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Eve nt: Dave Care y
Type of Eve nt: Inte rvie w
Date : Octobe r 31 , 2003
Spe cial Acce ss Issue s: None
Pre pare d by: Gordon Le de rman
Te amNumbe r: 2
Location: The Commission's K Stre e t Office
Participants non-Commission: Dave Care y
Participants Commission: Ll oyd Sal ve tti, 9999999/, Gordon Le de rman
(U) BACKGROUND
('S) He starte d work in the Dire ctorate of Inte l l ige nce (DI) of the Ce ntral Inte l l ige nce
Age ncy (CIA) in.June 1 969, focusing on the Sovie t Union.
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In 1 990, he he ade d the DI's office de vote d to Ne ar East anal ysis. In
1 993, he be came the Dire ctor of CNC. Dire ctor of Ce ntral Inte l l ige nce (DCI) Wool se y
change d the name to Crime and Narcotics Ce nte r (CNC) to re fl e ct a focus on more than
counte rnarcotics.I
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but in Jul y 1 997 be came CIA Exe cutive Dire ctor. As Exe cutive Dire ctor, he
was re sponsibl e for e ve rything fromstrate gic pl anning to make sure waste baske ts we re
e mptie d. The Exe cutive Dire ctor had conside rabl e authority and l atitude in ce rtain issue s
such as e mpl oye e dismissal . Te ne t as DCI is a hands-on manage r and stre sse s l e ade rship.
In April 2001 he be came Counse l or to the DCI, and in Se pte mbe r 2001 he re tire d from
CIA.
(U) THE CIA AFTER THE COLD WAR, AND THE TENURE OF DCI DEUTCH
(S) DCI Te ne t inhe rite d an age ncy se ve re l y downsize d afte r the Col d War. Pe rsonne l fe l l
by 22%, and budge ts we re cut accordingl y.
('S) The mantra during the 1 990s was to take CIA's e xpe rtise on the Sovie t Union and
move it to othe r are as, a mantra pre dicate d on the be l ie f that 80-90% of what CIA did
was focuse d on the Sovie t Union. In re al ity, he CIA was focuse d on the
Sovie t Union; the CIA was al so doing - We apons-o -mass- e struction (WMD)
prol ife ration, counte rte rrorism-- (CT), counte rnarcotics, e tc. al l of those are as we re hit by
the re source crunch_as - we l l . CIA moral e had pl umme te d, and DCI De utch had
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de moral ize d the CIA Dire ctorate of Ope rations (DO). De utch at one point had insul te d
the DO by saying that the brighte st DO office r was l e ss bright than the worst col one l in
DOD.
N
De utch isol ate d himse l f fromthe DO and the DI. De utch may have had more
conne ction with the Dire ctor of Scie nce & Te chnol ogy (DS&T) but onl y to show his
scie ntific smarts. Al l communications to DCI De utch had to go through his Exe cutive
Dire ctor, Nora Sl atkin; the proce ss took fore ve r.
(U) GEORGE TENET'S ASSUMPTION'OF COMMAND
(U) THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AND THE STRUCTURE
OF DECISIONMAKING
N Whe n he be came Exe cutive Dire ctor, he tal ke d with Te ne t about what manage rial
mode l Te ne t wante d. He wante d to capital ize on Te ne t's good standing with CIA's rank-
and-fil e and Te ne t's be ing so pe rsonabl e in orde r to re invigorate the CIA. He wante d
Te ne t to be more invol ve d in the day-to-day activitie s of the dire ctorate s. To do so, the
job of the Exe cutive Dire ctor ne e de d to re ce de the CIA Dire ctor ne e de d to be
re e stabl ishe d as the dire ctor. The agre e me nt was that no he ad of a CIA dire ctorate woul d
take advantage of dire ct acce ss to the DCI to cut re source de al s with the DCI, al though
the y trie d to do so. He coul d wal k into Te ne t's office at any time and join whate ve r
me e ting he wante d.
(S) Unde r DCI De utch, de cisions we nt to the Exe cutive Committe e whe re the y we re put
to a vote . The the n-4 dire ctorate s coul d be outvote d by othe r me mbe rs (the Ge ne ral
Counse l , Comptrol l e r, e tc.). Te ne t did away with the voting and made the dire ctorate
he ads the onl y me mbe rs of the ExCom. During the De utch e ra, Care y was in CNC.
S) Ambiguity was introduce d be twe e n the Exe cutive Dire ctor and the dire ctorate s. The
obje ctive was to ge t to the point whe re the DCI was se e n as the he ad of the CIA.
Accordingl y, he gave a spe e ch in May in the bubbl e conce rning the Strate gic Dire ction.
(S) He tal ke d to the DCI about major pe rsonne l change s. The re was a se nior pe rsonne l
re vie w board and al !se nior manage me nt te am.
(S) The re was aI;ackdoor fromthe DO to the DCI's office , pe rhaps due to the al l ure of
ope rations. "Who can re sist pl aying spymaste r?" he aske d. Te ne t had a robust
re l ationship with the DI which was product-drive n and focuse d on the Pre side nt's Dail y
Brie fing.
(U) A STRATEGIC DIRECTION FOR THE CIA
'S-) Se nior manage rs we re brought to an off-site in 1 997, facil itate d by manage me nt guru
JimO'Tool e . Most of the se nior manage me nt te amthat that CIA was in good shape . Ye t
se ve ral pe opl e l e ft the off-site thinking that the off-site had "misse d the boat." He and his
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Strate gic Dire ction to show a traje ctory, that the more mone y CIA re ce ive d, the faste r it
coul d accompl ish its goal s. Of course , the re we re some time conside rations such as the
l ag e ffe ct of hiring ne w case office rs.
.(S,) In In May 1 998, Te ne t tol d the workforce about the strate gic dire ction. Congre ss was
happy be cause at l e ast CIA had a pl an. The he aring for the FY1 998 budge t had be e n
"abysmal " be cause CIA had no pl an. To impl e me nt change , l e ade rs ne e d to te l l the story
ove r and ove r again. But Te ne t did not l ike to do that. He al ways wante d to give a
diffe re nt spe e ch. Te ne t ne e de d to be stage -manage d.
(U) RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
(OMB) AND THE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT STAFF (CMS1
OMB woul d micromanage CIA's budge t. OMB's "fore man" for the CIA budge t
be came a big advocate of IT se curity. In the Gingrich suppl e me ntal (1 999), Te ne t
pe rsonal l y worke d the Hil l . OMB got ve ry upse t be cause it fe l t that Te ne t had gone
around OMB's back.
CMS is a "thankl e ss job." No one kne w whe re the mone y was going to come from
for FIA and othe r te chnical programs. TPED was going to cost bil l ions. And the n the
National Re connaissance Office drie d-up as the IC cash cow.
(U) The re was a l ot of inte raction be twe e n OMB and CIA. Most of the day-to-day
inte raction with OMB is be twe e n the CIA Chie f Financial Office r and OMB's budge t
e xamine rs (Ke vin Sche id, the n Pe ggy Evans). The OMB e xamine r woul d micromanage
CIA's work. CMS was onl y invol ve d in the CIA/OMB re l ationship whe n it came to ne w
initiative s and suppl e me ntal s. CMS al so got invol ve d in horse trading.
') Budge t proposal s we nt to the Community Manage me nt Staff (CMS), and CMS
"whacke d it" or maybe woul d pass it through. CMS ne ve r e nhance d the budge t. OMB
the n "whacke d it" and se nt it to Congre ss. CIA the n had to de fe nd the budge t be fore
Congre ss. For e xampl e : information ope rations. In 2000, he and his de puty be came
convince d that the re we re unaddre sse d issue s that coul d ge t a l ot of mone y from
Congre ss, name l y biowe apons and information ope rations. He got Jami Miscik to l ay out
a vision for whe re CIA ne e de d to be on information ope rations. He fashione d a budge t
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iTMS cut the re que st] I and OMB cut it to
Congre ss and e spe cial l y the House Pe rmane nt Se l e ct Committe e on Inte l l ige nce gave it
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I CIA use d the mone y to pay for information ope rations but al so as re sul t
coul d fund othe r ope rations.
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(U) Having the DCI ge t more mone y is a mul ti-ste p proce ss that is fraught with many
probl e ms. If you move mone y froman are a of Congre ssional inte re st or into an are a of
Congre ssional inte re st, the DCI ne e ds to ask for pe rmission by notifying Congre ss if
the DCI doe s not he ar a re sponse in 2 we e ks, the n the DCI can move the mone y, but the
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DCI ge ne ral l y doe s not do so due to possibl e Congre ssional re tal iation. And CMS stil l
has to sign-off on ce rtain things.
(U) As Exe cutive Dire ctor, he we nt to biwe e kl y community programme e tings as the CIA
re pre se ntative s. Te ne t spe nt a l ot of time on community issue s, ge ne ral l y budge t-drive n.
)3,) He had phil osophical disagre e me nts with the DDCl /CM, Joan De mpse y. She wante d
to codify community issue s in DCIDs, at the e xpe nse of CIA. De mpse y re wrote al l of the
DCIDs. For e xampl e , she wante d to make it such that a pe rson coul d not be promote d at
CIA unl e ss the y se rve d for a time in anothe r age ncy of the IC. But the re st of the IC did
not have jobs, and he did not have the manpowe r. His opposition was not ove rridde n by
the DCI.
(U) COUNTERTERRORISM
(U) CT was the "first among e qual s" in te rms of issue s. CIA was be ate n-up on WMD
nonprol ife ration issue s.
(S) CIA fe l t good be cause it got Kansi. Winston Wil e y was move d out of the
Counte rte rrorist Ce nte r (CTC) to be come Assistant De puty Dire ctor of Inte l l ige nce . CTC
unde r Mr. Wil e y had focuse d on Kansi. CTC fe l t good about itse l f The re was a
re asonabl e focus on Middl e Easte rn te rrorism. Starting: in 1 997, CTC starte d focusing on
al Qa'ida in Sudan. Mr. Care y was not invol ve d in the cre ation of ALEC Station, which
was starte d whil e he was Exe cutive Dire ctor. He woul d onl y have be e n brought into
ALEC Station issue s whe n the y conce rne d re source s.
("S) Counte rte rrorismwas at l e ast at, or maybe a l ittl e be tte r than, othe r are as in te rms of
re source s. CT suffe re d l e ss than the DO in ge ne ral in the De utch-e ra mal aise . At l e st
CTC had a focus.'
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XXXXX CTC had good working re l ationships with the are a divisions.
(U) STRATEGY
(S) Re garding a CT strate gy, afte r ge tting Kansi CTC trie d to formul ate a strate gy. Ge off
O'Conne l l took ove r CTC. The strate gy e vol ve d. No one e ve r sat down to draft a
strate gy. I
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(U) ANALYSIS
Z S) He did not l ook at CTC froma manage rial pe rspe ctive . His pe rsonal invol ve d in
CTC starte d in 1 996 be cause CTC anal ysts we nt to CTC fromthe Office of Gl obal Issue s
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in the DI, which he he ade d. He saw the probl e mof anal ysts be ing dragge d into
ope rations. Te n ye ars l ate r, anal ysts we re stil l be ing pushe d into istipport for,,Ope rations.
CTC had a de facto division of l abor, but most of the ope rational support was in ALEC
Station. He note d that CNC had a group of anal ysts for l onge r-te rmissue s and a group of
anal ysts to support ope rations.
'N) He was frustrate d with O'Conne l l andl kcause the ir approath was that the re
was no ne e d to re do pape rs that had be e n done se ve ral ye ars be fore .
(S) CTC was the "counte rte rrorist" ce nte r, not the "counte rte rrorism' ce nte r, me aning
that it was focuse d on ope rations.
(U) OPERATIONS, AND RELATIONS WITH OTHER AGENCIES
N The re was a me e ting on Usama bin Ladin but the re we re too many pe opl e the re . He
cannot re me mbe r whe n the me e tings starte d. The re duce d the numbe r of atte nde e s to 4-6
pe opl e and he l d the me e ting 3-4 time s pe r we e k, and the n he woul d brie f highl ights to the
DCI. The y me t with the DCI once e ve ry we e k or e ve ry two we e ks. UBL was in
Kandahar in mid-1 998. The purpose of the me e tings was to e xamine whe the r the re we re
any constraints.'
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1 1 1 -71 . we re probl e ms not e nough
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support fromNSA the mil itary, the CSG. MI did powe r-point sl ide s for those
me e tings and summary sl ide s of the Friday me e tings with the DCI.
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The ke y
issue was: whe re was UB
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Why are se nior pe opl e de al ing with the se sort of issue s? DCI has a
pe nchant for the se issue s. Al so, the se issue s we re worke d by l owe r-l e ve l pe opl e , but
se nior-l e ve l invol ve me nt may make things e asie r...or harde r. The re are al so diffe ring
phil osophie s invol ve d: CIA wante d transcripts, whil e NSA did not want to give the m. It
be came a "manhood" issue with NSA. Transcripts we re an issue in e ve r are a. It was
,uncl e ar whe the r the l ack of acce ss to transcripts had any e ffe ct on pe rformance .
. (U) KUALA LUMPUR MEETING
He has no spe cific re col l e ction of the January 2000 me e ting in Kual a Lumpur. The re was
al ways some thing going on in South Asia.
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(U.) FUNDING
(g) He sugge ste d that we shoul d tal k to Mary "Corado" about the unfunde d mandate of
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I for CT. I
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'I'uppl e me ntal s we re te rribl e ways to finance ope rations. The re was
no guarante e of continuity. How can you de ve l op re l ations with a source or a fore ign
country if the re is no guarante e of continue d funding.
(U) THE DCI'S 1 998 "DECLARATION OF WAR" MEMORANDUM
(S) The CIA did not go through and do a he ad-count of whe the r re source s we re be ing
spare d. The me morandumwas vie we d as a note to the re st of the IC to say, "ge t out of
our way stop frustrating our e fforts if we ne e d transcripts, give it to us." The DCI's
me mo came in the conte xt of the DCI de al ing with the cl e anup of the East African
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In re al ity, the re are
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al ways doze ns of things going on.


(5 ) How did the CIA re spond to the "strate gic warning" of the East African e mbassy
bombings. CIA trie d to find out how it happe ne d.
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I How coul d CTC have gue sse d
that the Cole and 91 1 we re ne xt? CTC's first re action was to focus on prote cting
e mbassie s and the n what targe ts we re cre ate d due to harde ning of e mbassie s. Woul d a
strate gic anal ytic unit have change d things? A re d ce l l ? How coul d the y have gue sse d
91 1 ?
(U) THE MILLENNIUM THREAT
He se nt a l ot of time on Y2K issue s.
the y we re targe ting a hote l compl e x and possibl y an e mbassy! Se cond, ,
Re ssamj
* (S) As for the CT me thodol ogy in combating the Mil l e nniumpl ot, the mil l e nniumtime
was the l ogical time for te rrorists to cause panic. Lots of pe opl e gathe re d in capital s, a l ot
of Ame ricans we re around the worl d so there were l ots of targe ts. In othe r words, the
ide ntification of the mil l e nniumas a time of particul ar CT focus was not drive n by any
inte l l ige nce .'
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Ithe re was focus on the
mil l e nniumas a high-thre at time .
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Te e - ste t: e t- I
The CIA high-l e ve l group starte d me e ting l e ss fre que ntl y be cause re l ations improve d
with the mil itary (U.S. Spe cial Ope rations Command), NSA, NIMA, parts of the Joint
Chie fs of Staff, the De fe nse Inte l l ige nce Age ncy' 9/1 1 Cl assifie d Information I
U) THE CONCEPT OF "CENTERS"
(U) Onl y in CIA can a ce nte r be cre ate d and the n the re is a fight about which dire ctorate
the ce nte r shoul d be in. CNC succe e de d (it was in the DI) be cause he ignore d the DI and
had re l ations with the De puty Dire ctor of Ope rations. He we nt to DO staff me e tings.
(U) Why put a ce nte r in any dire ctorate ? He saw himse l f as working for the DCI. A
ce nte r ne e ds to be unde r a dire ctorate be cause that is how re source s fl ow. Ce nte rs we re
ge tting the ir own care e r tracks.
(U) Ce nte rs take a l ot of work to cre ate and are ve ry e xpe nsive . Al so, giving ce nte rs
ope rational control confl icts with the re sponsibil ity of the chie fs of station to know what
can and cannot be done in the ir spe cific are as. Functional are as shoul d have more say,
but re gional are as can be e l iminate d.
(U) COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT AND THE QUESTION OF A DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENC (DNI)
(U) The onl y authority that the DCI has is be cause he is Dire ctor of the CIA and be cause
he can put bodie s on the targe t. Cre ating a DNI (me aning se parating the DCI fromCIA
Dire ctor) woul d be works than cre ating a drug czar. If the De fe nse De partme nt's
inte l l ige nce age ncie s stil l re port to the Se cre tary of De fe nse , the n the DNI has no re al
powe r. He chal l e nge d us to name a matrix manage me nt mode l that actual l y works in
practice . Matrix manage me nt is fundame ntal l y ine ffe ctive .
(UI 91 1
IS) The fact that 91 1 happe ne d was an inte l l ige nce fail ure . CIA is in the busine ss of
thwarting te rrorists but did not. But the re is probabl y no smoking gun. We did not have
the source s to te l l us what the y we re pl anning. Woul d anal ysis have gue sse d it right? If
anal ysis had gue sse d it right, no one woul d have acte d on it. Without no more than
anal ysis, no one woul d have take n action.
(U) As for l e ssons fromthe private se ctor, he was l ooking at the se l e ssons whe n he was
in gove rnme nt. IT is not a cost ce nte r but rathe r an e nabl e r. But CIA is not taking
advantage of industry's IT capabil itie s. Doing so woul d fre e up CIA re source s. CIA is
wre stl ing with how to pay for pe rformance . This was trie d in 1 998. In ge ne ral , CIA is
risk-ave rse in the manage rial worl d.
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