
construction will %e such as to carry out these o%.ects. @Black, /nterpretation of 3aws, p. 12.D
/n The ,eople vs. Supervisors @1! ;. J., 1!D the court said:
The occasion of the enactment of a law always %e referred to in interpreting and giving effect to it. The court should place
itself in the situation of the legislature and ascertain the necessity and pro%a%le o%.ect of the statute, and then give such
construction to the language used as to carry the intention of the legislature into effect so far as it can %e ascertained
from the terms of the statute itself. @A. S. vs. Anion ,acific ". ". $o., 71 A. S., =:, =7.D
Ee do not %elieve that in construing the statute in &uestion there is necessity re&uiring that clauses should %e taken from
the position given them and placed in other portions of the statute in order to give the whole 5ct a reasona%le meaning.
3eaving all of the clauses located as they now are in the statute, a reasona%le interpretation, %ased upon the plain and
ordinary meaning of the words used, re&uires that the 5ct should %e held applica%le to the case at %ar.
The .udgment of the court %elow and the sentence imposed thereunder are here%y affirmed. So ordered.
rellano" C. %." 'orres" and Carson" %%." concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. !O-INGO "STILLO, 2R., accused-appellant.
9 # $ / S / H ;
F"5;$/S$H, %.:
This is a case of parricide more tragic in that it involves the cold( %looded murder of a father %y his only son.
Hn ;ovem%er 2, 177! %etween the hours of =:! and <:! in the evening, the appellant 9H8/;?H $5ST/33H, -".,
nicknamed OBoyetP, was in the 9 M ? "estaurant in ;or0agaray, Bulacan drinking %eer with the victim, his father,
9omingo $astillo, Sr.B1C 5fter some two hours of drinking, a group of noisy customers arrived. Eary of the trou%le that
these customers may cause and aware of his son)s propensity to get into fights, the victim urged the former to go home
with him.B:C The appellant and the victim then %oarded a %lue pick(up truck with plate num%er $B# 471.B!C The appellant
drove the vehicle in the direction of their home in 5ngat, Bulacan with the victim in the passenger)s seat. 9uring the trip
home, an argument ensued %etween the appellant and the victim who were %oth a %it drunk alreadyB1C %ecause the
former kept insisting that he should or could go %ack to the restaurant while the latter prevented him from doing so.B4C
Apon nearing their house, the appellant a%ruptly stopped the pick(up and the victim alighted therefrom.B2C 'olding a
%ottle of %eer in his right hand, the victim raised %oth of his hands, stood in front of the pick(up and said, Osige kung gusto
mo sagasaan mo ako, hindi ka makakaalisP @go ahead, run over me if you want to leaveD.B=C The appellant slowly drove
the pick(up forward threatening to run over the victim. 5t this .uncture, the victim exclaimed, Opapatayin mo %a akoLP @are
you going to kill meLD.B<C 5fter the victim uttered these words, the appellant %acked(up almost hitting an owner type .eep
parked at the side of the road and on %oard which were four @1D people conversing with each other, including prosecution
eyewitness, 8a. $ecilia 8ariano. Then at high speed, the appellant drove the pick(up forward hitting the victim in the
process. ;ot satisfied with what he had done, the appellant put the vehicle in reverse there%y running over the victim a
second time. The appellant then alighted from the vehicle and walked towards their house.B7C
5t the precise moment of the perpetration of the crime, another witness, 5rthur 5garan who worked at the recapping
shop of the victim was in the latter)s residence.B1C 'e was changing his clothes and preparing to work overtime in the
recapping shop located in the premises of the victim)s residence.B11C 5garan saw the pick(up truck %eing driven %y the
appellant and noticed that it moved forward and %ackward four @1D timesB1:C a%out twenty @:D to thirty @!D meters from
the house.B1!C Ehen he and another worker went outside to find out what had happened, they saw the victim)s %ody
%loodied and sprawled on the ground.B11C They rushed the victim to the 9olorosa 'ospital at ;or0agaray, Bulacan
where the victim expired shortly thereafter.B14C
The appellant was not immediately prosecuted for the death of his father which he was a%le to pass off as an accident.
But when his older sister, 3eslie $. ,adilla, arrived from the Anited States to attend her father)s wake and funeral, she
made in&uiries a%out the circumstances surrounding his death and was given different versions of the incident, some of
which insinuated that her father did not meet his demise accidentally.B12C 3ater, a suspicion of foul play moved her to
engage the services of the ;ational Bureau of /nvestigation @;B/D for a formal investigation into the matter.B1=C The
results thereof confirmed ,adilla)s suspicion and led to the filing of an information for parricide against appellant.B1<C
5fter trial, Branch 11 of the "egional Trial $ourt of Bulacan found the appellant guilty %eyond reasona%le dou%t of the
crime of parricide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the other heirs of the victim
TEH 'A;9"#9 F/FTJ T'HAS5;9 ,#SHS @,:4,.D as actual damages.B17C
Ee affirm the .udgment of conviction.
The prosecution has successfully esta%lished the elements of parricide: @1D the death of the deceased* @:D that he or she
was killed %y the accused* and @!D that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or the legitimate spouse
of the accused.B:C The only &uestion left to %e answered %y this $ourt is whether or not the parricide was committed
thru reckless imprudence as claimed %y the appellant. The appellant does not dispute the fact that he had indeed ran
over his father with the pick(up truck he was driving on that fateful night in ;ovem%er, 177!. 'e claims, however, that
there was no intention on his part to kill his father, and that he had accidentally stepped on the gas pedal forcefully,
causing the vehicle to travel at a fast speed.B:1C
The appellant)s asseveration is not worthy of credence. /n convicting the appellant, the trial court relied heavily on the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, 8ariano and 5garan. Ee find no reason to do otherwise, applying the
fundamental rule in criminal cases that in the matter of credi%ility of witnesses, the appellate court gives great weight and
highest degree of respect to the findings of the trial court as they are in a %etter position to examine real evidence as well
as to o%serve the demeanor of the witnesses.B::C The details of the incident as narrated %y 8ariano and 5garan
%espeak of a crime committed with full intent. 5nd we have held that a deli%erate intent to do an unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence.B:!C Ehat &ualifies an act as one of reckless or simple
negligence or imprudence is the lack of malice or criminal intent in the execution thereof.B:1C Htherwise stated, in
criminal negligence, the in.ury caused to another should %e unintentional, it %eing simply the incident of another act done
without maliceB:4C %ut with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence, and which has harmed society or an
individual.B:2C
Hn direct examination, 8ariano testified as follows:
34 Ehile you were there infront @sicD of your house, do you recall of any unusual incident that happenedL
4 Jes, sir there was.
34 Tell us a%out that unusual incidentL
4 Ehile we were conversing at that time, all of a sudden there was a colored %lue pick up @sicD that was rushing towards
our place in very fast speed @humaharurotD.
34 Eith whom were you conversing at that timeL
4 8y two @:D friends and one of my sister @sicD, sir.
34 Ehat is the name of your sisterL
4 8a. 3ucila ?. 8ariano, sir.
34 From where did that pick up van come from @sicDL
4/t came from %ehind our %ack, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
34 Ehat happened after you saw that pick up @sicD colored %lue speeding in that streetL
4 5ll of a sudden it stopped, sir.
34 /n your sketch, will you please draw a s&uare or a rectangular figure to indicate the position of that van when it
stoppedL
5T T'/S -A;$TA"#, T'# E/T;#SS /S /;9/$5T/;? T'# S58#.
34 5fter that pick up @sicD stopped, what happened nextL
4 /t stopped there, sir.
34 'ow a%out you, what did you do when the pick up stoppedL
4 Ee were looking at it. Ee did not mind it.
34 5fter that, did you notice anything unusual that happened around the premises.
4 Jes, sir.
34 Tell us a%out that unusual incidentL
4 5n old man alighted, sir.
34 From where did that old man alightL
4 From the pick up @sicD, sir.
$HA"T:
34 The %lue pick up @sicDL
4 Jes, your honor.
F/S$53:
34 From what side of the pick up @sicD did he alight, from the left or from the right sideL
4 From the right side, sir.
34 5fter that old man had alighted, what happenedL
4 / noticed that the pick up @sicD colored %lue thru the headlight seems to %e moving trying to intimidate the old man then
/ heard the old man saying Opapatayin mo %a akoP and at that time, he was holding a %ottle of %eer, sir.
34 /n this sketch, will you please draw the position of that old manL
5T T'/S -A;$TA"#, T'# E/T;#SS /S 9H/;? T'# S58#.
34 5fter the old man uttered those words, what happenedL
4 / .ust saw that the pick up made a %ack up @sicD almost hitting us, sir.
34 Then, what did the driver of that pick up @sicD do afterwards after %acking up ratherL
4 5ll of a sudden, the pick up @sicD ran very fast and hit the old man, sir.
34 Jou said that, that vehicle %acked up and then it proceeded very fast hitting the old man in the process, is that
correctL
4 Jes, sir.
349id the old man change his position after he uttered Opapatayin mo %a akoLP up to the time that he was hit %y that pick
up vanL
4 Jes, sir.
34 Eill you please indicate where the old man proceed @sicDL
5T T'/S -A;$TA"#, T'# E/T;#SS /S 9H/;? T'# S58#.
34 Ehen you saw the old man hit %y that pick up @sicD, did you do anythingL
4 / was .ust shocked, sir.
34 5nd what happened to the pick up @sicD after it hit the old manL
4 5fter it hit the old man, / noticed that it moved %ackwards again and then the headlight was on at that time and / saw
the old man lying sprawled on the road, sir.
34 5nd what did you do after you saw the old man lying sprawled on the streetL
4 / .ust say @sicD to my companion, O'oy, nasagasaan yong matandaP then all of us were shocked and we noticed that
the driver of that pick up @sicD was @sicD alighted, sir.
34 Eere you a%le to recogni0e the driver of that pick up who alighted from that vehicleL
4 / did not recogni0e, / .ust recall that he was wearing white shorts, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
34 5fter that driver wearing white shorts alighted from that pick up @sicD, where did he proceedL
4 'e walked towards the town proper walking, sir.
34 Ehen you said that he walk @sicD, are you saying that the driver left his vehicle in the middle of the streetL
4 Jes, sir he left the pick up @sicD.PB:=C

@Anderscoring supplied.D
The records are %ereft of any evidence that the appellant had tried to avoid hitting the victim who positioned himself in
front of the pick(up. Hn the contrary, 8ariano)s testimony is to the effect that prior to actually hitting the victim, the
appellant was OintimidatingP him %y moving the pick(up forward, thus prompting the victim to exclaim, Opapatayin mo %a
akoLP. Eorse, the appellant %acked(up to gain momentum, then accelerated at a very fast speed knowing fully well that
the vehicle would definitely hit the victim who was still standing in front of the same.
The appellant)s actuations su%se&uent thereto also serve to refute his allegation that he did not intend to kill his father.
Surely, the appellant must have felt the impact upon hitting the victim. The normal reaction of any person who had
accidentally ran over another would %e to immediately alight from the vehicle and render aid to the victim. But as if to
ensure the victim)s death, the appellant instead %acked(up, there%y running over the victim again. This explains why, as
testified to %y 5garan, he saw the imprint of tiremarks on the victim)s feet.B:<C #ven more indicative that this was a cold(
%looded killing and not an accident as appellant would have us %elieve is his deli%erate failure to promptly summon help
for his father. 8ariano categorically testified that after the appellant had ran over the victim, he alighted from the pick(up
and walked in the direction of the town. The appellant)s claim that he shouted for help and called the workers in the
recapping shop to %ring his father to the hospital is o%viously a fa%rication.B:7C 5garan recounted that after the incident,
the appellant walked towards their house and while passing in front of the recapping shop, merely looked at him and the
other workers thereat.B!C 5 man who had not intended to harm his own father would not walk %ut more likely run in
search of help. 5ware of the fact that his father)s life is precariously hanging in the %alance, the normal reaction of a
child is to waste no time in trying to save his life. The appellant, on the other hand, did not even lift a finger to help his
own father whose life he had so %rutally taken away. /t was 5garan and the other workers who, on their own accord,
%rought the victim to the hospital. /n the light of the foregoing circumstances, we therefore find it difficult to %elieve that
the appellant did not act with malice. Eorth reiterating here is the rule that evidence, to %e %elieved, must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credi%le witness, %ut it must %e credi%le in itself( such as the common experience and
o%servation of mankind can approve as pro%a%le under the circumstances.B!1C
/ronically, it is the appellant)s testimony that finally clinches his conviction. 'is testimony reveals that a certain degree of
enmity and resentment characteri0ed his relationship with his parents. The appellant was the only son of well to do
parents. 'e had never held a day)s .o% in his entire life, and although already a family man himself, he continued to rely
solely on his parents) support. That he was a Olittle spoiledPB!:C is %eyond dou%t. The appellant admitted that during the
previous years, he and his parents had some differences.B!!C 5s a matter of fact, several days prior to the incident, his
father who wanted him to look for a .o% had a Oheart to heart talkP with him, and asked him, Oganito ka na lang %aLP @will
you never changeLD.B!1C Finally, it was the appellant himself who told the court that the incident was preceded %y an
argument %etween him and his father who was determined to prevent him from returning to the restaurant.B!4C But what
exactly motivated the appellant to commit so heinous a crime continues to %e %eyond the comprehension of this court.
There is, however, no need to delve into the same as the facts proven during trial speak elo&uently of the commission of
a crime and the identity of the author thereof.B!2C
5nent the award of actual damages, we delete the same as none had %een proven in court. The appellant should,
however, %e made to pay the other heirs of the victim the amount of F/FTJ T'HAS5;9 ,#SHS @,4,.D %y way of
moral damages.
5HEREFORE, the assailed decision finding the appellant guilty %eyond reasona%le dou%t of the crime of parricide is
here%y 5FF/"8#9 with the modification that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
other heirs of the victim the amount F/FTJ T'HAS5;9 ,#SHS @,4,.D as moral damages.
SH H"9#"#9.

Peo.,e (. Gu*,,e6 GR No. L-1477, 2a6uary 18, 1951
F5$TS:The accused -ulio ?uillen, was found guilty %eyond reasona%le dou%t of thecrime of murder and multiple
frustrated murder after his attempt to assassinate the ,residentof the ,hilippines, 8anuel "oxas on 8arch 1,
171=.9uring the 1712 ,residential #lections, ?uillen voted for the opposing candidateof 8anuel "oxas.
5ccording to the accused, he was disappointed with the latter for failing toredeem and fulfill promises made %y
,resident "oxas during the elections. $onse&uently, theaccused determined to assassinate the ,resident and
found the oppoturnity to do so on thenight of 8arch 1, 171= when the ,resident attended a popular meeting %y
the 3i%eral ,artyat ,la0a de 8iranda, Nuiapo, 8anila. ?uillen first intended to use a revolver to accomplish
hisgoal %ut he had previously lost his licensed firearm, so he thought of using two handgrenades which were
given to him %y an 5merican soldier in exchange for two %ottles of whisky. The accused stood on the chair he
had %een sitting on and hurled the grenade at the,resident when the latter had .ust closed his speech. 5 general
who was on the platform sawthe smoking grenade and kicked it away from the platform towards an open space
where hethought the grenade was likely to do the least harm. The grenade exploded in the middle of agroup of
persons standing close to the platform and grenade fragments seriously in.uredSimeon Karela, who died the
next day due to the mortal wounds caused, and several other persons. ?uillen was arrested and he readily
admitted his responsi%ility./SSA#:EH; the accused was guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in
regard to thedeath of Simeon Karela and of less serious physical in.uries in regard to the other
in.uredpersons.'#39:The facts do not support the contention of the counsel for the appellant. /n throwing the
handgrenade at the ,resident with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice andis therefore
lia%le for all the conse&uences of his wrongful act. 5s provided %y 5rt. 1 of the"evised ,enal $ode, criminal
lia%ility is incurred %y any person committing a felony althoughthe wronful act done %e different from that which
he intended. /n criminal negligence, thein.ury caused to another should %e unintentional, it %eing simply the
incident of another actperformed without malice. 5s held %y thie $ourt, a deli%erate intent to do an unlawful act
isessentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. Ehere such unlawful act iswilfully done, a
mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot %e considered recklessimprudence.The sentence of the trial
court is affirmed %y unanimous vote and death sentence shall %eexecuted in accordance with article <1 of the
"evised ,enal $ode.
%*u8a 8e #a/a+a6 e/ a, (9 -e8*6a
,ass(midnight in Septem%er 174:, -uan Bataclan rode a %us owned %y 8ariano 8edina from $avite to ,asay. Ehile on its way, the
driver of the %us was driving fast and when he applied the %rakes it cause the %us to %e overturned. The driver, the conductor, and
some passengers were a%le to free themselves from the %us except Bataclan and ! others. The passengers called the help of the
villagers and as it was dark, the villagers %rought torch with them. The driver and the conductor failed to warn the would(%e helpers of
the fact that gasoline has spilled from the overturned %us so a huge fire ensued which engulfed the %us there%y killing the 1 passengers
trapped inside. /t was also found later in trial that the tires of the %us were old.
ISS'E4 Ehether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their %urning %y reason of the
torches which ignited the gasoline.
HEL!4 ;o. The proximate cause was the overturning of the %us which was caused %y the negligence of the
driver %ecause he was speeding and also he was already advised %y 8edina to change the tires yet he did not.
Such negligence resulted to the overturning of the %us. The torches carried %y the would(%e helpers are not to
%e %lamed. /t is .ust %ut natural for the villagers to respond to the call for help from the passengers and since it is
a rural area which did not have flashlights, torches are the natural source of lighting. Further, the smell of gas
could have %een all over the place yet the driver and the conductor failed to provide warning a%out said fact to
the villagers.
5HT IS :PRO;I-TE "'SE<=
,roximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous se&uence, un%roken %y any efficient intervening
cause, produces the in.ury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
5nd more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the in.ury, either
immediately or %y setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the in.ury as a natural and pro%a%le result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
the person responsi%le for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasona%le
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an in.ury to some person might pro%a%ly result
therefrom.
G.R. No. L-31319 No(e0ber 25, 1983
"LE-ENTE #RI>S, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES a68 HONOR#LE "O'RT OF PPELS, respondents.
(ariano ). bad for petitioner.
'he Solicitor General for respondents.

G'TIERRE?, 2R., J.4
This is a petition to review the decision of respondent $ourt of 5ppeals, now /ntermediate 5ppellate $ourt,
affirming the decision of the $ourt of First /nstance of Nue0on, ;inth -udicial 9istrict, Branch 1, which found the
accused $lemente Bri6as guilty of the crime of 9HAB3# 'H8/$/9# T'"A "#$G3#SS /8,"A9#;$# prior
the deaths of 8artina Bool and #melita ?esmundo.
The information charged the accused(appellant. and others as follows:
That on or a%out the 2th day of -anuary, 174=, in the 8unicipality of Tiaong, ,rovince of Nue0on, ,hilippines,
and within the .urisdiction of this 'on. $ourt, the said accused Kictor 8ilan, $lemente Bri6as and 'ermogenes
Buencamino, %eing then persons in charge of passenger Train ;o. 4::(2 of the 8anila "ailroad $ompany, then
running from Tagkawayan to San ,a%lo $ity, as engine driver, conductor and assistant conductor, respectively,
wilfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due
regard to existing laws, regulations and ordinances, that although there were passengers on %oard the
passenger coach, they failed to provide lamps or lights therein, and failed to take the necessary precautions for
the safety of passengers and to prevent accident to persons and damage to property, causing %y such
negligence, carelessness and imprudence, that when said passenger Train ;o. 4::(2 was passing the railroad
tracks in the 8unicipality of Tiaong, Nue0on, two of its passengers, 8artina Bool, an old woman, and #melita
?esmundo, a child a%out three years of age, fell from the passenger coach of the said train, as a result of which,
they were over run, causing their instantaneous death. F
The facts esta%lished %y the prosecution and accepted %y the respondent court as %asis for the decision are
summari0ed as follows:
The evidence of the prosecution tends to show that in the afternoon of -anuary 2, 174=, -uanito ?esmundo
%ought a train ticket at the railroad station in Tagkawayan, Nue0on for his 44(year old mother 8artina Bool and
his !(year old daughter #melita ?esmundo, who were %ound for Barrio 3usacan, Tiaong, same province. 5t
a%out :: p.m., Train ;o. 4:: left Tagkawayan with the old woman and her granddaughter among the
passengers. 5t 'ondagua the train>s complement were relieved, with Kictor 8illan taking over as engineman,
$lemente Bri6as as conductor, and 'ermogenes Buencamino as assistant conductor. Apon approaching Barrio
3agalag in Tiaong at a%out <: p.m. of that same night, the train slowed down and the conductor shouted
>3usacan>, >3usacan>. Thereupon, the old woman walked towards the left front door facing the direction of Tiaong,
carrying the child with one hand and holding her %aggage with the other. Ehen 8artina and #melita were near
the door, the train suddenly picked up speed. 5s a result the old woman and the child stum%led and they were
seen no more. /t took three minutes more %efore the train stopped at the next %arrio, 3usacan, and the victims
were not among the passengers who disem%arked thereat .t*$.+,hq-.+
;ext morning, the Tiaong police received a report that two corpses were found along the railroad
tracks at Barrio 3agalag. "epairing to the scene to investigate, they found the lifeless %ody of a
female child, a%out : feet from the railroad tracks, sprawled to the ground with her %elly down,
the hand resting on the forehead, and with the %ack portion of the head crushed. The
investigators also found the corpse of an old woman a%out : feet away from the railroad tracks
with the head and %oth legs severed and the left hand missing. The head was located farther
west %etween the rails. 5n arm was found midway from the %ody of the child to the %ody of the
old woman. Blood, pieces of scattered %rain and pieces of clothes were at the scene. 3ater, the
%odies were /dentified as those of 8artina Bool and #melita ?esmundo. 5mong the personal
effects found on 8artina was a train ticket @#xhi%its FBFD.
Hn -anuary =, 174=, the %odies of the deceased were autopsied %y 9r. ,astor 'uertas, the 8unicipal 'ealth
Hfficer of Tiaong. 9r. 'uertas testified on the cause of death of the victims as follows: t*$.+,hq-.+
F/S$53 J;?#;T#:
N Ehat could have caused the death of those womenL
5 Shock.
N Ehat could have caused that shockL
5 Traumatic in.ury.
N Ehat could have caused traumatic in.uryL
5 The running over %y the wheel of the train.
N Eith those in.uries, has a person a chance to surviveL
5 ;o chance to survive.
N Ehat would you say death would comeL
5 /nstantaneous.
N 'ow a%out the girl, the young girl a%out four years old, what could have
caused the deathL
5 Shock too.
N Ehat could have caused the shockL
5 $ompound fracture of the skull and going out of the %rain.
N Ehat could have caused the fracture of the skull and the going out of the
%rainL
5 That is the impact against a steel o%.ect. @TS;., pp. <1(<:, -uly 1, 1747D
The $ourt of First /nstance of Nue0on convicted defendant(appellant $lemente Bri6as for dou%le homicide thru
reckless imprudence %ut ac&uitted 'ermogenes Buencamino and Kictor 8illan The dispositive portion of the
decision reads: t*$.+,hq-.+
E'#"#FH"#, the court finds the defendant $lemente Bri6as guilty %eyond dou%t of the crime
of dou%le homicide thru reckless imprudence, defined and punished under 5rticle !4 in
connection with 5rticle :17 of the "evised ,enal $ode, and sentences him to suffer six @2D
months and one @1D day of prision correccional to indemnify the heirs of the deceased 8artina
Bool and #melita ?esmundo in the amounts of ,2, and ,!,, respectively, with su%sidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed one(third of the principal penalty, and to pay
the costs.
For lack of sufficient evidence against the defendant 'ermogenes Buencamino and on the
ground of reasona%le dou%t in the case of defendant Kictor 8illan the court here%y ac&uits them
of the crime charged in the information and their %ail %onds declared cancelled.
5s to the responsi%ility of the 8anila "ailroad $ompany in this case, this will %e the su%.ect of
court determination in another proceeding.
Hn appeal, the respondent $ourt of 5ppeals affirmed the .udgment of the lower court.
9uring the pendency of the criminal prosecution in the $ourt of First /nstance of Nue0on, the heirs of the
deceased victims filed with the same court, a separate civil action for damages against the 8anila "ailroad
$ompany entitled F$ivil $ase ;o. 47=<, 8analeyo ?esmundo, et al., v. 8anila "ailroad $ompanyF. The separate
civil action was filed for the recovery of ,!,!4. from the 8anila "ailroad $ompany as damages resulting
from the accident.
The accused(appellant alleges that the $ourt of 5ppeals made the following errors in its decision:
/ t*$.+,hq-.+
T'# 'H;H"5B3# $HA"T HF 5,,#53S #""#9 /; $H;K/$T/;? ,#T/T/H;#"(5,,#335;T
A;9#" T'# F5$TS 5S FHA;9 BJ S5/9 $HA"T* and
// t*$.+,hq-.+
T'# 'H;H"5B3# $HA"T HF 5,,#53S #""#9 /; /;$3A9/;? T'# ,5J8#;T HF 9#5T'
/;9#8;/TJ BJ T'# ,#T/T/H;#"( 5,,#335;T, E/T' SABS/9/5"J /8,"/SH;8#;T /;
$5S# HF /;SH3K#;$J, 5FT#" T'# '#/"S HF T'# 9#$#5S#9 '5K# 53"#59J
$H88#;$#9 5 S#,5"5T# $/K/3 5$T/H; FH" 9585?#S 5?5/;ST T'# "5/3"H59
$H8,5;J 5"/S/;? F"H8 T'# S58# 8/S'5,.
Ee see no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in the conclusion drawn from those findings.
/t is undisputed that the victims were on %oard the second coach where the petitioner(appellant was assigned as
conductor and that when the train slackened its speed and the conductor shouted F3usacan, 3usacanF, they
stood up and proceeded to the nearest exit. /t is also undisputed that the train unexpectedly resumed its regular
speed and as a result Fthe old woman and the child stum%led and they were seen no more.
/n finding petitioner(appellant negligent, respondent $ourt t*$.+,hq-.+
xxx xxx xxx
The appellant>s announcement was premature and erroneous, for it took a full three minutes
more %efore the next %arrio of 3usacan was reached. /n making the erroneous and premature
announcement, appellant was negligent. 'e ought to have known that train passengers
invaria%ly prepare to alight upon notice from the conductor that the destination was reached and
that the train was a%out to stop. Apon the facts, it was the appellant>s negligent act which led the
victims to the door. Said acts virtually exposed the victims to peril, for had not the appellant
mistakenly made the announcement, the victims would %e safely ensconced in their seats when
the train .erked while picking up speed, 5lthough it might %e argued that the negligent act of the
appellant was not the immediate cause of, or the cause nearest in time to, the in.ury, for the train
.erked %efore the victims stum%led, yet in legal contemplation appellant>s negligent act was the
proximate cause of the in.ury. 5s this $ourt held in Tucker v. 8ilan, $5 ?.". ;o. =47(", -une !,
174!: >The proximate cause of the in.ury is not necessarily the immediate cause of, or the cause
nearest in time to, the in.ury. /t is only when the causes are independent of each other that the
nearest is to %e charged with the disaster. So long as there is a natural, direct and continuous
se&uence %etween the negligent act the in.ury @sicD that it can reasona%ly %e said that %ut for the
act the in.ury could not have occurred, such negligent act is the proximate cause of the in.ury,
and whoever is responsi%le therefore is lia%le for damages resulting therefrom. Hne who
negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape lia%ility for the natural and pro%a%le
conse&uences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of ?od for which he is not
responsi%le intervenes to precipitate the loss.
xxx xxx xxx
/t is a matter of common knowledge and experience a%out common carriers like trains and %uses that %efore
reaching a station or flagstop they slow down and the conductor announces the name of the place. /t is also a
matter of common experience that as the train or %us slackens its speed, some passengers usually stand and
proceed to the nearest exit, ready to disem%ark as the train or %us comes to a full stop. This is especially true of
a train %ecause passengers feel that if the train resumes its run %efore they are a%le to disem%ark, there is no
way to stop it as a %us may %e stopped.
/t was negligence on the conductor>s part to announce the next flag stop when said stop was still a full three
minutes ahead. 5s the respondent $ourt of 5ppeals correctly o%served, Fthe appellant>s announcement was
premature and erroneous.
That the announcement was premature and erroneous is shown %y the fact that immediately after the train
slowed down, it unexpectedly accelerated to full speed. ,etitioner(appellant failed to show any reason why the
train suddenly resumed its regular speed. The announcement was made while the train was still in Barrio
3agalag.
The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and erroneous announcement of petitioner>
appelant Bri6as. This announcement prompted the victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Eithout said
announcement, the victims would have %een safely seated in their respective seats when the train .erked as it
picked up speed. The connection %etween the premature and erroneous announcement of petitioner(appellant
and the deaths of the victims is direct and natural, un%roken %y any intervening efficient causes.
,etitioner(appellant also argues that it was negligence per se for 8artina Bool to go to the door of the coach
while the train was still in motion and that it was this negligence that was the proximate cause of their deaths.
Ee have carefully examined the records and we agree with the respondent court that the negligence of
petitioner(appellant in prematurely and erroneously announcing the next flag stop was the proximate cause of
the deaths of 8artina Bool and #melita ?esmundo. 5ny negligence of the victims was at most contri%utory and
does not exculpate the accused from criminal lia%ility.
Eith respect to the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that after the heirs of 8artina Bool and
#melita ?esmundo had actually commenced the separate civil action for damages in the same trial court during
the pendency of the criminal action, the said court had no more power to include any civil lia%ility in its .udgment
of conviction.
The source of the o%ligation sought to %e enforced in $ivil $ase ;o. 47=< is culpa contractual, not an act or
omission punisha%le %y law. Ee also note from the appellant>s arguments and from the title of the civil case that
the party defendant is the 8anila "ailroad $ompany and not petitioner(appellant Bri6as $ulpa contractual and
an act or omission punisha%le %y law are two distinct sources of o%ligation.
The petitioner(appellant argues that since the information did not allege the existence of any kind of damages
whatsoever coupled %y the fact that no private prosecutors appeared and the prosecution witnesses were not
interrogated on the issue of damages, the trial court erred in awarding death indemnity in its .udgment of
conviction.
5 perusal of the records clearly shows that the complainants in the criminal action for dou%le homicide thru
reckless imprudence did not only reserve their right to file an independent civil action %ut in fact filed a separate
civil action against the 8anila "ailroad $ompany.
The trial court acted within its .urisdiction when, despite the filing with it of the separate civil action against the
8anila "ailroad $ompany, it still awarded death indemnity in the .udgment of conviction against the petitioner(
appellant.
/t is well(settled that when death occurs as a result of the commission of a crime, the following items of damages
may %e recovered: @1D an indemnity for the death of the victim* @:D an indemnity for loss of earning capacity of
the deceased* @!D moral damages* @1D exemplary damages* @4D attorney>s fees and expenses of litigation, and @2D
interest in proper cases.
The indemnity for loss of earning capacity, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney>s fees, and interests
are recovera%le separately from and in addition to the fixed slim of ,1:,. corresponding to the indemnity
for the sole fact of death. This indemnity arising from the fact of death due to a crime is fixed whereas the others
are still su%.ect to the determination of the court %ased on the evidence presented. The fact that the witnesses
were not interrogated on the issue of damages is of no moment %ecause the death indemnity fixed for death is
separate and distinct from the other forms of indemnity for damages.
E'#"#FH"#, the .udgment appealed from is modified in that the award for death indemnity is increased to
,1:,. for the death of 8artina Bool instead of ,2,. and ,1:,. for the death of #melita
?esmundo instead of ,!,., %ut deleting the su%sidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency imposed %y the
lower court. The .udgment is 5FF/"8#9 in all other respects.
SH H"9#"#9./0-ph1/
G.. !o. "-#$%&, '.S. v. (a)asigan
"epu%lic of the ,hilippines
S'PRE-E "O'RT
8anila
#; B5;$
9#$/S/H;
5ugust 14, 1711
?.". ;o. 3(71:2
THE 'NITE! STTES, plaintiff(appellee,
vs.
FILO-ENO -RSIGN, defendant(appellant.
Silvester pacible for appellant. Office of the Solicitor-General Corpus for appellee.
-ore,a68, %.4
/n this case it appears that a%out 1 o>clock of the afternoon of the :!d of -anuary, 171!, Francisco 8endo0a,
while engaged in examining his sugar crop growing upon his lands in the %arrio of /rucan, now called $alayan, in
the municipality of Taal, Batangas ,rovince, was asked %y the accused and his wife to approach them.
Hn arriving near them the accused said to 8endo0a: FEhy is this line curvedLF Bindicating the division line
%etween the lands of the two.C F3et us make it straight.F
Francisco replied saying: FEhy do you want to make the line straightL /f you make the line straight, it will put
certain logs and trees on your land.LF
To this the accused replied: FThis is false.F Saying this he drew his knife and struck at 8endo0a.
Hn attempting to ward off the %low 8endo0a was cut in the left hand. The accused continued the attack,
whereupon 8endo0a sei0ed the accused %y the neck and the %ody and threw him down. Ehile %oth were lying
upon the ground the accused still sought to strike 8endo0a with his dagger. The latter sei0ed the hand which
held the dagger and attempted to loosen his hold upon it. Ehile they were thus fighting for the possession of the
knife, the wife of the accused came forward and took the dagger from her hus%and>s hand, throwing it to one
side. She then sei0ed who after various maneuvers, struck 8endo0a a %low which knocked him senseless.
5s a result of the fight 8endo0a received three wounds, two in the chest and one in the left hand, the latter %eing
the most serious, the extensor tendor in one of the seven days at a cost of a%out ,14, %ut the middle finger of
the left hand was rendered useless.
The story of the affair told %y the accused is &uite different from that .ust related, %ut the facts as stated were as
found %y the trial court and the evidence given fully supports the findings. Ee have examined the case carefully
and see no reason why it should %e reversed upon the facts. Ee may say the same as to the law.
The accused asserts that he should have a new trial upon the ground that if he should %e given another
opportunity to present evidence he would %e a%le to show %y a physician, ?regorio 3im.oco, that the finger which
the court found to have %een rendered useless %y the cut already descri%ed was not necessarily a useless
mem%er, inasmuch as, if the accused would permit a surgical operation, the finger could %e restored to its
normal condition. 'e also asserts that he could demonstrate %y the physician referred to that it was not the
middle finger that was disa%led %ut the third finger instead.
Ee do not regard the case made as sufficient to warrant a new trial. /t is immaterial for the purposes of this case
whether the finger, the usefullness of which was destroyed, was the middle finger or the third finger. 5ll agree
that one of the fingers of the left hand was rendered useless %y the act of the accused. /t does not matter which
finger it was.
;or do we attach any importance to the contention that the original condition of the finger could %e restored %y a
surgical operation to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary results of his crime. /t was his voluntary
act which disa%led 8endo0a and he must a%ide %y the conse&uences resulting therefrom without aid from
8endo0a.
The .udgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
rellano" C.%." 'orres" %ohnson" Carson and raullo" %%." concur.