ACC Opp To Mot To Remove Confidentiality

866332
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
Charlotte Division

)
In Re: ) Chapter 11
)
GARLOCK SEALING TECHNOLOGIES ) Case No. 10-31607
LLC, et al. )
)
Debtors.
1
)
) J ointly Administered

OPPOSITION OF THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF ASBESTOS PERSONAL
INJURY CLAIMANTS TO MOTION OF DEBTORS TO REMOVE
CONFIDENTIALITY DESIGNATIONS FROM CERTAIN EVIDENCE FOR

PURPOSES OF TRIAL
The Official Committee of Asbestos Personal Injury Claimants (the Committee),
hereby responds to the Debtors Motion to Remove Confidentiality Designations from Certain
Evidence for Purposes of Trial (the Motion) filed by Garlock on J uly 3, 2013 [Dkt. No. 2979].
1. Garlocks Motion is a transparent attempt to use information that was provided in
discovery under stringent protections and solely for use in this lawsuit (the
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Confidential
Discovery Materials) in other fora and for other purposes. This attempt is contrary to the
controlling protective order entered by this Court, by the terms of which Garlock specifically
agreed to be bound, and upon which terms the nonparty law firms relied when providing
Garlocks requested discovery (the Stipulated Protective Order).
2

1
The Debtors in these jointly administered cases are Garlock Sealing Technologies LLC
(Garlock) Garrison Litigation Management Group, Ltd., and The Anchor Packing Company.

2
Stipulated Protective Order, dated Mar. 22, 2011 [Dkt. No. 1225].
Case 10-31607 Doc 3046 Filed 07/17/13 Entered 07/17/13 20:58:24 Desc Main
Document Page 1 of 16
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2. Moreover, the law is clear that, having stipulated to a protective order providing
for confidentiality, Garlock is not entitled to make public access arguments to eliminate such
confidentiality. Yet those are the only arguments that Garlock makes.
3. The Motion must be denied.
4. On March 22, 2011, the parties submitted the Stipulated Protective Order to the
Court. The Debtors, the FCR, and the Committee were all signatories. The Court entered it as
an order that same day.
BACKGROUND
5. In November of 2012, Garlock issued subpoenas for documents and deposition
testimony with respect to the so-called Designated Plaintiffs and also more broadly to
various asbestos plaintiffs law firms who had been active litigants against Garlock in the tort
system prepetition. Ostensibly, that discovery was undertaken only for the purposes of the
estimation proceeding. While the Committee did not oppose the depositions, it moved for
protection against the Subpoenas Duces Tecum, noting, inter alia, that Garlocks search for
poster children is thus fundamentally irrelevant and can serve no proper purpose in aggregate
estimation, and that [b]ecause the Subpoenas Duces Tecum are so plainly out of place for
aggregate estimation, they suggest ulterior purposes.
3
The Court allowed the subpoenas in part,
while narrowing their scope.
4

3
Motion of the Official Committee of Asbestos Personal Injury Claimants for a Protective
Order with Respect to Document Demands Included in Garlocks Subpoenas Duces Tecum to
Five Law Firms at 7, 8, dated Nov. 16, 2012 [Dkt. No. 2623].

4
Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part Motion by Official Committee of Asbestos
Personal Injury Claimants for Protective Order with Respect to Document Demands Included in
Garlocks Subpoenas Duces Tecum to Five Law Firms, Certain Firms J oinders in Committees
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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6. On December 20, 2012, the same signatories filed an Amendment to Stipulated
Protective Order [Dkt. No. 2704] (the Amendment); this Amendment makes clear that the
protections of the Stipulated Protective Order for confidential information extend to discovery
materials produced by non-parties and designated as confidential by those non-parties. Id.
7. On March 1, 2013, Garlock sent various asbestos plaintiffs law firms a three-
page letter challenging the confidentiality designations of 11 depositions of plaintiffs tort
counsel, as well as challenging the confidentiality designations of plaintiffs documents
produced by Belluck & Fox; The David Law Firm; Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett, PC;
Early, Lucarelli, Sweeney & Strauss; Shein Law Center, Ltd.; Williams Kherkher; and Waters
Kraus & Paul by Plaintiffs. Letter from Garland Cassada, Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A.,
to Trevor W. Swett et al. at 2 (March 1, 2013) (Garlock March 1 letter). That letter did not
purport to identify any particular documents or testimony.
8. After the parties engaged in discussions as to the confidentiality designations,
Garlock filed the Motion, seeking the same broad-brush removal of confidentiality initially set
forth in its March 1 letter.
9. Garlock requests in the Motion the blanket removal of the confidential
designations made as to the depositions it took of opposing counsel relating to how those counsel
prepare and present asbestos personal injury claims against Garlock and others. This is
information that Garlock would never be entitled to under ordinary circumstances, and which the
asbestos plaintiffs lawyers only provided pursuant to, and in reliance on, the provisions of the
ARGUMENT

(Footnote continued from previous page.)
Motion, and Motion to Quash and for Protective Order of Troy D. Chandler and Williams
Kherkher Hart Boundas L.L.P., dated Dec. 12, 2012 [Dkt. No. 2686].
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Stipulated Protective Order. Garlock likewise seeks to remove the confidentiality of a large
group of documents, including Rule 2019 Exhibits, Trust claim forms and documents relating to
the law firms clients asbestos exposure, all of which fall within the scope of Confidential
Information as defined in the Stipulated Protective Order as information regarding individual
asbestos claimants. Garlocks Motion cannot be justified under the terms of the Stipulated
Protective Order, and indeed, the Motion studiously ignores the standard for Confidential
Information set forth therein. Controlling law demonstrates that the Motion must be rejected.
I.
10. The Stipulated Protective Order binds all parties to this proceeding, including
Debtors, who are signatories to it. It provides that [t]his Stipulated Protective Order is the
jointly-drafted product of arms-length negotiations among the Parties with the benefit of advice
of counsel, Stipulated Protective Order 17, and also provides that [t]he Debtors, FCR,
Committee and Counsel of Record shall seek to have this Stipulated Protective Order entered as
an order of the Court, but agree to be bound by this Stipulated Protective Order whether or not
the Court so orders. Stipulated Protective Order 26.
THE STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER CONTROLS HERE
A. The Sole Purpose and Intended Effect of Garlocks Motion is to Enable
Garlock to Use the Confidential Discovery Materials in Other Contexts and
to Publicize Them
11. Garlock already has the Confidential Discovery Materials, and nowhere in the
Motion does Garlock argue, nor could it, that the confidential designations of those materials
preclude Garlock from using the Confidential Discovery Materials at the estimation hearing.
Indeed, the Stipulated Protective Order expressly provides for the potential use of such
confidential materials there, subject to the terms of a pretrial order or other rulings to be made by
this Court. Stipulated Protective Order 6(b).
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12. As Garlock already has the Confidential Discovery Materials and will be able to
use them at the estimation if this Court so permits, its argument with respect to confidentiality at
the trial of estimation boils down to the proposition that other entities not involved therein
should be given access to such documents. But Garlock provides no legal basis on which to
assert the alleged rights of such hypothetical third parties or for exempting Garlock from the
normal rule that a litigant may not assert the rights of others.
13. Garlock is also disingenuous in arguing that Debtors do not intend to publicize
this evidence before it is introduced at trial, but wish to ensure that when they do present the
evidence, it will be publicly available. Motion 16 (emphasis added). Indeed, Garlock seeks to
strip the confidential status preemptively of materials that it only might offer in evidence and
might succeed in getting admitted into evidence over objection.
14. In fact, the Stipulated Protective Order makes clear that the confidentiality
protections attached to Confidential Discovery Materials, like any other materials designated
confidential, may not be removed until (a) this Court decides that they should be removed, and
(b) any such decision by this Court is affirmed on any appeal. Stipulated Protective Order 5
(disputed discovery material shall be treated as Confidential Information even after having its
confidential treatment challenged pending the Courts decision and any appeal therefrom). As
Garlock chose to file its Motion on the eve of trial, even if this Court were to grant it the full
relief requested (a ruling that would be wrong, for reasons explained herein), there would be no
realistic prospect that the confidentiality protections would become inoperative in time for the
Confidential Discovery Materials to be used publicly at the estimation trial. This makes even
more clear that what is really at stake with respect to the Motion is whether Garlock will
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potentially be able to use the Confidential Discovery Materials for purposes other than the
estimation hearing.
15. Indeed, Garlock expressly argues that it seeks to have Congress, the public, state
legislatures, state and federal courts, other defendants, and other interested parties get the full
story on these issues of major public concern. Motion 15. But such out-of-court use of the
Confidential Discovery Materials flies in the face of the Stipulated Protective Orders clear
directive that [a]ny Receiving Party shall use Confidential Information solely in fulfillment of its
respective rights, duties, and obligations in the Chapter 11 Cases subject to the terms of this
Stipulated Protective Order. Stipulated Protective Order 6(a) (emphasis added). Garlocks
attempt to remove confidentiality protections for the purpose of transmitting currently
confidential information to other entities is blatantly inconsistent with this explicit use restriction
set forth in the Stipulated Protective Order itself, to which Garlock expressly agreed. And it is
black-letter law that, had Garlock informed this Court prior to seeking the Confidential
Discovery Materials that it sought such discovery materials for use outside of the estimation
proceeding, this Court would have been obliged to deny discovery of such materials. See, e.g.,
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 352 n.17 (1978) ([W]hen the purpose of a
discovery request is to gather information for use in proceedings other than the pending suit,
discovery properly is denied. Likewise, discovery should be denied when a partys aim is to
delay bringing a case to trial, or embarrass or harass the person from whom he seeks discovery.)
(citations omitted); Insulate Am. v. Masco Corp., 227 F.R.D. 427, 434 (W.D.N.C. 2005)
([W]hen the purpose of a discovery request is to gather information for use in proceedings other
than the pending suit, discovery properly is denied.) (citation omitted).
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16. Garlocks position is also hypocritical: with respect to the thousands of pages of
information Garlock itself, or its affiliates, have designated as confidential, Garlock and its
controlling parent apparently will continue to protect such designations irrespective of its
purported interest in having an open trial. Motion 15.
B. Garlocks Public Access Arguments Are Contrary to the Governing Law
17. Garlock cites Section 107 of the Bankruptcy Code and cases regarding public
access rights to certain documents as legal support for the Motion. Motion at 8-10. But, as the
Motion itself sets forth, Section 107s express language is limited to a paper filed in a case
under this title and the dockets of a bankruptcy court. Motion 20, citing 11 U.S.C. 107(a). By
the clear terms of Section 107 of the Bankruptcy Code therefore, such public access rights
have no application to discovery materials such as depositions and document productions, which
are the subject of Garlocks Motion. Neither a document produced in discovery nor a deposition
transcript is a paper filed. Numerous cases make this same point. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp.
Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 2005 WL 3504860, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2005)
(finding that any documents underlying the Examiners report, if not filed, are not part of the
court record and are not subject to public access); In re Handy Andy Home Improvement Ctrs.,
Inc., 199 B.R. 376, 381 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding Section 107 inapplicable to discovery
materials because it only applies to filed documents and that absent a court order, discovery
materials may not be filed in the district); In re Apex Oil Co., 101 B.R. 92, 98 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1989) (This Court determines that the Underlying Documents are not subject to 107(a)
because they have not been, and will not be, filed. The plain language of 107 establishes
standards only for those documents which are filed with the court. To the extent the Underlying
Documents are not filed, they are not subject to the 107(a) requirements.). Garlock does not
cite any case to the contrary.
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18. Nor does Garlocks alleged intent to use some of the depositions and documents
at the estimation entitle Garlock to remove the confidentiality designations of the Confidential
Discovery Materials. Controlling case law in this Circuit makes clear that a party may not solicit
the production of sensitive information through means of an agreed protective order, and then
later use Constitutional, statutory or common law arguments regarding public access to
undercut the protections to which it previously agreed. The case of Pittston Co. v. United States,
2002 WL 32158052 (E.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2002), affd, 368 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2004), is directly on
point. In that case, the party receiving documents designated as confidential by the disclosing
non-party utilized such documents in a summary judgment brief, and then argued that pursuant
to the presumption of access set forth in public access cases, such documents were not worthy
of continued protection and should have such protection removed. Id. at *1. Accordingly, the
receiving party filed a motion to remove protection from certain such documents. Id.
19. The district court first held that the fact that the requesting party had agreed to a
protective order to get the documents in the first place removed the otherwise applicable
presumption of public access. A party to the protective order cannot later make a public access
claim which it bargained away in order to expeditiously receive the documents in the first place.
Id. at *2. The district court also noted that a contrary ruling would require a document-by-
document review and complete litigation of the confidentiality issue for every document the
receiving party sought to strip of protection. Id. at *3. This, in turn, would defeat the purposes
of Rule 26(c) protective orders to facilitate discovery and expedite resolution of the issues.
Id. The district court concluded by noting that the receiving partys public access argument is
inappropriate coming from a party who agreed to the Protective Order and benefitted from it.
Id. The district court denied the Motion, and maintained the protection of the documents. Id.
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20. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district courts decision. Pittston Co.
v. United States, 368 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2004). The Fourth Circuit specifically distinguished the
case from the case of Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988) (a
case on which Garlock specifically relies in the Motion), because, in Pittston, the party seeking
to remove confidentiality from the documents had access to the documents covered by the
protective order. Pittston, 368 F.3d at 406. The Court also reiterated the district courts point
that the movant had previously agreed to the sealing of documents pursuant to the protective
order in order to benefit from a more open discovery from [the producing entity], which was not
a party to the litigation. Id. Both points apply fully to the present Motion, and reveal that it
must be denied.
21. A similar result was reached in the case of Longman v. Food Lion, Inc., 186
F.R.D. 331 (M.D.N.C. 1999). There, a party who had previously agreed to the terms of a
protective order and received confidential documents under it, did not initially challenge the fact
that the other party had designated many documents and categories of documents as
confidential. Later, the receiving party sought to remove such confidentiality from those
documents wholesale to avoid having to submit the record on appeal under seal and so that it
could provide the information to the public at large. Id. at 332-34.
22. The district court rejected the receiving partys blanket request to remove
confidentiality, noting that granting a protective order during pretrial discovery necessarily
required that the court had found that good cause existed for its issuance. Id. at 333. The court
held that the receiving party could not meet its burden of showing that the protective order
should be modified so as to remove such confidentiality where the receiving party agreed to the
terms of the protective order, did not challenge the confidentiality designations during
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discovery, and where the producing party relied on this protection in producing documents.
Id. The district court specifically rejected the argument that the receiving partys desire to
provide such information to the public constituted good cause to, in effect, modify the
protective order by a broadbrush removal of such confidentiality designations. Id. at 333-34.
23. The district court also rejected the receiving partys argument that at least the
materials submitted as part of the summary judgment proceeding should have protection
removed from them based on the common law presumption of access to judicial records and the
First Amendment right of access. Id. at 334. The court held that because the receiving party
agreed to the Confidentiality order, the Court will not entertain their First Amendment and
public access arguments. Id. See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529
F. Supp. 866, 894 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (a party who voluntarily enters into a protective order
effectively waive[s] their right to seek wholesale declassification).
24. By contrast, the majority of the cases relied upon by Garlock do not involve
stipulated protective orders, or any agreement between the parties. And, those cases relied upon
by Garlock that do contain an agreement between the parties also involve third-party requests for
the protected material, not just a request by one of the parties to the agreement. Garlocks cases
are thus inapposite. See, e.g., Va. Dept of State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 577, n.6
(4th Cir. 2004) (noting that although the partys argument for public access in the instant appeal
is similar to the one we rejected in Pittson, the cases are distinguishable because here (unlike
Pittson) we have the intervention by the Media Appellees).
C. Garlocks Motion Violates the Requirements of the Stipulated Protective
Order
25. The very first sentence of the Motion makes clear that it is theoretically premised
on Section 5 of the Stipulated Protective Order: Debtors bring this motion under section 5 of the
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Stipulated Protective Order (Docket No. 1225) to remove confidentiality designations from
certain evidence that law firms have designated as confidential under that order. Motion at 1.
26. But Garlock violates the requirements of that Section. Section 5 of the Stipulated
Protective Order requires that, if a party receiving materials designated as confidential disputes
that designation, the Receiving Party shall give prompt written notice of the dispute to the
Producing Party. Garlocks Motion is noticeably absent of any assertion that it did so. In fact,
the Confidential Discovery Materials were largely provided to Garlock in December 2012 and
J anuary 2013, but Garlocks first notice regarding a challenge to such confidential designations
was in March of 2013. A delay of several months to challenge confidentiality is not prompt.
27. Moreover, Section 5 of the Stipulated Protective Order also requires that an
impasse be reached and declared before a Receiving Party can challenge confidential
designations in this Court. Yet the Motion itself sets forth that Garlocks conferences with the
law firms have not yet resolved the disputes, and that Garlock will continue to meet and
confer with counsel for the law firms. Motion 9.
28. In other words, the Motion was filed before an impasse had been reached and
declared (in fact, Garlock declared an impasse in an email to counsel for the ACC and the law
firms on J uly 16 after a telephonic meet-and-confer the same day, nearly two weeks after it filed
the Motion). This is another example of how the Motion fails to meet the requirements of the
Stipulated Protective Order.
29. These violations of Section 5 of the Stipulated Protective Order by Garlock are
full and independent reasons why the Motion should be denied.

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II.
30. The Motion, although it purports to argue that the Confidential Discovery
Materials should have their status as Confidential Information under the Stipulated Protective
Order stripped away, does not set out the definition of Confidential Information from that Order.
That language is as follows:
THE CONFIDENTIAL DISCOVERY MATERIALS WERE APPROPRIATELY
DESIGNATED AS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION UNDER THE
STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER
Confidential Information means Discovery Material that (i) is produced or
provided by the Producing Party or its representatives or has previously been
produced or provided by a Producing Party or its representatives pursuant to an
Existing Confidentiality Agreement; (ii) is believed in good faith by the
Producing Party to contain information that has not been made public and which
the Producing Party would not make public in the ordinary course of its activities,
including, without limitation, proprietary or sensitive information concerning the
Debtors assets, liabilities, business operations, projections, analyses,
compilations, studies, terms of employment, employee compensation levels,
asbestos claims data, the Database, information regarding individual asbestos
claimants, including medical information, health information, and social security
numbers; and (iii) is designated as Confidential Information pursuant to the
procedures set forth in Section 4 hereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the term
Confidential Information shall not include any information or Discovery
Material, or portion thereof, that (1) is or becomes generally available to the
public or is or becomes available to any Party on a non-confidential basis, in each
case to the extent such information or Discovery Material became so available
other than by a violation of a contractual, legal, or fiduciary obligation, including
without limitation this Stipulated Protective Order; or (2) was in the possession of
the Receiving Party prior to its disclosure by the Producing Party and is not
subject to any other duty or obligation to maintain confidentiality.
Stipulated Protective Order 1(g).
31. Confidential Information is thus defined by the Stipulated Protective Order as
information that is believed in good faith by the Producing Party to contain information that has
not been made public and which the Producing Party would not make public in the ordinary
course of its activities. Stipulated Protective Order 1(g). This expressly includes, without
limitation, information regarding individual asbestos claimants. Id.
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32. Garlocks Motion makes clear that the Confidential Discovery Materials it would
remove confidentiality from fall within this definition. Specifically, Garlock seeks to remove
confidentiality from:
a. Documents produced by law firms pursuant to subpoena relating to seventeen
Designated Plaintiffs, consisting of documents pertaining to the plaintiffs
asbestos exposures produced during tort cases and Trust claims, ballots, and Rule
2019 statements filed for these plaintiffs;
b. Testimony from six law firms provided under subpoena about the exposures
identified to Garlock during the tort case; Trust claims, ballots, and 2019
statements filed for these plaintiffs; exposures underlying those Trust claims,
ballots, and 2019 statements; and law firms practices with respect to exposure
evidence, Trust claims, ballots, and 2019 statements;
c. The report of Professor Lester Brickman, which Debtors have designated
confidential solely because it references in part the above evidence that has been
designated confidential.
Motion 2. The Confidential Discovery Materials are revealed by Garlocks own description
above to be information regarding individual asbestos claimants. Stipulated Protective Order
1(g). Nor would such information be made available by the producing law firms in the
ordinary course of their activities. The same analysis applies to the depositions, which Garlock
acknowledges address those same topics and include law firms practices with respect to
exposure evidence, Trust claims, ballots and 2019 Statements. Motion 2. For example,
questions that were asked and answered at the depositions include such matters as the
circumstances of certain asbestos plaintiffs cases, plaintiffs particular exposures and how the
law firms identified and analyzed products to which their clients were exposed, the process by
which the law firms were retained by their clients, their referral sources, the extent of their pre-
filing investigations, how the law firms responded to discovery, the questions they asked their
clients in so responding, and how the law firms approached settlement negotiations. This
questioning and the answers given were also frequently tied to particular asbestos cases and
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plaintiffs. The law firms practices with respect to how they investigate and try cases and make
claims, and the other topics addressed, are not the sort of information that a firm would plausibly
make public in the ordinary course of its activities, and certainly not to its tort litigation
adversaries such as Garlock. Thus, they are Confidential Information under the Stipulated
Protective Order. Stipulated Protective Order 1(g).
33. Indeed, the rhetoric Garlock uses in the Motion reveals that Garlock itself does
not believe that the Confidential Discovery Materials are the kind of information that the
producing law firms have made public or make public in the ordinary course of their activities: it
alleges, for example, that various other non-parties need to get access to the Confidential
Disclosure Materials to get the full story. Motion 15. Inherent in Garlocks Motion to
destroy the confidentiality of the Confidential Disclosure Materials is that such documents are
not available publicly; otherwise, there would have been no need for Garlock to seek in
discovery, and to now utilize at the estimation hearing, the Confidential Discovery Materials in
the first place.
34. The casualness with which Garlock approaches the confidential nature of the
Confidential Discovery Materials is best illustrated by its attempt to have this Court make a
blanket ruling that, among other items, confidentiality should be stripped from the Rule 2019
Statements (by which Garlock means the non-public Rule 2019 Exhibits that are associated with
publicly-filed Rule 2019 statements, yet typically kept off the public docket by order of the
presiding court, as indeed they were in Garlocks own Chapter 11 case). In response to
Garlocks attempt to get 2019 Exhibits from a variety of bankruptcy courts, J udge Stark, United
States District Court J udge for the District of Delaware, recently ruled that they would be
provided, but that [t]his Order authorizes Garlock to use such 2019 Exhibits solely in
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connection with the estimation proceedings in Garlocks chapter 11 bankruptcy cases pending in
the North Carolina Bankruptcy Court, and neither the 2019 Exhibits nor the information
contained therein may be used for any other purpose. Order Implementing Opinion and Order
Reversing Bankruptcy Court Orders and Granting Garlock Sealing Technologies LLC Access to
2019 Exhibits 2, In re Motions for Access of Garlock Sealing Technologies LLC, No. 11-1130
(D. Del. Mar. 14, 2013) (emphasis added). J udge Stark also ruled that Garlock shall not
disclose publicly the information contained in any 2019 Exhibit except in an aggregate format
that does not identify any individual represented person. Id. 3. This Court likewise ordered
that such 2019 Exhibits shall be confidential and treated as such without need of any special
designation, that they not be used for any purpose other than the Estimation Proceeding, and
that any hearing, deposition or other proceeding is closed and limited to attendance by persons
who are subject to the terms of this Order. Order Governing Use and Confidentiality of Certain
Exhibits to Rule 2019 Statements from Other Bankruptcy Cases 9, 13, 17, dated Mar. 28,
2013 [Dkt. No. 2807].
35. Such materials deserve the same solicitude and protection from this Court now as
they were given by J udge Stark and this Court previously, and Garlocks attempt to strip away
the confidentiality protections from them, so that they can be publicly disclosed and used in
other contexts as Garlock proclaims, should be rejected.

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Garlocks Motion should be denied.
CONCLUSION
Dated: J uly 17, 2013 Respectfully submitted,

CAPLIN & DRYSDALE, CHARTERED

By:
Trevor W. Swett III
/s/ Trevor W. Swett III
(tswett@capdale.com)
Kevin C. Maclay
(kmaclay@capdale.com)
One Thomas Circle, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
Telephone: (202) 862-5000

Elihu Inselbuch
(einselbuch@capdale.com)
CAPLIN & DRYSDALE, CHARTERED
600 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Telephone: (212) 319-6001

MOON WRIGHT & HOUSTON, PLLC

Travis W. Moon
(tmoon@mwhattorneys.com)
227 West Trade Street, Suite 1800
Charlotte, NC 28202
Telephone: (704) 944-6560

Attorneys for the Official Committee of Asbestos
Personal Injury Claimants


ACC Opp To Mot To Remove Confidentiality

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