By Gordon H.

Clark
DISCUSSION
Gordon H. Clark, now retired, taughl philosophy m ost recelllly at CO llen.
aliI College.
A semi-defense
of Francis Schaeffer
In the Christian Scholar's Review, Vol. X, No.3 (1981) Dr. Ron Ruegsegger
criticizes Francis Schaeffer'S philosophy. The article is well researched, well
written, and well worth reading. Even so, Ifind some irrelevancies, one misap-
prehension, and certain omissions.
The irrelevancies come in the first half of the article. The first half is indeed
good, in that itcompares Schaeffer's historical and logical remarks with the
views of philosophers he opposes. But the method does not seem just. Ruegseg-
ger opposes Schaeffer's interpretation of (for example) Hegel and Kierkegaard
on the ground that some recent critics interpret these philosophers differently.
The suggestion then is, modestly expressed, that Schaeffer's philosophy suffers
therefrom. To argue cogently, however, Ruegsegger would have to show that
Schaeffer's interpretation is wrong, and that a recent view is correct. This he
does not do.
On page 249Ruegsegger charges Schaeffer with a logical fallacy. He writes,
"Schaeffer frequently defends what he calls the Christian presuppositions'
against its contradictories, but he seldom argues for itagainst its contraries." On
this point it is the critic who commits the fallacy.
The contradictory of "All dogs have four legs" is "Some dogs do not have
four legs." Its contrary is, "No dogs have four legs." Now, being a good Chris-
tian presuppositionalist, Iwish to defend the true Calvinist position that "All
dogs have four legs." To do so, Iconstruct a fine argument in refutation of the
thesis "Some dogs do not have four legs." Ifthis latter proposition is false, then
the affirmative must be true. But note that ifthis is what Ido, it is not necessary
todisprove the contrary also. Ifthe contradictory is false, the contrary must also
be false. ItisRuegsegger who falls into the logical blunder with which hecharges
Schaeffer.
There is another point also. Itis similar to the preceding insofar as it charges
Schaeffer with missing an alternate view. Schaeffer, when discussing ethiCS,
states that if one abandons Christianity "there are three (and only three) alterna-
tives: hedonism, sociological law, and totalitarianism." The critic insists that there
are more than three: "utilitarian, intuitionistic, naturalistic, ... and none of these
are [sic) reducible to either hedonism, sociological law, or totalitarianism." If the
148
piScussion
criticwill read either Bentham himself, the founder of utilitarianism Sid _
wick'S great work on The M ethods of Ethics, he will discover that utili~r. 1. g
:0 based on psychological hedonism, from which it attempts to prod narus~
., . uce a uru-
versa I hedonism,
In connection with Schaeffer's ethics there is another point that his c iti
objectsto. Schaeffer's normative principles are distinctly revelational or bibli~al:
but, complains Ruegsegger, not one of his nine arguments against abortion is
blblica~.He s~ys "curiousl~ enough" (p. 2~;),and. contr~sts Schaeffer'S theory
withhis practice, condemrung the latter as inconsistent. Yet it is not inconsis-
tent, as Ruegsegger almost sees. In opposing secular advocates of abortion and
greedy politi~i~ns, it is le?itimate to use ad J'~ominem arguments. These argu-
ments are legitimate even In geometry. One tries to show Inconsistencies in the
opponent's position. One tries to point out conclusions, logically drawn from
theabortionist's principles but which he either does not like or isafraid to admit
inpublic. In this Schaeffer commits no inconsistency.
These notes, however, are only a semi-defense of Francis Schaeffer. IfI
werecriticizing him, I should first say that he is not a philosopher at all. To be
sure, he discusses certain philosophical problems; but he omits so much that he
does not deserve the title. In fact, r rather guess that he admits that he is not a
philosopher. His great work lies in other fields, particularly the field of evange-
lism. And there are others who discuss more of philosophy than he does and
still omit a great deal. Itis not enough to state that the doctrine of the Trinity
solves the one-many problem. One must state what the problem is and show
just how the Trinity solves it. Itis not enough to assert the trustworthiness of
sensory experience in an attempt to avoid skepticism. One must define sensa-
tion, prove that there are uninterpreted elements in the mind, show how these
can be combined into perceptions, and then develop concepts without assum-
ing, what is factually false, that all men have sensory images. Besides which, one
must choose from among Plato's, Aristotle's, and Kant's theories of individua-
tion, or produce a further alternative. Schaeffer is not the only one who omits
these essential elements in a philosophy.
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