G.R. No.

L-34882 August 24, 1976

J. AMADO ARANETA, petitioner,
vs.
ALFONSO DORONILA, A. DORONILA RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-35643 August 24, 1976
ALFONSO DORONILA and A. DORONILA RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL AS TRIBUNAL, JUDGE BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, and J. AMADO ARANETA, respondents.
Facts:
Two separate but related petitions, being for certiorari and prohibition against
the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of said court
in refusing to dismiss the appeal of private respondents from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in a civil action between the private parties the
Doronilas took steps to appeal to the Court of Appeals, but in the said appellate
court, J. Amado Araneta moved to dismiss said appeal the motion was denied
And when Araneta moved to reconsider the foregoing resolution, the motion was
denied In the present petition with Us, Araneta maintains that under this Court's
rulings in Valera vs. Court of Appeals, and other cases of similar vein, the
respondent Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal of the Dornilas,
there being no showing on the face of their amended record on appeal as to when
their original record on appeal was filed, hence said amended record "fails to
show on its face that their appeal was perfected within the period fixed by the
rules", pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 50, counsel for Araneta, filed a
manifestation taking not only of the later more liberal rulings of this Court
Issue: Whether or not where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new
doctrine should operate prospectively only and should not adversely affect those
favored by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith
thereof
Held: No, Anent the ruling in Liceria relied upon by Araneta, We hold that the
same is not applicable to matters involving controversies regarding the
application of the Rules of Court, if only for the reason that it is within the power
of this Court to excuse failure to literally observe any rule to avoid possible
injustice Liceria was predicated on the principle that changes in substantive law
may not be applied retroactively, specially when prejudice will result to the party
that has followed the earlier law. That principle does not obtain in remedial law.

G.R. No. L-15645 January 31, 1964
PAZ P. ARRIETA and VITALIADO ARRIETA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
NATIONAL RICE AND CORN CORPORATION, defendant-appellant,
MANILA UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE CO., INC., defendant-appellee.
Facts:
Plaintiff-appellee participated in the public bidding called by the NARIC for the
supply of 20,000 metric tons of Burmese rice. As her bid per metric ton was the
lowest, she was awarded the contract for the same the appellant corporation
entered into a Contract of Sale of Rice, under the terms of which the former
obligated herself to deliver to the latter 20,000 metric tons of Burmese Rice In
turn, the defendant corporation committed itself to pay for the imported rice As
it turned out, however, the appellant corporation not in any financial position to
meet the condition As a result of the delay, the allocation of appellee's supplier
in Rangoon was cancelled The appellee endeavored, but failed, to restore the
cancelled Burmese rice allocation. When the futility of reinstating the same
became apparent, she offered to substitute Thailand rice instead to the
defendant NARIC, This offer for substitution, however, was rejected. The appellee
sent a letter to the appellant, demanding compensation for the damages caused
her, representing unrealized profit. The demand having been rejected she
instituted this case now on appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the subsequent offer to substitute Thailand rice for the
originally contracted Burmese rice amounted to a waiver by the appellee of
whatever rights she might have derived from the breach of the contract
Held: No, We disagree. Waivers are not presumed, but must be clearly and
convincingly shown, either by express stipulation or acts admitting no other
reasonable explanation. In the case at bar, no such intent to waive has been
established







EONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMONITO BALOGBOG and GENEROSO
BALOGBOG, respondents.
Facts: Petitioners are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal who
died intestate. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died, predeceasing
their parents. Private respondents brought an action for partition and
accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of
Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third
share in the estate of their grandparents. In their answer, petitioners denied
knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died single
and without issue in their parents residence Private respondents presented
Priscilo Y. Trazo, mayor of the municipality of Asturias from 1928 to 1934, who
testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and Ramonito
to be their first child. Private respondents produced a certificate from the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar that the Register of Marriages did not have a record
of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina, for this reason, the record must be
presumed to have been lost or destroyed during the war. Petitioners contend that
the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in accordance
with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force
at the time the alleged marriage was celebrated. Art. 53 provides that marriages
celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy
of the memorandum in the Civil Registrar
Issue: WON evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held
competent to prove the marriage.
Held: Yes, The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested
in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of
constitutional concern although a marriage contract is considered primary
evidence of marriage,the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took
place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. Here, private
respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina
were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy;
that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their
children, private respondents herein, were recognized by Gavinos family and by
the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.


G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He
had five legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three
legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three
illegitimate children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the
remainder of his estate and properties to his seven surviving children. The
appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they
have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the
Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate
to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of
the illegitimate childrens successional rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national
law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those
matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national
law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic
validity of his will should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does
not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the
legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the
legitimes under the texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.



G.R. No. L-18566 September 30, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF ELIZABETH MIRA, GILBERT R. BREHM
and ESTER MIRA BREHM, petitioners-appellees, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
oppositor-appellant.


FACTS:

Brehm was a non-resident alien of the Philippines. He filed a petition however, to adopt
his step-child. He argued that Article 335 of the New Civil Code which prohibits a non-
resident alien to adopt was inapplicable because it covers adoption only for the purpose
of establishing a relationship of paternity and filiations where none existed, but not where
the adopting parents are not total strangers to the child. Petitioners further contended that
they could adopt pursuant to Article 332 of the New Civil Code which expressly authorizes
the adoption of a step-child by a stepfather.

ISSUE: Whether or not Brehm as a non resident may adopt a child

Held: Article 338 should be construed in connection with Article 335. Article 33G clearly
states that "The following cannot adopt ... (4) non-resident aliens." It is therefore
mandatory because it contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in negative
terms, importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated (50
Am. JUl'. 51). On the other hand, Article 338 provides that "the following may be adopted:
(3) step-child by the step-father or step-mother." This provision is merely directory and
can only be given operation if the same does not conflict with the mandatory provisions
of Article 335, Moreover, it is Article 335 that confers jurisdiction to the court over the case
and before Article 338 may or can be availed of, such jurisdiction must first be established.
There is no question that petitioner Brehm is a non-resident. By his own testimony, he
supplied the conclusive proof of his status, and no amount of reasoning will overcome the
same. For this reason he cannot adopt.






July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP,
SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR,
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO.
ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO
H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C.
IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and
ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE
FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J.
ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES,
JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA,
petitioners.
FACTS: Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners
of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of
Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to
continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners contend that In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and
engineering, the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any
restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; Under the
law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which
includes the name of a deceased partner.
ISSUE: whether or not a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under
a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partners.
Held: No, The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the
name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search
of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing
in a firm title. Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of
the legal system. When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its
Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased partners in
their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no custom or practice to the
contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which clearly
ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner.




NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
Vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA,
respondents.
G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005

Facts: On the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, On July 31,
1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, Declaring and decreeing the
marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia
Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio. Among other things in the
decision it also ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property
particularly the plaintiffs separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank
[and] Trust Company and one-half of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila
Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies;
Issue: Whether or not the rules on dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal
partnership applies in the case at bar.
Held: No, since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage,
the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code,
providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains,
as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case
a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated,
partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.









CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966

Facts: Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground work for a promotional scheme
calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not
only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of
communications, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest
to be cleared in advance for mailing. This was formalized in a letter sent by Caltex to the Post
master General, a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest
does not violate the The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law. Unfortunately, the
Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied Caltexs request stating that the contest scheme
falls within the purview of the Anti-lottery Provision and ultimately, declined Caltexs request for
clearance Caltex sought reconsideration. However, the Postmaster General maintained his view
that the contest involves consideration, or even it does not involve any consideration it still falls
as Gift Enterprise, which was equally banned by the Postal Law.
Issue: Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex the appellee is within the coverage of
the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law?
Held: No, Supreme Court ruled, the contest scheme is not a lottery but it appears to be more of a
gratuitous distribution since nowhere in the rules is any requirements that any fee be paid, any
merchandise be bought, any services be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the
privilege to participate. Since, a prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex Station, request
for the entry form which is available on demand and accomplish and submit the same for the
drawing of the winner. Because of this, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration
which would brand it as a lottery.
Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no
consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but it does
condemn as criminal scheme in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or
indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.





COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
vs.
CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY and COURT OF TAX APPEALS
G.R. No. L-29059 December 15, 1987
Facts:
By virtue of a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals rendered on June 21, 1961, as modified on
appeal by the Supreme Court on February 27, 1965, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was
ordered to refund to the Cebu Portland Cement Company the amount, representing overpayments
of ad valorem taxes on cement produced and sold by it after October 1957. Following denial of
motions for reconsideration filed by both the petitioner and the private respondent, the latter moved
for a writ of execution to enforce the said judgment.
The motion was opposed by the petitioner on the ground that the private respondent had an
outstanding sales tax liability to which the judgment debt had already been credited. In fact, it was
stressed, there was still a balance owing on the sales plus 28% surcharge. The Court of Tax Appeals
granted the motion, holding that the alleged sales tax liability of the private respondent was still
being questioned and therefore could not be set-off against the refund.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment debt can be enforced against private respondents sales tax
liability, the latter still being questioned.

Held: The argument that the assessment cannot as yet be enforced because it is still being
contested loses sight of the urgency of the need to collect taxes as "the lifeblood of the
government." If the payment of taxes could be postponed by simply questioning their validity, the
machinery of the state would grind to a halt and all government functions would be paralyzed.
The Tax Code provides: Sec. 291. Injunction not available to restrain collection of tax. - No court
shall have authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue
tax, fee or charge imposed by this Code. It goes without saying that this injunction is available not
only when the assessment is already being questioned in a court of justice but more so if, as in the
instant case, the challenge to the assessment is still-and only-on the administrative level. There is
all the more reason to apply the rule here because it appears that even after crediting of the refund
against the tax deficiency, a balance of more than P 4 million is still due from the private
respondent.



D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
Facts: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds
employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows
prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC
rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. D. M. Consunji now seeks
the reversal of the CA decision. On the ground among others that THE APPELLATE
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR [sic] IS
APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to prove negligence
on the part of petitioner.
Held: Yes, all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar 1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2)
the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due
to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injury. No worker is going
to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a
construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application
of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with
all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the
exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also
present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellees deceased husband[;]
thus[,] the last requisite is also present





DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
Vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. HERMOGENES CALUAG, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, and SPOUSES HONESTO G. NICANDRO and ELISA F.
NICANDRO, respondents.
Facts: On March 18, 1955, the Board of Governors of petitioner-appellant DBP (hereinafter
referred to as petitioner or simply DBP for brevity and convenience), Under its Resolution No.
2004, appropriated the sum of P1,204,000.00 to purchase land for a housing project for its
employees. However, the area sold was then part of a bigger parcel of land and because the
subdivision plan for the area was still pending approval by the Bureau of Lands, the sales
agreement between the DBP and the PHHC was not presented immediately for registration by
the DBP. DBP expressed its doubts as to whether it could acquire the property in question for the
intended purpose of a housing project in the light of the then Sec. 13 of RA 85. However, without
the knowledge of the DBP, a portion of the property including the 159 lots sold to the DBP, were
segregated and a separate certificate of title was issued for the segregated portion in the name
of PHHC wherein there was no annotation whatsoever to the title. Then, RA 3147 was enacted,
amending certain provisions of the DBP Charter (RA 85), among which was Sec. 13.
Issue: Whether or not RA 3147 which amended certain provisions of sec 13 of RA 85 is
retroactive.
Held: as a general rule, that curative statutes are forms of "retrospective legislation which
reach back on past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and
effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties
intended." They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have
designed and intended, but which has failed of expected legal consequences by reason
of some statutory disability or irregularity in their action. They thus make valid that which,
before enactment of the statute, was invalid. here cannot be any doubt that one of the
purposes of Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. 3147, by amending Section 13
of Republic Act No. 85, was to erase any doubts regarding the legality of the acquisition
by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC for the housing project which it intended to
establish for its employees who did not yet have houses of their own.



THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,
Vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

Facts:
The defendant, a person not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a
revolver without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the
same. The accused admitted that he was in possession of the revolver described
in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed
to be entitled to exoneration because, he had an appointments as Secret Agent
from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and as Confidential Agent from the PC
Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them
the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question. The accused
contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess
the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the
basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang. The trial court
held that the relied ruling was abandoned already in and held him criminally
liable
Issue: WON, a new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not
apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Held: No, It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in, but when
a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially
true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary
that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of
society. It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess
a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and
Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said
firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must
be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the
time it was done was held not to be punishable.



THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Vs.
RAFAEL LICERA, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975

Facts: The Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint,
with the municipal court of the said municipality, charging Rafael Licera with
illegal possession of a rifle. The municipal court rendered judgment finding
Licera guilty of the crime charged, sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging five years and one day to six years and eight months of
imprisonment. Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the
rifle his appointment as secret agent by Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas.
He claims that as secret agent, pursuant to People vs. Macarandang, was exempt
from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms.
Issue: Whether the rule that should be applied to the case at bar that enunciated
in Macarandang or that in Mapa.
Held: Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this
jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws,
constitute evidence of what the laws mean. At the time of Licera's designation as
secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension for possession of the
Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the
Macarandang rule the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code - formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this
jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in
1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine
should operate respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored
by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof.








PRIMITIVO ESPIRITU and LEONORA A. DE ESPIRITU, petitioners,
Vs.
RICARDO CIPRIANO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, RIZAL, BRANCH
XV, respondents.
G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974

Facts: The case originated as one for unlawful detainer instituted on May 30,
1969, by plaintiffs, now petitioners, in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal,
against private respondent Ricardo Cipriano for the latter's alleged failure to pay
rentals. An adverse judgment having been rendered against said respondent, he
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal the Court of First Instance of
Rizal issued an order giving private respondent herein seven days within which
to file his motion to dismiss. Subsequently, on July 13, 1970, respondent moved
to dismiss petitioner's complaint, invoking the prohibitory provision of Republic
Act 6126, entitled "An Act To Regulate Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On
Which Another's Dwelling Is Located For One Year And Penalizing Violations
Thereof. It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court
that the case at bar is covered by the aforecited law.
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the rental law is retroactive.
Held: No, We rule otherwise. Established and undisputed is the fact that the
increase in the rental of the lot involved was effected in January, 1969, 1 while
the law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year
and a half after the increase in rentals had been effected. The claim of private
respondent that the act is remedial and may, therefore, be given retroactive effect
is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being
remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and
prospective construction thereof is in order. Article 4 of the New Civil Code
ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided
and that where the law is clear, our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to
the facts as found.







JOAQUIN QUIMSING, petitioner-appellant,
Vs.
CAPT. ALFREDO LACHICA, Officer-in-Charge of the PC Controlled-Police
Dept., Iloilo City; LT. NARCISO ALIO, JR., Actg. Chief of Police of the City
of Iloilo; and MAJ. CESAR LUCERO, PC Provincial Commander of the
Province of Iloilo, respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-14683 May 30, 1961

Facts: Petitioner is the owner and manager of a licensed cockpit, located in the
District of Molo, City of Iloilo. On February 13, 1958, the cockpit was raided by
members of the city police force and the Constabulary under the command of
Capt. Alfredo Lachica upon the ground that it was being illegally operated on
that day, which was Thursday, not a legal holiday. Petitioner claimed that it was
authorized to operate on Thursday by an ordinance of the City Council of Iloilo
petitioner, in turn, commenced the present action, in the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo, against the provincial commander of the Constabulary, and Capt.
Alfredo Lachica of the Iloilo City Police. In his petition, he set up two (2) causes
of action: one for the recovery from respondents, in their private capacity, of
compensatory damages, as well as moral and exemplary damages allegedly
sustained in consequence of the raid and arrest After due hearing, the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo rendered judgment dismissing the petition, as well as
respondents' counterclaim. Hence this appeal by petitioner herein
Issue: WON the lower court erred in not awarding damages to the petitioner.
Held: No, As regards Capt. Lachica and Lt. Alio Jr., the records indicate that
they were unaware of the city ordinances relieved upon by petitioner herein.
Indeed, they appeared to have been surprised when petitioner invoked said
ordinances. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that they were earnestly
of the opinion, Although petitioner maintains that such opinion is erroneous, the
facts of record sufficiently warrant the conclusion that Capt. Lachica and Lt.
Alio Jr. had acted in good faith and under the firm conviction that they were
faithfully discharging their duty as law enforcing agents. In the light of the
foregoing and of the other circumstances surrounding the case, and inasmuch
as the assessment of moral and exemplary damages "is left to the discretion of
the court, according to the circumstances of each case" (Art. 2216, Civil Code of
the Philippines), it is our considered view that respondents herein should not be
held liable for said damages. Neither should they be sentenced to pay
compensatory damages, the same not having been proven satisfactorily.


ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE, Y. FELICIANO, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-24022 March 3, 1965

Facts: The respondent, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate
importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the
President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National
Economic Council. the President designated the Rice and Corn Administration
as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation. Considering
that said importation, the Iloilo Palay and corn Planters Association alleged that
it is contrary to RA 3453 which prohibits the government from importing rice
and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same. They said that
it is illegal because it is prohibited by RA 3452 which in Section 10 provides that
the importation of rice and corn is only left to private properties upon payment
of the corresponding taxes. They claim that RCA is prohibited from doing so.
According to them, RA 2207 which provides that should there be an existing or
imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of suh gravity as to constitute a
national emergency and certified by the NEC, the president may authorize such
importation thru any government agency he may designate - is repealed by RA
3452.
Issue: Whether or not RA 2207 which allows importation of rice by government
agency during national emergency is repealed by RA 3452
Held: No, RA 2207 is not repealed by RA 3452.
Section 16 of RA 3452 contains a repealing clause. This repealing clause is not
an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act/s that
are intended to be repealed, the presumption against implied repeals and the
rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigre.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to
repeal any existing law, unless on irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
exists in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no inconsistency.
While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods
of approach are different; one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other
by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the government during normal
period. Also, RA 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but
when there is shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a
national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These two laws are therefore
not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.
MARIA APIAG, TERESITA CANTERO SECUROM and GLICERIO CANTERO,
complainants,
Vs.
JUDGE ESMERALDO G. CANTERO, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070. February 12, 1997

Facts: In a letter-complaint dated November 10, 1993, Maria Apiag Cantero with
her daughter Teresita A. Cantero Sacurom and son Glicerio A. Cantero charged
the respondent, Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Pinamungajan-Aloquinsan, Cebu, among other causes of action to have
allegedly having committed bigamy. The respondent judge in his comment
explained that for the truth of the matter is that such alleged marriage was only
dramatized at the instance of our parents just to shot (sic) their wishes and
purposes on the matter, without my consent freely given. As a matter of fact, I
was only called by my parents to go home to our town at Hinundayan, Southern
Leyte to attend party celebration of my sister's birthday from Iligan City, without
patently knowing I was made to appear (in) a certain drama marriage and we
were forced to acknowledge our signatures appearing in the duly prepared
marriage contract That was 46 years ago when I was yet 20 years of age, and at
my second year high school days.
Issue: WON a decree of nullity of marriage is needed to declare the prior marriage
void
Held: Yes, Now, per current jurisprudence, "a marriage though void still needs x
x x a judicial declaration of such fact" before any party thereto "can marry again;
otherwise, the second marriage will also be void." This was expressly provided
under Article 40 of the Family Code. However, the marriage of Judge Cantero to
Nieves Ygay took place and all their children were born before the promulgation
of Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and before the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence,
the doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante applies in favor of respondent.








LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
Vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

FACTS:
Karl Heinz Weigel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Lilia
Oliva Weigel on the ground that the latter has existing marriage with Eduardo A.
Maxion. Lilia claimed that prior marriage was null and void because she and
Eduardo were forced to enter said marital union. She likewise alleged that
Eduardo was married to someone else.

ISSUE: Whether or not Karl's marriage with Lilia is void.

RULING: Yes. It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was
vitiated with force because it will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil
Code). Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been
made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her
first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no
need of introducing evidence on Lilia's prior marriage for then such marriage
though void still needs a judicial declaration before she can remarry.
Accordingly, Karl and Lilias marriage are regarded void under the law.










PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, ET AL., petitioners
Vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of
Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
FACTS:Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground
operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in
the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of
government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required
precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved
to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmens Compensation Act before the Workmens
Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for
additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have
already claimed benefits under the WCA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.
HELD: Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the
WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts.
Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming
benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this
deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not
availed of such a remedy. However, if in case theyll win in the lower court whatever award may
be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized
that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be
defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of
the law insures mans survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law
killeth but its spirit giveth life.