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  • States of Conflict: A Case Study On Peace-Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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    This paper explores the effects of international state-building efforts on the Bosnian state. It addresses the central question of what happens when external ideas about what constitutes a ‘modern’ state conflict with local contexts. The paper takes a step back from the exigencies and challenges of day-to-day politics and looks at the structural determinants of state-building beyond the practices of single actors.

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    States of Conflict: A case study on peace-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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    This paper explores the effects of international state-building efforts on the Bosnian state. It addresses the central question of what happens when external ideas about what constitutes a ‘modern’ state conflict with local contexts. The paper takes a step back from the exigencies and challenges of day-to-day politics and looks at the structural determinants of state-building beyond the practices of single actors.

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    672 visualizações29 páginas

    States of Conflict: A Case Study On Peace-Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina

    Enviado por

    IPPR
    This paper explores the effects of international state-building efforts on the Bosnian state. It addresses the central question of what happens when external ideas about what constitutes a ‘modern’ state conflict with local contexts. The paper takes a step back from the exigencies and challenges of day-to-day politics and looks at the structural determinants of state-building beyond the practices of single actors.

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    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Baixe no formato PDF, TXT ou leia online no Scribd
    Sinalizar o conteúdo como inadequado
    de 29

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    StatesofConflict
    Acasestudyonpeace-buildingin
    BosniaandHerzegovina
    BeritBliesemanndeGuevara

    November2009
    ©ippr2009

    InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch
    Challengingideas– Changingpolicy
    2 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    Contents
    Aboutippr ............................................................................................................................. 3
    Abouttheauthor.................................................................................................................. 3
    Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. 3
    ‘StatesofConflict’................................................................................................................. 3
    Abbreviations........................................................................................................................ 4
    Introduction........................................................................................................................... 6
    BosniaandHerzegovina–anoverview ............................................................................... 8
    TheinternationalinterventioninBosniaandHerzegovina................................................. 12
    Conclusions:somethoughtsonfutureforeignpolicyformulation..................................... 23
    References .......................................................................................................................... 25
    3 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    Aboutippr
    TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUK’sleadingprogressivethinktank,
    producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticand
    sustainableworld.
    Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakinginthe
    UK.Throughourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeand
    providepracticalsolutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.
    WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedas
    possible,whileourinternationalandmigrationteamsandclimatechangeprogrammeextend
    ourpartnershipsandinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationfor
    highqualityresearch.
    ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:info@ippr.org
    www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065

    ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinNovember2009.©ippr2009

    Abouttheauthor
    BeritBliesemanndeGuevaraisaResearcherattheInstituteforInternationalRelations,
    HelmutSchmidtUniversity,Hamburg,fromwhereshehasaPhD.
    Thispaperisbasedontheresultsoftheauthor’sfive-yearresearchproject(2003–2008)on
    theeffectsofstate-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina,publishedinBeritBliesemannde
    Guevara(2009) StaatlichkeitinZeitendesState-building.InterventionundHerrschaftin
    BosnienundHerzegowina, Frankfurta.M.:PeterLang.

    Acknowledgements
    ipprisgratefultotheUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentandtheSwedish
    ForeignMinistryfortheirgenerousfundingofthispieceofwork.

    ‘StatesofConflict’
    Thispaperisoneofaseries.TheotherpaperscoverMacedonia,Kosovo,Afghanistanand
    Haiti.DueforpublicationinAutumn2009,theywillbeavailablefrom
    www.ippr.org/publicationsandreports
    4 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    Abbreviations
    AFBiH ArmedForcesofBosniaandHerzegovina
    BiH BosniaandHerzegovina
    CARDS CommunityAssistanceforReconstruction,DevelopmentandStabilisation
    CSA CivilServiceAgency
    DPA DaytonPeaceAgreement
    DFID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment[UK]
    EUPM EuropeanUnionPoliceMission
    EUSR EuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentative
    FBiH FederationofBosniaandHerzegovina
    GDP Grossdomesticproduct
    IDC ResearchandDocumentationCenter,Sarajevo
    HJPC HighJudicialandProsecutorialCouncil
    HR HighRepresentative
    IDP Internallydisplacedperson
    ICTY InternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia
    IFI Internationalfinancialinstitution
    IFOR ImplementationForce
    IMF InternationalMonetaryFund
    IPTF InternationalPoliceTaskForce
    ITA IndirectTaxationAuthority
    JISB JournalofInterventionandStatebuilding
    NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisation
    NGO Non-governmentalorganisation
    ODA Officialdevelopmentaid
    OHR OfficeoftheHighRepresentative
    OSCE OrganisationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope
    PfP PartnershipforPeace
    PIC PeaceImplementationCouncil
    PRSP PovertyReductionStrategyPaper
    RS RepublikaSrpska
    SAP StabilisationandAssociationProcess
    SBS StateBorderService
    SFOR StabilisationForce
    SFRY SocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia
    SIPA StateInvestigationandProtectionAgency
    5 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    UNECE UnitedNationsEconomicCommissionforEurope
    UNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme
    UNHCR UNHighCommissiononRefugees
    UNMIBH UnitedNationsMissioninBosniaandHerzegovina
    USAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment
    6 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    Introduction
    Inearly2009,BosniaandHerzegovina(BiH)1 witnessedafamiliarspectacle:during
    negotiationsonthefuturedesignofthestate,theprimeministeroftheRepublikaSrpska,
    oneofthecountry’stwomainpolitical-territorialdivisions,demandedtherightofsecession
    forthisSerb-controlledentity,whileBosnianMuslimrepresentativeswarnedthatifthe
    disputeoverconstitutionalreformswasnotsettled,anewwarcouldbetheultimate
    consequence.Priortothedispute,theBosnianMuslimmembersofthestatepresidencyhad
    threatenedtodismantlethecountry’sentitystructure,disregardingSerbianinterests.The
    politicians’adversepositionsledtosplitswithinbothethno-national2 communities.
    ThesituationboreastrikingresemblancetotheperiodbeforetheBosniancivilwaratthe
    beginningofthe1990s.Aftermorethan13yearsofinternationalinterventionandtenyears
    ofexplicitstate-building,fundamentalproblemsthatcoulddestabilisetheBosnianstate
    remainunsolved.
    SincethesigningoftheDaytonPeaceAgreement(DPA)3 inDecember1995,Bosniahas
    experiencedextensiveinterventionbywesternstatesandinternationalorganisationswiththe
    objectiveofconsolidatingpeaceandbuildingastabledemocraticstate.Duringthefirstfour
    yearsofpeace-building,internationally-prescribedreformsfollowedthedictatesofpolitical
    andeconomicliberalisationtheories.In1999–2000,however,thenegativeeffectscausedby
    policiesaimingtoestablishdemocracyandamarketeconomypriortostrengtheningthe
    stateledtoastrategicshifttowardsinstitutionalisation.4 Sincethen,Bosniahasbecomethe
    arenaforamassiveinternationalstate-buildingprojectconcentratedontheestablishmentof
    central-stateinstitutions.

    Aimsandstructureofthepaper
    Thispaperexplorestheeffectsofinternationalstate-buildingeffortsontheBosnianstate.It
    addressesthecentralquestionofwhathappenswhenexternalideasaboutwhatconstitutes
    a‘modern’stateconflictwithlocalcontexts,asking:
    •Whatkindofstatehastheinternationalstate-buildingprocesscreatedinBosnia?
    •Whatarethelimitsofthisapproach?
    •Istheexportoftheliberalstatemodelappropriateasameansofpromotingthe
    securityandwelfareoftheBosnianpopulation?
    •Whatdoesthisallmeanforfutureforeignpolicyformulationregardingstate-building
    ingeneral?
    Toanswerthesequestions,thepapertakesastepbackfromtheexigenciesandchallenges
    ofday-to-daypoliticsandlooksatthestructuraldeterminantsofstate-buildingbeyondthe
    practicesofsingleactors.Fromthisperspective,explanationsofthesetbacksofinternational

    1.Hereafterweusethename‘Bosnia’asanabbreviatedwayofreferringtoBosniaandHerzegovina.
    2.‘Anethno-nationalgroupusuallyreferstopopulationswhichexpressanethnicidentityandmakea
    claimtobeingrecognisedasanation’(Cashmore2003:148).
    3.Officially:GeneralFrameworkAgreementforPeaceinBosniaandHerzegovina.
    4.Themainlessonlearnedregardingtheliberalisationstrategyisthatexternaldemocratisationand
    marketliberalisationsetsfreemechanismsofpoliticalandeconomiccompetitionwhichareunproblematic
    inconsolidatedstates.Inunconsolidatedstates,however,theytendtoendangerthepeacebecause
    regulatoryinstitutionsarestillmissingorweak(Paris2004).InBosnia,theprolongingofethno-
    nationalistruledespiteinternationalelectoralengineering(Belloni2004,ManningandAntić 2003),and
    theappropriationofstateassetsbypowerfulelitesintheprivatisationprocess(Donais2002a,Pugh
    2002)werebuttwosymptomsofthisproblem.Therefore,bytheendofthe1990s,institutionalisation
    cametobeseenasapreconditionforliberalisation(onthegenesisofthestate-buildingapproachsee
    BliesemanndeGuevara2008a:350-1).
    7 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    state-buildingcannotbelimitedtolocal‘spoiling’or‘corruption’.Rather,localresistanceand
    informalpracticeshavetobeseenasevidenceofstructurallimitstostate-buildingwhose
    resultsaremuchmoreambiguousandlesscontrollablethanmightbeexpected.
    Themainargumentisthatstate-buildinginBosniahascontributedtotheestablishmentof
    whatresemblesa‘Potemkinstate’–theproverbialvillagesmadeupofpaintedfaçadesthat
    FieldMarshalPotemkinbuiltforRussianEmpressCatherineIIduringhervisittothenewly-
    conqueredCrimeain1787inordertohidethetrue,desolateconditionoftheregion.In
    otherwords,state-buildinginBosniahasstrengthenedaformalstatefaçadebymeansofan
    internationally-ledprocessofinstitutionalisationbutbehindthisfaçadetheBosnianstate’s
    capacityandlegitimacyhaveremainedprecarious.
    Thepaperstartswithabriefoverviewofthecountryanditsrecentexperienceofconflict,
    andgoesontodescribethemostimportantinternationalactorsandtheirapproaches
    towardspeace-buildinginBosnia.Thesubsequentsectionanalysestheeffectsofstate-
    buildingontheBosnianstate.Itarguesthattheinterventionhascausedsimultaneous,
    contradictorydynamicsofstate-strengtheningandstate-weakeningwhichhaveresultedin
    anexternallysupported,butinternallyunconsolidated‘Potemkinstate’.Thefindingsare
    illustratedwithexamplesfromthethreecorestatefunctionsofprovidingsecurity,enablinga
    functioningnationaleconomy,andensuringtheruleoflaw.Theyarebolsteredbytheviews
    garneredfrominterviewsbetweentheauthorandrepresentativesofinternationaland
    nationalagencies,organisationsandministriesinBosnia.Thepaperfinisheswithsome
    conclusionsregardingfutureforeignpolicyformulationintheareaofinternational
    interventionandstate-building.
    8 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    BosniaandHerzegovina–anoverview
    Historicalbackground:state-formationandwar5
    ThestateofBosniaandHerzegovinacameintoformalexistencein1992,whenitdeclared
    itsindependencefromtheSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(SFRY),followingthe
    latter’sdemise.Yugoslavia’scollapsehadbeenforeshadowedintheearly1970swhenthere
    wasextensivetransferofstatefunctionsfromthecentralgovernmenttothesixYugoslav
    republicsthatwererunbypowerfulelites.Bytheendofthe1980s,andagainstthe
    backgroundofasevereeconomiccrisis,Yugoslavia’sprocessofeconomicandpolitical
    liberalisationfundamentallychallengedthestructuresofrule,leadingtostrugglesamongthe
    elitesovereverscarcerpowerresourcesandpositions.
    Multi-ethnicBosniawasparticularlyaffectedbytheseevents.Intheprocessof
    fragmentation,andduetothelackofhorizontalstratification,afeatureinheritedfrom
    socialisttimes,newpoliticalpartiesweredeeplydividedalongethno-nationalistlinesduring
    theirstruggleforpower.ThethreemainpartiesofBosnianMuslims(Bosniaks),Serbsand
    Croatssoonstartedtocarveupthepolitical,economicandsocialinstitutionsofBosnia
    amongthem,creatingthreeethno-nationalistsystemsofrule.
    FollowingthedeclarationsofindependencebySloveniaandCroatia,Bosniaalsoconfronted
    thequestionofitspoliticalfuture.WhileBosniaks(around44percentofthepopulationin
    1991)andBosnianCroats(around17percent)supportedthecreationofanindependent
    state,theBosnianSerbs(around31percent)boycottedthereferendumonindependence
    anddeclaredtheseparationofSerb-inhabitedareasfromBosnia.
    Inthespringof1992,warbrokeoutbetweenBosnianSerbs(backedbySerbiaunder
    SlobodanMilošević)andaloosecoalitionofBosniaks,BosnianCroatsandCroatiaunderthe
    leadershipofFranjoTudjman.TheSerbianobjectivewastocreatea‘GreaterSerbia’
    encompassingSerbia,MontenegroandallSerb-inhabitedareasinCroatiaandBosnia.From
    thestart,theaggressorsreliedheavilyon‘ethniccleansing’toestablishaterritoriallink
    betweenallSerbianareasandtohomogenisethepopulation.
    InApril1993theBosnianCroatsalsodeclaredanindependentrepublicwithinBosniaandits
    possibleunificationwithCroatia,creatingasecondconflictlinebetweenCroatsand
    Bosniaks.Again,expulsionsand‘ethniccleansing’wereamongthemaininstrumentsofthe
    armedfactions.InMarch1994,theBosniak-Croatian‘warwithinawar’endedwiththe
    WashingtonAgreement,whichformallyestablishedafederationbetweenthetwogroups.
    ThestateofBosniaremainedsplitintothreepara-statescontrolledbytheethno-nationalist
    warparties.IttookuntilDecember1995beforethewarbetweenthefederationandthe
    SerbsfinallycametoaninternationallybrokeredendwiththesigningoftheDaytonPeace
    Agreement.

    Politicaldevelopmentsafter1995:the‘Daytonsystem’anditsconflictive
    transformation
    TheconstitutioninAnnex4oftheDPAestablishedafederalstatecomposedoftwoentities:
    theRepublikaSrpska(RS),whichismostlySerb-inhabited,andtheFederationofBosniaand
    Herzegovina(FBiH),whichispredominantlyinhabitedbyBosniakandCroatianpopulations
    andisadditionallydividedintotencantons,eightofwhicharedominatedbyoneofthetwo
    groups.6 Thisconstitutionaldivisionofcompetenciescementedtheprofoundweaknessof
    thecentralstateandprovidedthetwoentitieswithmarkedstate-likequalities.Allmain

    5.Forfurtherreadingfromdifferentperspectives,see,forexample,Bennett(1995),BurgandShoup
    (1999),Cohen1995,DykerandVejvoda(1995),Ramet(1996),Schierup(1999),Woodward(1995).
    6.ForcriticalassessmentsoftheDPA,seeCousens(2002),Cox(1998),O’Brien(2005),SoliozandVogel
    (2004).
    9 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    responsibilitiesrestedwiththeentities,includingtherighttolevy,administerandredistribute
    taxes,andtomaintainseparatemilitaryandpoliceapparatusesaswellasspecialrelations
    withCroatiaandYugoslavia.Thecentralstate,bycontrast,lackedthesemostbasic
    characteristicsofstates,thatis,themonopoliesofviolenceandtaxation.
    Whilethisarrangementreflectedthedivisionofpowerattheendofthewar,thecreationof
    apoliticalsystemgearedtowardsmulti-ethniccooperationindicatedthewishofinternational
    actorstorestoreamulti-ethnicBosniansociety.Theconstitutionestablishedatripartite
    power-sharingsystematthecentral-stateleveltoensuretheparticipationofallethno-
    nationalgroupsinthepoliticalprocessandtopreventdecisionsbeingmadebyjustone
    group.Besidesethno-nationalquotasforpoliticalrepresentation,severalvetomechanisms
    wereestablishedagainstdecisionsbelievedtoimperilagroup’svitalinterests.However,
    whilethesearrangementsweredesignedtopromoteconsensusandcompromise,inpractice
    theyofferedethno-nationalistpoliticiansconsiderableleewayforblockingthepolitical
    process.7
    Morethan13yearson,Bosnia’sinstitutionalsettinghaschangedconsiderably.Relyingon
    directimplementationstrategies,especiallythepowersoftheinternationalHigh
    RepresentativeinBosnia,aswellasconditional‘carrotsandsticks’fromtheEuropeanUnion,
    NATOandothers(seebelow),theinternationalactorshavesucceededintransferring
    importantcompetencesfromtheentitiesandcantonstothecentral-statelevel.Therehave
    beenvisiblesuccessesregardingthecorestatefunctionsofsecurityandtaxation,for
    exampleinmilitaryreform,whichhasresultedinthecreationoftheunifiedArmedForcesof
    BosniaandHerzegovina(AFBiH),andoftheIndirectTaxationAuthority(ITA),which
    providesrevenuetothecentralstate.Thesereformshavereducedthestrengthofthe
    entities’quasi-statequalitiesandpowersandcontributedinsteadtothestrengtheningofthe
    centralBosnianstate.
    However,thelimitationsofotherreformprocessesmeanthatBosniaisstillfarfrom
    sustainingpoliticalstability.Reformstoconstitutionalmattersandtothepolice(seeJISB
    2007)–whichbothinvolvedsubstantialchangesoftheDaytonsystem–gotwaylaidby
    severepoliticalstrugglesnotonlyamongBosnians,butalsobetweenlocalandinternational
    actors,indicatingthattherearelimitstotheexternalstate-buildingapproach.Threatsof
    separationoftheRepublikaSrpska,warningsaboutthepossibilityofanewwarand
    attemptstoplaytheethno-nationalcardaredevicesthatarestillusedinpoliticaldiscourses,
    andtheBosniancentral-stateinstitutionsareapparentlystillunabletocopewithelitepower
    strugglesinthewaythatconsolidatedstatesare.

    Socio-economicdevelopment:reconstructionandgrowthwithout
    integrationandwelfare8
    Attheendofthewar,theeconomicsituationinBosniawasdire.TheWorldBankestimated
    thattotalwardamagescametoUS$50–70billion.Morethanhalfofallbuildingswere
    damaged,andlargepartsoftheelectricity,road,railwayandtelecommunicationsnetworks
    wereaffected.GDPhadsunkby80percentcomparedwith1990levels,andin1997
    remainedaslowasUS$500percapita.Industrialproductionhaddecreasedto90percentof
    thepre-warlevelandmanyassetsweredamaged(Herti etal 2000,WorldBank1996).The
    economic,financialandfiscalsystemsweredividedalongethno-nationalistlines,with
    differentcurrenciesbeingusedinthethreepara-states,therebyerectingquasi-customs
    borderswithinBosnia.

    7.OnthepoliticalsystemandtheexternaldemocratisationprocessinBosnia,see,forexample,Bose
    (2002),Chandler(2000),Perry(2005),SchwarzandHèrges(2003),SoliozandDizdarevic(2003).
    8.Onsocio-economicdevelopmentinBosnia,see,forexample,Bojičić-Dželilović,Čaušević andTomaš
    (2003),InternationalCrisisGroup(2001),PughandCooper(2004),Pugh(2002,2005),UNDPBiH(2006,
    2007).
    10 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    Thephysicaldislocationofpeoplecausedbythewarwasalsosevere.Morethan97,000
    peoplediedintheviolentconflict.9 Around2millionofthe4.4millioninhabitantscountedin
    the1991censusweredisplacedfromtheirhomes,eitherseekingasyluminforeigncountries
    ormovingasinternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs)tootherpartsofBosnia(ÓTuathailand
    Dahlman2004).In1995,unemploymentstoodat90percent,andaround90percentof
    thepopulationdependedonhumanitarianassistanceforbasicsurvival(Herti etal 2000).
    Physicalreconstructionandhumanitarianassistancewerethereforetheinitialprioritiesfor
    internationalactorsworkinginBosnia.Thehighlevelsofofficialdevelopmentaid(ODA)10
    flowingintoBosniaduringthefirstfouryearsofinterventionprovidedthefinancialbasisfor
    materialreconstruction.Atthesametime,themarket,monetaryandbankingsystemswere
    reunifiedasthebasisforeconomicgrowth.In1997,theinternationalactorsalsostartedthe
    processofprivatisingsocially-ownedassets.Theinternationalaidandliberalisationstrategies
    weresuccessfulwithregardtophysicalreconstruction,humanitarianassistanceandthe
    creationofacommonBosnianmarketwithanationalcentralbankandcurrency.However,
    thestrategiesalsoenabledlocalelitestosiphonoffrevenuesforpersonalenrichmentandto
    financeparallelpowerstructures,challengingtheauthorityoftheBosnianstate(Andreas
    2004a,2004b,Donais2002a,Festić andRausche2004,Pugh2002).
    Sincethestrategicshifttoinstitutionalisationin1999–2000,economicintervention,mainly
    bytheWorldBank,theIMFandtheOHR,hasbeengearedtowardsthecreationofa
    resilientbusinessandinvestmentenvironmentandpromotionofmacroeconomicstabilityas
    thebasisforeconomicgrowth.Strictbudgetarydiscipline,effectivetaxationandstructural
    adjustmenthavebeenthemainaimsguidingthepoliciesofinternationalactors.
    Therehavebeenseveraltaxreforms,includingtheintroductionofavalue-addedtaxanda
    progressiveincometax,whichhavecontributedtohigherandmorepredictablestate
    revenues.However,theseeconomicstrategieshave,todate,beenunabletofightthehigh
    levelsofunemploymentandpoverty.Althoughrealgrowthbetween2001and2007reached
    anaverageof5.4percent(withpeaksofalmost7percentin2006and2007),the
    unemploymentratewasstillmorethan47percentin2006(UNECE2009).Activitiesinthe
    informalsectorwereestimatedatforming43percentoftotalemploymentin2004(Krstić
    andSanfey2006).Officially,remittancesamountto20percentoftheGDP,withactual
    numbersprobablymuchlarger(WorldBank2007).ThepovertyrateinBosniawasnearly20
    percentin2004(CouncilofMinistersofBiH2004)andtheUnitedNationsDevelopment
    Programme(UNDP)saidthataround50percentoftheBosnianpopulationwassocially
    excludedinonewayoranother,withwomen,pensionersandyoungpeoplebeingthose
    mostaffectedandvulnerable(UNDPBiH2007).In2008nearlytwothirdsofyoungpeople
    between18and35yearssaidtheywouldemigrateiftheycouldduetothelackofsocio-
    economicprospects(EarlyWarningSystem2008:47).
    Inthesocialsector,amainfocusofthefirstphaseofinterventionwasonthereturnof
    refugeesandinternallydisplacedpersonstotheirplacesoforigin(asprovidedforinthe
    DaytonPeaceAgreement,Annex7)andontheimplementationofhumanandminority
    rights(DPA,Annexes4and6).Bothprocesseswerehampered,however,byproblemsarising
    fromweakandpoliticisedinstitutions,includingethnicisedpoliceforces,judiciariesand
    publicadministrations(InternationalCrisisGroup1999a,1999b,1999c,JudicialSystem
    AssessmentProgramme2000).
    In1999,theinternationalactorsinitiatedreformsofthejudiciaryandpublicadministrations
    whichaimedtoincreaseefficiencyandeffectivenessandtopromotemoreindependence

    9.Preliminaryresultofthe‘PopulationLossProject1992-1995’conductedbytheBosniannon-
    governmentalorganisationResearchandDocumentationCenter(IDC)(seewww.idc.org.ba).
    10.OnODAleveldevelopmentsinBosnia,alsoascomparedtootherinterventions,seeSuhrkeand
    Buckmaster(2006).
    11 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    frompoliticalandsocialinfluences.Theseprocessesalsoledtotheestablishmentofnew
    central-stateinstitutions,suchastheHighJudicialandProsecutorialCouncil(HJPC)andthe
    CivilServiceAgency(CSA).
    Inthematterofpropertyrestitutiontheinternationalactorswereabletogivebackalmostall
    occupiedhouses,flatsandlandstotheirpre-warowners.However,althoughtheprocessof
    returningpeopletotheirhomesgainedsomemomentum,propertyrestitutioncannotbe
    equatedwithreturn,asmanyrefugeesandIDPssoldorrentedtheirproperties(seeDonais
    2002b,Heimerl2005,ÓTuathailandDahlman2004).Alltheseprocessesfellunderthe
    heading‘ruleoflaw’,whichbecamethecentralcatchphraseoftheinterventionandhas
    sincebeenabenchmarkagainstwhichlocalpracticesaremeasured.Thisincluded,among
    otherthings,moreemphasisonthefightagainstcorruptionandthedetentionofindicted
    warcriminals(seeChandler2007,ÓTuathail2005forcriticalassessments).
    12 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    TheinternationalinterventioninBosniaandHerzegovina
    Who?CoreinternationalactorsinBosnia
    Inthissection,whichisnotintendedtobeexhaustive,wegiveanoverviewofthemain
    actorsandareasofcommitment.
    TheinternationalinterventioninBosniaconsistsofamilitaryandacivilcomponent.The
    militarycomponentstartedasaNATO-ledImplementationForce(IFOR)consistingof60,000
    internationaltroopswitharobustmandate.In1997,itwastransformedintotheStabilisation
    Force(SFOR).Itsmandateincludedpreventingaresurgenceofviolence,facilitatingthesafe
    returnofrefugeesandIDPsanddetainingwarcriminals.Duringtheinitialphaseof
    interventionSFORwasamainguarantorofpeaceandenforceroftheinternationalcivil
    agencies’directinterventionsintolocalpowerconstellations.By2004thesecuritysituation
    hadimprovedsignificantlyandthemilitarycomponenthadbeenreducedto7,500troops,at
    whichpointSFORwasreplacedbytheEU-ledEUFOR/OperationALTHEA.Todate,thisforce
    amountsto2,500soldiers.11
    Onthecivilside,thePeaceImplementationCouncil(PIC)12,itsSteeringBoard13 and
    especiallyitsappointee,theHighRepresentative(HR),havebeenatthecentreofthe
    intervention.AsperAnnex10oftheDPA,theHR’sinitialtasksweretomonitor,coordinate
    andfacilitatethepeaceprocess.Inviewoflocalblockades,however,thePICextendedthe
    HR’spowersconsiderablybytheendof1997.Theso-called‘Bonnpowers’enabletheHRto
    divestelectedpoliticiansandotherstateofficialsofofficeandtodecreelegislature,turning
    Bosniaintoasemi-protectorate.AsthemaincoordinatoroftheinternaleffortsinBosnia,the
    OfficeoftheHighRepresentative(OHR)hasbeeninvolvedinallreformprocessesinone
    wayoranother,buildingthegravitationalcentreoftheintervention.14
    AnothermainactoristheOrganisationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope(OSCE),
    whichhasbeenactiveinagreatnumberoffieldsrangingfromoperationaltaskslikeregional
    militarystabilisationanddemobilisationandtheorganisationandoverseeingofelections,to
    policyformulationandmonitoringtasksintheprocessesofmilitary,judicial,public
    administrationandeducationreforms.15
    Theinternationalfinancialinstitutions(IFIs)–particularlytheWorldBankandthe
    InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)–havebeenatthecoreofeconomicreconstructionand
    reforminBosnia,coordinatingtheseprocesses,providingloansandcredits,buildingcore
    financialandeconomicinstitutions,anddefiningandcontrollingeconomicandfiscalpolicies
    bymeansofconditionalityandmonitoring.
    TheUnitedNationsanditssub-organisationshaveplayedalesserroleinBosniathanin
    otherinterventioncases.Mostimportantly,theUnitedNationsMissioninBosniaand
    Herzegovina(UNMIBH)deployedtheInternationalPoliceTaskForce(IPTF)whosemain
    tasksweretoscreenpoliceofficersandtosupportotherreformprojectsgearedtowards
    democratic,multi-ethnicpolicingandthedepoliticisationofthepolice.IPTFwasreplacedby
    aEuropeanUnionPoliceMission(EUPM)in2003.16 UNMIBHwasalsoengagedinjudicial

    11.Seewww.euforbih.org
    12.ThePICcomprises55countriesandagenciesthatsupportthepeaceprocessviafinancialassistance,
    providingtroopsforSFOR,ordirectlyrunningoperationsinBosnia,plusprovidingobservers
    (www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/#pic)
    13.Members:Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,Russia,UK,US,thePresidencyoftheEU,the
    EuropeanCommission,andtheOrganisationoftheIslamicConference(OIC),whichisrepresentedby
    Turkey(www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/#pic)
    14.Seewww.ohr.int
    15.Seewww.oscebih.org
    16.Seewww.eupm.org
    13 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    reforms.TheUNRefugeeAgency(UNHCR)assistedintheprocessofrefugeereturn,while
    theUNDevelopmentProgrammehasassumedmonitoringandassistancefunctionsinthe
    areasofdemocraticgovernance,povertyreduction,crisispreventionandrecovery,and
    energyandenvironment.17
    ApartfromtheirrepresentationinthePICanditsSteeringBoard,westerncountrieshave
    alsobeenpresentintheformofbilateraldevelopmentagencies,takingtheleadincertain
    reformareas.18 Inrecentyears,keyplayersprovidingbilateralaidhavebeentheUS,Sweden,
    Germany,theNetherlands,Austria,JapanandFrance.19 Theworkofthegovernmental
    interventionagencieswasaccompaniedbyahighbutdecliningnumberofinternationaland
    localNGOs.
    Since2000,theEuropeanUnion’srolehasexpandednoticeably,resultingnotonlyinthe
    aforementioneddeploymentofEUFORandEUPM,butalsoinadouble-functionoftheHR
    asEuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentative(EUSR)since2002.TheobjectiveoftheEuropean
    CommissionDelegationtoBosniahasbeentoprovidethecountrywithsupportforthe
    stabilisationandassociationprocess,includingpeaceconsolidation,ethnicreconciliation,
    refugeereturn,institution-building,democratisation,ruleoflaw,humanrights,sustainable
    economicdevelopment,andfacilitationoftheharmonisationwithEUstandardsand
    principles.WithintheframeworkoftheCommunityAssistanceforReconstruction,
    DevelopmentandStabilisation(CARDS)programme,theEUprovided4.6billionEurosto
    supportinstitution-buildinginBosniabetween2000and2006;since2007furtherassistance
    hasbeenprovidedthoughthenewPre-AccessionInstrument(IPA).20
    Finally,NATOhasalsoplayedamajorrolethroughits‘PartnershipforPeace’(PfP)
    programme.Inadditiontoprovidingassistanceforsecuritysectorreforms,aspirationsto
    NATOaccessionexpressedbytheStatePresidencyofBosniain2001providedthe
    internationalcommunitywithconditionalcarrotsandstickstofurthertheprocessesof
    militaryreformandthedetentionofindictedwarcriminals.Indeed,accessiontalksweretied
    toanumberofrequirements,suchasthecreationofunifiedarmedforcesinsteadoftwo
    separatearmies,theadjustmentofequipmentandorganisationtoNATOstandards,and,
    mostimportantly,astrongercommitmentofBosnianSerbrepresentativestocooperatewith
    theInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia(ICTY).21

    How?Peace-andstate-buildingstrategiesinBosnia
    TheinternationalinterventioninBosniahasbeendominatedbytwotypesofstrategies:
    operativeandconditional-structuralones(seeRichter2009:94-96).Operativestrategiesare
    directformsofinterferenceorprojectimplementationbyinternationalactors.InBosnia,the
    interventionagencywhichhasmostfrequentlyresortedtooperativestrategiesistheOHR
    withitsBonnpowers.Thetwomainadvantagesofdirectinterventionsarethatthey
    facilitatecrucialreformsandinstitution-buildingprocesseswhichotherwisemightnotcome
    intobeingduetoalackofcapacityorwillingnessonthesideoflocalactors,andthatthey
    ensuretheprotectionofvulnerablegroups.TheHR’sdecisiontoestablishcarlicenceplates
    thatwouldnotrevealaperson’sorigin,forexample,isoftencitedasacentralsuccessof

    17.Seewww.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmibhforUNMIBH,www.unhcr.baforUNHCRand
    www.undp.baforUNDPinBiH.
    18.Forexample,theUSAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)waslargelyresponsibleforthe
    privatisationprocess,theUK’sDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)hasengagedinpublic
    administrationreform,andtheGermanGTZhastriedunsuccessfullytoestablishadirecttaxsystemin
    theBrčkodistrict(seewww.usaid.baforUSAID,www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-
    zentralasien/651.htmforGTZandwww.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Europe/Bosnia-Herzegovinafor
    DFID).
    19.Ofthese,onlytheUS,Germany,JapanandFrancearealsomembersofthePICSteeringBoard.
    20.Seewww.delbih.ec.europa.eu
    21.Seewww.nato.int/issues/nato-bosnia-herzegovina/index.html
    14 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    operativestrategies,asitprovidedforfreemovementofallpersonsalloverBosnia.Themost
    importantdisadvantagesofdirectinterventionsarethattheytendtoprioritisepragmatic
    solutionswhichtakea‘leastcommondenominator’approachtoendingacuteconflictsbut
    whichmightimpedefurtherreforms,thattheytendtopolariseconflictlinesbetween
    antagonisticactorsandtohindercompromise,andthattheyfurtherlocaldependencyatthe
    costofownership.
    Conditional-structuralstrategies,bycontrast,arebasedonthepremiseoftheexistenceof
    rationalactorswhichcanbeinfluencedbyconditionalities–thatis,tyingspecificreform
    demandstoaid,loansoraspiredmemberships,incentivesandmonitoring,aslongasthey
    arealsoprovidedwithcapacitythroughtransfersofknowledgeandtechnologies.InBosnia,
    suchstrategieshavebecomeastrongincentiveforreformssincetheconvergenceprocess
    withtheEUstartedinthelate1990s–notonlybecauseofthecarrotofpossibleEU
    accession,butalsobecausetheEU’sgeneralenlargementapproachinvolvesanemphasison
    reformownershipaccompaniedbytechnicalassistance.
    Conditional-structuralstrategiesaresupposedtoensureacomplianceofvaluesand
    standardswithoutjeopardisinglocalownership–whetherareformisimplementedideally
    dependsonlocalactors.InBosnia,however,conditionalitieshaveworkeddifferentlyinsofar
    astheyhaveinmanycasesbeenovershadowedbythe‘Damoclessword’oftheBonn
    powers.Themostimportantdisadvantageofthesestrategiesisthatthepoliticalelitesmight
    getbetweenthe‘frontlines’ofinternationalandlocaldemands:iftheytaketheinternational
    side,reformswillmostlikelylacklocallegitimacy,whilethedecisiontodefendthelocalpoint
    ofviewmightconsiderablylimitthepossibilitiesofexternalassistance.
    InBosnia,thecentralisationeffortsinthecourseofthepolicereformillustratedthisproblem
    (seeJISB2007).Caughtinthemiddle,theSerbianrepresentativesdecidedtoignore
    internationalconditionalitiesandtodefendtheethno-nationalpositionoftheirconstituency
    –partlyduetomerepowerconsiderations,yetalsobecausetheywouldotherwisehavelost
    theirsocialbasis.Asresearchhasshown,suchsocialconstraintsdonotonlyaffectethno-
    nationalistsbutallpoliticalactors:‘Insuchapoliticalenvironment,whichisdominatedby
    thesearchforprotectionofnationalrightsandinterests,moremoderatepartiesinsistthat
    theyhavetoadjusttotheprevailingmindsetofthevotersinordertoensuretheirown
    politicalsurvival’(Kostić 2007:343).
    Bothstrategytypes,operativeandconditional-structural,facethechallengeofhowto
    transferinternationally-supportedstateinstitutionsintolocalhandswithoutjeopardisingthe
    attainmentsofstate-building.AsignificantdisputeamonginternationalactorsinBosnia
    todayconcernsthequestionofwhethertheHRshoulddefinitelyrefrainfromuseofthe
    Bonnpowers.TheUShasstucktoaninterventionapproachcharacterisedbypowerful
    operativeinstruments,wishingtomaintainitsinfluenceonreformoutcomes.TheEU,by
    comparison,hastendedtosupportactorswhoputmoreemphasisontheownershipofthe
    politicalprocessitself,arguingthatonlyconditional-structuralstrategiescanensurethe
    strengtheningoflocalstatecapacityandlegitimacy.
    Asthesubsequentanalysisofthesuccessesandfailuresofstate-buildinginBosniawill
    show,bothinternationalstrategiesareflawedwhenitcomestothequestionoftransferring
    controlofthestateintolocalhands.Institutionsbuiltbyoperativestrategiestendtolack
    legitimacybecausetheyhavenotemerged‘organically’throughagenuinepoliticalprocess,
    resultingina‘Potemkinstate’.Conditional-structuralstrategies,bycontrast,leavemore
    roomforlocalinitiativeandacceptance,buttheoutcomeofreformsusuallydiffersfromthe
    oneenvisagedbecausereformsimplementedbylocalactorstendtobetwistedtosuittheir
    ownpurposes,andnewformsofruleusuallymeldwitholderformsintohybridstructures.
    Theoutcomemightnotbeastatethatishollow,yetitwillprobablydifferfairlysignificantly
    fromthewesternmodelsunderlyingstate-building(BliesemanndeGuevara2008a,Ottaway
    2002).
    15 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    Internationalstate-buildinginBosnia
    Internationalstate-buildingisbasedonthepremisethatastate,understoodasasetof
    institutionsandfunctionsaccordingtowesternmodelsandnorms,canbebuiltand
    strengthenedviacomprehensive‘institutionalengineering’byexternalactors.Intheory,
    thesestatesarethenabletoimplementandenforceinternationalnormsinorderto
    contributetothesecurityandwelfareoftheirpopulations(Bickerton2007,Ottaway2002).
    LookingatthecaseofBosnia,however,thequestionarisesofwhetherexportingthe
    westernstatemodelisthebestwaytostrengthenstatecapacityandresponsibility.
    ThepeaceprocessinBosniaseemsstuckbetweenaviolent,conflictivepastandan
    envisionedstateofsecurity,politicalstabilityandsocio-economicwelfarewhichhasyetto
    bereached.WhetherBosnia’sglassishalffullorhalfemptydependsverymuchonthe
    beholder’spointofview.Foradvocatesofthestate-buildingapproach,theBosnianexample
    showsthatinternationalinterventionsarecapableofendingviolenceandrebuildingstates
    basedonmoderninstitutionsandnorms;inthisview,Bosniajustneedsmoretime,
    internationalcommitmentandpossiblyEUaccessionprospectstoconsolidateitsstate.22
    Critics,ontheotherhand,arguethatthemainaimsofstate-buildinginBosnia–the
    consolidationofstateinstitutions,someformofnation-buildingamongthethreeethno-
    nationalgroups,andeconomicdevelopmentthathaspositiveeffectsonindividuals–have
    stillnotbeenachieveddespitetheextensiveintervention.
    Thesemixedfindingshintatacentraltensioninthestate-buildingprocessinBosnia:state-
    strengtheningandstate-weakeningdynamicscoexist,23 creatingsomeinstitutionalisation
    successesbutatthesametimeleavingthestateunconsolidatedanditsfutureunclear.
    State-weakeningdynamicsarenotpredominantlyrootedinlocalunwillingnesstocooperate,
    assomemightsuggest,butratherinthestructurallimitstotheinterventionitself,aswillbe
    discussedinthefollowingsections.

    State-strengtheningdynamics
    Politicalexpropriationofstateantagonists
    Theweakeningoftheethno-nationalistelites(whoatfirstmaintainedparallelprojectsof
    rule)bytheinterveningagencies,especiallytheOHR,wasthemostimportantprecondition
    forfurtherprocessesofstrengtheningthecentralstateinBosnia.Thedismantlingofillegal
    financingchannels,thereduction,reformandcontroloflocalmilitaryandpoliceforces,as
    wellasstructuralreformsofpublicadministrationandjudiciarywerekeystrategiesdesigned
    tocurtailtheabilityofethno-nationalistelitestomaintainparallelpowerstructures,to
    politicisestateagencies,andtoaccommodateclientsthroughredistributionofmoneyand
    posts.Theinternationalagencies’political,economicandmilitarypowersgavethem
    particularstrengthtotargettheethno-nationalistantagonists.
    The‘politicalexpropriation’ofstateantagonistswasanecessarypreconditionforstate
    consolidationandpavedthewayforthelaterinstitutionalisationofcorefunctionsatthe
    central-statelevel.Yet,asthisdependedonthepowersoftheinternationalactors,itwasnot
    sufficientandledneithertoanautomaticstrengtheningofcentral-statepowerandcapacity
    nortotheestablishmentofsupremacyofthecentralstateoveritsconstituentparts.

    22.SeeforexampleParis2004.Thetimeargumentcanoftenbereadinpolicyrecommendationsandis
    convincingatfirstsightbecausestructuralreformstendtoneedgenerationstotakehold.However,from
    thestructuralperspectiveontheeffectsofstate-buildingpresentedhere,therearenotmanyhintsthata
    prolongationofinternationalcommitmentwouldchangethemaindilemmasofstate-buildingoutlined
    below.
    23.Practicesarestate-strengthening whentheyareconsistentwiththe‘ideal’ofamodernstateinthat
    theyfavourtheinstitutionalisationofpowerandpromotetheexpansionofstaterule.State-weakening
    practiceshinderstateinstitutionalisationandlegitimacyandfavourbehaviourthatescapes,resistsor
    bendstherulesofthestate(MigdalandSchlichte2005).
    16 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    Institution-building
    Theestablishmentofinstitutionsandfunctionsatthecentral-statelevelwasakeysuccess
    oftheinstitutionalisationapproachadoptedbytheinternationalactorsin1999–2000.The
    establishmentofnewcentral-stateinstitutionsandagenciesliketheIndirectTaxation
    Authority(ITA),theStateBorderService(SBS),theStateInvestigationandProtection
    Agency(SIPA),theArmedForcesofBosniaandHerzegovina(AFBiH),theHighJudicialand
    ProsecutorialCouncil(HJPC)andtheCivilServiceAgency(CSA)testifiestotheeffectiveness
    ofthestate-buildingapproachinbuildingformalstatestructures.
    ThenewstateinstitutionswerepartlytheresultofreformprocessesinitiatedbytheOHR
    andotherinterventionagenciesandpartlyconnectedwiththeexigenciesoftheEU’s
    StabilisationandAssociationProcess(SAP).Thisprocessof‘member-statebuilding’provided
    strongimpetusesforinstitutionalisationandmodernisation,forexamplethroughthe
    EuropeanCommission’sfeasibilitystudyforBosniawhichlistedtheareasinneedofreformif
    BosniawantedtojointheSAP(EC2003)andthroughseveralsectorreportspreparedbythe
    ECDelegationtoBosnia(2004,2005a,2005b).Allinall,theinternationalinstitution-
    buildingeffortsbroughttheformandfunctionsoftheBosnianstateinlinewith
    internationalisednorms.
    Alessacknowledgedmechanismthatalsoledtothetransferoffunctionstothecentral-
    statelevelwaswhatcouldbetermed‘localproblem-orientedstate-building’,orformsof
    voluntarytransferofresponsibilitiesfromthesub-statetothestatelevelinordertosolve
    commonproblems.Thisismostlyfoundinareasoflowprestigeandoutsidethemainfocus
    ofinternationalintervention,likethevoluntarycentralisationoffunctionsinthehealth
    sector.Suchlocalstate-buildingeffortstendtobeoverlookedduetotheoverwhelming
    importanceoftheinternationalisedreformprocesses,buttheyhavecontributedtostate-
    strengtheningdynamicsinBosnia.
    Staterationalisationandmodernisation
    AthirdfactorcontributingtothestrengtheningofthestateinBosniawastheestablishment
    ofmanyinternationalreformprogrammesaimedatthecreation,modernisationand
    rationalisationofstateagenciesfromthecommunitytothecentral-statelevel.Thesereform
    programmes,whichincludedthecomputerisationoftaxprocessing,personneltrainingand
    proceduralreformsinthepolice,judiciaryandpublicadministration,ledtoincreasesinthe
    efficiencyofstateservices.24 Theyalsocontributedtoloweringthehighlevelsofcorruption,
    patronageandprivateappropriationofstateresourcesthathadcharacterisedthefirstyears
    ofpost-conflictpeace-building.
    AmongyoungerBosniancivilservants,theseeffortsalsoseemtohaveresultedinaformof
    ‘mentalstate-building’.Thenormativestrategiesofintervention–forexampletheinclusion
    oflocalexpertsintheprocessofPovertyReductionStrategyPaper(PRSP)formulationor
    themanyformsofpersonneltrainingandadvice–havehadeffectsontheformationofa
    modernbureaucraticculture.However,enduringcorruptionandstatepoliticisationindicate
    thatthequestionofwhethertherationalisedworkingroutinesandnewly-erectedcontrol
    agencieswillfunctionwithoutinternationalsupportandmonitoringandwhethertheycan
    infiltratethegeneralbehaviourofBosnianstateagentsremainsunanswered.

    State-weakeningdynamics
    Structuralandpower-relateddeterminantsofstateformation
    Amainproblemofthestate-buildingapproachoutlinedaboveisitstechnocraticnatureand
    itsneglectofthehistorical,politicalandsocialprocessesthatnecessarilybenditscourseand
    influenceitsoutcome.Post-conflictstate-buildingdoesnottakeplaceinavacuumbuthas

    24.Intheareaoftaxadministration,forexample,seeRozneretal (2005).
    17 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    tobuildonthesocial,politicalandeconomicstructuresinplace.Forexample,international
    state-buildingeffortshavehadtocontendwithBosnia’sdependencyoninternationalised
    revenuesourcestofinanceitsrule,andwiththeworkingroutinesbasedonpersonal
    relationshipsinsteadofimpersonalproceduresthatcharacteriseBosnianstatebureaucracy–
    bothofwhicharestructuralinheritancesfromitsYugoslavpast.Structuralpath
    dependenciesarenotpredeterminedorunchangeable,buttheytendtobequitepersistent
    andtoendureinhybridmixtureswithnewstructuresimposedfromoutside.
    Internationalstate-buildingprojectsarealsoinfluencedbythereactionsoflocalactorswith
    specificinterestsandrepertoiresforaction.TheBosnianstate,justasanyother,isadynamic
    fieldofpowerinwhichmultiplestateandnon-stateactorsfromtheinternationaltothelocal
    levelstruggle‘tohavetheirrules,whetherstatelaworsomeotherimplicitcode,becomethe
    routinebasisuponwhichpeopleact’(MigdalandSchlichte2005:15).AlthoughtheBosniak
    wishtostrengthenthecentralstatehasoftenconvergedwithinternationalobjectives,this
    positionhasbeenasorientedtowardspowerandgroup-specificinterestsastheoften
    resistingpositionsofBosnianCroatsandSerbs.Bosniakpoliticianssupporttheideaofa
    Bosnianstatebecause,asthebiggestpopulationgroup,theyhopeforgreaterpolitical
    influenceinamorecentralisedstate.
    ThecongruencybetweenBosniakandinternationalobjectivesenabledtheformertotake
    advantageoftheinternationalpowersinordertofurthertheirinterestsandpowerpositions
    withrespecttoothergroups.ThisisoneofthemainreasonswhytheBosnianSerbsare
    scepticalaboutfurtherstatecentralisationandcriticiseinternationalpartiality.Althoughat
    firstglanceitappearsthattheBosniaks’‘tacticalstate-building’iscontributingtothe
    institutionalisationprocessinBosnia,thedownsideisthatithashinderedthelegitimacyof
    newstateinstitutionsamonglargepartsofthenon-Bosniakpopulation.Theapproaches
    takenbyinternationalactorsinBosniahaveprovedunsuccessfulinresolvingthesestructural
    andpowerdilemmasofstate-building.
    Theresourcedilemma
    Thereductionofresourcescentraltotheprocessofpoliticalexpropriationofstate
    antagonistsalsohadstronglynegativeeffectsoncentral-stateinstitutions.After1999,
    internationalaidtoBosniafelldrastically.In1999officialdevelopmentaid(ODA)still
    amountedtooverUS$1billion;by2000ithadshrunktoaround$737millionandtoonly
    $565millionin2002.Thesumofinternationalgrantsandloans,includingexternally-
    financedstateinvestmentprojects,hadstoodatnearly27percentofBosnia’stotalstate
    incomein1998butdecreasedsteadilytoaround10percentin2005(OECD.stat,Dataset
    DAC2aandIMF2003,2005,2006).
    DecliningODAandstrictbudgetconstraintshaveleftthecentralstatewithlittlefinancial
    leewaytoinitiatepoliticalprogrammesofitsown.Furthermore,theIFIshaveconstrictedthe
    state’sfinancial,economicandfiscalpolicies.AlthoughtheaimoftheIFIs’neoliberalpolitics
    istoimpedecorruption,budgetaryrestrictionshavedeprivedthestateoftheresources
    necessarytoaddresssocietalproblemsanddemands,andtogeneratebasiclegitimacy
    throughmaterialredistributionandthecreationofindividualeconomicopportunities.The
    neoliberaladjustmentofstateinstitutionsandtheoftentechnocraticformsofeconomic
    interventionhavealsohinderedlocalinitiatives.Lackofmoneyandtheneedtoeconomise
    havethereforelimitedtheBosnianstate’scapacityandlegitimacy.25
    Localinformalpractices
    Localactors,caughtbetweeninternationalreformdemandsandresourceconstraintsonthe
    onehand,andtheirsocio-historicalembeddednessinlocalcontextsontheother,have
    resortedtoinformalinstitutionsandpracticestocopewiththesituation.Whilethehigh

    25.FormoredetailseeBliesemanndeGuevara(2008b).
    18 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    levelsofprivateappropriationofstateresourcesthatdominatedthefirstphaseofpeace-
    buildinginBosniaweresuccessfullycurtailedbyinternationalactors,otherformsofinformal
    statestructuresaremoreenduring,Persistingformstodayconsistmainlyofpettycorruption
    likethepolice’sillegalroadchargesystemsandpracticesofbriberyinthestatebureaucracy.
    Thecircumventionofthestateinthiswayhasparticularlycometotheforeintheeconomic
    sphere,wherethestatesystemoftaxationandredistributionissystematicallyunderminedby
    activitiesintheinformalsector(seeBliesemanndeGuevara2008b).

    Internationalisedfaçade,unconsolidatedcontent
    Soitappearsthatstate-strengtheningdynamics–especiallytheestablishmentofnew
    central-stateagenciesandthemodernisationandrationalisationofexistinginstitutions–
    haveledtostructureswhich,atleastformally,areverysimilartomodernwesternstates.
    However,atthesametimestate-weakeningeffectsofstate-buildingaremakingthemselves
    felt,creatingformalstateinstitutionsthatlackthecapacitiesandlegitimacycharacteristicof
    aconsolidatedmodernstate.Themaintenanceofthestatestilldependsinmanywayson
    internationalsupport,andtherearefewsignsoftherebeinganysustainableconsolidationof
    statecapacityandlegitimacy.Understandingthesehurdlesiscrucialtounderstandingthe
    limitsofinternationalstate-building.
    Internationalisation
    State-buildinginBosniahasledtoanextensiveinternationalisationofthestate–thatis,a
    deepembeddednessintoanddependenceoninternationalstructuresandactors–which
    persiststoday,eventhoughtherehasbeenachangeintheformofinternationalisationover
    thecourseofintervention.
    Intheareaofstaterevenuesandnationaleconomy,thischangecanbedetected,firstly,in
    thereducedamountofODAflowingintoBosnia,andsecondly,inalteredintervention
    instruments.InthecontextoftheIFIs’generalstrategyshiftawayfromtheorthodox
    neoliberalWashingtonConsensus,andrelyingonthenewcentral-stateinstitutions,the
    internationalagenciesnowresortmoretoinstrumentsbasedonlocalparticipationanda
    higherdegreeofownership,suchastheWorldBank’sPovertyReductionStrategyPapers.
    However,thewayinwhichtheBosnianstateisinternationalisedhasremainedlargely
    unchanged.Bosniaisstilldependentoninternationalcreditandloanstofinancebudget
    deficits,foreigndebtsandpublicinvestmentprojects.Furthermore,theunderlyingneoliberal
    ideologywithitsemphasisonbudgetarydisciplineandsustainabilityhasremainedlargelyin
    place.Despitemoreparticipatoryformsofeconomicstrategyformulation,IMFandtheWorld
    Bankstillhavethefinalsayoneconomic,fiscalandfinancialpolicyissues,andthereislittle
    roomfornationalpolicyinitiativesintheeconomicsector.
    Inthesecuritysector,theevidenceregardingstateinternationalisationisambiguous.For
    instance,thepolicehaveremainedrelativelyresistanttointernationalinfluences.Thanksto
    internationalreformprojectsbyIPTFandEUPM,therehasbeenanadaptationofworking
    routinestointernationalpolicingstandards.Thecreationofnewcentral-stateinstitutions
    suchastheStateBorderServiceandtheStateInvestigationandProtectionAgency,which
    arecompatiblewithinternationalstructures,canalsobeseenasformsofinternationalisation
    ofthepoliceinBosnia.However,localinterestsandresistancehavelimitedreformsofthe
    corepoliceapparatusesintheentitiesandcantons.Theinternationalactorshavebeen
    unabletoenforcethemodel,envisionedbytheHR,ofcentralisedpoliceforceswithentity-
    crossingoperationaldistricts.
    Themilitarysector,bycontrast,isalmostcompletelyinternationalised.Theformofthe
    militaryapparatus–itsoperationalorganisation,equipment,trainingandsoon–hasbeen
    adaptedtoNATOstandardsinthecourseoftheaccessionprocesstothePartnershipfor
    Peaceprogramme.Theroleofthemilitarywithinthestatehasalsobeeninternationalised:it
    haschangedfromthatofanethno-nationaldefendertothatofapost-modern,multilateral
    19 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    peacebuilder.Internationalandlocalactorsalikepromotethisnewrole,theformerbecause
    theyhopeforpositiveeffectsfromthecommonparticipationofsoldiersfromallthree
    ethno-nationalgroupsininternationalinterventions,thelatterbecausetheywanttoshow
    thatBosniaisreadyforequalandresponsiblemembershipintheinternationalcommunityof
    sovereignstates.
    Thethirdformofinternationalisationinthemilitarysectoristheoutsourcingofitssecurity
    anddefencefunctiontointernationaltroops.Althoughlessthanonequarterofthe
    populationfearsanotheroutbreakofwariftheinternationalsecurityforceswithdraw(Early
    WarningSystem2007),mostlocalactorsstilldonotseethestateasacentralguarantorof
    securityinthecountry,preferringtorelyontheinternationalcivilandmilitaryagenciesin
    thisrespect.
    Intheareaoflaw,theinternationalisationoftheBosnianstatecanbedetected,firstly,inthe
    functionoflawproduction.AccordingtotheDaytonPeaceAgreement,theEuropean
    HumanRightsConventionisdirectlyapplicabletoBosniaandhaspriorityoverallotherlaws.
    Additionally,Bosniahassigneduptootherinternationalhumanrightstreaties,makingthe
    stateformallyaccountabletothehigheststandardsofinternationallyrecogniseduniversal
    rights.Furthermore,theinternationalagenciesinBosniahaveinfluencedthelaw-making
    processbydraftingoradvisingonthecreationofnewlaws.Inthefirstphaseof
    intervention,theOHRwasthemostimportantlocusofsuchactivities;latertheEUandits
    Copenhagencriteriacametobeastrongincentiveforlawproduction,leadingtoahigh
    degreeofinternationalisationofthelaw-makingprocess.
    Secondly,thefunctionoflawimplementationandenforcementhasbeeninternationalised.
    Thisisnotonlythecaseinareassuchasinternationalcriminallawwheretheindictmentof
    warcriminalsbytheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia(ICTY)inThe
    Hagueisavisibleformofinternationalinterference.Thedeploymentofjudges,prosecutors
    andjudicialexpertstoBosnia’scourtshasalsoensuredanatleastpartialinfluenceof
    internationalactorsandnormsonthefunctioningofthejudicialsystem.Leewayforlocal
    interpretationsandroomformanoeuvreremainlimited.
    Fromaninternationalstatebuilder’sperspective,theinternationalisationoftheBosnianstate
    isapositivething,aslongasitleadstotheestablishmentofstateinstitutionswhose
    capacityandlegitimacycontributetoaconsolidationofthestateasanintermediarybetween
    theinternationallevelandthelocalsociety,abletoproceedandimplementinternationally
    producednormsandvalues.ButtheinternationalisedBosnianstate’scapacityandlegitimacy
    haveremainedhighlyprecarious,callingintoquestionthesebasicpremisesofstate-building.
    Limitedstatecapacity
    Statecapacitymeansbeingabletosetandenforcebindingrules.Theidealforamodern
    stateistohavesupremacyover,andautonomyfrom,allgroupsofsociety,withanall-
    encompassingregulatorycapacityandnoparticulargroupsareabletoeludestate
    regulations.Acorepreconditionforstatecapacityisresources–revenues,aboveall,butalso
    trainedpersonnelandfunctioningworkingroutines.
    StatecapacityinBosniahasremainedlimitedbyactorsatboththeinternationalandthe
    locallevels.Inareasinwhichthestateishighlyinternationalisedandhastosubmittothe
    rulesoftheinterventionagencies,thestateisdecoupledfromthelocalpoliticalprocess.This
    isespeciallyvisibleintheshiftofthestate’sreferenceofaccountabilityfromthesocietalto
    theinternationallevel.TheconsentandcontrolofpublicbudgetsbytheIFIsonthepremise
    ofeconomicneoliberalism,theinternationalisationoftheformandfunctionsofthemilitary
    anditsdefinedroleaspost-modernpeacebuilder,andthepriorityofinternationalover
    nationallawsandcustomsareexamplesofthisdynamic.Theseinternationallydetermined
    rulesdonotleavemuchleewayforalternativenationalpolitics.
    20 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    Inareasthatarelessinternationalised,bycontrast,thereareindicationsofstaterule
    becominglessformalisedandofthestate-buildingprojectbecomingderailedinthecourse
    ofconflicts,negotiationsandcompromisesbetweenthediverseinternationalandnational
    actors.Thecircumventionofrigidbudgetaryreformsviainformalfinancingpractices,political
    actors’informalstrategiestokeeptheircontroloverthepolice,aswellasthenumerous
    practicesbystateagentstointerprettheofteninternationally-dictatedrulesandcategories
    ofadministrationintheirfavouraresomeexamplesofthetendenciesofstate
    informalisation.26 Theeffectoftheseinformalpracticesisthatthestate’sautonomyfrom
    politicalandsocialinfluenceshasremainedlimitedandtheinternationallysupportedstate
    façadehasnotbeenbackedupwiththelegal-rationalformsofrulethataretheprimary
    sourceoflegitimacyinamodernstate.
    Thelimitsofstateautonomywithregardtopowerfulelitesaremostvisibleregardingthe
    policeatthelevelofentitiesandcantons.Despitevisibleadvancementsinpolice
    performanceandalthoughtheyarenolongerasethnicisedasduringthewar,thepoliceare
    stillpoliticisedandtendtoservepoliticalleadersratherthancitizens,providingpowerful
    politicalandeconomicactorswiththeleewaytocircumventthelaw.Thisalsohas
    implicationsforthejudicialsystem.Althoughrelativelyautonomousfrompoliticalandsocial
    influencestoday,thejudiciary’sabilitytotakeactionagainstpowerfulpoliticalandeconomic
    actorsremainslimitedbythelatter’sinfluenceonpoliceandpublicprosecution.
    Itisnotonlypowerfuleliteswholimitthestate’sautonomy.Thereisamutualdependency
    betweenassociationsofwarveterans,invalidsandfamiliesoffallensoldiersontheone
    hand,andpoliticalpartiesontheother,thatwasestablishedduringthewartoensurethe
    internalcoherenceofthewarparties.Thismutualdependencyisthereasonwhybigpartsof
    thestate’ssocialexpendituresflowtowardstheseclientswho,duetotheirnumerical
    strengthandmoralweight,areabletoexertinfluenceonpoliticalelites.Althoughthese
    kindsofnetworkshavebeenweakened,theproblemisthattherearefewalternativestofill
    thevoidthisleaves.27
    Aslongasthesocio-economicsituationinBosniaremainsprecarious,anysocialreforms
    mightdestabilisethenascentandstillpoliticallyandsociallycontestedstate.Policies
    cushioningthemid-termnegativeeffectsofnecessarystructuralreformsinthesocialsector,
    suchastheprovisionofworktounemployedwarveteransbylocalcommunitiesinorderto
    cushioncut-backsinwelfaretransfers,arefeasiblebutcostlyandwoulddependonthe
    consentoftheinternationalactorsinBosnia.Unsurprisingly,theIFIs’coreprioritiesuntilnow
    havebeen:economicgrowth,realisedbyrelyingalmostentirelyoncreatingastablebusiness
    environment,andstrictdisciplineoverthepublicbudget–astrategythathasprovedtobe
    insufficientasameansofexpandingthelabourmarket(Pugh2007);thereductionof
    poverty(UNDPBosnia2007);andstrengtheningofthewelfaresystem.
    Localpolicyinitiatives–suchas(limited)protectionismorstateemploymentintheindustrial
    andagriculturalsector(seePugh2008)–havebeensystematicallyblocked.Forexample,an
    attemptbyBosnianactorstoincludeaninterimtariffprotectionforagriculturalgoodsinthe
    PovertyReductionStrategyPaper–inordertostrengthentheprecariousagriculturalsector
    whichisanimportantpartoftheBosnianlabourmarket–wasblockedbytheIFIs.Likewise,
    Bosnianparliamentarians’concernsthattheintroductionofasingle-ratevalue-addedtax
    wouldadverselyaffectthepoorweredismissedbytheinternationalactors(Bliesemannde
    Guevara2008b).Thisdeepinternationalisationoftheeconomicspherehasstronglylimited
    theBosnianstate’sroomformanoeuvre.

    26.Onthepowergamesevolvingaroundbureaucraticcategorisations,seeVetters2007.
    27.Ontheroleofwarveterans,seeBojičić-Dželilović (2006),Bougarel(2007),Grandits(2007),Gregson
    (2000).
    21 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    Lackofstatelegitimacy
    Aseconddimensionofthemodernstateisitssocialembeddednessandlegitimacy.
    Functionally,statesgenerateacertaindegreeoflegitimacybyprovidingbasicformsof
    securityandwelfare.Beyondthat,themodernstateisideallycharacterisedbyaservice-
    oriented,impersonalbureaucracyandastrongandimpartiallegalsystem.Fromthislegal-
    rationalfunctioningitcanthenderivefurtherlegitimacy.Indeed,onlyifpeopleacceptand
    makeuseofstateinstitutionscantheinstitutionalisationofstaterulebeenduring.
    Intheinternationalisedsecuritysector,thecontainmentofethnicviolencehasbeen
    conducivetoacertainbasiclegitimacyofthestate–regardlessofthequestionofwhether
    nationalorinternationalactorsprovidefortheenforcementofthemonopolyofviolence.
    Beyondthisverybasiclevelhowever,itisdifficulttojudgetheextenttowhichthereformed
    andpartlycentralisedapparatusesofthemilitaryandpoliceareseenaslegitimateby
    Bosniancitizensandthesecurityforcesthemselves.Enduringethno-nationaldifferences
    withinthecentralisedArmedForces(AFBiH)aswellasthelastingpoliticisationandpetty
    corruptionofthepolicegivereasontosupposethattheconsolidationprocessofthesecurity
    apparatusesofBosniahasnotyetbeencompleted.
    Thecurrentchancesoftheeconomicsectorservingasapossiblesourceoflegitimacyforthe
    statearenothigh.Forthemajorityofthepopulation,internationalstate-buildinghasnot
    resultedintheirpersonaleconomicsituationsimproving,andsocio-economicprospects
    remainlimited.Atthesametime,therehavebeencutbacksinthewelfaresectorwhich,
    despiteitsdeficienciesandinequalities,hadatleastservedasamomentarycushionagainst
    distress.TheIFIshaveespeciallycriticisedtransferstodisabledwarveterans,whichin2004
    amountedto66percentoftotalwelfarespending(althoughsinglepaymentsweresmall
    andoftenirregular),therebyconstrainingthebudgetsofsocialprogrammesforotherneedy
    butlesspoliticallyimportantgroupssuchaschildrenandtheelderly(UNDPBosnia2007,
    WorldBank2002).
    Asoutlinedabove,Bosnia’seconomic,financialandfiscalpolicieshavebeendeterminedby
    internationalactors,theneoliberalintervention’sfiscalfocushasbeenonadjustmentsand
    austerity,andthemodusofreformshasoftenbeentechnocraticanddecoupledfromlocal
    concernsandinitiatives.ThishasleftthestateofBosniawithlittleleewayfornegotiation
    processeswithlocalinterestgroups,fortheconsiderationofsociety’sdemandsorthe
    developmentofalternativeeconomicstrategies,contributingtotheimpressionofa
    powerlessstateanddecreasingthelegitimacythatflowsfromastate’sgoodeconomic
    performance.
    Regardingthelegal-rationalfunctionofthestate,itappearsthattherearestructurallimits
    tostate-building.Firstly,theconsolidationofamodernpublicadministrationhasremained
    incomplete.Despitetheall-encompassinginternationalreformproject,personalrelationships
    arestillveryimportanttoeverydaybureaucraticpractices–havinginfluentialconnections
    remainsthemostimportantcriterionintheinteractionbetweencitizensandthestate.The
    enduranceofpersonalrelationsindicatesthefailureofattemptstoseparatethepublicand
    privatespheres.Thereasonsforthisarestructuralratherthanpersonal:thelegal-rational
    formsofstate-societyinteractiondonotresonatewithallstateofficialsyet,notleast
    becauselowpaymentsencouragecorruptionandrecruitmentquotasputethnicityover
    merit.Thenegativedailyencountersthatcitizenshavewithcorruptorinefficientstate
    officials,ontheotherhand,fostertheirimpressionthatpersonalconnectionsremainthe
    bestwayofensuringthattheirdemandstothestateareprocessedintheirfavour.28
    State-societyrelationsinBosniaarealsocharacterisedbythelastingsignificanceofthethree
    ethno-nationalcollectives.Thishaspersistedinpost-wartimesandhasbeenfurther

    28.OncorruptioninBosniaseeDivjakandPugh(2008),TransparencyInternational(2004),Transparency
    InternationalBosnia(2004).
    22 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    institutionalisedbytheinternationalactorswhohavebasedtheDaytonpower-sharing
    systemandmanyoftheirlaterreformsonthefundamentalideaofthreeseparatepopulation
    groups.Throughtheinternationally-backedconstitutionalcourt’sdecisiononthe‘three
    constituentpeoples’ofBosnia,ethno-nationalquotasbecamethegeneralprincipleofstate
    organisation(Bieber2004,InternationalCrisisGroup2002).Thebackgroundtothisisthe
    internationalactors’wishtorestoreamultiethnicsocietybutitignoresthefactthatevenin
    YugoslavtimesBosnia’sallegedmulticulturalismcameclosertoa‘pluralmono-culturalism’
    (Sen2006)thatwaslargelylimitedtoaneighbourlycoexistence,givingwaytoamodern,
    individualisedidealofnationalcitizenshiponlyinthesmallurbanmiddleclassandsmall
    partsoftheworkingclass(Bougarel1996,2003).
    Giventheinstitutionalisationofethnicdivisionsthroughtheprocessofstate-building,itis
    likelythatcollectiveorganisationwillcontinuetostandinthewayofanindividualisationof
    societyasthebasisforlegal-rationalstaterule.Attemptsbyinternationalactorsto
    contributetoanintegrationofthethreeethno-nationalcollectivesthroughsymbolicpolitics
    –through,forexample,thecreationofBosnia’sstatesymbolssuchastheBosniannational
    flagandanthem–havenotsucceededinovercomingtheethno-nationaldifferences(Kostic
    2007).Ina2005survey,only9.8percentoftheBosnianCroatsand2.5oftheBosnian
    SerbssaidtheywereproudofBosnia’snationalsymbols,comparedwith79.2percentofthe
    Bosniaks(ibid).Thesefindingsconfirmtheimpressionthatnation-building–thecreationof
    affectivebondsbetweenstateandpopulation–cannotbeinitiatedbyexternalactorsbut
    mustcomefromwithin.
    23 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    Conclusions:somethoughtsonfutureforeignpolicyformulation
    Afteradecadeofstate-buildinginBosnia,itishightimeweassessedtheadvantagesand
    limitationsofthisinternationalapproach.Theanalysispresentedherepointstothe
    importantstructurallimitstostate-buildingthatshouldbetakenintoaccountinfuture
    foreignpolicyformulationandtothegenerallessonsthatcanbelearnedfromthecaseof
    state-buildinginBosnia.
    Firstly,thetransferofnewinstitutionsbuiltupbytheinterveningagenciesintolocalhands
    exposesthemaindilemmaofinternationalstate-building,regardlessofthestrategyapplied.
    Manyofthe‘operative’strategiesareveryeffectiveandexercisegoodcontrolofreformsbut
    theyalsoimpedelocalownership,hinderingthedevelopmentofstatecapacityand
    legitimacy.Meanwhile,‘conditional’strategiesaredesignedtofacilitatelocalinitiativeand
    capacityandtogeneratelegitimacybylettinglocalactorstakethefinaldecisionsbutwhere
    theyinvolveconditionalitiesthatarestrongandinflexible,theireffectsonstatecapacityand
    legitimacytendtobejustlikethoseofoperativestrategies.Theymayevenhelpwestern
    statebuilderstoevaderesponsibilityfortheoutcomeoftheirinterventions(e.g.Chandler
    2006).Whereconditionalitiesareweak,bycontrast,localactorscandecidetoignorethem,
    whichmeansthatlegitimacymightbehighbutstatestructureswilldivergefrom
    internationalmodels.Inanycase,theresultsofstate-buildingwillfallshortofnormative
    expectations–whichshouldthereforebeadjustedtothestructurallylimitedpossibilitiesof
    state-building.
    Thiscouldbeachievedthroughaparadigmshiftinwesternpeace-buildingpoliciesaway
    fromtheconcentrationonmeans(thatis,institution-buildingandliberalisationaccordingto
    westernmodels)towardsafocusonends:theglobalprovisionofsecurityandeconomic
    welfare.Fromthisperspective,theremightbeseveralwaystoreachthesameeffect–a
    possibilitythathasbeenexcludedfromthestate-buildingdiscoursesofar(seePughetal
    2008).Ascriticalstudiesonwar-torncountriessuggest,forexample,non-stateactors’
    provisionsofsecurityandeconomicwelfaremightinsomecasesorareasbebettersuitedto
    meetthesocio-economicneedsofthepeoplethaninternationally-dictatedstatestrategies.
    Insuchsituations,insistingontheestablishmentofcentralisedstatestructuresaccordingto
    thewesternmodelimperilsexistingsocialarrangements,leadingtomoreuncertaintyand
    insecurityandunderminingtheintervention’saimofstabilisingthestate(seeKühn2009).
    Whilethehistoricalprocessofstate-formationintheWesthasledtoapacificationof
    societalrelationsonlyaftersocialhardshipswereinstitutionallyovercome,contingent
    modernisationprocessesinothersocietiesmightwellopposetheideaofauniversalisationof
    thewesternstate.
    Secondly,economicandfinancialinterventionstrategies,andtheireffectsonthesocio-
    economicsituationofthecountryconcerned,arearguablyacruxofstate-building.Onthe
    onehand,theweakeningofpowerfulelitesbylimitingtheavailabilityoffinancialresources
    createsthebasisforformalstateinstitutionalisation.Ontheotherhand,however,thestate’s
    possibilitiesforbuildingupcapacityandautonomyarelimitedbyinternationally-defined
    budgetconstraints.Yetheavilysubsidisingthecentralstatewouldnotofferawayoutofthis
    dilemmabecausethiswouldfostertheproblemsofrent-basedstaterule,ascaseslike
    Afghanistansuggest.Thetax-orientedapproachtakeninBosniaisalsolimited:althoughthe
    internationalinterventionhasbeenabletoerectcentral-statetaxagencies,theeconomic
    interventionhasnotachievedasustainedstrengtheningofthestate’sextractionand
    distributioncapacity.TheBosnianstateistrappedinaviciouscircleoflimiteddomestic
    revenuesources,acostlywelfaresysteminneedofreform,adisappointedpopulationanda
    tightfinancialandpoliticalframeworklargelycontrolledbytheinternationalcommunity.
    Therecentglobalfinancialcrisisandrecessionhaveclearlydemonstratedthatwar-torn
    societiesareespeciallyvulnerabletotheupsanddownsoftheworldeconomy.Althoughthe
    24 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

    Bosnianfinancesectorwasnotdeeplyaffectedbythe‘casinocollapse’duetoitslimited
    integrationintotheglobalfinancialmarket,thetradeandservicesectorsexperiencedthe
    effectsofrecessionintheformoffallingdemand.Remittances–formanyfamiliesa
    financiallifeline–arealsoexpectedtofall.RethinkingtheEU’svisaregimefortheSoutheast
    Europeancountrieswouldbeagoodfirststepinaddressingthelatterpoint–toincludeall
    countriesintheregioninthemid-terminordertoavoidfurthereconomicdisparitiesand
    politicalanimositiesintheregion.
    Theaimofareformedpeace-buildingpolitics,notleastfromanethicalangle,shouldbeto
    savepost-conflictsocieties–whosevulnerabilitytotheupsanddownsoftheworldmarket
    is,atleastpartially,aneffectoftheveryliberaleconomicstructuresdictatedbythe
    interveningagencies–fromtherisksinherentintheglobaleconomy.Therefore,areformed
    peace-buildingstrategywillhavetofocusnotonlyonconcreteinterventionstrategies,but
    alsoonstructuralconstraintstothedevelopmentandsecurityofpost-warsocietiesposedby
    thecontemporarystructuresandinstitutionsoftheworldeconomy.AsPughetal state:
    Aparadigmshiftwouldinvolveinterrogationofthewayinwhichthe
    globalsystemexacerbatesthesubalternstatusofwar-tornsocieties
    (alreadyreinforcedbyovertviolence)andadvocateacommensurately
    greaterfocusontheoutsideofthepost-conflictsociety,ontheneedfor
    far-reachingtransformationofthestructuresandinstitutionsthat
    determinewhatmightbetermed‘thelimitsofpotential’forhuman
    securityinwar-tornsocietiesasawhole.(2008:395)
    Thatmeanssubstitutingthepoliticsofliberalstate-buildingwithapoliticsofwelfare-state-
    building.
    Therearenumerouspolicymeasuresthatmightpromotesuchawelfare-stateapproach.How
    appropriatetheyareultimatelydependsonthespecificcase.Forexample,oneofthekeysto
    breaktheviciouseconomiccircleinBosniadescribedabovecouldbemassivejobcreation
    throughlong-termemploymentstrategiesbyanactivestate.Throughanexpansionofthe
    formallabourmarket,unemploymentandinformalsectoractivitiescouldbereduced,the
    taxpayerbasisenhanced,andconsumptionandtherebyindirecttaxlevelslifted.Thatwould
    resultinanexpansionofstatecapacity,andtheoutputefficiencywouldproducediffuse
    supportofthepoliticalsystemonthesideofthepopulationinthelongrun.
    TheinternationalagenciesinBosnia,bycontrast,havemerelyfocusedonthecreationofa
    favourableprivatebusinessenvironment.Yetitisthecountry’soligarchythatwouldhavethe
    meanstoinvest,andtheyhavebecomeuninterestedintheproductionandinfrastructure
    sectors.Insuchasituation,moreactivestateinvolvementseemsnecessarytospureconomic
    developmentandcreateworkingopportunities.Internationalpeace-buildingstrategies
    shouldconsidernon-neoliberalmeasures–suchasinterimformsofprotectionismorthe
    fosteringofstateenterprisesandcommunityproperty–aspossiblealternativestothe
    neoliberalapproach.Inwar-tornsocieties,suchpoliciespromisetobemoresuitablethanthe
    IFIs’neoliberalone-size-fits-allmodels.
    Finally,policymakersshouldbeawarethatstate-buildingisfacedwith,andcauses,many
    problemswithoutsolutions.Understandingthesestructuraldilemmasisthebasisonwhich
    toconsciouslydecidewhichofseveralsub-optimalpoliticalalternativestochooseunder
    whichpremises,andwhatconsequencestobear.Takingthelessonsofstate-buildingin
    Bosniaseriouslydoesnotmeandisengagementfromzonesofcrisis.Itmeansrealistically
    rethinkingtheunachievablenormativeaimsofinternationalstate-buildingandsubstituting
    themwithpoliticalalternativesthatarelessself-referentialandmoregearedtothesecurity
    andwelfareoflocalpopulations.Thiscouldmeanthatthestatesbeingbuiltdifferfromthe
    westernmodel;however,itmightbeworthdeliberatingonalternativelocalgovernance
    modelsthatcouldprovetobemorelegitimateandeffectiveintheeyesoftheirsocieties.
    25 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonpeace-buildinginBosniaandHerzegovina

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