Obstacles in Afghanistan 2009-2011 Final

Campaign disconnect:
operational progress and strategic

obstacles in Afghanistan, 20092011
RUDRA CHAUDHURI AND THEO FARRELL
*
International Afairs 87:2 (2011) 271296
2011 The Author(s). International Afairs 2011 The Royal Institute of International Afairs. Published by Blackwell Publishing
Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford ox4 2dq, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
The United States and its allies have been at war in Afghanistan for almost ten
years. The campaign has been led formally by NATO since 2003, when it took
command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan.
It seems fair to ask now whether ISAF has made any progress at all. Indeed, some
analysts might be excused for arguing that it is time for the United States to cut
its losses and give up on this war.
1
Critics of the war see little real progress. They point to rising civilian casual-
ties, intensication of the war in the south since 2009, and a growing insurgent
presence in previously quiet areas of the country (especially in the north) as signs
that things are getting worse, not better.
2
Our research, drawing on extensive
eldwork, shows the opposite. We nd that ISAF has made signicant progress at
the operational level. As we show in the rst section of this article below, this is
evident in the adoption of a more efective approach to counterinsurgency (COIN),
in the development of Afghan national security forces (ANSF) and subnational
governance, and in the military campaign against the Taleban, especially in the
key southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar.
So much progress having been made, one might expect NATO to be well on
the road to victory. A handful of optimists do indeed think there are reasonable
prospects for campaign successwhich is to say, the development of a democratic
government able to survive and provide for the countrys own internal security
when NATO withdraws its combat forces in 2014.
3
We argue otherwise. In the
*
Drafts of this article were presented to the Department of War Studies at Kings College London and the
Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen in November 2010, and to the Carr Center at
the University of Harvard in February 2011. We are grateful to the seminar participants for their feedback. We
also thank the following for their written comments on earlier drafts: Stephen Biddle, Robert Cassidy, James
de Waal, Antonio Giustozzi, Anatol Lieven, Mike Martin, Jef Michaels, Mikkel Rasmussen, Michael Semple,
Joshua White, the anonymous reviewer, and especially Lawrence Lewis. Theo Farrell wishes gratefully to
acknowledge the nancial support provided by an ESRC/AHRC Research Fellowship (RES-0710270069)
funded under the Research Councils UK Global uncertainties programme.
1
Robert D. Blackwill, Plan B in Afghanistan, Foreign Afairs 90: 1, 2011, pp. 4250.
2
Ahmed Rashid, Before the endgame: Americas fatal aws in Afghanistan, Der Spiegel, 26 May 2010; Gilles
Dorronso, Afghanistan at the breaking point, Carnegie Report, Nov. 2010, pp. 79.
3
Paul D. Miller, Finish the job, Foreign Afairs 90: 1, 2011, pp. 5165; Max Boot, Afghanistan: the case for
optimism (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2 Sept. 2010), http://www.cfr.org/publication/22878/
afghanistan.html, accessed 9 Feb. 2011; Michael OHanlon and Hassina Sherjan, Toughing it out in Afghanistan
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2010); Michael E. OHanlon, New reasons for hope in Afghanistan
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 28 Sept. 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0928_
Rudra Chaudhuri and Theo Farrell
272
International Afairs 87: 2, 2011
Copyright 2011 The Author(s). International Afairs 2011 The Royal Institute of International Afairs.
second section of the article, we identify three strategic obstacles to campaign
success. The rst is the degree of corruption in Afghan government, which under-
mines the legitimacy and efectiveness of this infant democracy. The second is
falling public and political support for the war in NATO capitals, which under-
mines ISAF credibility in the political endgame to the war. In sum, those who
might be inuenced by the military might of NATOespecially the main insur-
gent groups, Afghan fence-sitters and regional playersall know that essentially
the alliance is on its way out of Afghanistan. The third is the existence of home
bases in Pakistan from where the main insurgent groupsQuetta Shura Taleban
(QST), the Haqqani Network (HQN) and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)are
able to direct and regenerate forces. This inherently limits the efect of the ISAF
military campaign in Afghanistan. No matter how successful it is, it cannot elimi-
nate the main insurgent groups.
Looking at prospects for the campaign in the third section of the article, we
conclude that progress at the operational level cannot address these strategic
obstacles. Prerequisites for this are political changes in Kabul, NATO capitals and
Pakistan that are beyond the abilities of the ISAF campaign to bring about. In this
sense, there is an operationalstrategic disconnect at the heart of the NATO war
efort.
Progress on the ground
By mid-2009, the NATO campaign in Afghanistan had stalled. The initial assess-
ment of ISAF Commander Stanley McChrystal, delivered to Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates in August, was that the overall situation is deteriorating; that ISAF
faced a resilient and growing insurgency and a crisis of condence among
Afghans.
4
Some 18 months on, ISAF has recovered momentum on the ground. In
this section, we explore how it did so. First, we outline how McChrystal sought
to change the conduct of the campaign. Then we assess the success of two key
elements of the new McChrystal approach in Afghanistan: namely, protecting
the population, and developing the ANSF through closer partnering with ISAF
units. Finally, we discuss recent progress in the ISAF campaign, in promoting
subnational governance, and in taking the ght to the Taleban.
The McChrystal approach
Faced with a agging campaign, McChrystal set out to redene the ght. Under
its previous US commander, General David McKiernan, ISAF had focused on
defeating the insurgency, and this resulted in a fairly conventional military
afghanistan_ohanlon.aspx, accessed 9 Feb. 2011; Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, A winnable war,
Weekly Standard 15: 40, 512 July 2010, http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/winnable-war, accessed 21
Feb. 2011. Some optimists argue that success in the war would be possible if a more decentralized form of
democratic government were adopted: see Stephen Biddle, Fotini Christia and J. Alexander Thier, Dening
success in Afghanistan, Foreign Afairs 89: 4, 2010, pp. 4860.
4
General Stanley McChrystal, Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force and US Forces,
Afghanistan (COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A), Commanders initial assessment, 30 Aug. 2009 (unclassied), p. 1.
Campaign disconnect
273
campaign. McChrystal redened the campaign using classic COIN principles.
Recognizing that the conict was essentially a political struggle rather than a
military one, his campaign planthe rst for Afghanistan despite eight years of
operationsaddressed the reality that the greatest threat to stability in Afghani-
stan was not from insurgent violence but from insurgent shadow government, as
well as local power struggles. Thus the key to eventual success in the campaign
was to demonstrate to the Afghan people that their government could protect and
provide for them. McChrystal declared that ISAFs centre of gravity is the will
and ability to provide for the needs of the population by, with and through the
Afghan government.
5
McChrystals new approach to operations in Afghanistan was dubbed
population-centric COIN. It aimed to address the campaign centre of gravity
through two operational priorities. First and foremost was to protect the popula-
tion from violence, intimidation and corruption. This required ISAF to connect
with the people, in order to build relationships with Afghan partners and the local
population.
6
The second imperative was to accelerate the development and owner-
ship of Afghan security by Afghan national security forces through embedded
partnership of ISAF with ANSF. Tactically this required ISAF forces to assume
more risk by getting out of forward operating bases and armoured vehicles.
7
Protecting civilians from violence included a focus on reducing civilian casual-
ties in operations involving ISAF forces. Karzai had been complaining in private to
US commanders about civilian casualties since 2005, and had received reassurances
that this issue would be dealt with.
8
By 2007 he was fed up and became openly
critical of ISAFs failure to reduce the number of civilians killed and injured in
military operations.
9
Even so, the numbers increased further in 2008, with the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) estimating that 828
civilian casualties were caused by ISAF and ANSF forces. This was an increase over
2007, when ISAF and ANSF together caused an estimated 539 civilian casualties.
10
In this context, McChrystal recognized that it was imperative to reduce civilian
casualties. In his nomination hearing before the US Senate, McChrystal noted that
how ISAF conducts its operations may be the critical point in winning the support
of the Afghan people and thereby campaign success. McChrystal told senators
that ISAF would have to operate in ways that minimize [civilian] casualties or
5
McChrystal, Commanders initial assessment, pp. 24.
6
7
The McChrystal approach was in fact based on that developed under General Petraeus in Iraq, which emphasized
securing the population and close partnership with Iraqi security forces. See Lt-Gen. Raymond Odierno,
Commander Multinational Forces Iraq, Counterinsurgency guidance, 15 June 2007. Ironically, towards
the end of his command McKiernan did produce a COIN guidance paper that recognized the imperative of
protecting the population and supporting the ANSF. But this came too late to efect the necessary change in
campaign approach. See Walter Pincus, Generals paper sheds light on counterinsurgency, Washington Post, 7
April 2009.
8
Sarah Sewall, The civilian in American warfare: normative pathways and institutional imperatives, D.Phil.
thesis, St Antonys College, Oxford, 2010, p. 281.
9
Barry Bearak, Karzai calls coalition careless, New York Times, 24 June 2007.
10
Jason H. Campbell and Jeremy Shapiro, Afghanistan index: tracking variables of reconstruction and security
in post-9/11 Afghanistan (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 24 June 2009), p. 4, http://www.brookings.
edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx, accessed 9 Feb. 2011
274
damageeven when doing so makes our task more difcult.
11
Hence, upon
assuming command, McChrystal issued a tactical directive that set restraints on
the use by ISAF of lethal force, especially air power and artillery.
12
McChrystal also saw that it was imperative to accelerate the development of the
Afghan National Army (ANA), both in size and in capability. In May 2009 ANA
strength stood at around 86,000, with planned expansion to 134,000 by the end
of 2011. McChrystal brought forward this target to October 2010. It was already
clear that there were serious shortcomings both in ISAF training facilities and in
ANA leadership and equipment.
13
Accelerating ANA growth risked sacricing
ANA quality, as it would invariably lead to a lower standard of recruits and the
condensing of ANA training. Moreover, ANA quality was far worse than was
ofcially acknowledged at the time.
14
In 2008, NATO had assessed 62 per cent of
ANA units to be incapable of conducting battalion-level operations with some
ISAF support.
15
In reality, ANA units were plagued by corruption, drug abuse,
ethnic rivalry and poor leadership at all levels. Not surprisingly, ANA units sufered
high rates of desertion, especially in the south and east. Given all these problems,
few ANA kandaks (battalions) had the men, let alone the command and equipment
capabilities, to conduct battalion-level operations in 2009.
16
Thus McChrystal had
not only to make the ANA bigger, he also had to make it far better. Compounding
this challenge was a roughly 50 per cent shortfall in military trainers.
17
McChrystal decided to adopt a fundamentally new approach that extends
beyond just working together outside a [forward operating base]. Embedded
partnering involved ISAF troops merging with ANSF to form a single combined
force. McChrystal directed that ISAF will partner with ANSF at all levels
from Government ministries down to platoon level, in order to live, train, plan,
control and execute operations together. It was hoped that embedded partnering
would enable the Afghan army to move more quickly towards eventual transition
to lead responsibility for security.
18
McChrystal also had to sort out ISAF unity of efort and command. He
found ISAF waging not one war but several. In broad terms, ISAF was engaged
in two diferent campaigns: a peace operations campaign in the west and north
of the country, and a COIN campaign involving much combat in the east and
11
Tim Reid, NATO commander Stanley McChrystal: we must gain support of Afghans, The Times, 3 June
2009.
12
General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A, Tactical directive, 6 July 2009 (unclassied
version).
13
Inspector General of the US Department of Defense, Report on the assessment of US and coalition plans to train,
equip and eld the Afghan national security forces, SPO-2001007 (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 30
Sept. 2009), pp. iiiii.
14
Thom Shaker and John H. Cushman, Jr, Reviews raise doubts on training of Afghan forces, New York Times,
6 Nov. 2009.
15
ISAF HQ, Metrics brief 20072008, p. 8.
16
Antonio Giustozzi, The Afghan national army: unwarranted hope?, RUSI Journal 154: 6, 2009, pp. 3642.
17
Ian S. Livingston, Heather L. Messera and Michael OHanlon, Afghanistan index: tracking variables of
reconstruction and security in post-9/11 Afghanistan, 22 Dec. 2009, p. 15.
18
General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A, Partnering directive, 29 Aug. 2009 (unclassied).
Again, while this approach was fundamentally new to Afghanistan, it had been adopted two years before in
Iraq under General Petraeus.
Campaign disconnect
275
the south. ISAF was also divided into ve regional commandsWest, North,
Capital, East and Southwith little coordination between them. Each regional
command contained a number of military task forces, often from diferent troop-
contributing countries. Here too unity of efort and command was weak, with
the national task forces taking little direction from their supposedly superior
regional commands. Further complicating matters was a lack of unity between
ISAF eforts and those of partners outside the ISAF chain of commandboth
the civilian development programmes of partner nations and also the counterter-
rorism mission of US forces still waging Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
McChrystal declared that ISAFs subordinate headquarters must stop ghting
separate campaigns. To this end, he established an intermediate operational
headquartersISAF Joint Commandto synchronize operational activities and
local civilmilitary coordination and ensure a shared understanding of the mission
throughout the force. With ISAF Joint Command taking care of the down and
in aspect of command, ISAF Headquarters would be able to focus on the up
and out aspect: that is, overall campaign strategy, coordination with the Afghan
government and international partners, and liaison with NATO capitals and other
countries in the region.
19
McChrystal also took command of all American forces
in theatre, and thus was able to improve unity of efort between the ISAF and
OEF missions. Improving unity of efort on the civilian side has proved more
challenging. Even the appointment in January 2010 of a high-prole and highly
capable NATO Senior Civilian Representative, Mark Sedwill (former UK ambas-
sador to Afghanistan), to grapple with this problem appears to have made little
diference on the ground.

However, on protecting the population and partnership
with ANSF, the picture looks more encouraging.
Protecting the population
Since population-centric COIN is focused on protecting the population, civilian
casualties (CIVCAS) provide a useful metric for assessing its efectiveness.
Producing reliable and independent data on CIVCAS is problematic, however,
given the limited UN and humanitarian presence on the ground. ISAF has civilian
casualty tracking cells in each regional command, which has improved the quality
of the data, but there are still inherent limitations in relying on self-reporting by
units on the ground.
UNAMA reported in August 2010 that there had been an 18 per cent decrease in
CIVCAS caused by ISAF and ANSF over the rst nine months of 2010 in compar-
ison with the same period in 2009.
20
This picture is consistent with a CIVCAS
study commissioned by Petraeus and undertaken by an independent team from
November 2009 to November 2010. Drawing on quantitative and qualitative data,
the study found that some progress had been made in reducing CIVCAS. It assessed
19
20
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Civilian casualties rise 31 per cent in rst six months of
2010, 10 Aug. 2010.
276
that CIVCAS numbers had reduced by about 20 per cent over the period from
mid 2009 through to October 2010. Moreover, this period saw a huge increase in
the scale and number of operations undertaken by ISAF, as a consequence of the
surge of American forces into Afghanistan. When the number of civilian casual-
ties is adjusted against this baseline, the study identies an overall 50 per cent
decrease both in civilian casualties and the number of CIVCAS incidents over
the 18-month period.
21
As noted already, a major priority for McChrystal was to reduce civilian casual-
ties caused by ISAF air attacks, and this was reected in his tactical directive to
ISAF units. The ISAF CIVCAS study found that civilian casualties from air-to-
ground engagements had decreased since 2009. However, the number of civil-
ians shot by ISAF forces, especially in situations involving escalation of force (for
example, at checkpoints), had increased over the same period.
22
Clearly, there is more work to be done, both in improving the accuracy with
which civilian casualties are tracked and, more importantly, in reducing civilian
casualties caused by ISAF troops escalating to lethal force. But overall the trend
is going in the right direction. The ISAF CIVCAS study found that McChrystals
consistent emphasis on reducing civilian harm did have a positive efect. Indeed,
the study concluded that this command philosophy was more important than the
formal restrictions in the tactical directive on containing civilian casualties during
a period when ISAF went on the ofensive in the south.
23
Developing Afghan security forces
There has been a huge numerical expansion in the ANSF. Indeed, growth has
exceeded targets. The ANA target was 134,000 by October 2010; actual numbers
had reached 139,000 by 24 September 2010. Likewise, the Afghan National Police
(ANP) target was 109,000 by October, and numbers had already reached 122,000
by 24 September 2010.
24
So the ANA has got far bigger. But has it got better? In truth, we dont entirely
know. There is no accurate overall picture of ANA operational prociency. The
main assessment process, called the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system, was
managed by the same institutions responsible for training the ANA, namely the
Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and NATO
Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A). This created a motivated bias in the
assessment process, as CSTC-A and NTM-A had an obvious institutional incen-
tive to demonstrate the efectiveness of their training programmes. In late 2009,
ISAF Joint Command assumed responsibility for managing the CM rating system,
and in early 2010 it abandoned the system following a damning report by the US
21
ISAF CIVCAS study brieng (classied), Nov. 2010, slide 7.
22
ISAF CIVCAS study, 31 August 2010, p. 9. The Afghanistan NGO Safety Ofce (ANSO) also reported a sharp
rise in civilians killed in escalations of force incidents in the rst quarter of 2010: ANSO quarterly data report
(Q1 2010), 1 Jan.31 Mar., 2010, p. 13.
23
This is evidenced in part by the fact that General McChrystals tactical directive was similar to directives put
in place by the two previous ISAF commanders: ISAF CIVCAS study, 31 August 2010, p. 11.
24
COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A General David Petraeus, unclassied brieng, ISAF HQ, Kabul, 9 Oct. 2010.
Campaign disconnect
277
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).
25
The system
adopted in its place, called the Commanders Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT), relies
more on qualitative assessment and tracks a broader range of metrics. According
to ISAF Joint Command, SIGAR had given CUAT a clean bill of health by the
end of 2010.
26
What is clear is that the rapid growth of the ANA has put a very great strain
on the limited abilities of the Afghan Ministry of Defence to manage such a large
army. Moreover, ANA infrastructure and logistics are struggling to support the
expanding force. Predictably, ANA training was also shortened; the Basic Warrior
Training course was reduced from ten to eight weeks.

These structural and sustain-
ability challenges are compounded by ethnic and political rivalries within the
ANA, especially between Tajik and Pashtun factions.
27
Moreover, the army still
sufers from high levels of illiteracy (7090 per cent) and drug addiction (2025
per cent).
28
Absence without leave and desertion rates remain a serious problem,
at 3545 per cent nationally and as high as 55 per cent in some units in the south.
29
Anecdotal evidence from Helmand suggests that ANA troops generally ght
well, and that they are better at spotting IEDs than ISAF personnel.
30
To be sure,
Afghan troops exercise poor re discipline, creating hazards for friendly forces
and civilians.
31
But they also are better able to ascertain hostile intent than ISAF
troops, and thereby to avoid unwarranted escalation of force incidents involving
civilians. The CIVCAS study for ISAF concluded that the general consensus
by forces in the eld was that partnering probably provides some reduction in
CIVCAS.
32
By one key measure, Afghan public opinion, the ANA is doing well.
Accordingly to one major survey, most Afghans recognize that the ANA is poorly
trained (52 per cent) and cannot operate without ISAF support (69 per cent). Yet
when asked if the ANA helps improve security, there is a very positive response
(89 per cent).
33
Partnering with the ANA became a priority for ISAF forces across theatre in
late 2009 following McChrystals directive. All regional commands recognize the
essential importance of partnering to the ISAF strategy of eventual transition to
25
United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Actions needed to improve
the reliability of Afghan security force assessments, SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings,
29 June 2010.
26
Farrell email correspondence with Colonel Robert Cassidy, ISAF Joint Command, 4 Dec. 2010.
27
International Crisis Group, A force in fragments: reconstituting the Afghan National Army, Asia Report 190,
(Brussels: ICG, 12 May 2010), pp. 911, 17, 1921; US SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress
(Arlington, VA, 30 April 2010), p. 6; Obaid Younossi et al., The long march: building an Afghan national army
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2009), pp. 212.
28
ICG, A force in fragments, p. 10.
29
US SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress (Arlington, VA, 30 Oct. 2010), p. 65, g. 3.19; Farrell
interview with ISAF mentor, TFH HQ, Lashkar Gah, 28 May 2010.
30
Farrell interview with ISAF mentors, 205 Corps HQ, Camp Hero, Kandahar, 26 May 2010; Major Ed Hill,
All together now: observations on embedded partnering with ANA on Op Moshtarak, Bravo Company,
1 Royal Welsh BG (CF31), n.d.; Afghan National Army Training Center (ANATC)/Doctrine Directorate,
Observations from Marjeh, pp. 8, 13.
31
Wesley Morgan, Afghanistan: the problems with partnering, New York Times, 8 Nov. 2010.
32
ISAF CIVCAS study, p. 66.
33
Random survey of 6,467 adults across all 34 provinces of Afghanistan: Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2010: a
survey of the Afghan people (2010), p. 42, http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/797, accessed 9 Feb. 2011.
278
ANSF security lead.
34
The main obstacle to partnering is not the commitment of
ISAF units, but ANA willingness to deploy in the eld. Often ANA units will
not deploy without clear instruction to do so.
35
This situation is worsened by
the highly centralized Afghan Ministry of Defence, which retards initiative by
subordinate commanders.
36
ISAF is trying to get around this, with some success,
by issuing combined force orders down the ISAF and ANSF chains of command,
and enabling ISAF eld commanders to walk these orders across to their Afghan
partners.
In sum, the ANA is quickly getting bigger and slowly getting better. The next
big challenge is the ANP. In fact, the police are in many respects more important
than the army, since it is the police who must provide long-term security within
an area cleared of insurgents. The ANA dislikes hanging around for the hold
phase because they consider this to be a police role. The problem is that the ANP
is far more corrupt, poorly trained, drug-ridden and ill-disciplined than the ANA.
Often, the police are little more than a militia of the local powerholder; they
commonly prey on the population, and through their extortion and violent abuse
of civilians can turn local people towards insurgency.
37
A number of institutional reforms within the Ministry of Interior and the
Afghan police since 2008 have begun to address the problems. A very top-heavy
police force has been attened: the number of commissioned ofcers (18,000) was
halved, and the number of police generals and colonels (3,000) was reduced by 85
per cent. Police pay for all ranks has been greatly increased (to reduce the need
and inclination to extort from the local population).
38
CTSC-A also operates the
Focused District Delivery (FDD) Program, designed to improve the ANP rapidly
in key districts. FDD takes whole police units away from their localities for eight
weeks, weeds out the drug addicts and retrains the unit as a whole. CTSC-As
own assessment indicates that FDD has produced promising results. In 2009 it
judged that 19 per cent of retrained ANP were able to operate independently,
and 56 per cent could operate to various degrees with ISAF support. However,
the impact of FDD is hindered by a shortage of training teams.
39
Moreover, the
situation in Helmand suggests that FDD has had more mixed results. When the
ANP from Gereshk were taken to the regional training centre in Kandahar in May
2008, 119 of the 130 policemen tested positive for drugs. The entire eight-week
training course was spent detoxifying the police. The ANP did show improve-
ment on return to Gereshk, but one year on few FDD-retrained police were still
34
Farrell interviews with command staf at RC-North (Mazar-e-Sharif ), RC-East (BAF), RC-South (KAF),
RC-Southwest (Camp Bastion) and RC-West (Herat), Afghanistan, Oct. 2010.
35
Farrell interview with ISAF mentor team, Camp Hero, Kandahar, 28 May 2010.
36
ICG, A force in fragments, p. 10.
37
Royal United Services Institute and Foreign Policy Research Institute, Reforming the Afghan national
police, Joint Report, Nov. 2009, pp. 814; Brian Brady, Drugs and defection: how the UK really rates the
Afghan police, Independent, 28 March 2010; Thomas Hardy, Afghan police corruption is fuelling insurgency,
Daily Telegraph, 3 June 2010.
38
US General Accounting Ofce, Afghan security: US programs to further reform Ministry of Interior and national police
challenged by lack of military personnel and Afghan cooperation, GAO-09280 (Washington DC: USGAO, March
2009).
39
USGAO, Afghan security.
Campaign disconnect
279
serving.
40
The ANP in Nad-e-Ali showed little improvement following FDD in
early 2009.
41
In response, the British task force created a Helmand Police Training
Academy in late 2009, in order to produce newly minted ANP for a major opera-
tion to clear and hold southern and northern Nad-e-Ali. Local leaders in Nad-e-
Ali conrm that these new police are somewhat better, but there is still a need to
root out the old corrupt checkpoint commanders in the district.
42
Recognizing the challenge, ISAF Joint Command made ANP partnering a key
priority for regional commands in mid-2010. It was pushing at an open door.
Where previously regional commands and task forces were focused on partnering
with the ANA, by 2010 everybody had woken up to the imperative to improve the
ANP. An assessment of regional commands (RC) in October 2010 for ISAF Joint
Command found that All RC are pursuing ANP embedded partnering as priority
within available resources.
43
Indeed, according to ISAF Joint Command, 87 per
cent of ANP operating in key terrain districts were partnered with ISAF units by
late 2010.
44
Overall, ISAF has taken a grasp of ANP development. But this is a
tougher challenge than with the ANA, and it remains to be seen if the police can
be made better fast enough.
Developing local governance
While ANSF development took centre stage under McChrystal, ISAF atten-
tion also turned to developing local governance. Indeed, the rst campaign-wide
plan, produced by McChrystal, dealt head-on with the problem of ISAF resource
constraints. Across Afghanistan, ISAF efort was focused on some 80 key terrain
districts, dened by population concentrations, economic hubs and major trans-
port routes.
45
Many of these were in the south, which, as noted above, was where
ISAFs main efort was focused. However, even with this concentration of efort,
ISAF analysis showed that progress would not be fast enough to demonstrate
results within a politically acceptable timescale.
46
It was this realization that led McChrystal to look for a campaign acceler-
atorsomething dramatic that would restore momentum to the ISAF campaign.
He settled on Operation Moshtarak. It was hoped that ISAF would be able to inict
a strategic defeat on the Taleban in Helmand, and visibly demonstrate to local and
home audiences that ISAF had turned the campaign around.
47
This was the context
for playing up expectations of Moshtarak, and for McChrystals ill-advised claim
that weve got government in a box, ready to roll in. Moshtarak failed to deliver
40
Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Striking the right balance: how to rebuild the Afghan national police, International
Peacekeeping 17: 1, 2010, p. 87.
41
Farrell interview with ISAF police trainers, Nad-e-Ali, Helmand, Sept. 2009.
42
Farrell interview with local ofcial, Nad-e-Ali, Helmand, 29 May 2010.
43
ISAF Joint Command (IJC) study (classied), Oct. 2010.
44
Farrell email correspondence with Colonel Robert Cassidy, ISAF Joint Command, 4 Dec. 2010.
45
There are currently 401 districts in Afghanistan.
46
Command staf brieng at ISAF Joint Command, IJC HQ, Kabul, Jan. 2010.
47
Farrell interviews with ISAF command staf, ISAF HQ, Kabul, Jan. 2010.
280
dramatic success in Marjah, and so did not produce a campaign-wide boost.
48

However, the Taleban did sufer defeat in Nad-e-Ali. Indeed, by mid-2010 it was
clear that the tide had turned in Helmand. In most districts the trends looked
encouraging in terms of improved governance, services and security.
49
This concentration of efort continues under the revised ISAFANSF opera-
tional plan, promulgated in October 2010. The number of key terrain districts
has increased to just over 90, and there is increased emphasis on freedom of
movement on the major transport routes. Crucially, the revised plan focuses
on combating corruption and developing subnational governance.
50
This efort
is aided by the international communitys support of a number of Afghan
programmes to promote subnational governance. A key example is the District
Delivery Programme (DDP) run by the Independent Directorate of Local Gover-
nance (IDLG). Launched in January 2010 the plan was for DDP to rapidly improve
governance and services in 80 key terrain districts by the end of 2011, primarily by
providing funds and personnel for the district governors and improving links with
national government line ministries.
51
DDP was trialled, with some success, in
Nad-e-Ali during Moshtarak. But the programme is lagging considerably behind
schedule. By September 2010 it had been rolled out only to six pilot districts, with
packages being worked up for a further 14 districts.
52
More successful has been the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), launched
by the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD) in 2003 to
promote democracy at village level in areas under government control. By mid-2010
NSP had supported the creation of 22,500 community development councils in 316
districts across Afghanistan, and had nanced some 50,000 development projects.
Field research shows the crucial importance of driving development assistance
through local governance structures, in order to increase the local legitimacy and
hence efectiveness of aid projects.
53
Assessment of NSP, based on an iterative
large-scale survey, indicates that the programme has improved local democracy
(especially in empowering women) and transparency, and has signicantly raised
local perceptions of access to governance and services.
54
48
Noah Shachtman, Marjahs government in a box ops as McChrystal fumes, Wired, 25 May 2010, http://
www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/05/marjahs-government-in-a-box-ops-as-mcchryst, accessed 9 Feb.
2011.
49
Farrell interviews with stabilization ofcers and government ofcials in Lashkar Gah and Nad-e-Ali, Helmand,
May 2010.
50
ISAFANSF operational plan, Oct. 2010 (classied).
51
Farrell attendance at nal coordination meeting for roll-out of DDP trial, IDLG, Kabul, 8 Jan. 2010.
52
Farrell telephone interview with DDP mentor, 3 Sept. 2010.
53
Stuart Gordon, Helmand and stabilisation, 20062008 (Boston, MA: Feinstein Center, Tufts University,
forthcoming 2011).
54
Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, Rubin Enikolopov and Shahim Ahmad Kabuli, Randomized impact evaluation of
Phase II of Afghanistans National Solidarity Programme: estimates of interim project impact from rst follow-up survey, 8
July 2010, http://www.nsp-ie.org/reportsimpacts.html, accessed 9 Feb. 2011.
Campaign disconnect
281
Regaining military momentum
The modest progress achieved on protecting the population, developing ANSF
and improving subnational governance belies a more dramatic development on
the ground. In short, ISAF regained military momentum in 2010. The surge of
30,000 additional US troops into Afghanistan authorized by President Obama
shifted the campaign on the ground in favour of the ISAFANSF combined force.
These additional resources had been concentrated in the south (see table 1), which
was designated campaign main efort. Under the new combined force opera-
tional plan, forces in the south would rst secure central Helmand (Operation
Moshtarak) and then go on to create the security conditions to expand governance
in Kandahar (Operation Hamkari).
55
Moshtarak was the rst major test of McChrystals population-centric COIN.
This massive operation involved simultaneously clearing insurgent strongholds in
Marjah (by the US Marines) and north-east Nad-e-Ali (by British forces). Partner-
ship with ANSF was far better than in previous ofensives, and further improved
as the operation progressed.
56
ISAF went to extraordinary lengths to gain local
support for the clearing of central Helmand and to minimize civilian casualties.
There were no civilian casualties in the British sector; the Taleban put up more of
a ght in Marjah, and between 16 and 28 civilians were killed here.
57
The American press took a dim view of Moshtarak.
58
ISAF set expectations
unrealistically high for the pace of progress in Marjah. When the Marines pushed
into Taleban territory, they found the area far more run-down and people more
cowed than they had anticipated. This has made it difcult for ISAF to build
55
ISAF operational plan, Oct. 2009 (classied).
56
Major B. Parker, OP MOSHTARAK Phase 2 observations and lessons identied, 205 ATAL Corps, ANA,
Camp hero, KAF, April 2010; ANATC/Doctrine Directorate, ANA Lessons Learned Center, Helmand
province: observations from Marjeh, April 2010.
57
Theo Farrell, Appraising Moshtarak: the campaign in Nad-e-Ali District, Helmand, Royal United Services Institute
report (London: RUSI, June 2010); Jefrey Dressler, Operation Moshtarak: taking and holding Marjah, Institute for
the Study of War report (Washington DC, March 2010), pp. 78.
58
Michael M. Philips, Progress in Marjeh, but civilian trust remains elusive, Wall Street Journal, 22 Feb. 2010;
Richard A. Oppel, Violence helps Taleban undo Afghan gains, New York Times, 3 April 2010.
Table 1: ISAF force levels by regional command
Regional command March 2009 February 2010
RC-North 5,080 7,500
RC-West 2,940 5,500
RC-Capital 5,740 5,000
RC-East 25,870 26,500
RC-South 22,330 54,500
Source: Data from ISAF webpage, http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/isaf-placemat-archives.
html.
282
government and services, and easy for the Taleban to re-inltrate and intimidate
the local populace.
59
American reporters failed to spot the far more encouraging
progress in north-east Nad-e-Ali. Following Moshtarak, district governance was
strengthened, freedom of movement for locals greatly improved, and a more
representative district community council elected.
60
The atmospherics on the
ground and key indicatorssuch as the number of shops in the bazaar and the
number of children attending schoolall pointed to improvements in security.
61

In a survey of public opinion in Nad-e-Ali, 95 per cent of respondents felt that life
was better or very much better in the district since Moshtarak.
62
Following Moshtarak, ISAF turned its attention under Petraeus to Hamkari,
a massive operation to improve security and governance in and around Kandahar
city. This operation is now ISAFs main efort, with some 12,000 ISAF troops
massed for it. The summer of 2010 was spent in a tough ght to clear the districts
of Dand, Arghandab, Zharay and Panjwai and, with the ANP, establish a security
force encircling Kandahar city. Dand was quickly cleared. Arghandab was eventu-
ally cleared of insurgents with the help of the Afghan border police in October.
By early November 2010, Taleban were leaving Zharay and Panjwai, albeit towards
the end of the ghting season when ghters typically decamp to Pakistan for the
winter months. The view within ISAF, and reported by the American press, was
that the Taleban had been routed in southern Afghanistan.
63
What is clear is that Petraeus has ratcheted up the ISAF military campaign in
order to relentlessly pursue the insurgents. As one ofcial put it: Weve taken
the gloves of. Under McChrystal, ISAF operated under the most restrictive rules
of engagement in order to minimize civilian casualties. Petraeus has sought to
rebalance things in order to give commanders increased latitude to use force, and
this has resulted in greater use of air strikes and artillery.
64
Even more signi-
cant is the increased tempo of special operations forces (SOF) raids, especially
targeted against Taleban leaders. From July to September 2010 some 300 insur-
gent leaders were killed or captured in SOF operations; a further 850 lower-level
insurgents were killed and 2,100 captured.
65
The more robust military campaign
carries greater risk of civilian casualties, and potentially is in tension with the
protect the population mission.
66
Certainly, the clearance of districts around
Kandahar has necessitated extensive destruction of civilian buildings (rigged with
59
Farrell interview with ISAF intelligence ofcers, RC-South HQ, Kandahar, 25 May 2010.
60
Farrell interviews with civilian adviser and battlegroup commander, FOB Shawqat, Nad-e-Ali, Helmand, 27
May 2010.
61
Farrell visits to Nad-e-Ali district centre in late Sept. 2009 and late May 2010.
62
This survey was conducted between 7 and 14 May. Of 503 callers to Radio Nad-e-Ali, 97 per cent freely
agreed to participate in the survey. Capt. Nick Carter, Inuence Ofcer, CF Nad-e-Ali, Public perceptions
of security in Nad-e-Ali, Helmand, powerpoint slides, 7 June 2010.
63
Carlotta Gall, Coalition routs Taleban in southern Afghanistan, New York Times, 20 Oct. 2010. This view was
conrmed in Farrell interviews with ISAF ofcers, RC-South HQ, Kandahar, 2526 May 2010.
64
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, US deploying heavily armoured battle tanks for rst time in Afghanistan, Washington
Post, 19 Nov. 2010.
65
Unclassied brieng by COMISAF, General David Petraeus, ISAF HQ, Kabul, 9 Oct. 2010.
66
The International Committee of the Red Cross reported steep rises in CIVCAS in Kandahar in late 2010:
Alissa J. Rubin, Conditions hit new low for Red Cross, New York Times, 15 Dec. 2010.
Campaign disconnect
283
IEDs), albeit with the promise of reconstruction funded by ISAF.
67
The SOF
raids, in particular, have attracted criticism from Karzai.
68
ISAFs own assessment
is that those forces pursuing the kill-and-capture mission have developed ways
of operating that respond to the emphasis of senior leaders on reducing civilian
casualties.
69
Press reporting of Taleban sources indicates that the SOF campaign
has thrown the insurgents into disarray in the south, in particular, and that relent-
less targeting of enemy leadership has reduced insurgents ability to conduct
deliberate operations.
70
It was with good reason, therefore, that the new British Chief of the Defence
Staf, General Sir David Richards, told the Commons Defence Committee in
November 2010 that we are hammering [the Taleban] at the moment. Less clear,
however, is the strategic efect of these military gains; hence, at another point in
his evidence to the committee, General Richards adopted a more guarded tone,
telling MPs that we can be cautiously optimistic, that theres been a bit of an
upturn.
71
Perhaps learning the lessons of Marjah, ISAF leaders are being careful
not to oversell success. To be sure, it is too early to tell whether the gains in the
south are sustainable. The Taleban may yet regenerate and return in force to central
Helmand and the area around Kandahar. One very senior ISAF commander, while
acknowledging the military gains ISAF has made, suggested that we must judge
progress on a seasonal basis.
72
One problem is that ISAFs success in the south may displace insurgents to
elsewhere in Afghanistan. In other words, the Taleban may simply change focus
to where ISAF is weaker. Press reporting suggests that this has been happening
since summer 2010. In fact, Taleban inltration of the north has been under way
since 2007, with major Taleban gains in 2009 in Kunduz, Faryab and Baghlan
provinces with large Pashtun pockets. That said, Taleban eforts in the north do
appear to have increased in 2010, with the support of Taleban cadres sent from the
south. It is not all plain sailing for the Taleban, however. While local resistance to
the Taleban in the north was not as erce or widespread as commonly believed, the
Taleban must still compete in a region with numerous other insurgent groups.
73
67
For an eyewitness account, see http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/13/travels_with_paula_i_a_
time_to_build, accessed 9 Feb. 2011.
68
Thom Shanker, Elizabeth Bumiller and Rob Noland, Despite gains, Afghan night raids split US and Karzai,
New York Times, 15 Dec. 2010.
69
Farrell email correspondence with Dr Lawrence Lewis, US Joint Forces Command, 7 Jan. 2011.
70
Alissa J. Rubin, Taleban extend reach to North, where armed groups reign, New York Times, 15 Dec. 2010;
Jon Boone, Afghan Taleban leadership splintered by intense US military campaign, Guardian, 22 Dec. 2010.
71
House of Commons Defence Committee hearing on The appointment of the new Chief of the Defence Staf,
uncorrected transcript of oral evidence, General Sir David Richards, 17 Nov. 2010, response to QQ 58, Q62,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmdfence/uc600-i/uc60001.htm, accessed 9
Feb. 2011.
72
Comments at RUSILand Warfare Centre conference, Frontline COIN: linking strategy to tactics, London,
89 Dec. 2010.
73
Rubin, Taleban extend reach to North; Antonio Giustozzi and Christopher Reuter, The northern front:
the Afghan insurgency spreading beyond the Pashtuns, brieng paper 3 (Berlin: Afghan Analysts Network,
2010).
284
Strategic obstacles to success
So far, ISAF has been unable to convert operational progress into strategic
momentum. This failure is attributable to three strategic problems besetting the
campaign: rst, the lack of transparency and rampant corruption within Afghan
government; second, the decline in political and public support for the war in
NATO capitals; and third, the existence of insurgent safe havens in Pakistan.
74

We explore each issue in turn below.
The Karzai administration: an unreliable partner
A key objective in McChrystals eforts to redene the ght was to increase
transparency within the Afghan government. Widespread corruption and rapidly
declining government legitimacy were identied as strategic issues that created
fertile ground for the insurgency.
75
The idea was to connect with the people,
shielding them not only from insurgent violence but also, and just as importantly,
from corruption and coercion.
76
Working with Sedwill, McChrystal focused on addressing endemic corruption
and the culture of impunity.
77
A key initiative in this respect was the formation of
the Major Crimes Task Force Afghanistan (MCTF-A) to coordinate international
mentoring of Afghan eforts to combat corruption and organized crime. While
MCTF-A is led by the Afghan government, it was created by international law
enforcement agencies, which maintains a close watch on the task force. This has
served to irritate the already tense relationship between the international commu-
nity and Karzai.
One prominent incident illustrates the problem. In July 2010 Mohammad Zia
Saleh, a top ofcial in the ofce of the Afghan National Security Adviser, was
arrested on bribery charges. The investigation was prompted by the MCTF-A.
Salehs internment exposed the deeply entrenched strains between Karzai and the
ISAF anti-corruption drive.
78
Almost immediately, Karzai launched a campaign
to rein in the MCTF-A and subordinate it to Afghan government structures,
79

efectively robbing it of its independent status. Signicantly, Saleh was later
released on the orders of the Afghan attorney generals ofce.
80
Hence, notwithstanding Karzais pledge to clean the government of corrup -
tion,
81
he has come to be viewed on the contrary as the chief stumbling block
74
The problems of Afghan corruption and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan have been noted in successive White
House reviews of the campaign. See General James Jones, President Obamas AfghanistanPakistan (AfPak)
strategy, Foreign Press Center brieng, Washington DC, 27 March 2009; Overview of the Afghanistan and
Pakistan strategy review, 16 Dec. 2010.
75
76
77
ISAF document 4 (classied), July 2010, p. 3.
78
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Karzai rift prompts US to re-evaluate anti-corruption strategy in Afghanistan,
Washington Post, 13 Sept. 2010.
79
Joshua Partlow and Greg Miller, Karzai calls for probe of US-backed anti-corruption task force, Washington
Post, 5 Aug. 2010.
80
Rod Nordland and Dexter Felkins, Anti-graft units, backed by US, draw Karzais ire, New York Times, 6 Aug.
2010.
81
Quoted in Alissa J. Rubin, Karzai vows corruption ght, but avoids details, New York Times, 3 Nov. 2009.
Campaign disconnect
285
to meaningful reform.
82
Indeed, as western law enforcement agencies worked
to investigate corruption, they were rebuked by Karzais ofcials for misunder-
standing the nature of patronage networks that served to support the government.
That such networks have a role to play is an established mantra in the Regional
Commands. Senior ofcers accept that functional corruption is a norm in
Afghanistan.
83
The question is, how much corruption is acceptable and necessary
to lubricate government? The fact remains that an uncontrollable level of corrup-
tion undermines strategic progress.
According to surveys collated in 2010 by Transparency International, in terms
of local Afghan perception, Afghanistan is the third most corrupt state in the
world.
84
Importantly, 60 per cent of those polled in 2010 stated that corruption had
increased in the previous three years.
85
Data collected for a 2010 United Nations
Ofce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report are even more staggering. Nearly
two-thirds59 per centof those polled afrm that public dishonesty is a greater
concern than insecurity (54 per cent) and unemployment (52 per cent).
86
Among
those surveyed, the average amount of baksheesh paid in cash between January 2009
and January 2010 was $160in a country where, on average, GDP per capita is
$425 per annum. UNODC estimates the total sum of bribes paid over the same
period amounted to $2.5 billion, or nearly a quarter of Afghanistans GDP.
87
Given this state of afairs, Petraeus has identied combating corruption as a
key objective. Shortly after assuming command, he appointed Brigadier-General
H. R. McMaster (much lauded for conducting a brilliant counterinsurgency
campaign in Tal Afar in Iraq) to head a newly created anti-corruption unit.
88

The mission of the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (CJIATF) Shafayat
(Transparency) is to understand the nature of patronage networks and implement
achievable anti-graft strategies.
89
Rather than seek to eliminate corruption per se,
the transparency task force is seeking to restore legitimacy by focusing on local
networks in the provinces and districts, as well as on high-level corruption in
Kabul.
90
Importantly, the CJIATF incorporates the work on combating corrup-
tion already under way in ISAF contracting practices.
91
82
This has become evident in recently leaked diplomatic documents: see Polly Curtis, Wikileaks cables on UKs
Afghan role embarrassing, says Cameron, Guardian, 7 Dec. 2010.
83
ISAF document 1 (classied), Nov. 2009.
84
Transparency International, Corruption perception index 2010, http://www.transparency.org/policy_
research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results, accessed 9 Feb. 2011.
85
Transparency International, Global corruption barometer 2010 report, http://www.transparency.org/
policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2010/results, accessed 9 Feb. 2011.
86
United Nations Ofce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Corruption in Afghanistan: bribery as reported by
the victims (New York: UNODC, Jan. 2010), p. 3. Similar results were yielded by a poll conducted jointly by
the BBC, ABC News and Germanys ARD News Show: 95 per cent of those surveyed said that corruption
was a problem, 76 per cent said it was a big problem. See BBC News, Afghans more optimistic for future,
11 Jan. 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8448930.stm, accessed 9 Feb. 2011.
87
UNODC, Corruption, p. 4.
88
Dexter Filkins, Petraeus opposes rapid pull-out in Afghanistan, New York Times, 15 Aug. 2010.
89
US Department of Defense, Progress towards security and stability in Afghanistan: Report to Congress (Washington
DC: Department of Defense, Nov. 2010), p. 62.
90
Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes and Siobhan Gorman, US shifts Afghan graft plan, Wall Street Journal, 20 Sept.
2010.
91
COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A, General David Petraeus, COMISAFs counterinsurgency (COIN) contracting
guidance, 8 Sept. 2010.
286
These contentious issuesKarzai, ISAF contracting and corruptionall came
together in Kandahar which, as noted, was the focus of ISAFs main efort from
summer 2010. The key power broker in the area is the Presidents half-brother and
Chief of the Kandahar Provincial Council, Ahmed Wali Karzai (AWK). Western
ofcials and journalists alike have long maintained that AWK is heavily involved
in the illicit drugs trade.
92
Exerting a dominant inuence over regional politics
through patronage networks, AWK was identied by ISAF as a major obstacle to
progress in the southbut one that it was unable to remove. AWK is untouchable,
given his close links to the President, who depends on his half-brother to maintain
his support base in the south.
93
Accordingly, ISAF has sought to win over and
work with AWK. International contracts worth millions of dollars were dispensed
to various companies and agencies run by his network. This engagement strategy
has produced a short-term pay-of: AWK assisted in stabilizing parts of Kandahar
province, and has stayed clear of ISAFs execution of operations inside the city.
94

But this has been achieved at a longer-term cost to ISAFs campaign to combat
corruption and improve Afghan government legitimacy.
The extent of corruption was most dramatically revealed in the asco of the
2009 presidential elections, which were marred by massive electoral fraud.
95
Over
a million votes cast were found to be suspicious, of which 950,000 in favour of
Karzai were fraudulent.
96
In the wake of this unedifying spectacle, international
observers argued that ISAF could not defeat the Taleban because it did not have a
credible local partner.
97
Yet polls indicate that the elections themselves have not
eroded Karzais popularity among Afghans. One major survey put the Presidents
approval rating at 72 per cent.
98
Another surmised that 74 per cent of Afghans
believe that elections have improved the country.
99
Clearly, vote-rigging has not
put people of the electoral process.
However, this is not to say that ordinary Afghans have been fooled. Most people,
especially in the east and south of the country, do not think that the presidential and
parliamentary elections were free and fair.
100
In sum, the persistence of support
for Karzai exists alongside waning public faith in the state and its organs. Indeed,
92
James Risen, Reports link Karzais brother to Afghanistan heroin trade, New York Times, 4 Oct. 2008. AWKs
malign activities have been conrmed in recently leaked diplomatic cables: see Embassy in Kabul to State
Department, Ahmed Wali Karzai: seeking to dene himself as US partner, 25 Feb. 2010, http://213.251.145.96/
cable/2010/02/10KABUL693.html, accessed 9 Feb. 2011.
93
Abdul Waheed Wafa, Brother of Karzai denies links to heroin, New York Times, 6 Oct. 2008.
94
Chaudhuri interviews with British, Canadian and American ofcials, Kandahar RC-South, Aug. 2010;
Chaudhuri interview with former senior adviser to the Afghan government, London, Oct. 2010; Chaudhuri
interview with senior ofcial, Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, Aug. 2010; Farrell interviews with
command staf, RC-South, 10 Oct. 2010.
95
Haseeb Humayoon, The re-election of Hamid Karzai, report 4 (Washington DC: Institute for the Study of
War, Jan. 2010); Peter. W. Galbraith, How the Afghan election was rigged, Time Magazine, 19 Oct. 2009.
96
Humayoon, The re-election of Hamid Karzai, pp. 2931.
97
Galbraith, How the Afghan election was rigged; Chaudhuri interviews with British, Canadian and American
ofcials, Kandahar, Aug. 2010; Chaudhuri observations in three round tables with senior ISAF ofcials, ISAF
HQ, Kabul, Aug. 2010.
98
BBC News, Afghans more optimistic for future.
99
Asia Foundation, Key ndings Afghanistan in 2010: a survey of the Afghan people, pp. 67, http://
asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/KeyFindingsAGSurvey2010.pdf, accessed 9 Feb. 2011.
100
Asia Foundation, Key ndings, pp. 56.
Campaign disconnect
287
the high approval rating for the President may reect an inclination to support
political authority and thus not provide an accurate picture of Karzais personal
popularity.
101
Independent studies suggest that the lack of legitimacy has pushed
the population to look elsewhere for a more moral form of governance.
102
Some
have taken to Taleban courts, often reputed to deliver harsh but swift justice.
103

Others have chosen to support insurgent groups, not necessarily out of positive
choice, but because of the lack of political alternatives.
104
Petraeus has thrown his best and brightest at this problem. But progress on
corruption is hindered by multiple tensions. Afghan politicians depend on the
well-entrenched patronage system for survival and capacity to govern. Hence,
tackling corruption targets the bedrock of the Afghan government. Moreover, as
the case of AWK illustrates, ISAF often nds it expedient to work with corrupt
power brokers.
NATO politics and withdrawal
The question of when international forces would withdraw from the country
dominated policy debate on Afghanistan in 2010, both in Washington DC and
in other key NATO capitals. It generated considerable strategic uncertainty,
clouding progress on the ground. The debate kicked of with President Obamas
speech at West Point on 1 December 2009. Speaking to international and domestic
audiences alike, the President argued that the American military surge was to
create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the
Afghans, following which US forces would begin to withdraw in July 2011.
105
In
other words, transition to ANSF lead would open the door for NATO to leave.
As Obama put it in private, this [the surge] needs to be a plan about how were
going to hand it of [sic] and get out of Afghanistan.
106
In public, the Obama
administration has emphasized that the July deadline is not set in stone, and is
dependent upon conditions on the ground.
107
Nonetheless, it has buttressed the
downturn in strategic momentum.
The international conferences in London ( January 2010) and Kabul ( July 2010)
emphasized transition as a strategic goal. The communiqu following the Kabul
conference stressed that transition should be completed by 2014.
108
This position
was endorsed by NATO members at the Lisbon summit in November 2010. Indeed,
101
Chaudhuri telephone interview with senior Afghan specialist involved in polling, 20 Jan. 2011.
102
Sarah Ladbury, Testing hypotheses on radicalisation in Afghanistan, independent Report for the Department
of International Development (London: DfID, 14 Aug. 2009), p. 18; Stephen Carter and Kate Clark, No
shortcut to stability: justice, politics, and insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Chatham House, Dec. 2010),
pp. 211.
103
For details, see Frank Ledwidge, Justice and counter-insurgency in Afghanistan: a missing link, RUSI Journal
154: 9, 2009, p. 69.
104
For surveys that validate this point, see Ladbury, Testing hypotheses, pp. 1719.
105
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in address to the nation, speech at United States Military Academy
at West Point, 1 Dec. 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofce/remarks-president-address-nation-
way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan, accessed 9 Feb. 2011.
106
Quoted in Bob Woodward, Obamas war (London: Simon & Schuster, 2010), p. 301.
107
Jon Boone, General Petraeus insists he will not be bound by Obamas Afghan exit date, Guardian, 15 Aug. 2010.
108
Communiqu, Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, 20 July 2010, p. 7.
288
the summit discussions made clear that the vast majority of the 138,000 inter-
national troops deployed in Afghanistan would leave by 2014.
109
Notwithstanding
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussens assurance that NATO is in
this for the long term,
110
political elites afrmed the deadline was real. Britains
Prime Minister David Cameron argued forcefully that transitioning by 2014 will
pave the way for British combat troops to be out of Afghanistan by 2015, a rm
deadline that the UK is set to meet.
111
The withdrawal of Dutch troops in August
2010, the planned withdrawal of Canadian forces in the middle of 2011 and that
of Polish soldiers in 2012 further suggest that NATO has begun the process of
leaving Afghanistan.
The situation in Germany, the third largest troop-contributing nation, is hardly
more encouraging. The current government is divided on the issue, with Defence
Minister Guttenberg seeking an extended role for the Bundeswehr, and Foreign
Minister Westerwelle pushing for withdrawal sooner rather than later.
112
While the
Bundestag is expected to extend the force mandate in March 2011, further exten-
sions are likely to invite strong political opposition, making it all the more difcult
to secure broad social consensus for what is efectively a parliamentary army.
113

Indeed, Westerwelle has conrmed that German troops will begin withdrawing as
early as 2012, suggesting the direction policy is likely to take on this question.
114
Even in Australia and France, where the governments have actually advocated
extending the mission beyond 2014, public pressure has reined in executive branch
enthusiasm. In October, the federal parliament in Canberra debated the Afghan
war for the rst time since Australian Defence Forces deployed to Afghanistan
in 2001.
115
While both Prime Minister Julia Gillard and opposition leader Tony
Abbott supported the war,
116
polls indicate dipping public condence.
117
Similarly,
in France, President Sarkozys backing of the Afghan war has done nothing to
rally popular support. Indeed, as table 2 shows, public support for the war among
all four top troop-contributing states declined in 2010.
There are three reasons for this decline in public support: NATOs inability
to craft a convincing strategic narrative that has a degree of salience with home
109
Ian Traynor, NATO maps out Afghanistan withdrawal by 2014 at Lisbon Summit, Guardian, 20 Nov. 2010.
110
Quoted in NATO and Afghanistan launch transition and embark on a long term partnership, NATO News,
20 Nov. 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-9880914D-F3600C02/natolive/news_68728.htm, accessed 9
Feb. 2011.
111
BBC News, David Cameron defends Afghan withdrawal deadline, 20 Nov. 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-politics-11804205, accessed 9 Feb. 2011.
112
Ralf Beste, Christoph Hickmann, Dirk Kurbjuweit, Ralf Neukirch and Gregor-Peter Schmitz, Germany
debates Afghanistan, Der Spiegel, 27 Dec. 2010.
113
Ulrike Demmer, Christoph Hickmann, Dirk Kurbjuweit and Ralf Neukirch, Fear of rising death toll, Der
Spiegel, 25 Dec. 2010.
114
Judy Dempsey and Mathew Saltmarsh, German troops to begin Afghan exit next year, New York Times, 16
Dec. 2010.
115
Gerard Henderson, Party leaders closer on Afghanistan war than you may think, Sydney Morning Herald, 12
Oct. 2010.
116
Editorial, Speeches mask the reality of Afghanistans war, Sydney Morning Herald, 21 Oct. 2010; Hamish
McDonald, A shaky premise for our Afghan exit, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 Jan. 2011.
117
Mathew Franklin and Mark Todd, Afghan ak hits Tony Abbott in the polls, Australian, 12 Oct. 2010; More
Australians call for Afghanistan withdrawal, Angus Reid Public Opinion, 30 June 2010, http://www.angus-
reid.com/polls/39176/more_australians_call_for_afghanistan_withdrawal/, accessed 9 Feb. 2011.
Campaign disconnect
289
Table 2. Comparative public support for Afghanistan campaign, 2009 and 2010
Country Public support in 2009 (%) Public support in 2010 (%)
United States 55
a
40
b
United Kingdom 42
c
37
d
Germany 37
e
30
f
France 32
g
30
h
a
Mean percentage gure for the period between 2006 and 2009, based on multiple polls computed by Sarah
Kreps, Elite consensus as a determinant of alliance cohesion, Foreign Policy Analysis 6: 3, July 2010, p. 195.
b
Figure computed by the authors based on the mean average of polls conducted between Aug. and Dec. 2010.
See Jefrey M. Jones, Americans less pessimistic about US progress in Afghanistan, Gallup, 29 Nov. 2010,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/144944/Americans-Less-Pessimistic-Progress-Afghanistan.aspx; Jefrey M.
Jones, Obama nds majority approval elusive, Gallup, 11 Aug. 2010, http://www.gallup.com/poll/141836/
Issues-Obama-Finds-Majority-Approval-Elusive.aspx; Jefrey M. Jones, In the US, new high of 43% call
Afghanistan war a mistake, Gallup, 3 Aug. 2010, http://www.gallup.com/poll/141716/New-High-Call-
Afghanistan-War-Mistake.aspx; Julie Phelon and Gary Langer, Poll: assessment of Afghanistan war sours,
ABC/Washington Post poll, 16 Dec. 2010; What the numbers say about Afghanistan progress in Afghanistan,
CNN, 15 Oct. 2010, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/10/15/what-the-numbers-say-about-progress-
in-afghanistan/.
c
Based on the average of polls conducted in 2009: see Richard Norton Taylor, Julian Glover and Nicholas
Watt, Public support of war in Afghanistan is rm, Guardian, 13 July 2009; Majority of Britons oppose
Afghan war, Reuters, 7 Oct. 2009, http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-42978320091007.
d
This percentage argued that British troops should begin to be removed from Afghanistan in 2010: News-
night poll: most think Afghan war unwinnable, BBC Newsnight, 23 Feb. 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
programmes/newsnight/8530761.stm; Nigel Morris, Afghan war is unwinnable and we should not be there,
says voters, Independent, 21 April 2010.
e
Based on the average of polls conducted in 2009: see Transatlantic trends, German Marshall Fund, 2010,
pp. 389, http://www.gmfus.org/trends/doc/2010_English_Top.pdf; Germans would remove troops
from Afghanistan, Angus Reid Public Opinion, 28 March 2000, http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/35577/
germans_would_remove_troops_from_afghanistan/. These gures are consistent with alternative research:
Kreps, Elite consensus, p. 195.
f
Germans consider ending Afghan mission now, Angus Reid Public Opinion, 2 April 2010, http://www.
angus-reid.com/polls/38244/germans_consider_ending_afghan_mission_now/. The authors calculated the
average of those advocating immediate withdrawal (32%), withdrawal by 2011 (24%) and withdrawal by 2015
(14%).
g
Based on the average percentage of polling data from questions concerning attitudes towards the war and
respondents support for withdrawal: see Transatlantic trends, pp. 389.
h
Gene Zbikowski, War in Afghanistan unpopular in France, LHumanit, 15 July 2010, http://www.
humaniteinenglish.com/spip.php?article1567.
populations; a sharp rise in western casualties;
118
and the questionable objective
of supporting a government marred by charges of corruption and electoral fraud.
The fact that both NATO and western political leaders have failed to commu-
nicate the purpose of the mission to home audiences is an accepted fact among
military commanders at ISAF HQ.
119
In Britain, for instance, the war has been
justied as necessary in order to prevent Afghanistan once again becoming a base
for terrorism. However, the government has failed to convince the parliament,
let alone the public, of this case for war.
120
As one senior British commander
118
Coalition fatalities were the highest in 2009 and 2010: Military casualty data, Afghanistan Conict Monitor,
2010, http://www.afghanconictmonitor.org/military.html, accessed 9 Feb. 2011.
119
Chaudhuri interviews and observations during four round tables with senior British, American, French and
Canadian ofcers and civilians at ISAF HQ and RC-South, Aug. 2010.
120
House of Commons Foreign Afairs Committee, Global security: Afghanistan and Pakistan, eighth report of
290
recounts, the 9/11-Al Qaeda story lacks credibility when the scope of our mission
is as expansive as it is, and complicated by an elusive end state.
121
With support for the war declining in NATO capitals, the political mood has
turned against it. This is the all-important context of the 2014 deadline. No matter
what ofcials say about transition being based on conditions on the ground, the
political reality is that, come 2014, NATO combat troops will almost certainly
withdraw.
122
Pakistan: an unwilling ally
Pakistans unwillingness to target insurgent groups hostile to coalition forces and
housed in sanctuaries on the Pakistani side of the porous Durand Line serves as
yet another strategic impediment to progress in Afghanistan.
123
These groups
include the QST and the HQN, which operate out of Quetta (the capital city
of Baluchistan), the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and, increasingly, the
densely populated city of Karachi.
Under the Bush administration, little attention was given to the dynamic of
a shared insurgency spanning the AfghanistanPakistan border.
124
Conversely,
Obamas advisers were quick to recognize that both the ISAF mission and the
future of Afghanistan were directly dependent upon Pakistani cooperation.
125
In
March 2009 the much publicized Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) strategy document
made a case for a regional approach, treating Afghanistan and Pakistan as two
countries with one challenge in one region.
126
At ISAF HQ, McChrystal reached
a similar conclusion: stability in Pakistan was essential to enable progress in
Afghanistan.
127
Insurgent groups were reportedly aided by some elements of
Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI).
128
While the veracity of
the latter claim is questionable,
129
that the Pakistani military are living a lie is a
matter of both conventional wisdom and dilemma.
130
session 20082009, HC 302 (London: TSO, Aug. 2009), pp. 969; David J. Betz, Communication breakdown:
strategic communication and defeat in Afghanistan, internal paper for PRISM, RC-South, Sept. 2010.
121
Chaudhuri interview with very senior British commander, ISAF HQ, Kabul, 11 Aug. 2010.
122
This is not to suggest that NATO will abandon Afghanistan. There is evidence to suggest that a smaller
training/support mission and special forces will remain beyond the 2014 deadline.
123
Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy review; Elisabeth Bumiller, Intelligence reports ofer
dim views of Afghan war, New York Times, 14 Dec. 2010.
124
Ahmed Rashid, Descent into chaos (New York: Viking, 2008), pp. xxxviilviii; Gary C. Schroen, First in: an
insiders account of how the CIA spearheaded the war on terror in Afghanistan (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005),
pp. 35863.
125
Chaudhuri interview with Bruce Riedel, Washington DC, 28 Aug. 2008; Bruce Riedel, Al Qaeda strikes
back, Foreign Afairs 86: 3, MayJune 2007, pp. 358; Richard C. Holbrooke, The next President: mastering
a daunting agenda, Foreign Afairs 87: 5, Sept.Oct. 2008, pp. 1820.
126
Jones, President Obamas AfghanistanPakistan (AfPak) strategy.
127
128
129
The ISIs linkage with the QST is a matter of much debate. While recent studies show that ISI ofcers are
represented on the QSTs leadership council, specialists claim that the ISI and the military merely provide shelter,
not necessarily direct support, to the QST. See Matt Waldman, The sun in the sky: the relationship between
Pakistans ISI and Afghan insurgents, Crisis State Research Centre working paper (London: London School of
Economics, June 2010), p. 5; Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: a hard country (London: Penguin, forthcoming 2011), ch. 6.
130
Quoted by Mike McConnell, the former US Director of National Intelligence, in Woodward, Obamas war, p.
1; Michael Semple, Afghanistan and Pakistan: interdependent, distrustful neighbours, Guardian, 27 July 2010.
Campaign disconnect
291
Three interrelated reasons explain this state of afairs. First, Pakistani elites are
convinced that ISAF forces will soon withdraw from Afghanistan,
131
leaving them
to contend with a raging civil war. Western intelligence accepts that the July 2011
deadline for the beginning of US force withdrawal reinforced Pakistani support for
the QST and the HQN, viewed by Pakistan as its proxies in the Afghan endgame.
132

Second, a core objective is to craft a hedging strategy against increasing Indian
inuence in Kabul.
133
That is, as far as the military are concerned, it simply does not
make sense to target PashtunAfghan Taleban actors who may well return to power
in at least some part of Afghanistan, particularly when the contending partythe
existing Tajik-dominated government in Kabulis considered to comprise Indias
Afghan protgs.
134
The insecurity complex is further compounded by the fact
that Pakistan has historically shared an uneasy relationship with Afghan princi-
ples.
135
Third, recent research highlights a key domestic rationale for sheltering
Afghan insurgent groups. Anatol Lieven argues that on the street there is an
overwhelming level of sympathy for the Afghan Taleban, making it all the harder
for state authorities to turn against them.
136
In short, Pakistans frame of reference
is shaped by regional dynamics that have been accentuated by both the repeated
talk of withdrawal and important domestic compulsions.
With a view to reversing Pakistans strategic calculation, the Obama administra-
tion set about increasing US economic assistance. Accordingly, the US Congress
pledged $1.5 billion annually for ve years.
137
The idea, initially, was to strengthen
the government headed by President Asif Ali Zardari. However, US eforts to
buttress civilian authority irritated the military leadership.
138
By the end of 2009,
military elites felt sidelined. In an attempt to restore condence, both countries
initiated a strategic dialogue at the ministerial level. Importantly, the US increased
assistance to the Pakistani military by $2 billion.
139
The extended scal support
was once again intended to prompt the military to take action against insurgent
groups. Yet to date, for the reasons highlighted above, this approach has proved
unsuccessful.
This is not to say that the Pakistani military has shied away from the war on
terror. To the contrary: the military and intelligence agencies have taken decisive
action against extremists who threaten stability within Pakistan. Indeed, the
131
Ahmed Rashid, Trotsky in Baluchistan, National Interest, Nov.Dec. 2009. For alternative ndings on
Pakistani military views on the US exit, see Christine C. Fair, The militant challenge in Pakistan, Policy
Analysis 11, Jan. 2011, p. 117.
132
Chaudhuri interview with a senior western intelligence ofcer, Kabul, 11 Aug. 2010. This is not to suggest that
the military controls either the QST or the HQN; rather, that these groups serve as favourites in Afghanistans
political landscape. See Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, eds, Abdul Salaam Zaeef: my life with the
Taleban (London: Hurst, 2010) pp. 10721.
133
Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the brink, New York Review of Books 56: 10, 11 June 2009.
134
Rashid, Trotsky in Baluchistan.
135
For an overview, see Farzana Shaikh, Making sense of Pakistan (London: Hurst, 2009) pp. 200208.
136
Lieven, Pakistan, chs 6, 11. The authors thank Anatol Lieven for sharing chapters of his manuscript and
research in advance of publication.
137
Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2009, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111
962&tab=summary, accessed 9 Feb. 2011.
138
David Ignatius, How to aggravate Pakistan, Washington Post, 11 Oct. 2009; KerryLugar aid bill sparks debate
in parliament, Dawn, 7 Oct. 2009.
139
Eric Schmitt and David Sanger, US ofers Pakistan army 2 billion aid package, New York Times, 22 Oct. 2010.
292
Pakistani security forces have lost more lives ghting the militancy than all NATO
countries in Afghanistan.
140
Since at least 2004 the military has helped target key
Al-Qaeda leaders.
141
In April 2009 it launched clearing operations in the Swat
Valley. Operation Rah-e-Raast (The Right Path) pushed extremists out, elimi-
nating their ability to regain control of the area.
142
In October 2009 the military
took the ght (Operation Rah-e-Nijat or Path to Salvation) to the Tehrik-e-
Taleban Pakistan (TTP) or the Pakistan Taleban. In 2010, while Pakistans COIN
strategy and timetable were set back by the devastating oods that afected over
100 million people,
143
a number of operations were soon reinitiated in key Taleban
strongholds.
144
Clearly, resolve is hardly an issue with the Pakistani military, as
long as the mission complements its strategic calculations.
Alongside the extended programme of assistance to Pakistan, the Obama admin-
istration devoted attention to India. It was believed that meaningful dialogue and
traction on the Kashmir dispute would encourage Pakistani elites to focus their
attention on the QST and associated groups, rather than on India in the east.
145

Holbrookes unofcial brief as US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan
was to convince the Indians to engage in dialogue with Pakistan.
146
However,
the prospect of improving relations was sidelined by the growing opposition to
rapprochement in India following the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November
2008.
147
Frustrated by Pakistans refusal to arrest those responsible, the Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh argued that talks could resume once Pakistan
put a stop to the terror machine.
148
In early 2011 Indian and Pakistani leaders
stressed the need to engage in dialogue, but rapprochement will require Pakistan
to take meaningful action against those accused in the Mumbai attacks.
149
This is
unlikely to happen any time soon.
Neither economic nor regional incentives have altered Pakistans strategic
perceptions. In fact, Pakistani anxieties have deepened because of Indias expanding
footprint in Afghanistan. This point was emphasized by McChrystal, who argued
that while Indian activities largely benet the Afghan people, they exacerbate
regional tensions and encourage[s] Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or
140
Hilary Synnott, Look both ways before attacking Pakistan, Financial Times, 4 Aug. 2010; Pakistan Institute
of Peace Studies, Pakistan Security Report 2009 (Islamabad, Jan. 2010), pp. 15.
141
Anatol Lieven, How the Afghan counterinsurgency threatens Pakistan, The Nation, 3 Jan. 2011.
142
Hasan Abbas, Militancy in Pakistans borderlands (New York: Century Foundation, 2010), p. 29. This was
conrmed by independent observers having visited Swat: Chaudhuri interview with senior Pakistani
journalist embedded with the army, London, 22 March 2010; discussions with Anatol Lieven following his
visit to Swat in Sept. 2009.
143
Hilary Synnott, After the ood, Survival 52: 5, Sept. 2010, p. 249.
144
S. Akbar Zaidi, Pakistan after the oods (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 29
Sept. 2010; Carlotta Gall, Floods stunt Pakistani ght against insurgents, New York Times, 13 Sept. 2010.
145
Rashid, Trotsky in Baluchistan; C. Raja Mohan, Barack Obamas Kashmir thesis, Indian Express, 3 Nov.
2008.
146
Laura Roxen, Indias stealth lobbying against Holbrooke brief , The Cable, Foreign Policy, 24 Jan. 2009;
Woodward, Obamas war, p. 86; Chaudhuri interview with former senior US State Department ofcial,
London, 18 Sept. 2009.
147
See Rudra Chaudhuri, The proxy calculus, RUSI Journal 155: 6, Dec. 2010, pp. 5260.
148
Obama says talk to Pakistan, Times of India, 8 Nov. 2010.
149
Sandeep Dikshit, Krishna expects productive meeting with Qureshi, The Hindu, 8 Jan. 2011.
Campaign disconnect
293
India.
150
McChrystal was referring to Indias $1.3 billion aid package to Kabul,
which angered the Pakistani military. This impending crisis in condence is fuelled
by claims made by Pakistani elites that India actively supports and arms Baluch
groups in their struggle against the government in Islamabad. Baluch leaders are
said to be sheltered in Indian consulates in southern and eastern Afghanistan along
the border with Pakistan.
151
While the facts underlying these claims are hazy at
best, they serve to intensify further the prevailing culture of mistrust.
152
Far from encouraging support for ISAF objectives, the layered and complex
regional situation reinforces the belief among Pakistani elites that the central
nodes of the insurgency represent the most promising option in the quest to
secure Pakistani interests in the long term. This is the primary reason why, rather
than turning on the Taleban, military leaders have positioned themselves as the
key brokers in any attempt at reconciliation between the QST and the Karzai
administration.
153
The prospects for 2011
How, then, does the western campaign in Afghanistan look for 2011? It is pretty
promising at the operational level. The trend on CIVCAS is positive. ANSF growth
is healthy. There is more work yet to be done on ANA quality, but at least ISAF is
now also focused on ANP partnering. Militarily, the ISAF campaign has regained
momentum, and the Taleban appear to have been worn down in Helmand and
Kandahar. ISAF is focused on the key challenge of supporting the development of
subnational governance. The problem is that continued progress at the operational
level cannot address the three strategic obstacles to campaign success: a corrupt
and unreliable national government, declining domestic political support for the
war in NATO countries, and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan.
154
For all the assistance that NATO provides to Afghanistan, there is only so much
the US and its allies can do about Afghan government corruption. For a start,
Afghanistan is a sovereign state and, ultimately, ISAF operates at the request of
the Afghan government. Besides, Karzai probably realizes that the US needs him
150
McChrystal, Commanders initial assessment, pp. 210. For detailed analysis of Indias role in Afghanistan,
see Shashank Joshi, Indias AfPak strategy, RUSI Journal 155: 1, Feb.March 2010, pp. 2029; Matthieu
Aikins, India in Afghanistan, The Caravan Journal, Oct. 2010.
151
For details on Pakistani views on the Indian hand, see Imtiaz Gul, The most dangerous place: Pakistans lawless
frontier (London: Penguin, 2009), pp. 201205.
152
To date, Indians argue that such evidence has not been made available, and western ofcials in Kandahar are
not clear about the validity of these claims. Importantly, and unsurprisingly, Afghan ofcials reject Pakistans
claims. See Pak claims India backing Baluch rebels, Indian Express, 22 Apr. 2009; Chaudhuri interviews with
British, American and Canadian ofcials, RC-South, 89 Aug. 2010.
153
Antonio Giustiozzi, Negotiating with the Taleban, (New York: Century Foundation, 2010), pp. 1516.
154
Space constraints have prevented our discussing every issue pertaining to campaign progress in this article.
Opium production declined between 2007 and 2010, but from a very high baseline, while the licit economy
grew spectacularly, albeit from a very low baseline: Afghan GDP grew on average by 12 per cent per annum
from 2003 to 2008. See Ian S. Livingston, Heather L. Messera and Michael OHanlon, Afghanistan index:
tracking variables of reconstruction and security in post-9/11 Afghanistan, 19 Oct. 2010, pp. 25, 29. The
important point is that economic growth is a crucial factor in enabling states to escape the conict trap: see
Paul Collier, The bottom billion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
294
almost as much as he needs the US.
155
McMasters newly formed anti-corruption
unit, the CJIATF-Shafayat, promises to introduce better-informed anti-graft
strategies in consultation with Afghan principals, a key failing of the MCTF-A.
Yet rooting out high-level corruption, with the attendant costs for the existing
patronage system, is likely to attract strong opposition from within the Afghan
government. Indeed, in most cases the patronage network in Kabul can be traced
back to key power brokers at the regional level. As we have noted, the paradox of
having to work with such ambiguous and problematic gures, while knowing
that they corrode the governments already waning legitimacy, is unfortunately
a reality.
156
It is possible that, in time, the growth of subnational governance and
a more professional ANSF will increase public condence in the institutions of
government. But such a legitimacy uplift is unlikely in the next four years.
Could progress in the military campaign not stem the decline in public support
for the war? Well, possibly; but no amount of operational progress is likely to
signicantly increase public support, because there is still the question of purpose:
why is NATO ghting the war? Academic analysis of American public opinion
and the use of force clearly show that public support for war is directly related
to its purpose.
157
As we have noted, NATO lacks a credible strategic narrative
to explain the purpose to home audiences. It may be argued that a NATO-wide
coherent narrative is not possible or even desirable, given diferent national sensi-
tivities and roles in Afghanistan. But in its absence, some NATO memberssuch
as Britain, Canada and Germanyhave struggled to construct national narratives
that resonate with their own publics. An endless stream of scandals, involving
political and nancial corruption at the highest levels of Afghan government, has
not helped on this score.
Finally, there is the problem of Pakistan. Notwithstanding a slew of high-
ranking US visitors to Islamabad towards the end of 2010 and at the beginning of
2011, there is nothing to suggest that the security forces will turn their guns on anti-
coalition insurgents.
158
Indeed, rather than adopting a conciliatory stance towards
American pleas to dry the swamp in north Waziristan, suspected home to the
Haqqanis, General Kayani has taken on an increasingly deant attitude. Indeed,
the media-shy general has made clear that the US and Pakistan have diferent
frames of reference with regard to regional security.
159
A leaked US National
Intelligence Estimate on Pakistan stressed that Kayani is unlikely to change his
mind anytime soon.
160
Convinced that western presence in Afghanistan will all
but disappear in the next four to ve years, Pakistan depends for its leverage
and reach within Afghanistan upon its ability to shape a reconciliation dialogue
155
Andrew Exum, Leverage: designing a political campaign for Afghanistan (Washington DC: Center for a New
American Security, May 2010), p. 9.
156
Anthony King, The power of politics, RUSI Journal 155: 6, Dec. 2010, p. 71.
157
Richard C. Eichenberg, Victory has many friends: US public opinion and the use of military force, 1981
2005, International Security 30: 1, 2005, pp. 14077.
158
Karin Brulliard and Karen De Young, US courts Pakistans top general, with little result, Washington Post, 1
Jan. 2011.
159
Brulliard and Young, US courts Pakistans top general.
160
Gen. Kayani resisting US pressures to launch ground attack, The Nation (Pakistan), 1 Jan. 2010.
Campaign disconnect
295
between the QST and the Afghan government,
161
or so senior Pakistani ofcials
believe.
162
Additionally, the stalemate in IndiaPakistan relations following
the Mumbai attacks persists, further aggravating Pakistani anxieties.
163
In sum,
Pakistan is preparing for the endgame, in which there is little strategic space to
consider US appeals that are wholly inimical to Pakistani interests.
In turn, and with a view to ending the war, if ISAF were to change tack
and support a high-level reconciliation dialogue with the QST and the HQN,
Pakistan would no doubt serve as a key interlocutor. Whether this is likely to
happen depends on how Washington reads the conict nearer to the US presi-
dential elections in 2012. Either way, reconciliation can at best be interpreted as
a central component of an exit strategy, itself shaped by the inability to convert
operational progress into strategic momentum.
Nobody can predict with any certainty how things will pan out in Afghan-
istan in 2011. Our reading of the situation leads us to conclude that the most
likely scenario is that operational progress will fail to produce the desired strategic
outcomes. Indeed, it is entirely possible that things will get worse on the strategic
side of things. Growing war-weariness among NATO publics, a strong and
largely immovable patronage system led by corrupt power brokers in Afghanistan,
and the strategic logic underlying Pakistani non-action may collectively tip the
campaign into a downward strategic spiral. In these circumstances, the best that
the US and its allies can hope for is to exert inuence on key terrain districts and
garrisoned cities like Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat and Jalalabad. With
transition as the central goal for 2011 and beyond, the focus is likely to remain
on ANSF development. In many ways, the key will lie in converting the ANA
and ANP into corporate institutions capable of thinking and ghting for national
strategic interests.
As mentioned above, reconciliation is the wild card. There may yet be a negoti-
ated end to the conict that ensures a reasonably stable, legitimate and secure
national government following NATO withdrawal. This coming year is likely to
see leniency on the part of Washington to widen the channel of dialogue with at
least the less ideologically driven parts of the insurgency. Negotiations in some
form have been going on for some time.
164
The process, if it succeeds at all, will be
a slow one. Violent resistance to the Afghan government is driven by a combina-
tion of local rivalries and grievances, and ideological and military direction from
the QST, HQN or HIG.
165
Accordingly, reconciliation requires engaging with
a myriad of insurgent groups and addressing the mix of motivations specic to
each group.
166
There is a growing realization in Washington that a negotiated end
161
For details on Pakistan and reconciliation, see Matt Waldman, Tough talking, RUSI Journal 155: 6, Dec. 2010,
pp. 645.
162
Chaudhuri observations in track-two meetings convened by the authors with senior Pakistani and Indian
representatives, London, 2324 March 2010.
163
Chaudhuri, The proxy calculus, pp. 567.
164
Ahmed Rashid, The way out of Afghanistan, New York Review of Books, 16 Dec. 2010; Ewan MacAskill and
Simon Tisdall, White House shifts Afghanistan strategy towards talks with Taleban, Guardian, 19 July 2010.
165
Antonio Giustozzi, ed., Decoding the new Taleban (London: Hurst, 2009).
166
Michael Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009).
296
to the conict is a better scenario than a strategy of hope in which key strategic
impediments are implausibly expected to fall in line with ISAF campaign objec-
tives.

Obstacles in Afghanistan 2009-2011 Final

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Obstacles in Afghanistan 2009-2011 Final

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Campaign disconnect:

operational progress and strategic

Você também pode gostar