Kant and the Unknown thing-in-itself

The most significant contribution to the not-known and the unknowable was Immanuel
Kants formulation of the noumena. (A thorough understanding of the place Kant gives to
the unknowable would be extremel useful here! and I would like to delve deeper into it!
but for the moment I will have to be brief and as too the point as is possible when dealing
with Kant." This noumenal! the opposite of which was the phenomenal (b which Kant
meant the world of appearances" was in his philosoph the ungraspable thing-in-itself. In
short! Kant draws a sharp distinction between the #real$ world in-itself and the world as it
is perceived (or intuited" b the five senses. This distinction is one which Kant suggests
emerges from the understanding. %e writes! &The understanding! when it terms an ob'ect
in a certain relation phenomenon! at the same time forms out of this relation a
representation or notion of an ob'ect in itself! and hence believes that it can form also
conceptions of such ob'ects.
(
)ssentiall! the noumena is the ob'ect of sensuous
perception that exists independentl of being perceived! the actualit of which is based
upon the assumption that there must be something behind the representations of
phenomena that we perceive. *onstitutionall! noumena cannot be experienced! and
therefore the most that can be said or known about such #ob'ects$ is that the remain
unknowable! even their existence in realit+ &what things ma be in themselves! I know
not! and need not know because a thing is never presented to me otherwise than as a
phenomena.
,
In spite of such a dearth of knowledge noumena provide a significant role
in Kants philosoph! making it possible for ob'ects of experience - and thus perceptual
apprehension - to have a solid existence without 'ust being mere appearances. The logical
conclusion is such that were phenomena bereft of an in-itself core the would have no
(
Kant! Critique of Pure Reason! trans. -eikle'ohn! ..! (/ew 0ork+ 1over 2ublications! Inc.! ,334"! p.
(54. %ereafter for *26 read Critique of Pure Reason
,
Kant! *26! p. (57
(
existence beond our perception of them.
4
The paradox is then! that in order to have solid
real-world existence! ob'ects of empirical experience must rel upon that which is both
unknowable and unproveable+ that is to sa! the noumenal represents both the limit of
possible knowledge and the guarantee that such knowledge is ob'ectivel real.
8

%ow does this relate to the art ob'ect! though9 The ke is Kants idea of 'udgement!
which is that facult of the human mind which ascribes purposiveness to external realit.
This 'udgement of purposiveness is not one which is based on an prior experience (it is a
priori"! but is a rule that it prescribes for itself in order to determine its own reflections on
nature.
7
Two points should be noted here+ the first is that this 'udgement is prior to
experience! and as such it is universall valid for all rational individuals.
5
All that this
means is that as human beings we do not and can not approach the world as though it
were a kaleidoscopic smorgasbord of sensuous information! but rather alwas assume an
order of purpose. The second point is that this 'udgement is reflective onl and not
prescriptive: it does not sa what that purpose is! as that is the 'ob of the facult of the
understanding to decipher! a task which when attained brings a kind of cerebral pleasure.
;
The 'udgement in this wa is also that which makes ever experience of sensuous realit
possible: that is! without the assumption<'udgement of purpose experience as such reall
would be a stream of apparentl meaningless sensuous data. Kantian scholar! %oward
*agill! writes+ &it is a =self-imposed> rule used b the 'udgement in order to facilitate its
4
Kant! *26! p. 8,
8
The reason! of course! wh such a distinction was even necessar is because! prior to Kant! under the
influence of 6en? 1escartes! modern philosoph had placed prime importance on the centralit of the
experience! rationalit and doubt of the ego in relation to that which can be known. /o longer receiving
ontological status from either @od and<or the platonic Ideas! ob'ects could onl be ob'ects at all because
and insofar as the human ego perceived them. The obvious conseAuence of such a position was that the
ob'ective realit of ob'ects of experience and sensuous perception no longer held an ontological certaint.
7
Kant! Critique of Judgement! trans. Bernard! ..! (/ew 0ork+ 1over 2ublications! ,337"! p. (5.
%ereafter! for *. read Critique of Judgement
5
Kant! *.! p. (4
;
Kant! *.! p. (C
,
investigations into nature.
C
The 'udgement knits this data together. Kant goes as far as
to sa that it is because of this 'udgement that knowledge of the external world is possible+
the science of biolog! for example! is predicated on the assumption of purpose in an
given aspect of a living organism - everthing has a reason! even if that reason has
conseAuentl become redundant (i.e. the vermiform appendix in humans". As mentioned!
the convergence of the 'udgement of purpose with the actual discover in nature that said
purpose if real is a source of great pleasure for human cognition. Kant writes+
&After all! an observer of nature finall becomes fond of ob'ects that
initiall offended his senses! when he discovers in them the great
purposiveness of their organisation and thus feasts his reason on the
contemplation of themDBut this occupation of the power of 'udgement!
which lets us feel our own cognitive powers! is not et interest in the
actions and moralit of itself. It merel brings about =the fact> that one
gladl entertains oneself with such 'udging! and it gives to virtue or the wa
of thinking according to moral laws a form of beaut that is admired but
not et therefore sought! ='ust> as everthing the contemplation of which
brings about sub'ectivel a consciousness of the harmon of our powers of
presentation! and in which we feel our entire cognitive power
(understanding and imagination" strengthened! produces a liking that can
also be communicated to other people.
E

Fhen confronting art! however! the 'udgement makes the same assumption of purpose
without there being an attending content to the concept of purpose normall provided b
the understanding. -ade in freedom b a rational mind the ob'ect of art provokes the
individuals 'udgement to assume purpose! the absence of an evidence for which in the
ob'ect does not stop the cognitive powers of the mind! but rather sets and keeps them in
motion.
(3
Aesthetic en'oment is the inherentl pleasurable pla that ensues between the
C
*agill! %.! A Kant Dictionary! (Gxford+ Blackwell! (EE7"! p. ,,4
E
Kant! *2r6! pp. ,33! ,3(
(3
Kant! *.! pp. 8,! 84+ &The consciousness of the mere formal purposiveness in the pla of the sub'ects
cognitive powers! in a representation through which an ob'ect is given! is the pleasure itself: because it
contains a determining ground of the activit of the sub'ect in respect of the excitement of its cognitive
powers! and therefore an inner causalit (which is purposive" in respect of cognition in general without
however being limited to an definite cognition: and therefore contains a mere form of the sub'ective
purposiveness of a representation in an aesthetical 'udgement.
4
facult of 'udgement and the facult of the understanding (the concepts of which govern
experience a priori! such as the concept of space and time". This pla! predicated on the
assumption of purpose! is kept in motion b the absence of a definite purpose+ the art is a
site of the overflowing of meaning precisel because no definite meaning can be ascribed
to it.
((
As previousl mentioned! the fact that art is something produced b rational beings means
that it is also a product of freedom.
(,
Hor Kant! freedom was the onl one of the three big
ideas of pure reason (which were the existence of @od! the immortalit of the soul! and
freedom" which could be resolved with an degree of satisfaction due to the practical
effects of freedom in the #real$ world.
(4
Briefl put! freedom is the Auilting point between
the supersensible realm of pure reason and the experiential world of empirical realit! and
as such it falls under the 'urisdiction of practical reason - that is! freedom is essentiall
reason that can be applied to the empirical world. The logic is! that insofar as reason can
determine the actions of a rational being! so that individual ought to behave and so be free
of empirical determination.
(8
This &ought (which is identical with the moral law" is not
something that can be found b appealing to nature! in which can onl ever be seen that
which &is! but is instead a product of pure reason.
(7
Hreedom is not! therefore! morall
neutral! but is! according to Kant! rigidl prescriptive of human behaviour: and because it
is rationall determined! the moral law derived from reason is universall applicable at all
times and in all places.
(5

((
Kant! *.! p. ((E
(,
Kant! *.! p. (3E
(4
Kant! Critique of Practical Reason! trans. 2luhar! F.! (%ackett 2ublishing *ompan! Inc.! ,33,"! p. 7.
%ereafter for *2r6 read Critique of Practical Reason.
(8
In this view to fail to behave rationall is to be operating at the level of senseless nature.
(7
Kant! *2r6! p. 55
(5
Kant! *2r6! p. 8;
8
The work of art! then! stands in an odd place within Kantian philosoph! because! on the
one hand it is produced in freedom b reason! but! on the other! it makes no mention of
the moral legislation freedom aspires to! neither pointing to it nor hinting at it.
(;
That
being said! beaut! Kant sas! is a smbol of moralit! because in the 'udgement of taste
(i.e. the 'udgement that such and such an ob'ect is beautiful" there is &something analogous
to the consciousness of the state of the mind brought about b moral 'udgements.
(C
This
something analogous! b representing the imagination operating in the freedom of
purposive determination! and not being bound b empirical determinations! is able to
render the necessar leap to moral development less daunting to the sub'ect. )ven so!
Kant is Auite insistent that the beautiful in art should not be bound up with the morall
good in such a wa that the morall good is able to determine what is aestheticall
beautiful. Iuch a move would mean that! in order to be beautiful the ob'ect would have to
be good! and in order to be good! said ob'ect would also have to contain a concept of
what it was meant to be (against which to be 'udged #good$ or not"! which would mean
that the 'udgement of taste! would be open to proofs! which would mean that it wasnt a
'udgement of taste+ beaut would be something rationall deduced and provable in an
given ob'ect! like saing , J , K 8! and conseAuentl the experience of the beautiful in
nature or in art would be no better or worse than a phsicall pleasant sensation.
(E

Hor Kant! then! I would argue! the work of art stands in-between the is and the ought! in-
between pure materialit and the realm of the supersensible: it is at once an ob'ect
determined empiricall (insofar as it is an ob'ect of possible experience" and an ob'ect
determined rationall b the freedom of the imagination. .ust as! in order to be both an
empiricall determined being and a being who can break that chain in nature of cause and
(;
Kant! *.! p. (3E
(C
Kant! *.! p. (73
(E
Kant! *.! p. (88
7
effect determinations b acting rationall! the freel acting sub'ect must be both a
phenomenon (ob'ect of sense" and a noumenon (an ob'ect unknowable in experience! such
as freedom in nature"! so the work of art is both noumenon and phenomenon with a
twist.
,3
The point I have been driving at is that! 'ust as freedom is revealed to be the
essence of the sub'ects in-itselfness! so freedom is revealed in art to be the in-itselfness of
the art. In making art the artist performs a kind of transubstantiation+ the divide between
appearance and the thing-in-itself breaks down and the unknowable is made manifest while
still retaining its unknowable characteristic: phenomenon is made unknowable! and
noumenon is made manifest. Fe can see the art! touch it! lick it even (if we so wish"! but
in its ver materialit it is unknowable to us.
,3
Kant! *2r6! p. 5;
5
;