1000

CHAPTER 31
RELIABILITY IN THE MECHANICAL
DESIGN PROCESS
B. S. Dhillon
Department of Mechanical Engineering
University of Ottawa
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
1 INTRODUCTION 1000
2 STATISTICAL DISTRIBUTIONS
AND HAZARD RATE MODELS 1001
2.1 Statistical Distributions 1001
2.2 Hazard Rate Models 1002
3 COMMON RELIABILITY
NETWORKS 1003
3.1 Series Network 1004
3.2 Parallel Network 1005
3.3 SeriesParallel Network 1005
3.4 ParallelSeries Network 1006
3.5 K-out-of-m-Unit Network 1007
3.6 Standby System 1008
3.7 Bridge Network 1009
4 MECHANICAL FAILURE MODES
AND CAUSES OF GENERAL
AND GEAR FAILURES 1010
5 RELIABILITY-BASED DESIGN
AND DESIGN-BY-RELIABILITY
METHODOLOGY 1011
6 DESIGN RELIABILITY
ALLOCATION AND
EVALUATION METHODS 1012
6.1 Failure Rate Allocation Method 1013
6.2 Hybrid Reliability Allocation
Method 1013
6.3 Safety Factor and Safety Margin 1014
6.4 StressStrength Interference
Theory Method 1015
6.5 Failure Modes and Effect
Analysis (FMEA) 1016
6.6 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 1017
7 HUMAN ERROR AND
RELIABILITY CONSIDERATION
IN MECHANICAL DESIGN 1017
8 FAILURE RATE ESTIMATION
MODELS FOR VARIOUS
MECHANICAL ITEMS 1018
8.1 Brake System Failure Rate
Estimation Model 1018
8.2 Compressor System Failure Rate
Estimation Model 1019
8.3 Filter Failure Rate
Estimation Model 1019
8.4 Pump Failure Rate
Estimation Model 1019
9 FAILURE DATA AND FAILURE
DATA COLLECTION SOURCES 1019
REFERENCES 1021
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1022
1 INTRODUCTION
The history of reliability may be traced back to the early 1930s when probability concepts
were applied to problems related to electric power systems.
17
During World War II, German
researchers applied the basic reliability concepts to improve reliability of their V1 and V2
rockets. During the period 19451950, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) conducted
various studies that revealed a denite need to improve equipment reliability. Consequently,
the DOD formed an ad hoc committee on reliability in 1950. In 1952, this committee was
transformed to a permanent body: Advisory Group on the Re
r
-liability of Electronic Equip-
ment (AGREE).
8
The group released its report in 1957.
Mechanical Engineers Handbook: Materials and Mechanical Design, Volume 1, Third Edition.
Edited by Myer Kutz
Copyright ! 2006 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
2 Statistical Distributions and Hazard Rate Models 1001
In 1951, W. Weibull proposed a function to represent time to failure of various engi-
neering items.
9
Subsequently, this function became known as the Weibull distribution and is
regarded as the starting point of mechanical reliability along with the works of A. M. Freu-
denthal.
1011
In the early 1960s, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) played
an important role in the development of mechanical reliability, basically due to the following
three factors
12
:
The loss of Syncom I in space in 1963 due to a bursting high-pressure gas tank
The loss of Mariner III in 1964 due to a mechanical failure
The frequent failure of components such as valves, regulators, and pyrotechnics in the
Gemini spacecraft systems
Consequently, NASA initiated and completed many projects concerned with mechanical re-
liability. A detailed history of mechanical reliability is given in Refs. 1315 along with a
comprehensive list of publications on the subject up to 1992.
2 STATISTICAL DISTRIBUTIONS AND HAZARD RATE MODELS
Various types of statistical distributions and hazard rate models are used in mechanical
reliability to represent failure times of mechanical items. This section presents some of these
distributions and models considered useful to perform various types of mechanical reliability
analyses.
2.1 Statistical Distributions
This section presents three statistical or probability distributions: exponential, Weibull, and
normal.
Exponential Distribution
This is probably the most widely used distribution in reliability work to represent the failure
behavior of various engineering items.
16
Moreover, it is relatively easy to handle in perform-
ing reliability analysis in the industrial sector. Its probability density function is expressed
by
14,16
t
(t) e for 0 t 0 (1)
where (t) probability density function
distribution parameter; in reliability work, it is known as the constant failure
rate
t time.
The cumulative distribution function is given by
14,16
t t t
F(t) (t) dt e dt
0 0
(2)
t
1 e
where F(t) is the cumulative distribution function.
1002 Reliability in the Mechanical Design Process
Weibull Distribution
This distribution was developed by W. Weibull in the early 1950s and can be used to rep-
resent many different physical phenomena.
9
The distribution probability density function is
expressed by
14,16
1
t

(t) e(t / ) for t 0 0 0 (3)

where and are the distribution scale and shape parameters, respectively. The cumulative
distribution function is given by
14,16
t t
1
t

(t / )
F(t) (t) dt e dt

0 0

(t / )
1 e (4)
For 1 and 2, the Weibull distribution becomes the exponential and Rayleigh
distributions, respectively.
Normal Distribution
This is one of the most widely known distributions. In mechanical reliability, it is often used
to represent an items stress and strength. The probability density function of the distribution
is expressed by
2
1 (t )
(t) exp t (5)

2
2
2
where and are the distribution parameters (i.e., mean and standard deviation, respec-
tively). The cumulative distribution function is given by
14,16
t t
2
1 (x )
F(t) (t) dt exp dx (6)

2
2
2

2.2 Hazard Rate Models
In reliability studies, the term hazard rate is often used. It simply means the constant or
nonconstant failure rate of an item. Thus, the hazard rate of an item is expressed by
(t)
h(t) (7)
1 F(t)
where h(t) is the item hazard rate.
This section presents four hazard rate models considered useful to perform various types
of mechanical reliability studies: exponential, Weibull, normal, and general.
Exponential Distribution
By substituting Eqs. (1) and (2) into Eq. (7), we get the following equation for the expo-
nential distribution hazard rate function:
3 Common Reliability Networks 1003
t
e
h(t)
t
1 (1 e )
(8)
As the right-hand side of Eq. (8) is independent of time, is called the failure rate.
Weibull Distribution
By substituting Eqs. (3) and (4) into Eq. (7), we get the following equation for the Weibull
distribution hazard rate function:

1 (t / ) 1
[(t / ) e ] t
h(t) (9)

(t / )
1 [1 e ]
For 1 and 2, Eq. (9) becomes the hazard rate function for the exponential and
Rayleigh distributions, respectively.
Normal Distribution
By substituting Eqs. (5) and (6) into Eq. (7), we get the following equation for the normal
distribution hazard rate function:
2 2
1/ (2) exp [(t ) / 2 ]
h(t) (10)
t
2 2
1 1/ (2) exp [ (x ) / 2 ] dx

General Distribution
The distribution hazard rate function is dened by
17
m
1 m1 t
h(t) ct (1 c)mt e for 0 c 1 , , m, 0 (11)
where , scale parameters
, m shape parameters
t time
The following distribution hazard rate functions are the special cases of Eq. (11):
Bathtub; for m 1, 0.5
Makeham; for m 1, 1
Extreme value; for c 0, m 1
Weibull; for c 1
Rayleigh; for c 1, 2
Exponential; for c 1, 1
3 COMMON RELIABILITY NETWORKS
Components of a mechanical system can form congurations such as series, parallel, series
parallel, parallelseries, k out of m, standby, and bridge. Often, these congurations are
referred to as the standard congurations. Sometime during the design process, it might be
1004 Reliability in the Mechanical Design Process
1 2 3 m
Figure 1 Series system block diagram.
desirable to determine the reliability or the values of other related parameters of systems
forming such congurations. All these congurations or networks are described below.
14,16
3.1 Series Network
The block diagram of an m-unit series network or conguration is shown in Fig. 1. Each
block represents a system unit or component. If any one of the components fails, the system
fails; that is, all of the series units must work normally for the system to succeed. For
independent units, the reliability of the system shown in Fig. 1 is
R R R R R (12)
S 1 2 3 m
where R
S
series system reliability
m number of units
R
i
reliability of unit i for i 1, 2, 3, ... , m
For constant unit failure rates of the units, Eq. (12) becomes
14
m
t t t t 1 2 3 m
R (t) e e e e exp t (13)

S i
i1
where R
S
(t) series system reliability at time t

i
constant failure rate of unit i for i 1, 2, 3, ... , m
The system hazard rate is given by
14
(t) 1 dR (t)
S S
(t)
S
1 F (t) R (t) dt
S S
m
(14)

i
i1
where
S
(t) series system hazard rate or total failure rate

S
(t) series system probability density function
F
S
(t) series system cumulative distribution function
It is to be noted that the system total failure rate given by Eq. (14) is the sum of the failure
rates of all of the units. It means that whenever the failure rates of units are added, it is
automatically assumed that the units are acting in series (i.e., if one unit fails, the system
fails). This is the worst-case assumption often practiced in the design of engineering systems.
The system mean time to failure is given by
14

m
MTTF R (t) dt exp t dt

S S i
i1
0 0
1
(15)
m
(1/ )
i1 i
where MTTF
S
is the series system mean time to failure.
3 Common Reliability Networks 1005
1
2
3
m
Figure 2 Parallel system block diagram.
3.2 Parallel Network
This type of conguration can be used to improve a mechanical systems reliability during
the design phase. The block diagram of an m-unit parallel network is shown in Fig. 2.
Each block in the diagram represents a unit. This conguration assumes that all of its units
are active and at least one unit must work normally for the system to succeed. For indepen-
dently failing units, the reliability of the parallel network shown in Fig. 2 is expressed by
14
m
R 1 (1 R) (16)

p i
i1
where R
p
reliability of parallel network
R
i
reliability of unit i for i 1, 2, 3, ... , m
For constant failure rates of the units, Eq. (16) becomes
14
m
t i
R (t) 1 (1 e ) (17)

p
i1
where R
p
(t) parallel network reliability at time t

i
constant failure rate of unit i for i 1, 2, 3, ... , m
For identical units, the network mean time to failure is given by
14

m
1 1
MTTF R (t) dt (18)

p p
i
i1
0
where MTTF
p
parallel network mean time to failure
unit constant failure rate
3.3 SeriesParallel Network
The network block diagram is shown in Fig. 3. Each block in the diagram represents a unit.
This network represents a system having m number of subsystems in series. In turn, each
subsystem contains n number of active units in parallel. All subsystems must operate nor-
mally for the system to succeed. For independent units, the reliability of the seriesparallel
network shown in Fig. 3 is given by
18,19
1006 Reliability in the Mechanical Design Process
1
1
2
n
1
2
n
1
2
n
2 m
Figure 3 Seriesparallel network block diagram.
m n
R 1 F (19)

Sp ij
i1 j1
where R
Sp
seriesparallel network reliability
m number of subsystems
n number of units
F
ij
failure probability of the ith subsystems jth unit
For constant unit failure rates, Eq. (19) becomes
18,19
m n
t ij
R (t) 1 (1 e ) (20)

Sp
i1 j1
where R
Sp
(t) seriesparallel network reliability at time t

ij
constant failure rate of unit ij
For identical units, the network mean time to failure is given by
19

MTTF R (t) dt
Sp Sp
0
m in
1 1
m
i1
(1) (21)


i
j
i1 j1
where MTTF
Sp
seriesparallel network mean time to failure
unit failure rate
3.4 ParallelSeries Network
This network represents a system having m number of subsystems in parallel. In turn, each
subsystem contains n number of units in series. At least one subsystem must function nor-
mally for the system to succeed. The network block diagram is shown in Fig. 4. Each block
in the diagram represents a unit. For independent units, the reliability of the parallelseries
network shown in Fig. 4 is expressed by
18,19
m n
R 1 1 R (22)

pS ij
i1 j1
3 Common Reliability Networks 1007
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
n
n
n
n
1
2
3
m
Figure 4 Parallelseries network block diagram.
where R
pS
parallelseries network reliability
m number of subsystems
n number of units
R
ij
reliability of the jth unit in the ith subsystem
For constant unit failure rates, Eq. (23) becomes
18,19
m n
t ij
R (t) 1 1 e (23)

pS
i1 j1
where R
pS
(t) parallelseries network reliability at time t

ij
constant failure rate of unit ij
For identical units, the network mean time to failure is given by
19

m
1 1
MTTF R (t) dt (24)

pS pS
n i
i1
0
where MTTF
pS
is the parallelseries network mean time to failure.
3.5 K-out-of-m-Unit Network
This network is sometimes referred to as a partially redundant network. It is a parallel
network with a condition that at least K units out of the total of m units must operate normally
for the system to succeed.
For independent and identical units, the network reliability is given by
14,16
m
m
i mi
R R (1 R) (25)

K/ m
i
iK
where
m!
m

i
i!(m i)!
1008 Reliability in the Mechanical Design Process
0
1
2
m
Figure 5 Block diagram of an (m 1)-unit standby system.
R
K/ m
is the K-out-of-m-unit network reliability, and R is the unit reliability. For K 1 and
K m, Eq. (25) becomes the reliability expression for parallel and series networks, respec-
tively. More specically, parallel and series networks are the special cases of the K-out-of-
m-unit network.
For constant failure rates of the units, Eq. (25) becomes
14,16
m
m
it t mi
R e (1 e ) (26)

K/ m
i
iK
where R
K/ m
K-out-of-m-unit network reliability at time t
unit constant failure rate
The network mean time to failure is given by
14,16

m
1 1
MTTF R (t) dt (27)

K/ m k / m
i
ik
0
where MTTF
K/ m
is the K-out-of-m-unit network mean time to failure.
3.6 Standby System
This is another conguration used to improve reliability. The block diagram of an (m 1)-
unit standby system is shown in Fig. 5. Each block in the diagram represents a unit. In this
conguration, one unit operates and m units are kept on standby. As soon as the operating
unit fails, it is replaced by one of the standbys. The system fails when all of its units fail
(i.e., operating plus all standbys). For perfect switching, independent and identical units, and
as-good-as-new standby units, the standby system reliability is given by
14,16
m
t i t
[ (t) dt] exp( (t) dt)
0 0
R (t) (28)

SS
i!
i0
where R
SS
(t) standby system reliability at time t
(t) unit hazard rate or time-dependent failure rate
m number of standbys
For constant failure rates of the units [i.e., (t) ] Eq. (28) becomes
m
i t
( t) e
R (t) (29)

SS
i!
i0
3 Common Reliability Networks 1009
1 2
3
4
5
Figure 6 Block diagram of a ve-unit bridge network.
where is the unit constant failure rate. The system mean time to failure is given by
14

MTTF R (t) dt
SS SS
0

m
i t
(t) e
dt

i!
i0
0
m 1
(30)

where MTTF
SS
is the standby system mean time to failure.
3.7 Bridge Network
The block diagram of a bridge network is shown in Fig. 6. Each block in the diagram
represents a unit. Mechanical components sometimes can form this type of conguration.
For independent units, the reliability of the bridge network shown in Fig. 6 is
20
5 4
R 2 R R R R R R R R R

bn i i 1 3 5 1 4 2 5
i1 i1
5 4 3 5
R R R R R R R R R R (31)

i i 5 i 1 i 1 2 4 5
i2 i1 i1 i3
where R
bn
bridge network reliability
R
i
unit i reliability for i 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
For identical units and constant failure rates of the units, Eq. (31) becomes
14
5t 4t 3t 2t
R (t) 2e 5e 2e 2e (32)
bn
where is the unit constant failure rate. The network mean time to failure is given by

49
MTTF R (t) dt (33)
bn bn
60
0
where MTTF
bn
is the bridge network mean time to failure.
1010 Reliability in the Mechanical Design Process
4 MECHANICAL FAILURE MODES AND CAUSES OF GENERAL
AND GEAR FAILURES
A mechanical failure may be dened as any change in the shape, size, or material properties
of a structure, piece of equipment, or equipment part that renders it unt to carry out its
specied mission adequately.
13
Thus, there are many different types of failure modes asso-
ciated with mechanical items. Good design practices can reduce or eliminate altogether the
occurrence of these failure modes. Some of these failure modes are as follows
2123
:
Fatigue failure
Material aw failure
Bending failure
Metallurgical failure
Bearing failure
Instability failure
Shear loading failure
Compressive failure
Creep/ rupture failure
Tensile yield strength failure
Ultimate tensile strength failure
Stress concentration failure
There are many causes of product failures. Some of these are as follows
24
:
Defective design
Wear-out
Defective manufacturing
Wrong application
Incorrect installation
Failure of other parts
A study performed over a period of 35 years reported a total of 931 gear failures.
24
They were classied under four categories: breakage (61.2%), surface fatigue (20.3%), wear
(3.2%), and plastic ow (5.3%). The causes of these failures were grouped into the ve
categories shown in Fig. 7.
These ve categories were further divided into various elements. The elements of the
service-related classication were continual overloading (25%), improper assembly (21.2%),
impact loading (13.9%), incorrect lubrication (11%), foreign material (1.4%), abusive han-
dling (1.2%), bearing failure (0.7%), and operator errors (0.3%). The elements of the heat-
treatment-related classication were incorrect hardening (5.9%), inadequate case depth
(4.8%), inadequate core hardness (2%), excessive case depth (1.8%), improper tempering
(1%), excessive core hardness (0.5%), and distortion (0.2%). The elements of the design-
related classication were wrong design (2.8%), specication of suitable heat treatment
(2.5%), and incorrect material selection (1.6%). The elements of the manufacturing-related
classication were grinding burns (0.7%) and tool marks or notches (0.7%). Finally, the three
elements of the material-related classication were steel defects (0.5%), mixed steel or in-
correct composition (0.2%), and forging defects (0.1%).
5 Reliability-Based Design and Design-by-Reliability Methodology 1011
Heat
treatment
related
(16.2%)
Design
related
(6.9%)
Material
related
(0.8%)
Manufacturing
related
(1.4%)
Service
related
(74.7%)
Classifications
Figure 7 Classications of gear failure causes.
5 RELIABILITY-BASED DESIGN AND DESIGN-BY-RELIABILITY METHODOLOGY
It would be unwise to expect a system to perform to a desired level of reliability unless it
is specically designed for that level. Desired system/ equipment / part reliability design spec-
ications due to factors such as well-publicized failures (e.g., the space shuttle Challenger
disaster and the Chernobyl nuclear accident) have increased the importance of reliability-
based design. The starting point for reliability-based design is during the writing of the design
specication. In this phase, all reliability needs and specications are entrenched into the
design specication. Examples of these requirements might include item mean time to failure
(MTTF), mean time to repair (MTTR), test or demonstration procedures to be used, and
applicable documents.
Over the years the DOD has developed various reliability documents for use during the
design and development of an engineering item. Many times, such documents are entrenched
into the item design specication document. Table 1 presents some of these documents.
Many professional bodies and other organizations have also developed documents on various
aspects of reliability.
15,22,25
References 22 and 26 provide descriptions of documents devel-
oped by the DOD.
Reliability is an important consideration during the design phase. According to Ref. 27,
as many as 60% of failures can be eliminated through design changes. There are many
strategies the designer could follow to improve design:
Eliminate failure modes.
Focus design for fault tolerance.
Focus design for fail safe.
Focus design to include mechanism for early warnings of failure through fault diag-
nosis.
1012 Reliability in the Mechanical Design Process
Table 1 Selected Design-Related Documents Developed by the U.S. Department of Defense
Document No. Document Title
MIL-STD-721 Denitions of Terms for Reliability and Maintainability
MIL-STD-217 Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment
MIL-STD-781 Reliability Design, Qualication, and Production Acceptance Tests: Exponential Distribution
MIL-STD-756 Reliability Modeling and Prediction
MIL-STD-785 Reliability Program for Systems and Equipment
MIL-HDBK-251 Reliability/ Design Thermal Applications
MIL-STD-1629 Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
RADC-TR-75-22 Non-Electronic Reliability Notebook
MIL-STD-965 Parts Control Program
MIL-STD-2074 Failure Classication for Reliability Testing
During the design phase of a product, various types of reliability and maintainability analyses
can be performed, including reliability evaluation and modeling, reliability allocation, main-
tainability evaluation, human factors/ reliability evaluation, reliability testing, reliability
growth modeling, and life-cycle cost. In addition, some of the design improvement strategies
are zero-failure design, fault-tolerant design, built-in testing, derating, design for damage
detection, modular design, design for fault isolation, and maintenance-free design. During
design reviews, reliability and maintainability-related actions recommended/ taken are to be
thoroughly reviewed from desirable aspects.
A systematic series of steps are taken to design a reliable mechanical item. The design
by methodology is composed of such steps
14,28,29
:
Dene the design problem under consideration.
Identify and list all associated design variables and parameters.
Perform failure mode, effect, and criticality analyses according to MIL-STD-1629.
30
Verify critical design parameter selection.
Establish appropriate relationships between the failure-governing criteria and the crit-
ical parameters.
Determine the failure-governing stress and strength functions and then the most ap-
propriate failure-governing stress and strength distributions.
Estimate the reliability utilizing the failure-governing stress and strength distributions
for all critical failure modes.
Iterate the design until reliability goals are achieved.
Optimize design with respect to factors such as safety, reliability, cost, performance,
maintainability, weight, and volume.
Repeat the design optimization process for all critical components.
Estimate item reliability.
Iterate the design until item reliability goals are fully satised.
6 DESIGN RELIABILITY ALLOCATION AND EVALUATION METHODS
Over the years, many reliability allocation and evaluation methods have been developed for
use during the design phase.
14,29
This section presents some that are considered useful, par-
ticularly in designing mechanical items.
6 Design Reliability Allocation and Evaluation Methods 1013
6.1 Failure Rate Allocation Method
This method is used to allocate failure rates to system components when the overall system
required failure rate is given. The method is based on the following three assumptions
14
:
All system components fail independently.
Component failure rates are constant.
System components form a series network.
Thus, the system failure rate using Eq. (14) is
m
(34)

S i
i1
where
S
system failure rate
m total number of system components

i
failure rate of component i for i 1, 2, 3, ... , m
If the specied failure rate of the system is
Sp
, then the component failure rate is allocated
such that
m
* (35)

i Sp
i1
where is the failure rate allocated to component i for i 1, 2, 3, ... , m. The following *
i
three steps are associated with this approach:
Estimate failure rates of the system components (i.e.,
i
for i 1, 2, 3, ... , m) using
the eld data.
Calculate the relative weight
i
of component i using the preceding step failure rate
data and the expression

i
for i 1, 2, 3, ... , m (36)
i
m

i1 i
It is to be noted that
i
represents the relative failure vulnerability of component i and
m
1 (37)

i
i1
Allocate the failure rate to part or component i by using the equation
* for i 1, 2, 3, ... , m (38)
i i Sp
A solved example in Ref. 14 demonstrates the application of this method.
6.2 Hybrid Reliability Allocation Method
This method combines two reliability allocation methods: similar familiar systems and factors
of inuence. The method is more attractive because it incorporates the benets of both
systems.
14,29
The basis for the similar-familiar-systems approach is the familiarity of the designer
with similar systems as well as the utilization of failure data collected on similar systems
from various sources during the allocation process. The principal disadvantage of the similar-
1014 Reliability in the Mechanical Design Process
familiar-systems method is the assumption that the reliability and life-cycle cost of similar
systems are satisfactory or adequate.
The factors-of-inuence method is based upon four factors that are considered to affect
item reliability: failure criticality, environment, complexity/ time, and state of the art.
The failure criticality factor is concerned with how critical is the failure of an item (e.g.,
the failure of some auxiliary equipment in an aircraft may not be as critical as the failure
of an engine). The environmental factor takes into account the susceptibility of items to
conditions such as vibration, humidity, and temperature.
The complexity/ time factor relates to the number of item/ subsystem components/ parts
and the operating time of the item under consideration during the total system operating
period. Finally, the state-of-the-art factor relates to the advancement in the state of the art
for an item under consideration.
During the reliability allocation process, each item is rated with respect to each of these
four factors by assigning a number from 1 to 10. The assignment of 1 means the item is
least affected by the factor under consideration and 10 means the item is most affected by
the same factor. Subsequently, reliability is determined by weighing these numbers for all
four factors.
6.3 Safety Factor and Safety Margin
The safety factor and safety margin are arbitrary multipliers used to ensure the reliability of
mechanical items during the design phase. These indexes can provide satisfactory design if
they are established using considerable past experiences and data.
Safety Factor
A safety factor can be dened in many different ways.
13,3135
Two commonly used denitions
follow.
Denition I. The safety factor is dened by
36
m
Sh
SF 1 (39)
m
SS
where SF safety factor
m
Sh
mean failure governing strength
m
SS
mean failure governing stress
This index is a good measure of safety when both stress and strength are normally distributed.
However, when the spread of both strength and/ or stress is large, the index becomes mean-
ingless because of positive failure rate.
14
Denition II. The safety factor is dened by
3237
US
SF (40)
WS
where SF safety factor
WS working stress expressed in pounds per square inch (psi)
US ultimate strength expressed in psi
6 Design Reliability Allocation and Evaluation Methods 1015
Safety Margin
The safety margin (SM) is dened as
14,31
SM SF 1 (41)
The negative value of this measure means that the item under consideration will fail. Thus,
its value must always be greater than zero.
The safety margin for normally distributed stress and strength is expressed by
14,31

as ms
SM (42)

Sh
where
as
average strength

ms
maximum stress

Sh
strength standard deviation
In turn the maximum stress
ms
is expressed by
C (43)
ms SS SS
where
SS
mean stress

SS
stress standard deviation
C factor between 3 and 6
6.4 StressStrength Interference Theory Method
This method is used to determine the reliability of a mechanical item when its associated
stress and strength probability density functions are known. The item reliability is dened
by
13,14,29
R P(y x) P(x y) (44)
where R item reliability
P probability
x strength random variable
y stress random variable
Equation (44) is rewritten in the form
13,14,29

R (y) (x) dx dy (45)

y
where (x) strength probability density function
(y) stress probability density function
Special Case Model: Exponentially Distributed Stress and Strength
In this case, an items stress and strength are dened by
y
(y) e 0 y (46)
and
1016 Reliability in the Mechanical Design Process
x
(x) e 0 x (47)
where and are the reciprocals of the mean values of stress and strength, respectively.
Using Eqs. (46) and (47) in Eq. (45) yields

y x
R e e dx dy

0 y
(48)

For and Eq. (48) becomes 1/ y, 1/ x,
x
R (49)
x y
where x mean strength
y mean stress
Similarly, models for other stress and strength probability distributions can be developed. A
number of such models are presented in Ref. 13.
6.5 Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
FMEA is a vital tool for evaluating system design from the point of view of reliability. It
was developed in the early 1950s to evaluate the design of various ight control systems.
38
The difference between the FMEA and the failure mode, effect, and criticality analysis
(FMECA) is that FMEA is a qualitative technique used to evaluate a design, whereas
FMECA is composed of FMEA and criticality analysis (CA). Criticality analysis is a quan-
titative method used to rank critical failure mode effects by taking into account their occur-
rence probabilities.
As FMEA is a widely used method in industry, there are many standards/ documents
written about it. In Ref. 30 45 such publications were collected and evaluated, prepared by
organizations such as the DOD, NASA, and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engi-
neers (IEEE). These documents include
39
:
DOD: MIL-STD-785A (1969), MIL-STD-1629 (draft) (1980), MIL-STD-2070 (AS)
(1977), MIL-STD-1543 (1974), AMCP-706-196 (1976)
NASA: NHB 5300.4 (1A) (1970), ARAC Proj. 79-7 (1976)
IEEE: ANSI N 41.4 (1976)
Details of the above documents as well as a list of publications on FMEA are given in Ref.
24.
The main steps involved in performing FMEA are as follows
29
:
Dene carefully all system boundaries and detailed requirements.
List all parts/ subsystems in the system under consideration.
Identify and describe each part and list all its associated failure modes.
Assign failure rate/ probability to each failure mode.
List effects of each failure mode on subsystem/ system/ plant.
7 Human Error and Reliability Consideration in Mechanical Design 1017
Enter remarks for each failure mode.
Review each critical failure mode and take appropriate measures.
This method is described in detail in Ref. 14.
6.6 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
This method, so called because it arranges fault events in a tree-shaped diagram, is one of
the most widely used techniques for performing system reliability analysis. In particular, it
is probably the most widely used method in the nuclear power industry. The technique is
well suited for determining the combined effects of multiple failures.
The fault tree technique is more costly to use than the FMEA approach. It was developed
in the early 1960s at Bell Telephone Laboratories to evaluate the reliability of the Minuteman
Launch Control System. Since that time, hundreds of publications on the method have ap-
peared.
15
The FTA begins by identifying an undesirable event, called the top event, associated
with a system. Fault events that could cause the occurrence of the top event are generated
and connected by AND and OR logic gates. The construction of a fault tree proceeds by
generation of fault events (by asking the question How could this event occur?) in a
successive manner until the fault events need not be developed further. These events are
known as primary or elementary events. In simple terms, the fault tree may be described as
the logic structure relating the top event to the primary events. This method is described in
detail in Ref. 14.
7 HUMAN ERROR AND RELIABILITY CONSIDERATION
IN MECHANICAL DESIGN
As in the reliability of any other system, human reliability and error play an important role
in the reliability of mechanical systems. Over the years many times mechanical systems/
equipment have failed due to human error rather than hardware failure. Careful consideration
of human error and reliability during the design of mechanical systems can help to eliminate
or reduce the occurrence of non-hardware-related failures during the operation of such sys-
tems. Human errors may be classied under the following seven distinct categories
4042
:
Design errors
Operator errors
Assembly errors
Inspection errors
Maintenance errors
Installation errors
Handling errors
Each of these categories is described in detail in Ref. 14.
There are numerous causes for the occurrence of human error including poor equipment
design, complex tasks, poor work layout, poorly written operating and maintenance proce-
dures, poor job environment (e.g., poor lighting, high/ low temperature, crowded work space,
high noise level), inadequate work tools, poor skill of involved personnel, and poor moti-
vation of involved personnel.
4042
1018 Reliability in the Mechanical Design Process
Human reliability of time-continuous tasks such as aircraft maneuvering, scope moni-
toring, and missile countdown can be calculated by using the equation
42,43
t
R (t) exp (t) dt (50)
h

0
where R
h
(t) human reliability at time t
(t) time-dependent human error rate
For constant human error rate [i.e., (t) ], Eq. (50) becomes
t
t
R (t) exp dt e (51)
h

0
where is the constant human error rate. The subject of human reliability and error is
discussed in detail in Ref. 42.
Example. A person is performing a certain time-continuous task. Assume his or her error
rate is 0.004 per hour. Calculate the persons probability of performing the task correctly
during a 5-h period.
By using the values in Eq. (51), we get
(0.004)5
R (5) e 0.98
h
So, there is approximately a 98% chance that the person will perform the task correctly
during the specied period.
8 FAILURE RATE ESTIMATION MODELS FOR VARIOUS MECHANICAL ITEMS
Many mathematical models available in the literature can be used to estimate failure rates
of items such as bearings, pumps, brakes, lters, compressors, and seals.
4446
This section
presents some of these models.
8.1 Brake System Failure Rate Estimation Model
The brake system failure rate is expressed by
44
6
(52)

brs i
i1
where
brs
brake system failure rate, expressed in failures/ 10
6
h

1
brake housing failure rate

2
total failure rate of actuators

3
total failure rate of seals

4
total failure rate of bearings

5
total failure rate of springs

6
total failure rate of brake friction materials
The values of
i
for i 1, 2, ... , 6 are obtained through various means.
44,47
9 Failure Data and Failure Data Collection Sources 1019
8.2 Compressor System Failure Rate Estimation Model
The compressor system failure rate is expressed by
45
6
(53)

comp i
i1
where
comp
compressor system failure rate, expressed in failures/ 10
6
h

1
failure rate of all compressor bearings

2
compressor casing failure rate

3
failure rate due to design conguration

4
failure rate of valve assay (if any)

5
failure rate of all compressor seals

6
failure rate of all compressor shafts
Procedures for calculating
1
,
2
,
3
,
4
,
5
, and
6
are presented in Ref. 45.
8.3 Filter Failure Rate Estimation Model
The lter failure rate is expressed by
46
6
(54)

ft b i
i1
where
ft
lter failure rate, expressed in failures/ 10
6
h

b
lter base failure rate

i
ith modifying factor; i 1 is for temperature effects, i 2 for water contam-
ination effects, i 3 for cyclic ow effects, i 4 for differential pressure
effects, i 5 for cold-start effects, and i 6 for vibration effects
Procedures for estimating
b
,
1
,
2
,
3
,
4
,
5
, and
6
are given in Ref. 46.
8.4 Pump Failure Rate Estimation Model
The pump failure rate is expressed by
46
5
(55)

pm i
i1
where
pm
pump failure rate, expressed in failures/ 10
6
cycles

1
pump uid driver failure rate

2
pump casing failure rate

3
pump shaft failure rate

4
failure rate of all pump seals

5
failure rate of all pump bearings
Procedures for calculating
1
,
2
,
3
,
4
, and
5
are presented in Ref. 46.
9 FAILURE DATA AND FAILURE DATA COLLECTION SOURCES
Failure data provide invaluable information to reliability engineers, design engineers, man-
agement, and so on, concerning the product performance. These data are the nal proof of
1020 Reliability in the Mechanical Design Process
Table 2 Failure Rates for Selected Mechanical Items
Item Description Failure Rate 10
6
h
Roller bearing 8.323
Bellows (general) 13.317
Filter (liquid) 6.00
Compressor (general) 33.624
Pipe 0.2
Hair spring 1.0
Pump (vacuum) 10.610
Gear (spur) 3.152
Seal (O-ring) 0.2
Nut or bolt 0.02
Brake (electromechanical) 16.00
Knob (general) 2.081
Washer (lock) 0.586
Washer (at) 0.614
Duct (general) 2.902
Note: Use environment: ground xed or general.
Table 3 Selected Failure Data Sources for Mechanical Items
Source Developed By
Ref. 48 Reliability Analysis Center, Rome Air Development
Center, Grifs Air Force Base, Rome, New York
Component Reliability Data for Use in
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (1998)
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna,
Austria
R. G. Arno, Non-Electronic Parts Reliability
Data (Rept. No. NPRD-2, 1981)
Reliability Analysis Center, Rome Air Development
Center, Grifs Air Force Base, Rome, New York
Government Industry Data Exchange
Program (GIDEP)
GIDEP Operations Center, U.S. Dept. of Navy,
Seal Beach, Corona, California.
Ref. 49 Reliability Analysis Center, Rome Air Development
Center, Grifs Air Force Base, Rome, New York
the success or failure of the effort expended during the design and manufacture of a product
used under designed conditions. During the design phase of a product, past information
concerning its failures plays a critical role in the reliability analysis of that product. Failure
data can be used to estimate item failure rate, perform effective design reviews, predict
reliability and maintainability of redundant systems, conduct trade-off and life-cycle cost
studies, and perform preventive maintenance and replacement studies. Table 2 presents failure
rates for selected mechanical items.
13,48,49
There are many different ways to collect failure data. For example, during the equipment
life cycle, there are eight identiable data sources: repair facility reports, development testing
of the item, previous experience with similar or identical items, customers failure-reporting
systems, inspection records generated by quality control and manufacturing groups, tests
conducted during eld demonstration, environmental qualication approval, and eld instal-
lation, acceptance testing, and warranty claims.
50
Table 3 presents some sources for collecting
failure data for use during the design phase.
13
References 1021
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1022 Reliability in the Mechanical Design Process
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