1

DOLO v CULPA
MISTAKE OF FACT
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by
reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as
he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the
true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer,
and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or
mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular
intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder,
malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the
circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under
the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for
any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's
Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240;
Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs.
Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability
provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused
must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal..,
65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P.
vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good
faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to
him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be
expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.

MISTAKE IN IDENTITY
2

G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.

The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the door, Oanis
and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without
having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question is whether or not they may, upon
such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent
mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they
incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of
homicide through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the case, the
crime committed by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.

In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah
Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without
fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by someone
trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a
robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment,
he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he
seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common
illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road
held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend
under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and
property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact
committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further
inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then
appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the
instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the
room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim
was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow
even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get
him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.

Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and
detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from
bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with
wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p.
3

612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in
making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his
detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses
unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that
Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the
community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no
resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down,
although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).

It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life which he
has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers
resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in
the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of
the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate
action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and
there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man,
condemnation not condonation should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of
official actuation.

The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In
criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de
imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de daar; existiendo esa intencion,
debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un
mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once
held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully
done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54
Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.

As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.
There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in
article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when
he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the
circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance
of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present
appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is
not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead
or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their
desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed
4

to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to
article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such
case, be imposed.

NO INTENTION
G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.

It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their written statements to the
police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased
believing that the contents thereof was water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused
Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the
person who set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did not impute any participation of
eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense.

While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written statements alleging that they were
extracted by force. They claimed that the police maltreated them into admitting authorship of the crime. They also
engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the commission of the offense.

Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned and discussed in the
decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the sole basis for the findings of facts in the
decision rendered. The said court categorically stated that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's
straightforward, positive and convincing testimony which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and
unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, Records).

It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that Gabion stopped reading
when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from
under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body of
the deceased when Gabion warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire.

However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and
intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no
5

animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was
accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the
respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is
individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13,
Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).

The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having taken the can from under
the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew
that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even
before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable
consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the
deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence
defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled
as follows:

A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and
prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone
might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own
person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.

There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the deceased before the
incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that
evening. For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.

There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was
gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were
otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set
the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of
the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised
Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible
therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the accused Samson is only
guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are
disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
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committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that
the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17).
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN HOMICIDE
G.R. No. 153591 February 23, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
vs.
RENATO GARCIA y ROMANO, appellant.

The issue to be resolved is whether or not appellant is guilty of murder or reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

We find from a careful review of the facts on record that the unfortunate incident was more the result of reckless
imprudence than of malicious intent. Therefore, the trial court erred in convicting appellant of the crime of murder
qualified by evident premeditation.

The elements of evident premeditation are: (1) a previous decision by the appellant to commit the crime; (2) an overt
act/acts manifestly indicating that the appellant clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision
to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his acts.

The victims brother, Bentley, testified that the vehicle stopped after it bumped the victim, but it moved forward and ran
over the prostrate body of her sister. From his narration, we find that no sufficient time elapsed for appellant to decide
to commit the crime and reflect on its consequences. Moreover, there was no showing that appellant performed other
overt acts to show that he was determined to commit murder. The essence of evident premeditation is that the
execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent, during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.5 These circumstances do not obtain in
the case at bar.

Thus, appellant is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. In U.S. v. Maleza,7 we explained the rationale behind this crime as follows:

A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and
prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone
might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own
person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.
7


In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.8
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing such act. Compared to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes
the place of the element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take
precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.9

Appellant showed an inexcusable lack of precaution when he disregarded a traffic sign cautioning motorists to slow
down10 and drove his vehicle in full speed despite being aware that he was traversing a school zone and pedestrians
were crossing the street. He should have observed due diligence of a reasonably prudent man by slackening his speed
and proceeding cautiously while passing the area.
MALA IN SE
G.R. No. 157171 March 14, 2006
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents

The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se or mala prohibita?
Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of are
inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law.8Accordingly, criminal intent
must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand,
in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the
law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated.9Criminal intent is
not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.10

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to
overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited
amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish
unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a
candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.
8


Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the
contrary shall appear.13Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden of proving its existence.

FELONY
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 165842
November 29, 2005

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by
law.[20] The phrase or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were
of the impression that in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of
a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for
bigamy.[21]

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been
legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully
dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.[22] It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would
be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.[23] Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the
second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a
felony by dolo.[24] On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the
existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not
matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until lawfully
dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.[25] As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of Appeals[26] and Mercado
v. Tan,[27] under the Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a
defense.


In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared that there are
three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention
constituting the felony of the act.[28] He explained that:

9

This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the principle antedating
all codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is no crime.
There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by very strong evidence, and if this be
produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in the
reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many years that have elapsed since he has
had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy,
because there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the crime.[29]

As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent.
Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed
voluntary.[30] Although the words with malice do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is
included in the word voluntary.[31]

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification from which
another suffers injury.[32] When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or
committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.[33] Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law
that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary,
and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.[34]

For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil
intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.[35]

n the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was not
judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.[36] The prosecution also proved that the
petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a
general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such
defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is
presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was
of the well-grounded belief
10

that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have
adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also
constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part
when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case.
The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
CORPUS DELICTI
G.R. No. 142773 January 28, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM, MANUEL DELIM alias "BONG" (At Large), ROBERT DELIM (At Large), and RONALD
DELIM alias "BONG", accused-appellants.

If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of the victim's liberty
does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the killing, and hence, is merged into, or
absorbed by, the killing of the victim.16 The crime committed would either be homicide or murder.

What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal complaint
that is determinative of what crime the accused is charged with that of murder or kidnapping.

In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things: first, the
criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act.25 Wharton says that corpus delicti includes
two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective element of crimes.26 In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases,
the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by
the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c)
that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the
death.27 To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial,
that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may
consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the
victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.

The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by
circumstantial or presumptive evidence.28

11

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.48 Conspiracy must be
proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Conspiracy is not presumed. It may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy is deducible
from the acts of the malefactors before, during and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint
purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiment.49 To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be
proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime.50 It is sufficient if, at the time of the commission
of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. If conspiracy is established, the act of
one is deemed the act of all. It matters not who among the accused actually shot and killed the victim.51 This is based
on the theory of a joint or mutual agency ad hoc for the prosecution of the common plan:

"x x x The acts and declarations of an agent, within the scope of his authority, are considered and treated as the acts and
declarations of his principal. 'What is so done by an agent, is done by the principal, through him, as his mere instrument.'
Franklin Bank of Baltimore v. Pennsylvania D. & M. Steam Navigation Co., 11 G. & J. 28, 33 (1839). 'If the conspiracy be
proved to have existed, or rather if evidence be given to the jury of its existence, the acts of one in furtherance of the
common design are the acts of all; and whatever one does in furtherance of the common design, he does as the agent of
the co-conspirators.' R. v. O'Connell, 5 St.Tr. (N.S.) 1, 710."52

In the eyes of the law, conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm
and the law says that the acts, words and declaration of each, while in the pursuit of the common design, are the acts,
words and declarations of all.53

In the case at bar, Marlon, Ronald and Leon arrived together in the house of Modesto, each armed with a handgun.
Marlon and Ronald barged into said house while Leon stood guard by the door thereof. After Marlon and Ronald had left
with Modesto in tow, Leon stood by the door and warned Randy and Rita not to leave the house. Leon stood guard by
the door of the house until 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 when he left the house. The overt acts of all the malefactors
were so synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan or design of all the malefactors to
achieve a common purpose, namely the killing of Modesto. Irrefragably, the tasks assigned to Leon in the commission of
the crime were (a) to act as a lookout; (b) to ensure that Rita and Randy remain in their house to prevent them from
seeking assistance from police authorities and their relatives before their mission to kill Modesto shall have been a fait
accompli as well as the escape of Marlon and Ronald.54 Patently, Leon, a lookout for the group, is guilty of the killing of
Modesto.55 Leon may not have been at the situs criminis when Modesto was killed by Marlon and Ronald nevertheless
he is a principal by direct participation.56 If part of a crime has been committed in one place and part in another, each
person concerned in the commission of either part is liable as principal. No matter how wide may be the separation of
the conspirators, if they are all engaged in a common plan for the execution of a felony and all take their part in
furtherance of the common design, all are liable as principals. Actual presence is not necessary if there is a direct
connection between the actor and the crime.57
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE OR NEGLIGENCE
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
12

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.

Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor
in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve
unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason,
robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In
intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x
x

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor,
then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be
fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful
offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art.
365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the
willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from
prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no
relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage,
either to person or property.19

13

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x
x x (Emphasis supplied)Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but
awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely,
Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal
Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two
categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation
light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the
resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple
intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the
prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a
hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime
damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The
ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48s framework
apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to
light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively
alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties
under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy)
applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one consequence amounts
to a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less
grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light
felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly
14

sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive
original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium
period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365
involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the
resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other
acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized
as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime
collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately.
Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be
imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information
cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis
supplied)

By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework
over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate
offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365,
discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as
separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of
Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts
regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the
15

distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy
adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1

A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains us
to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article
48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to
stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary
means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor Generals argument that
double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly
because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:

MALA IN SE
February 16, 1935
G.R. No. 42288
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CORNELIO BAYONA, defendant-appellant.

The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the
prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. ..." (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128.)

While it is true that, as a rule and on principles of abstract justice, men are not and should not be held criminally
responsible for acts committed by them without guilty knowledge and criminal or at least evil intent (Bishop's New Crim.
Law, vol. I, sec. 286), the courts have always recognized the power of the legislature, on grounds of public policy and
compelled by necessity, "the great master of things", to forbid in a limited class of cases the doing of certain acts, and to
make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128; U.S. vs. Ah
Chong, 15 Phil., 488.) In such cases no judicial authority has the power to require, in the enforcement of the law, such
knowledge or motive to be shown. (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng and Co Kong, 30 Phil., 577.)
MISTAKE OF LAW
September 15, 1909

G.R. No. 4963
16

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GO CHICO, defendant-appellant.

The defendant is charged with the violation of section 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission, which reads as
follows:

Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view on his own premises, or who shall
expose, or cause to be exposed, to public view, either on his own premises or elsewhere, any flag, banner, emblem, or
device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against
the United States, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device used or adopted at any time by the public enemies of the
United States in the Philippine Island for the purpose of public disorder or of rebellion or insurrection against the
authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device of the Katipunan Society,
or which is commonly known as such, shall be punished by a fine of not less that five hundred pesos for more than five
thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not less than three months nor more than five years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

The defendant was tried in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 8th day of September, 1908. After
hearing the evidence adduced the court adjudged the defendant guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him under
that judgment to pay a fine of P500, Philippine currency, and to pay the costs of the action, and to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment during the time and in the form and in the place prescribed by law until said fine should be paid. From
that judgment and sentence the defendant appealed to this court.

A careful examination of the record brought to this court discloses the following facts:

That on or about the 4th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, the appellant Go Chico displayed in one of the
windows and one of the show cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario, a number of medallions, in the form of a small
button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or
device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate and identify those in armed insurrection
against the United States. On the day previous to the one above set forth the appellant had purchased the stock of
goods in said store, of which the medallions formed a part, at a public sale made under authority of the sheriff of the city
of Manila. On the day in question, the 4th of August aforesaid, the appellant was arranging his stock of goods for the
purpose of displaying them to the public and in so doing placed in his showcase and in one of the windows of his store
the medallions described. The appellant was ignorant of the existence of a law against the display of the medallions in
question and had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts above stated are admitted.

17

The appellant rests his right to acquittal upon two propositions:

First. That before a conviction under the law cited can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the accused must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Second. That the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of the identical banners, devices, or emblems actually
used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United States.

In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with the criminal intent. In many
crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial.
This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be
impossible of execution. In many cases the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect which
the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result
whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad. The case at bar is a perfect illustration of this.
The display of a flag or emblem used particularly within a recent period, by the enemies of the Government tends to
incite resistance to governmental functions and insurrection against governmental authority just as effectively if made in
the best of good faith as if made with the most corrupt intent. The display itself, without the intervention of any other
factor, is the evil. It is quite different from that large class of crimes, made such by the common law or by statute, in
which the injurious effect upon the public depends upon the corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act. If A
discharges a loaded gun and kills B, the interest which society has in the act depends, not upon B's death, upon the
intention with which A consummated the act. If the gun were discharged intentionally, with the purpose of
accomplishing the death of B, then society has been injured and its security violated; but if the gun was discharged
accidentally on the part of A, then society, strictly speaking, has no concern in the matter, even though the death of B
results. The reason for this is that A does not become a danger to society and institutions until he becomes a person
with a corrupt mind. The mere discharge of the gun and the death of B do not of themselves make him so. With those
two facts must go the corrupt intent to kill. In the case at bar, however, the evil to society and the Governmental does
not depend upon the state of mind of the one who displays the banner, but upon the effect which that display has upon
the public mind. In the one case the public is affected by the intention of the actor; in the other by the act itself.

It is stated in volume 12 of Cyc., page 148, that

The legislature, however, may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission a crime without regard to the intent
of the doer, and if such an intention appears the courts must give it effect although the intention may have been
innocent. Whether or not in a given case the statute is to be so construed is to be determined by the court by
considering the subject-matter of the prohibition as well as the language of the statute, and thus ascertaining the
intention of the legislature.

18

In the case of The People vs. Kibler (106 N. Y., 321) the defendant was charged with the sale of adulterated milk under a
statute reading as follows:

No person or persons shall sell or exchange or expose for sale or exchange any impure, unhealthy, adulterated, of
unwholesome milk.

It was proved in that case that one Vandeburg purchased at the defendant's store 1 pint of milk which was shown to
contain a very small percentage of water more than that permitted by the statute. There was no dispute about the facts,
but the objection made by the defendant was that he was not allowed, upon the trial, to show an absence of criminal
intent, or to go the jury upon the question whether it existed, but was condemned under a charge from the court which
made his intent totally immaterial and his guilt consist in having sold the adulterated article whether he knew it or not
and however carefully he may have sought to keep on hand and sell the genuine article.

The opinion of the court in that case says:

As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no elements of the offense. The act alone, irrespective of its motive,
constitutes the crime.

xxx xxx xxx

It is notorious that the adulteration of food products has grown to proportions so enormous as to menace the health
and safety of the people. Ingenuity keeps pace with greed, and the careless and heedless consumers are exposed to
increasing perils. To redress such evils is a plain duty but a difficult task. Experience has taught the lesson that repressive
measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer's knowledge or of his intent to deceive and defraud
are of title use and rarely accomplish their purpose. Such an emergency may justify legislation which throws upon the
seller the entire responsibility of the purity and soundness of what he sells and compels him to know and certain.

In the case of Gardner vs. The People (62 N. Y., 299) the question arose under a statute which provided that an inspector
of elections of the city of New York should not be removed from office except "after notice in writing to the officer
sought to be removed, which notice shall set forth clearly and distinctly the reasons for his removal," and further
provided that any person who removed such an officer without such notice should be guilty of a misdemeanor. An
officer named Sheridan was removed by Gardener, the defendant, without notice. Gardener was arrested and convicted
of a misdemeanor under the statute. He appealed from the judgment of conviction and the opinion from which the
following quotation is made was written upon the decision of that appeal. Chief Justice Church, writing the opinion of
the court, says in relation to criminal intent:
19


In short, the defense was an honest misconstruction of the law under legal device. The court ruled out the evidence
offered, and held that intentionally doing the act prohibited constituted the offense. It is quite clear that the facts
offered to be shown, if true, would relieve the defendant from the imputation of a corrupt intent, and, indeed, from any
intent to violate the statute. The defendants made a mistake of law. Such mistakes do not excuse the commission of
prohibited acts. "The rule on the subject appears to be, that in acts mala in se, intent governs but in those mala prohibit
a, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?

xxx xxx xxx

The authorities seem to establish that sustain and indictment for doing a prohibited act, it is sufficient to prove that the
act was knowingly and intentionally done.

xxx xxx xxx

In this case, if the defendants could have shown that they believed that in fact notice had been given to the inspector,
although it had not, they would not have been guilty of the offense, because the intention to do the act would have
been wanting. Their plea is: True, we intended to remove the inspector without notice, but we thought the law
permitted it. This was a mistake of law, and is not strictly a defense.

xxx xxx xxx

If the offense is merely technical, the punishment can be made correspondingly nominal; while a rule requiring proof of
a criminal intent to violate the statute, independent of an intent to do the act which the statute declares shall constitute
the offense, would, in many cases, prevent the restraining influence which the statute was designed to secure.

In general, it may be said that there must be malus animus, or a criminal intent. But there is a large class of cases in
which, on grounds of public policy, certain acts are made punishable without proof that the defendant understands the
facts that give character to his act.

In such cases it is deemed best to require everybody at his peril to ascertain whether his act comes within the legislative
prohibition.

20

As there is an undoubted competency in the lawmaker to declare an act criminal, irrespective of the knowledge or
motive of the doer of such act, there can be of necessity, no judicial authority having the power to require, in the
enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown. In such instances the entire function of the court is to
find out the intention of the legislature, and to enforce the law in absolute conformity to such intention. And in looking
over the decided cases on the subject it will be found that in the considered adjudications this inquiry has been the
judicial guide.In the case of The State vs. McBrayer (98 N. C., 623) the court stated:

It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent to violate the criminal law is an essential ingredient in every criminal
offense, and that where is an absence of such intent there is no offense; this is especially true as to statutory offenses.
When the statute plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by some person, the law implies conclusively the guilty
intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law he violates. When the language is
plain and positive, and the offense is not made to depend upon the positive, willful intent and purpose, nothing is left to
interpretation.

The prohibition is absolute and general; it could not be expressed in terms more explicit and comprehensive. The
statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the forbidden act shall be done knowingly or
willfully, and if it did, the designed purpose of the act would be practically defeated. The intention of the legislature is
plain, that persons engaged in the traffic so engage in it at their peril and that they can not set up their ignorance of the
nature and qualities of the commodities they sell, as a defense.

It is clear from the authorities cited that in the act under consideration the legislature did not intend that a criminal
intent should be a necessary element of the crime. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying
that the prohibited act shall be done knowingly or willfully. The wording is plain. The Act means what it says. Nothing is
left to the interpretation.

Care must be exercised in distiguishing the differences between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to
perpetrate the act. The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and
the act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself intent and all. The wording of the law is such that the intent
and the act are inseparable. The act is the crime. The accused intended to put the device in his window. Nothing more is
required to commit the crime.