Per gamon

Microelectron. Reliab., Vol. 35, Nos 9-10, pp. 1285-1307, 1995

Copyright 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd
Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved
0026-2714/95 $9.50+.00
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS IN WI ND TURBINE ENGINEERING
A.J. Seebregts 1, L.W.M.M. Rademakers 1, and B.A. van den Horn 1
Abstract
Wind turbines are being designed in accordance wi th deterministic design
rules. As wind turbines increase in size and power, these rules may not
be adequate to ascertain a safe and well balanced design. Wind turbine
industry can take advantage of the safety and reliability practices in e.g.
aerospace, nuclear and offshore industry. These practices include System
Reliability (such as FMECA, Event Sequence Analysis and Fault Tree
Analysis) and Structural Reliability methods. The approach to introduce
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) which incorporates these reliability
methods into wind turbine engineering will be described. By means of
t wo recent case studies, the applicability, benefits, and limitations of
these methods will be illustrated.
1 .Introduction
Wind turbines are being designed in accordance wi th deterministic design
rules, e.g. [Van Hulle, 1991, IEC, 1992, Stare et al., 1991, RISO, 1992,
Germanisher Lloyd, 1993]. These rules concern the design of main
components e.g. blades, hub, and tower, and the design of safety
systems. As wind turbines increase in size and power, these rules may
not be adequate to ascertain a safe and well balanced design. They
neither facilitate the quantification of the degree of conservatism in the
applied safety margins nor explicitly address the reliability and safety of
the wind turbine. While in the past, small wind turbines could be
developed wi th trial and error, this approach seems not adequate for the
development of large wind turbines. A failure of a large wind turbine may
have severe consequences. The approach of trial and error is also not
adequate for mass produced wind turbines. Numerous design
modifications realized after installation appear to be very expensive for
Netherlands Energy Research Foundation ECN, P.O. Box 1, NL-
1755 ZG Petten, The Netherlands
1285
1286 A.J. Seebregts et at .
manufacturers. For the devel opment of large or mass produced wi nd
turbines, analytical and systemati c tool s to i mprove safety and rel i abi l i ty
become more and more i mportant. Even wi t h the additional costs of a
PSA, it is expected t hat the cost benefi t ratio of such an anal yti cal and
syst emat i cal approach is better than the tradi ti onal trial and error
approach.
Furthermore, the local and national authori ti es ask more and more f or an
eval uati on of the safety and risks of industrial acti vi ti es. In the
Netherl ands for instance, thi s evaluation should include a quanti tati ve
j udgement of safety and risk. Criteria for safety and risks are defined in
[VROM, 1990] . For the siting of new wi nd turbine parks, the safety and
risk should be evaluated also, as part of a so called ' Envi ronmental Impact
Report' [MER Commi ssi on, 1993] . Moreover, on a compet i t i ve market,
uti l i ti es wi l l easier choose wi nd turbine designs for whi ch a saf et y and
risk anal ysi s has been performed, as an advantage compared to those for
whi ch no such analyses have been performed.
Thus, the appl i cati on of PSA seems inevitable to assess the risk of wi nd
turbi nes or wi nd turbi ne parks. In the past, several rel i abi l i ty analyses
have been performed for wi nd turbines wi t h a l i mi ted scope. Appl i ed
methods were FMEA [USDOE, 1979, Bollmeier, 1981] , Fault Trees
[Petersen et al., 1990] , and envi ronmental risk assessment (conditional
upon blade failure) [Montgomeri e, 1982, Turner, 1986] . The PSA
met hodol ogy outlined here integrates these and other methods to enable
a more compl ete assessment of a wi nd turbine design.
2. Development phases for introduction of psa
To i ntroduce the PSA methods i nto wi nd turbi ne engineering,
f ol l owi ng devel opment phases have been or are to be carried out:
the
R eliability analysis 1287
Phase 1 : Development of Methodology
The feasibility of reliability based methods in wi nd turbine engineering has
recently been demonstrated in the proj ect ' PSA of Wind Turbines'
[Rademakers et al., 1992, 1993], carried out under a j oi nt contract of
NOVEM (Netherlands Agency for Energy and Environment) and the CEC
DG-XII (Commission of the European Communities DG XII for Science,
Research, and Development), see section 3.1.
Phase 2: Verification of Methodology
ECN is presently performing a proj ect called 'Reliability Analysis and
Design Review of the NEWECS-45'. The NEWECS-45 wi nd turbine is the
only 1 MW machine installed in the Netherlands. It is equipped wi t h t wo
l i ghtwei ght glass fibre reinforced plastic rotor blades, an integrated drive
train and a soft t ower design. Furthermore, the machine has some unique
control features, namely fast blade pitch adj ustment and variable rotor
speed. The machine is in operation since 1985. During the fi rst period of
operation, a measurement program has been performed, so the syst em
performance and characteristics are known. Furthermore, operating
experience is documented in log books and failure registration f orms over
the full period. The availability, and thus the actual energy production,
appears to stay far behind the preliminary estimates, due to technical
troubles. One obj ective of the study is to increase the availability, to
assess the reliability of important components, and to reduce the
maintenance costs. The other obj ective is to refine and improve the
methodology for PSA of wind turbines. This proj ect wi l l be finished in
1994.
Phase 3: Technology Transfer
The groups that can benefit from the PSA methods are designers and
manufactures of wi nd turbines, utilities, and certifying bodies. In wi nd
turbine industry, the knowledge about these methods is now mostl y
1288 A. J. Seebregts et al.
present at research i nsti tutes. The best way to transfer knowl edge is by
means of case studies tailored to the specific interests and needs of the
di f f erent groups. In the Netherlands, case studies are planned on the
short term. ECN has recentl y performed an analysis of an Ameri can wi nd
turbi ne, the AOC 15/ 50 [Carter et el., 1993] , see section 3.2.
Phase 4: Development of Guidelines, Standards, and Criteria
ECN wi l l t ake i ni ti ati ves to introduce the PSA methods in the national and
i nternati onal wi nd turbi ne standards. These methods should be used t o
f urt her underpin the currentl y used safety factors, to detail the
requi rements f or wi nd turbine safety, and the design of safety systems.
The devel opment of guidelines, standards, and criteria wi l l be done in
close cooperati on wi t h other international research i nsti tutes and
manufacturers.
3. Methodol ogy and examples
3.1 LW 15/ 75 Case Study
The met hodol ogy has been applied on a mass produced, medi um size
wi nd turbi ne, the LAGERWEY LW 15/ 75 design [Rademakers et el.,
1993] , see Fig. 1. It describes how to assess the safety, rel i abi l i ty, and
avai l abi l i ty in a more integrated and quanti tati ve way, very much
structured anal ogousl y to PSAs for Nuclear Power Plants [IAEA, 1992] .
The case st udy has focused on safety and avai l abi l i ty mai nl y. The ext ent
to whi ch the methodol ogy can be i mpl emented in the current design
practi ces on the short term and the areas t hat require further research
have also been indicated. The subsequent tasks and are bri efl y discussed
bel ow.
Task 1: Description of System Design and Operation
Before starti ng a detailed analysis of a wi nd turbine, i t is necessary f or
the rel i abi l i ty analyst(s) to become fami l i ar wi t h the specific wi nd turbine.
R el i abi l i t y a na l ys i s 1289
, 101 I t l
[. Rotor
2. Blades
3. Gcazbox
4. Generator
5. Yaw ruolor
6. Wind vane
7. Nacelle
8. Step
9. Tower
tO. Worm geart ~x of yaw drive
Figure 1- Main components of the LW 15/75
This should result in a detailed description of the system design and
operation, including maintenance, test and inspection procedures, and
design modifications. State Diagrams and Event Trees have been used to
explain the control and safety actions.
The Lagerwey LW 15/75 wind turbine is equipped wi t h an upwind, t wo
bladed rotor that has a diameter of 15.6 m. The rated electrical power of
75 kW is produced wi th an asynchronous generator at wind speeds
between 3 and 30 m/s. The power control is realized by pitch control of
the blades towards feather position in combination wi t h a variable rotor
speed. This power control method requires a fairly complex electrical
1290 A. J. Seebregts e t al .
system, whi ch is tuned wi t h the passive blade pitch control mechanism.
It is recommended by the manufacturer to shut-down the turbine
manually at wi nd speeds over 30 m/s by yawi ng the nacelle such t hat the
rotor is at 150 degrees towards the wi nd direction. The nacelle is placed
on a steel t ower of a length that can be either 24, 30 or 36 meter. In
order to ensure safe operation the wi nd turbine is equipped wi t h t wo
independent and diverse safety systems, viz. a passive blade pitching
mechanism, and a yaw mechanism.
Generally, the control systems of the LW 15/ 75 have to keep the wi nd
turbine wi t hi n its design limits during normal operation and to ensure
electrical energy is generated and supplied to the grid in an effi ci ent
manner. In case of a failure or in case of abnormal external conditions,
the control systems in combination wi t h the safety systems have also to
keep the turbine wi t hi n its design envelope to prevent damage or unsafe
operation. For a clear description of the wi nd turbine operation, a State
Diagram has been made. A distinction has been made between
Operational (O), Transitional (T), and Damaged (D) Modes. The State
Diagram enables a clear presentation for the relationships between the
di fferent wi nd turbines modes (or states), see Fig. 2.
The safety systems of the LW 15/ 75 wi l l be activated in case of the
f ol l owi ng events: an overspeed situation, excessive vibration, overload of
the generator, loss of load, too high inverter temperature, and abnormal
cable t wi st whi ch have all been considered in the case study. In case of a
normal shut-down (T4), the nacelle wi l l be yawed out of the wi nd; the
yaw motor is activated by the grid. In case of an emergency shut -down
(TS), the yaw motor is powered directly by the generator. This happens
for instance during grid failure (S5).
Task 2: FMECA
From the FMECA, a set of critical component failures and initiating events
has been derived. This survey has been used to check the measures the
R e l i a b i l i t y analysis 1291
.
R e ~ t
" ~ "'"",,,\\
Su~-up I S t P I
J
AVAI LABLE . -
" I " 4
!
I
No r ma l
- - $ h u - d o wn
Emc~ncy
Shut-dovm
l
Figure 2: State Diagram of the LW 15/ 75.
manufacturer has taken to prevent these failures and events from
happening or to reduce the likelihood. Since Lagerwey has a long term ex-
perience with this type of turbine, most of the preventive measures
conceived during the FMECA had already been realized, either as a design
modification, or by changing the maintenance procedures.
Task 3: Event Sequence Analysis and System Modelling
The event sequence analysis involved safety actions leading to
unavailability of the wind turbine. The analysis has focused on the
1292 A. J. Seebregts et al .
operational modes 'Idling', 02, and 'Energy Production', O3, and on the
transitional modes 'Normal Shutdown' , T4, and 'Emergency Shutdown' ,
T5. These modes are the most important wi th respect to the
unavailability and safety of the wind turbines. For the event sequence
analysis and system modelling, techniques have been used like event
trees, see Fig. 3, and fault trees, respectively.
From the qualitative analyses, unbalances were found in the design of
safety systems. Excessive vibration had the lowest level of defence, viz.
a single failure.
Task 4: Data Collection and Parameter Estimation
Maintenance and failure data have been derived partially from
maintenance sheets, audits, and logbooks. In addition, generic data
contained in reliability data handbooks, European, and American wind
turbine databases, and engineering judgment have been used to finally
arrive at the parameters required for the quantification process (see next
task) and to compare the specific LW 15/75 failure data wi th. The
operational data have been derived from logbooks, measurements, and
function tests. The data of 11 turbines have been collected and analyzed,
representing operational experience of about 26 years. Limitations
showed up in the current practices of data collection. Not all types of
data required for reliability purposes have been recorded. Despite these
shortcomings, both useful qualitative and quantitative information has
been derived from the available operational experience. In general, the
component failure frequencies of the LW 15/75 compared favourably to
the reported generic wind turbine data.
Task 5: System Reliability Quantification
The fault trees and event trees developed in Task 3 have been quantified
wi t h the failure rates, initiating event frequencies, and downtimes,
estimated in Task 4. Estimates have been obtained of safety system
Reliability analysis 1293
unavailabilities and wind turbine unavailability. Components contributing
to the safety system unavailabilities have been ranked according to their
importance in order to identify possibly weak points in the LW 15/ 75
design, to highlight unbalances, and to indicate effective areas for
improvement. The end states of the event trees have been quantified by
multiplying the probabilities of the successive events, see Table 1 and
Fig. 3.
Table 1: Initiating Events and Frequencies of End States
Initiating Event
Frequency [/yr]
Frequency End State [/yr]
Shutdown Not Shutdown Not Shutdown
No Damage Partial Damage Severe Damage
$ 10ver speed 0.65 6.5E-1
$2 Excessive Vibration 0.95 9.3E-1
$3 Inverter Temperature 0. 038 3.8E-2
$4 Inverter Control 0.23 2.2E-1
$5 Grid Failures 3.12 2. 98
$6 Generator Overload 0.42 4.0E-1
Total 5. 408 5.21
3.2E-3
2.3E-2
4.7E-4 4.2E-6
1.1E-2 9.6E-5
1.4E-1 1.2E-3
2.3E-2 2.1E-4
0. 17 0. 028
Yaw
S y ste m
Pitch Control
System
End State:
$5. Grid failures
(3.12/yr)
StlCC~k~
I (0.956)
failm~
(0.9911)
I (0.044)
(0.0089)
Figure 3: S5 event tree quantification
S - N D (3.0 ~ )
NS-PD (0.14/yr.)
NS.SD (0.0012/yr)
1294 A. J. Seebregts et al.
The results show an esti mated severe damage frequency of 1 per 35
wi nd turbi ne operating years. Partial damage wi t h no safety i mpl i cati ons
occurs approxi matel y once in 6 years. Successful shut -downs occur 5
t i mes per year. Especially failure of the detecti on units (e.g. t achomet er
and vi brati on detecti on) contri bute to the damage frequencies. Thi s is
because there is no redundancy in these components.
Task 6: Structural Reliability
The possible appl i cati on of probabilistic techniques f or the assessment of
t he structural i nt egri t y of wi nd turbi ne components has been i nvesti gated.
For the structural rel i abi l i ty analysis, four levels can be i denti fi ed [de
Kraker et al.]:
Level O: A determi ni sti c analysis based on fi xed data, a det ermi ni st i c
(high) load, a determi ni sti c (low) strength, and an ' overal l -saf et y' factor.
Level I: Intended f or routine design use. For each stochasti c variable, a
certai n unfavourabl e value is chosen, the so-called characteri sti c value,
usually based on a 5% confidence l i mi t. In addition, a set of partial saf et y
factors is applied, whi ch establish the margin bet ween load and strength
f or the various cases to be considered. This approach is yet commonl y
used in wi nd engineering.
Le v e l I1: An approxi mati ve analysis based on the so-called ' f i r st
order/second moment ' principle. Briefly, what i t amounts to is t hat onl y
t he mean value and the standard deviation of each stochasti c variable are
taken i nto account, linearization being applied when necessary. Level II
approxi mati ons are used to provide a basis f or Level I procedures. Level II
studies aim to underpin the partial safety f act or of a Level I analysis as
soundl y as possible. Moreover, t hey are used f or special and i mport ant
structures f or whi ch an above-normal standard of rel i abi l i ty is consi dered
essential, e.g. offshore structures.
L e v e l II1: Comprises compl ete and exact analyses using anal yti cal or
numerical procedures or Monte Carlo si mul ati ons. Level III analyses
Reliability analysis 1295
general l y demand too much comput at i onal effort to be pract i cal for
deal i ng wi t h major probl ems due to t he large number of s t ochas t i c
var i abl es to be consi dered. The scope for applying t hem exi s t s mai nl y in
veri fyi ng and compl ement i ng Level II approxi mat i ons.
To demons t r at e st ruct ural reliability appl i cat i ons on wi nd t urbi nes, f at i gue
failure of t he t ower f oot has been sel ect ed. Normally, only t he s t ochas t i c
nat ure of t he wi nd speed is incorporated in a det er mi ni st i c f at i gue
anal ysi s. A probabilistic anal ysi s provides a manner to deal wi t h t he
s t ochas t i c behavi our of t he most i mport ant problem var i abl es more
real i st i cal l y t han wi t h t he use of prescri bed s af et y f act ors. The procedure
for a probabilistic f at i gue anal ysi s of t he t ower foot is bas ed on
[Karadeniz et al., 1984, Ang and Tang, 19841. A reliability functi on Z
must be selected in a deterministic way as to establish t hat Z < 0
corresponds to fatigue failure and Z >_ 0 to non-failure, and the l i mi t state
is given by Z = 0. Z is related to the Miner sum D and Z = 1 - D has
been chosen. Af t er the distributions are selected and the reliability
functi on is defined, the failure integral must be calculated. The most
accurate computati onal procedure for the probabilistic fatigue analysis is
presented in Fig. 4.
l o a d str u c tu r e mat er i al pr oper t i es
(wi nd) (wind turbine) (fatigu e)
~ b a s ~ l e s
D
Figure 4: Determination D and the fatigue failure probability.
1296 A. J. Seebregts e t al .
When t he i nf l uence of t he uncert ai nt i es in l oad, geomet r y and mat eri al
propert i es are consi dered, i t is possi bl e to make a f requency t abl e f or D.
Thi s can be achi eved by the combi nat i on of every possi bl e val ue of t he
basi c vari abl es in t he cal cul at i on of D. Subsequent l y, a di st r i but i on of D
has t o be sel ected and t he st at i st i cal paramet ers have t o be det ermi ned.
The probabi l i t y of f at i gue fai l ure can be expressed as
and can be det er mi ned f or the IogC-value associ at ed wi t h a line in t he
WShl er-di agram. A normal di st ri but i on is sel ected f or IogC in
correspondence wi t h of f -shore i ndust ry. However , i t is pract i cal l y not
possi bl e t o eval uat e the f requency t abl e f or D, because t he load
cal cul at i ons wi t h SWI FT [Wi nkel aar, 1992] and PHATAS-I I [ Li ndenburg,
1992] are t oo t i me- consumi ng. Theref ore, t he fai l ure i ntegral (1) is
appr oxi mat ed wi t h t he Mean Value Approach ( MVA) , whi ch is a si mpl e
appl i cat i on of a Level II met hod.
In a general f or mul at i on f or MVA, the rel i abi l i ty f unct i on is a f unct i on of
t he probl em vari abl es i ncl udi ng a number of st ochast i c vari abl es here
gi ven t he desi gnat i on X1, )(2 ..... X, . The st ochast i c vari abl es are assumed
t o be uncorrel at ed, mut ual l y i ndependent and normal l y di st ri but ed wi t h
known mean values/1,- and standard devi at i ons a;. When Z is l i neari zed in
t he mean val ues of the st ochast i c vari abl es, t he mean val ue #z and t he
st andard devi at i on az of Z can t hen be appr oxi mat ed by t he expressi ons
~/Z =Z( ~ / 1 ,/J2, " ,/Jn ) = 1 - D (Pl ,P2, , P, ) = 1 - Po (2)
az = az ( pl , gz . . . . . p, ) ai
i . 1
The parti al deri vat i ves in (3) cannot be det er mi ned anal yt i cal l y and are
Reliability analysis 1297
therefore numerically approached
az ~ Z(/zl , #2, . . . , p; +o; , . . . , p, ) - # z = .bZ~ (4)
In this particular case, the partial derivatives in (3) can be approximated
by
_ az ~ D( I J 1 , I J 2 , . . . , I J i + o' i , . . . , P , ) - P o= ADi (5)
a Xi a i (>,
The standard deviation of Z is then given by
O z = i ; -'
( 6 )
and the reliability index B can be wri tten as
= __Pz = 1 - P o
az I ; (71
(AD;)2
=1
Now, the failure
derived
probability of the welding in the t ower f oot can be
P ~ = q) N( - B ) ( 8 )
where (I)N is the standard normal cumulative distribution functi on. For
positive # it appears that the larger p, the larger the safety. The
importance factors a7 are defined by the squares of the direction cosines
of # and can be expressed as:
= ( ~ Oi ) 2 ( 9}
var Z
They are a measure for the percentage of variability due to each random
variable.
1298 A. J. Seebregts et al.
A selection has been made of wi nd parameters, wi nd turbine parameters,
and fati gue parameters whi ch are considered to be stochastical instead of
fixed and deterministic. Table 2 lists the parameter means and standard
deviations, whi ch have been derived from measurements or based on
engineering j udgment.
Tabel 2: Stochastic variables and results
i Designation xl Pi ai ( a/ p) i
1 Turbul ence alU~ o 19. 28 % 1 % 0 . 0 52
i ntensi ty
2 1st t ower f,~ ., 0. 97 Hz 0. 049 Hz 0. 050
e i g e n f r e q u e n c y
3 maxi mum l i ft C~,,= 1. 60 0. 04 0 . 0 24
coeffi ci ent
4 torsi on spring Mp,=h,,= 730 Nm 50 Nm 0. 068
5 load level Model 1.0 0. 125 0. 125
uncertai nti es
6 wal l thi ckness t,,= 10 mm 0. 5 mm 0 . 0 50
7 constant of S-N l ogo 12.511 0. 207 0. 017
c u r v e
8 annual average U,,, 7. 28 m/s 0. 728 m/s 0. 100
wi nd speed
i Po + L~9i EO, =
1 0 . 2225 0. 0009
2 0 . 18 18 0. 0001
3 O. 1770 0. 0003
4 0. 2081 0. 0002
5 0 . 274 8 0. 0067
6 0 . 2235 0. 0009
7 0 . 310 9 0 . 0 139
8 0 . 3124 0 . 0 14 2
Po = 0 . 1930
Pz = 0 . 8 0 70
a z = 0 . 1929
/9 = 4. 18
Pc = 1.4E-5
The importance factors are displayed in Fig. 5.
It appeared t hat the fatigue coeffi ci ent IogC and the average annual wi nd
speed Uo., are by far the most important sources of variability, fol l owed
Reliability analysis 1299
by the model uncertainties.
o/r.~,,
2.3%
mo d e l u n c e r t a i n t i e s
l o g C
37.3%
18 .0 %
4
_-_ _ ~ _ _ _ " - ~ _ |
~ 0. 6% M~m~,(4)
0 . 7 % C , . _ . (3)
38.3%
0.3% f,,,, ( 2)
u=
2.s% t . ( l)
Figure 5: Importance factors obtained wi t h MVA
Summarizing, MVA in addition to the currently used deterministic design
rules gives qualitative insights in the uncertainties of the fatigue damage
calculations. MVA appeared to have limitations, but a further application
of probabilistic design techniques is strongly recommended. The speed of
the load calculation codes and the probabilistic techniques need to be
improved for actual implementation in the design and certification
process.
However, the process of identifying components, failure modes, and a list
of uncertain parameters for each combination is expected to be more
troublesome and time-consuming than the actual calculational procedure.
The fi rst emphasis should therefore be on this initial step, because it also
affects the results of the current deterministic structural analyses. In
addition, Monte Carlo procedures, in particular Latin Hypercube Sampling
(LHS) [Imam, 1984], is worthwhi l e investigating. Although perhaps time-
consuming, this procedure has advantages compared to Level II methods
like MVA, viz.:
- parameters can be varied simultaneously and correlations can be
HR 3 5 : 9 / 1 0 - G
1300 A. J. Seebregts et al .
taken into account;
- PF can be derived directly and is not dependent of a (non-robust)
defi ni ti on of Z; and
- no assumptions are needed on the normality of parameter or PF
distributions.
For more details, see [Rademakers, 1993] or [Van den Horn, 1993].
Task 7: I nterpretation and Discussions of the Results
It has been concluded that there are unbalances in the safety systems
design. Excessive vibration of the nacelle had the l owest level of defence
(only the yaw system) and contributed the most to the severe damage
frequency. If safety is to be improved, modifications can best be focused
on the improvement of the detection units. A strong i mprovement of the
wi nd turbine availability can be made by, under certain conditions,
automati c resetting, whi ch causes the downti mes to decrease. The
presented estimates for the safety system unavailabilities, the wi nd
turbine unavailability, and the damage frequencies should be considered
as approximate values because of the data and modelling uncertainties.
The results are based on assumptions whi ch depend on certain external
conditions, as given by the site of the wi nd turbine, and operating
procedures. These assumptions may be di fferent for other sites. The
event tree and faul t tree models can be easily recalculated for those sites,
if site specific data is available. Sensitivity analyses have been performed
to show the robustness of the conclusions.
The system reliability analysis results are valid for the so-called ' useful
life' period where failures are random and component failure rates are
more or less constant. Reported gross failures (from other than the 1 1
units) whi ch have resulted in hazardous situations appeared to be caused
not by random failures during the useful life period, but were mostl y the
result of unexpected situations not foreseen in the design stage.
Especially, acti vati on of the yaw mechanism at high wi nd speeds was
R eliability analysis, 1301
found to be critical. In early designs, this si tuati on led to excessi ve
vi brati ons and high loads. The phenomena causing these effects were not
known in the design phase. A load and operation moni tori ng programme
t oget her wi t h the analysis of more load si tuati ons are strongl y
recommended to gain more insights in the dynami c behaviour of the
turbi ne and to reduce the occurrence of these failures. To i mprove the
safety at high wi nd speeds, i t is recommended to enhance the yaw
mechani sm or to add an extra safety device. Otherwi se, i t is
recommended to install an anemometer t hat causes aut omat i c shut -down
at l ower wi nd speed.
3. 2 AO C 15/ 50 Case Study
At l ant i c Ori ent Corporation (AOC, USA) is presently developing the AOC
15/ 50 wi nd turbine. This turbine is derived f rom an exi sti ng mass
produced wi nd turbine, the ENERTECH 44. Based on experienced fai l ures
of thi s design, AOC has conceived design modi fi cati ons to enhance the
structural i ntegri ty, to i mprove the reliability and to reduce the
mai ntenance costs. This update led to some unique and i nnovati ve
features, viz. an integrated gearbox design, the ti p brake design, and the
procedures f or normal and emergency shut down. Since the AOC 15/ 50
is at the very end of the design phase and at the beginning of the testi ng
phase, ECN has performed a qual i tati ve rel i abi l i ty analysis in close
co-operati on wi t h personnel of AOC [Carter et al., 1993] . In addi ti on, the
saf et y syst ems have been assessed qual i tati vel y. Tasks 1, 2, and 3 have
been performed. The maj or part of the analysis consisted of an FMECA of
the i mproved and i nnovati ve components and systems. The transi ti onal
modes, e.g. start up, normal shut down, and emergency shut down, have
been analyzed wi t h event trees to determi ne possible critical i tems in
these event sequences. The analyses are yet not finished so onl y partl y
results can be given here. The FMECA:
- esti mated the likelihood, and thus the cri ti cal i ty, of failure modes
1302 A. J. Seebregts et al .
of i nnovati ve components rather high. Reliability demonstrati on
testi ng and prototype testi ng must prove t hat the actual likelihood
of a fai l ure mode is l ower than the fi rst esti mate; and
indicated t hat no acti ve protecti on system had to be installed to
prevent excessive cable t wi st . Thi s is required by e.g. the Dutch
certi fi cati on criteria [Stam et al., 1991] . From the reported failures
of the si mi l ar ENERTECH 44 design, i t appeared t hat the likelihood
of cable t wi st is very l ow, whi ch could be underpinned f rom
rel i abi l i ty demonstrati on testing of the power cable. Furthermore,
no ef f ect wi t h a high severi ty could be conceived. The cri t i cal i t y of
this fai l ure mode was thus rather l ow.
lead to unsafe
In addi ti on to the FMECA, the event tree analyses:
- did not i denti fy any single fai l ure t hat could
operati on of the turbi ne; and
- compl eted the l i st wi t h load si tuati ons
si tuati ons presented in the current
appeared to be too generic for thi s specific turbine.
and showed t hat load
determi ni sti c standards
4 . Uncertainties and acceptance
in areas where new techni ques are introduced, people must be convi nced
of the added value of the new methodol ogy. E.g., f or Psa f or nuclear
power plants [hirschberg, 1992] , there is someti mes cri ti ci sm on the
usefulness of these techni ques because of the uncertainties. For wi nd
turbi ne appl i cati on, si mi l ar uncertai nti es exi st. The most i mport ant
i nsi ghts provided by a psa are engineering ones, i.e., those related to the
i denti fi cati on of potenti al design weaknesses. In many cases, once such
insights have been obtained the value of the predicted frequenci es
i nvol ved becomes less i mportant. Such ' rel at i ve' results of psas are
usual l y not undermined by the numerical uncertai nti es i nvol ved.
Moreover, i t should be noted t hat one of the strengths of psa is to show
t he l i mi tati ons and uncertai nti es that still exist. One rarely observes thi s in
R eliability analysis 1303
the standard deterministic analyses. In addition, the systemati c nature of
the process already leads to valuable insights and a better understanding
of the design j ust by doing the exercise. Of course, the (numerical)
results of psas should also be used wi t h caution both in the design,
regulatory and certification process. Probabilistic analyses applied for
regulatory and certification purposes have been introduced in other indus-
tries after a period of familiarization and obtaining experience. For wi nd
turbine industry, requirements should also not be hastened, and the
emphasis should fi rst be on the qualitative analyses.
5. Conclusions and recommendations
based on the experiences of the Iw 15/ 75 and aoc 15/ 50 case studies,
the fol l owi ng conclusions can be drawn on the methodology:
feasibility
the short term benefits of system reliability analysis (thorough syst em
description, state diagrams, fmeca, event tree and faul t tree analysis)
have been proven. Probabilistic analyses consti tute a necessary
supplement to the existing deterministic analyses and design rules in
order to achieve a more balanced and safe design. Qualitative analysis
methods can and should be applied immediately.
Limitations
in addition to deterministic analyses, probabilistic analysis techniques are
not the only means to further enhance safety and reliability. There is still
a fundamental lack of knowledge of physical phenomena in wi nd turbine
engineering that may cause hazardous situations, e.g. excessive
vibrations. Even when these phenomena are known, quite often they
cannot be adequately modelled wi t h the current computer codes. It is
therefore highly recommended to perform analyses of additional load
situations during the design stage and to use measurement, t est and
1304 A.J. Seebregts et al .
moni tori ng programmes during the early operational phase of a wi nd
turbine. The results of these programmes can be used for updating the
design process.
Data collection and analysis
in vi ew of l i mi tati ons in the current practices of data col l ecti on, pri ori ty
must be gi ven to a syst emat i c col l ecti on of data, not only concerni ng
mai ntenance and failure data (component failures, downt i mes, fai l ure
causes, etc.) but also concerning operational data (external condi ti ons,
starts and stops, etc.). Computeri zed data col l ecti on syst ems are
recommended to prevent these ti me-consumi ng, partl y manual efforts.
Qual i tati ve insights and trends can be derived very easily. On the longer
term, rel i abi l i ty data f or quanti tati ve analyses (e.g. opti mi zi ng
mai ntenance procedures) can be obtained. Each manufacturer must set
up his own data col l ecti on system, preferably computerized. Such a data
base can play an i mport ant role in the planning of mai ntenance and f or
the i mprovement of rel i abi l i ty and avai l abi l i ty of the considered wi nd
turbine. A central data base wi t h accidents and incidents must be
mai ntai ned t o assess the safety and risks f or the envi ronment, to adj ust
the rules f or siting, and to sharpen the current design rules.
Certification
on a short term, the certi fi cati on i nsti tutes can especially benefi t f rom
qual i tati ve anal ysi s methods. The syst emat i c approach and presentati on,
e.g. state diagrams and event trees enable a di rect i nsi ght in the
operati on of the considered wi nd turbine. Fmecas performed by the
designers provide a survey of critical events whi ch the cert i f i cat i on
i nsti tutes can revi ew during the certi fi cati on process. At thi s moment , the
critical events are often conceived by the certi fi cati on i nsti tutes
themsel ves in a more or less unstructured way. They should therefore ask
at least f or the results of an fmeca. In addition, quanti fi cati on of the
Reliability analysis 1305
safety system unavailabilities will be necessary for evaluating safety
concepts that differ from the deterministic safety concept as described in
the dutch certification criteria.
Safe operation of a wind turbine is not only determined by its design and
manufacturing process but also by the operating, maintenance and
inspection procedures. These procedures are considered in the
certification process but only in a limited fashion. During the operating
phase of a wind turbine, no check is made to see if these procedures are
applied correctly and to see if the wind turbine is in a ' healthy' state. In
the certification process, more attention should be paid to these
procedures, preferably by asking for checklists and using reliability
analysis techniques.
Structural reliability
although the demonstrated mva for the structural reliability analysis of
mechanical components appeared to have limitations, a further
application of probabilistic design techniques is strongly recommended.
The application of the mva in addition to the currently used deterministic
design rules gives qualitative insights in the uncertainties of the fatigue
damage calculations. Fruitful discussions in wind turbine industry whi ch
must lead to a wider acceptance and introduction of probabilistic design
techniques can be generated only if these techniques are wider applied,
parallel to the improvement of the methodology and the identification and
quantification of uncertain parameters. In the near future, more advanced
probabilistic techniques should be used to further underpin or adjust the
currently used safety factors.
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