University of Calgary Press Canadian Association of Latin American and Caribbean Studies

University of Calgary Press
Canadian Association of Latin American and Caribbean Studies

PARTY-SOCIETY LINKAGES AND DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA
Author(s): KENNETH M. ROBERTS
Source: Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revue canadienne des
tudes latino-amricaines et carabes, Vol. 27, No. 53, Special Issue on Democracy in Latin
America (2002), pp. 9-34
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PARTY-SOCIETY LINKAGES AND
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN
LATIN AMERICA
KENNETH M. ROBERTS
University
of New Mexico
Abstract.
Although
it is often said that there is a crisis of
party systems
and
political representation
in Latin
America,
it
may
be more accurate to assert that a
transition is
underway
from some
types
of
partisan representation
to others. This
transition is best understood
by exploring party-society linkages
and their trans-
formation over time. Five
types
of
party-society linkage
are
identified,
along
with
the social and economic
changes
that have undermined
encapsulating
and
pro-
grammatic linkages
while
buttressing
those based on
political brokerage, personal
appeal,
and
political marketing.
The net effect of these
changes
is to
produce
political parties
that are more detached from
organized
social constituencies and
more individualized and
contingent
in their
patterns
of affiliation.
Rsum. Bien
que
l'on ait souvent l'occasion d'affirmer
que
le
systme
de
partis
et la
reprsentation politique
en
Amrique
latine est en
crise,
il serait
plus
exact de
dire
que
certains
types
de
reprsentation
sont en voie de transition. L' tude des
liaisons
partis-socit
et de leur transformation au fil du
temps permet
de mieux
comprendre
ce
phnomne.
On
peut
ainsi
dgager cinq types
de liaisons ainsi
que
les
changements conomiques
et sociaux
qui
ont affaibli celles
qui
ont trait aux
programmes
et aux formules tout en
renforant
celles
qui
sont axes sur les
tractations
politiques,
l'attrait
personnel
et le
marketing politique.
Ces
changements
ont directement contribu la cration de
partis politiques
moins lis des lectorats
socialement
organiss,
mais bien
plus
individualiss et
contingents quant
leur
mode d'affiliation.
Canadian Journal of
Latin American and Caribbean Studies
,
Vol.
27,
No. 53
(2002):
9-34
9
10 CJLACS / RCELAC 27/53 2002
Introduction
As elected officials
replaced military
dictators across most of Latin
America in the
1980s,
it seemed as if
they
had
barely
taken the oath of
office before scholars
began
to lament the "crisis of
political represen-
tation" that
plagued
the
region's fledgling
democratic
regimes.1
The
manifestations of this crisis were
legion, including
voter
abstention,
declining partisan
identification,
electoral
volatility,
the rise of inde-
pendent
candidates and
"anti-politics"
outsiders,
and the demise of
traditional
political parties
as well as
secondary
associations like la-
bour unions.2 Since
political parties
are
widely recognized
to be the
primary intermediary
institutions between citizens and the state under
democratic
regimes,3 they
were often held accountable for this al-
leged
crisis of
representation. Although
some scholars claimed to find
evidence of
increasing party system
institutionalization in the
region,4
there was a
growing
sentiment over the course of the 1990s that
party
systems
were
failing
in a number of countries and that their deficien-
cies
posed
formidable
problems
for the
quality
and
stability
of democ-
racy
in the
region.5
Is there a crisis of
in Latin America? If
so,
to what extent is it attributable to the
failings
of
political parties?
While
intuitively appealing, given
the turmoil that exists in
many
Latin Ameri-
can
party systems,
the notion of a crisis of
representation
is
overly
simplistic.
Political
representation,
after
all,
can assume a number of
different
forms,
and
parties
have
performed
a
variety
of social and
political
functions. A crisis in a
particular
mode of
political represen-
tation or a certain
type
of
party organization
does not
necessarily
im-
ply
a more
generalized
crisis of
representation.
What
may actually
be
occurring
is a shift
away
from one mode of
representation
to
another,
with distinctive institutional features and societal
linkages.
To understand such a
process
of transformation
requires
a more
systematic analysis
of the different
ways
in which
parties represent
citizens in democratic contexts
-
that
is,
how
they
articulate societal
interests,
aggregate groups
and
individuals,
and mobilize
support
in a
competitive
electoral arena. In
short,
it
requires
that
parties
be
analyzed
in the social milieu in which
they compete.
This
departs
from much of
the
contemporary
literature on
political parties
in Latin
America,
which
has
placed greater emphasis
on the institutional environs of
partisan
competition. Certainly,
the
design
of electoral rules and the structure
Roberts /
Party-Society Linkages
1 1
of
legislative-executive
relations can
shape
the contours of
party sys-
tems, including
the number of
parties
in
any particular
national
system
and the nature of the
competition among
them.6 But institutional
ap-
proaches
do not tell us
enough
about how different kinds of
parties
relate to social
actors,
nor do
they explain
how these
relationships
are
modified as
parties'
structural foundations are
reconfigured by
the
forces of social and economic
change.
If
parties
are in
crisis,
it is be-
cause
they
are detached from their social
moorings,
and such detach-
ment can
only
be understood
by
means of an assessment of
party-
society linkages
and their evolution over time.
This
paper attempts
such an assessment of Latin American
party
systems.
It
argues
that
economic, social,
and
technological changes
have altered the
political
functions
performed by party organizations
and transformed their societal
linkages.
The
paper develops
a
typol-
ogy
of
linkage patterns
and
suggests
that modes of
representation
based
on durable
encapsulating
and
programmatic linkages
between
parties
and social
groups
have been
displaced by
a
variety
of more
contingent
and individualized
linkages.
In a social
landscape
that is
increasingly
structured
by
market
relationships,
the mass
media,
and a
globalized
consumer
culture,
ideological
and
group-based patterns
of
political
representation
that
emerged during
the
import-substitution
industri-
alization
(ISI)
era of
development
have entered into
crisis,
while mar-
keting-based
modes of
representation
that are tailored to individual
preferences
have risen to
prominence.
More than a crisis or failure of
representation,
what has occurred is a fundamental transformation of
the character of
political representation.
This transformation has
pro-
duced a
new,
more fluid
political
matrix that
corresponds
to a social
landscape
dominated
by
market individualism and a
generalized
depoliticization
of
society.
Parties and
Democracy
in Latin America
Political
parties
are
easy
to
vilify. By
definition,
they represent only
part
of the
body politic,
which
they inevitably
lead into conflict with
other
parts. They
are self-interested actors who
pursue political power
while
cloaking
their
particular
interests behind the veil of the
public
good.
When
overly strong, they
are assailed for
monopolizing
the
state,
subordinating
civil
society,
and
concentrating authority
in
self-repro-
ducing
bureaucratic enclaves.7 When
overly
weak,
they
are criticized
for
inadequately representing
societal
interests,
allowing
de facto eco-
nomic or
military powers
to dominate the
political process, failing
to
establish a
programmatic
and
legislative agenda, undermining
the
pros-
pects
for
policy
reform,
and
failing
to hold elected officials account-
able to their constituents.8 In
public opinion surveys, parties typically
rank as the least
respected
of the
major
institutions in Latin American
societies. It is
hardly surprising,
then,
that
independent
mavericks can
often make a
political
career out of
attacking
the
party-based political
establishment or
partyarchy.
Nevertheless,
no modern democratic
regime
has ever functioned
without
political parties.
The closest
approximation
was
probably
Peru
in the
1990s,
where neither
governing
nor
opposition parties played
a
significant
role in the
political process.9
The
degeneration
of Peruvian
democracy
under the autocratic rule of Alberto
Fujimori,
however,
hardly augurs
well for the
prospects
of
creating
a
partyless
democ-
racy.
Parties remain central actors for
articulating
and
aggregating
societal
interests,
structuring
electoral and
programmatic
alternatives,
co-ordinating legislation, recruiting
candidates for
public
office,
and
holding
them accountable once
they
have been
elected,
all functions
that are vital to the
healthy operation
of a democratic
regime.
Indeed,
the Latin American
experience
over the
past
two decades
suggests
that
democracy
is
endangered
where there is severe instabil-
ity
in
party systems.
Table I
provides comparative
data on electoral
discontinuity
in Latin American
party systems during
the most recent
wave of democratization between 1978 and
1999,
measured as the net
shift in vote shares for all of a nation's
political parties
between the
first and last national elections
during
this time
period.
The table dem-
onstrates that there are
striking
differences in the
stability
of
party
systems
across the
region.
Whereas countries like Honduras and Costa
Rica
experienced virtually
no
change
in relative vote shares
during
this time
period,
other nations like
Peru, Ecuador,
and Venezuela wit-
nessed the
collapse
of the
party systems
that
began
the
period
and the
emergence
of an
entirely
new set of
(often non-partisan)
electoral ref-
erents.
Notably,
these latter three cases are the
only
countries in the
region
that
experienced
a definitive
rupture
in their democratic
regime
during
the
1990s,10
and in all three cases the democratic breakdown
followed the demise of the
party system.
This does not
necessarily
imply
that the
collapse
of
party systems
is a direct cause of democratic
Roberts /
1 3
breakdown;
it is
possible
that
party system
demise is
merely
a
symp-
tom of a broader crisis of democratic institutions that is attributable to
other
factors,
such as economic
mismanagement
or
egregious politi-
cal
corruption.
Nevertheless,
the association
suggests
that turmoil in
party systems
-
or a
generalized incapacity
of
parties
to articulate
societal
interests,
address
outstanding problems,
and
reproduce
their
electoral
support
-
is a
powerful
indicator of a crisis in democratic
governance.
Table 1
Net Electoral
Discontinuity
in Latin American
Party Systems,
1978-1999*
Presidential
Legislative Average
Country
Elections Elections
Discontinuity
% % %
Peru 93.7 85.8 89.8
Ecuador 88.8 77.5 82.8
Venezuela 82.2 51.1 66.7
Nicaragua
59.9 55.6 57.8
Brazil 70.2 40.8 55.5
Bolivia 48.8 39.2 44.0
Dominican
Republic
38.1 35.9 37.0
Mexico 29.4 34.4 31.9
Panama 31.7 21.2 26.5
Argentina
26.8 25.2 26.0
Uruguay
23.6 22.3 23.0
Colombia 31.0 12.0 21.5
Chile 22.2 16.6 19.4
Paraguay
21.3 13.2 17.3
Costa Rica 6.4 6.9 6.7
Honduras 2.3 2.8 2.6
*Calculated as the net shift in vote shares for all the
parties
in the
party system
from the first to the last election
during
the
period
from 1978 to 1999.
In
short,
despite
the
proliferation
of new social
movements,
non-
governmental organizations,
and other
non-partisan agents
of interest
articulation,
parties
remain vital intermediaries between citizens and
the state under democratic
regimes.
There is no
consensus, however,
on how
parties perform
their
intermediary
functions or what balance
they
maintain between their societal and statist orientations. In
part,
this is attributable to variation in
patterns
of intermediation across
space
and time. Classic
sociological approaches
treated
European par-
ties as direct
expressions
of social
cleavages
and the
group-based
in-
terests and identities that
they spawned.11
In Latin America and other
developing regions,
however,
party systems
were less
clearly grounded
in such structural divisions.12 More
recently,
as social
cleavages
and
the bonds
linking parties
to social
groups
have loosened in
Europe
and
elsewhere,
scholars have
portrayed parties
as collusive
governing
cartels that are entrenched in state institutions and
dependent
on state
resources.13 In this latter
approach, parties' linkages
to
society
are
understood to be shallow and tenuous.
Clearly, party-society linkages
can
vary
across
nations,14
across
different
parties
within the same national
political system,
or over time
for a
given party
as
social, economic,
and
alter
the
landscape
on which it
competes.
As
linkages change,
so does the
character of
A
conceptual mapping
of differ-
ent
linkage patterns
is thus
necessary
to understand how
changes
in
party-society linkages
have transformed
in
contemporary
Latin America.
Reconceptualizing Party-Society Linkages
Party systems
are
generally categorized according
to their number of
competing
units
(or parties)
and/or their
ideological makeup.15
More
recently, Mainwaring
and
Scully
have
developed
a
typology
of Latin
American
party systems
based on their level of institutionalization.16
But to understand the
alleged
crisis of
in Latin
America,
categorization
based on the nature of
party-society linkages
has a number of
advantages,
as it makes it
possible
to
identify
the
different
ways
in which
parties
mobilize
support
and how these evolve
in
response
to societal
change.
Previous efforts to
conceptualize
dif-
ferent
patterns
of
have contributed
greatly
to
scholarly understanding
of
party systems,17 yet they
do not exhaust
the
range
of
possible linkages
or
fully specify
the dimensions
along
which
linkage patterns vary.
The discussion that follows builds on
pre-
vious work in order to extend its
range
of
application, particularly
within the Latin American
region.
Roberts /
1 5
Party-society linkages vary along
several
important
dimensions,
including
their level of association and their
degree
of
contingency.
Association can occur at the individual
level,
when a citizen decides to
join
or vote for a
party organization,
or at a collective
level,
when
citizens
acquire
a formal or de facto association with a
party by
virtue
of their
membership
in a
party-affiliated
social
group
or
organization,
such as a labour
union,
peasant
federation,
or ethnic
group.
Likewise,
linkages vary widely
in their
permanence
or
contingency.
For some
individuals or
groups,
association with a
party
is soldered
by deep-
seated
ideological
commitments,
political
identities,
and
organizational
bonds.
Linkages
based on such durable
loyalties carry
over from one
electoral
cycle
to another
-
indeed,
they may
be
passed
on from one
family generation
to another
-
and
they
are
rarely
severed in the ab-
sence of serious
political
trauma. For other individuals or
groups,
how-
ever,
linkages may
be
temporary
and
conditional,
as
they
are
forged
during specific (generally
electoral) political conjunctures
and
may
not
withstand a
poor governing performance by
the
party,
a shift in its
policy
stance,
the rise of new
competitors,
or a
change
in the issue
agenda.
Where such
contingent linkages prevail,
voters do not
ap-
proach
a new electoral
cycle
as
loyalists
with
pre-determined partisan
preferences;
instead,
they
are free
agents
who
shop
around for a
party
or candidate that strikes a
responsive
chord in the
prevailing political
conjuncture.
These dimensions are
readily apparent
in the
typology
of
linkage
patterns developed
below. The
typology
identifies five
ideal-type
modes
of
linkage
that are
logically
distinct and
independently
sufficient to
mobilize
support
in the electoral arena. The five modes of
linkage
are
jointly
exhaustive,
but
they
are not
mutually
exclusive;
that
is,
every
party
is assumed to
employ
at least one of these
linkage patterns
to
mobilize
political support,
but reliance on one does not
preclude
the
utilization of others. The existence of
multiple
or cumulative
linkages
is an indicator of
deeper,
and
presumably stronger,
bonds between
parties
and citizens.
Political
Brokerage
and Patron-Clientelism
Arguably
the oldest and most
pervasive
mode of
in Latin America is
patron-clientelism,
or what I will call
political
bro-
kerage, following
the lead of Arturo Valenzuela.18
Brokerage
entails
an
exchange
of selective material benefits for
political support;
as
Lawson
argues,
it creates
linkages
based on the
provision
of rewards
and favours for
political loyalty.19
Parties based on such
linkages
-
identified
by
Kaufman as "machine
parties"20
-
are
generally loosely
organized
alliances of
political
notables and their
patronage
networks
or machines. Local
power
brokers distribute
particularistic
benefits
-
such as
public employment,
a
government
contract,
or
paved
streets
-
in order to
co-opt
electoral
support,
but their
patronage
machines
generally
do not
require
extensive
grassroots organization
or
partici-
pation by party loyalists. Brokerage-based parties
are thus
vertically
rather than
horizontally organized: they
cut across class
distinctions,
and
they
are
usually comprised
of hierarchical chains of
patrons,
bro-
kers,
and clients rather than
strong
mass
organizations.
The constitu-
encies of such
parties
are
socially heterogeneous
and
relatively
indi-
vidualized,
as affiliation is based on
personal
ties or
family
and
kinship
connections rather than
membership
or identification with
larger
so-
cial
groups.21
Little is asked or
expected
of
party supporters beyond
the
voting
booth,
and
parties'
limited
presence
in
society
outside elec-
toral
campaigns
is sustained
by
the activities of
patrons
and brokers.
Political
loyalty
is
reproduced by periodic
material
exchanges
and
per-
sonal bonds rather than
ideological
commitments.
Although
broker-
age practices
can exist in
virtually any political party, they generally
provide
the dominant
linkage
mechanism in centrist and conservative
parties
with roots in the
oligarchic
era
prior
to the onset of mass
poli-
tics,
such as the Colombian Liberals and
Conservatives,
the
Paraguayan
Colorados,
and the
Uruguayan
Blancos and Colorados.
Encapsulating Linkages
Encapsulating linkages
have two distinctive features: mass-based
organizational
structures and
participatory
modes of affiliation. In
short,
parties
with
encapsulating linkages,
or what Lawson calls
"participa-
tory" linkages,22 incorporate
the masses
directly
into the
political proc-
ess
beyond
the act of
voting.
This entails the construction of a
party
organization
with local branches or
grassroots
units that
provide
mem-
bers,
or
militantes,
with
permanent opportunities
for
political
activ-
ism. These
party organs
are often
supplemented by
close bonds to
mass
secondary
associations of workers or
peasants, creating
collec-
tive modes of association
among groups
defined
by pertinent
social
cleavages
or identities. For this
reason,
Kaufman
speaks
of
"group-
based"
party systems
where
organized
social blocs
comprise
the
primary
Roberts /
1 7
constituencies of
parties.23
The
political
activism of militantes carries
the
expectation
that
they help
the
party penetrate
and
organize
civil
society.
Even where such
parties possess
centralized and hierarchical
leadership
structures,
there is an
important
horizontal,
bottom-up
di-
mension to their
organizational
models,
and
they rely greatly
on the
political
labour of committed
non-professional loyalists.
As the term
signifies, encapsulating linkages
create
powerful
bonds
between militantes and their
parties.
Militantes are
enveloped
within a
web of social and
organizational
networks that
bring
them into
regular
contact with the
party
and other
loyalists.
Parties thus
help
to inte-
grate society
and socialize citizens to
political
life.
Indeed,
they may
provide
an
array
of social services that create channels for
participa-
tion and
reproduce political loyalties, including
health or dental clin-
ics,
childcare
facilities,
educational
programs, youth
and women's
groups,
cultural
activities,
and
sports
clubs.
Levitsky's depiction
of
Peronist local
branches,
or unidades bsicas
(UBs), provides
a
para-
digmatic example
of the
encapsulating
activities and services
performed
by
mass
party organizations:
UBs
play
a central
organizational
role
during
electoral
proc-
esses,
signing up
members and
providing
activists to
paint
walls,
put up posters
and mobilize voters for rallies. Between elec-
tions,
many
UBs continue to
play
an
important
role in
neigh-
bourhood
life,
serving
as critical
points
of access to
city
and
provincial governments.
In addition to
distributing
food,
medi-
cines,
and
clothing, attending
to local residents'
problems
with
municipal government
and
providing
social services such as
legal
and medical
assistance,
school
tutoring,
and even free
haircuts,
many
UBs administer
government
social
programs
and attend to
neighbourhood
infrastructural
problems
such as
sewage,
street
lights
and road surfaces.
Many
UBs also serve
as cultural
centers,
organizing sports
activities for
young peo-
ple,
vacation
trips
for the
elderly
and
parties
for
neighbour-
hood
birthdays.24
The
encapsulating linkages forged by
such activities tend to be
highly
durable and resistant to
many
kinds of
political
shocks. While these
linkages
are
occasionally
found within centrist
parties
like the Chilean
Christian Democrats and the
Argentine
Radicals,
they
are most common
among
mass-based
populist
or leftist
parties
with close ties to labour
movements and historical roots in
processes
of
popular
mobilization,
including
the Peronist
party
in
Argentina,
the American
Popular
Revo-
lutionary
Alliance
(APRA)
in
Peru,
the Democratic Action
party (AD)
in
Venezuela,
the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI)
in
Mexico,
the Workers'
Party (PT)
in
Brazil,
the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua,
and
the Socialist and Communist
parties
in Chile. As
such,
encapsulating
linkages
are exclusive to the
post-oligarchic
era of mass
politics
in
Latin America.
Programmatic Linkages
Programmatic linkages
exist where citizens
develop loyalties
to a
party
that are based on
ideological
or
general programmatic
commitments.
Such
linkages require
that
parties adopt ideological positions
that are
reasonably
consistent, coherent,
and differentiated from those of their
competitors.
Likewise,
they require
that citizens
develop relatively
well-defined belief
systems
and
programmatic preferences.
In the Euro-
pean experience, ideological
differences were
historically grounded
in
social
cleavages,
and were often
superimposed upon encapsulating
linkages;
in
particular,
socialist
parties
articulated
ideological posi-
tions that
appealed directly
to the collective interests and identities of
their core
working
class
constituencies,
and
they
built mass
organiza-
tions to
encapsulate
their
supporters.
This
pattern
was much weaker
in Latin America. Outside
Chile,
the
working
class was
typically
mo-
bilized
politically by ideologically amorphous
and
socially heteroge-
neous
populist parties
rather than class-based
parties
of the left.25
Consequently,
leftist
partisanship
in most of Latin America has relied
on individual rather than collective
ideological
commitments and is
often divorced from mass-based
encapsulating linkages.
Centrist,
popu-
list,
and conservative
parties,
on the other
hand,
have
generally
es-
chewed
explicit ideological definition,
leaving programmatic linkages
to
play
a
secondary
role in their
appeals
for
popular support.26
Personalistic
Linkages
and Charismatic Bonds
There is a
long
tradition in Latin America
politics
of
parties serving
as
little more than electoral vehicles for
prominent personalities. Sup-
porters
are attracted to the
party
not
by ideological
commitments or
organizational identities,
but
by
the
leadership qualities
of the domi-
nant
personality. Although personalistic linkages
do not
necessarily
Roberts /
1 9
imply
charismatic
leadership, they
are
strongest
where "charismatic
bonds" exist between a leader who demonstrates
special gifts
and
popu-
lar masses who
deposit
their confidence in a messiah
figure
to direct a
process
of radical
change
or resolve a national crisis.27 Since
person-
alism is
generally
in conflict with
institutionalization,
parties
based on
personalistic linkages
are often
loosely organized
or even
ephemeral
in their
existence,
as can be seen in the
"parties"
that
accompanied
leaders like Velasco Ibarra in
Ecuador,
Collor in
Brazil,
and
Fujimori
in Peru. Even a movement as formidable and resilient as Peronism has
been renowned for its lack of
organizational
institutionalization.28 In
some
cases, however,
personalistic parties may
routinize their author-
ity,
as seen in the Mexican PRI after
Crdenas,
or even
develop
disci-
plined organizational
structures,
as with APRA under
Haya
de la Torre.
Although
affiliation with
personalistic parties
is often
highly
individu-
alized,
collective association
may
exist when a charismatic
figure
mo-
bilizes
support among organized
social
blocs,
as seen in the Peronist
absorption
of the
Argentine
labour movement.
Marketing Linkages
Whereas
brokerage, encapsulation, ideology,
and charisma are all
capable
of
forging
durable bonds between citizens and
parties,
mar-
keting linkages
are
by
definition
contingent
and
temporary.
Such link-
ages
are
generally
formed in
specific
electoral
conjunctures
as
parties
appeal
to uncommitted voters on the basis of a
particular policy
stance,
recent
performance
in
office,
the relative
capabilities
of
particular
can-
didates,
or the
negative
attributes of
competitors.
These
linkages gen-
erate conditional
support
rather than
political loyalty,
as citizens do
not
forge lasting organizational
bonds or identities.
Instead,
they ap-
proach
each electoral
cycle
as a one-shot
process,
and
they
reassess
competing parties'
issue
positions,
track
records,
and candidate offer-
ings
before
deciding
whether to
stay
with the same
party
or
change
their vote. This forces
parties
to
continuously polish
their
public
im-
age by reframing
the
political agenda, modifying
their issue
positions
to accommodate
public opinion, defending
their track
record,
reinventing
their
candidates,
and
highlighting
the
failings
of their
opponents.
Parties that
rely
on
marketing linkages
tend to be streamlined and
professionalized
in their
organizational
structures,
as
captured
in
Panebianco's
concept
of the
professional-electoral party.29 They
do
not
possess strong grassroots
branches or affiliated mass
organiza-
tions;
support
is thus individualized rather than collective.
Indeed,
such
parties
have little need for
grassroots
militantes to
penetrate
civil soci-
ety
and mobilize
loyal
constituents. In an era of modern communica-
tions and
survey
research
techniques, they
can
appeal
to voters via the
mass media and
tap popular
sentiments
through public opinion polls
and focus
groups.
Rather than bear the costs of a
permanent
mass
organization composed
of
grassroots
activists,
parties
are teams of
professional politicians
advised
by
hired technical
specialists
in the
fields of
campaign advertising,
media
communications,
and
survey
research. These teams are activated
during
electoral
cycles,
but
they
have little
presence
in
society
in the interim
period
between elections.
Clearly,
these five modes of
linkages
are not
mutually
exclusive.
Brokerage
is
present
in
virtually any party
that has had access to
pub-
lic
office,
and in an era of mass communications
any party
that is a
serious contender for state
power
must
develop marketing linkages.
In
Europe,
there is a
long
tradition of
combining encapsulating
and
programmatic linkages, especially
on the
political
left. In Latin
America,
conservative and centrist
parties
have relied
heavily
on
brokerage
and
personality,
while
populist parties
like the Peronists in
Argentina
and
Democratic Action in Venezuela have sometimes combined
personalistic, encapsulating,
and
brokerage linkages.
Leftist
parties
like the Workers'
Party
in Brazil and the Communist
Party
in
Chile,
on
the other
hand,
have combined
programmatic
and
encapsulating
link-
ages.
To further
complicate
the
picture, linkage patterns
are fluid and
adaptable,
and thus
subject
to
reconfiguration
as
political entrepre-
neurs
respond
to
changes
in
social, economic,
and
technological
con-
texts. The Chilean Socialist
Party,
for
example,
which relied histori-
cally
on
programmatic
and
encapsulating linkages,
has
increasingly
been transformed into a
professional-electoral party
that
depends
on
marketing
and
personalistic linkages.30
Indeed,
recent
patterns
of social and economic
change
have under-
mined several traditional modes of
while rein-
forcing
other,
less institutionalized forms. The dislocation that results
accounts for much of the
perception
of a crisis of
political representa-
tion in the
region.
To
place
this crisis in the
proper perspective requires
a more
systematic
assessment of the transformation of
party-society
linkages
and the factors that lie behind it.
Roberts /
2 1
The Transformation of
in Con-
temporary
Latin America
In his classic
comparative study
of
party organizations, Duverger sug-
gested
that
mass-based,
encapsulating organizational
forms
provided
socialist
working-class parties
with a
comparative
electoral
advantage
in modern mass democracies that was sure to stimulate imitation
by
centrist and conservative
parties.31
Eckstein
challenged
this notion of
a
"contagion
from the
Left,"
claiming
that mass
party organizations
were too
expensive
to maintain and
functionally unnecessary
for
gen-
erating
electoral
support
in an era of mass media communications and
professionalized political campaigns.32
Eckstein
argued
that
loosely
organized,
cadre-based
parties
oriented toward the middle class and
business interests such as those in the US had
pioneered
in the devel-
opment
of modern media
campaign techniques, providing
them with a
comparative advantage
over
European-style
mass
parties
in contem-
porary
democracies.
Eckstein's notion of an
organizational "contagion
from the
right"
clearly
comes closer to
capturing
the
evolutionary dynamics
of
party-
society linkages
in the recent Latin American
experience.
Three core
trends within this
contagion
are
readily
discernible:
(1)
a shift from
collective to individualized modes of
association; (2)
a shift from mass-
to cadre- or elite-based
organizational
forms;
and
(3)
a shift from fixed
and durable bonds to more fluid and
contingent
forms of
support.
Taken
together,
these three trends entail a shift toward looser
party-
society
bonds,
less institutionalized forms of
political representation,
and a
professionalization
of the
political
arena.
At the heart of these trends has been the severe erosion of both
encapsulating
and
programmatic linkages,
the
only
two forms of link-
age
that
historically encouraged participatory
forms of
party militancy.
These
linkages
were based on fixed
organizational
or
ideological
bonds,
creating
durable
political loyalties
and,
at least in the case of
encapsu-
lation,
collective modes of association and mass-based
organizational
structures.
Nevertheless,
these
linkages
have been
pummeled by
so-
cioeconomic,
political,
and
over the
past
sev-
eral decades.
Encapsulating linkages
were
forged during
the era of
import
substitution industrialization
(ISI)
in the middle of the twenti-
eth
century,
when
rapid
urbanization and industrialization created a
new
working
class that was unattached
politically
and amenable to
organization
in both economic and
political spheres.
The
expansion
of
the state's
regulatory
and welfare
responsibilities generated powerful
incentives for
political
mobilization,
and as
capitalism spread through
the
countryside, eroding
traditional
patron-client
bonds between land-
lords and
peasants,
even the
peasantry
became a
potential target
for
mobilizing appeals
around land reform issues. Parties
typically
medi-
ated the
corporatist relationships
that states established with labour
and/or
peasant organizations
in order to control the articulation of
lower-class demands and structure their
political participation.
This
allowed
parties
to establish
organizational
bonds and distribute mate-
rial benefits to
encapsulated
social
constituencies,
which were
quickly
transformed into durable bastions of electoral
support.
Likewise,
ideological linkages
were
significant during
the ISI
era,
when distinct
market,
state
capitalist,
and socialist
development
mod-
els confronted each other in the
political
arena.
Although many popu-
list, centrist,
and conservative
parties
lacked
explicit ideological
defi-
nition,
there was sufficient variance in
programmatic positions
across
the
party spectrum
to
give
voters
meaningful
choice in
many (though
not
all)
national electoral arenas.33
Consequently,
citizens with ideo-
logical preferences
had incentives to
align
with the
party
that best
articulated their beliefs and values.
Both
encapsulating
and
have been hard-
pressed
to withstand the maelstrom of
political
and economic
changes
that have
swept
across Latin America over the
past
two decades. Pro-
grammatic linkages
have been
greatly
weakened
by
the
collapse
of
both socialist and state
capitalist development
models in Latin America
and the dramatic
narrowing
of
policy
debate,
as seen in the diffusion
of the so-called
"Washington
consensus" for market liberalism.34 The
debt crisis of the 1980s eroded the fiscal foundations of ISI and the
state
capitalist development
models followed
by populist parties,
while
the
burgeoning
crisis and eventual
collapse
of
communism,
combined
with the
growing
defensiveness of
European
welfare states in an era
of market
globalization,
undermined the
appeal
of both Marxist and
social democratic alternatives. As
global
financial
pressures
narrowed
the
manoeuvering space
and
sovereign
economic
powers
of national
governments, parties
that held fast to
populist
or statist
programs
and
had the misfortune to shoulder
governmental responsibilities during
the
1980s,
such as APRA in Peru and Bolivia's leftist coalition under
Roberts /
23
Hernn
Siles,
were
politically
devastated
by
their
mismanagement
of
fiscal crises and their association with
hyperinflation.
Leaders from
other
parties
with statist traditions
-
including
the Mexican
PRI,
the
Argentine
Peronists,
the Venezuelan
AD,
the Bolivian
MNR,
the Costa
Rican
PLN,
the Brazilian Social
Democrats,
and the Chilean Social-
ists
-
embraced the core of the
Washington
consensus,
and
although
most of these
parties (excepting
the
AD)
have remained
electorally
competitive
or even
thrived,
their
contemporary appeal
has little to do
with the articulation of
programmatic
or
ideological
alternatives.
Paradoxically, although
the
political right
has been
ideologically
rejuvenated by
the
spread
of
neoliberalism,
conservative
parties
have
played
a minor role in the
implementation
of market reforms and the
diffusion of the new
programmatic
consensus.
Deep
market reforms
have been
imposed by
a
variety
of
military
dictators,
civilian auto-
crats,
nonpartisan
technocrats,
and erstwhile
populist parties,
but
they
have
rarely
been initiated
by pro-business
conservative
parties.
As
such,
the reform
process
is often entrusted to
parties
and leaders who act
less out of conviction than out of a
pragmatic
concession to
political
and economic
pressures. Many
neoliberal technocrats and business
elites
prefer nonpartisan
channels of
political
influence over the
costly
and
time-consuming
tasks of
party building,
and conservative
parties
continue to
rely heavily
on
brokerage
and
marketing linkages
as
opposed
to
explicit ideological appeals.
Where
populist
or centre-left
parties
were saddled with the
respon-
sibility
of
implementing
neoliberal
reforms,
some
fraying
of
encapsu-
lating linkages
to labour
organizations invariably
occurred. The de-
regulation
or "flexibilization" of labour markets weakened mechanisms
of
corporatist
control and eroded workers'
rights
and benefits that
had been
hard-fought gains
of
previous
rounds of
populist
mobiliza-
tion.
Likewise,
reforms that
privatized
state-owned
industries,
stream-
lined
public
administration,
and
opened
national economies to
foreign
competition
created
unemployment
and
dampened wages, straining
the
relationships
between labour movements and their
partisan
allies.
Organized
labour, however,
was
dramatically
weakened
by
the col-
lapse
of ISI and the shift to
neoliberalism,
especially
in those countries
where
strong
labour movements had
emerged during
the middle of the
twentieth
century.
The informal sector of the workforce
expanded rap-
idly,
as did the number of workers
employed
in
temporary
contract or
non-contract
positions.
These workers were
notoriously
difficult to
organize,
as their economic activities were too
widely dispersed,
ir-
regular,
and
functionally heterogeneous
to facilitate collective action
or the construction of
strong
class identities.
Trade union
density
thus
plummeted
across the
region
as labour
organizations
-
increasingly
the domain of
relatively privileged, per-
manent workers in the
public
sector and the
very largest private
firms
-
strained to articulate the interests of a more fluid and
fragmented
la-
bour force. A
parallel process
of social atomization was
underway
in
the
countryside,
where a limited
parcelization
of
property,
the
flight
of
rural workers to urban
areas,
temporary
labour
practices,
and restric-
tions on collective
bargaining
diffused
peasant
land claims and under-
mined collective action.
By
the 1990s
large-scale peasant
mobilizations
for land had
largely
ceased outside of Brazil and
Ecuador,
and mar-
ket-oriented claims related to
wages, prices,
credits,
and
agricultural
inputs
did not
spawn
rural civil societies with
organized
mass con-
stituencies that could be bound to
political parties.
In
short,
the social
and economic
landscape
of the neoliberal era
discouraged
the forma-
tion of
organized
blocs of lower class citizens in both urban and rural
areas who could be
encapsulated by party organizations.
And
although
a
plethora
of new social movements and
popular
economic
organiza-
tions
emerged
as class-based forms of collective action
declined,35
they
were
typically wary
of restrictive
(or manipulative)
ties to
politi-
cal
parties
and
highly
defensive of their
political autonomy.
Often,
they
preferred
to
acquire
technical and material
support
from
non-govern-
mental
organizations (NGOs)
or
municipal
authorities rather than
par-
ties or states. Civil societies in
contemporary
Latin America are thus
more diverse but also more
fragmented
and
depoliticized
than those
of the
populist
era,
with less
density
in
large-scale secondary
associa-
tions and a
growing
detachment from
parties
and states. As more social
actors
develop
ties to NGOs or carve out their own market
niches,
the
old model of class actors who
press
claims on the state that are medi-
ated
by
national
party organizations
has been
increasingly displaced
by
more
fluid, decentralized,
and
issue-specific
"associative networks"
of
private groups
and local
public
officials that
operate
at the
margins
of
party systems.36
But if civil societies are less
structurally disposed
to
provide ready-
made collective constituencies for
party encapsulation,
it must be ree-
Roberts /
25
ognized
that
contemporary parties
have also devoted far less
energy
to the tasks of
penetrating
and
organizing
civil
society.
Indeed,
party
leaderships
have
de-emphasized encapsulating linkages
in both the civic
and internal
partisan
arenas,
clearly reflecting
their calculations that
mass
organization
is no
longer
a
prerequisite
for electoral success.
Candidates for
public
office can enter voters'
living
rooms via televi-
sion or
campaign mailings
and
appeal
for
support directly
without a
mass
organization
of committed activists to
inform,
proselytize,
and
mobilize the electorate. Candidates like
Fujimori
and Collor have even
won national elections without
any significant organization
at all. And
if mass
organization
is no
longer necessary
to mobilize electoral
ap-
peal,
neither is it
required
to articulate
political
and economic demands
or
provide political entrepreneurs
with
input regarding popular
senti-
ments. Public
opinion surveys
and focus
group
studies allow candi-
dates to measure the salience of different
issues,
identify
the
policy
preferences
of
targeted
social
groups,
and
gauge
the effectiveness of
different
strategies
for
framing
issues and
addressing problems.
A rela-
tively
small team of
professional
fundraisers,
pollsters,
media consult-
ants,
direct mail
specialists,
and
campaign managers
can thus
displace
mass
organizations
from their traditional functional
responsibilities
in
the electoral
arena,
much like new social movements and NGOs have
taken over
many
of
parties'
interest-articulation and
service-provision
functions in civil
society.
Furthermore,
hired
professional campaign
teams do not
require
investment in a
permanent party bureaucracy
or
branch
offices,
and in contrast to mass
party organizations they pose
few restrictions on the
strategic autonomy
of
party
leaders to
adapt
their
programmatic positions
or coalitional
alignments
in
response
to
changing political
and economic circumstances.37
Consequently,
there has been a notable shift from
programmatic
and
encapsulating linkages
to media-based
marketing linkages,
which
place
a
premium
on the technical skills
developed by professionalized
campaign
teams. This can be seen in the rise of new centre-left
profes-
sional-electoral
parties,
such as the Chilean
Party
for
Democracy (PPD)
and FREPASO in
Argentina,
which were
spawned by
historic socialist
or
populist parties
but have weak
grassroots
structures,
minimal ties
to
organized
labour,
and
powerful appeal among
the
unorganized
but
increasingly cosmopolitan
middle classes. These
parties typically
generate
electoral
support by projecting
attractive,
if
ideologically
amorphous, images
of
modernity,
moderation,
and civic
republican-
ism
through
the mass media.
Personalistic
linkages
and charismatic bonds have also thrived in
contemporary
Latin America. Given the demise of
organizational
and
ideological
identities,
personal appeal
has
increasingly provided
the
adhesive force to
aggregate disparate
interests in the electoral
arena,
and television
provides
a
powerful
medium for the
projection
of indi-
vidualized candidate
images.
Considerable attention has thus been
focused on the rise of new forms of
populist leadership
that
appeal
directly
to atomized mass electorates while
bypassing
or subordinat-
ing representative
institutions like
parties
and labour unions. In con-
trast to classical
populist figures
like
Pern,
Vargas, Crdenas,
and
Haya
de la
Torre,
who built the mass social and
political organizations
that dominated the ISI
era,
the new breed of
populists
eschew mass
organization
and extra-electoral forms of
political mobilization,
and in
some cases
they
have even
imposed
neoliberal structural
adjustments.38
Nevertheless,
personalistic
leaders like
Fujimori,
Menem, Collor,
Bucaram,
and Chvez have mobilized
powerful support among
the
lower
classes,
even if their autocratic tendencies and lack of institu-
tionalized bases have undermined the
stability
of their rule.
Recent trends have been more nuanced with
respect
to
brokerage
and clientelistic
linkages.
Patron-clientelism has
deep
roots in Latin
America's rural social structure and the
oligarchic party systems
that
it
spawned,
and it thrives in social contexts that
provide
direct
per-
sonal ties between elite and subaltern sectors.
Although brokerage
has
certainly
influenced urban
political dynamics
in Latin
America,39
as it
did
historically
in the
US,
it is
probably
less efficient in
larger
and
more
impersonal
electoral
environments;
as Geddes
points out,
it should
be more cost-effective for
politicians
to
supply public goods
than
pri-
vate
(patronage-based) goods
for a
dense,
impersonal
mass elector-
ate.40
Furthermore,
in
theory
the neoliberal model should
drastically
reduce the
opportunities
and resources for
private rent-seeking
and
political patronage.41
As states slash
public employment, privatize
social
services,
deregulate
the
economy,
and leave distributive outcomes to
the
mercy
of the
marketplace, parties
should have fewer means to
distribute selective material rewards in
exchange
for
political loyalty.
In
practice, however,
brokerage appears
to be alive and well in
contemporary
Latin American
party systems.
The
privatization
of
public
Roberts /
27
enterprises
can
provide
executives with windfall resources and
oppor-
tunities to bestow
favours,
while the new social
policy emphasis
on
targeted poverty
relief
spending
can
easily
be
manipulated
to the advan-
tage
of incumbents.42 In contexts of
heightened
individual economic
insecurity
and diminished state
supply
of
public goods,
the
political
dividends that derive from the
partisan provision
of selective benefits
may actually
be accentuated. As Valenzuela
argues, brokerage
is most
prevalent
where
scarcity precludes
the universal
provision
of
public
goods
and
encourages
a resort to
particularistic
allocative criteria.43
Consequently,
scholars have noted that
parties
like the Mexican PRI
and the
Argentine
Peronists that
historically developed encapsulating
corporatist linkages
to mass
organizations
have become
increasingly
dependent
on the selective distribution of
patronage
after
implement-
ing
neoliberal reforms.44 Even in
Chile,
where neoliberal reforms have
advanced the furthest and
parties
are
among
the most
professionalized
in Latin
America,
a Christian Democratic leader
recently
lamented
that the
party
"doesn't have
militantes,
only
clients,"
leaving
it with-
out a "common
project."45
The streamlined state of neoliberalism
may
thus
impose
limits on
patronage
distributions,
but inventive
politicians
appear capable
of
adapting political brokerage
to the
exigencies
of a
new socioeconomic era.
Implications
for Democratic
Representation
I have
argued
that
encapsulating
and
between
parties
and
society
have been
gravely
weakened,
while
marketing
and
have risen in
prominence
and
brokerage appears
to be
holding
firm. These
linkage
trends have several
important impli-
cations for democratic
representation
in Latin America.
First,
political
representation
is
increasingly
individualized rather than
collective;
that
is,
party
affiliation is
being
driven more
by
individual
preferences
and
choices rather than
membership
in a
particular
social bloc or
organiza-
tional
collectivity. Marketing, personalistic,
and
brokerage linkages
are all based on
partisan appeals
to individuals rather than social
collectivities,
and
they
do not
require
the construction of mass
organi-
zations. This trend makes it
especially
difficult for lower class citizens
to articulate their interests
effectively
in the
political
arena,
because
they
have few
political
resources other than their
strength
in
numbers,
and their voice has
historically
been
highly dependent
on their
capacity
for collective action and
expression.
A
second,
related
implication
of
linkage
trends is that
they
are
generally
associated with cadre- or elite-based
party organizations
rather than mass bureaucratic
organizations
with active
grassroots
structures. Successful
parties
still
appeal
to a mass electoral constitu-
ency,
but this does not make them mass
parties,
as
they may possess
no
permanent organizational
structure below the
leadership
cadres.
Parties thus have
sympathizers
and
voters,
but
relatively
few mem-
bers, activists,
or militantes.
Marketing, personalistic,
and
brokerage
linkages
demand little or
nothing
of
party supporters beyond
the ballot
box,
and
they provide
few structures or
opportunities
to
encourage
extra-electoral forms of
participation.
As
such,
party organizations
revolve,
respectively,
around the
professionals,
the
caudillos,
and the
brokers or
patrones,
with minimal
input
from the
bottom-up.
This
trend reflects a
generalized depoliticization
of social life and a nar-
rowing
or
specialization
of the
political sphere.
As Lechner
argues,46
individuals in
socially
differentiated market societies have
multiple
channels of cultural
expression
that
compete
with the
political sphere
and undermine the bases of
large-scale
collective solidarities that fuel
political
activism.
Finally,
these trends
point
to a shift from
fixed,
durable bonds to
more fluid and
contingent patterns
of
support.
The individual
prefer-
ences and choices that
undergird brokerage
and
marketing linkages
are
generally
more fluid and instrumental than
ideological
convictions
or
membership
in a social bloc.
Likewise,
the
forged by contemporary populist figures appear
far more
fragile
than
those of classical
populists,
since
they
have not been
accompanied by
serious efforts to institutionalize
support.
These
linkage patterns
thus
allow
relatively high
levels of
mobility
for individual
voters,
who
may
switch
allegiances
from one election to the next as
parties compete
to
project
a better
image,
frame the issues more
effectively, package
more
attractive
candidates,
or offer more
enticing
selective benefits.
Although
brokerage
in
Colombia,
Uruguay,
Costa
Rica,
and Honduras has
gen-
erated
strong partisan
identities and
remarkably
stable
patterns
of elec-
toral
competition,47
in other countries it has
provided
more instru-
mental,
contingent,
and volatile forms of
support. Furthermore,
brokerage
is a
two-edged
sword: it can create material
dependencies
Roberts /
29
that
generate
durable
partisan loyalties,
but it can also
degenerate
into
blatant forms of
corruption
and
political
favouritism,
alienating
voters
and
leaving party systems
vulnerable to the rise of anti-establishment
political
outsiders.
Marketing
and
also
present
a number of
sig-
nificant vulnerabilities.
Marketing linkages
are
very
flexible,
but
they
leave
parties relatively
detached from
society,
with weak
organiza-
tional
bonds,
shallow social
roots,
and
ephemeral political loyalties.
Parties'
professionalized leadership
teams can
easily
become an
entrenched,
collusive
political
caste that uses state resources to
repro-
duce its
authority
and exclude outside
challengers
from the
political
arena. Like
patronage-based
machine
parties,
such "cartel
parties"48
are vulnerable to voter backlash and
challenges
from anti-establish-
ment
figures,
as the Venezuelan case so
graphically
demonstrates.
Personalistic
linkages,
on the other
hand,
create vulnerabilities that
are related to their lack of institutionalization.
By
their
very
nature,
such
linkages
do little to hold leaders accountable to their constitu-
ents,
and
autocratic,
unpredictable political
behaviour is the
frequent
result. In
Peru,
for
example, Fujimori's independence
was both his
greatest political
resource
and,
in the
end,
the Achilles heel that under-
mined his
regime. Lacking
an institutionalized base of
support, Fujimori
turned to
military
and
intelligence
officials with minimal democratic
credentials to
prop up
his
authority,
then
proclaimed
a
presidential
coup
that allowed him to dissolve a
congress
controlled
by
his
oppo-
nents. His
principal
advisors later
provoked
a
political
scandal
by forg-
ing
a million
signatures
to facilitate the
registration
of
Fujimori's
fourth
"party"
vehicle,
and then bribed
opposition parliamentarians
to switch
sides and thus create an unelected official
majority
in the
congress.
These blatant
manipulations
of the democratic
process eventually
deto-
nated a
political
crisis that drove
Fujimori
from office.
Ultimately,
the three
primary linkage
mechanisms reduce
parties
to their most
basic,
self-referential
political
function:
electing
candi-
dates from their ranks into
public
office. As
such,
parties
have been
stripped
of a
range
of other
sociopolitical
functions that
historically
served the
public
interest and enhanced their
legitimacy
in the
eyes
of
the
citizenry.
Parties in
contemporary
Latin America are less active in
representing
social
groups
in the
political
arena,
organizing
civil soci-
ety, articulating ideological
and
programmatic
alternatives,
socializ-
ing
citizens in democratic
values,
supplying public goods,
and creat-
ing grassroots
channels for
popular participation
and social
integra-
tion.
Stripped
of such
edifying
functions,
teams of self-interested of-
fice seekers are
hard-pressed
to maintain their
legitimacy,
and
they
become
increasingly dependent
on instrumental assessments of their
performance
to maintain
popular support.
When
political corruption
or economic
hardship
render such assessments
negative, parties
become
easy prey
for anti-establishment
political entrepreneurs
who blame them
for an assortment of collective ills and
appeal
to an alienated elector-
ate. At such moments a crisis of
becomes
pal-
pable,
but it is
generally preceded by
a more
complex, long-term
trans-
formation in the character of
party-society linkages. Any
effort to
improve
the
quality
and
stability
of democratic
governance
in Latin
America must start with a
recognition
of these
changes
and how
they
have altered the character of
Notes
1. Torcuato S. Di
Telia, ed.,
Crisis de
representatividad y
sistemas de
partidos
polticos (Buenos
Aires:
Grupo
Editor
Latinoamericano, 1998);
Frances
Hagopian,
"After
Regime Change:
Authoritarian
Legacies,
Political
Repre-
sentation,
and the Democratic Future of South
America,"
World Politics 45
(April 1993): 464-500;
Pedro
Nikken,
Amrica Latina : La democracia de
partidos
en crisis
(San Jose,
Costa Rica: Instituto Interamericano de Derechos
Humanos, 1992);
Steve Stein and Carlos
Monge,
La crisis del estado
patrimonial
en el Per
(Lima:
Instituto de Estudios Peruanos and the Univer-
sity
of
Miami, 1988).
2. Carina
Perelli,
Sonia Picado
S.,
and Daniel
Zovatto, eds.,
Partidos
y
clase
poltica
en Amrica Latina en los 90
(San Jos,
Costa Rica: Instituto
Interamericano de Derechos
Humamos, 1995).
3 . Giovanni
Sartori,
Parties and
Party Systems:
A Framework
for Analysis (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
4. Robert H.
Dix,
"Democratization and the Institutionalization of Latin Ameri-
can
Parties/'
Comparative
Political Studies 24
(January 1992):
488-511.
5 . Frances
Hagopian, "Democracy
and Political
Representation
in Latin America
in the 1990s:
Pause,
Reorganization
or Decline?" in
Felipe Aguero
and
Jeffrey
Stark, eds.,
Fault Lines
of Democracy
in Post-Transition Latin America
(Mi-
ami:
University
of Miami North-South Center
Press, 1998);
Scott P.
Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems
in the Third Wave
of
Democratiza-
tion: The Case
of
Brazil
(Stanford,
CA: Stanford
University
Press, 1999);
Kenneth M. Roberts and Erik
Wibbels,
"Party Systems
and Electoral Volatil-
Roberts /
3 1
ity
in Latin America: A Test of
Economic, Institutional,
and Structural
Expla-
nations,"
American Political Science Review
93,
3
(September 1999):
575-590.
6. Maurice
Duverger,
Political Parties : Their
Organization
and
Activity
in the
Modern State
(London:
Methuen and Co.
Ltd., 1964);
Mark P.
Jones,
Elec-
toral Laws and the Survival
of
Presidential Democracies
(Notre Dame,
IN:
University
of Notre Dame
Press, 1995);
Arend
Lijphart,
Electoral
Systems
and
Party Systems:
A
Study of Twenty-Seven
Democracies 1945-1990
(Ox-
ford: Oxford
University
Press, 1994);
Matthew
Shugart
and John
Carey,
Presi-
dents and Assemblies: Constitutional
Design
and Electoral
Dynamics (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
7. Michael
Coppedge, Strong
Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential
Party archy
and Factionalism in Venezuela
(Stanford,
CA: Stanford
University Press, 1994).
8.
Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems
;
Scott
Mainwaring
and
Timothy
R.
Scully,
eds.,
Building
Democratic Institutions:
Party Systems
in Latin America
(Stanford,
CA: Stanford
University
Press, 1995).
9. In
general,
the
opposition
to President
Fujimori
revolved around
prominent
individuals rather than
party
institutions,
including
in the electoral arena.
The succession of official
"parties" sponsored by Fujimori
were
essentially
shadow
organizations
that
provided
a label for his electoral candidacies and
those of his
loyalists, although they
did
play
a role in
co-ordinating support
for the
president's legislative agenda.
10. Alberto
Fujimori
launched a
presidential coup
or
auto-golpe
to
popular
ac-
claim in Peru in 1992. In
Ecuador,
military
officers
sympathetic
to a mass
protest
movement
toppled
the elected
president
in
January
1999,
although
they quickly
turned
power
over to the constitutional
vice-president
under con-
siderable international
pressure.
In
Venezuela,
newly
elected President
Hugo
Chvez
adopted
extra-constitutional
plebiscitary
measures in 1999 to elect a
constituent
assembly, displace
the elected
congress,
and draft a new constitu-
tion that
proclaimed
an end to the old
republic.
1 1 .
Seymour
Martin
Lipset
and Stein
Rokkan, eds., Party Systems
and Voter
Align-
ments: Cross-National
Perspectives (New
York: Free
Press, 1967);
Stefano
Bartolini and Peter
Mair, Identity
,
Competition
,
and Electoral
Availability
:
The Stabilization
of European
Electorates 1885-1985
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University
Press, 1990);
Mark N.
Franklin,
Thomas T.
Mackie,
and
Henry
Valen,
Electoral
Change: Responses
to
Evolving
Social and Attitudinal Struc-
tures in Western Countries
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
12. Robert H.
Dix,
"Cleavage
Structures and
Party Systems
in Latin
America,"
Comparative
Politics 22
(October 1989):
23-37.
13. Richard S.
Katz,
"Party Organizations
and
Finance,"
in Lawrence
LeDuc,
Richard G.
Niemi,
and
Pippa
Norris, eds.,
Comparing
Democracies: Elec-
tions and
Voting
in Global
Perspective (Thousand Oaks,
CA:
Sage
Publica-
tions, 1996);
Peter
Mair, Party System Change: Approaches
and
Interpreta-
tions
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1997).
32 CJLACS/RCELAC 27/53 2002
14.
Kay
Lawson, ed.,
Political Parties and
Linkage
: A
Comparative Perspective
(New Haven,
CT: Yale
University
Press, 1980).
15. Giovanni
Sartori,
Parties and
Party Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge
Uni-
versity
Press, 1976).
16.
Mainwaring
and
Scully, Building
Democratic Institutions.
17. See
especially
Lawson,
Political Parties and
Linkage
,
and Herbert
Kitschelt,
Zdenka
Mansfeldova,
Radoslaw
Markowski,
and Gabor
Toka,
Post-Commu-
nist
Party Systems: Competition, Representation,
and
Inter-Party Coopera-
tion
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999).
18. The
brokerage concept
is more
generalizable
than that of
patron-clientelism,
which is most
properly
used in reference to
highly asymetrical
and
personal-
ized
exchange relationships
between lower class individuals and traditional
social elites.
Brokerage
can refer as well to
exchanges
of material benefits for
political support
that are more
voluntary
and less
asymetrical
in
nature,
as in
many
urban
party
machines. For an
elaboration,
see Arturo
Valenzuela,
Po-
litical Brokers in Chile: Local Government in a Centralized
Polity (Durham,
NC: Duke
University Press, 1977), especially Chapter
7.
19.
Kay Lawson,
"Political Parties and
Linkage,"
in
Lawson, ed.,
Political Par-
ties and
Linkage.
20. Robert R.
Kaufman,
"Corporatism, Clientelism,
and Partisan Conflict: A
Study
of Seven Latin American
Countries,"
in James M.
Malloy,
ed.,
Authoritari-
anism and
Corporatism
in Latin America
(Pittsburgh: University
of Pitts-
burgh Press, 1977).
21. In the US
experience,
urban
party
machines often
developed brokerage
ties
with ethnic
immigrant groups
at the turn of the
century, giving
them some
foundation in social
cleavages.
In Latin
America, however,
the constituencies
of
brokerage
or machine
parties
have been
poorly
differentiated
by
class or
ethnic
cleavages, leaving
individual
or,
at
times,
community
bonds to deter-
mine the direction of
partisan loyalties.
22.
Lawson,
"Political Parties and
Linkage."
23.
Kaufman,
"Corporatism, Clientelism,
and Partisan Conflict."
24. Steven
Levitsky,
"Crisis,
Party Adaptation,
and
Regime Stability
in
Argen-
tina: The Case of
Peronism, 1989-1995," Party
Politics
4,
4
(1998):
458.
25. Ruth Berins Collier and David
Collier,
Shaping
the Political Arena: Critical
Junctures,
the Labor
Movement,
and
Regime Dynamics
in Latin America
(Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press, 1991); Dix,
"Cleavage
Structures and
Party Systems
in Latin America."
26. Some
exceptions
to this
generalization
would include the centrist Christian
Democratic
Party
in Chile
during
its formative
years
and the
right-wing
Inde-
pendent
Democratic Union
(UDI)
in
Chile,
both of which articulated
explicit
ideological positions.
27.
Douglas
Madsen and Peter G.
Snow,
The Charismatic Bond : Political Behavior
in Time
of
Crisis
(Cambridge,
MA: Harvard
University
Press, 1991).
28. James
McGuire,
Peronism without Pern:
Unions, Parties,
and
Democracy
Roberts /
33
in
Argentina (Stanford,
CA: Stanford
University
Press, 1997); Levitsky,
"Cri-
sis,
Party Adaptation,
and
Regime Stability
in
Argentina."
29.
Angelo
Panebianco,
Political Parties :
Organization
and Power
(Cambridge:
Cambridge University
Press, 1988), pp.
262-267.
30. Kenneth M.
Roberts,
Deepening Democracy?
The Modern
Left
and Social
Movements in Chile and Peru
(Stanford,
CA: Stanford
University
Press, 1998).
31. Maurice
Duverger,
Political Parties
(London:
Methuen and
Company
Ltd.,
1964), p.
25.
32. Leon D.
Eckstein,
Political Parties in Western Democracies
(New
Bruns-
wick,
NJ: Transaction
Books, 1980), pp.
233-260.
33.
Programmatic
choices were the best defined and most varied in
Chile,
where
clearly
differentiated
conservative, centrist,
and Marxist alternatives each
cap-
tured around a third of the electorate
during
the 1933-1973 democratic re-
gime.
In nations where traditional
oligarchic parties
dominated the electoral
arena,
such as Colombia and
Uruguay, programmatic
alternatives were much
less
significant.
Nations with
strong populist parties,
such as Venezuela and
Peru,
generally occupied
an intermediate
position.
34. John
Williamson,
Latin American
Adjustment:
How Much Has
Happened?
(Washington,
DC: Institute for International
Economics, 1990).
35. Arturo Escobar and Sonia E.
Alvarez, eds.,
The
Making of
Social Movements
in Latin America:
Identity, Strategy,
and
Democracy (Boulder,
CO: Westview
Press.
1992); Philip
D.
Oxhorn,
Organizing
Civil
Society:
The
Popular
Sec-
tors and the
Struggle for Democracy
in Chile
(University
Park,
PA:
Pennsyl-
vania State
University
Press, 1995);
David
Slater, ed.,
New Social Movements
and the State in Latin America
(Amsterdam: CEDLA, 1985).
36.
Douglas
Chalmers,
Scott B.
Martin,
and Kerianne
Piester,
"Associative Net-
works: New Structures of
Representation
for the
Popular
Sectors?" in
Doug-
las A.
Chalmers,
Carlos M.
Vilas,
Katherine
Hite,
Scott B.
Martin,
and
Monique Segarra,
eds.,
The New Politics
of Inequality
in Latin America: Re-
thinking Participation
and
Representation (Oxford:
Oxford
University
Press,
1997).
37. Herbert
Kitschelt,
The
Transformation of European
Social
Democracy (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994).
38. Kenneth M.
Roberts,
"Neoliberalism and the Transformation of
Populism
in
Latin America: The Peruvian
Case,"
World Politics 48
(October 1995):
82-
116;
Kurt
Weyland, "Neopopulism
and Neoliberalism in Latin America: Un-
expected
Affinities,"
Studies in
Comparative
International
Development
32
(Fall 1996):
3-31.
39. Susan C.
Stokes,
Cultures in
Conflict:
Social Movements and the State in
Peru
(Berkeley: University
of California
Press, 1995).
40. Barbara
Geddes,
"A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American
Democracies,"
85,
2
(June 1991):
373.
41. Barbara
Geddes,
Politician's Dilemma:
Building
State
Capacity
in Latin
America
(Berkeley: University
of California
Press, 1994).
34 CJLACS/RCELAC 27/53 2002
42.
Wayne
A.
Cornelius,
Ann L.
Craig,
and Jonathan
Fox, eds.,
Transforming
State-Society
Relations in Mexico : The National
Solidarity Strategy (San
Diego:
Center for US-Mexican
Studies, 1994);
Carol Graham and Cheikh
Kane,
"Opportunistic
Government or
Sustaining
Reform? Electoral Trends
and
Public-Expenditure
Patterns in
Peru, 1990-1995,"
Latin American Re-
search Review
33,
1
(1998): 67-104;
Norbert R.
Schady,
"The Political
Economy
of
Expenditures by
the Peruvian Social Fund
(FONCODES),
1991-
95,"
94,
2
(June 2000):
289-304.
43.
Valenzuela,
Political Brokers in Chile
, p.
154.
44. Denise
Dresser,
Neopopulist
Solutions to Neoliberal Problems: Mexico's
National
Solidarity Program (San Diego:
Center for US-Mexican
Studies,
1991);
Steven
Levitsky,
From Laborism to Liberalism:
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and Labor-Based
Party Adaptation
in
Argentina (1983-1997) (Unpublished
doctoral
dissertation,
Harvard
University, 1999).
45. From El Mercurio
,
2 June
1999,
p.
C2.
46. Norbert
Lechner,
"The Transformation of
Politics,"
in
Aguero
and
Stark,
Fault
Lines
of Democracy
.
47. Roberts and
Wibbels,
"Party Systems
and Electoral
Volatility
in Latin America."
48.
Katz,
"Party Organizations
and Finance."

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