Selanova v Mendoza (1975)

Selanova v Mendoza
May 19,1975
Administrative Complaint in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law.
Facts:
Saturino Selanova charged Judge Alejandro Mendoza with gross ignorance of the l
aw for preparing and ratifying a document (November 21, 1972) extrajudicially l
iquidating the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his wife, Avelina Cen
iza.
The conditions of the liquidation were
1. Either spouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which
each had filed against the other and
2. Waiver of the right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity e
ither one would commit against the other
In his judgment, respondent relied on Par. 4, Art 191 of the old Civil Code that
states:
the husband and wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership d
uring the marriage, subject to judicial approval.
While the judge claimed that he asked the CFI of Negros (where the couple reside
d) for judicial approval, the Judicial Consultant confirmed that there was no af
firmation from the same court. He still ratified the document.
Issue:
WON the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial a
pproval is void.
Held:
Yes, it is void.
Precedents (Quintana vs. Lerma, De Luna vs. Linatoc, De La Rosa vs. Barruga)
Under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, the following shall be void:
1. Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
2. Every extrajudicial agreement during marriage, for the dissolution of the con
jugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community property between husband
and wife.
Moreover, while adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they are crimes pun
ishable by the RPC, and a contract legalizing their commission is contrary to law
, morals and public order, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable.
Decision:
Respondent severely censured.
Dicta:
A. Respondent Judge claimed that prohibition of the extrajudicial liquidation of
the conjugal partnership during the marriage made article 191 of the Civil Code
nugatory. He cited Lacson vs. San Jose-Lacson case to show that subsequent appr
oval of the court can render the marriage dissolved.
The SC argued that the judicial sanction should be secured before the separation
.
B. Disciplinary action had been taken against notaries who authenticated agreem
ents for the personal separation of spouses wherein either spouse was permitted
to commit acts of infidelity.
For instance, in Panganiban vs. Borromeo, the notary was rebuked for authorizing
a document that permitted both spouses to take in concubines without opposition
from either spouse.
In Biton vs. Momongon, a document entitled Legal Separation was executed by a not
ary. The husband and wife were separated mutually and voluntarily, renouncing th
eir rights and obligations in the process, and given the authorization to remarr
y while not being witnesses against one another. The lawyer was also rebuked.
In In re Santiago, a lawyer/ respondent prepared a document that gave a married
couple the authorization to marry again while giving them assurance of renouncem
ent of rights one would have against the other. He was suspended from practice.
C. The judge was truly unaware of the legal prohibition in contracts for the per
sonal separation of spouses.
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Selanova v Mendoza 64 SCRA 69
Facts:
Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with gross ignorance of the law for preparing and
ratifying a document extra judicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of t
he complainant and his wife. One condition of the liquidation was that either sp
ouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had fil
ed against the other and that they waived their right to prosecute each other fo
r whatever acts of infidelity either one would commit against the other. Respond
ent relied on Art 191 of the old Civil Code that states the husband and wife may
agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, sub
ject to judicial approval. The judge ratified the document without judicial appr
oval from CFI Negros where the couple was residing, making it void assuming argu
endo that Art. 191 is still in effect.
Issue:
WON the agreement separating the conjugal property and the spouses is void.
Held:
It is void. Under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, the following shall be void:
Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
Every extrajudicial agreement during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjug
al partnership of gains or of the absolute community property between husband an
d wife.
While adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they are crimes punishable by
the RPC, and a contract legalizing their commission is contrary to law, morals
and public order, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable
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