Raeff - Distinguishing Between Development and Change - Reviving The Organismic Developmental Theory - 11

Paper
Human Development 2011;54:433

DOI: 10.1159/000324334
Distinguishing between Development and
Change: Reviving Organismic-Developmental
Theory
CatherineRaeff
Indiana University of Pennsylvania, Indiana, Pa. , USA
Key Words
Development systems Organismic-developmental theory Sociocultural
perspectives
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to contribute to the revival of Heinz Werners organismic-
developmental theory by considering some of its key claims in relation to contemporary
developmental theory and research. The organismic-developmental definition of de-
velopment in terms of differentiation and integration is first discussed in relation to
contemporary systems theory. It is then synthesized with contemporary sociocultural
theory, specifically the position that development occurs as individuals participate with
others in cultural practices. Ultimately, it is argued that defining development in terms
of differentiation and integration offers a systematic framework for distinguishing
between change and development. Some implications of organismic-developmental
theory for conducting research are discussed, and the paper ends with suggestions for
future theorizing and research. Copyright 2011 S. Karger AG, Basel
Broadly speaking, developmental psychology addresses two basic and interre-
lated questions: What happens during development? and How does development
happen? Contemporary theoretical considerations of these questions are permeated
by varied complex issues and themes that continue to beg for conceptual refinement
and empirical systematicity. For example, addressing what happens during develop-
Catherine Raeff
Department of Psychology
Indiana University of Pennsylvania
Indiana, PA 15705 (USA)
Tel. +1 724 357 2422, E-Mail craeff @ iup.edu
2011 S. Karger AG, Basel
0018716X/11/05410004$38.00/0
Accessible online at:
www.karger.com/hde
Fax +41 61 306 12 34
E-Mail karger@karger.ch
www.karger.com
It was my good fortune to attend graduate school at Clark University from 1988 to 1993, when the
Wernerian tradition was still thriving there. Most of my exposure to organismic-developmental the-
ory came from two of Werners colleagues, the late Seymour Wapner and Bernard Kaplan. I can only
hope that they would have approved of this paper.
Organismic-Developmental Theory 5 Human Development
2011;54:433
ment involves varied issues, including how to define development, identifying forms
of change, analyzing continuity and discontinuity in development, analyzing the
process of development, identifying variability in development, as well as discerning
sequences of development. With regard to how development happens, increasing at-
tention is being paid to how multiple factors interact during development, including
the interrelated roles of individual, social and cultural processes in development.
Of course, these theoretical issues are not new, and they have been addressed in
varied ways since before developmental psychology emerged as an academic disci-
pline in its own right. Many of these issues were addressed by Heinz Werner in his
early twentieth century organismic-developmental theory. Although there is a con-
tingent of Werners colleagues, students and their students (many of whom will be
cited in this paper), who continue to use and extend organismic-developmental the-
ory, it has largely been forgotten by mainstream developmental psychology. How-
ever, in 2005, an edited volume on varied facets of Werners career and work chal-
lenged developmentalists to consider how some of his claims can inform contempo-
rary developmental inquiry [Valsiner, 2005a]. Recent empirical analyses further
suggest that Werners main theoretical constructs deserve renewed attention due to
their utility for analyzing childrens cognitive development [Siegler & Chen, 2008].
Understanding any theory can be advanced by considering not only where it comes
from, but also how it stands in relation to other theories. A discussion of the philo-
sophical roots of organismic-developmental theory was presented long ago in this
journal [Kaplan, 1967]. The goal of the current paper is to contribute to the continued
revival of organismic-developmental theory by considering some of Werners key
points in relation to contemporary developmental theory and research. Ultimately,
it will be argued that organismic-developmental theorys definition of development
in terms of differentiation and integration offers a systematic framework for distin-
guishing between change and development that can advance our understanding of
development.
With regard to what happens during development, organismic-developmental
theory will first be discussed in relation to contemporary systems theory. Then, to
address how development happens, organismic-developmental theory will be syn-
thesized with contemporary sociocultural conceptions of how development happens
through individual, social and cultural processes. Some implications of the organis-
mic-developmental conceptualization for analyzing development are discussed
next, and the paper ends with suggestions for future theorizing and research.
Organismic-Developmental Theory
Organismic-developmental theory was formulated by Heinz Werner (1890
1964), an Austrian whose academic career took him to Germany in 1915. In 1933, he
immigrated to the USA, where the theory was elaborated with colleagues at several
institutions, especially Clark University from 1947 to 1960. Werner was a contempo-
rary of Piaget and Vygotsky, and although they all addressed many of the same is-
sues, he has not enjoyed the widespread recognition that Piaget and Vygotsky con-
tinue to command. Undoubtedly, there are varied reasons for the fate of organismic-
developmental theory [Siegler & Chen, 2008; van der Veer, 2005], a discussion of
which is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, Werner offered a conceptual-
Human Development
2011;54:433
6 Raeff
ization of behavior and development that resonates with many of contemporary de-
velopmental psychologys concerns.
To preview some of Werners main claims, the following points from Rogoff s
[1993] discussion of Dewey, Gibson, Piaget and Vygotsky, as progenitors of contem-
porary sociocultural approaches to development, are all fully applicable to Werner:
Vygotsky, Gibson, Piaget, and Dewey share an emphasis on the importance of mutuality
of individual and environment in cognitive development Vygotsky and Piaget share an
emphasis on understanding human processes through studying development an ap-
proach to scholarly inquiry that contrasts with the study of static forms of thought without
concern for their transformations. Gibson and Vygotsky (and Vygotskys colleague
Leontev) share a conception of thinking as process For Gibson, as for Dewey, Vygotsky
and Leontev, the world is one of meaning, with objects and events defined with refer -
ences to the organisms purposes and in the context of sociohistorical purposes and prac-
tices. Piaget described relativity between organism and environment in his discussion of
assimilation and accommodation. (pp. 122123)
Including Werner in this group of venerable traditions can enhance our under-
standing of development as a process that occurs in sociocultural practices.
Systems Premises
Franklin [1990] pointed out that Werner was ahead of his time in positing a ho-
listic or systemic approach to understanding development. As Kaplan [1967] ex-
plained: The term organismic has sometimes been used as a synonym for holis-
tic, sometimes as an equivalent of systemic (p. 75). Indeed, organismic-develop-
mental theory rests on the same basic premises as current systems approaches. Thus,
understanding it can be facilitated by relating it to some key points from systems
theory, which has come a long way since Werners time. Although there are several
contemporary variants of systems theory [Witherington, 2007], they share some ba-
sic conceptual points that provide a useful context for considering organismic-devel-
opmental theory.
Systems theory starts from the premise that human behavior and development
are made up of multiple and interrelated constituents and subconstituents [Ford &
Lerner, 1992; Lerner, 2006; Lewis, 2000; Overton, 2006; Thelen & Smith, 1994/1996,
2006; von Bertalanffy, 1969; Witherington, 2007]. Thus, the basic process of devel-
opment involves mutually influential (that is, bidirectional) relations [among] levels
of organization ranging from biology through individual and social functioning to
societal, cultural, physical, ecological, and ultimately, historical levels of organiza-
tion [Lerner, Lerner, Almerigi, & Theokas, 2006, p. 24]. By emphasizing mutual in-
teractions among system components, systems conceptions of behavior and develop-
ment are derived from a relational metatheory which takes holism as its fundamen-
tal guiding principle [Overton, 2006, p. 32]. More specifically,
Holism is the conceptual principle that the identities of objects and events derive from the
relational context in which they are embedded. The whole is not an aggregate of discrete
elements, but an organized and self-organizing system of parts, each part being defined
by its relations to other parts and to the whole. [Overton, 2006, p. 32]
2011;54:433
In addition, the holistic premise of relational metatheory stands in contrast to
the atomism of perspectives that are derived from split metatheory, which has long
dominated psychology. Within split metatheory, splitting involves the conceptual
assumption of pure forms, but this assumption itself springs from the acceptance of
the atomistic assumption that there is a fixed unchanging bedrock bottom to reality
composed of elements that preserve their identity regardless of context [Overton,
2006, p. 32].
To say that system constituents are interrelated means that they mutually affect
and constitute each other so that each constituent is inseparable from the others.
System constituents further derive their meanings through their interrelations, and
thus do not have fixed independent, or split, meanings. Ultimately, if one part of a
system is changed, the other parts are also affected, and the functioning of the entire
system is affected. Interactions among system parts permeate human functioning,
from biological processes, to everyday action, to societal functioning.
For example, eating is a complex form of action that partakes of varied and in-
terrelated constituents and subconstituents, including sucking, biting, chewing and
swallowing. In addition, eating involves perceiving food through several senses,
grasping utensils, bringing food to ones mouth, making decisions about what, when
and where to eat, as well as interacting with other people. It requires obtaining and
preparing food. Eating may also be fraught with feeling or emotion, and may involve
varied ways of conceptualizing oneself. Eating further reflects cultural conceptions
and values, as well as the use of cultural tools. From a systems perspective, these as-
pects of eating are inseparable constituents of action that function in relation to each
other, in a given context. Moreover, these constituents are systems themselves that
are made up of multiple and interrelated subconstituents.
Building on the premise that complex action consists of multiple and interre-
lated constituents is the key systems claim that the whole cannot be reduced to its
parts, or that the whole is qualitatively different from the simple sum of its parts. In
keeping with a relational metatheory, it is the interrelations among the parts that
comprise the whole. For example, eating refers to a whole that involves certain inter-
relations among seeing, grasping, biting, interacting with others, and the varied oth-
er constituents mentioned above. The same behavioral constituents may be found in
countless activities and are interrelated in different ways for different purposes.
Thus, the meaning and function of behavioral constituents depend on the wider
whole of which they are momentarily parts. As Lewontin [2000] explained, to be
parts things must be parts of something. That is, there are no parts unless there is
a whole of which they are pieces the determination of parts is made only after the
appropriate whole is defined (p. 79).
These systems premises were evident in Werners [1940/1980] historical over-
view of the turn from mechanism to organicism in psychology. He argued that with-
in a mechanistic approach, the sum or aggregate of parts makes up the whole. In
contrast, from an organismic perspective,
The totality is not a superordinated unity built up of elements and something more than
their sum. It has an entirely different origin; it is prior to any division into elements what-
soever The elements are not precedent to the whole, but the whole, as a basic entity, is
the precursor of its component parts. [Werner, 1940/1980, pp. 89]
Human Development
2011;54:433
8 Raeff
Wapners elaborations of organismic-developmental theory also starts with
the assumption of interrelations [Wapner, 2000; Wapner & Demick, 1998, 2005].
That is,
The organismic worldview is embodied by an attempt to understand the world through
the use of synthesis It stresses the relationship among parts, but the relationships are
viewed as part of an integrated process rather than as unidirectional chains of cause-effect
relationships. [Wapner & Demick, 1998, p. 768]
From a systems perspective, human functioning is further understood contex-
tually, meaning that the contexts of human functioning are considered to be insepa-
rable constituents of behavior and development. In keeping with this premise, Wer-
ner [1940/1980] explained that the individual thinks, speaks a certain language, and
acts in a characteristic way because of his participation, his integration, in the whole,
and his thinking, talking and acting are primarily understandable only insofar as he
is identified with this totality (p. 9). Thus, the person and the environment are con-
ceptualized as parts of a whole; one cannot, so to speak, deal with one aspect of the
whole without treating the other [Wapner & Demick, 1998, p. 768]. Accordingly,
analyses are directed towards characterizing relations within the person-environ-
ment system as an indissoluble whole, rather than analyzing the person or environ-
ment in isolation from each other.
By highlighting mutual relations among system constituents, current systems
perspectives go beyond claiming that a persons functioning can only be understood
in relation to his/her context, to also claiming that contexts of human functioning
can only be understood in terms of how they are constituted through peoples action.
For example, consider a classroom setting. Students and teachers know how to act in
a classroom, and it seems straightforward to claim that the classroom context is in-
fluencing their behavior. At the same time, however, a classroom context does not
exist independently of the students and teachers who construct it. Indeed, the phys-
ical space could be used for varied purposes, and thus could be made into varied
contexts. In addition, a classroom context can be created in locations other than
rooms in a specifically designated school building, as demonstrated by students an-
nual spring pleas to have class outside. The teachers and students may act and inter-
act in particular ways because they know they are in a classroom setting, but they
have to act and interact to create the classroom setting. Thus, there are ongoing in-
terrelations between action and context.
What, then, happens during the development of action conceptualized in terms
of multiple and interrelated constituents? Answering this question requires defining
development. Overton [2006] observed that one of the most popular characteriza-
tions of developmental change, at least among developmental psychologists, has been
some variant of the idea that development is defined as changes in observed behavior
across age (p. 22). To be sure, development entails some change over time. However,
all of human behavior takes place over time, and people may experience all kinds of
changes as time passes, and as they get older. As Adolph, Robinson, Young and Gill-
Alvarez [2008] pointed out, changes over time come in varied shapes, including lin-
ear, accelerating, asymptotic, step-like, S-shaped, variable, unsystematic, stair-climb-
ing, U-shaped and inverted U-shaped (p. 528). Given how variable change can be, one
can question whether all changes over time are necessarily developmental changes.
2011;54:433
Although development obviously entails change, development and change are
not necessarily equivalent [Ford & Lerner, 1992; Kaplan, 1983a, b, 1986, 1992; Kap-
lan, Josephs, & Bhatia, 2005; Mascolo & Fischer, in press; Wapner & Demick, 1998].
If they were, we would not need the term development. Invoking the term develop-
ment implies that something more than mere change is occurring, or that a particu-
lar kind of change is occurring. In other words, although the focus on change is
straightforward and noncontroversial, major problems arise when considering
whether every type of change should be accepted as developmental and, if not, what
is the peculiar nature of the change we call developmental [Overton, 2006, p. 22].
With regard to child development, Kaplan explained that we want our children
to develop, and we dont mean merely that we want them to change [Kaplan et al.,
2005, p. 145]. In fact, some of the changes that a person undergoes over time may not
be considered developmental at all. For example, the terms regression and deteriora-
tion can be used to indicate that a person is not developing because they imply a
change away from an endpoint or some standard of improvement. Yet regression and
deterioration are changes that occur over time. If development is change over time,
then a person is developing when he/she is not developing by regressing or deterio-
rating. That statement clearly makes no sense, and more specific criteria for devel-
opmental change are required.
In addition, within the development-as-change-over-time paradigm, develop-
mental psychology has focused on dividing human beings into age ranges and life
phases, and on identifying stages of development for different ages and life phases.
However, the stages have become reified as milestones, which are used to describe
the apparently typical behavior of the allegedly average person at different ages and
in different life phases. Thus, much of developmental psychology is a catalog of forms
of behavior at different ages and life phases. Three-year-olds do X, 5-year-olds do Y,
and 7-year-olds do Z. Or, infants do A, children do B, adolescents do C, emerging
adults do D, young adults do E, middle adults to F, and old adults do G. This approach
may be useful for some diagnostic purposes, but it diverts attention away from the
process through which the new forms of behavior that characterize each age group
develop. One is left wondering what happens in between the age-based catalog of
achievements or milestones. If 3-year-olds do X, and 5-year-olds do Y, what about
4-year-olds? What happened to the childs behavior between X and Y? More specifi-
cally, what kinds of changes occurred in the structuring of behavioral constituents
and their interrelations?
Taken together, development does not necessarily involve any change over time,
nor does it involve only the emergence of new forms of behavior with age. Instead,
the point here is that development refers to certain kinds of systematic or organized
changes. Defining development as systematic or organized change begs the question:
systematic or organized according to what criteria? As organismic-developmental
theory was elaborated, development was defined in terms of specific criteria for iden-
tifying developmental changes in the constituents of action. The specific changes
that comprise development are stated in the orthogenetic principle of organismic-
developmental theory, to which we now turn.
Human Development
2011;54:433
10 Raeff
The Orthogenetic Principle
Building on the systems premise that complex action is made up of interrelated
constituents, the orthogenetic principle of organismic-developmental theory holds
that development involves moving from a state of relative globality and undifferen-
tiatedness towards states of increasing differentiation and hierarchic integration
[Werner & Kaplan, 1963/1984, p. 7]. This definition of development does not assume
that development occurs in human beings just because time passes and they get old-
er, nor does it assume that all changes are developmental changes. The orthogenetic
principle provides an a priori definition of development that can be applied to dis-
cern if some change is a developmental change. As Kaplan [1967] explained,
Such a formulation did not commit one to the view that any process was a developmental
one or had a predominantly developmental shape; at the same time, it allowed one to ex-
amine every process to determine the extent to which it revealed features of increasing
differentiation and hierarchic integration over time. (p. 83)
In other words, development does not lurk directly in the population(s) studied
but resides fundamentally in the perspective used [Kaplan, 1983a, p. 196], and there-
fore, it cannot be read off from the mere facts of change over time, either in the ac-
tual social order or in the individual member of a social order [Kaplan, 1994, p. 5].
Defining development in terms of differentiation and integration focuses atten-
tion on the increasing differentiation of action into constituent parts, as well as on
the increasing interrelatedness of those constituent parts. Going back to the eating
example, eating partakes of multiple and interrelated constituents, and the orthoge-
netic principle provides a systematic way of identifying specifically developmental
changes in the eating action system. That is, development involves increasing differ-
entiation of eating constituents, as well as increasing integration among them.
Valsiners [1997] analyses suggest that a childs use of fingers to get food into the
mouth is differentiated out of a more global manual and oral exploration of food.
Differentiation among action constituents can also include the refinement or im-
provement of action constituents, which in turn allows them to be integrated into
new forms of action. For example, refinement in finger manipulation facilitates pick-
ing up pieces of food of varying sizes and textures by integrating the contributions
of each finger. Using one hand to hold a fork in relation to using the other hand to
cut with a knife, allows for the emergence of being able to cut ones own food in the
service of eating. In some cultures, using certain fingers to manipulate a chopstick
in relation to other fingers that are manipulating a second chopstick makes indepen-
dent eating possible.
Using a very different example, contemporary discussions of attachment are
typically based on Bowlbys 4-phase sequence of attachment formation [Bowlby,
1969/1982], which can be characterized in terms of differentiation and integration.
During the first phase of preattachment, infants do not show preferences for certain
people over others, and their action towards others suggests a global, or undifferen-
tiated, social orientation. As infants proceed through the phases of attachment-in-
the-making and full-fledged attachment, to the formation of a reciprocal relation-
ship, children increasingly differentiate among people, and relate to them in ways
that involve accounting for others perspectives. In addition, infants initial, rela-
2011;54:433
tively undifferentiated reflex cries are differentiated into the use of language to en-
sure caregivers proximity. There is also differentiation of motor activity into reach-
ing for, as well as crawling and walking to an attachment figure. These varied means
become integrated as a child can simultaneously vocalize and locomote towards a
caregiver. Also during the course of attachment formation, children differentiate
among their own and others perspectives, and also come to integrate their own per-
spectives and goals with others.
Hierarchic integration means that previous, and also less differentiated and in-
tegrated, modes of action are reorganized as subordinate constituents of new modes
of action. Thus, as a rule the lower level is not lost. In many instances it develops as
an integral part of a more complex organization in which the higher process domi-
nates the lower [Werner, 1940/1980, p. 216]. For example,
Never is abstract thinking so self-sufficient that it can dispense with the material of sense.
At the same time, thinking as a relating and comparative activity assumes the rle of a
central selective function commanding sensorimotor, perceptual and imaginative data. It
mediates among the confusing multiplicity of sensuous impressions by means of judg-
ments and interpretations, and imposes order and measure upon this manifold. [Werner,
1940/1980, p. 52]
In other words, action constituents are reorganized such that earlier action sys-
tems become constituents of new action systems.
According to Werner, at the same time that earlier modes of action become part
of more developed modes, less differentiated and integrated forms of action may
sometimes dominate, depending on the situation, or the persons physical and emo-
tional condition. For example, if a person is confronted with a novel and/or difficult
task, he/she may not initially be able to engage in his/her most developed forms of
action. When people are stressed or tired, less developed modes of action may dom-
inate. Thus, for varied reasons and in varied ways, experience is organized simulta-
neously at various psychogenetic levels [Werner & Kaplan, 1956/1978, p. 95]. Build-
ing on this claim, organismic-developmental theory posits the genetic principle of
spirality, whereby there is a partial return to more primitive modes of functioning
before progressing towards full-fledged higher operations [Werner & Kaplan,
1963/1984, p. 8].
Contemporary systems approaches have done much to investigate and further
conceptualize how such variability is played out during development [Fischer, 1980;
Fischer & Bidell, 2006; Nelson, 2007; Thelen & Smith, 1994/1996, 2006]. Indeed, it is
argued that the hallmark of the dynamic nature of human behavior is its pervasive
variability. People act differently in different situations, with different people, in dif-
ferent emotional states The task of developmental science is to detect and describe
patterns in this variability [Fischer & Bidell, 2006, p. 314]. Fischers research shows
that people act within a developmental range, from functional to optimal levels of
action, depending on the conditions of support in a particular situation. Functional
levels of action refer to a persons independent action with low support, and optimal
levels of action refer to a persons functioning with high support. Also in keeping
with Vygotskys [1978] conception of the zone of proximal development, people typ-
ically engage in optimal levels of functioning with support, before being able to en-
gage in high levels of functioning on their own in specific contexts.
Human Development
2011;54:433
12 Raeff
Within the context of current systems theorizing, it is further pointed out that
systems theorists disagree about the relations between the variability of modes of
functioning within specific contexts and the extent to which a persons action in-
volves generalized stages of functioning [Witherington, 2007]. According to With-
erington [2007], rather than appeal to the abstract, generalizable forms action as-
sumes, contextualism grounds itself in the now, in the moment, in the real-time
activities of organisms in specific settings and contexts (p. 131). Organismic-contex-
tualists integrate contextualism with the organismic position in favor of abstracting
from the ever-changing present formal properties of action within and between gen-
eral levels of developmental organization [Witherington, 2007, p. 131]. Ultimately,
organismic-contextualist systems approaches capture both the domain-general and
the domain-specific, the global order and the local variability, without reducing one
to the other [Witherington, 2007, p. 149]. Werners organismic-developmental the-
ory is in line with the organismic-contextualist view because it posits general ge-
netic levels of development, or modes of functioning characterized by increasing
differentiation and integration, while simultaneously accounting for variability in
functioning across contexts and intrapersonal conditions.
In addition to the differentiation and integration of action constituents, Werner
also focused on the differentiation and integration of action in relation to context.
For example, Werner observed that, at the outset, infant functioning is set in motion
by vital drives on the one hand, and by the concrete signals of the milieu on the oth-
er [1940/1980, p. 194]. According to Werner, as infants and children transition from
sensorimotor functioning, to concrete cognition, to abstract thinking, action be-
comes increasingly differentiated from the immediate, concrete context. In addition,
there is differentiation in an individuals understanding of how contexts differ from
one another. As action is differentiated from the context in these ways, a person can
employ varied means to achieve varied goals. Of course, organismic-developmental
theorys systems assumptions hold that action is always embedded in context, and
thus action and context do not become wholly differentiated or separate. Thus, along
with differentiation, action becomes more effectively integrated with the context as
differentiated ways of acting are employed to fit particular contexts.
These claims about the development of action in relation to context further
point to how differentiation and integration do not have to be conceptualized as con-
flicting processes, but as mutually supportive ones. Although differentiation and
integration may at times appear to be in conflict, they are not necessarily opposing
or mutually exclusive. Indeed, within a relational metatheory, dichotomies are re-
jected, and efforts are directed towards identifying how distinct constituents of a
whole relate to each other [Overton, 2006]. In principle, only action constituents that
are differentiated can be coordinated or integrated. Thus, integration is derived from
differentiation. In turn, integration of current constituents provides a basis for the
differentiation of new constituents, making for ongoing interrelations between dif-
ferentiation and integration.
The Continuous Dimensions
Werner additionally identified different patterns of differentiation and integra-
tion in terms of several continuous and interrelated dimensions, including diffuse/
2011;54:433
global-articulated, labile-stable, rigid-flexible and syncretic-discrete. The process
explained above, of differentiation and integration among the constituents of eating,
is an example of moving along the diffuse/global to articulated dimension. Also il-
lustrating development from diffusion/globality to articulation, Werner [1940/1980]
observed that initially, legs, hands, mouth, and feet are all used in the movements of
grasping (p. 200). In keeping with contemporary systems research [Thelen & Smith,
1994/1996], Werner explained that directed manual grasping is differentiated from
global or diffuse body movements, and also involves the integration of articulated
grasping constituents in relation to particular objects.
Drawing on Piaget, Werner [1940/1980] described the diffuse or global nature
of childrens conceptions of the world:
What is salient and characteristic for a conceptual name at one time may not hold true
at another. According to Piaget, a child may say that the sun, moon and wind are alive
because they move, yet the clouds and sea are not since it is the wind that moves them.
At another time the same child may say that the clouds are alive because they make it
rain and that the sea is alive because it ebbs and flows The diffuse structure allows
the object to be determined by successive properties standing in logical contradiction.
(pp. 285286)
This lack of differentiation among object properties is accompanied by a lack of
conceptual integration insofar as the conceptual connections between diverse con-
tents are not enduring but mutable in accordance with the childs transitory state of
apprehension (p. 325). In other words, childrens conceptions of the world are labile,
not stable.
Lability along the labile-stable dimension refers to the variability, or fluidity
and inconsistency [Wapner & Demick, 1998, p. 776], that can characterize action
that is relatively undifferentiated and/or unintegrated. For example, contemporary
research suggests that the development of childrens theories of mind does not pro-
ceed simply from no theory of mind to full-blown theory of mind [Dunn, 2008; Nel-
son, 2007; Nelson et al., 2003]. Instead, childrens responses are often incomplete or
partially correct, suggesting that they are actively constructing stable ways of under-
standing other peoples minds and behavior. Going back to attachment, movement
along the labile-stable dimension is evident as children go from being satisfied with
anyone who ministers to them, to showing preferences for certain people, and estab-
lishing enduring relationships with them.
As differentiation and integration allow for increased stability in action, stable
functioning does not necessarily imply rigid functioning insofar as development also
involves moving along the rigid-flexible dimension. Action that is flexible is rela-
tively differentiated from a specific context, meaning that a person does not resort
rigidly to one form of action in a particular context. Flexible action also occurs when
differentiated action constituents can be assembled or integrated in varied ways to
meet the demands of a specific situation. In other words, multiple means become
available for the achievement of a particular goal, and multiple goals can be served
by a single means [Glick & Zigler, 2005, p. 326]. Human language use represents
flexible differentiation and integration par excellence, as the same words are inte-
grated in different ways to construct different meanings, and as different words are
integrated to construct similar meanings.
Human Development
2011;54:433
14 Raeff
The syncretic-discrete dimension refers to the fusion of domains of action and
their increasing differentiation into discrete domains during development [Frank-
lin, 2000]. For example, Werner pointed out that there is syncretism among sensory,
emotional and motor domains in newborn functioning. With development, these
and other domains of functioning (e.g., cognitive, social) become differentiated.
However, during the course of their differentiation, they do not become wholly sep-
arate because systemic integration also takes place, as action is constituted by inter-
relations among varied domains.
How Does Development Happen?
Thus far, we have addressed the issue of what happens during development. We
now turn to a consideration of how development happens. Within the theoretical
context of the orthogenetic principle, our task here is to consider how development
as differentiation and integration happens. A systems perspective holds that human
behavior and development are shaped by multiple and interrelated processes, includ-
ing individual, social and cultural processes. These processes are considered to be
foundational for development because human beings are individuals who are born
into and live within sociocultural contexts. More specifically, the current approach
integrates organismic-developmental theory with contemporary sociocultural the-
ory [Cole, 1996; Rogoff, 1993, 2003; Valsiner, 1997; Wertsch, 1998], and holds that
the differentiation and integration of development happen as an individual partici-
pates with others in cultural practices.
Cultural Processes
Insofar as all action occurs in cultural practices, culture is obviously implicated
in the current approach to development. More specifically, from a sociocultural per-
spective, human behavior and development are taken to occur in the context of cul-
tural practices, which are situated in physical environments and institutional set-
tings. The forms of complex action that comprise cultural practices are further in-
vested with normative expectations and with meanings or significances that go
beyond the immediate goals of the action [Miller & Goodnow, 1995, p. 7]. Accord-
ingly, cultural processes refer to common and contested cultural beliefs, values, goals
and ways of understanding the world that are enacted in cultural practices, as well
as the cultural tools or mediational means [Wertsch, 1998] through which action is
achieved. Cultural processes also include aspects of societal functioning, such as the
institutional settings in which cultural practices are situated, as well as political and
economic factors. These varied processes shape culturally specific ways of structur-
ing or organizing the constituents of action within cultural practices. In turn, devel-
opment involves the differentiation and integration of culturally specific ways of
structuring or organizing action constituents.
Kaplan has emphasized the importance of explicitly recognizing that concep-
tions of development are made with reference to idealized standards and expecta-
tions for behavior in varied contexts [Kaplan, 1983b, 1986; Kaplan et al., 2005]. He
explained that the process of development , in contradistinction to the process of
2011;54:433
mere change, is a movement towards perfection , as variously as that idea may be
construed [Kaplan, 1983b, p. 57]. Moreover, it is in the name of such ideas of per-
fection-development, however dimly held or vaguely apprehended, that we osten-
sibly advocate different forms of education, different forms of therapeutic interven-
tion, different forms of inquiry, different forms of governance [Kaplan, 1983b,
p. 59]. As suggested earlier, the term development connotes progress in relation to
cultural standards and norms, in contrast to terms such as regression and deterio-
ration. In conjunction with the orthogenetic principle, development involves the
differentiation and integration of action in relation to cultural standards and expec-
tations.
It is readily recognized that this claim gets us into dangerous territory because
normative notions and conceptions of development are clearly subject to disagree-
ment and debate, within as well as across cultures [Gjerde, 2004; Turiel & Wainryb,
2000]. To be clear, the current view of development in relation to goals is opposed to
any claim that development is given in the nature of things, or that development fol-
lows an innate sequence towards some predetermined goal. On the contrary, goals
of development are viewed as human constructions that reflect cultural values.
Moreover, insofar as cultures are dynamic, goals of development are subject to ongo-
ing construction and reconstruction.
People develop different modes of action around the world through participa-
tion in diverse cultural practices, in which cultural values and goals of development
are enacted. Research shows that people participate in sometimes vastly different
cultural practices that provide them with opportunities to develop sometimes vastly
different modes of action. For example, research with middle-class Americans in
Cambridge, Mass., and in a Kipsigis community in Kokwet, Kenya [Harkness & Su-
per, 1992] showed that
Childrens competence in the culturally marked areas is accelerated, whereas development
in other domains lags if indeed it is even recognized. Thus, it is customary in Kokwet for
children as young as 5 years old to take care of infants without the immediate supervision
of an adult. A 3-year-old boy can drive cows from the garden, and an 8-year-old girl can
cook an entire dinner for the family over an open fire. These same children do poorly in a
simple cognitive test that involves retelling a story to an adult tester. The Cambridge chil-
dren, on the other hand, may be highly precocious verbally, in some cases speaking in full
sentences by the age of 2 according to their parents. These children become adept at imag-
inative play and at competing for the attention and praise of parents and other adults.
Typically, however, these children will also frustrate their parents by slow developmental
progress in relation to household responsibilities. (p. 389)
Development in these different cultural contexts involves the differentiation
and integration of the constituents of different modes of action, in relation to differ-
ent cultural goals of development.
Cultural processes also contribute to within culture variability in development,
as people of different sociocultural circumstances participate in variously structured
cultural practices that shape different pathways of differentiation and integration
[Lareau, 2003]. For example, Heaths classic ethnographic research [1983/1992]
pointed to how children from different racial and socioeconomic communities in the
USA participated in different patterns of interaction in relation to different cultural
ways of using language and telling stories.
Human Development
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16 Raeff
As developing individuals engage with others in cultural practices, culture is
made part of a developing persons experience through interactions with other peo-
ple. In other words, development as differentiation and integration also partakes of
social processes.
Social Processes
Social processes refer here to the interactions with other people that shape an
individuals development. Clearly, human infants could neither survive physically,
nor develop psychologically, without social interaction. Decades of child develop-
ment research have focused on how development happens as children interact with
varied others, including parents, siblings, teachers and peers. Adult development is
also shaped socially as adults participate with others in cultural practices. The cur-
rent definition of development leads to considering how social interactions shape
development by providing opportunities for differentiation and integration.
Research within a Vygotskian framework focuses on how guidance from oth-
ers who are more competent shapes the development of an individuals participa-
tion in cultural practices. Guided participation comes in varied forms depending
in part on the cultural practice, as well as on the people involved [Rogoff, 2003].
With regard to the current definition of development, guidance shapes develop-
ment insofar as it propels the differentiation and integration of action constituents
within cultural practices towards cultural goals of development. Any kind of guid-
ance that involves making distinctions among the constituents of action has the
potential to facilitate differentiation, and any kind of guidance that involves coor-
dinating action constituents has the potential to facilitate integration. For example,
scaffolding generally refers to how a more expert person guides a novice by break-
ing up a task into its constituent parts [Granott, 2005; Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976],
and helping the novice to perform each constituent part. Breaking a task up into
constituent parts can be viewed as a form of differentiation because the task is not
being approached as a global whole, but in terms of some of its constituent parts.
In addition, the guide can help the novice to integrate varied differentiated con-
stituents.
Also in the service of differentiation, a guide may show an object to a developing
individual by turning it around, and pointing out different object features. The de-
veloping individual may be anywhere in the lifespan, and the object may be anything
from a toy to eating utensils to a power tool to a written text to an abstract idea to
another persons feelings. In the service of integration, the guide may demonstrate
and explain what happens when object components are combined, or when different
perspectives on a text or idea are integrated, or how someone else might feel in a par-
ticular situation. When reading to young children, it is commonplace for middle-
class European-American adults to ask children questions about what is going on in
the story [Heath, 1986/1992]. Initially, there are what questions that can support the
differentiation of the story into its component parts. For example, an adult can point
to varied parts of a picture and ask, whats this, and whats that? The adults are also
likely to ask attribute questions about story characters (e.g., what does a duck say?),
as well as reason questions (e.g., why did the duck do that?). Such questions provide
opportunities to differentiate among story components. Integration may be facili-
2011;54:433
tated by asking questions about relations among events within the book, and be-
tween the book and the childs previous experience.
Developing individuals also interact with peers who are not necessarily more
competent, and peer interactions have long been considered to play an important
role in how development happens [Piaget, 1932/1950]. Engagement among peers can
provide opportunities to differentiate among varied perspectives, as well as to con-
struct modes of action that involve the integration of varied perspectives. Depending
on the modes of action, peers can engage jointly in making distinctions among ac-
tion constituents, and can also coordinate or integrate them in varied ways.
The current claim that social processes can provide opportunities for differen-
tiation and integration means that guidance by itself does not guarantee that devel-
opment will occur. Just as leading a horse to water does not guarantee that it will
drink, guiding a persons action does not guarantee that he/she will develop. In order
for the person to benefit from someones guidance, the guidance has to be sensitive
to the persons current and potential abilities, which are shaped in part by his/her
genetic predispositions and current patterns of behavior. In addition, research has
long shown that developing individuals make active contributions to the structuring
of social interaction [Bell & Harper, 1977; Shatz, 1994; Stern, 1977; Ugiris, 1989].
Moreover, action by the individual contributes to the process of development [Lewis,
1997; Nelson, 2007; Oyama, 2000; Piaget, 1953, 1954/1986; Rogoff, 2003; Shatz, 1994;
Ugiris, 1977, 1989; Valsiner, 1997]. Taken together, development does not simply
happen to passive receptacles of culture and social interaction. Insofar as develop-
ment is actively constructed by individuals, individual processes are also fully impli-
cated in how development happens.
Individual Processes
Genetic and biological processes have been given much attention recently in de-
velopmental psychological considerations of how individual characteristics affect
development. Increasing attention is also being paid to how individuals shape their
own development through their own action. Nelson [2007] argued that during child
development, the child is an experiential child who actively seeks meaningful ex-
periences relevant to her current needs and interests and makes pragmatic sense of
her encounters in the world, in close relation with adults who care for, support, and
guide her (p. 1). Indeed, as Kaplan [1967, p. 79] explained, connotations of the term
organismic include sense-giving, form-building, [and] world-constituting, all of
which imply activity on the part of an individual in constructing his/her experience.
Such active individual involvement is also evident in the basic premise that de-
velopment happens as a person participates with others in cultural practices. This
premise emphasizes the developing persons active individual contribution to the
social interaction, the cultural practice and his/her development [Rogoff, 2003].
Along similar lines, Mascolo defined self-scaffolding as the ways in which products
of the individuals own actions create conditions that direct and support the produc-
tion of novel forms of action and meaning [2005, p. 193]. Individual processes fur-
ther shape development as people construct their own developmental goals. In addi-
tion, individuals actively make judgments and decisions about varied social situa-
tions, which includes sometimes actively resisting and even rejecting cultural values,
Human Development
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18 Raeff
as well as others efforts at guidance [Turiel, 2008; Turiel & Wainryb, 2000]. Of
course, the ability to evaluate social situations develops through interacting indi-
vidual, social and cultural processes. In turn, developing modes of evaluation serve
as another individual contribution to how development happens.
Throughout the lifespan, varied forms of individual activity may facilitate de-
velopment as differentiation and integration. Beginning during infancy, sensorimo-
tor action facilitates the individual construction of meaning. Infants and young chil-
dren can spend a lot of time turning objects every which way, providing them with
opportunities to construct the objects properties from an individual perspective.
Such object manipulation can provide a basis for differentiating among an objects
varied properties, as well as discerning how object components are integrated. At any
age, a person can practice a skill on his/her own, perhaps first differentiating by fo-
cusing on one part of the skill, then another, and then integrating them.
Just as social and cultural processes are operative when a person is alone, indi-
vidual processes shape development when a person is interacting with others in cul-
tural practices. For example, the developing individual can turn his/her attention to
a new component of a task, which then becomes the subject of interaction. Shifting
attention in this way can support differentiating among task components. In turn,
the developing individual can actively attempt to integrate task components. Using
language, the developing individual can ask questions about differentiated compo-
nents of a task, or about how components work together [Raeff & Mascolo, 1996].
Taken together, linking sociocultural theory and organismic-developmental
theory provides a systematic framework for linking the what and the how of devel-
opment. Sociocultural theory can inform organismic-developmental theory by pro-
viding a framework for considering how differentiation and integration occur
through individual, social and cultural processes. In the next section, we will have
the opportunity to consider how organismic-developmental theory can inform so-
ciocultural analyses of development.
Implications and Applications
By specifying criteria for development, organismic-developmental theory pro-
vides a systematic framework for developmental inquiry that has significant implica-
tions for contemporary research. This section begins with a discussion of how to
design research from the perspective of organismic-developmental theory, and then
some specific advantages of conducting such research will be discussed.
Designing Research from the Perspective of Organismic-Developmental Theory
Before considering how to design research in terms of the orthogenetic princi-
ple, it is interesting to first note that the terms differentiation and integration and
varied synonyms (e.g., coordinated for integrated) do crop up in contemporary de-
velopmental analyses. For example, according to Harter [1999], young childrens self-
descriptions are highly differentiated or isolated from one another; that is, the young
child is incapable of integrating these compartmentalized representations of self, and
thus self-descriptive accounts appear quite disjointed (p. 37). Although there are
2011;54:433
echoes of organismic-developmental theory in contemporary analyses, it is not nec-
essarily the starting point. A recent exception can be found in research that utilizes
the differentiation and integration constructs to analyze childrens developing con-
cepts of quantity [Siegler & Chen, 2008]. However, although the orthogenetic prin-
ciple is used as a starting point in this research, it is not linked to the wider theo-
retical context of organismic-developmental theory.
Although the details of differentiation and integration will vary, depending on
the particular forms of action and cultural practices under investigation, the organ-
ismic-developmental framework implies several analytic steps. First, based on the
position that development can only be understood in relation to a goal or goals, as well
as the position that complex action partakes of multiple and interrelated constituents,
the goal(s) of development for the form of action under investigation can be articu-
lated in terms of the organization of its constituents. A goal may be relatively short-
term or long-term, and it may represent varied cultural and/or individual conceptions
of development. As discussed earlier, it is readily recognized that articulating goals of
development is dicey because conceptions of developmental goals (including devel-
opmental psychologists conceptions thereof) are derived from (often implicit) values
and assumptions, and serve (often implicit) agendas [Burman, 1994; Kaplan, 1983b;
Kaplan et al., 2005]. By making conceptions of developmental goals explicit, assump-
tions and agendas can be more readily evaluated, debated and revised.
Moreover, insofar as developmental analysis involves investigating the differen-
tiation and integration of action constituents, some articulation of a goal is necessary
in order for researchers to know what action constituents to investigate. As Overton
[2006] explained:
The question is what one would possibly describe if one did not understand development
as tending toward some specified end? If one wishes to describe/explain the course of ac-
quiring language, then adult language is, of necessity, the endpoint. No description of the
language of the child would be possible without this ideal endpoint. In a similar fashion,
if one wishes to describe/explain the transformational development of reasoning, thought,
problem solving, personality, or anything, a conceptual endpoint must serve as the ideal
ultimate end. (p. 26)
In addition, part of distinguishing between development and change involves
viewing development in terms of specific criteria for systematic change, rather than
in terms of any change that might occur. To identify systematic sequences of differ-
entiation and integration, there must be some conceptualization of the goal to be
achieved [Langer, 1970; Ugiris, 1987; Wertsch, 1998].
Once a developmental goal is explicated in terms of the organization of action
constituents, the next analytic step involves discerning the current organization of
an individuals functioning with respect to the action constituents under scrutiny.
Then, the organization of functioning can be analyzed over time to discern patterns
of differentiation and integration. Such analyses involve identifying the differentia-
tion of action into constituents, as well as integration among constituent subcompo-
nents. In addition, analyses of integration involve tracking integration between and
among constituents.
In general, the main advantage of conducting developmental research in terms of
differentiation and integration is that these constructs provide tools for analyzing de-
velopment in ways that are more systematic and precise than analyzing change or
Human Development
2011;54:433
20 Raeff
growth over time. Along similar lines, analyzing differentiation and integration with-
in and among constituents provides a systematic way of discerning how functioning
becomes more complex during development. From the perspective of organismic-de-
velopmental theory, increasing complexity means that functioning partakes of more
differentiated and integrated parts. This position leads to systematically defining some
form of functioning in terms of multiple and interrelated constituents. One can then
go on to analyze the ways in which the parts differentiate and integrate over time.
In addition to the general advantages of analytic systematicity and precision, the
added value of conducting developmental research in terms of differentiation and
integration lies in how it can advance our understanding of varied specific develop-
mental issues, including analyzing the process of development, variability in devel-
opment, the links among different types of change, and continuity and discontinu-
ity in development.
Advancing Understanding of the Process of What Happens during Development
One advantage of investigating sequences of differentiation and integration is
that it permits systematic analyses of the process of development. As Adolph et al.
[2008] pointed out, much of developmental psychological research is a gallery of be-
fore and after snapshots, studio portraits of newborns, and fossilized milestones but
little understanding of the process of development itself (p. 527). To illustrate how
research derived from organismic-developmental theory offers ways to analyze the
process of development, I will consider a specific study that was conducted from a
sociocultural perspective about the development of Girl Scout cookie sellers [Rogoff,
Baker-Sennett, Lacasa, & Goldsmith, 1995]. This wonderful study was conducted
with an eye towards discerning how Girl Scouts develop varied cookie selling abili-
ties through guided participation. I chose to use this study to illustrate the added
value of conducting research from an organismic-developmental perspective be-
cause of my interest in linking organismic-developmental theory and sociocultural
theory. In the previous section on how development happens, the focus was on how
sociocultural theory can fruitfully inform organismic-developmental theory. Here,
the focus is on considering how organismic-developmental theory can inform socio-
culturally oriented research.
The Girl Scout study is based on the sociocultural premise that development
generally involves changes in how a person understands and participates with others
in specific contexts or cultural practices. Within a sociocultural framework, Rogoff
[1995] defined development in terms of participatory appropriation as follows:
Appropriation occurs in the process of participation, as the individual changes through
involvement in the situation at hand, and this participation contributes both to the direc-
tion of the evolving event and to the individuals preparation for involvement in other
similar events. Thus the term appropriation refer[s] to the change resulting from a
persons own participation in an activity. (p. 153)
In the Girl Scout study, development is considered in terms of appropriation,
and is defined further as a process of transformation of responsibilities and under-
standing [Rogoff et al., 1995, p. 54]. Development is also defined as a process of
2011;54:433
stretching to understand the action and ideas of others to accomplish something
together during participation in activities (p. 53). Case studies of 4 girls participa-
tion in Girl Scout cookie sales are presented, and it is concluded that the girls changed
in the process of their participation with others to become sellers (p. 61), and that
such change involved moving from peripheral participation to being primarily re-
sponsible for selling the cookies.
A little more specifically, we find out that at first, Darlene had many difficulties
with implementation of the sales script (p. 59). As she interacted with encouraging
customers, participated in role-playing training sessions, and practiced with her fa-
ther and stepmother, Darlene became a skilled seller, effectively communicating
knowledge of her product, using the order form effectively, and adjusting her sales
pitch and interpersonal manner to fit each customer (p. 60). Another scout, Lorna,
was assisted in becoming a cookie seller by her friend Elaine, a more experienced
seller from the same troop (p. 60). At first the girls went to a house together, and by
the third stop, Lorna was the one proposing that they go to different houses; and after
about ten stops, Lorna was proposing the specific route (p. 60). We find out that Amy
also began her sales with the support of an experienced Scout from her troop (p. 61).
During their practice trip together, the more experienced Scout offered instructions
and advice. Then, in her first sale after her practice trip with her friend, Amy spoke
with confidence as a seller Nonetheless, she still had difficulty with some aspects
of the sales procedure, including not having the customers fill out the order form
themselves (p. 61). The fourth scout, Carla, depended heavily on the leadership of
family members. Either her sister or her mother were with her at all times, and ulti-
mately Carla did not regard herself as the person responsible for selling (p. 60).
From the perspective of organismic-developmental theory, several questions
arise immediately. Does development include all changes that result from participa-
tion? What specifically is involved in stretching ones understanding? What happens
to a persons action that makes the transformation from peripheral participation to
responsible participation possible? In Darlenes case, for example, what specific de-
velopmental changes occurred in her action along the way from having difficulties
implementing the sales script to becoming a skilled seller? What was the organiza-
tion of the constituents to begin with, and what differentiation and integration did
they undergo to support skilled selling? Similar questions also arise for Carla, who
did not seem to develop responsibility for selling cookies on her own. In fact, one
wonders what changes she underwent, and whether she developed at all. Using an
organismic-developmental approach would provide a framework for analyzing spe-
cific developmental changes that occurred (or did not occur) as the girls participated
with others in Girl Scout cookie sales. In a nutshell, such research would involve in-
vestigating the differentiation and integration of action constituents that occurred
during the course of participating in Girl Scout cookie sales.
More specifically, such analyses would first involve identifying some develop-
mental endpoints or goals for selling Girl Scout cookies sales responsibly, such as
planning sales routes, filling out the sales form correctly, keeping track of deliveries
and payments, interacting appropriately and effectively with customers, and identify-
ing with the Girl Scout role. Next, each of these goals can be defined further in terms
of constituent and subconstituent parts. In another presentation of the Girl Scouts
research, keeping track of deliveries and payments is analyzed in terms of 4 constitu-
ents, each of which is defined further in terms of 2 subconstituents [Rogoff, Topping,
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2011;54:433
22 Raeff
Baker-Sennett, & Lacasa, 2002]. For example, keeping track of delivery progress and
deliveries yet to be made involves checking off the order once a delivery was made,
or prompting tracking by someone else by reminding someone to check off complet-
ed deliveries, or requesting someone to recap the completed deliveries or to describe
upcoming deliveries [Rogoff et al., 2002, p. 278]. These constituents represent differ-
ent possible means for keeping track of deliveries. Once particular aspects of selling
cookies are chosen for investigation, and defined in terms of specific constituents,
investigations of development can proceed. Observations would involve tracking dif-
ferentiation and integration within and between constituents.
To analyze the development of a scouts communication with customers, one
would first identify a goal for how to approach customers, and define that goal in
terms of constituent parts. Apparently, there is a script on Girl Scout order forms with
specific wordings for the girls to introduce themselves, explain what they are doing,
and take the order [Rogoff, et al., 1995, p. 59]. This description suggests that a goal of
development for communicating with customers consists of an introduction and ex-
planation. The introduction could consist of a greeting and stating ones name. The
explanation could include a statement about belonging to a Girl Scout troop and a
statement about selling cookies. The approach could end by asking the potential cus-
tomer if he/she would like to buy cookies. The next analytic step would be to observe
a particular scouts initial ways of communicating, and describe her action in terms of
constituents and subconstituents. Then, each subsequent observation would involve
discerning if and how the action constituents undergo differentiation and integration.
Consider the following hypothetical scenario. A girl might begin globally with:
Hi, do you want to buy some cookies? Next time, she might say: Hi. My name is
Abigail. Do you want to buy some cookies? Ultimately, she might consistently say:
Hi. My name is Abigail. Im selling cookies for my Girl Scout troop, number 12.
Would you like to buy some? Between the first and second observations, the intro-
duction is differentiated into greeting the potential customer and stating her name.
There is also a global request to buy cookies. Then, the explanation of the purpose
involves the integration of 2 differentiated points, namely belonging to the Girl Scouts
and selling cookies within a single statement. The request to buy cookies follows the
pertinent information, and thus is differentiated from, yet coherently integrated with
the preceding statements. This kind of analysis provides a systematic and precise de-
scription of the process of development that occurs in a persons functioning.
In addition to furthering our understanding of the process of development, in-
tegrating sociocultural and organismic-developmental approaches allows for more
precise links between guided participation and developmental change, or between
what happens during development and how such development happens. The Girl
Scout studys analysis of guided participation provides information about how each
girls cooking selling was supported by varied people and cultural tools. Analyzing
differentiation and integration within and between action constituents would add
information about the specific developmental changes that occurred in the girls
ways of acting. Then, analyses could be directed towards relating specific aspects of
guided participation to specific developments in the girls functioning.
Analyses of the process of development can also be fruitfully applied to discern
what happens in between ages, stages and milestones. As noted at the outset of this
paper, listing stages or milestones of development does not necessarily tell us about
what happened to a persons behavior along the way because it is in between ages,
2011;54:433
stages and milestones that the process of development occurs. Identifying sequences
of differentiation and integration for the constituents of action would provide more
precise information about what happened to the persons action that supported the
movement from one stage or milestone to the next.
It is interesting to note that Piaget [1954/1986] made a similar point in his dis-
cussion of the development of object permanence. Piaget was concerned with the
process of development that occurs on the way towards the ultimate goal of repre-
senting objects as existing independently of ones own action, and in terms of spatial,
temporal and causal relations. Accordingly, he did not conceive of object perma-
nence as a concept that an infant either has or does not have at a particular age, and
he identified a 6-phase sequence of transformations in the development of object
permanence. Ultimately, Piaget argued that
These global transformations of the objects of perception, and of the very intelligence
which makes them, gradually denote the existence of a sort of law of evolution which can
be phrased as follows: assimilation and accommodation proceed from a state of chaotic
undifferentiation to a state of differentiation with correlative coordination. (p. 397)
Piagets analyses show how understanding development requires tracing the
processes of differentiation and integration from infants initial apprehension of ob-
jects to full-fledged object permanence. Within the context of organismic-develop-
mental theory, trying to find the earliest manifestation of object permanence misses
the point that any form of action undergoes development. Using the discourse of dif-
ferentiation and integration provides a way to systematically analyze the process that
occurs on the way to full-fledged object permanence, or any goal of development.
Advancing Understanding of Developmental Variability
As pointed out earlier, there are increasing calls to seriously address variability
in development, both within and between individuals. Analyzing differentiation and
integration can elucidate developmental variability, while simultaneously using a
common language for making systematic comparisons across varied developmental
pathways.
Recall that identifying goals of development is the first analytic step in conduct-
ing research from the perspective of organismic-developmental theory. This step is
a key to investigating variability across individuals, which may occur across cultures,
as well as within cultures, in relation to different goals of development. Going be-
yond identifying different cultural goals of development, organismic-developmental
theory leads to further explicating those goals in terms of constituent parts. Then,
developmental analyses can be directed towards discerning sequences of differentia-
tion and integration for the constituents that comprise varied cultural goals.
Interindividual variability may also occur during development in relation to the
same cultural goals, both within and across cultures. Such variability occurs when
different individuals follow different developmental trajectories towards the same
goal. The orthogenetic principle provides a common language for analyzing differ-
ent developmental pathways in relation to the same goal. Again, we start by defining
a goal in terms of constituents, and then analyzing the organization of those con-
Human Development
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24 Raeff
stituents in the functioning of particular individuals. This point in the analysis could
already reveal differences across individuals, and there would be a systematic way of
comparing their different starting points, namely in terms of the organization of
previously identified action constituents. The next analytic step involves discerning
differentiation and integration within and among constituent parts. If individuals
start with different patterns of functioning or constituent organization, then clearly
they will undergo different sequences of differentiation and integration [Nelson et
al., 2003; Thelen & Smith, 1994/1996]. Nevertheless, it is possible that some of these
developmental pathways may converge at some point. Such convergence could be
elucidated by analyzing the different pathways in terms of the same constructs,
namely the ways in which previously identified action constituents are differentiated
and integrated. Also, even if individuals start with the same organization of con-
stituents, they could experience different sequences of differentiation and integra-
tion. Taken together, organismic-developmental theory provides a common lan-
guage for dealing with permutations of variability in a systematic way, without laps-
ing into an infinity of case studies that use different terms to describe each case. In
other words, the added value of conducting research from an organismic-develop-
mental perspective is that it allows for systematic comparisons across varied devel-
opmental pathways, while simultaneously preserving what is unique to each one.
As discussed earlier, Werner himself emphasized that there is much intraindi-
vidual variability in a persons behavior, both within and across contexts, due to con-
textual dimensions, as well as a persons emotional and physical condition. Such in-
traindividual variability makes it impossible to say that a person is always function-
ing at a single developmental stage, or that he/she has permanently reached a
particular developmental milestone [Fischer & Bidell, 2006]. Instead, a persons
functioning can be analyzed systematically in terms of the co-existence of different
patterns of constituent differentiation and integration [Bibace, 2005]. It then be-
comes possible to systematically discern when and why particular configurations of
action constituents emerge.
Advancing Understanding of Different Types of Change
The organismic-developmental framework explicitly distinguishes between de-
velopment and change, and recognizes that not all changes involve increasing dif-
ferentiation and integration. Indeed, this point has been foundational for this paper.
Defining development in terms of differentiation and integration is not equivalent
to denying that other types of change take place, nor is the significance of other types
of change being ignored. What the current definition of development does is provide
a conceptual framework for distinguishing among different types of change. It also
provides tools for discerning interrelations among different types of change, includ-
ing how developmental change and varied types of nondevelopmental change may
be related.
More specifically, insofar as action partakes of multiple and interrelated con-
stituents, differentiation and integration can be used as constructs for classifying
different types of changes within and among action constituents. For example, re-
gression in a persons functioning is a form of change that involves engaging in a
previously exhibited pattern of functioning characterized by relatively less differen-
2011;54:433
tiation and integration. Or, there could be some deterioration in functioning that
involves engaging in a new pattern of action that is characterized by less differentia-
tion and integration in comparison to another, previous pattern of action. Defined
in this way, deterioration involves the emergence of a new form of behavior that does
not represent development. Thus, as suggested earlier, not all novel forms of behavior
necessarily count as developmental change.
Once different types of change are classified in terms of the relative differentia-
tion and integration of constituents, it is possible to analyze interrelations among
them. For example, there are reports of regression occurring prior to development
[Fischer & Granott, 1995; Gershkoff-Stowe & Thelen, 2004; Thelen & Smith,
1994/1996; Ugiris, 1987; Wapner & Demick, 1998]. Insofar as action constituents
are reassembled or reorganized during development, one has to partially dissolve
the existing organization if one [is] to move ahead [Kaplan et al., 2005, p. 139]. Such
dissolution means that there can be a return to previous modes of functioning before
the constituents are reassembled in ways that reflect increasing differentiation and
integration. Of course, regression does not necessarily always precede development,
nor does development necessarily always follow regression. The point here is that the
relations between regression and development can be analyzed systematically once
types of change are distinguished in terms of how action constituents are differenti-
ated and integrated.
Analyzing how different types of change are related also has implications for is-
sues of intraindividual variability, discussed in the previous section. For example, it is
commonplace to assert that people do not function well under stress, suggesting that
functioning changes under stress. However, it could change in varied ways over the
duration of a stressful situation. A persons functioning could regress to a previous
form of functioning, or deteriorate into a new form of functioning. The person could
rally and reach his/her highest level of functioning before regressing or deteriorating
again. If different forms of change are defined in terms of patterns of differentiation
and integration, comparisons among them can be made more systematically and rela-
tions among them can also be analyzed more systematically because there is a com-
mon framework within which to describe and analyze the varied patterns.
Advancing Understanding of Developmental Continuity and Discontinuity
Analyzing development in terms of differentiation and integration also has im-
plications for the intractable issue of continuity and discontinuity in development.
In keeping with a relational metatheory that eschews dichotomies, organismic-
developmental theory is in line with the view that development involves both conti-
nuity and discontinuity [Werner, 1957]. There is continuity insofar as only what has
been differentiated can be integrated. Therefore, what is integrated entails, or is con-
tinuous with, what has been differentiated. There is also continuity insofar as dif-
ferentiation occurs from some whole that already exists. At the same time, there is
discontinuity because a qualitatively new form emerges through the processes of dif-
ferentiation and integration. In addition, recall that Werner posits that earlier modes
of functioning are not necessarily lost as more developed ones emerge. Instead, they
become necessary parts of a new whole. As such, there is continuity because later
forms maintain and build on previous forms. At the same time, there is also discon-
Human Development
2011;54:433
26 Raeff
tinuity insofar as the new form is qualitatively different from the previous form, and
because the old form now takes on a different function and meaning within a new
whole. Conceptualizing development in terms of both continuity and discontinuity
in relation to differentiation and integration leads to research that eschews privileg-
ing either continuity or discontinuity. Rather, from an organismic-developmental
perspective, empirical analyses would be directed towards discerning ongoing inter-
relations between continuity and discontinuity.
Issues of continuity and discontinuity permeate developmental research on the
relations between earlier and later functioning, and the extent to which later modes
of functioning can be predicted based on knowledge of earlier functioning. It is ar-
gued that if development is continuous, then predictions should be possible, but if
development is discontinuous, trying to predict later functioning based on earlier
functioning is futile. There is ample evidence to support the position that develop-
ment entails both continuity and discontinuity. For example, attachment research
shows that sometimes attachment in infancy predicts later psychosocial function-
ing, and sometimes it does not [Thompson, 1999, p. 274].
Insofar as neither continuity nor discontinuity is privileged from an organismic-
developmental perspective, predicting later functioning based on earlier functioning
is not a major concern. Instead, the goal is to discern what happens to the constituents
of action on the way from earlier to later functioning. Analyzing differentiation and
integration provides a way to identify how earlier and later functioning are interre-
lated, even if the latter cannot be predicted from the former. Moreover, even if later
functioning can sometimes be predicted based on earlier functioning, that alone does
not tell us about the process that a person undergoes to get from the earlier function-
ing to the later functioning. Identifying the differentiation and integration that oc-
curs along the way provides more precise information about the patterning of conti-
nuities and discontinuities between earlier and later modes of functioning.
Future Directions
Although organismic-developmental theory has been largely forgotten by devel-
opmental psychology, the preceding discussion indicates that it is neither outlandish
nor incompatible with contemporary theory and research. To recapitulate, according
to organismic-developmental theory, development does not refer simply to any kind
of change that may occur over time. Rather, the term development is reserved for cer-
tain kinds of changes, namely those that involve differentiation and integration in
relation to developmental goals. The orthogenetic principle provides a systematic
framework for analyzing what happens during development, and it can be fruitfully
integrated with contemporary systems theory and sociocultural perspectives to show
how differentiation and integration happen as individuals participate with others in
cultural practices. Organismic-developmental theory provides a basis for future re-
search, and can also benefit from continued theoretical elaboration.
As discussed earlier, organismic-developmental theory rests on the systems
premise that human functioning partakes of multiple and interrelated constituent
processes. However, what counts as a constituent remains rather vague. Moreover,
particular forms of action partake of potentially innumerable constituents, and it is
also often difficult to demarcate where one constituent ends and another begins. In
2011;54:433
addition, constituents can be understood systemically, leading to considerations of
subconstituents, subsubconstituents, and so on. Trying to discern the constituents
of action from societal processes to cellular processes becomes an impossible under-
taking. Therefore, investigators have to make decisions about which constituents to
focus on in any one study. Towards that end, more specific conceptual criteria are
required for defining action constituents in relation to developmental goals for var-
ied modes of action.
One direction in identifying relevant action constituents can be found in Over-
tons distinction between the expressive-constitutive and instrumental-communica-
tive functions of action [Overton, 2006]. According to Overton [2006], expressive-
constitutive action expresses or reflects some fundamental organization or system
(p.22). For example, a verbalization may reflect the nature of the childs system of
thought. A cry, in a particular context, may reflect the status of the childs attach-
ment system [Overton, 2006, p. 22]. At the same time, action is also taken to have
instrumental functions such as when an expressive cognitive act or thought may
also be the means to solve a problem. An emotional act of crying may, while being
expressive from one perspective, also instrumentally lead to acquiring a caregiver
[Overton, 2006, pp. 2324]. Overton explained further that any given action can be
understood from the perspective of either its expressive-constitutive or its instru-
mental-communicative features (p. 24). With regard to identifying and analyzing
action constituents, this distinction first leads to conceptualizing the expressive-
constitutive and instrumental-communicative functions of action within particular
cultural practices. Then, further identification of action constituents in relation to
goals of development within each of these functional modes could proceed.
Differentiation and integration are general terms, and the foregoing examples
suggest that they can be manifest in a wide variety of specific ways. The advantage
of their generality is that they are applicable to varied forms of action, in the context
of varied cultural practices. This view of development was unabashedly recognized
as a heuristic concept, serving to order phenomena from the most diverse domains
[Kaplan, 1983a, p. 195]. However, if the differentiation and integration constructs
remain too general, they risk being applied willy nilly, at the whim of individual in-
vestigators. Indeed, Werners descriptions of differentiation and integration can be
debated, as it is not always clear why some change is considered to represent differ-
entiation or integration [Poddiakov, 2006; van der Veer, 2005]. For instance, accord-
ing to Werner [1940/1980], an example of a lack of differentiation is when concept
and percept are fused in one indistinguishable entity insofar as the functions of con-
crete apprehension and conception proceed as one (p. 267). Werner [1940/1980]
pointed out that this lack of differentiation is evident in some cultures where there
are no general category words, only names for individual instances of what would
represent wider categories in some other cultural contexts:
The Bakar of Brazil have a whole group of expressions for different species of parrots, but
the generic name parrot is lacking in their language. Among the Australian aborigines
there are no such class names as bird, tree or fish; but on the other hand there are special
terms for particular species of birds, trees and fishes Certain American Indian lan-
guages have many names for cloud formations; the Lapps have twenty names for different
kinds of ice and forty-one words for the various kinds of snow. Yet in both cases the lan-
guage has no corresponding generic terms. (pp. 267268)
Human Development
2011;54:433
28 Raeff
However, one could argue that these examples represent much differentiation
insofar as a wide range of distinctions among types of birds, trees, fish, ice and snow
is being made. Thus, theoretical and empirical efforts may be directed towards spec-
ifying some criteria for varied forms of differentiation and integration, while simul-
taneously maintaining their broad applicability.
Some criteria are offered by Wapner in his elaborations on organismic-develop-
mental theory. For example, he argued that person-environment relations can be
conceptualized and analyzed developmentally in terms of the orthogenetic principle
[Wapner, 2000; Wapner & Demick, 1998, 2005]. That is, in dedifferentiated person-
in-environment relations, there is typically passive accommodation (whereby the
individual passively goes along with environmental demands) [Wapner & Demick,
2005, p. 292]. In differentiated and isolated person-in-environment relations, there
is disengagement, characterized by the individuals withdrawal and removal from
the environment. Nonconstructive ventilation relations occur when the person
maintains conflicted relations with aspects of the environment [Wapner & Demick,
2005, p. 292]. Finally, differentiated and integrated person-in-environment relations
are characterized by constructive assertion, whereby the person takes positive con-
structive action vis--vis aspects of the environment [Wapner & Demick, 2005,
p. 292]. In keeping with the position that development occurs in relation to goals, the
differentiated and integrated mode of person-environment relations is considered
optimal, and is further explained in terms of the following developmental goals:
Optimal development entails a differentiated and hierarchically integrated person-in-
environment system with flexibility, freedom, self-mastery, and the capacity to shift from
one mode of person-in-environment relationship to another as required by goals, by de-
mands of the situation and by the instrumentalities available. [Wapner & Demick, 1998,
p. 775]
It is readily recognized that issues such as freedom and self-mastery are subject
to all sorts of cultural variability and debate. Nevertheless, the point here is that the
orthogenetic principle serves as a systematic framework for discerning development
in relation to an articulated goal that can be applied to varied person-environment
circumstances.
Indeed, Wapners developmentally ordered modes of coping have been applied
to analyses of peoples developmental experiences of critical person-in-environment
transitions, from adoption, to retirement, to natural disasters, to illness, to entering
nursery school, college and medical school, to immigration. The variability of life
transitions requires that the differentiation and integration constructs be tailored to
specific life transitions, which involve different specific developmental goals and ac-
tion constituents. At the same time however, the developmentally ordered modes of
person-environment relations provide a systematic rubric for going about analyzing
individuals developmental experiences of major life transitions in relation to cul-
tural goals of development.
With dynamic skills theory, Fischer has also done much to concretize and refine
conceptions of how differentiation and integration are played out during develop-
ment. It is interesting to note that in the initial presentation of dynamic skills theory,
Fischer [1980] explicitly acknowledged Werner, along with Bruner, Dewey, Hebb,
Kagan, Piaget, Skinner, White and Wolff, as one of the scholars whose ideas have
2011;54:433
been most important to the formation of the theory (p. 477). However, almost 3 de-
cades later in Fischer, Stewart and Stein [2008, p. 331], the list of theoretical inspira-
tions is quite different, with the exception of Piaget: Baldwin, Freud, Piaget, Sullivan
and Vygotsky. Be that as it may, the basic tenets of dynamic skills theory still echo
Wernerian ideas about differentiation and integration.
According to dynamic skills theory, skills are taken to develop along tiers, as
well as along levels within tiers [Fischer, 1980; Fischer & Bidell, 2006; Mascolo &
Fischer, in press]. Along the tier scale, action develops from reflexes to sensorimotor
actions to representations to abstractions to principles. These tiers parallel the sen-
sorimotor, perceptual and abstract developmental levels posited by Werner for char-
acterizing peoples understandings of the world [Werner, 1940/1980]. The tiers are
further characterized by developmental levels, each of which has a characteristic
skill structure [Fischer & Bidell, 2006, p. 323]. Development proceeds along the lev-
els as single sets are differentiated and coordinated into mappings, which are differ-
entiated and coordinated into systems, which are differentiated and coordinated into
systems of systems. In explicating development along the tiers and levels, there seems
to be an emphasis on coordination or integration. However, insofar as only differen-
tiated constituents can be integrated, coordination here implies that differentiation
has occurred. Although continued refinement of dynamic skills theory is ongoing,
it offers guidelines for analyzing patterns of structural differentiation and integra-
tion in relation to endpoints, and within specific contexts.
As Valsiner [2005b] pointed out, Werners use and explication of the continuous
dimensions changed over several editions of his major work Comparative Psychology
of Mental Development [1940/1980]. They remain somewhat vague, and could ben-
efit from further theoretical and empirical elaboration. The diffuse/global-articulat-
ed dimension seems to be a restatement of the process of differentiation. However,
there is not a continuous dimension to restate the process of integration, such as
fragmentation-systematic. One can question whether it is even necessary to restate
the processes of differentiation and integration with continuous dimensions. The
other dimensions do not restate the differentiation and integration processes, but
rather reflect byproducts of differentiation and integration. Theoretical work is
needed to specify what counts as rigid and flexible, syncretic and discrete, labile and
stable. Ultimately, systematic research is needed to discern patterns of functioning
along the continuous dimensions for varied modes of action. It is also important to
point out that although I have referred to these constructs as continuous dimensions,
Werner [1940/1980] referred to them as conceptual opposites (p. 54), and Wapner
[2000] referred to them as polarities (p. 8). This terminology sets the dimensions up
as dichotomies, which can easily lead to focusing on the extreme endpoints, and
viewing the endpoints as mutually exclusive. However, given Werners focus on vari-
ability and the process of development, it seems important to go beyond the extremes
of the continua, by defining and analyzing the areas in between them. Moreover, do-
ing so would be in keeping with a relational metatheory that rejects dichotomies.
Research that documents movement along the continuous dimensions is worth
pursuing because it could further enhance understanding of the process of develop-
ment in between ages, stages and milestones, as well as of intraindividual variability
in development. As discussed earlier, intraindividual variability refers to how the
organization of a persons functioning may vary across contexts and individual cir-
cumstances. Such variability may include movement along the continuous dimen-
Human Development
2011;54:433
30 Raeff
sions. For example, in stressful situations, peoples functioning may become rigid, as
they utilize one means to an end, rather than integrating several, or flexibly employ-
ing varied means to discern which ones would be most effective in the current situ-
ation. Analyzing the persons functioning along the rigid-flexible dimension would
provide a way to go beyond simply saying that people do not function optimally
when under stress. More generally, attention to the continuous dimensions reminds
us that human behavior is not static. Thus, documenting movement along the con-
tinuous dimensions could be useful for analyzing the ongoing dynamics of behav-
ioral organization.
The whole point of this paper has been to argue that organismic-developmental
theory provides a framework for systematically conceptualizing and investigating
developmental change. In addition to investigating patterns of differentiation and
integration along the lines explicated in the previous section, understanding what
happens during development will be advanced by research on the relations among
different types of change. Research may also be directed towards discerning the fac-
tors and conditions that lead to different forms of change [Kaplan et al., 2005].
Synthesizing organismic-developmental theory with the sociocultural position
that development happens through participation with others in cultural practices,
provides a framework for relating answers to developmental psychologys basic ques-
tions to each other in systematic ways. That is, investigating how development hap-
pens first requires a conceptualization of what happens during development. When
the question of what happens during development is answered in terms of differen-
tiation and integration, it then becomes possible to consider how specific individual,
social and cultural processes shape specific sequences of differentiation and integra-
tion. Thus, research is needed to discern how varied interrelated individual, social
and cultural processes are related to trajectories of differentiation and integration for
varied modes of action.
Conceptualizing developmental change in terms of differentiation and integra-
tion provides a way of looking at and describing events, a way of organizing the
manifold of phenomena [Kaplan et al., 2005, p. 140]. The orthogenetic principle of-
fers theoretical insights for developmental psychologys perennial questions, and
provides a framework for systematic research on the dynamic complexities of devel-
opment in varied domains of functioning throughout the lifespan.

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