I ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW

Cayetano vs. Monsod

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

G.R. No. 100113
September 3, 1991

PARAS, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

ISSUE:
It is whether the respondent has the ten year practice of law requirement for him to assume such
office

HELD:
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill.

In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court.
Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years..





Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G.
HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G.
GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO
C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V.
PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
"OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON,
ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE
F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
R E S O L U T I O N
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:+.wph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander
Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died
on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms,
the names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both
Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name
which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly
sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: t.hqw
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership
name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the
individual property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such
person or partnership.
1

2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has
authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of
the name of a deceased partner;
2
the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the
practice of accountancy a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect
of clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client to acquire and use a trade
name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use
by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least
where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name."
3

3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: t.hqw
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible
by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. ...
4

4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased
partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the
stationeries now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their
respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading
national and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths.
5

5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's
name;
6
there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which
recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm.
7

6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been
consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most
countries in the world.
8

The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a
law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a
deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist
from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled
Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile
moved to intervene asamicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15,
1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although
Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins
and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by petitioners,
prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: t.hqw
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and
Associates for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the
Court found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it
required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from
including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court
believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations
between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of
professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree
could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised
to drop the name "PERKINS" from their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon,
Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased
partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: t.hqw
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not
include the name of one or more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm
name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be
those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be
subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his
name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased
partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly
where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an
agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either
gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both
because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not
represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor
the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor.
There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the
names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to
create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer
without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able
lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by
deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the
first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and
Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved
partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person
or partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the
deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation
preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather
than of aprofessional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the
personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can
exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of
lawyers.
9
t.hqw
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding
partners or parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in
the absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial
partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. ... (60
Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, t.hqw
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill
of the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to
be distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such
skill and reputation may be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership
agreement relating to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis
supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a
trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy.
10
t.hqw
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose
of carrying on trade or business or of holding property."
11
Thus, it has been stated
that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is
improper.
12

The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the
practice of law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal
Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession
as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public
service, no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of
livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving
thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
13

"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or
franchise.
14
It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified.
15
The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal
standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of
the nature of a public trust."
16

D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association"
in support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased
or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local
custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a
deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our
custom, Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse
at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their
firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership
changed. t.hqw
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners
designated by it is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by
custom this purports to Identify the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the
propriety of adding the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that
of a deceased partner who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op.
cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased
partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be
guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased
partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by
custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners
Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the
firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either
name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or
legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated
therein: t.hqw
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no
statutory provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics of both the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association
provides in part as follows: "The continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner, when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken
that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use." There is no question
as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with
the approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate
Division of the First Department has considered the matter and reached The
conclusion that such practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question.
The use of the firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between
the partners.
18

Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has
been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a
social rule, legally binding and obligatory.
19
Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must
be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.
20
A local custom as a source of right cannot
be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent
evidence like any other fact.
21
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the
elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a
matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a
juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former can
supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system.
22
When
the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist
from including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule
against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak
of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any
partner.
23
Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced.
24

The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should
not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade." t.hqw
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A
trade ... aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers
beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free
competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may
seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to
acquire as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But
the member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his
professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor
exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn.
There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of
the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent
and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done
with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which the profession of
law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice
according to law. The other two elements of a profession, namely, organization and
pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that
spirit.
25

In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow
to legal and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names
"SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in
the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they
served as such.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur
Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being
of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It
is out of delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as
the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the
father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being
his brother- in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned,
and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of individuals
wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in
their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name,
notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He
was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta
& Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said
firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son,
Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was
established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta
has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased
partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon
that the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use"
(Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the
letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and
Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased
founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and
Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed
law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the
law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross,
Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the
year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm
name was illegal or unethical.

# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being
of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It
is out of delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as
the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the
father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being
his brother- in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned,
and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of individuals
wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in
their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name,
notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He
was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta
& Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said
firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son,
Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was
established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta
has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased
partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon
that the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use"
(Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the
letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and
Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased
founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and
Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed
law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the
law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross,
Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the
year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm
name was illegal or unethical.


















In Re Cunanan
IN RE CUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Resoluti, 1954on
March 18

Facts:

Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In
accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those
candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the
bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were
still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also
others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the
law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.

Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Held:

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from
which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys
at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or
as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.





Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of
the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her
by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of
jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition
that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez
on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the
unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a)
a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984
also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of
P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3)
checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds.
Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank
concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations
to Ms. Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due
time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and
sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in
Criminal Case No. 8538359;
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-
38360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-
38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion
of the decision read as follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the
conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar,
and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is
hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her
profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections
27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision must be
forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED.
1

On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her
"to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February
1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of
Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and
executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December
1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal
by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review
on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful
penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-
appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has
always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense
charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she
did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon
respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found
guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal
offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez,
2
the
Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by the law. The
law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public
order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of
the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt
the welfare of society and the public interest.
3
(Italics supplied)
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted
of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance.
The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from
practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the
Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation
of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was
bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as
in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a
lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of
such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena,
4
this Court stressed that:
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of
good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an
admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.
5

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall
remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this
Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
spread on the record of respondent.












































II - CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY

Legal Ethics 5 SCRA 661 Conditional Pardon will not bar disbarment
Attorney Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in 1956. He was sentenced
to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion of the penalty, he was granted a
conditional pardon by the President. He was released on the condition that he shall not commit any
crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of
the latters conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted pardon.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely remitted his
sentence. It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his
conviction for murder without regard to the pardon (which he invoked in defense). The crime was
actually qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking
advantage of his official position (Gutierrez being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of
motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the
profession.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 1174 February 27, 1976
LUZON MAHOGANY TIMBER INDUSTRIES, INC., complainant,
vs.
ATTORNEY MANUEL REYES CASTRO, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

FERNANDO, J.:
It was the dismissal of an administrative complaint for disbarment on the ground of its being
premature against respondent Manuel Reyes Castro, a member of the Philippine Bar charged with
malpractice and gross misconduct for allegedly assisting a third party in a dishonest and illegal
,,scheme, and his failure to file a comment on a motion for reconsideration that led to the resolution
of this Court of December 18, 1974. It is of the following tenor: "For failure of respondent Castro to
file comment on the motion of complainant for reconsideration of the resolution of April 5, 1973
which dismissed the herein complaint for disbarment, the Court Resolved: (a) to require respondent
Castro to [explain] such failure; and (b) to [file] said comment with warning that disciplinary action
will be taken against him should be fail to do so, both within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
1

His explanation was duly filed on January 9, 1975. He alleged that while he was desirous to comply
with his obligation to file such comment, he was unable to do so "because of some tragedy in the
family.
2
Reference was then made to the following: "Respondent's sister, Mrs. Lourdes Castro-
Soriano, suffered a nervous breakdown (bordering on insanity) and respondent had to go to
Pangasinan to fetch her for hospitalization in the city. Added to this was the fact that his aged
parents, Mr. and Mrs. Claudio Castro, Sr. and Marciana Reyes-Castro, also suffered from several
ailments which required the personal attention of the respondent as he alone, among his parents'
children, could be of help due to his residence being here in Quezon City where hospital facilities are
available.
3
He would stress, however, that it was his intention "to file such comment to show his
innocence.
4
There was likewise the submission that "he met the officials and counsel of the
complainant, and it appears that complainant is inclined to withdraw or cause the dismissal of the
instant complaint after respondent had a change [sic] of views with them regarding the
circumstances of the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-17383 in the CFI of Quezon City.
5

1. This Court has no reason to doubt the veracity of the explanation. It does not suffice, however, for
exculpation. As far as the effort to help his sister, who suffered a nervous breakdown, is concerned,
his omission is excusable. Nor can fault be attributed to him if he took time to attend to the needs of
his aged parents, likewise the victims of "Several ailments, Insofar however as he would predicate
his neglect because of alleged professional problems consisting of court attendance and preparation
of motions, respondent ought to have been aware that such a manifestation does not help his cause
at all. This is not the first time a member of the bar has been told in no uncertain terms that in view
of the hierarchy in the judicial system in the Philippines, it is, to say the least, a deplorable lack of
common sense on the part of a member of the bar taken to task if this Court is to be given the least
attention. He should be aware likewise that what is involved is his own standing in the legal
profession, presumably, until this incident, one as yet unblemished. Nor could he expect
approbation when instead of doing what is required of him by this Court, he would readily assume
that just because complainant "was inclined to withdraw or cause the dismissal of the instant
complaint," he was free to disregard a duty that ought to have been fulfilled. He has the temerity to
speak of professional obligations. He must be reminded that as an officer of the Court, he is likewise
called upon to discharge certain responsibilities. When therefore he would assert with all confidence
that "he is not guilty of any act or omission as will justify the imposition of disciplinary action," he is
very much mistaken. It is this Court, not his deficient sense of what duty requires, that is controlling.
Accordingly, punishment should be imposed. It is only the realization that his negligence could also
be attributed to the commendable concern for the welfare of his aged parents and his ailing sister
that has led this Court to limit the penalty to reprimand.
2. As far as the motion for reconsideration for complainant is concerned, there is nothing therein
that would in any way militate against the conclusion reached by this Court in dismissing it "without
prejudice to its being filed after the termination of the pending civil case," reference being made-to
Civil Case Q-17383 of Quezon City.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of complainant is denied. Respondent Manuel Reyes
Castro is reprimanded, his explanation of the failure to submit the comment required of him being
only partially satisfactory. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his record.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-35766 July 12, 1973
LIBERATO V. CASALS, and JOSE T. SUMCAD, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, BR. 1, REBECCA
T. PALANCA and GRECAN CO., INC., respondents.
Ortile Law Office for petitioners.
Delante, Orellan and Associates for private respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N

TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court imposes a three-months suspension from the practice of law upon counsel of respondents
for improper conduct and abuse of the Court's good faith by his acts in the case at bar manifesting
gross disrespect for the Court's processes and a willful disregard of his solemn duty to conduct
himself with all good fidelity to the Court and tending to embarrass gravely the administration of
justice.
Upon the filing on November 2, 1972 of the petition at bar for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for writ of preliminary injunction, the Court as per its resolution of November 9, 1972 resolved,
without giving due course to the petition, to require respondents to comment thereon within ten
days from notice and to issue a temporary restraining order restraining respondent court inter
alia from proceeding with the hearing of the case
1
pending before it below.
Under date of December 8, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante as counsel for respondents, stating that
while he had received on November 15, 1972 notice of the Court's resolution of November 9, 1972,
"no accompanying copy of the petition has been attached thereto, hence the undersigned counsel
would not be able to prepare the comments of the respondents as directed in said resolution
without said copy." filed his first motion for a ten-day extension of time from receipt of such petition
within which to submit respondents' comment. The Court granted such first extension per its
resolution of December 15, 1972.
Under date of December 14, 1972, Atty. Primo O. Orellan on behalf of Delante, Orellan & Associates
as counsel for respondents filed a verified second motion for extension of ten days from December
15, 1972 within which to submit respondents' comment on the ground "2. That Atty. L.C. Delante,
counsel of record, got sick on December 6, 1972 and had not reported to work as yet" as per verified
medical certificate attached to the motion and "3. That Atty. Delante has just recovered from his
ailment, and has requested the undersigned to specially make this motion for another extension of
TEN (10) days in order to enable him to finish the comments for the respondents."
Under date of December 28, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante filed a third motion for "a last
extension of fifteen days from December 29, 1972 to submit the required comment, stating "That
the undersigned counsel has already prepared the final draft of the desired comments, but due to
pressure of work in his office and matters occasioned by the Christmas season, the same has not
been finalized and typed out in a clean copy," for filing by the expiry date on December 28, 1972.
The Court per its resolution of January 15, 1973 granted the said extensions totalling twenty-five
days. Having noted respondents' failure to file their comment notwithstanding the numerous
extensions sought by and granted to their counsel, which expired on January 12, 1973, the Court as
per its resolution of April 12, 1973 resolved to require Atty. Delante as counsel for respondents to
explain and show cause within ten days from notice why they failed to file the required comment.
Atty. Delante filed in due course his explanation dated May 7, 1973, wherein he claimed for the first
time that "in view of (his) pressing professional commitments," he requested his clients "to have the
answer ... prepared by another lawyer for which reason (respondents) took delivery of the records of
the said case from his office and contracted the services of Atty. Antonio Fernandez."
Atty. Delante goes on to claim that it was only upon receipt of the Court's resolution of April 12,
1973 requiring his explanation that he learned that Atty. Fernandez who had contracted "to prepare
an answer, underwent a surgical operation," attaching a copy of Atty. Fernandez' affidavit together
with a medical certificate which certified however to the latter's confinement at the Davao Doctors'
Hospital only from "Dec. 23-26, 1972" and "(D)aily follow up: Dec. 26, 1972 Jan. 15, 1973." Atty.
Fernandez in his affidavit however stated that after his services had been retained by respondents
"sometime on December 12, 1972" he "had been confined in the Davao Doctors' Hospital and
subsequently operated on for sinusitis" (on December 23-26, 1972) and that Gregorio Caeda,
president of respondent Grecan Co. Inc. "saw me in the hospital and asked from me the answer and I
told him that I may not be able to proceed and prepare the answer because of the operation that I
just had, hence he got the records of the case G.R. No. L-35766 from me."
Atty. Delante further submitted the so-called "affidavit" dated May 5, 1973 of Gregorio Caeda,
president and general manager of respondent Grecan Co. Inc. supporting his belated claim now that
their corporation contracted the services of Atty. Fernandez "to prepare the answer to meet the
deadline" and delivered the records of the case to the latter. The so-called "affidavit" is however not
sworn to before any official authorized to administer oaths but merely carries the statement "(T)hat
the foregoing facts are true and correct as what actually transpired" under the signature of one
Rebecca T. Palanca (Secretary-Treasurer)."
Atty. Delante pleads that "it is far from (his) intention to cause any undue delay in the disposition of
the above-entitled case," and "(T)hat this is the first time it happened to him, and that if given an
opportunity to prepare the answer, he will try his best to do it within the period granted by this
Honorable Tribunal, and that he assures this Honorable Tribunal that there would be no repetition of
this similar incident in the future." He prays that his explanation be accepted and without blinking an
eye notwithstanding that the required comment has long been overdue for almost four months at
the time that he "be given an opportunity to prepare the necessary answer for the respondents."
Counsel for petitioners promptly filed their comments dated May 11, 1973 citing the inconsistencies
and contradictions in Atty. Delante's explanation, opposing his plea to still be allowed to file
respondents' comment after his "gross and inexcusable negligence" and praying that the petition be
considered submitted for resolution by the Court.
In an earlier resolution of July 9, 1973, the Court took action on the petition and dismissed the same
for insufficient showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court in denying
petitioners' motion to dismiss the case below and appeal in due course from any adverse decision on
the merits being the merits being the proper and adequate remedy.
The present resolution concerns Atty. Delante's explanation which the Court finds to be
unsatisfactory.
Atty. Delante's present explanation that his failure to file respondents' comment is due to the failure
of the other lawyer, Atty. Fernandez, contracted by his clients at his instance because of his pressing
professional commitments "to do so, because of a surgical operation," is unworthy of credence
because it is contrary to the facts of record:
In his previous motions for extension, he never mentioned his belated allegation now
that another lawyer had been retained to file the required comment, and no other lawyer, much less
Atty. Fernandez, ever entered an appearance herein on behalf of respondents;
In his second motion for extension, supra, Atty. Delante's law office cited as reason the fact
that he had gotten sick on December 6, 1972 and had just recovered and needed the additional 10-
day extension "in order to enable him to finish the comments for the respondents;"
In his third motion for a last 15-day extension, Delante assured the Court "that (he) has already
prepared thefinal draft of the desired comments" and cited "pressure of work in his office" and the
Christmas Season for not having "finalized and typed out (the comments) in a clean copy" which
comments never came to be submitted to this Court;
His present explanation is not even borne out by Atty. Fernandez' medical certificate which shows
that he was confined in the hospital for sinusitis only from December 23-26, 1972 and therefore had
sufficient time and opportunity to submit the comments by the extended deadline on January 12,
1973;
Atty. Fernandez' own affidavit as submitted by Atty. Delante belies the latter's claim that the
records of the case had been given to the former, for Atty. Fernandez swore therein that when
Gregorio Caeda of respondent corporation saw him at the hospital (sometime between December
23-26, 1972) he advised Caeda of his inability to prepare the "answer" and Caeda got back the
records of the case from him;
He submits no explanation whatsoever, why if his "final draft of the desired comments" was
"already prepared" since year-end of 1972 and only had to be "finalized and typed out" he utterly
failed to submit the same notwithstanding the lapse of over six months and worse, in his
"explanation" of May 7, 1973 asked yet for "an opportunity to prepare the anser [which] he will try
his best to do it within the period granted by the Honorable Tribunal" when he had utterly ignored
and disregarded the numerous extensions granted him which lapsed on January 12, 1973; and
He likewise submits no explanation for his gross neglect in not seeing to it, assuming that Atty.
Fernandez was to prepare the required comment, that the required comment was filed within the
last extension (that expired on January 12, 1973) secured by him from the Court on his assurance
that the final draft was ready and did nothing for three months until after he received the Court's
resolution of April 12, 1973 requiring his explanation.
The Court thus finds unsatisfactory Atty. Delante's explanation for his having allowed his extended
period to lapse without submitting the required comment nor extending to the Court the courtesy of
any explanation or manifestation for his failure to do so. His inaction unduly prevented and delayed
for a considerable period the Court's prompt disposition of the petition. Worse, when this was noted
and the Court required his explanation, he gave an explanation that is devious and unworthy of
belief since it is contradicted by his own previous representations of record as well as by the
"supporting" documents submitted by him therewith, as shown hereinabove.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the lapse of over six months which he let pass without submitting the
required comment which according to his motion of December 28, 1972 was "already prepared" by
him and was only to be typed in clean, Atty. Delante in his explanation still brazenly asked the Court
for a further period to submit respondents' comment which supposedly had been readied by him for
submittal six months ago. His cavalier actions and attitude manifest gross disrespect for the Court's
processes and tend to embarrass gravely the administration of justice.
In Pajares vs. Abad Santos
2
the Court reminded attorneys that "There must be more faithful
adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be
subjected to disciplinary action."
It should also not be necessary to remind attorneys of their solemn oath upon their admission to the
Philippine Bar, that they will do no falsehood and conduct themselves as lawyers according to the
best of their knowledge and discretion good fidelity to the courts and their clients.
The unsatisfactory explanation given by Atty. Delante as against the pleadings of record in the case
at bar evinces a willful disregard of his solemn duty as an attorney to employ in the conduct of a case
"such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead" the courts "by
an artifice or false statement of false statement of fact or law."
3

The Court has ever stressed that a lawyer must do his best to honor his oath, as there would be a
great detriment to, if not a failure of the administration of justice if courts could not rely on the
submissions and representations made by lawyers in the conduct of a case. As stated by the Court in
one case, "Time and time again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that they are officers
of the court, and that while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the utmost
diligence, they are likewise held to strict accountability insofar as candor and honesty towards the
court is concerned."
4

Hence, the Court has in several instances suspended lawyers from the practice of law for failure to
file appellants' briefs in criminal cases despite repeated extensions of time obtained by them,
(except to file the missing briefs), with the reminder that "the trust imposed on counsel in
accordance not only with the canons of legal ethics but with the soundest traditions of the
profession would require fidelity on their part."
Considering, however, that counsel's record shows no previous infractions on his part since his
admission to the Philippine Bar in 1959, the Court is inclined to act in a spirit of leniency.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby suspends Atty. Leonido C. Delante from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) months effective from his receipt of notice hereof, with the warning that
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. The clerk of court is directed
to circularize notice of such suspension to the Court of Appeals and all courts of first instance and
other courts of similar rank.
Let copies of this resolution be filed in his personal record and furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of
the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her
by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of
jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition
that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez
on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the
unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a)
a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984
also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of
P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3)
checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds.
Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank
concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations
to Ms. Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due
time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and
sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in
Criminal Case No. 8538359;
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-
38360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-
38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion
of the decision read as follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the
conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar,
and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is
hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her
profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections
27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision must be
forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED.
1

On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her
"to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February
1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of
Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and
executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December
1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal
by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review
on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful
penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-
appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has
always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense
charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she
did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon
respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found
guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal
offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez,
2
the
Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by the law. The
law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public
order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of
the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt
the welfare of society and the public interest.
3
(Italics supplied)
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted
of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance.
The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from
practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the
Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation
of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was
bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as
in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a
lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of
such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena,
4
this Court stressed that:
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of
good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an
admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.
5

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall
remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this
Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
spread on the record of respondent.

FIRST DIVISION

[Adm. Case No. 126. October 24, 1952.]

In re: Atty. Tranquilino Rovero

Tranquilino Rovero in his own behalf.

SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; REMOVAL OR SUSPENSION; ACTS OF ATTORNEY NOT IN EXERCISE OF LEGAL
PROFESSION; CRIMINAL CONVICTION. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from
his office as attorney for a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, and this ground is apart
from any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office as a lawyer.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MORAL TURPITUDE, DEFINED; SMUGGLING. Moral turpitude includes any act
done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. The conviction for smuggling certainly
involves an act done contrary at least to honesty or good morals.


D E C I S I O N


PARAS, C.J. :


The Solicitor-General has filed the present complaint for disbarment against Atty. Tranquilino
Rovero, on the grounds that on March 31, 1947, "respondent Tranquilino Rovero, having been found
in a final decision rendered by the then Insular Collector of Customs to have violated the customs
law by fraudulently concealing a dutiable importation, was fined in an amount equal to three times
the customs duty due on a piece of jewelry which he omitted to declare and which was subsequently
found to be concealed in his wallet", and that on October 28, 1948, "respondent Tranquilino Rovero
was convicted of smuggling by final decision of the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case No. CA-G.R. No.
2214-R, affirming a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila sentencing him to pay a fine of
P2,500 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, said case involving a fraudulent practice
against customs revenue, as defined and penalized by Section 2703 of the Revised Administrative
Code." The respondent admits the existence of the decision of the Collector of Customs, and his
conviction by the Court of Appeals, but sets up the defense that they are not sufficient to disqualify
him from the practice of law, especially because the acts of which he was found guilty, while at most
merely discreditable, had been committed by him as an individual and not in pursuance or in the
exercise of his legal profession.

Under section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney for a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, and this
ground is apart from any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office as lawyer. Moral
turpitude includes any act done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. (In re Basa, 41
Phil. 275.)

Respondents conviction of smuggling by final decision of the Court of Appeals certainly involves an
act done contrary at least to honesty or good morals. The ground invoked by the Solicitor General is
aggravated by the fact that the respondent sought to defraud, not merely a private person, but the
Government.

Wherefore, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero is hereby disbarred from the practice of law, and he
is hereby directed to surrender to this Court his lawyers certificate within 10 days after this
resolution shall have become final.
So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 516 June 27, 1967
TRANQUILINO O. CALO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ESTEBAN DEGAMO, respondent.
Teodoro O. Calo, Jr. for complainant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor Pedro A,. Ramirez for investigators.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Disbarment proceedings against the respondent Esteban Degamo
1
upon a verified letter-complaint
of the petitioner, Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr., filed with this Court on 2 March 1962, and charging the
former with "having committed false statement under oath or perjury" in connection with his
appointment as Chief of Police of Carmen, Agusan.
On 12 March 1962, this Court required the respondent to file "an answer (not a motion to dismiss.)
After interposing an unsuccessful motion for a bill of particulars, he filed his answer on 29 May 1962
and this Court accordingly referred the case to the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and
recommendation. In turn, the Solicitor General referred the case to the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan.
The fiscal conducted an investigation. The petitioner adduced evidence, but not the respondent,
because on the date set for hearing, on 25 July 1964, following several postponements, the
respondent failed to attend, despite due notice, for which reason the investigating fiscal considered
the respondent as having waived his right to present evidence. Thereafter, the fiscal forwarded the
record of the investigation to the Solicitor General. On the basis thereof, the Solicitor General filed
his report and a complaint with this Court, recommending the disbarment of the respondent, for
gross misconduct.
No evidence having been submitted by the respondent, the following facts are either unrebutted or
admitted:
On 17 January 1959, respondent Esteban Degamo, as an applicant to the position of Chief of Police
of Carmen, Agusan, subscribed and swore to a filled-out "Information Sheet" before Mayor Jose
Malimit of the same municipality. The sheet called for answers about name, personal circumstances,
educational attainment, civil service eligibility and so forth. One item required to be filled out reads:
Criminal or police record, if any, including those which did not reach the Court. (State the
details of case and the final outcome.)"
to which respondent answered, "None."
Having accomplished the form, the respondent was appointed by the mayor to the position applied
for. However, on the day the respondent swore to the information sheet, there was pending against
him, and two (2) other co-accused, a criminal case in the Court of First Instance of Bohol (No. 2646)
for illegal possession of explosive powder.
2

Prior to the commencement of this administrative case, the respondent was also charged in an
information, dated 23 September 1960, for perjury, in the Court of First Instance of Agusan,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2194, on the same facts upon which he is now proceeded against as a
member of the Philippine bar.
In his defense, the respondent claims that his answer "None" to the aforequoted questionnaire was
made in good faith, it being his honest interpretation of the particular question (heretofore quoted)
that it referred to a final judgment or conviction and that Criminal Case No. 2646 was not a criminal
or police record.1wph1.t
The defense is plainly untenable. The questionnaire was simple, couched in ordinary terms and
devoid of legalism hence, it needed no interpretation. It only called for simple information. That it
asked for records "which did not reach the Court" entirely disproves respondent's technical twist to
the question as referring to final judgments or convictions.
Petitioner's letter-complaint was filed on 2 March 1962 while the act of the respondent complained
of was committed on 17 January 1959. Without explaining how and upon what authority,
respondent invokes the defense of prescription. This defense does not lie; the rule is that
The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, nor does
the circumstance that the facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a crime,
prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is barred by limitation, affect the disbarment
proceeding, . . . (5 Am. Jur. 434).
Nor is the pendency of Criminal Case No. 2194 (for perjury) a prejudicial question, since the ground
for disbarment in the present proceeding is not for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
but for gross misconduct. A violation of a criminal law is not a bar to disbarment (6 Moran 242, 1963
Ed., citing the case of In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577), and an acquittal is no obstacle to
cancellation of the lawyer's license. (In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399).
Respondent Degamo stresses that there is no cause of action against him because the information
sheet is not required by law but only by the Civil Service Commission. This argument is beside the
point. The issue is whether or not he acted honestly when he denied under oath the existence
against him of any criminal or police record, including those that did not reach the court. In this, he
did not tell the truth. He deliberately concealed it in order to secure an appointment in his own
favor. He, therefore, failed to maintain that high degree of morality expected and required of a
member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, 27 April 1963; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm.
Case No. 145, 28 Dec. 1956; Bolivar vs. Simbol, Adm. Case No. 377, 29 April 1966
**
), and he has
violated his oath as a lawyer to "do no falsehood". It needs no reiteration that the ethical standards
applicable to a member of the bar, who thereby automatically becomes a court officer, must
necessarily be one higher than that of the market place.
The facts being clear and undisputed, respondent's insistence upon patent technical excuses
disentitle him to leniency from his Court.
For the foregoing reasons, respondent Esteban Degamo is hereby disbarred, and his name ordered
stricken from the roll of attorneys.
So ordered.

FIRST DIVISION
SOCORRO T. CO, complainant, vs. ATTY. GODOFREDO N. BERNARDINO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Socorro T. Co, a
businesswoman, against Atty. Godofredo N. Bernardino charging him with unprofessional and
unethical conduct indicating moral deficiency and unfitness to stay in the profession of law.
Socorro T. Co alleged that in October 1989, as she was following up the documents for her
shipment at the Bureau of Customs, she was approached by respondent, Atty. Godofredo N.
Bernardino, introducing himself as someone holding various positions in the Bureau of Customs such
as Executive Assistant at the NAIA, Hearing Officer at the Law Division,
and OIC of the Security Warehouse. Respondent offered to help complainant and promised to
give her some business at the Bureau. In no time, they became friends and a month after, or in
November of the same year, respondent succeeded in borrowing from complainant P120,000.00
with the promise to pay the amount in full the following month, broadly hinting that he could use his
influence at the Bureau of Customs to assist her. To ensure payment of his obligation, respondent
issued to complainant several postdated Boston Bank checks: No. 092601 dated 1 December 1989
for P21,950.00, No. 092602 dated 4 December 1989 for P6,750.00, No. 092615 dated 15 January
1990 for P65,000.00 and No. 092622 dated 15 January 1990 for P10,000.00 (Exhs. "A-3," "B," "C,"
"D," respectively). Respondent also issued a postdated Urban Development Bank check No. 051946
dated 9 January 1990 forP5,500.00 (Exh. "E"). However, the checks covering the total amount
of P109,200.00 were dishonored for insufficiency of funds and closure of account.
Pressed to make good his obligation, respondent told complainant that he would be able to pay
her if she would lend him an additional amount of P75,000.00 to be paid a month after to be
secured by a chattel mortgage on his Datsun car.
[1]
As complainant agreed respondent handed her
three (3) copies of a deed of chattel mortgage which he himself drafted and six (6) copies of the
deed of sale of his car with the assurance that he would turn over its registration certificate and
official receipt. The agreement was not consummated as respondent later sold the same car to
another.
Despite several chances given him to settle his obligation respondent chose to evade
complainant altogether so that she was constrained
to write him a final demand letter dated 22 September 1992
[2]
preceding the filing of several
criminal complaints against him for violation of BP Blg. 22.
[3]
Complainant also filed a letter-
complaint dated 5 October 1992 with the Office of the Ombudsman.
[4]

It may be worth mentioning that a certain Emelinda Ortiz also filed several criminal and civil
cases against respondent similarly involving money transactions.
[5]
Ms. Ortiz claimed that
respondent had volunteered to sell to her a 20-footer container van filled with imported cotton
fabric shirting raw materials from the Bureau of Customs warehouse for P600,000.00 in time for the
holidays. However, despite her successive payments to respondent totalling P410,000.00, the latter
failed to deliver the goods as promised. Worse, respondent's personal check forP410,000.00
representing reimbursement of the amount he received from Ms. Ortiz was returned dishonored for
insufficiency of funds.
By way of defense, respondent averred that he gave the checks to complainant Co by way of
rediscounting and that these were fully paid when he delivered five cellular phones to her. He
brushed aside the allegations of complainant and Ms. Ortiz as ill-motivated, vague, confusing,
misleading and full of biases and prejudices. Although he is married he insinuated a special
relationship with the two (2) women which caused him to be careless in his dealings with them.
On 3 March 1993 the Court referred this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
On 17 May 1997 the IBP issued a resolution recommending the suspension of respondent from
the practice of law for six (6) months based on the following findings -
1. No receipt has been produced by respondent showing that the face value of the subject checks
has been paid or that the alleged five (5) units of cellular phones have been delivered to the
complainant;
2. The Decision in the criminal cases that were filed vis-a-vis the subject bouncing checks and
wherein he was acquitted clearly shows that his acquittal was not due to payment of the obligation
but rather that 'private complainant knew at the time the accused issued the checks that the latter
did not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the same. No violation of BP Blg. 22 is committed
where complainant was told by the drawer that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank; and
3. Respondent subsequently paid the complainant as shown by a receipt dated 26 August 1995 x x x
and the release of real estate mortgage x x x x If it is true that he had already paid his obligation with
five (5) cellular phones, why pay again?
The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not
ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private
capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]). Where, however, the misconduct outside of the
lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in
suspending or removing him from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]).
The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad checks. This gross
misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar, puts
his moral character in serious doubt. The Commission, however, does not find him a hopeless case
in the light of the fact that he eventually paid his obligation to the complainant, albeit very much
delayed.
[6]

While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between complainant and
respondent as the transaction between them did not require the professional legal services of
respondent, nevertheless respondent's abject conduct merits condemnation from this Court. Thus
we held in Lizaso v. Amante
[7]
where Atty. Amante enticed complainant to invest in the casino
business with the proposition that her investment would yield her an interest of 10%
profit daily, and Atty. Amante not only failed to deliver the promised return on the investment
but also the principal thereof (P5,000.00) despite complainant's repeated demands -
As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567 (1923)] the
principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the
relationship of an attorney and client x x x x In disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm
said: x x x x As a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for
misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with
many exceptions x x x x The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney
and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rules prescribing the
qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral
character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the
practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and
the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice
and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional
duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license
and the law confer upon him x x x x
[8]

Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo
[9]
where the erring lawyer was suspended for one year from
the practice of law for attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice Malcolm reiterated that an
attorney may be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for
gross misconduct not related to his professional duties which show him to be an unfit and unworthy
lawyer. "The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not
compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of
prison. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when
the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be
entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him x x x x Of all
classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the law x x x and to that
doctrine we give our unqualified support."
[10]

Finally, reference is made to Rule 1.01, Chapter 1, entitled The Lawyer and Society of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." "Conduct," as used in this Rule, is not limited to conduct exhibited in
connection with the performance of professional duties.
In the case at bar, it is glaringly clear that the procurement of personal loans through
insinuations of his power as an influence peddler in the Bureau of Customs, the issuance of a series
of bad checks and the taking undue advantage of his position in the aforesaid government office
constitute conduct in gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The recommended suspension of respondent for six (6) months is less than what he justly
deserves. His propinquity for employing deceit and misrepresentations as well as his cavalier
attitude towards incurring debts without the least intention of repaying them is reprehensible. This
disturbing behavior cannot be tolerated most especially in a lawyer who is an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GODOFREDO N. BERNARDINO is SUSPENDED FOR ONE (1) YEAR
from the practice of law with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more
severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts in the land, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread in respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.


EN BANC
A.C. No. 289 November 29, 1962
MERCEDES AGDOMA, EUGENIA AGDOMA and PEDRO AGDOMA, petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. ISAIAS A. CELESTINO, respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a disbarment proceeding against Isaias A. Celestino for malpractice and misconduct as a
lawyer and notary public.
The complainants Mercedes Agdoma, Eugenia Agdoma and Pedro Agdoma are aunts and uncle of
respondent Isaias A. Celestino, his deceased mother Eulogia Agdoma being the sister of the former.
Both the complainant and the respondent, in representation of his late mother Eulogia, are the heirs
of the late Julian Agdoma, the complainants' father and the respondent's grandfather. Julian
Agdoma left a parcel of land situated in barrio San Juan, Alcala, Pangasinan, registered in his name
under original certificate of title No. 62507. On 23 July 19 Julian Agdoma died in Lambayong,
Cotabato (Exhibits B-1 and B-2). On 9 March 1956 Anastasia Cabatic, Julian's wife, died in Alcala,
Pangasinan (Exhibit C).
On or after 16 August 1955 Isaias A. Celestino filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an ex-
partepetition in behalf of the late Julian Agdoma. In said petition he represented that his late
grandfather was alive and that the latter's copy of original certificate of title No. 62507 had been
burned by fire that razed to the ground his (Julian's) house in San Vicente, Alcala, Pangasinan and
prayed that the Register of Deeds in and for the province of Pangasinan be directed to issue another
duplicate copy thereof. (Exhibit E-1). The respondent supported the petition by an affidavit
purportedly subscribed and sworn to by the deceased Julian Agdoma on 16 August 1955 before him
(the respondent) as notary public (Exhibit E-2). On 17 August 1955 Judge Jesus P. Morfe of the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan entered an order granting the petition and directing the Register of
Deeds in and for the province of Pangasinan to issue another owner's duplicate of certificate of title
No. 62507 (Exhibit F).
Two days before the respondent filed the ex parte petition asking for a new copy of original
certificate of title No. 62507, it was made to appear that for and in consideration of P1,000 Julian
Agdoma had sold the lot described in the original certificate of title No. 62507 to the respondent in a
deed of absolute sale (Exhibit C) purportedly acknowledged before notary public Julio B. Pequet
who, however, turned out to be a fictitious or nonexistent notary public in and for the province of
Pangasinan (Exhibits I and J). By virtue of said sale, on 17 August 1955 the Register of Deeds in and
for the province of Pangasinan cancelled original certificate of title No. 62507 in the name of Julian
Agdoma and in lieu thereof issued transfer certificate of title No. 18925 in the name of respondent
Isaias A. Celestino (Exhibit H). Afterwards, the respondent mortgaged the parcel of land for P425 to
the Dagupan City branch of the Philippine National Bank. Until now the loan still is unpaid.
On 14 February 1957 the complainants filed in this Court a complaint praying for the disbarment of
Isaias A. Celestino. On 19 February 1957 this Court ordered the respondent to answer the complaint
within ten days from notice. On 15 March the respondent in his behalf filed an answer denying all
the material averments of the complaint. On 18 March this Court passed a resolution referring the
case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 30 April, the Solicitor
General forwarded the case to the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan set the hearing of the case for 26 April 1957, which was
postponed to 9 May 1957. At the hearing held on 9 May, the respondent did not appear. The officer
serving summons and notices certified that the respondent refused to sign the notice. The fiscal
considered such refusal as a waiver by the respondent of his right to be present at the investigation.
When the fiscal was preparing a report on case based on the evidence presented by the
complainants, Attorney Cipriano V. Abenojar of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, on 10 June 1957 formally
entered his appearance for the respondent and requested that the case be immediately set for
hearing. The respondent expressed in writing his consent to the appearance of and motion by
Attorney Abenojar to set the case for hearing. The fiscal granted request and set the hearing for 26
July 1957 with a warning that no further postponement would be granted. At the hearing held on 26
July, neither the respondent nor his counsel appeared. Instead, the latter filed a motion for
postponement, alleging that the respondent and the complainants, being blood relatives, might
settle amicably. This last motion was granted and the fiscal set the investigation for 20 August 1957
with a warning of no further postponement. Again, the respondent or lawyer did not appear at the
hearing on 20 August. Forthwith, the fiscal rendered a report finding the respondent Isaias A.
Celestino guilty of malpractice an commending to the Solicitor General that the corresponding
charges for disbarment be filed against him (respondent Celestino).
On 22 June 1959, the Solicitor General filed in Court a formal complaint against Isaias A. Celestino
malpractice and breach of professional ethics. Letters and communications sent by this Court to the
respondent directing him to answer the complaint filed by the Solicitor General were all returned
undelivered or unserved, because the respondent could not be located at his given address at San
Vicente, Alcala, Pangasinan. His attorney of record in the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan also
required to answer, but instead of answering, he requested that he be relieved as counsel for the
respondent. At the oral argument of the case before this Court on 14 December, Attorney Cipriano
V. Abenojar appeared the respondent. The Court ordered the respondent self to submit a
memorandum in lieu of oral argumentation.
The oral and documentary evidence points unerringly to the guilt of respondent Isaias A. Celestino as
charged. The ex-parte petition wherein he sought another owner's duplicate of original certificate of
title No. 62507 and presented himself as counsel for Julian Agdoma, his grandfather, whom he knew
had been dead since 23 July 1945, and the affidavit which he (the respondent) represented to have
been subscribed and sworn to by Julian Agdoma before him (the respondent) as notary public, thus
making it appear that his late grandfather was alive, and which he used to support the ex-
parte petition, are clear evidence that the respondent Isaias A. Celestino had committed a wanton
falsehood in court. And this wanton disregard for truth and honesty is aggravated by his forging or
simulating a deed of sale of the parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 62507
executed in his favor by his deceased grandfather Julian Agdoma when he (the respondent) knew
that his grandfather had been dead ten years before and therefore could not have executed the
deed of sale. To lend to this concoction a semblance of legality, the respondent made it appear that
Julian Agdoma, appeared and acknowledged the sale before one Julio B. Pequet supposedly a notary
public. But it clearly has been shown that said Julio B. Pequet was a non-existent or fictitious notary
public. The residence certificate No. A-3609899 issued at Alcala, Pangasinan, on 14 February 1955,
which the respondent attributed to pertain to and to have been exhibited by the late Julian Agdoma
in swearing before him (the respondent) supporting affidavit to the ex-parte petition seeking an
owner's duplicate of the original certificate of title No. 62507 and in acknowledging the deed of sale
before the fictitious notary public Julio B. Pequet is another evidence showing the respondent's
propensity to commit falsehood, because the said residence certificate does not belong to Julian
Agdoma but to one Mrs. Angela Eslava of Alcala, Pangasinan (Exhibit A). The clinching evidence of
the respondent's guilt is the fact that after the ownership to the parcel of land had been transferred
to him, he mortgaged it for P425 to the Philippine National Bank, Dagupan City branch.
The respondent avoided attending the hearings conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan.
Even in this Court, his whereabouts are totally unknown. His knowledge that a disbarment
proceeding had been file pending against him imposes upon him the duty to make himself or his
presence available to this Court for a trial. That he could not be located at his known address
without making his whereabouts known implies that he had chosen to waive every right and
opportunity to put up his defense.
THEREFORE, the respondent Isaias A. Celestino is barred from the practice of the legal profession.


52 Phil 399 Legal Ethics Practice of Law is a Privilege
Felipe Del Rosario took the bar in 1925 for the second time and he failed. He again took it in 1926
and he failed again. In 1927, he filed a motion before the Supreme Court in which he alleged that
there was a mistake in the computation of his exam results in the 1925 bar exams. He was then
admitted to the bar.
HOWEVER, a subsequent investigation by the city fiscal uncovered that Del Rosario, together with
one Juan Villaflor a former employee of the Supreme Court, falsified some documents to make it
appear that Del Rosario actually passed the 1925 bar exams. The two were subsequently charged
with falsification. Villaflor was convicted as he pleaded guilty but Del Rosario was acquitted for lack
of evidence. The fiscal however recommended Del Rosario to surrender his certificate of attorney.

ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation by the fiscal is correct.

HELD: Yes. The mere fact that Villaflor was convicted proves that Del Rosario is unworthy of the
certificate of attorney. The crime which Villaflor is proven guilty of has benefited only Del Rosario
and it is impossible that the latter has no knowledge of this illegal machination.
But shouldnt the Supreme Court just allow Del Rosario to take the bar exams again?
No. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who demands it, but is a
privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards of the legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the
criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as
an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him
to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar.




EN BANC

[Adm. Case No. 195. January 31, 1958.]

In re: Attorney JESUS T. QUIAMBAO, Respondents.

Jose G. Gatchalian and Santiago F. Alidio for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

ATTORNEY AT LAW; DISBARMENT; MISAPPROPRIATION OF MONEY RECEIVED; RELEASE OBTAINED
THRU FRAUD AND MALICIOUS INDUCEMENT TO PAY OBLIGATION. Respondent attorney JTQ
engineered the whole scheme to induce, through his brother MQ, PRP to purchase a parcel of land
knowing fully well that it is not for sale because the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Company
was just a mortgagee and not in a position to sell it. In that way he succeeded in taking from PRP the
sum of P12,000 which he appropriated for his own use and benefit; that he fraudulently and
maliciously induced PRP to sign a document, thereby relieving him from the obligation of paying the
said sum to PRP, and at the same time caused the latter to execute another document where PRP
undertook to collect from MQ the whole sum of P12,000. HELD: that by his acts the respondent has
shown that he is unworthy to continue as a member of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from
practice of law.


D E C I S I O N


PADILLA, J.:


On 17 May 1954 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-GR No. 11104-R, Pedro R. Peralta,
plaintiff-appellee v. Jesus T. Quiambao, Defendant-Appellant, affirming that of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (case No. 1783) and transmitted the record of the case to this Court for whatever
action it may deem proper to take against Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao for having committed acts
unbecoming a member of the Bar.

It appears that sometime in January 1949 Manuel Quiambao, an agent of the Yek Tong Lin Fire &
Marine Insurance Company offered for sale to Pedro R. Peralta a parcel of land located in barrio
Moriones, Tarlac, Tarlac, containing an area of 44 hectares for P15,000. Peralta accepted the offer,
and on 7 February 1949 he opened a checking account with the Tarlac branch of the Philippines
National Bank by depositing therewith the sum of P11,000. With a check of P11,000 drawn upon the
bank in Manila, Peralta and Manuel Quiambao proceeded to Manila and contacted Attorney Jesus T.
Quiambao, brother of Manuel, at his house to seek his help in the purchase of the parcel of land. On
9 February Peralta and the two brothers cashed the check at the bank in Escolta and repaired to the
law office of Honesto K. Bausa, attorney for the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Company, at
the Regina building, where upon reaching the door Peralta handed to Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao
the sum of P11,000. Attorney Quiambao went inside the office of Attorney Bausa, where he stayed
for about an hour, leaving Peralta at the door waiting for him. As he emerged from the law office,
Attorney Quiambao told Peralta to wait for a while because "they will place your name in the title,"
and later on executed a document (Exhibit A), acknowledging receipt from Peralta of the sum of
P12,000 to be kept by the former as attorney-in-fact of the latter pending issuance of the title to the
parcel of land. The receipt acknowledges the sum of P12,000, because Peralta had given Attorney
Quiambao the sum of P1,000 as earnest money. Days passed and as Peralta did not receive the title
to the parcel of land, he went to the office of the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Company to
inquire whether the title to the parcel of land had already been issued in his name and there he
learned from the bookkeeper of the company that the title had not yet been issued in his name. He
then demanded the return of the sum of P12,000 from Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao but the later
failed to return it to him.

Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao does not deny having received the sum of P12,000 from Peralta, but
claims that the same had been returned to him by installments through his brother Manuel
Quiambao, who was Peraltas friend, and in whose house Peralta and his family lived; that he gave
Attorney Bausa the sum of P500 as earnest money when they went to see him; that the balance of
P12,000 was left in his custody; that Peralta was authorized to take possession of the property and
make improvements on it pending actual transfer to him; that the balance of P11,500 in his
(Attorney Quiambaos) custody was withdrawn from him by his brother Manuel by authority of
Peralta; that the first withdrawal in the sum of P3,000 was made sometime in the first week of
March 1949, the second in the sum of P4,000 in April 1949, the third in the sum of P3,000 or P2,000
on or about the 24th of May, 1949, and the last for the balance of the sum, paid by his wife,
sometime in June 1949; that he and his wife did not ask any receipt for all the withdrawals; that all
these sums were spent to build an earth dam in the parcel of land, to hire a bulldozer, to buy
seedlings, and to construct houses for 28 tenants, except the sum of P4,000, withdrawn by Manuel
Quiambao by way of loan from Peralta, which the former promised to pay to the latter as soon as he
would secure a loan from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation; that on 10 March 1950, a
document (Exhibit 1) was signed by Jesus T. Quiambao, Pedro R. Peralta and Manuel Quiambao
reciting, among others, that the sum of P12,000 in the custody of Attorney Quiambao was
periodically withdrawn from him by Manuel Quiambao at the behest and/or with the knowledge and
consent of Pedro R. Peralta; and that on that same day Pedro R. Peralta executed another document
(Exhibit 2) releasing Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao from liability for the sum of P12,000 entrusted to
him. It recites

TO WHOM IT MY CONCERN:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

This is to certify that I should collect the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS, (P12,000.00) from Mr.
Manuel Quiambao, from the proceeds of the sale of his property, as satisfaction of the money
receipted by Mr. Jesus T. Quiambao and withdrawn from him with my knowledge and consent.

This is made in order to secure the realization of said sum from Mr. Manuel Quiambao exclusively.

Manila, March 10, 1950.

(Sgd.) PEDRO PERALTA

The Court of Appeals is of the opinion that Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao engineered the whole
scheme to induce, through his brother Manuel, Pedro R. Peralta to purchase the parcel of land in
question, knowing fully well that it was not for sale because the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine
Insurance Company was just a mortgagee and not in a position to sell it. In that way he succeeded in
taking from Peralta the sum of P12,000 which he appropriated for his own use and benefit; that he
fraudulently and maliciously induced Peralta to sign the document marked Exhibit 1, thereby
relieving him from the obligation of paying the said sum to Peralta and at the same time caused the
latter to execute another document marked Exhibit 2 where Peralta undertook to collect from
Manuel Quiambao the whole sum of P12,000.

The respondent attorney was required by this Court to answer the charges against him. In his
answer he set up the same defenses he had set up in case No. 1783 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal and CA-GR No. 11104-R of the Court of Appeals which were overruled by the two Courts.

By his acts the respondent has shown that he is unworthy to continue as a member of the Bar. He is,
therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.


EN BANC
VICTORIANO P. RESURRECCION, complainant, vs. ATTY. CIRIACO C. SAYSON, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but
such statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, "of all classes and professions,
[lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law,"
[1]
it is imperative that they live by the
law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in
the legal profession.
In a Complaint-Affidavit, Victoriano P. Resurrecion charged Respondent Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson
with acts constituting "malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct in his office and a violation of his
duties and oath as a lawyer." The Complaint arose from a homicide through reckless imprudence
case, in which Complainant Resurrecion was the defendant and Respondent Sayson was the counsel
for the offended party, Mr. Armando Basto Sr. The complainant alleged that, pursuant to the
amicable settlement previously reached by the parties, he gave P2,500 to the respondent who,
however, never gave the money to his client. Thus, the complainant was compelled to give
another P2,500 to Mr. Basto as settlement of the case. The complainant then demanded the return
of the money from respondent, to no avail. Thus, the Complaint for Disbarment.
The records show that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) conducted several hearings on
the matter; during which the complainant was represented by Atty. Ronaldo Lopez. Although
respondent had been notified, he failed to attend a number of such hearings. He eventually
appeared through his new counsel, Atty. Wenceslao Fajardo. Because respondent once again failed
to attend the next hearing, the OSG, in its September 4, 1973 Order,
[2]
deemed the investigation of
the case terminated. But upon the motion of the respondent, the OSG on October 31, 1973, set
aside its earlier Order and once again set the case for a hearing of the former's evidence. Since then,
however, it appears that the OSG has not been able to submit its report and recommendation on the
case.
In 1990, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) took cognizance of the case
[3]
and
tasked Commissioner Jesulito A. Manalo with the investigation, of which both the complainant and
the respondent were duly notified. Complainant Resurreccion manifested his assent to the pursuit
of the matter, but Respondent Sayson could not be found.
[4]
In his Report, Commissioner Manalo
presented the following facts:
"Respondent, a member of the Philippine Bar was accused of having converted and appropriated
[for] his own personal benefit the amount of P2,500.00 representing the amount which was
delivered by the complainant to the respondent as compensation or settlement money of a case for
homicide thru reckless imprudence.
xxx xxx xxx
"Complainant alleged that on 13 May 1970, he was involved in a vehicular accident which occurred
at Epifanio delos Santos Avenue, Quezon City which involved a boy [named] the name of Armando
Basto resulting [in] the death of the latter. By reason of the said incident, complainant was accused
of homicide thru reckless imprudence before the City Fiscal's Office at Quezon City. In the
preliminary investigation, the father of the victim Mr. Armando Basto, Sr., was represented by
respondent. Complainant was however, represented by Atty. Ramon Umali. The case for homicide
thru reckless imprudence was amicably settled on 8 August 1970 and respondent received from the
complainant the amount of P2,500.00. Respondent allegedly assured complainant that the sum
[would] be delivered to his client Mr. Armando Basto, Sr. Respondent acknowledged in writing
having received the amount of P2,500.00.
"Contrary however, to the assurances of the respondent, he had not delivered the said amount
of P2,500.00 and the case was not dismissed for which reason complainant was compelled to pay
anew the heirs of the victim the amount of P2,500.00. Demands were made for the respondent to
return the said amount ofP2,500.00 but the latter failed. By reason thereof, complainant filed a
complaint for estafa against the respondent before the City Court of Quezon City which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. III-149358 entitled 'People of the Philippines vs. Ciriaco C. Sayson'.
"In the hearing held on 22 May 1973, complainant Victoriano P. Resurreccion appeared assisted by
his counsel. There was however, no appearance for the respondent Ciriaco C. Sayson. The
investigator declared his failure to appear as a waiver of his presence and Mr. Armando Basto, Sr.
was presented as witness. He testified that he [was] the father of Armando Basto, Jr. who was ran
over by a motor vehicle then driven by the respondent. By reason of such death a case was filed in
court and he was represented by Atty. Ciriaco Sayson, respondent in this case. A settlement
arrangement was arrived at and complainant entrusted the amount of P2,500.00 to the respondent
for the latter to turn over the same to his client. Atty. Ciriaco Sayson, however, failed to turn over
the said amount ofP2,500.00 to his client for which reason the case was not immediately
dismissed. To effect dismissal of the case, complainant was forced to pay anew the sum
ofP2,500.00.
"Complainant was next presented as witness and he testified that on 30 May 1970, he was involved
in a vehicular accident which resulted in the death of one Armando Basto, Jr. By reason thereof, he
was accused of homicide thru reckless imprudence[,] and to effect settlement of that case he agreed
to pay the amount ofP2,500.00.
"On 8 August 1970, complainant together with his counsel conferred with [the] respondent in the
latter's office at May Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila and in a conference, a settlement was arrived at
whereby complainant [would] pay the amount of P2,500.00. This was done and payment was
delivered to the respondent who acknowledged having received the said amount.
"Subsequently, complainant learned that the said amount of P2,500.00 was not delivered by
respondent to Mr. Armando Basto, Sr., the father of the victim for which reason he was compelled
to pay another amount of P2,500.00 to the heirs of the victim.
"Thereafter, he demanded [the] return of the said amount of P2,500.00 from the
respondent. Despite visiting the latter fifteen or sixteen times, Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson still failed to
return the money. Thus, complainant filed a complaint for estafa which was elevated in Court and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 49358.
"A Decision finding the respondent guilty of [the] crime of estafa was promulgated by the City Court
of Quezon City."
[5]

Commissioner Manalo then rendered his evaluation and recommendation in this wise:
"Complainant was able to establish by more than convincing evidence that the misappropriation was
in fact committed by the respondent. This fact [is] eloquently proven by Exhibits "A" to "E", all of
which were not controverted by the respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
"In view of the foregoing, undersigned Commissioner respectfully recommends that the above-
entitled case be endorsed by the Honorable Board Governors to the Supreme Court with the
recommendation that the complain[ant be] disbarred and his name be stricken off xxx the roll of
attorneys.
xxx xxx xxx"
[6]

On February 28, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting and approving
the report and recommendation of Commissioner Manalo. The Resolution, signed by IBP National
Secretary Roland B. Inting and forwarded to this Court on March 28, 1998, is worded as follows:
"RESOLUTION NO. XIII-97-202
Adm. Case No. 1037
Victoriano P. Resurreccion vs. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, respondent Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson is
DISBARRED and xxx his name xxx stricken from the Roll of Attorneys for having been found guilty of
Estafa promulgated by the City Court of Quezon City and [which] complainant was able to establish
by more convincing evidences that misappropriation was in fact committed by the respondent, all of
which were not controverted by the respondent."
[7]

The Court agrees with Commissioner Manalo's findings and conclusion, as approved and
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson must be disbarred.
Respondent Sayson was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on
September 20, 1973.
[8]
Such conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
[9]
and upheld by this
Court.
[10]

In In re Vinzon,
[11]
the Court disbarred a lawyer who had been convicted of estafa and held that
"moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty or good morals. In
essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude because the act is
unquestionably against justice, honesty and good morals."
In a more recent case,
[12]
the Court upheld the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
to disbar a lawyer who had been convicted of estafa through falsification of public documents,
because she was "totally unfit to be a member of the legal profession." In adopting the
recommendation, we held that "good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission
to the legal profession, but it must also remain extant in order to maintain one's good standing in
that exclusive and honored fraternity."
True, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution and only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court
and member of the bar.
[13]
Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.
[14]
However, in the present case, the
Court notes that even if respondent's culpability for estafa has been indubitably established, there is
no indication that he has served sentence, returned to complainant what was due him or showed
any remorse for what he did. The 27-year delay in the resolution of this case was, to a large extent,
caused by his failure to appear before the Office of the Solicitor General and to inform the IBP of his
change of address, a failure that also indicated his lack of regard for the very serious charges brought
against him. Respondent Sayson, by his conduct, has shown that he is not worthy to remain a
member of the bar.
Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who
are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are
vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially
in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Ciriaco C. Sayson is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed
to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

LEGAL PROFESSION CASE 23
ROYONG VS. OBLENA
AC No. 376 April 30, 1963
En Banc, Barrera

FACTS:
Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar and
bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation and found out that
there was no rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent seems to be
consensual sex.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit
the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor General made
another complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for
admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia
Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus
rendering him unfit to practice law, praying that this Court render judgment ordering the permanent
removal of the respondent as lawyer and judge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the adulterous
cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.

HELD:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred.

RATIO:
The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been
admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify
that as ground for disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his
profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this
case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in
protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show
good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place
where he is known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission
to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him
sqemed to have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a person of good moral character. It is
of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a
member of the bar.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 266 April 27, 1963
PAZ ARELLANO TOLEDO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JESUS B. TOLEDO, respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a disbarment proceedings under Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.
On 9 July 1956 Paz Arellano Toledo filed in this Court a sworn complaint in the form of a letter
alleging that she is the wife of Jesus B. Toledo, a member of the Bar;
1
that they were married on 27
December 1946 while he was still a second year student of law; that she supported him and spent
for his studies; that after passing the bar examination and becoming a full-fledged member of the
Bar he abandoned her; that he is at present employed in the Bureau of Mines
2
and stationed at
Cagayan de Oro City; and that he is cohabiting with another woman who had borne him three
children. She prayed that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. On 11, July 1956,
this Court directed the respondent to answer the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice
and a copy of the complaint.
3
The respondent mailed his answer in the form of a letter, which was
received in this Court on 4, October 1956, averring that the complaint was not in due form because
"It does not set out distinctly, clearly and concisely the legal causes for the suspension or disbarment
of a member of the Philippine Bar as provided in the Rules of Court hence his "answer could not be
made in the logical sequence of a formal pleading;" that there seems to be an irregularity in the
filing of the complaint because while the letter-complaint was dated 25, June 1956, and received at
the Docket Section of this Court on 2, July 1956, by an employee whose initials are "A.L."
4
It was
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public on a later date, 5 July 1956; and the alleged
information furnished by Esperanza D. Almonte that the respondent was cohabiting with another
woman who had borne him three children is not true because her very informant, whose true name
is Leoncia D. Almonte, executed an affidavit to the effect that the respondent was employed in the
Bureau of Lands, not in the Bureau of Mines, and that the three children referred to by the
complainant were the children of Mr. and Mrs. Ruperto Ll. Jose, with whom the respondent was
boarding. Attached to his answer are the affidavit of Leoncia D. Almonte and a copy of his answer to
a complaint filed by the complainant with the Director of Lands for abandonment and immorality. In
9 October 1956, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation and on 11 October 1956 the record of the case was received by the Office of the
Solicitor General. On 19 November 1956, 10 December 1956, 7, 8, 14, and 15 February 1957, 18
March 1957 and 5 August 1957, the office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings during which
the complainant presented her evidence both oral and documentary and the respondent, who
appeared in his own behalf, cross-examined her witnesses. The respondent did not present evidence
in his behalf but reserved the right to present it under the provisions of Section 6, Rule 128. After
finding that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, on 24 July 1958 the
Solicitor General filed a complaint in this Court charging the respondent with abandonment of his
wife and immorality for cohabiting with another woman by whom he has a child, and praying that he
be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law. On 30 July 1958 the Clerk of Court sent to the
respondent by mail a copy of the complaint filed by the Solicitor General and directed him to answer
the same within 15 days from receipt thereof, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 128. On 28 August 1958
the respondent filed in this Court a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground "that the charges
contained therein are not based on and supported by the facts and evidence adduced at the
investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General." On 2 September 1958 this Court set
the case for hearing on 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning. On 13 September 1958
the respondent filed a motion praying that his motion to dismiss filed on 28 August 1958 be first
resolved or, that, should it be denied, he be given a period of ten days within which to file an
answer; that upon receipt of his answer the case be returned to the Solicitor General for reception
of his evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 128; and that the hearing of the case set for 17
September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning be held in abeyance pending resolution of his
motion. At the hearing of the case on 17 September 1958, counsel for the respondent appeared and
was given a period of 15 days within which to submit a written memorandum in lieu of oral
argument, and the Solicitor General the same period of time from receipt of a copy of the
respondent's memorandum within which to reply. On 22 October 1958, within the extension of time
previously granted, the respondent filed his memorandum and on 17 November 1958, also within
the extension of time previously granted, the Solicitor General, his memorandum in reply.
Section 6, Rule 128, provides:
The evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation may be considered,
by the Supreme Court in the final decision of the case, if the respondent had an opportunity
to object and cross-examine. If in the respondent's answer no statement is made as to any
intention of introducing additional evidence, the case shall be set down for hearing, upon the
filing of such answer or upon the expiration of the time to file the same. (Emphasis supplied)
The above-quoted rule in no uncertain terms requires the respondent in disbarment or suspension
proceedings from the practice of law to file an answer to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General
after investigation and, should he desire to present evidence in his behalf, to expressly say so in the
answer. Instead of doing what the rule requires, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss without
stating that he intended to present evidence in his behalf, thereby waiving his right. The fact that at
the close of the hearing conducted by the Solicitor General, he made of record his desire to present
evidence in his behalf, is not sufficient. The correct manner and proper time for him to make known
his intention is by and in the answer seasonably filed in this Court.
The complainant testified as follows: On 27 December 1946 she, a dentist by profession, and the
respondent, then a second year law student, were married civilly in Camiling, Tarlac, by the Justice of
the Peace (Exhibit A). For a period of two weeks after their wedding, they lived in the house of her
parents at No. 76 General del Pilar street in Camiling. After two weeks, the respondent went to
Manila to resume his studies at the Far Eastern University,
5
and she remained in Camiling to practice
her profession. While the respondent was still studying, he either returned to Camiling once a week
or she came to Manila twice a week to visit with each other. Sometimes the respondent stayed with
her in Camiling for a week, and when she came to Manila to buy dental materials she slept with him
at his boarding house or at the house on Economia street where he on lived with his brother Cleto
and Aniceto and cousin Felisa Bacera, who cooked their meals for them. They were in good terms
until about three or four months before his graduation. On the day of his graduation, he showed her
indifference and humiliated and embarrassed her by calling her a "provinciana" and telling her that
she was a nuisance whenever she came to see him. Nevertheless, being his wife, she continued to
see him while he was reviewing for the bar examinations. She specifically mentioned that three days
before the last examination, she came to see him. A week after the bar examinations, she again
came to see him. Since then they became actually separated and she never saw him again until the
hearing of the case. Through Mrs. Esperanza Almonte, she learned that the respondent was
employed in the Bureau of Lands and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City. The respondent never wrote
to her and asked her to follow him at his place of work and she did not care to either.
Marina Payot gave the following testimony: From 28 February to 3 June 1955 she lived and worked
as maid, laundress and cook for the respondent, his family composed of himself, Mrs. Corazon
Toledo and their child in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The respondent and Corazon Toledo lived as
husband and wife, and have a child named Angie who was less than a year old at the time she lived
with them. The couple slept together in the same room with their daughter Angie and ate their
meals together although sometimes Corazon ate alone when the respondent was out somewhere.
The respondent used to call Corazon "Honey" and Corazon used to call the respondent "Jess".
Corazon Toledo is not the same person as the complainant.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Lino Domingo testified in the following manner: He is employed as operator-mechanic in the Bureau
of Public Highways in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and has resided there since 1952. He knows the
respondent because he headed a survey party that surveyed public lands in Malaybalay for
distribution to the landless. Sometime in March 1955 he went to the respondent's place of residence
and office at Moreno street, where his friend Mr. Nieva, an Ilocano, also resided to apply for a parcel
of public land, and about ten times he went to the respondent's place of residence and office.
Among those who lived with the respondent were Mrs. Corazon Toledo, Mr. Nieva, a maid and Mr.
Abad (the latter only slept at the place whenever he was in town). He knew that Corazon Toledo,
who is not the same person as Paz Arellano Toledo, was the wife of the respondent. At the
respondent's place of residence and office, he saw a room where the respondent, Corazon and a
baby slept and where man's pajamas and shirts were hung. One day at about 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, while the respondent and his (the witness') friend Mr. Abad were repairing the front
mudguard and seats of a station wagon behind the respondent's place of residence and office, his
friend Mr. Abad introduced him to the respondent. He helped Abad place the seats of the station
wagon in their proper places and while he was helping Abad, he heard the respondent address
Corazon as "Mama" and ask her for money to buy cigarettes. His friends Nieva and Abad used to
address Corazon as "Mrs. Toledo."
The respondent admits that he is married to the complainant (p. 14, t.s.n.).The fact that he is
cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child has been established by the testimony of
Marina Payot and Lino Domingo, whose sincerity and truthfulness have been put to a severe and
searching test by the investigating Solicitor in the presence of the respondent who appeared in his
own behalf and cross-examined the witnesses during the investigation. Asked by the investigating
Solicitor how she came to testify at the investigation, or whether anybody taught or coached her on
what to testify or whether she testified because of any promise of reward or consideration, Marina
Payot without hesitation and in a straight forward manner answered that the complainant, Mr.
Domingo and Mr. Reyes (the latter is the complainant's counsel) spoke to her and told her to tell
nothing but the truth about the respondent's affair with his paramour in Malaybalay; that nobody
taught or coached her on what to testify at the investigation; and that she was not promised
anything by way of reward or consideration or given money for testifying. Going further in his
investigation, the Solicitor asked the witness how she was treated by the respondent to find out if
she harbors any ill-feeling or grudge against him and his alleged paramour, which could be a motive
for falsely testifying against them, and she answered that she was well treated by the Toledos; that
they considered her a sister; that they paid regularly her salary of P15 a month; that they bought her
a dress during the town fiesta on May 15; that Corazon never scolded her for she was a woman of
few words, was kind and did not know how to get angry; and that the reason she left them was
because she just felt lonesome for her parents. Further testing her credibility, the Solicitor asked
how the respondent's paramour looked, and she described her as a woman of fair complexion.
Comparing her (Corazon) to the complainant, she said that the complainant was more beautiful but
Corazon was not ugly and that the latter had a nicer figure, because she was stouter and taller than
the complainant. To find out if it was another and not the respondent who lived with Corazon, the
Solicitor asked her if she had not seen Teodoro Nieva, who lived with the respondent and Corazon in
the same house, kiss or embrace Corazon, and she replied that she had not.
Testing the credibility of Lino Domingo, the investigating Solicitor asked him whether he was related
to Claudio Arellano, brother of the complainant, and Lino readily answered that he is his brother-in-
law and added that he (Lino) is the cousin of the wife of Claudio. Asked if he had been asked by the
complainant to testify at the hearing, he frankly answered in the affirmative. Questioned as to the
description of the respondent's paramour, the witness stated that Corazon is fair in complexion, five
feet tall; that she is taller and fairer in complexion, more beautiful and has a nicer figure than the
complainant.
The testimony of these two witnesses are worthy of credence. Marina Payot is a simple girl of
eighteen years, a mere maid, scant in education, and understands little English. She did not even
finish the sixth grade of the elementary course. The sharp and incisive questions propounded to her
by the investigating Solicitor and the lengthy cross-examination to which she was subjected by the
respondent himself would have revealed herself if she was lying. The apparent inconsistencies in her
answers may be attributed to her innocence and simple-mindedness and her failure to understand
the questions propounded to her. Moreover, she could not be expected to remember the dates
asked of her in the same way that a person of more than average intelligence would. Add to this the
fact that she was subjected to a thorough examination by three lawyers and her confusion was
compounded. Lino Domingo's frank and ready answers to the questions propounded by the Solicitor
show sincerity and do not reveal any intention to pervert the truth. And even if his testimony be
discarded, still the testimony of Marina Payot stands unrebutted.
The annexes attached to the respondent's memorandum cannot be taken into consideration for
they were not properly introduced in evidence during the investigation.
The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne
him a child, has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a
member of the Bar.
6

THEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred from the practice of law.








PARTIES:
Complainant: DOROTHY B. TERRE
Respondent: ATTY. JORDAN TERRE
FACTS:
On December 24, 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member
of the Philippine Bar with grossly immoral conduct, consisting of contracting a second marriage
and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant
remained subsisting No judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to
the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy by complainant. Dorothy Terre
was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo her first cousin, with this fact, Atty. Jordan Terre
succesfully convinced complainant that her marriage was void ab initio and they are free to contract
marriage. In their marriage license, despite her objection, he wrote single as her status. After
getting the complainant pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted
another marriage to Helina Malicdem believing again that her previous marriage was also void ab
initio.

ISSUE:
(1) WON a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a subsequent marriage

HELD:
Yes. The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In
the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainants evidence as to the basic fact which
underscores that bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, the pretended defense is the
same argument by which he inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage or Merlito
A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to
each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan
Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the
prevailing case law of the supreme Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage , a judicial declaration that the first marriage was
null and void ab initio is essential.


FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with
gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school
teacher for a number of years. The respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1,
1958, signingthe hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for
sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for
sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. Complainant gave birth to a baby
boysupported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate and to show how intimate the
relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she gave
money to the respondent whenever he asked from her.

The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense
averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under
section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.



ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.



HELD: YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant
must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). It is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise
of the privilege to maintain good moral character. When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is
not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and
integrity, which at all times is expected of him. With respect to the special defense raised by the
respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do
not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as
enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the
statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation
on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over
its officers cannot be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney
will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for
gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
his license and the law confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of court states that:

A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other grossmisconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do.The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the
fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and
learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of
morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:

The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit
or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times
to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law
but the administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is
ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.


100 Phil 586 Legal Ethics Lawyer may be disbarred even if transgression is not one enumerated by
law
In 1952, Atty. Anacleto Aspiras introduced himself as a single man to Mortel. The latter believed it
and he let Anacleto court her. Anacleto, with flowery words, promised to marry Mortel. With this
promise, Mortel agreed to have carnal knowledge with him. Later, Anacleto persuaded Mortel to go
to Manila so that they could marry there. Mortel complied. However, Anacleto did not secure the
marriage license with Mortel, instead he let Cesar Aspiras, whom he introduced to Mortel as his
nephew, secure it with Mortel. Further, in the marriage ceremony, Anacleto made Mortel believe
that Cesar will be his proxy in the wedding. So it happened that Mortel married Cesar who turned
out to be Anacletos son, worse, Cesar was a minor. Worst still, after Cesars and Mortels marriage,
Anacleto continued to cohabit and have carnal knowledge with Mortel until the latter got pregnant,
and until the latter found out that Anacleto is married and he has a son, Cesar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Anacleto should be disbarred.

HELD: Yes. Though it may be said that Anacletos moral transgression did not amount to crime nor is
it one of those enumerated by statute still his moral delinquency as proved by the facts as
aggravated by his mockery of marriage which is an inviolable social institution and his corruption of
his minor son to marry Mortel just so he could redeem his promise of marriage to Mortel - all these
concur to Anacleto being unfit to continue being a member of the legal profession. The Supreme
Court ordered his disbarment.


EN BANC
A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989
ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.
Federico A. Blay for complainant.
Luciano Babiera for respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross immorality.
Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged in her
verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal
knowledge of her for several times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if she
would not submit to respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that when she
became pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion.
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer
denying any personal knowledge of complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the
complaint and by way of special defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT
Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:
1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern
University, the Chairman of the Board of which was respondent Jose
B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975);
2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted her
to approach respondent in the latter's house who assured her that
she would pass the said subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6,
1975);
3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6,
1975);
4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should
go with him to Manila, otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects
(pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ;
5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant boarded
the same plane (Exh. "A") for Manila; from the Manila Domestic
Airport, they proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the Ambassador
Hotel where they stayed for three days (Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p.
55, tsn, June 6, 1 975);
6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish
restaurant at San Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around three hours
(pp 56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);
7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight,
where respondent had carnal knowledge of her twice and then
thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157,
tsn, July 18, 1975);
8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent
because for her, she would sacrifice her personal honor rather than
fail in her subjects (p.6l, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;
9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she
was suspecting pregnancy because she missed her menstruation (p.
76, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ...;
10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the
college of medicine) that respondent wanted that an abortion be
performed upon her (p.82, tsn, July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ;
11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr.
Monsato fetched her at her boarding house on the pretext that she
would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975);
12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an injection
and an inhalation mask was placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-
90, tsn, July 17, 1 975);
13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an
abortion had already been performed upon her and she was weak,
bleeding and felt pain all over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17,
1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom
complainant introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-
184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that abdominal
examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbro-sacral region of complainant showed no signs of
abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).
The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
Edilberto Caban testified that:
1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador
Hotel with his wife and children; respondent never came to Manila
except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);
2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to
Manila (p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).
Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:
1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet
respondent; the latter had male companions at the hotel but he did
not see any woman companion of respondent Aznar;
2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and
ate with him outside the hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15,
tsn, Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).
The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General,
respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations made against him.
In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of the allegations in
the complaint. As special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against him is
in furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by reason of the latter's
approval of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for
the school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise contended that
the defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General because nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove that respondent had carnal
knowledge of the complainant.
Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical finding to the effect
that respondent had carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit:
From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to Manila with
respondent upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she would
flunk in all her subjects and she would never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50,
tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was Chairman of the College of Medicine,
complainant had every reason to believe him.
It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to
Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days where he repeatedly had carnal
knowledge of her upon the threat that if she would not give in to his lustful desires,
she would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-
59, tsn, June 6, 1975);
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It is
true that he presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who testified that
respondent usually slept with them every time the latter came to Manila, but their
testimony (sic) is not much of help. None of them mentioned during the hearing that
they stayed and slept with respondent on February 12 to February 14, 1973 at
Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that respondent stayed
at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children in December, 1972. The dates in
question, however, are February 12 to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony,
therefore, is immaterial to the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar has
been substantiated by sufficient evidence both testimonial and documentary; while finding
insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then
recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of not less than
three (3) years.
On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to determine
whether any intervening event occurred which would render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p.
69).
On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying that the case at bar
be considered submitted for decision on the bases of the report and recommendation previously
submitted together with the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75).
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the Solicitor General
that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report of the investigation conducted in the
case, is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the
Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability of the
offense imputed upon him. With the exception of the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses
presented on respondent's behalf, the records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of
the act complained of, much less contradict, on material points, the testimonies of complainant
herself.
While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual
intercourse with the latter, he did not present any evidence to show where he was at that date.
While this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his silence if he
really felt unjustly traduced.
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court that he is
a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor
downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439
[1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the
relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still
maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected
of him. ... In the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland,
speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does
not perform that duty, he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If
he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the
easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same full and
wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable
effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to
help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may
assist him (Quingwa SCRA 439 [1967]).
The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having gone with
respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children,
respondent should merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years
(Rollo, p. 47).
On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989 alleges that
since a period of about ten (10) years had already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made
his recommendation for a three (3) years suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession
as a lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as having been suspended during the said
period and the case dismissed for being moot and academic.
We disagree.
Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a promise to
marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly. complainant's knowledge of of respondent's
marital status is not at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation
for sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual gratification but because of respondent's
moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As
chairman of the college of medicine where complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to
believe that respondent could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would
deem it "worthwhile to inform the the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a
very rich man in his own right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p.
70), mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The
fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render
respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes admission
to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission
thereto. Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in
the practice of law. The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest
standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v.
Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of immoral
conduct, as follows:
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have
moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies
that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be
the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community' (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became
pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six
children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified
(In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken
advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in
said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that
she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken off
from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.



EN BANC

IN RE: COMPLIANCE OF IBP
CHAPTERS WITH ADM.
ORDER NO. 16-2007,
LETTER-COMPLIANCE OF
ATTY. RAMON EDISON C.
BATACAN
A.M. No. 07-3-13-SC

Members:

PUNO, C. J.
QUISUMBING,
*

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, Jr.,
NACHURA,
REYES, and
DE CASTRO, JJ.

Promulgated:
February 27, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is the Letter of Atty. Ramon Edison C. Batacan, (Atty. Batacan), Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region, dated April 27, 2007, claiming that the election of
Atty. Rogelio Vinluan (Atty. Vinluan), IBP Governor for Southern Luzon, as Executive Vice-President (EVP) for
the term 2007 to 2009, is null and void on the ground that it violated the rotation rule.
[1]


Atty. Batacan asserts that under the rotation rule, embodied in Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-
Laws, all IBP regions must take turns in having a representative as EVP, who shall automatically succeed to the
IBP Presidency. He posits that since Atty.Pura Angelica Y. Santiago (Atty. Santiago) of IBP Southern Luzon was
validly elected as EVP on June 13, 2005, said region is disqualified from fielding another candidate for EVP until
all the regions have taken turns in holding the position. Considering that Atty. Vinluan comes from IBP
Southern Luzon and the other regions have not yet taken their turn in fielding an EVP, Atty. Vinluan'selection
as EVP on April 25, 2007 is null and void as it contravened the rotation rule.
[2]


Atty. Batacan further argues: The fact that Atty. Santiago was never able to assume the presidency of the
IBP is immaterial in the application of the rotation rule following the Court's pronouncement in Velez v. De
Vera
[3]
that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption of Atty. De Vera to the IBP
Presidency. Voluntary renunciation of the office will not change the fact that Atty. Santiago was validly
elected to the position which commenced the new rotation representing the Southern Luzon Region. To hold
otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the rotation rule as any duly elected EVP would just conveniently
resign before his term ends thus qualifying his region again in the same round of rotation. Since he
(Atty. Batacan), as Governor of the Eastern Mindanao Region, was the remaining candidate who was qualified
and was voted upon to the position, he is rightfully entitled to assume the EVP position. In any event, equity
dictates that he, the Governor of the Eastern Mindanao Region, be allowed to effectively act as EVP since the
said region was denied meaningful participation in the rotation rule when Atty. De Vera of Eastern
Mindanao was removed as EVP in 2005.
[4]


In its Comment, the IBP National Office through its Deputy General Counsel Atty. Rodolfo G. Urbiztondo,
stated that the election of Atty. Vinluan representing Southern Luzon is a violation of the rotation rule since
the election of Atty. Santiago of Southern Luzon began a new cycle of rotation and it is only after the rotation
is completed that a Governor from the Southern Luzon Region can be elected again.
[5]


In his Comment, Atty. Vinluan avers that his election as EVP on April 25, 2007 is valid for the following
reasons: Atty. Santiago never took her oath of office; she never assumed the position of EVP; she did not
function as EVP at any time; neither did she have the chance to serve out her term as evidenced by the fact
that 12 days after her election, Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar of the IBP Bicol Region was elected EVP and
eventually assumed the IBP Presidency beginning 2005. As stated in Atty. Batacan's letter, Atty. Santiago
voluntarily relinquished the EVP Position through a letter addressed to the IBP Board. Then IBP President Atty.
JoseAnselmo I. Cadiz stated in the June 25, 2005 IBP Board of Governors Meeting that Atty. Santiago's letter is
clear that she is foregoing her assumption of the EVP position. Atty. Santiago herself made clear that
considering that she has not taken her oath, she thinks that the more appropriate term to use is to forego her
assumption of the position. Thus, the election of Atty. Santiago cannot be considered as one turn within the
meaning of the rotation rule.

Atty. Vinluan further maintains that the election of Atty. Santiago did not trigger the beginning of a new
rotation cycle and that it was only with the term of Atty. Salazar of IBP Bicol Region, who was elected after
Atty. Santiago, and who eventually served out his term for 2005 to 2007, as EVP that the new cycle
began. Atty. Vinluan argues that Atty. Batacan's invocation of the Court's statement in Velez that the rotation
rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. De Vera to the IBP Presidency is misplaced
since Atty. De Vera had in fact served as EVP for the term 2003 to 2005, while the same cannot be said in the
case of Atty. Santiago. IBP Southern Luzon has not been represented yet in the new rotation cycle for EVPs.

Atty. Vinluan further asserts that he was elected pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws where he
obtained the majority of votes cast thereat. He also cites the Court's pronouncement in Velez that Section 47
of the IBP Rules uses the phrase as much as practicable to indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and
inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional circumstances, such as this case. Finally,
Atty. Vinluan claims that Atty. Batacan contradicted himself when he said that equity dictates that the
Governor of the Eastern Mindanao Region be allowed to act as EVP since the region was denied meaningful
participation in the rotation rule when Atty. De Vera was removed as EVP; while in the instant case,
Atty. Batacan seeks to deny IBP Southern Luzon of meaningful participation.

Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP, as amended, provides:

Sec. 47. National Officers. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a
President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from
among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The
governors shall be ex officio Vice President for their respective regions. There shall also be a
Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Board. (As amended pursuant to Bar Matter 491).

The Executive Vice President shall automatically become President for the next
succeeding term. The Presidency shall rotate among the nine Regions. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]

It is a product of Bar Matter No. 491
[6]
dated October 6, 1989, In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989
Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, where the Court, seeing the need to protect the non-
political character of the IBP and to reduce, if not completely eliminate, the expensive electioneering practices
of those who vie for the top IBP posts, ordered the repeal of Bar Matter No. 287, dated July 8, 1985, which
provided for the direct election by the House of Delegates of the IBP President, EVP, as well as officers of the
said House.

Bar Matter No. 491 restored the former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President
elected by the Board of Governors from among themselves as well as the right of automatic succession by the
Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term. It amended Sections 37
(Composition of the Board)
[7]
and 39 (Nomination and Election of the Governors), both of Article VI of the IBP
By-Laws.
[8]


As the Court explained in Garcia v. De Vera:
[9]


The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it
less controversial. The grounds for disqualification were reduced, if not totally eradicated,
for the pool from which the Delegates may choose their nominees is diminished as the
rotation process operates.

The simplification of the process was in line with this Court's vision of an Integrated
Bar which is non-political and effective in the discharge of its role in elevating the standards
of the legal profession, improving the administration of justice and contributing to the
growth and progress of the Philippine society.
[10]



Based on the foregoing, one can see that the Court introduced the rotation rule in order to give all the
regions and chapters their respective turns, each for a term of two years, in having a representative in the top
positions, with the aim of restoring the non-political character of the IBP and reducing the temptation of
electioneering for the said posts.

The principal question is whether the election on June 13, 2005 of Atty. Santiago of IBP Southern Luzon
for the term 2005 to 2007 as EVP constitutes one turn under the rotation rule; corollarily, whether
Atty. Vinluan who comes from the same IBP region is barred from being elected as EVP for the term 2007 to
2009.

The Courts answer is in the negative.

On June 13, 2005, Atty. Santiago of Southern Luzon was elected as EVP.
[11]
On June 20, 2005, seven days
after her election, she tendered her resignation, which resignation was approved by the IBP in a Resolution
dated June 25, 2005.
[12]
On the same day, Atty. Salazar of the IBP Bicol Region was elected as EVP, replacing
Atty. Santiago.
[13]


Based on these circumstances, one can readily see that the election of Atty. Santiago as EVP did not result
in any meaningful representation of the Southern Luzon Region which would satisfy the spirit of the rotation
rule. The proximity of the dates, from the time that she was elected to the time she tendered her resignation
(seven days) and the time the same was accepted by the IBP (five days) shows that there was no sufficient
opportunity for her to discharge the duties of an EVP. Significantly, records do not show that Atty. Santiago
took her oath of office.

There is no merit to Atty. Batacans claim that in view of the removal of Atty. Leonardo de Vera, IBP
Eastern Mindanao Region was denied meaningful participation.

In Velez, the Court held that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty.
De Vera to the IBP Presidency.
[14]
Atty. De Vera's removal from the position of EVP took place on the twenty-
third month of his term for 2003 to 2005.
[15]
Only a month short of completing his term, it is clear that he had
effectively exercised the functions of an EVP as representative of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region.

Moreover, the Court held in Velez that Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase as much as
practicable to clearly indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in
compelling and exceptional circumstances.
[16]

The Court agrees with Atty. Vinluan that the instant case is an exception to the rotation rule.

Atty. Batacan himself narrated that in the election on April 25, 2007, which was the first meeting of the
IBP Board of Governors for 2007 to 2009, he objected to the nomination of Atty. Vinluan as EVP citing the
rotation rule. Despite his objections, the Board of Governors proceeded with the election of its EVP, pursuant
to Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws and Atty. Vinluanemerged as the winner.

The Board acted correctly in not upholding the objections of Atty. Batacan. It applied the rotation rule
with flexibility, an act that is valid, concommitant with the tenor of Section 47 which qualifies the application
of the rotation rule with the phrase as much as practicable.

There being no grave abuse of discretion or gross error in the conduct of said election, the Court must
uphold the election of Atty. Vinluan as EVP for the term 2007 to 2009.

As the Court held in Velez:

While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of
supervision over the IBP, it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The
power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude the IBP from
exercising its reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs
governed by the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and
promulgated so as to define the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its
organizational structure, and govern relations and transactions among its officers and
members. With these By-Laws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall
be able to carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the Courts interference.

It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has
been vested in the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are elective and
representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws. The Board
acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of the majority. The
foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal
interest or malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP
Board deserve to be accorded the disputable presumption of validity, which shall continue,
until and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the
Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board has
acted without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be
persuaded to overturn and set aside the Boards action or resolution.
[17]
[Emphasis supplied]

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby RESOLVES to AFFIRM the election of Atty. Rogelio
A. Vinluan on April 25, 2007, by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as its
Executive Vice-President for the term 2007-2009.

SO ORDERED.


FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court for more than a
decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor
Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay
definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castaeda, L-
14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of
execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied,
and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them
for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago
appealed. On January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the
dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from
enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot;" his motions were denied, and the
sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the petitioners Castaeda
and Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale
in favor of the vendees Castaeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance
of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed
a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale
on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered against him in
the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their
conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally
be reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes
was not a party in the replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was
issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture
in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the
conjugal partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the
latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones
to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus arose where what
the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon City court countermanded. On November 1,
1965, however, the latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the
Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones
in favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the
Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then re-
restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being fought
in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under
date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed
it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The
respondents then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same preliminary injunction. The Court of
Appeals also dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court (L-
27140).1wph1.t We dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court gave due
course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After hearing, it rendered decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of
possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made permanent pending
decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to
proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the merits without unnecessary
delay. No pronouncement as to costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson filed the present petition for
review of the aforesaid decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-equal court
can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of
possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against the enforcement
of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the
enforcement of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al.,
1
where the wife was a party in one case and the husband
was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld, the petitioners
would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her husband for which
their conjugal properties would be answerable. The case invoked is not at par with the present case.
In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of the common interest of the
spouses; in the present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the
husband's business venture.
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of possession
may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is adversely
determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-
party" to her husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong, for, besides living with her
husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his business that failed, of the relevant cases in
which he got embroiled, and of the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties.
Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third
person is adversely determined, but that the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of
execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless
in the interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of third
parties to the property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the
present case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the properties or of any
interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of possession was
issued, and even up to the present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is much too
late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the property is unleviable
because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her husband's
activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives
in the very properties in question; (4) her husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the
properties were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a
preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff
executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had
impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family
house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and
his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in
the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging business
and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the issue in the
various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars them from
raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
2

5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-half share
in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in esse, but is merely
an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither legal nor equitable estate, and will
ripen into title when only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of the
community.
3
The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to
protect a right not in esse and which may never arise.
4

(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its enforcement. The Ago
spouses admittedly live together in the same house
5
which is conjugal property. By the Manila
court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the house, but the decision under review
would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor
and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here; the decision
would actually separate husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in effect divide
their conjugal properties during coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal union.
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale
(civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their
victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer
Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the
satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the
assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the
judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use
them to subvert the very ends of justice.
6

Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the
court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of
conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality
in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause
must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot
countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's
position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies
and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his
client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must
resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to
litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his
client; its primacy is indisputable.
7

7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to seek
justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below which might again
come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu proprio examined the
record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). We find that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits has not
even started;
(b) after the defendants Castaedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos
filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties-defendants;
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an amended
supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been
taken on this motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an extension to the
suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint and
amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated. The
Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of the
spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago, and
the business venture that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share
in the conjugal property is leviable, is the same issue that we have already resolved, as barred by
laches, in striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the
dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of
action of the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the Castaedas and the
sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took possession of certain machineries,
depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964.
This second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of
seizure is invalid or illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties was irregular,
illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castaeda spouses to pay or liquidate the
sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the properties at the auction sale) despite the
fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of
the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite the
pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment
value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in
damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of the
purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment creditor, and no
third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the
amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castaedas but did not
affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount of the judgment
was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is moreover barred
by prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on account of
the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of action derives its life
from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are baseless, the said fourth cause of action
must necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castaedas aver that the action was unfounded and as a
consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than
P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and
possession of the properties to the Castaedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the
properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use being 20% annually of their actual
value; and that the filing of the unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of
which is for the court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the defendants,
taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad
faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the registration of the sheriff's
final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two
of the parcels of land in question; that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the
defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the
defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial
Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the defendants'
bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint, which is,
the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty.
& Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy
Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson in bad
faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in
bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the supplemental
complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the cause of action would
depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original complaint, for, the Agos would
suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and possession of the properties by reason of
the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castaedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy
and sale are valid. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that
the conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the
Agos, but, we have already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the original
complaint is barred by laches, and it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the supplemental
complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case Q-7986 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the re-filing of the
petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble costs are assessed against the
spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let
a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk
of Court.


FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995
RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised
Rules of Court, this Court resolved to refer it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors rendered a decision, finding respondent guilty of
malpractice and recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law.
I
Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from the Municipal
Trial Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC) which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises subject of the
ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844). Co, through respondent as counsel, appealed the decision to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Bangued, Abra (RTC). She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid
the rentals adjudged by the MTC. The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to comply
with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines (CA-G.R. CV
No. 11404). According to the CA, Co should have filed a petition for review and not an ordinary
appeal (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22).
The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 19, 1986.
On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by respondent as counsel for Co in CA-
G.R. CV No. 11404, arguing that the decisions of the MTC and the RTC were null and void for being
contrary to law, justice and equity for allowing the lessor to increase by 300% the rentals for an old
house. Respondent, admitting his mistake in filing an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for
review, prayed that he be allowed to file an action for annulment.
On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to respondent's Manifestation and Motion and let the
records remain with it. However, on November 10, 1987, the said court ordered the records in CA-
G.R. CV No. 11404 to be remanded to the court a quo.
On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Decisions and/or
Reformation or Novation of Decisions of the MTC and the RTC (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690), insisting that
the decisions were not in accordance with existing laws and policies. On December 17, 1987, the CA
dismissed the petition for annulment or novation explaining that
. . . , aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38),
there is no other means whereby the defeated party may procure final and
executory judgment to be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation,
unless (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law,
or (b) it has been obtained by fraud, . . . . There is no allegation in the present
complaint to the effect that the judgments in the former cases were secured through
fraud (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35; Emphasis supplied).
On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Set
Motion for Reconsideration for Oral Arguments of the CA decision. The CA denied the motion. Again,
respondent requested the CA to set his Motion For Oral Arguments on April 14, 1988.
In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA denied the Motion for Oral Argument and in a
resolution dated October 18, 1988, denied the motion for reconsideration of the February 12
Resolution.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court (G.R. No. 86084)
questioning the decisions of the MTC and the RTC in favor of petitioner's mother. In a Resolution
dated January 4, 1989, we denied the petition for having been filed and paid late on December 12,
1988 and November 12, 1988, respectively. A motion for reconsideration from such resolution was
likewise denied with finality.
Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or Restraining Order (dated July 6, 1988)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690.
On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a Motion for Execution of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 844. Respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion for Execution on the ground that the
case was still pending review by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 and therefore the motion for
execution was premature. On August 23, 1988, the MTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The RTC affirmed the order for
the issuance of the writ of execution. Thus, a writ of execution was issued on October 18, 1988.
On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil action (SP CV No. 624) with the RTC, Branch 1,
Bangued, Abra for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against the MTC,
Provincial Sheriff and complainant's mother, seeking to annul the writ of execution issued in MTC
Civil Case No. 844 and RTC Civil Case No. 344. Respondent alleged that the order granting the writ of
execution was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a petition
to annul the decisions (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690) was still pending with the CA.
On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V. Paredes, deferred the implementation of the
writ of execution until the petition filed in SP CV No. 624 for certiorari was resolved. The CA denied
in SP CV No. 624 respondent's Urgent Motion to Set Aside and Declare Null and Void the Writ of
Execution.
From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in SP CV No. 624 denying the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition,Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order, respondent again filed an
Appeal and/or Review byCertiorari, Etc. with the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 17040).
II
We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his
client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow his client
to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.
Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any arguable construction of
the law or rules which is favorable to his client. But the lawyer is not allowed to knowingly advance a
claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. He cannot prosecute patently frivolous and
meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions (Annotated Code of Professional
Responsibility 310 [1979]). Professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with
necessary restrictions and qualifications (Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 579-582 [1986]).
Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert every effort
and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Implementing
said Canon are the following rules:
Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of dilatory
motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying
the execution of a judgment (Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motions Practice: Time for Change, 44
Fordham L. Rev. 1069 [1976]; Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F. 2d 539, 543 [2d Cir.
1971]).
The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully protected and her
defenses were properly ventilated when he filed the appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But
respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay the execution of the
judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client. The said decision became executory even
pending its appeal with the RTC because of the failure of Co to file a supersedeas bond and to pay
the monthly rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the decisions of the
MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and dilatory. According
to the CA, there was no allegation therein that the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client was
denied due process, or "that the judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud."
As ruled in Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530 (1993):
A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for
want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) that it has been obtained
by fraud. . . . (at p. 534).
Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded, respondent knew very
well that the decision of the MTC was already ripe for execution.
This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 423 (1993), ruled:
. . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior court is remanded to the trial court for
execution, the function of the trial court is ministerial only; the trial court is merely
obliged with becoming modesty to enforce that judgment and has no jurisdiction
either to modify in any way or to reverse the same. . . . (at p. 430).
(See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 306 [1993] and Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226
SCRA 250 [1993]).
Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution of the MTC
judgment in Civil Case No. 844, to wit:
(1) Civil Case No. 344 Appeal from the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 844 of
the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra, with the Regional Trial Court, Abra;
(2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Abra;
(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 An Action For the Annulment of Decisions And/Or
Reformation or Novation of Decisions filed with the Court of Appeals;
(4) G.R. No. 86084 Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court;
(5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 Appeal And/Or Review By Certiorari, Etc. filed also with
the Court of Appeals; and,
(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 Petition For Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with
Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
1, Bangued, Abra.
Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same
judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping.
In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court explained that forum shopping exists when, by
reason of an adverse decision in one forum, defendant ventures to another for a more favorable
resolution of his case. In the case of Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 272 (1976), this Court
explained that:
Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's processes and
improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of
justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to add, the lawyer who
filed such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a
final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an
attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only such actions
as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor (at p. 275).
By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a favorable
judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a member of the Bar to
institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses as he perceives to be truly contestable
under the laws (Garcia v. Francisco, 220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the Committee on
Bar Discipline "in filing a number of pleadings, actions and petitioner, respondent 'has made a
mockery of the judicial processes' and disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally
frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered, thus, 'abused
procedural rules to defeat ends of substantial justice'" (Report and Recommendation, IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline, p. 2).
WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.
SO ORDERED.



EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 1424 October 15, 1991
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MONTALVO, JR., respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Ismaela Dimagiba against Atty. Jose Montalvo for Malpractice, for
stretching to almost a half a century a litigation arising from the probate of a will of the late
Benedicta de Los Reyes which instituted Ismaela Dimagiba as the sole heir of all the properties.
The letter of the private complainant, Ismaela Dimagiba, received on January 15,1975 by the
Supreme Court, states:
xxx xxx xxx
The clients of Atty. Montalvo, namely: Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes, Luisa
Reyes, Mariano Reyes, Cesar Reyes, Leonor Reyes, filed a case against me with the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan in 1946 for annulment of sale and was docketed as
Civil Case No. 108 of said Court. This case was terminated annulling the sale, as per
decision in 1954 in G.R. No. L-5618 and L-5620.
On January 19, 1955, 1 filed a case for Probate of Will with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
regarding the same property subject of the annulment of sale and was docketed with the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan as Sp. Proc. No. 831-M. Luckily, the said case was terminated on June 20,
1958, probating the said will. The oppositors in this case who are the same persons mentioned
above appealed this case to the Higher Court of the Philippines and was decided by the Hon.
Supreme Court of the Philippines on October 12, 1967 in G.R. No. L-23638 and L-23662, affirming the
decision of the Lower Court;
That after the decision of the above-mentioned case was promulgated, the same parties filed on
June 5, 1968 Civil Case No. 3677-M with the CFI of Bulacan for annulment of will; this case was filed
through their counsel, Atty. Gregorio Centeno.
Said case was dismissed by the Court on February 11, 1970 without pronouncement of costs;
That on August 13,1971, again, the clients of Atty. Montalvo filed Civil Case No. 4078 with the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan for annulment of the said will; this case was again dismissed by the Court
on December 21, 1971;
That on April 22, 1972, again the same parties, through their counsel Atty. Montalvo, filed another
case with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, allegedly for Partition of the same property
mentioned in the probate of will which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4151. This case was again
dismissed by the Court in its Order dated October 11, 1972;
That on May 25, 1972, still another case was filed by the same parties, through Atty. Montalvo, for
specific performance, with the CFI of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case No. 4188-M. This case
was again dismissed by the Court in its Order dated October 24,1973. On August 12, 1974, the said
case was remanded to the Court of Appeals, Manila, by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan;
Still on April 5, 1974, I was again surprised to know that there was another case filed by the same
persons mentioned above through Atty. Montalvo with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and
was docketed as Civil Case No. 4458. This case is still pending before said court.
In view of the numerous cases filed against me by the same parties, through their counsel, Atty.
Montalvo, I am constrained to report to that [sic] Honorable Court of the actuation of said lawyer
who is a member of the Philippine Bar attending to cases of non suit, which cause harassment on
may part.
The parties in this case are the ones in possession of the property Subject of Sp. Proc. No. 831 of the
CFI, Bulacan. They can not be ejected from the land holdings because they claim that the case filed
by Atty. Montalvo is still pending in Court.
In all the foregoing [sic] I respectfully submit to this Honorable Court for appropriate action.
xxx xxx xxx 1
In the Resolution of the Second Division of the Supreme Court dated January 27, 1975, the
respondent Montalvo was required to file an Answer within ten days from notice.2
In his Answer dated March 3, 1975, Montalvo, claims that the case filed against the complainant
were done.
xxx xxx xxx
at the instance of different parties; or by reason of different causes of action and all
the pleadings filed by the undersigned were and/or the result of a very painstaking,
diligent, and careful study and evaluation of the facts and law involved therein such
that even before signing the same, the undersigned has always been of the honest
and sincere belief that its filing is for the interest of justice certainly never for
harassment; (2) that the reason why the parties tenant could not be ejected from
their land as stated by complainant in her complaint is because of the passage of
Presidential Decree No. 27 which emancipated the farmers from their bondage and
declared them as owners of the rice and corn land they tilled upon the passage of
the decree coupled with the very acts of the complainant herself; and that (3) the
complainant by filing this instant complaint for disbarment wants to cow and
intimidate the undersigned in order to withdraw as counsel of his clients because
she has been thwarted in her erroneous belief that she owns exclusively all the
properties comprising the estate of the late Benedicta de Los Reyes and could not
accept and take into account the reality that by virtue of the final decision of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 5618 and 5620 she is not the sole owner of the present
estate of the deceased but only a co-owner with the clients of the undersigned. 3
In addition, Montalvo stated that it was Dimagiba who refused to be bound by the Supreme Court
Decision in G.R. Nos. 5618 and 5620. 4
As a Rejoinder to the Respondent's Answer, the complainant Dimagiba stated that in Civil Case No.
3677-M, the plaintiffs are the same parties-oppositors who opposed the petition for probate of the
Last Will and Testament of the deceased Benedicta De Los Reyes in Special Proceeding No. 831. The
same case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on the ground that the issue
raised had been decided by the Court. 5
Likewise Civil Case No. 4078-M was also dismissed by Branch 2 of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan presided by Judge Ricardo C. Pronove, Jr., in the order of August 24, 1973 on the ground
of res judicata.
xxx xxx xxx
But a closer analysis [sic) it is clear that this action is merely a rehash of the other
cases previously litigated between the plaintiffs and the defendant and already
settled by final judgment. 6
In fact, in that case, Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr., included himself as one of the defendants.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, the fact that plaintiffs counsel, Jose Montalvo, Jr., had decided to join cause
with the other plaintiffs in this case does no mean that there is no Identity of parties
between this case and Civil Case No. 3677-M. Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr., is not alleged
to be are party in interest in this case so that Ills inclusion herein as a p plaintiff can
not produce any legal significance. 7
This notwithstanding, Montalvo filed another case against Dimagiba which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 4458-M of the CFI Bulacan where the plaintiffs and causes of action were again the same as
3677-M and 4188-M. Again, the CFI Bulacan dismissed the cases.
On April 16, 1975, the Second Division, following the procedure then obtaining for the resolution of
disciplinary case against lawyers, referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report,
and recommendation. 8
It was only on May 4,1990, or almost fifteen years later, that the entire records of Adm. Case No.
1424 involving Ismaela Dimagiba versus Atty. Jose Montalvo was returned to the Clear of Court of
the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General through Solicitor Aurora P. Cortes.
In summary, the following are the litigations that ensue from the probate of the Will of De Los Reyes
as found by the Solicitor General involving the same parties and the same cause of action:
1. Special Proceedings No. 831 instituted on January 1 1955. The Will was admitted
to probate but was subsequently appealed.
2. CA-G.R. No. 31221-R. This was an appeal of the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 831.
The decision was affirmed.
3. G.R. Nos. L-23638 and L-23662. This decision dated October 12, 1967, in the
Supreme Court, upheld the decision CA-G.R. No. 31221-R, in effect, affirming the
due execution the Will and the capacity of the Testator as well as the institution of
the complainant.
4. Civil Case No. 3677-M. Filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on June 4,
1968, this was a petition for the nullification of the Will. This was dismissed.
5. Civil Case No. 200 which was redocketed as Civil Case No. 4078-M. This complaint
dated November 3, 1970 was again dismissed.
6. Civil Case No. 4151-M. This case, filed on February l6, 1972, for the partition of the
property left by the deceased Benedicta De los Reyes on the ground of the nullity of
the Will, was again dismissed for failure to prosecute.
7. Civil Case No. 4188-M. Filed on May 25,1972, with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch 2, the respondent Atty. Montalvo, Jr., joined the descendants of the
collateral relatives of the deceased De Los Reyes against herein complainant
Dimagiba. This case was dismissed.
8. Civil Case No. 4458-M. Civil Case No. 4188-M was appealed. But without waiting
for the outcome, Atty. Montalvo, Jr., filed Civil Case No. 4458-M on April 5, 1974
which was a complaint for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title in the
name of Ismaela Dimagiba and the issuance of new certificates of title in the name
of the late Benedicta de los Reyes.
Clearly, the respondent Montalvo, Jr. repetitively filed several complaints in various forms involving
the same parties and the same subject matter, persistently raising issues long laid to rest by final
judgment.
This misbehavior in facie curia consisting of a stubborn refusal to accept this Court's
pronouncements is in fact even summarily punishable under Rule 71, Suction 1 of the Rules of
Court.9
Any lawyer who assumes the responsibility for a client' cause has the duty to know the entire history
of a case, specially if any litigation has commenced. In the case at bar, even Atty. Montalvo does not
deny the fact that the probate of the will o the late Benedicta de los Reyes has been an over-
extended an contentious litigation between the heirs.
A lawyer should never take advantage of the seemingly end less channels left dangling by our legal
system in order wangle the attention of the court. Atty. Montalvo may have thought that lie could
get away with his indiscriminate filing o suits that were clearly intended to harass Ismaela Dimagiba
When court dockets get clogged and the administration of justice is delayed, our judicial system may
not be entirely blame less, yet the greater fault lies in the lawyers who had take their privilege so
lightly, and in such mindless fashion.
The Code of Professional Responsibility states that:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not for any corrupt motive or interest encourage any suit
or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
On the basis of the foregoing, we find him guilty of malpractice as charged. He has violated his oath
not to delay any ma for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession, and has
proven himself unworthy of the trust repose in him by law as an officer of the Court. We have not
countenanced other less significant infractions among the ranks of our lawyers. He deserves the
severest punishment of DISBARMENT.
WHEREFORE on the basis of the foregoing, and consisted with the urgent need to maintain the high
traditions an standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in
attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR the respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr. from the
practice law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all courts of the country and entered in the personal
record of respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr.
SO ORDERED.






74 Phil 579 Legal Ethics Malpractice
In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing marriage licenses;
that he does so avoiding delays and publicity; that he also makes marriage arrangements; that legal
consultations are free for the poor; and that everything is confidential. The Director of Religious
Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued Bayot for Malpractice.
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the same and
asked for the courts mercy as he promised to never repeat the act again.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.

HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. The advertisement he caused to be published is a brazen solicitation of
business from the public. . It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. The Supreme Court again emphasized that best advertisement for a
lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. But because of Bayots plea for leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not earn any
case by reason of the ad, the Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.


FACTS:The respondent Atty. Luis Tagorda, a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that
in the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which in
translation, read as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA Attoney; Notary Public; CANDIDATE FOR BOARD MEMBER, Province of Isabela.
(NOTE.- as notaty public, he can execute for a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by
the cadastral office, can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final
requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer he can help you
collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come or write
to him in his town Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the
poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in
his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter reads as follow:
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief
that my residence as member of the Board will be in Iligan and that I would then be disqualified to
exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear
that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in
Echague, I would request your kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of
your meeting or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve
with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet
contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I
would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every
registration.

HELD:Application is give to se. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act NO. 2828,
providing The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokets, constitutes malpractice, and to Canon 27 and 28 of the Code of
Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippines Bar Association in
1917, to the case of the respondent lawyer. The law is a profession and not a business. The
solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension.
1. Respondent Tagorda is suspended from the practice of law for 1 month.
2. For advertising his services in the Sunday Tribune respondent attorney is reprimanded.















































B THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL
MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty.
Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. for disciplinary action for their
acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and re-
evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho who flunked in the 1971,
1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively invited the
attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar
candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential
Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon
C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong
reasons to believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent
alternations to raise the grades prior to the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal
motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned
reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper
request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say
that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered
'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into
these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2,
Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and
found that the grades in five subjects Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law,
Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some
changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further
check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a
perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade
of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations
with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as
75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D.
Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter, with which
request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five examination
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation
and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the
same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-
checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant
Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court required, in a
resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from
noticewhy his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.).
Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court
likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his
name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners
concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary
action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents
Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-
63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another
sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163,
pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated
and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law
of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political
Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this
development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164.
Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law
and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code
No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further
investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the
subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office
Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty
dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E.
Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged
with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera,
another student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973
(Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with
the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact which
he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2, 1973.
Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and
Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia, where he is
believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his oral
testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the
affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-
examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the
investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which
they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon
C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the examination
notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy
in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all
subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject
and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for
re-evaluation and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner of the
paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned
will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of
the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation and
upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on the
same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with
original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to
5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with
following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no longer to
make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation and standard;
hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not know
the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor
the identities of the examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the
following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971,
relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point
that with respect to the correction of the examination booklets of bar
candidates I have always followed him and considered his instructions as
reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with
respect to the same; that I have no alternative but to take his words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation
to me as reflecting the real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I
did not bother any more to get the consent and permission of the
Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating
myself from all members of the Supreme Court and specially the chairman
of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such
recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial
Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the original correction of the same
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public
International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last bag
of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according
to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in
a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar confidant
had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual
amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said
notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according
to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the
highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I had
submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so because the
same was still within my control and authority as long as the particular examinee's name had
not been identified or that the code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed.
The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case present bearing code
number 661 had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I
had given a particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it was
humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-examined
the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with the same standards I
had used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee
deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority
to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the examinee in
question had not been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total
grade in the notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the
same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets
of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the
other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading
sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo
adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional
alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code
numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only
upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I
do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review, and
had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such revision and
was so assured of my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his
identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to
be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an
examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I
refrained as much as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be
identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at my
residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to
me that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was
riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two
companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant,
as it was about the same hour that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I
submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim
was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass the
subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that
particular notebook on December 31, 1971,considering especially the representation of the
Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the
highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me
as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know
and that there was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with
notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting
in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated,
my aim was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had
passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus was
that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said
subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the
Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge of the
motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee
concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the review and even up
to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to my
residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in Criminal
Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar
Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular
examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in
Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he would make the general passing
average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I
remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark and
revised also the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar
Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up
to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo,
Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street,
Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had
previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he used the
words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook
and possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained that the examine
concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade
that I had given him in Remedial Law his general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo
remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee
deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called
my attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good
enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would reconsider the
grades I had previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address such
a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo,
proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in question. I recall
that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some items, made
deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall
that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation,
the total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my
subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his sworn
statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of the
examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in
good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman
of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo.
Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware,
not having been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the authority of
the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or suggest that the
grade of a particular examination notebook be revised or reconsidered. He
had every right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the
position of the Bar Confidant, that the request was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that particular subject that the said
examine failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said
examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given to him, but
that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be
given the passing grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned that, in
reappraising the answers, herein respondent downgraded a previous rating
of an answer written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar
Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects
except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the
paper of this particular Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613)
showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular Bar
candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade sheet
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn statement of
April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated the
examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith
and in direct compliance with the agreement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar
Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner
concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I
did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-
evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this particular bar
examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the
posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first
notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five merited
re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to
the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given
to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or
re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of the
examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown
their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and have them checked by their
professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or
re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are
reading for submission to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be denied
because the result of the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring those
notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24,
rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest belief
that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or
betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the
examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter
of whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and
that, to his knowledge, he does not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation
but that he remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee during the
meeting a matter concerning another examinee who obtained a passing general average but
with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the
disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought the notebook
in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said
examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la
Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious
charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that the
examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that
the notebooks in question were submitted to the respective examiners for re-evaluation
believing in all good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum
(identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-
Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the
matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February,
1972, on my way back to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of
buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that the moment
I think of so buying, I pick a number from any object and the first number
that comes into my sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that
moment, the first number that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an
electrical contribance (evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a
post standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the
Supreme Court building from San Marcelino street and almost adjacent to
the south-eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo High
School(photograph of the number '954', the contrivance on which it is
printed and a portion of the post to which it is attached is identified and
marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a
ticket that would contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I
then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to "954". This number
became doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the six digits of the
ticket number was "27", a number that is so significant to me that
everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or connect it with said
number whenever possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the
Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the
examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number
"27" (or "227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List is identified and
marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list,
as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure
"227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as
Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-
Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227"
at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents
in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army
stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with
pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a
result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on December 8,
1941. While I was still confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and
strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many
casualties. From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning
of a new life for me having been saved from the possibility of being among
the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army
byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married
and since then we begot children the youngest of whom was born on
February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I
resumed my work which at the time was on the checking of the notebooks.
While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing the office code
number "954". As the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my
curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the notebooks.
Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language and the apparent
soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in all good faith on the
basis of the aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo
and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and
later on took them back to the respective examiners for possible review
recalling to them the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving
absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the two
cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting and which the
Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a
grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee
bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and
the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with
the original grade of 4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-
Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of
73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I
could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data thereon.
It turned out that the subject was Political and International Law under
Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee
bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo
and the notebook in Political and International Law bearing the Examiner's
Code No. 661 with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-
evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and
International Law is precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn
statement of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one (1)
subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the
former; and only Political and International Law in the latter, under the facts and
circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee
authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-check
some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that there was very
little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly
substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10%
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of
truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of
respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he
"was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of
ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to
pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and
never met him before except once when, as required by the latter respondent submitted
certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure"
cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case,
especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other
and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a reasonable
doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated March
5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's
actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the respondent never
knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar
Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the
Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of
herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's
examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or especially for him and
not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to
have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among those of others,
then it must have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase the
percentage of passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only
respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would
be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's
actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's
having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume
this could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the members of the
Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result
of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible
from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of
facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent
Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations
of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between them and the
Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners
were in the performance of their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the
consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly
initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent
Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision
without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to the
Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the
Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before Christmas day,
respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting
examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review
of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an
extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner
concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-
56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-examiner
Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned
the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to
75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's
word and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief
that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the
examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with
Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated
the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57;
Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law. After
such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for
admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to
the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent
Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade
given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee
concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said
examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing.
Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook were
reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar.
Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his
answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called
the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal fundamentals,
and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in the
correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify of language and soundness
of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration was
entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar
Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further believing that such request was in order,
proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the
examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo
authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said
notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and
belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-
75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade due to
his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to
respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and
Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law
bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent
Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except
in Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark
be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from
respondent that this is possible the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the
Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject respondent Pablo acceded to the request and
thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the
answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an
increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and
accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the passing
grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was
then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already
finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject Criminal Law that the examinee
who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his
grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade.
Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to be
the one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and
thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the
same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol.
V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the latter
approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a
candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the
Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that
he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation requested
by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing grade because
of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's
notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme by
securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate
said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested
that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review
the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-
Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by
respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was
made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely seated together.
Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day,
respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code
Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-
evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter
officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee failed
only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said
paper(Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he
remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee
after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner
Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent
Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According
to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar
Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing
Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to
review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine
who owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in
Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent
Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%.
Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-
Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E.
GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners concerned
to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the
increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8)
weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the
Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%)
in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority
from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang
or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed only in their
respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his
actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-
Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the
members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief
that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust
reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither
did he act in a presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was
left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum was
intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers and never
as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the
examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to
the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian whose declarations
on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and
consistent as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and
clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases show how
respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in
the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue
advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as
BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the
five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-
evaluating the answers of onlyrespondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades
therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-
calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect
that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the
before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2)
minor subjects while his general average was only 66.25% which under no circumstances or standard could
it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact,
before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang
had only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of
81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as
follows:
B A I
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
B A I
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
evaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects
under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an
increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations
and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the
possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-
evaluated for each of the latter who Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile
Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or
reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks
are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners,
his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter
compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of
passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on
the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant
has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the
appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know
better than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should
be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative,
exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of betraying the
trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the
incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than
ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI,
pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays
respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for
re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be
any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of
reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice
was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety
candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even
the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades,
precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg
and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a
semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang
would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela
Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the
examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects
respectively as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for
the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang
deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for
support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a
period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case
No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF
47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN
POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS
GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on
Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners
concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg
were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were
officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the
latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of
Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.).
Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper
which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a
record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.).
The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the
Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in his
desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-
45, rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room
of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII,
pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in Mercantile
Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-
35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law
of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the
change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo
presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code
Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by
the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48,
rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their
admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee presented
to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer
back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16,
rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further,
Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who
got a grade below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to
Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner
concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was
taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular
notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up by
the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo
declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved Political
Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by
respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the
Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in
whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-
Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to
Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law 68%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as
follows:
B A
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo to
remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:
Political Law 70%
Taxation 72%
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:
B A
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile
Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due to
the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can
hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at the time of
said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had
still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered
75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as
subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of having betrayed the trust and confidence
reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining
public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and the corresponding investigation
conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major
subjects Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily
involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil.
534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade
certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member
of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar
subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar
Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who
is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the
exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the
established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to
the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in
connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be
strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5)
subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the
Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant.
Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be
admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to
the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not
an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such
answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is
immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to
the Bar were in accordance with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the character
requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member
of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and
that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every
applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise
terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to
what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying
before or informing the Court of one's personal record whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted,
convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending becomes more compelling. The forms for application to
take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not
only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other
criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent
Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the
applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence
or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case
so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And
undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the
applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case,
whether pending or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his
character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the
second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already
required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any
court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature
against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form
prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether
involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare
that "he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused
of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a
pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally
withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is
pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his
applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and
withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967,
1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he
had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case
pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times
and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had
been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is
well settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding from
the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for
admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an indictment for a felony, was
guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he applied
for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of
the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207
N W 709 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the clerk of
court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the Appellate
Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly
of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and his standing at the bar of the
state from which he comes. The finding of indictments against him, one of which was still
outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the
court, with such explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible,
as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having been
apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the
victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to
testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to
the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is
therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to
explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as
August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any
explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take
the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other
alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the
Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but
is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of
the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the
penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose
integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its
confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar
(citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not without
any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful
bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or
false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico,
resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis
of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re:
Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c)
fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del
Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and
Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the
crime of falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon
Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel
Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the
papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed
good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity
of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or
expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that
indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any
consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the Bar, the
respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and
should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They
could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the
Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or
show them the complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to
have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully
satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done
and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the
answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo
in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to
respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective
subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent
Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed,
however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a
few points higher, he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one
causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to
have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and
increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I asked
him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help out examinees
who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will
try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I
could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the
answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and
what I did was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents Pamatian,
Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades they gave were
deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and
deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the
paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the
absence of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol.
V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April
17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19,
1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the owner of the
paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned
will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of
the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation
in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-
Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh.
1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully
evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria
laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that said examinee failed,
herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than
that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to
be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular
notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar
Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest
of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein
examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation
effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and
competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the said re-
evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which were
earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five
(5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations
satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that their
participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public
interest absolute purity of the proceedings and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case
and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that
respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support
thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his
(examiner's) alleged friend a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar
Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case
No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice Ramon
Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in his words is "essential
to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when Justice
Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also
against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest
it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the
part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the
five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-
evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who
failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his
help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman
of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an
examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp.
6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of the
bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit
restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended
to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to
enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release of the
1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and
Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a
house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount of
P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April 5,
1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two
(2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount
of P67,291.20 (First mortgage P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument April 5,
1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972: Second mortgage P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914:
date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III,
rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which
according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the
remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received
by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol.
VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister;
are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities which hefiled on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the
amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in
the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in
his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The
amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized
because the transaction therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and
Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister in
Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not
reflected in his 1971Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly,
the alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $200
was not even presented by respondent during the investigation. And according to
Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously
consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And
furthermore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the
Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out
by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her
own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to him, the
conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or
undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes house and
lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 date of
instrument;August 23, 1972 date of inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second
mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was
subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2,
1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by
respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled onMarch 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III,
rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's
house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS
mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In
his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation
and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets,
were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same
statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued
atP5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and November,
1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was listed in his statement of
assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that
his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in
his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and
lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations and
the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said
acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect to
respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the money used by respondent
Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came from respondent Galang in
consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious
irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after
Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court,
respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of
retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he
was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations,
respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the
case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e
used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he
bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a
violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced,
or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is
determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep.
Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities
were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are part of the
records of this Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his
father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the Philippine
Veterans Board from his high school days 1951 to 1955 up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational
Institution (now MLQ University) 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was
connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of
our veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent
Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising
Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that
period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the
Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the
date of waiver July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the availment
of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ
Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from
1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87,
rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in
1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the
Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent
Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school
year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St.,
Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans to
follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of the said office. He
does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to
the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent
Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never
bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine
Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated claims
for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not
remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across the
application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E.
Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and
then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla
movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the Philippine
Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the
Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications with
other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not remember
having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board.
He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac,
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial
Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes
on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162,
p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as
the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was
given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army,
43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army
stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of
recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947,
Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant,
the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court.
Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in
Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED
AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163,
RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME
ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.




EN BANC
A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was
admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter
was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and
later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys,
because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not
completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the
Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom
which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for
examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal
education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge:
but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the
U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is
equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities
considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit
any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is
unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his
A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A.
graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano
University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of
Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his
own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it
would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies
(2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he
would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant
for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had
successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the
Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his
false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the
Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked.
The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the
regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao.
And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.





157 SCRA 762 Legal Ethics Mutual Bickering Between Lawyers
Atty. Macias was the counsel of Spouses Valdes for at least 20 years. Spouses Valdes was wealthy couple
owning certain properties and corporations. There were still pending cases against the spouses and their
properties when they died. Their adopted daughter, Rosario Llora sought to continue said cases but she
intimated to Macias that she would like him to withdraw as their cancel and that he be replaced by Atty. Malig.
Atty. Macias then filed a motion in the testate proceedings involving the properties of the late Valdes where
he asked for the payment of legal services that he had been performing for the late spouses. Llora through
Atty. Malig opposed the said motion arguing among others that what Atty. Macias is asking for fees is too
much. Llora then asked for a meeting with Macias where she said shell withdraw their opposition to his
Motion if Macias shall withdraw from all pending cases hes handling which involve properties of the late
Vades and that Macias shall give her P10k. Macias complied so he signed a waiver and issued a check in the
amount of P10k. But Macias changed his mind and so he filed a civil case for damages against Llora. He also
filed a disbarment case against Atty. Malig where he accused the latter of representing Llora while Macias was
still the familys family representative; that Malig extorted P10k from Macias; that he induced Llora to
disposed of their properties which have pending cases in order to evade attorney fees which were due
Macias. Malig filed a counterclaim in the disbarment case where he accused Macias of filing in bad faith a civil
case against Llora; that Macias made unethical representation of Llora; Malig also accused Macias as a
denizen of a jungle who prey*s+ upon his brother lawyer *and+ his *own+ clients and likened him to a
baneful snake biting the hand of the client who fed him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations of both counsels should be given credit.
HELD: No. Both their allegations against each other are baseless. HOWEVER, both should be given disciplinary
sanctions for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the court. Both are too eager to throw baseless
accusations against each other. On the part of Macias for instance, hes too eager to accuse Malig of extorting
money from him (the P10k asked from him by Llora) when in fact said money was asked in consideration of
Lloras withdrawal of her opposition to Macias Motion in the testate proceedings. On the part of Malig, his
use of tactless language against Macias is deplorable. Each party here has shown himself to be too ready to
believe the other guilty of serious misconduct in the practice of the profession to which they both belong while
vehemently asserting his own good faith. Each attorney here was too prone to use intemperate and offensive
language in describing the professional behavior of the other.
The court however noted that Macias has been subjected to previous administrative complaints because of his
use of improper and unethical language where he was severely reprimanded hence his punishment is more
severe than Malig this time around. Macias is suspended for three months while Malig is fined P5,000.00.



166 SCRA 316 Legal Ethics Contemptuous Language Duty of a Lawyer
Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating
the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987
Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against
Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against
Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against
Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on
the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the rich
and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an
ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered
Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that
he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court,
to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes,
that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to go slow on
Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for
the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that
the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the
grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade
the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the
country.
Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware
of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and
that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no
antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who
owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment
and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of
Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In
the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme
Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.
The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.




Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, [G.R. No. L-27072 July 31 1968]
FACTS:
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board issued an Invitation to Bid for the exploration and development
of mineral deposits in a certain portion in the Province of Surigao. It was joined by two (2) bidders.
After evaluation, both were disqualified and their subsequent motions denied. One of the (failed)
bidder filed a petition at the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking relief. After the petitioners
here (respondents in the said case) answered the petition, Judge Gaudencio Cloribel of CFI issued a
restraining order to petitioners here (respondent in the petition to Judge Cloribel) to avert from their
action in the bidding process. Petitioners here seek a writ of preliminary injunction to the Supreme
Court on the assailed action of Judge Cloribel due to his alleged grave abuse of discretion on the
subject matter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Cloribel had committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.

HELD:
YES. Costs against the respondent.

RATIO:
There is no cause of action as a basis of the judge to issue the restraining order. Invitation to Bid is
not an offer from which deemed accepted by the other party in their submission of bids. In fact,
there is still no contract unless the bid is determined to be the most advantageous offer to the
government. What was accepted by the bidder was the condition, inter alia, that the government
reserves the right to reject any and all bids, waive any defect of form or accept such bid as may be
deemed advantageous to it. As a consequence, the bidder (one of respondent here) is in estoppel
to object or to assail the exercise of the said right by the petitioner as the Board.







EN BANC
G.R. No. 585 December 14, 1979
EMILIA E. ANDRES, petitioner,
vs.
STANLEY R. CABRERA, respondent.

GUERRERO, J.:
In a resolution of this Court dated October 11, 1979, respondent Stanley R. Cabrera. a successful bar
examine in 1977 and against whom a petition to disqualify him from membership in the Bar is
pending in this Court in the above-entitled case, was required to show cause why he should not be
cited and punished for contempt of court.
The above citation for contempt against the respondent was issued by the Court following the
persistence of the respondent in the use of, abusive and vituperative language despite the Court's
admonition implicit in Our previous resolution of June 5, 1979 deferring the oath-taking of
respondent pending showing that he has amended his ways and conformed to the use of polite,
courteous and civil language.
The petition to disqualify respondent from admission to the Bar was filed by Atty. Emilia F. Andres,
Legal Officer II in the Office of the Minister, Ministry of Labor on the ground of lack of good moral
character as shown by his propensity in using vile, uncouth, and in civil language to the extent of
being reprehensively malicious and criminally libelous and likewise, for his proclivity in filing
baseless, malicious and unfounded criminal cases.
It appears that Atty. Emilia E. Andres, designated as Special Investigator to investigate the
administrative charge filed by Mrs. Presentacion R. Cabrera, mother of the respondent, against one,
Atty. Benjamin Perez, former Hearing Officer of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Unit, Region
IV, Manila, for alleged dishonesty, oppression and discourtesy, recommended the dismissal of the
charge even as the records of two relevant Workmen's Compensation cases were not produced at
the hearing, notwithstanding the request of the respondent. When the Minister of Labor dismissed
the charges upon Atty. Andres' recommendation, respondent filed with the City Fiscal of Manila
criminal charges of infidelity in the custody of documents. falsification of public documents, and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against the investigator.
Supporting these criminal charges are affidavits of respondent Stanley R. Cabrera wherein Atty.
Andres. now the petitioner, points to the vile, in civil and uncouth language used by respondent, as
shown in the following excerpts:
9. That the moronic statements of Atty. Ernesto Cruz and Atty. Emilia Andres are the
product ofmoronic conspiracy to conceal the said falsified, fraudulent and
unauthorized document in the sense that how can the CARS conduct a diligent
search tor the aforesaid document when according to themoronic excuse of the
Chief of the said office which took over the functions of the defunct WCC
considering that it is easier to resort to the list of the inventory of cases before
conducting a diligent search unless both are morons with regards to their public
office ... (emphasis supplied).
10. That due to the fact that Acting Referee Benjamin R. Perez, Alfredo Antonio, Jr.,
Atty. Ernesto Cruz and Atty. Emilia Andres has perpetrated a moronic but criminal
conspiracy to conceal the falsified fraudulent and unauthorized petition ... (emphasis
supplied).
... And to show beyond reasonable doubt that that the letter is a manufactured
evidence respondent Atty. Andres in another demonstration of
her unparalleled stupidity in the discharge of her public functions moronically failed
to affix her signature to further aggravate matters said manufactured evidence
was moronically received upon unlawful inducement by respondents Atty. Cruz and
Atty. Andres in furtherance of the criminal conspiracy by the Idiotic with regards to
the discharge of public functions ... (emphasis supplied)
The same words and phrases are used in respondent's other affidavits supporting the criminal cases
against the petitioner such as the following:
Her moronic but criminal participation as a conspirator
another demonstration of her unparalleled stupidity in the discharge of her public
functions moronically failed to affix her signature
said manufactured evidence was moronically received by unlawful inducement by
respondents
idiotic receiving clerk of CAR
unparalleled stupidity of chief respondent
On April 28, 1977, this Court required respondent to file an answer to the petition to disqualify him
from admission to the Bar and ordered at the same time that his oath-taking be held in abeyance
until further orders. In his answer, respondent admits the filing of criminal cases in the City Fiscal's
Office against the petitioner but he claims that his language was not vile uncouth and un civil due to
the simple reason that the same is the truth and was made with good intentions and justifiable
motives pursuant to respondent's sense of justice as cherished under the New Society, aside from
being absolutely privileged. Respondent's answer, however, repeats his former allegations that
"Atty. Emilia Andres is not only a moron" and reiterates "the moronic discharge of public functions
by complainant Atty. Emilia Andres."
The records show repeated motions of respondent dated October 21, 1977 and February 22, 1978
for the early resolution of his case and in his letter dated April 11, 1978 addressed to then Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, respondent sought, in his very words "some semblance of justice from the
Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippines" and another letter to the Chief Justice dated August
17, 1978 making reference to the "avalance of the sadistic resolution en banc," "the cruel and
inhuman punishment the Court has speedily bestowed upon undersigned respondent," "the Court
does not honor its own resolution," and closing his letter thus "A victim of the Court's inhuman
and cruel punishment through its supreme inaction."
We referred the petition of Atty. Emilia Andres to the Legal Investigator of the Court for
investigation, report and recommendation which was submitted on May 24, 1979. Acting on said
report, the Court resolved to defer the oath-taking of respondent pending showing that he has
amended his ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language. Thereafter,
respondent filed on September 3, 1979 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to annul Our resolution of June 5,
1979 and to reinvestigate the case, preferably giving opportunity to respondent to argue his case
orally before the Court or to allow him to take his oath of office as an attorney. We denied the
motion.
On September 11, 1979, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt of Court, praying the
Supreme Court to cite complainant Atty. Emilia Andres for contempt of court, alleging that her false
and malicious accusations coupled with her improper and obnoxious acts during the investigation
impeded, obstructed and degraded the administration of justice. Under paragraph 2 of said motion,
he states:
2. That with all due respect to this Court, the aforestated resolution en banc to
DEFER my oath-taking as an attorney pending showing that "he has amended his
ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous, and civil language" is
a degradation of the administration of justice due to the fact that the same is bereft
of legal foundation due to the fact that the investigation conducted by Atty. Victor J.
Sevilla, whose supreme stupidity in the discharge of his official functions is
authenticated by his overt partiality to the complainant as authenticated by the
transcript of records of this case thus depriving undersigned respondent-movant of
the "Cold and neutral impartiality of a judge" tantamount to lack of due process of
law; (emphasis supplied).
We noted that the above paragraph is a repetition of paragraph 4 in respondent's previous Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion dated September 3, 1979 which also states:
4. That with all due respect to this Court, the aforestated resolution en banc to
DEFER my oath-taking as an attorney pending showing that "he has amended his
ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language" is a
degradation of the administration of justice due to the fact that same is bereft of
legal foundation due to the fact that the investigation conducted by Atty. Victor J.
Sevilla, whose supreme stupidity in the discharge of his official functions is
authenticated by his overt partiality to the complainant as authenticated by the
transcript of records of this case thus depriving undersigned respondent-movant of
the "cold and neutral impartiality of a judge, " tantamount to lack of due process of
law: (emphasis supplied).
We also took note in respondent's Urgent Motion for Contempt of Court the language used by him
in praying this Court "to impose upon said Emilia E. Andres imprisonment commensurate to the
humiliation and vomitting injusticeundersigned respondent-movant suffered and still suffering from
this Court due to complainant Atty. Emilia E. Andres' wanton dishonesty."
It is obvious and self-evident that respondent has not amended his conduct despite the Court's
admonition. Respondent persists and keeps on using abusive and vituperative language before the
Court. Accordingly, We resolved in Our resolution of October 11, 1979 to require respondent to
show cause why he should not be cited and punished for contempt of court.
Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated September 27, 1979 wherein he tried
to assure the Court that he has amended his ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous
and civil language and prayed that he be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. We denied it on October
16, 1979.
Thereafter, respondent submitted a pleading entitled "Subrosa" dated October 22, 1979 and
answered the citation for contempt against him in the following wise and manner:
3. That without prejudice to my Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 27,
1979, undersigned respondent respectfully states to this Court that the respondent
charges that the Court's Resolution of June 5, 1979 is a "degradation of the
administration of justice, " was never intended as a defiance of this Court's
authority. nor to scandalize the integrity, dignity, and respect which this Court
enjoys, but was an statement made with utmost good faith out of frustration out of
respondent's inability to take his lawyer's oath since April, 1977 and in justifiable
indignation at the illegalities perpetrated by both complainant Emilia E. Andres and
Legal Investigator Victor Sevilla, both members of the Bar which are evident with a
cursory perusal of the typewritten transcript of the stenographic notes of the
hearings conducted by Legal Investigator Sevilla which this Court adopted;
(emphasis supplied).
We reject totally respondent's supposed humble apology "for all his non-conformity to the use of
polite, courteous and civil language in all his pleadings filed with the Court and on his solemn word
of honor pledges not to commit the same hereinafter" and his disavowal of intent of "defiance of
(the) Court's authority nor to scandalize (its) integrity, dignity and respect which this Court enjoys."
Such apology and disavowal appear to be in sincere, sham and artful for respondent in the same
breadth contends that his statement calling the Court's resolution of June 5, 1979 as "a degradation
of the administration of justice" was made "with utmost, good faith out of frustration of
respondent's inability to take his lawyer's oath since April, 1977 and in justifiable indignation of the
illegalities perpetrated by both complainant Emilia E. Andres and Legal Investigation Victor Sevilla."
Although respondent is not yet admitted to the legal profession but now stands at the threshold
thereof, having already passed the Bar examinations, it is as much his duty as every attorney-at-law
already admitted to the practice of law to ..observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20, (b), Rule 138, Rules of Court) and "to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged" (Sec. 20, (f), Rule 138).
According to the Canons of Professional Ethics, it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the Judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves,
are particularly entitled to receive the support of the Bar against unjust criticism and clamor. This
duty is likewise incumbent upon one aspiring to be a lawyer such as the respondent for the
attorney's oath solemnly enjoins him to "conduct myself as a lawyer according to to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the Courts as to my client.
The power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt is inherent and extends to suits at law as
well as to administrative proceedings as in the case at bar for it is as necessary to maintain respect
for the courts, in administrative cases as it is in any other class of judicial proceedings. Under Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, a person guilty of any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for contempt, and the
reason is that respect for the courts guarantees their stability and permanence Without such
guaranty, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very loose and flimsy foundation, such
power is essential to the proper execution and effective maintenance of judicial authority.
Respondent's use of vile rude and repulsive language is patent and palpable from the very words,
phrases and sentences he has written and which are quoted herein. 'They speak for themselves in
their vulgarity, insolence and calumny. Specifically, respondent's direct reference to the Court on the
..sadistic resolution en banc, " "the cruel and inhuman punishment the Court has speedily bestowed"
upon him, that "the Court does not honor its own resolution," that he is "a victim of the Court's
inhuman and cruel punishment through its supreme inaction," and that he is suffering "humiliation
and vomitting in justice" from this Court is not only disrespectful but his charges are false, sham and
unfounded.
'There is no excuse, much less plea or pretext to brand ultimately the Court's resolution deferring
oath-taking of the respondent as a new lawyer issued June 5, 1979 as "a degradation of the
administration of justice." By his improper conduct in the use of highly disrespectful insolent
language, respondent has tended to degrade the administration of justice; he has disparaged the
dignity and brought to disrepute the integrity and authority of the Court. He has committed
contempt of this Court.
WHEREFORE respondent Stanley Cabrera is found guilty of contempt and he is hereby sentenced to
pay this Court within ten days from notice hereof a fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) or
imprisonment of fifty (50) days.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to respondent's personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED










FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]

JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SABINO PADILLA, JR., Respondent.

Jose M. Castillo for complainant.

Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.


SYLLABUS


1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged. The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities
between counsel.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE UNCALLED FOR IN THE CASE AT BAR; PENALTY. Whether
directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que
bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting
remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow
lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm
of conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is
not the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of judicial proceedings. He
has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be more
circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. Respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is
directed to observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt
with more severely.


R E S O L U T I O N


PLANA, J.:


Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for the use of
insulting language in the course of judicial proceedings.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

As the material facts are not in dispute, we have deemed the case submitted for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings of the parties.

Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time, one of the defendants) in Criminal
Case No. 13331 for forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan. Respondent was counsel for
the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on November 19, 1981, while complainant was formally offering his
evidence, he heard respondent say "bobo." When complainant turned toward respondent, he saw the latter
looking at him (complainant) menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of many people,
complainant was unable to proceed with his offer of evidence. The court proceedings had to be suspended.

While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the complainant, claiming that
what he said was "Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was trying to inject wholly irrelevant
and highly offensive matters into the record" while in the process of making an offer of evidence. The
statement of Atty. Castillo referred to by respondent was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present complaint for ejectment was because
defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of this representation called up this representation at his house and crying over
the phone, claiming that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her and immediately, this representation like any
good husband would do in the defense of his wife immediately went to the school and confronted Atty. Sabino
Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for a yes or no answer if he harassed the wife of this representation and if yes,
right then and there l would sock his face."cralaw virtua1aw library

Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and
(2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. (Rules of Court, Rule 138,
Sec. 20 (b) and (f). The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities between
counsel. (Canon 17.)

Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay,
que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such
cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a
fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to
the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach
because this is not the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of judicial
proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and
warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of Appeals;
Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of Caloocan.)

The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondents actuation was triggered by complainants own
manifest hostility and provocative remarks. Complainant is therefore not entirely free from blame when
respondent unleashed his irritation through the use of improper words.

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper
decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.



FACTS:Vicente Raul Almacens Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title, filed on Sept. 26,
1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is a great injustice committed against his client by
Supreme Court. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a tribual peopled by men who are calloused to
our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. His clients he continues, who was deeply
aggrieved by this Courts unjust judgment, has become one of the sacrificial victims before the
altar of hypocrisy.
He ridicules the members of the Court, saying that justice as administered by the present members
of the Supreme Court is not only bline, but also deaf and dumb. He then vows to argue the cause of
his client in the peoples forum, so that people may know of the silent injustices committed by
this court and that whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be
repeated. He ends his petition with a prayer that:
a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may
retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Yaptichay v. Calero, in which Atty.
Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court rencered judgment agains his client. On
June 15, 1966 atty. Almacen receive acopy of the decision. Twenty days later on he moved for its
reconsideration but did not notify the latter of the time and plce of hearing on said motion.
Meanwhile, onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For lack of proof of
service, the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy
of his first motion for reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon
verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who earlier, that is, on Aug. 22, 1966 had already perfected
the appeal. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals.

HELD:Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of law until further orders.