LACAPRA, D. Emile Durkheim - Sociologist and Philosopher (Em Inglês)

Emile Durlfeim
Sociologist and Philosopher

Dominick LaCapra
Cri tical Studies in the Humani ties
Victor E. Tayl or -Series Edi tor
The Davies Group, Publishers Aurora, Colorado
11 Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher
Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher
Copyright 1972 by Cornell University
Revised edition copyright 2001 by Dominick LaCapra
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Library of Congress Catalging-in-Publication Data
LaCapra, Domini ck, 1939-
Emile Durkheim : sociologist and philosopher I Dominick La Capra.
p. em. (Critical studies in the humanities)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-888570-60-1 (alk. paper)
I. Durkheim, Emile, 1858-1917. 2. Durkheimian school of
sociology. I. Series.
HM465 .L33 2001
30 1' .092 dc21
2001028598
Cover photo Digital Vi si on
Printed in the United States of America.
Published 200 1. The Davi es Group, Publishers. Aurora, Colorado.
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zv Emile Durkheim: Sociologit and Philosopher
Critical Studi es i n the Humani ti es
Vi ctor E. Tayl or, Series Edi tor
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PA 17405-7199.
Sharyn Clough, Siblings Under the Skin: Feminism, Social justice and
Analtic Philosophy
Sander L Gi l man, Nietchean Parody: An Introduction to Reading Nietsche
Domi ni ck LaCapra, Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher
Gregg Lambert, Report to the Academy (re: the NEW confict of the faculties
Mi chael Strysick, Ed. , The Politics of Communit
Denni s Wei ss, Interpreting Man
Forewrd
Prefa, 2001
1. Introduction
2 Durkheim' Milieu
3 The Division of Soia Labor
Quo Vais
Mechanical and Organic Solidrit
Conscience Collective
Crime and Punshment
Taitional Diferentiation
Teory of Change
Rsidua Doubts
Con tra and Srity
Mode Social Paolog
4 Suicide and Solidrit
Te Obect and Limitations of Suicide
Anomie and Egism
Atruism and Fataism
Durkheim a weber
From Analysis to Renn
5. Theory and Pratice
SocioloJ History and Rrm
Corporatism
Te Individual and Soiet
Contents
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Vlt
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211
v1 Emile Durkheim: Sociologit and Philosopher
6 The Sacred and Society
Epilogue
The Theory of Religion
Sociolo and Epistemolog
Social Metaphysic
Selected Bibliography
I
235
236
251
262
281
285
297
Foreword
In the past several decades, the domi nance of cri ti cal theory i n i nt erdisc
i pl inary scholarshi p has l e d to the reformul ati on of the basi c proposi ti ons
gui di ng research i n the humani t i es and soci al sci ences. Whi l e schol ars i n
vari ous di sci pl i nes cont i nue t o express thei r concern over the status of tradi
ti onal forms of i nqui ry i n response t o the radi cal nature of cri ti cal theory, i t
i s i mportant t o note that these theoreti cal i ncursi ons i nto tradi ti onal research
methods h ave made possi bl e producti ve reapprai sals of key hi st orical hgures
and thei r contri buti ons to i nt el l ectual l i fe. I n Emile Durkheim: Sociologist
and Philosopher, Domi ni ck La Capra, a l eadi ng theoretical hi stori an, offers an
i mpor tant revi sed cri ti cal analysis of Durkhei m's methodol ogi cal and phi l o
sophi cal pursui ts, wi th an emphasis on the metaphysi cal, epi stemological,
and et hi cal probl ems i nherent i n formi ng constructs of the cultural and
soci al spheres. Whi l e Durkhei m's thought di d not " i nfuence si gni fcantly,
if at al l , the wr i tings of Rol and Barthes, Gi l l es Del euze, Jacques Derri da,
Mi chel Foucaul t , Jul i a Kri steva, Jacques Lacan, Jean-Fran<oi s Lyotard and
ot her recent thinkers . . . the tradi ti on he hel ped i ni t i ate was qui te i mport ant
for such fgures as Pi erre Bourdi eu, [Marcel .1auss], Cl aude Levi -Strauss,
and members of the Annal es school " ( i x) . I t i s si gni fcant to note that i n ad
di ti on to presenting Durkhei m as a crucial resource for current theoretical
soci ol ogi sts, LaCapra's revi sed study si t uates Durkhei m's major wr i t i ngs i n
rel at i on to the current poststructurali st cr i t i ques of one of hi s central i ssues,
"the rol e of reason i n life and i ts rel ati on to normati ve l i mi ts and the senti
ment of sol i darity among members of soci ety" ( 3) . Emile Durkheim: Sociolo
gist and Philosopher i s a theoreti cally charged reexami nat i on of the hi stori cal
and i ntellectual contexts that gave ri se t o a uni que method of phi l osophi cal
soci ol ogy, provi di ng readers from a wi de range of i nterests wi th an i mportant
cri ti cal reappraisal of Durkhei m's l i fe and wri ti ngs.
Vi ct or E. Taylor, Seri es Edi tor
vm Emile Durkheim: Sociologst and Philosopher
Prece : 2001
Whi l e I have revised certain formul ati ons, added materi al , and updated
a number of footnotes, I have retai ned much that appeared i n the ori gi nal
edi ti on of thi s, my frst book. Sti l l , there are ti mes when supplementary
statements and seemingly small changes of i nfect i on may si gni fcantl y
transform meani ngs. In any case, I woul d mai ntai n that the i ssues rai sed i n
the book sti l l preoccupy us, especi al l y on the level of basi c or background
assumpti ons. Perhaps the key ethi cal and pol i ti cal i ssue i n thi s respect i s
the actual and desi rabl e i nteracti on between l egi ti mate l i mi ts and excessive
overtures or transgressive i ni ti ati ves - a recurrent issue that must al ways
be further di fferenti ated wi th respect to di fferent soci ohi stori cal contexts
and groups. Thi s is a cruci al issue in the rel ati on be tween structurali sm and
poststructurali sm, and it calls not for an ei ther/or deci si on but for an analysis
of compl ex relati ons and di ffcul t choi ces in part i cul ar ci rcumstances.
Si nce the wri ti ng of thi s book, fgures largely i gnored, relati vel y un
known, or sti l l l i ttle publ i shed i n the l ate si xti es and early seventies have come
to the forefront of French thought, and thei r work has el i ci ted responses
i n i nt ellecrual ci rcles around the worl d. They have efect ed a reorderi ng of
the canon of cri ti cal t heory i n a manner that we are onl y starti ng t rethi nk
and i n part redress. Durkhei m's work di d not i nfuence si gni fcantl y, i f at
all, the wri ti ngs of Rol and Barthes, Gi lles De l euze, Jacques Deni da, Mi chel
Foucaul t , Jul i a Kri steva, Jacques La can, J ean-F ran<ois Lyotard and ot her re
cent thi nkers, although the tradi ti on he hel ped i ni ti ate was qui te i mportant
for such fgures as Pi erre Bourdi eu, Cl aude Levi-Strauss, and members of
the Annal es school . And when thi s book was frst wri tten, one di d not see
Georges Batai l l e and others i n and around the Colege de Sociologie as mi ss
i ng l i nks between Durkhei m and Mauss, on the one hand, and Levi -Strauss
and hi s poststructural respondents, on the other. But one may nonethel ess
argue that a reconsi derati on of Durkhei m and hi s perspective on soci al
and ethi cal probl ems becomes more necessary i n li ght of the emphases of
Batail l e , Derri da, Foucaul t , and other recent fgures. For the l atter often
x Emil Dhcim; Sociol and Philsohe
stress the role of excess, undecidability, hyperbole , and transgression in a
manner that calls for a counte-stress on the role of limits. Oe may also
argue that Durkheim's concerns provide needed mediation between the
liberal tradition that draws from Tocqueville and the exorbitant radicalis
drawing from Foucault and other post structuralists-traditions that typi
cally have little to do with each other. 1
Indeed, when one rereads Durkheim today, o i struck by a pronounced
feature of his thought-in one signifcant sense, a civic virtue-to which
I would like to call attention: his stylistic decorum and poise in addressing
difcult if not intractable problems. While he may in certain respects be
criticized for having too distant a perspectve on the anomie disorientation
he diagnosed, he may also be seen as attempting to embody, in his very
style o writing and thought, the ethicopolitical vision h had for society
-a rhetorical and dialectical enactment c the ends he advocated for social
and cultural life at large. This attempt to work through the problems he
analyzed may have required a more complex approach, both stylistic and
sociopolitical, indeed an approach that was itself more empa thically moved
and even disturbed by the conficted problems h perceive in the larger
social context. However, there is also much to be said for the tense, fexible
interaction between limits and chalknges to them that Durkheim desired
in the larger society and to some extent performatively displayed in his own
conception of problems. Such an emphasis may both serve a a counterforce
to all-or-nothing responses and have sgnifcant implications for the crucial
social issues I try to address in this book.
I thank Tracie Matysik for her assistance in preparing the index.
Nos
On this proble s m Histoy ad Ring: Tocqzzlk, Fouault, Fch
Studies (Toronto: Universi ty ofToronto Pres, 20). Se alo my Witing
Histor Witing Tmml (altimore: Johns Hopkins University Pre, 201}.
Thee books complement t preent study i a variety of ways. Se also The
CoJSciol 1937-39, ed. Denis Hollier (Minneapol is: Universty of
Minnesota Press, 1988).1
1
Introduction
I you wish to mature your thought, attach yoursel to the scrupulous study of a
great master; inquire into a system until you reach its most secret workings.
- Advice of Emi l e Durkhei m to a di sci pl e
The present study attempts to provi de a comprehensi ve i nterpretati on
and assessment of t he thought of Emi l e Durkhei m. Largely, i t falls wi thi n
the venerable tradi ti on of the ttude d u systeme. Often i t treads the dangerous
but challengi ng l i ne between haute vulgarisation and a hi story of a l earned
di sci pl i ne. Its pri mary obj ect i s to treat Durkhei m's thought as an i ntegral
whol e compri si ng soci ol ogi cal analysis, pol i cy, and phi l osophy.
Some reference is mad e to the work o f other members of the An nee soci
ologique school that formed around Durkhei m as its acknowledged master.
In many basi c ways, the thought of members of thi s school was el aborated
di alogi cal ly. And the peri odi cal t hat became t h e s chool' s works hop was a
collecti ve product. Durkhei m's thought provi ded the elementary structure
for a close worki ng rel ati onshi p and a fai rly cohesive theoreti cal out l ook.
But ful l j usti ce coul d be rendered to members of t he Annie school onl y
i n a separate work. Marcel Mauss al one, who was perhaps i nhi bi ted i n hi s
scholarly product i on by a life spent i n the shadow of hi s more famous uncl e,
woul d requi re a full-length study to bri ng out the magnif cent contri buti ons
whi ch he managed to compress i nto the creative compass of rel ati vel y few
publ i shed works.
I sketch some pertinent features of Durkhei m's bi ography and si tuate hi s
experi ence wi thi n the matri x of hi s own soci ety. Whi l e Durkhei m's thought
was not merel y s ymptomati c of hi s mi l i eu, hi s i deas to a si gni fcant extent
arose i n response to th e needs of the Thi rd Republ i c i n France. I n fact,
he often concei ved hi s own soci ety as a test case of the needs of modern
soci ety i n general .
Durkhei m was the E rst to attempt the i nsti tuti onal i zati on in soci al sci
ence of what Auguste Comte had termed the era of speci ali zati on. Durkhei m
advi sed woul d-be di sci pl es to choose a ci rcumscri bed area of enqui ry. Hi s
foundi ng of t he famed peri odi cal L'm sociologique was i ntended t o further
this ai m. Hence there i s much to be gai ned from seemi ngly so superfci al a
task as the exami nati on of the tables of contents of the twelve vol umes of the
Annee publ i shed under Durkhei m, for they embody a tel l i ng concepti on of
the classif catory cadres of soci ol ogy i n his mi nd. In the pages of the Annee
and el sewhere, Durkhei m's own preferred obj ect of i nvesti gati on was the
rel ati onshi p be tween soci ety and moral i ty. Hi s very E rst publ i shed arti cl e
contai ned a programmati c announcement whi ch exercised a constrai ni ng
hol d on hi s ent i r e l i fe's work: "Of all the vari ous br anch es of soci ol ogy, the
sci ence of ethi cs i s the one whi ch attracts us by preference and whi ch wi l l
command our attenti on E rst of al l . " L
But Dur khei m retai ned Comte's overall ambi t i on of phi l os ophi cal
synthesi s. He became i ncreasi ngl y convi nced that speci al i zed experti se and
the profess i onali zed p urge of di l et tant i sm shoul d not be effected at t he ex
pens e of i nterdi sci pl i nary coor di nat i on and of t h e specul ati ve i magi nati on
restrai ned, tested, and matured by pati ent i nvestigati on. Li ke nearly al l the
members of hi s school , Durkhei m was trai ned i n phi l osophy, a preparati on
made necessary by the educati onal system of the ti me. And despi te hi s earlier
attempts to de ne soci ol ogy as an autonomous di sci pl i ne, he became con
vinced that all serious enqui ry i s founded i n phi l osophy and that phi l osophy
i s rel ated both to understandi ng and to acti on. It mi ght be sai d t hat for
Durkhei m soci ol ogy had not only a sci enti fc fel d to expl ore but also an
expl oratory vi si on and a ci vi li zi ng mi ssi on. I n ti me, soci ology cul mi nated
for hi m i n a phi l osophi cal anthropol ogy that drew the i nvestigator fro m
methodol ogy to epi stemol ogi cal and even metaphysical probl ems.
Toward the end of hi s l i fe, Durkhei m wrote to Ge orges Davy: " Hav
i ng begun wi th phi l osophy, I tend to return to i t, or rather I have found
mysel f drawn back to i t natural l y by t he nature of t he quest i ons whi ch I
found in my pat h. "2 In an i mportant arti cle wri tten at about the same ti me,
Durkhei m expressed this need for a return t o hi s phi l osophi cal ori gi ns i n
mor e i mpersonal terms: "Si nce our met hod has b een postul ated upon the
attempt to emanci pate soci ol ogy from a phi l osophi cal t utel age whi ch coul d
onl y prevent i t fro m bei ng consti tuted as a posi ti ve sci ence, we have at times
Chapter 1 introduction 3
been suspected of a systemati c hosti l i ty for phi l osophy in general or at l east
of a more or less excl usi ve sympathy for a narrow empi ri ci sm i n whi ch one
has rightly seen onl y a lesser phi l osophy. " But an ant i -phi l osophi cal posi
ti on i mpl i ed, for Durkhei m, "a very unsoci ol ogi cal atti t ude. " In hi s mi nd,
soci ology had "to pose as an axi om that quest i ons whi ch have hel d t hei r
pl ace i n hi story can never be out moded; t hey can become transformed but
cannot peri sh. " Here Durkhei m t ouched upon a concepti on of hi story
i tsel f nei ther as mere chronol ogy nor as evol uti onary devel opment but as
a compl ex, mul ti di mensi onal process of di spl acement, or repeti ti on wi th
more or l ess control l ed, yet at t i mes di srupt i vel y traumati c, change. Thus
he found i t i nadmi ssi bl e that "even the most audaci ous probl ems whi ch
h ave agi tated ph i l osophe rs" coul d ever fall i nto ob l i vi on.3 He went on to
concl ude that "soci ol ogi cal ref ecti on i s cal l ed upon to prol ong i tself by i ts
natural progress under the form of phi l osophi cal ref ecti on; and everythi ng
permi ts t he assumpti on t hat , consi dered i n thi s way, the probl ems whi ch
phi l osophy treats wi l l present more than one unexpected answer. "4
Thus Durkhei m concei ved of hi s proj ect i n terms of a rati onal coor
di nati on of soci al analysis, i nformed prescri pt i ve recommendat i on, and
phi l osophi cal specul ati on wi th speci al relevance for thought and acti on i n
modern soci ety. He compl eted onl y a fragment of a syntheti c phi l osophi cal
work enti tl ed "La Moral e. " But , in an i mportant sense, al l hi s thought was
ori ented toward this magisterial treati se on moral i ty - hi s last wi l l and
testament -whi ch he di d not l i ve t o compl et e. For the questi on runni ng
l i ke a red thread through Durkhei m's thi nki ng was the rol e of reason i n l i fe
and its rel ati on to normati ve l i mi ts and the senti ment of sol i dari ty among
members of soci ety. Hi s ul timate concern wi t h epi stemol ogy and metaphysic
subsumed a certain concepti on of the soci al system and of moral i ty as its
i nner moti vati on. In a crucial sense, Durkhei m's thought was as much the
cul mi nati on of classical phi l osophy a the i ni ti ati on of modern social science.
Indeed, this ambi val ent status consti tutes i ts pecul i ar fasci nat i on.
Parti al and hi ghl y s el ective readi ngs of Durkhei m have often resul ted
i n gri evous mi si nterpretati ons. But the attempt through exegesis to set
the record strai ght by seei ng Durkhei m whol e i s admi ttedl y probl emati c.
Thi s i s b ecause of the seemi ngl y ambi guous character of hi s thought itself.
Durkhei m i s one of the best known and one of the l east understood maj o r
soci al thi nkers. The controversies that surround hi s thought bear upon es-
senti al poi nts, not detai l s. 5 Thi s state of affairs poses a formi dabl e barri er for
the uni ni ti ated but genui nel y i nterested reader attempti ng to acqui re some
i nsi ght i nto hi s thought and i ts relevance. Durkhei m was a very vi gorous
advocate of t he i dea of a soci al sci ence. Incongruously, the i nterpretati on
of the body of i deas in whi ch he t ri ed to l ay the foundati ons of t hi s sci ence
seems often to ci rcumscribe i t wi th a magi c ci rcl e whose center i s everywhere
and whose ci rcumference is nowhere.
Si nce Durkhei m's i deas are the obj ect of highly divergent i nterpretati ons,
i t is i mportant to make cl ear the basi c i nterpreti ve schema that i nforms thi s
study. Unfortunately, to begi n a work wi th even a schemati c "showi ng and
tel l i ng" bri ngs a l oss of dramati c uni ty. The l ast act i s given away i n the
frst. And aestheti c u n i ty th reatens to be repl aced by the t edi ous ri gor of
a syllogisti c treati se. I n the case of a thi nker l i ke Durkhei m, i t i s perhaps
better to i ncur these ri sks than to be open to mi s understandi ng.
Durkhei m was a convi nced and unrepentant rati onal i st. To characteri ze
hi s own perspective, he rejected al l current l abels, i ncl udi ng the Comtean
and Spenceri an forms of posi t i vi sm. But he was wi l l i ng t o assert that "the
sol e appel l at i on whi ch we accept i s that of rati onal i s m. Indeed our pr i nci pl e
i s to extend sci enti fc rati onal i sm to human conduct i n showi ng that, con
si dered i n the past, i t i s reduci bl e to rel ati ons of cause and effect whi ch a no
l ess rati onal operati on can transform i nto rul es for the fu ture. "6 Durkhei m
most opposed romanti c i rrati onal i sm and renascent mysti ci sm as i nt ui ti ve
or excessi ve responses t o the compl exi t i es and di sori entati on of modern
soci ety. Hi s Les Regles de Ia mehode sociologique ( The Rules of Sociological
Method was an attempt to do for the study of soci ety what Descartes had
d o ne for the study of nature. Hi s l i fel ong ambi ti on was to reani mate and
renovate classical rati onal i sm unti l i t became a more fexi bl e, compl ex,
generous, and i nformed medi um of both thought and acti on. Reason for
Durkhei m had i ts full tradi ti onal sense: i t was a mode of analysi s, cri ti ci sm,
prescri pt i on, and reconstructi on i n soci ety.
Uni nt i mi dated by t he appl i cat i on of t he soci ol ogy of knowl edge to so
ciology i tself, Durkhei m concl uded that soci ology was the product of two
maj or hi stori cal and cul tural forces: the mani festati on of rati onal i sm i n the
natural sciences and the concrete experi ence of di srupti ve crisis i n modern
soci et i es. The rol e of reason i n the study of nature i nti mated a promi si ng
future for rati onal i sm i n soci al sci ence. But the second and more exi stenti al
cause was perhaps the more i mportant. For Durkhei m, soci al consci ousness
arose in response to the doubt, di sori entati on, and anomi e anxiety caused by
t he breakdown of t radi ti on. The r ol e of rati onal consci ousness was t o state
as cl earl y as possi bl e t he causes of cri si s i n soci ety and the way to overcome
them. Indeed the pri mary funct i on of rati onal consci ousness for Durkhei m
was reparati ve: to respond to someti mes traumati c di srupti on and to replace
what had been destroyed wi th new forms of l i fe. Unl i ke certai n reacti onary
conservati ves, Durkhei m di d not present consci ous thought as a cause of
di si ntegrati on i n modern soci ety. He defended consci ousness, and sci ence,
whi ch was i ts hi ghest expression, as the only effective i nstruments peopl e had
to gui de them i n reconstructi ng the soci al order. Durkhei m was concerned
wi th heal i ng, not sal vati on. Hi s fasci nati on wi t h medi cal met aphors attested
to this fact. The soci ol ogi st was not the quasi -transcendental advocate of
a messi ani sm wi thout a messi ah, the prophet of an abstract, perenni al l y
futuristi c, per haps vacuous utopi an i deal si tuated beyond human l i mi
tati ons. He or she was t he doctor who l uci dl y di agnosed t he i lls of soci ety
and prescrib ed rati onal remedi es. The al l i ance of Durkhei m's rati onal i sm
wi th hi s concepti on of the rel ati on of t heory t o practi ce and h i s di agnosi s
of modern soci ety was well expressed i n rel ati on to hi s own soci ety when he
del i neated wi th his habi tual combi nati on of analyti c rigor and moral fervor
the reasons why soci ol ogy (i n hi s sense) was born i n France. Hi s statement
deserves to be quoted at l ength:
Thi s [ the genesis of soci ology in France] was due in the frst instance
to a marked weakeni ng of tradi ti onal i sm. When reli gious, pol i ti cal ,
and j uri di cal tradi tions have preserved thei r rigidity and authori ty,
they contai n all wi l l toward change and by that token preclude the
awakeni ng of refection. When one is brought up to believe that thi ngs
must remain as they are, one has no reason to ask what they ought to
be and, consequently, what they are. The second factor is what may be
cal led t he rationali st spi ri t. One must have faith i n the power of reason
in order to dare an attempt to expl ai n in accordance with i ts laws thi s
sphere of soci al facts where events, by thei r compl exi ty, seem to resist
the formulas of science. Now France fulflls these two condi ti ons to
the highest degree. She is, of all the countries of Europe, the one where
the old soci al organi zation has been completely uprooted. We have
made a tabula rasa, and on this land laid bare we must erect an enti rely
new edif ce -an enterpri se whose urgency we have fel t for a century
but which, conti nually announced and continually del ayed, is hardly
more advanced today than on the morrow of the French Revol ut i on.
Furthermore, we are and we remai n t he l and of Descartes. We have
an irresisti bl e urge to see things through defned noti ons. No doubt ,
Cartesianism is an archaic and narrow for m of rati onal i sm, and we
must not rest content with it. But if it is necessary to transcend it, it
is even more necessary to conserve its pri nci pl e. We must fashi on for
ourselves more complex ways of thought, but we must keep this cult
of di sti nct ideas, whi ch i s at the very root of the French spi r i t and at
the root of al l sci ence. 7
Especi al l y si gni f cant in thi s p assage is the exi stenti al precedence ac
corded to normat i ve demand with respect to empi ri cal enqui ty. It i s when
one feel s and t hi nks t hat thi ngs ought to be ot her t han t hey are t hat one
i s j ust i fabl y moti vated t o i nqui r e i nt o t he way t hey i n fact are. Here
research i s not merel y t he r es ul t of s ome aut onomi zed, sel f-referenti al
met hodol ogi cal i mperati ve. Equal l y si gni f cant i s the experi ence of soci al
and personal di srupt i on, at ti mes of t raumat i c pr opor ti ons , i n rel at i on
to the rat i onal attempt to create mor e desi rabl e and l i vabl e soci al condi
ti ons. The t rul y basi c phi l os ophi cal t ensi on i n t he t hought of Durkhei m
was rel at ed to hi s rat i onal i sm. I t i nvol ved hi s part i al fai l ure to transcend
cl assi cal rat i onal i sm. Durkhei m' s t hought was caught up i n a tensi on
between the narrowl y anal yti cal and the di al ecti cal heritages transmi tted
to hi m through Charl es Renouvi er.
Wi th reference to the most i mportant hi stori cal i nf uences on Durkhei m,
one migt s i mpl i sti cal l y l abel the narrowly analytical tendency of hi s thought
a Cartesianized and soci al i zed neo-Kanti ani sm. The most obvi ous i nf uence
of neo- Kanti ani sm was i n hi s passi on for dual i sti c anti nomi es or extreme
bi nary oppos i t i ons . The more profound i nfuence, whi ch fed i nto h i s di a
l ecti cal attempt to reconci l e or at l east rel ate anti nomi es, was hi s ul ti mate
affrmati on of a phi l osophy of f ni tude based upon a normati ve sense of
l i mi ts. The treati se on moral i ty that Durkhei m di d not l i ve to compl ete
woul d have been a reformul at i on of Kant's Critique of Practical Reason
f eshed out with the results of soci ol ogi cal refect i on.
The i n fuence of Cartesi an i sm was most obvi ous i n Durkhei m's rel i ance
upon the anti nomy between mi nd and matter. This anti nomy was expressed
in the i dea of homo duplex- the dual nature of man -whi ch was i nter
preted by Durkhei m i n terms of the opposi ti on b etween the organi c and
what he cal l ed t he sui generis or speci fcal l y soci al . By t hi s i nterpretati on,
Durkhei m arri ved at the i dea that mi nd was made up of a "sui generis
realm of soci al facts . " Soci ol ogy was defned i n t he frst i nstance not by
its perspective or method but by the supposedl y autonomous status of its
obj ect, which was i denti fed wi th the obj ect of i deal i sti c phi l osophy. But the
soci ol ogi sti c revi si on of the i dea of homo duplex was only the most extreme
exampl e o f Durkhei m's tendency to force "cl ear and di sti nct i deas" beyond
conceptual analysis, or the el aborat i on of i deal types, i nt o an analytical
di ssoci ati on of reali ty.
The not i on of t he di al ecti cal is mos t often ass oci at ed wi t h the name
of Hegel, but before t he l i mi t s of knowl edge t hat Hegel attempted to
transcend were reached, Kant hi msel f sought a nontotal i zi ng medi at i on
of ant i nomi es. Kant , l i ke Durkhei m, i s perhaps best seen as pri mari l y a
moral phi l osopher. His concepti on of rel i gi on, l i ke that o f Durkhei m, was
rel ated to the needs of practi cal reason. But i n his Critique of judgment,
Kant saw t h e central posi ti on of aestheti cs i n i ts medi at i on of opposi t i ons. 8
And Kant' s concept i on of rel i gi on i tsel f hel d out the promi se of resolv
i ng, or at l east mi t i gati ng, the tragi c ant i nomi es whi ch di vi ded peopl e i n
a wa y that wa s mor e t ha n aestheti c because i t was, from hi s perspecti ve,
more t han s ubj ecti ve.
Durkhei m di d not recogni ze the i mportance of Kant 's Critique of
judgment. Hi s studi es of "pri mi rive" cul tures di d not open up t o hi m the
i mportance of aestheti cs and the ways i n whi ch art, when not autonomi zed
or made narrowl y self-referenti al , mi ght i tsel f be more than a subj ective or
purely formal phenomenon. Nor di d these studi es ful l y reveal to hi m the
l i mi tati ons of a purel y soci ol ogi cal vi ew of rel i gi on. Hi s i nterpretati on of
rel i gi on cul mi nated i n a vi si on of soci ety as a rather di si ncarnate functi onal
equi val ent of di vi ni ty -s omewhat a col l ecti ve ghost i n a "morphol ogi cal "
mach i ne.
The anti pathy between posi ti vi sm and i deal i sm, whi ch Talcott Parsons,
i n hi s Structure ofSociaiAction, took as the faul ted foundati on of Durkheim's
thought, is best seen as a facet of Durkhei m's Cartesi ani zed neo-Kanti an
i sm. Indeed, the phi l osophi cal assumpti ons of both these methodologi cal
foci were i deal i st i c or, i n Durkhei m's own term, "hyperspi ri tual i sti c. " In
the context of hi s i dea of homo duple, whi ch i denti f ed mi nd and soci ety,
pos i ti vi sm and i deal i sm rel ated to aspects of the i deal , autonomous obj ect
that soci et y was for Durkhei m.
In Durkhei m's earl y t hought, posi ti vi sm was most pronounced. I t was
epi t omi zed in the asserti on i n The Rules of Sociological Method t hat soci al
facts were to be treated l i ke things. By thi s Durkhei m di d not mean ont o logi
cally to cl assi f "soci al facts" among materi al thi ngs. But he di d en j oi n the
soci ol ogi st to adopt a methodol ogi cal atti tude of extreme obj ectivism i n the
study of soci ety. Perhaps the pri mary meani ng of" soci al fact" for Durkhei m
was the i nsti tuti onal norm. Yet i n t he st udy of t he genesi s, structure, and
functi oni ng of i nsti tuti ons, Durkhei m carri ed t he analogi cal val ue of the
natural sci ences t o a poi nt at whi ch he t ended t o deny t h e speci fci t y of a
sci ence of persons. Intenti ons were pl aced beyond the realm of sci enti f c
enquiry. The i dea that empathy served as a means of understandi ng i n the
soci al sci ences was rej ected out of hand. And the speci f c nature of symbol i c
activity i n soci ety seemed to be both emphasi zed, at ti mes i deal i s tically
exaggerated, and deni ed, especi al l y through mi sl eadi ng metaphors and
met hodol ogi cal i nj uncti ons.
Durkhei m's early posi tivism presented soci ety pri mari l y as an "acti on
system, " and structure as the essence of soci al facts. Methodol ogi cally, i t
focused upon two sorts o f causati on ( often conceived "mechani sti cally" ) :
e ff ci ent and functi onal . I t attempted to determi ne how "soci al facts" were
causal l y generated by antecedent condi t i ons and how they functi oned to
produce certai n consequences i n the soci al system. Soci ol ogy, paradoxi cally,
was to be restricted to a mechani sti cal l y causal expl anati on of the most
external, rei fed, and d epersonal i zed aspects of the i deal thi ngs consti tuti ve
of soci al facts. The cri teri a of soci al facts were asserted to be exteri ori ty and
constrai nt. And Durkhei m held to a rather di ssoci ated, i f not schi zoi d, i dea
of the rel ati on of t he i nner to the outer, of"subj ective" experi ence and "obj ec
ti vel y" observable b ehavior. Thi s was the source of hi s frequently confusi ng
pronouncements on the rel ati onsh i p of s oci ol ogy t o psychol ogy. I nner,
subj ecti ve experi ence was ascri bed to the i ndi vi dual and often assumed to
be obj ectively unknowabl e. Instead, Durkhei m i n hi s early thought stressed
the i mportance of "hard" data, "morphol ogi cal " i ndi ces, legal codes, and
stati sti cal procedures. His i dea of the rel ati on between soci ety and moral i ty
emphasi zed formal obl i gati on and duty.
Durkhei m's early posi tivism at times culmi nated in an arid formalism.
Homo duple was divided further into an "outer" social self def ned by insti
tutional norms and an "i nner," hi dden, neo-romantic or quasi -transcendental
i ndi vi dual self of i neffable subj ectivi ty. Soci ology amounted to an obj ecti vi st
study of the outer self and the structures that defned i ts external and con
strained relations wi th other selves and the material environment. Durkheim's
early posi tivism may have stemmed in part from a mysti fed generalizati on
of the nature of experience i n a soci ety characterized by certain di splaced
religi ous and i deological traditi ons and by extremely formal and markedly
bureaucrati c relati ons. In his own France, the state, the mi l i tary, the church,
and notably hi s own speci fc mi l i eu - the state uni versity system -were
hi ghl y bureaucratized. And t he typical personal i ty of members of hi s hyper
spi ri tuali sti c republican peer group displayed the dissociated combi nati on of
a formal, constrained exterior and a repressed well of i nner spontaneity and
private feeling.
A hi storical watershed in the development ofD urkhei m's thought was the
Dreyfus Aff1ir. It represented the breakthrough of communi ty and i deali sti c
spontanei ty i n a structural ly h i debound French soci ety. And Durkhei m's sub
sequent thought tended to conceive of the i ndi vi dual i n terms of the bodi l y
organism and to stress the "i nsi de" of shared values i n the collectivi ty. Para
mount was a concern for communal bonds, "collective representati ons, " and
the subj ective desi rabi li ty of i nternalized val ues, especially in their rel ati on to
symbol i c cult and the sacred. But Durkheim often treated communi ty, i deas,
and ideals i n abstracti on from operative i nsti tuti ons and practical reali ti es.
Indeed, he at ti mes envi si oned i deals as the abstract obj ects of a vague, con
templati ve mysti que and as phantom-like monuments si tuated on the hori zon
of a hoped-for evol uti onary devel opment. And methodologically he i nsi sted
upon an objectivi st study of ideologi es and i deals that provided l i ttl e insi ght
i nto the relationship of the questi oner to the questi oned i n soci al research or
the relati onshi p of theory to practi ce in soci al acti on.
In h i s second a nd mor e di al ect i cal tendency, Durkhei m parti al l y over
came a Cartesi ani zed neo-Kanti ani sm. He attempted to relate the el ements
and enti ti es that he analytically di sti ngui shed. It i s i n the l i ght of the more
di al ecti cal strand of hi s thought that i t i s frui tful to understand hi s con
cepti on of the rel ati on of phi l osophy to met hodol ogy and of theory to
practi ce. The noti on that provided ori entati on i n thi s respect was D urkheim's
I 0 Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher
gui di ng met aphor of a tree of soci al life. Thi s met aphor served as a l ogi cal
axi s for t he classif cati on of forms of human experi ence and enti re soci al
systems. The t runk of the tree corresponded t o t he transhi stori cal condi ti ons
of soci al and cul tural l i fe, whi l e the branches represented di fferent types of
soci ety. I n the l i ght of thi s model ( or some more sophi sti cated anal ogue)
Durkhei m's i deas were devel oped by hi s di sci pl es, notabl y Marcel Mauss
and Cl aude Levi -Strauss. It was no acci dent t hat Mauss was readi ng Hegel
when he wrote hi s pi votal essay Le Don ( The Gi).
Consi dered di alecti cally, soci al structure consti tuted one cruci al di men
si on of human experi ence. But the broader probl em was t he comprehensive
study of forms and levels of symboli cal l y informed experience and t hei r
rel ati ons to anomi e. I n h i s core concept of anomi e, Durkhei m referred to
the soci al and cul tural -per haps what one mi ght cal l the exi stenti al -po
si ti on of peopl e possessed of ( and frequentl y by) symbol i sm but devoi d of
subst antively l i mi t i ng nor ms and meani ngful paradi gms t hat gi ve a vi ably
coherent order to experi ence. Anomi e di sori entati on, confusi on, and anxiety
were basi c causes of breakdown and of new creati on i n soci ety.
The one quest i on Durkhei m never asked was whet her t he extreme ten
dency t o decompose reality analytically was itself symptomati c of the extreme
di ssoci ati on of sensi bi l i ty which he correl ated wi th social pathol ogy. Yet t he
concepts of normal i t y and p athology represent ed the second el ementary
axi s of Durkhei m's thought whi ch i ntersected the classif catory axis of the
tree of soci ocul tural l i fe . Indeed these concepts are cruci al i n t he attempt
to si tuate Durkhei m's thought i n rel ati on to a school whi ch has frequentl y
taken hi m as a foundi ng father: structurofuncti onal i sm ( whi ch has at l east
some resembl ance to more recent forms of systems t heory, for exampl e,
i n the work of Ni klas Luhman) . Thi s school has of course many i nternal
variants, whi ch at ti mes di spl ay si gni f cantl y di ferent ori entati ons. And the
enti re perspective has been attacked by proponents of a soci ol ogy of confi ct
as a theoreti cal excuse for a conservati ve i deol ogy.9
On t h e questi ons bot h of a structural i st methodol ogy and the concepts
of normal i ty and pat hol og, Durkhei m di d not di spl ay the degree of sophi s
ti cati on one mi ght have expected of hi m. Hi s i deas were rarely "cl ear and
di sti nct. " They were often more nebul ous than is expectabl e i n an i ni t i al ,
tentative, and expl oratory st atement . Al l owi ng for t hi s vagueness, one may
nonetheless attempt to art i cul at e certai n basi c el ements of hi s thought.
Chapter I Jntroduction II
There was i ndeed an i mportant i f i nsuff ci ently def ned sense in whi ch
Durkhei m's concepti on of the rel ati onshi ps among aspects of soci ety was
structural and functi onal i n nature. He attempted t o see thi ngs whol e and i n
thei r actual and possi bl e i nteracti ons wi th one another. More speci fcally, he
i dent i fed sci ence wi th t he at tempt t o show how an obj ect of i nvesti gati on
could be made to reveal systemati c rel ati onshi ps, i ncl udi ng the method i n
soci al madness. Very often, these rel ati onshi ps were hi dden and coul d be
made manifest onl y through sci enti f c i nvesti gati on. Thus hi s concepti on
of rati onal i sm, as wel l as hi s bel i ef i n the exi stence of i mportant anal ogi es
between natural and soci al sci ence, rested upon a not i on of !aws that com
prised structural models, functi onal correlations, and tendential regulari ti es.
I n hi s own words, t h ings soci al are "rati onal : by whi ch one must si mpl y
understand that they are l i nked to one another by de ni te rel ati ons cal l ed
laws . " 1
0
On thi s basi s, the most perti nent methodol ogi cal si mi l arity between
natural and soci al sci ence was the status of the comparative met hod and
concomi tant vari at i on as the anal ogues i n soci ol ogy of experi mentati on i n
t he natural sci ences. Related to the rol e of the comparati ve met hod was
t h e use of statistical procedures i n specifyi ng t he preval ence of condi t i ons
of soci al l i fe and the di rect or i ndi rect consequences of the functi oni ng of
soci al structures and symbol i c systems.
The i mpl i cati on of the existence of def nite relati ons among soci al and
cultural phenomena for rati onal prescri pti on was the requi rement that pur
poseful i ntenti on work wi t h a defni te, complex, and of ten l i ttl e known reality.
Ignorance of typical relati onshi ps might frustrate human purpose through
the generation of unintended consequences. The only specif city of soci ety,
when compared with nature in this regard , was a greater range of what Comte
had termed "modi able fatality. " Durkheim bel i eved frmly that soci ology,
in discovering the laws of social reality, woul d permi t soci al agents "to direct
with more ref ection than in the past the course of historical evol uti on; for we
can only change nature, moral or physical, i n abi di ng by its laws. " Auguste
Comte, Durkhei m himself observed, "even remarked with insistence t hat of
all natural phenomena, soci al phenomena are the most mal l eabl e, the most
accessible to changes, because they are the most compl ex. " Thus Durkhei m
could conclude that "sociology does not i n the least i mpose upon man a pas
sively conservative atti tude; on the contrary, it extends the f eld of our acti on
by the very fact that i t extends the f eld of our sci ence . "11
One cannot understand the sense in whi ch Durkhei m was a rati onal i st
or a conservative unl ess one understands hi s di sti ncti on between soci al
normal i ty and pat hol ogy. Yet thi s di sti ncti on, whi ch was essenti al to al l
of Durkhei m's work, has oft en been i gnored, repressed, or rej ected by
commentators and di sci pl es al i ke. One general probl em, of course, was
that Durkhei m's ideas remai ned at the level of gross approxi mati on. Here,
where careful and ri gorous conceptual analysis shoul d have been a foremost
concern, Durkhei m's i deas were li ttle more than suggesti ve. And the very
appeal to medi cal i zed concepts, relying on bi ol ogi cal analogies, threatened
to obscure or natural i ze the normative i ssues t hat were mani festly cruci al
for Durkhei m. Nor di d he ever try t o appl y the concepts of normal i ty and
pat hology t o hi st or i cal soci eti es in a comprehensi ve and convi nci ng way,
di sti ngui shi ng, for exampl e, between ki nds and degrees of normal i ty and
pathol ogy. The chapter devoted to a sustai ned di scussi on of the normal
and the pathol ogi cal i n The Rules of Sociological Method a chapter whi ch
shoul d have been the expressi on of Durkhei m's i ntel l ectual powers at thei r
most impressive, failed even to formul ate the pri nci pl es operative i n hi s own
works. Instead of drawi ng toget her the vari ous strands of hi s con cept i on of
soci al structure and moral ity, t he chapter rel i ed excessively upon bi ologi cal
anal ogi es, of ten wi thout i ndi cati ng thei r relevance for soci al l i fe. Except
for the concl udi ng secti on on cri me, the di scussi on of the normal and the
pat hol ogi cal i n The Rules i s probably the l east successful pi ece of wri ti ng
and thi nki ng i n al l of Durkhei m's work. Si nce the di st i nct i on between
soci al normal i ty and pathology was one of t he fundamental postul ates of
Durkhei mi sm, I shal l try to make expl i ci t what remai ned largely i mpl i ci t
i n hi s wri ti ngs. I n thi s respect, I shal l present Durkhei m's concept i on of
normal i ty and p athol ogy i n as useful and sympatheti c a manner as possi bl e,
al though I fnd i t preferable to avoi d bi ol ogi cal or medi cal i zed metaphors
and to empl oy clearly normati ve concept s i n addressi ng, however con
testably, et hi cal and soci opol i ti cal i ssues.
The concepts of soci al nor mality and pat hol ogy referred to paradi gms or
model s of soci al systems ( or more del i mi ted soci al setti ngs) that had both
methodol ogi cal and normative status. As i nstruments of investigati on, they
enabl ed the formul ati on of probl ems wi thi n the overarchi ng paradi gm of
the tree of soci ocul tural l i fe and made possi bl e the discovery of rel ati ons
that mi ght not be apparent to nai ve i ntrospecti on or ungui ded empi ri cal
Chapter I Jntroduction 13
observati on. Thei r basi s was the core probl em of Durkhei mi an soci ol ogy
as a whol e: the di al ecti c of order and di sorder, l i mi ts and excess, i n soci ety
and cul ture. And they informed Durkheim' s i dea of the rel ati on of theory
to practi ce. The characterization of a state of soci ety as pathol ogi cal i mpl i ed
a cri ti que and a call t o acti on.
Roughl y speaki ng, the normal state was characteri zed by a hi ghl y spe
ci f c, desi rabl e sort of functi onal i ntegrati on i n soci ety. In the normal state,
condi ti ons of soci al l i fe were f exi bly control l ed by li mi ti ng i nsti tuti onal
norms. Norms were i n turn l egi ti mated by val ues consensual l y accepted
as val i d objects of commi tment and sol i dari ty but nonethel ess chal l enged
by a dynami c, possi bly creati ve l eaven of anomi e. Gi ven the transhi stori
cal condi ti ons of soci al normality, t he preci se nature of the normal state
varied wi th different types of soci ety. To the extent that i t corresponded to
the vital necessi ti es of the vari ous branches of the tree of soci ocul tural life,
moral relati vi sm was understandabl e and j usti f ed.
A undesirable condition of social pathology characterized states of society
beset with varying sorts of internal contradiction and runaway excess. Like the
normal phenomena of whi ch they were t he counterparts, pathol ogical phe
nomena di ffered i n content according to social type. Symptoms of pathol ogy
on the most general level compri sed social confict in extreme, unregulated
forms, but they also included excessively hi gh or low rates of devi ance. Symp
toms were to be distinguished from causes, which resided i n the faulted nature
of the social system i tself and i ts bearing on the lives of members of soci ety.
The concept of social pathology enabl ed Durkheim t combi ne a structuralist
methodology with the recogni ti on of chaos, irrationality, and confict in social
li fe. The most i mportant requi rement for analysis and prescription was to be
obj ectively clear about t he fundamental causes of patholog i n soci ety and
the most rational means of effecting a passage from pathology to normal i ty.
It also requi red a strong di sti ncti on between social and i ndi vi dual pathology,
wi th excessive rates ( i n contrast to i ndi vi dual i nci dence) of the latter being
ascri bed to social causes, not personal i di osyncracies or faul ts. Moreover, there
was nothi ng i n Durkhei m to support the bel i ef that he defended penal sanc
tions or systemati c repression as the appropriate responses to symptoms of
social pathology. On the contrar, he consistently invoked the pri nci pl e that
i nsti tuti onal change al one attacked the causes of social pathol ogy. Of course
a crucial, controversial questi on was what phenomena, even with respect to
rates and relations wi thi n the broader soci ety, were seen as normal or patho
logi cal i n fact and i n right.
States of bot h pathol ogy and normal i ty were for Durkhei m formally
rati onal i n the sense that phenomena i n them could be made to reveal i n
tel l i gi bl e rel ati ons. There was method t o social madness. I t made sense, for
exampl e, that certai n pathol ogi cal states of soci ety woul d be characteri zed
by high rates of cri me, sui ci de, and endemi c vi ol ence. And means mi ght be
sui ted t o ends that were themselves pathogeni c. But Durkhei m di dno t argue
that anythi ng that functi oned in society was j usti f ed -if by functioni ng i s
meant formal adaptati on or effci ency i n mai nt ai ni ng a status quo. On t he
contrary, onl y the normal stat e of soci et y and forces adapt ed to i t s creati on
or mai nt enance were j us t i fed or substanti vel y rati onal . In t he normal state,
condi ti ons were "everythi ng that they ought to be . " In the pathol ogi cal
state, they "ought to be other than they are. " 1 2 The normal state of s oci ety
woul d have as the foundati on of i ts structure a culturally relati ve vari ant
of practi cal reason that woul d functi on as the sol e possi bl e b as i s for the
reconci l i ati on of l egi ti mate order and progress. Substantive rati onal i ty as
the basi c pr i nci pl e of soci al structure was, moreover, the onl y foundati on
for commi tment and sol i dari ty i n soci ety as a whol e. I n the normal state of
soci ety, the comcience colective woul d be the shared psychologi cal ground of
pr acti cal reason and sol idarity i n the personali ti es of members of soci ety: i t
woul d b e obj ectively real and subj ectively i nternal i zed a t the same ti me.
The practi cal i mpl i cat i ons of Durkhei m's i deas have been the subj ect
of i ntense controversy. Most often, Durkhei m has been seen as a conser
vative. In one i mportant sense, thi s concepti on of Durkhei m i s correct. But
Durkhei m's broader rati onal i st dr eam was to transcend parti san i deol ogi cal
struggles and to forge a di alecti cal reconci l i ati on of conservative, radi cal , and
l i beral traditions i n modern thought. Sci enti f c soci ol ogy, in Durkhei m's
concepti on of i t , ha d thi s ambi ti ous, perhaps unreal i sti c, rati onal i st dream
as its foremost practi cal goal .
One t hi ng was bl i ndi ngl y cl ear. Durkhei m became i ncreasingl y convi nced
that modern soci ety was signifcantly pathological. In what sense was he a
conservative? He was definitely not a reactionary tradi ti onal i st or, for that
matter, a protofasci st. He di d not advocate the restoration of monarchy,
feudal relations, aristocratic val ues, an established church, or medi eval ver
sions of corporati sm. Nor did he share the cultural despair of conservative
Chapter I Jntroduction 1 5
revolutionaries who felt an i ndiscrimi nate need to destroy all existing reali ties
i n order to clear the ground for a conservative utopi a. 1 3 Hi s thought reveals
no parallel to the fascist combi nati on of charismatic leader pri nci pl e, eli ti sm,
mass mobi l i zati on, mystical nati onali sm, scapegoating of an out-group, and
totalitarian integration of t he in-group under racial ( or other group) privi lege
and party di ctatorship. Despi te thei r i deal i zed aspect, moreover, his studi es of
"primitive" soci eti es do not display the obscurantist sort of neoli thi c nostalgia
that mi ght make the individual a dupe of authoritarian pol i ti cal movements
ostensibly hol di ng forth the value of communi ty.
I hi s own France, t he viewpoi nt of Charl es Maurras and t he Acti on
Francai se, i nspi red by a reacti on agai nst t he Dreyfusard posi ti on and the
republ i can form of gover nment whi ch Durkhei m supported, was anti theti cal
to hi s own outl ook. Nor did Durkhei m share wi th the authori tarian Comte,
whom Maurras fol l owed, a hi gh esti mati on of what Comte cal l ed the "Im
mortal Retrograde School " of M ai stre and Bonal d. Comte, accordi ng to
Durkhei m, was hi s master i n soci ol ogy. And the "organi c" concepti on
of soci ety, whi ch asserted the group to be "pri or" t o the i ndi vi dual , was
shared by a soci ol ogical t radi t i on t hat i ncl uded Mai stre, Bonal d, Com t e,
and Durkhei m. But Durkhei m departed from Mai stre and Bonal d, on the
one hand, and from Comte, on the other, i n hi s prescri pti ons for modern
soci ety. When D urkhei m referred to the rei gn of moral authori ty i n the
normal soci ety, he referred to the i mpersonal authori ty of norms compati bl e
wi th autonomy and reci proci ty, not authori tari an hi erarchi es or the el i t i st
s ubordi nati on of certai n groups to other groups i n modern soci ety. And
the rights of the i ndi vi dual were part and parcel of any l egi ti mate modern
soci al order. Hi s pri mary sources i n thi s respect were Kant and the Rousseau
whom Kant admired. Durkhei m's rati onalism served t o obvi ate the anxi ety
ri dden l ongi ng for order that had prompted Comte to propose a ri gi dl y
authori tari an system amalgamating cul tural debri s of the ecclesi asti cal past,
propheti cally technocrati c features, and i di osyncrasies of hi s own personal
bi ography. For Durkhei m, t he i nsti tuti onal l essons of t h e past were rel evant
to the present only i f they were adapted to the condi ti ons and val ues of the
present, i ncl udi ng democracy and the rights of the i ndi vi dual .
Moreover, Durkhei m di d not bel i eve that any status quo mi ght be pre
sumed to embody the tradi ti onal wi sdom of the ages that deserved to be
transmi t ted wi t h onl y mi nor modi f cati on from generati on t o generati on.
Thi s assumpti on appl i ed i n vari abl e ways onl y to the normal state of soci ety
and ha d at best onl y l i mi ted appl i cati on even to a transformed moderni ty
i n whi ch there woul d conti nue to be a rol e for cri ti cal questi oni ng. In a
pathol ogi cal state, thi s assumpti on converted conservatism from a l i vi ng
force i nto a tragi comi c atti tude detached from soci al real i ti es and conduci ve
to stereotyped reacti ons to si tuati ons of cri si s.
Durkhei m was not a s i mpl e status quo conservati ve. He was what
may be cal l ed a phi l osophi cal conservative. He desi red the emergence and
mai ntenance of a si gni f candy stabi l i zed state of soci ety t hat deserved t o
be t he b as i s of hi stori cal conti nui ty and personal commi tment. Durkhei m
was not a pure opti mi st . For hi m the perfect soci ety was an i mpossi bl e
dream. But he di d affrm the val ue of a state of soci ety that was rel ati vel y
harmoni ous and i n whi ch anomi e was conf ned to margi nal proporti ons.
I n this "normal " state of soci ety, the mi nds and hearts of peopl e woul d be
uni ted, a nd freedom woul d be reconci l ed wi th a normati vely i ngrai ned
sense o f l i mi ts.
In t he context of modern soci eti es, Dur khei m's conservati sm was
di scr i mi nat i ngl y radi cal a nd often future-ori e nted. He di d see el ements
i n modern soci ety that genui nel y deserved to be conti nued, better coor
di iuted, and strengthened: consti tuti onal i sm, i ndi vi dual ri ghts, soci al sol
i dari ty, representative government, and a certai n type of di vi si on of labor.
But he also real i zed that i n certain areas of modern l i fe the basi c probl em
was the absence of l egi ti mate tradi ti ons that mi ght pl ausi bl y clai m rati onal
commi tment and "sacred" respect. In these areas, Durkhei m -as analyst,
prophet, and lawgiver -longed for the creati on of i nsti tuti ons that woul d
bri dge t he gap between reason and senti ment and open t he way to a li vable,
stabi l i zed soci al envi ronment i n whi ch onl y the i ncorri gibly cri mi nal and the
extraordi nari l y creative woul d not be b asi cally conservative. Unlike many
conservatives i n modern hi story, he di d not reconci l e hi mself to a posi t i on
of tragic resi gnati on or resentful grumbl i ng i n t he face of rapi dl y changi ng
real i ti es that contradi cted h i s values. To achi eve stab i l i zati on, consensus,
and f exi bly tradi ti onal i sti c ends i n cri ti cal areas of soci ety marked by si g
ni ficant, if "transiti onal , " condi ti ons of soci al pathol ogy, he bel i eved that
structural reform was i mperati ve. In a sense, Durkhei m was a structural
reformer sel ectively open to radi cal i deas s o that one day peopl e mi ght be
authenti cally cons ervative i n good consci ence.
Durkhei m i s j ustly remembered as a severe cri ti c of uti l i tari ani sm and
classical l i beral i sm. But from the l i beral tradi ti on he di d accept the i dea that
the hi ghest values of modern soci ety i ncl ude the ri ghts of the i ndi vi dual
and parl i amentary control . He also defended a speci fc sort of pl urali sm
- what might be called a normative pl ural i sm. He did not present the
competi ti on of sel f-i nterested groups as the desi rabl e end state of modern
soci ety. Thi s woul d amount to a substi tuti on of soci ol ogi cal uti l i tari ani sm
for the i ndi vi dual i sti c uti l i tari ani sm of the past -a soci ol ogi cal uti l i tari an
i sm that was often compati bl e wi th i ndi vi dual i sol ati on and self-seeki ng.
Durkhei m's concrete goal was the formati on of co-operative communal
groups control l ed by norms under the aegi s of the democrati c state. Thi s
was the basi s of hi s defense of secondary groups medi at i ng rel ati ons be
tween the i ndi vi dual and the state, notabl y i n the form of a revitalized
corporati sm resp ectful of i ndi vi dual l i berti es. What he radi cal l y rejected
in classical l i beral i sm was the anti -communal i deol ogy that associ ated uni
versal human rights and personal di gni ty wi th atomi sti c i ndi vi dual i sm and
self-centered egoi sm, especi al l y i n possessi vely economi c forms. He came
to see unl i mi ted growth, proft maxi mi zat i on, and u nregul ated economi c
rel ati ons as cruci al causes o f modern soci al pathol ogy. I t mi ght b e said that
Durkhei m i denti f ed the "economi c rati onal i ty" of the economi sts wi th a
promi nent case of soci al i rrati onal i ty. For hi m, the i ndi vi dual referred to by
the pri nci pl es of t he French Revol uti on was not t he acqui si tive calculator or
possessive i ndi vi dual i st who l ooked upon l i fe as an exercise i n pre-empti ng
things wi th a sovereign "mi ne. " Ulti mately, Durkhei m came to argue that
the val uabl e core of i ndi vi dual i sm was a humani sti c, responsi bl e autonomy
that compl emented the commi tment to communi ty and reci proci ty rooted
i n the conscience colective.
The most probl emati c el ements i n Durkheim's practi cal i deas stemmed
from features of hi s thought whi ch Karl Mannhei m i denti f ed as charac
teri sti c of l i beral humani tari ani sm. 1 4 These elements severely compromi sed
Dur khei m's structural refor mi s m and hi s phi l osophi cal conservati sm. They
may be reduced to four tendenci es: ( 1 ) the tendency, especi ally i n hi s earl y
thought, to provide an i ns uffci entl y concrete penetrati on into the real
conf icts, tensi ons, and ambi gui ti es of soci al l i fe; ( 2) the tendency through
out hi s thought to neglect the probl em of means of real i zi ng the ends he
advocated; ( 3) the tendency, especially in hi s i ncreasingly pronounced social
1 8 Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher
metaphysi c, to i ndul ge i n a vague, contempl ati ve vi si on of i deal s stand
i ng above soci al real i ti es; and ( 4) the tendency t o rely on an evol uti onary
opti mi sm whi ch envi saged a progressive approxi mati on of these i deal s i n
some unspeci f ed future.
These tendenci es mi ght wel l have been embodi ed i n a revi si oni st at
ti tude toward Marx, as they were t o some extent i n t he thought of Eduard
Bernstei n. In Durkhei m, however, they were conjoi ned wi th what mi ght be
cal l ed a ri tual avoi dance of Marx Y For very often the absence of Marx or,
conversely, the hi dden presence of Marx as a si lent pariah i nterlocutor haunted
Durkhei mi sm. When he di d address himself to Marx's thought, Durkhei m
attempted to si tuate Marxism as an i deology whi l e i gnori ng Marx's theoretical
contri but i on. Thi s attitude toward Marx exacerbated s ome of the greatest
defects of Durkhei m, especi al l y hi s i nadequate treatment of the role of the
economy, of classes, and of group conf ict i n social life. One problem to
which Durkhei m never convi nci ngl y addressed hi msel f was central: whether
a Marxist-type analysis (especi ally a cri ti cal theory of a market-based com
modi ty system) was i n signi fcant measure sti ll relevant to the understandi ng
of endur i ng probl ems i n soci ety under advanced i ndustri al i s m, and, i f i t was,
how i t could be related to the i ssues whi ch for Durkhei m were paramount.
This was a probl em that remai ned even i f the concepti on of cl ass conf ict and
i ts revol uti onary potenti al i n t he speci f c form i n whi ch Marx presented i t
was becomi ng i ncreasi ngly irrelevant. (It i s also a probl em that has acqui red
i ncreased sali ence si nce the collapse of exi sti ng communist states and the
tri umphal i st celebration of a seemi ngly fated conj uncti on of capi tali sm and
liberal democracy bound up with market forces. )
Li ke Marx, Durkhei m tri ed to i nt egrate a cri ti que of poli ti cal economy
German specul ative phi l osophy, and the French soci al i st tradi ti on in a com
prehensi ve theory of the genesi s and functi oni ng of modern soci ety. Agai n,
l i ke Marx, he of ten percei ved hi story -especi al l y modern hi story -as the
story of soci al pathol ogy. And, i n contrast to theorists with a "value-neutral "
concepti on of soci al sci ence, Durkhei m saw a li nk between theory and prac
tice. But hi s anti pathy toward Marx prevented a balanced esti mate of Marx' s
achi evement and of the actual role off actors through which Marx expl ai ned
the hi stori cal process. Durkhei m fel l far short of the profound feeli ng for
tragedy whi ch dramati cally informed Marx's readi ng of hi story, and whi ch
gave an heroi c cast to hi s i dea of a di al ecti cal "overcoming" of t he burdens of
Chapter I Jntroduction 19
the past. Unl i ke Marx, moreover, Durkhei m rarely di spl ayed a telling sense
of the concrete with which to bring to l i fe (and temper with life's nuances)
hi s anal yti cal models and stati sti cal surveys ; and he rarel y was abl e to grasp
i magi nati vely the devel opmental possi bi l i ti es of a compl ex set of i nteracti ng
factors i n soci ety as a whole over ti me. One fnds no Eighteenth Brumaire
among Durkhei m's works. Marx had both an i nci sive sense of hi story and
an al most canni bal i sti c sense of i rony. Durkheim's more abstract and staid
approach lacked these cutti ng edges.
Signi fcantly, Durkheim shared Marx's i deol ogi cal bl i ndness to questions
of gender and assumed a basically traditional role for women i n society even
when his own analyses i ndi cated the possi bi li ty of a cri ti que of dubi ously
gendered rel ati ons. "Man" i Durkhei m, as i n Marx, can often be read li terally
as well as metonymically. The Marx whom Durkheim especi al l y abhorred
was the Marx who advocated cl ass conf ict and vi ol ent revoluti on i n modern
soci ety. In contrast with Marx, Durkhei m vi ewed modern soci ety - and
parti cul arly his own France, whi ch was always his center of reference - as
sufering from severe but transi tional symptoms of pathology and offering
the possi bi l ity of soci al justi ce wi thout recourse to vi ol ent revol ut i on. Thi s
primary focus upon the conception of modern soci ety as passing through a
pathol ogical state of rapid transi ti on on the way to normali ty was crucial for
the shape of Durkheim's thought as a whol e. For Durkhei m, modern soci ety
was experiencing, not death throes, but prolonged and di sruptive bi rth pangs.
Marx had mixed hi s metaphors and mi staken the nature and direction of
modern soci ety.
If Marx was both too pessi mi sti c in his i dea of the hi stori cal evol uti on of
the i ndustriali zed West toward col l apse ( at l east i n terms of the preci se pro
cesses he emphasized) and too opti mi sti c i n hi s messianic fai th i n sociocultural
regeneration after apocalyptic upheaval, Durkhei m combi ned extreme pes
si mi sm about the potenti al of the i ndi vi dual "l eft to hi msel f" with extreme
opti mi sm concerni ng the abi l i ty of modern soci ety to resolve the severe
probl ems presented to it i n the course of h i st ory. Thi s fal se opti mi sm, which
vacillated between the mechani sti cal l y sober and the euphorically i nfated,
generated i n Durkheim an ai r of complacency that was al l evi ated onl y by
genui ne concern and a devoti on to soci al acti on. Durkhei m often seemed
able to snatch the spi ri t of normal i ty from the j aws of anomi e. Despi te hi s
sensi ti vi ty to possi bl e abortive miscarriages i n the devel opment of moder
soci ety, he had an al most rel i gi ous fai th i n the evol uti on of modern soci ety,
on the whol e and i n good ti me, toward j usti ce and reason. If Durkhei m's
soci al i deal i sm at t i mes i ncl uded el ements of pol i ti cal naivete, he at least
recogni zed problems in the modern status quo that certain of hi s epi goni
preferred to overl ook. And the least questi onabl e aspect of his fai th in a strai n
i ng toward normal i ty and soci al sani ty i n modern life was the assumpti on
that the reformer wi th constructive i ntenti ons -even when he or she fai l ed
to be moved by the spi ri t - mi ght be constrai ned to accept opti mi sm as
somewhat a soci al duty.
A fnal remark shoul d i ndi cate the general concepti on of Durkhei m's
thought which informs this study. The i dea of soci ol ogy as a l i fe science
i mpl i ed for Durkhei m a fdel i ty to the l i vi ng. I n h i s l ast maj or work, whi ch
treated the vanishing reli gion of Australian abori gi nes, Durkhei m seemed to
be very far from his i ni ti al i nspi rati on. In one sense, the very opposi te was
true. In the opening pages of Les Formes tlmentaires de Ia vie religieuse ( The
Eementary Forms of the Religious Lie), Durkhei m asserted:
Soci ol ogy rai ses other probl ems than h i story and et hnography. I t does
not seek to know the bygone forms of ci vilizati on wi th the sol e end of
knowing and reconstituting them. Instead, li ke every posi rive science,
i t has as i ts object the explanati on of a present reali ty, near to us and
thus abl e t o afect our acti ons: Thi s reali ty is man and, more precisely,
the man of today, for there is none ot her whom we are more i nterested
in knowi ng. Th us, we wi l l not study t he very archai c rel i gi on t hat is
our subject for the sole pleasure of recounti ng i ts b i zarre and singular
features. If we have taken archai c rel i gi on as our obj ect of research, i t
i s because i t appeared to us more a pt than any other i n allowi ng us
to understand the rel i gi ous nature of man, which i s to reveal to us
an essenti al and permanent aspect of huma n nature.
1 6
The theoretical goal of The Elementary Forms was to arrive at a general
notion of culture and society through an i ntensi ve analysi s of reli gi ous sym
boli sm and its rel ati on to solidari ty. But the more speci fc obj ect preoccupying
Durkheim was hi s idea of the "moral medi ocrity" of modern soci ety and hi s
desi re to learn somethi ng of basi c value from the "savages" before thei r forms
of l i fe were uprooted by a ci vi l i zati on whose mode of advance was often symp
tomati c of its moral medi ocrity. At times this i ntenti on of the moraliste l ed
Durkhei m to perceive "primi tive" societies through a superfcial type of beni gn
reverse ethnocentrism: he focused upon abstracted features in "primi tive" li fe
which he felt were missing in modern soci ety but vital to all normal soci ety.
Hi s analysis of religious bel i ef and ri tual i n "pri mi ti ve" soci eti es reduced these
phenomena to selected aspects which accorded most wi th hi s lifelong moral
concern with creating legitimate institutions in modern society and his latter
day sensitivity to the uni versal need for signif cant communi ty. The Elementay
Forms was the summa of Durkhei m's written works. In a larger context, i t was
but the preface to his might-have-been chef-d' oeuvre, "La Moral e, " whi ch
Marcel Mauss accurately characterized as the "but de son exi stence, fond de
son esprit" (the goal of hi s exi stence, the substance of hi s mi nd) . 1 7 A curi ous
abstractness reachi ng out wi th el usive feel i ng for huma sol i di ty i n val ues and
moral soli darity i n people; a Cartesi ani zed, soci ali zed, and so mew hat mystifed
neo-Kantianism of a rabbi manque who had stoically i mperturbabl e good wi l l
-these were often the most apparent quali ti es of Durkhei mi sm.
22 Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosophe
Notes
1 . "Cours de sci ence soci al e: Leon d' ouverture, " Rwue internationale de
f'enseignement, X ( 1 888) , 45.
2. Letter t o Georges Davy; quoted i n Davy, "Durkhei m, " Revue ftanraise de
s ociologie, I ( 1 960 ) , 1 0.
3 . "Sociologie religieuse et theorie de I a connai ssance, " Reuue de mhaphys ique
et de morale, XII ( 1 909) , 755-756.
4. Ibid. , p. 758.
5. A superfcial review of the major orientations and di ffculties of some of the
most important interpretations ofDurkheim will give the reader a sense of the
problem. In his monumental The Structure of Social Action (frst pub. 1 937;
Glencoe, I l l . : Free Press, 1 949) , Talcott Parsons presented Durkheim's thought
as caught in an unresolved tensi on between early positi vism and latter-day
idealism as it tortuously worked its way toward convergence with other vol
untaristic theories of social action. (Parsons' ideas formed the basis for the
treatment of Durkheim in H. Stuart Hughes's infuential Conscious ness and
Societ [New York: Knopf; 1 958] . ) In hi s Es s ais de sociologie (Paris: Sirey, n. d. ) ,
Georges Gurvitch saw i n Durkheimism a deni al of social science itself i n the
attempt to construct a "metamorality. " Accordi ng to Gurvitch, Durkheim
transfgured society into a modern contender for the traditional role ofl ogos.
In his i dea of the relation of soci ology to phi losophy, Durkhei m was li ke
Col umbus, who discovered America whi l e sai li ng for the Indi es. Gurvitch
denied the validity of the integral bond between methodology and philosophy
in Durkheim' s idea of social science. With typical vi rtuosity, Claude Levi
Strauss has termed himself an "i nconstant disciple" of Durkheim and has
treated his thought over the years with a combination of wholesale praise and
retail criticism. Still, his thought, like that ofPierre Bourdieu, woul d not be
conceivable without the role of Durkheim and the Annie school. Yet Ray
mond Aron, whose interpretive ski l l is often beyond comparison, gave what
seemed to be a counsel of despair. In his Eta pes de Ia pens e s ocio!ogique (Pari s :
Callimard, 1 967) , he observed, after a s eriatim commentary on the texts, that
he had found himself forced to resort frequently to direct quotation, not to
i l l ustrate substantive points of an argument but, on the contrary, because
he fel t "a certain di ffculty in entering into Durkheim's way of thought, no
doubt because of a lack of sympathy necessary for understanding" (p. 360) .
In hi s i mportant Emile Durkheim: His LUe and Work (London: Penguin,
1 973) , which appeared at about the same ti me a the original edi tion of the
Chapte I Intoduction 23
present book, Steven Lukes employed a combination of analytic philosophy
i n the parsi ng of Durkhei m's concepts, neopositivistic empiricism i n the
chronological recounti ng of diverse biographical and contextual facts, and
synoptic content analysis i n the readi ng of texts . The result i s an encyclope
di c compendi um f lled with useful i nformation but not itself i nformed or
motivated by a sustained, thought-provoking argument. See also the essays
in Emile Durkheim: Critical As s es s ments , ed. Peter Hamilton (London: Rout
ledge, 1 990) and Debating Durkheim, ed. \ S. F Pi ckeri ng and H. Martin
(London: Routledge, 1 994) .
6. Les Regles de I mehode sociologique ( 1 5t h ed. ; Paris: Presses U niversitaires de
France, 1 963 ) , p. ix.
7. "La Sociologie e n France a u XXe si ecl e, " Reuue bleue, 4th series, XI I I ( 1 900) ,
65 1 .
8 . 0 n this problem, see Herbert Marcuse, Eros and CiZilization (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1 9 55) , chap. ix.
9. Robert K. Merton's discussi on probably remains the most concise and useful
examination of functional analysis i n sociology. Merton stresses the i mpor
tance of the concept of "dysfunction" for the study of social confi ct (Social
Theory and Social Structure [rev. ed. ; Glencoe, I l l . : Free Press of Glencoe,
1 9 64] , chap. i; repr. as chap. iii of On Theoretical Sociolog [New York: Free
Press, 1 967] ) . It would be interesting to relate Durkheim's conception of
anomi e to recent approaches to trauma. On the latter issue, see my Writing
History, Writing Tauma (Baltimore: The Johns Hopki ns University Press,
200 1 ) and His tory and Reading: TocqueZile, Foucault, French Studies (To
ronto: University ofToronto Press, 2000) . l ndeed trauma i s an often socially
based, psychological dimension of extreme disorientation on which Durkheim
touched but which he did not extensively explore.
1 0. "La Soci ol ogi e en France au X Xe si ecle, " p. 649.
1 1 . "Soci ol ogi e et sciences soci ales, " i n De Ia methode dans l es sciences (Pari s:
Alcan, 1 909) , p. 266.
1 2. Les Regles de Ia methode sociologique, p. 47.
1 3 . See Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair ( frst pub. 1 96 1 ; Garden
Ci ty, N. Y. : Doubleday, 1 965) .
1 4. Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1 936) , pp. 2 1 9-229.
1 5 . Durkheim's attitude was i n marked contrast t o Max Weber's open reckoning
with Marx. It is signifcant that Durkheim and Weber i ndi cated no knowledge
of each other's work. See Edward Tiryakian, "A Problem for the Sociology of
Knowledge: The Mutual Unawareness of Emi l e Durkheim and Max Weber, "
ArchiZes europeennes de sociologie, VII ( 1 966) , 330- 336. Tiryakian correctly
notes the reason why Durkheim and Weber should have been interested in
each other's work, e. g. , their conviction concerning the i mportance of religion
i n social lif e. But, in accounting for their "mutual unawareness, " he stresses the
role of exogenous factors such as opposi ng national allegiances. He does not
investigate the relation of seri ous intellectual differences to "mutual unaware
ness" or, perhaps, mutual avoidance. One basi c difference was on the i ssue of
the ethical neutrality of soci al science. One mi ght hazard the generalizati on
that, on s ubj ects extending from epistemology to pol i ti cs, the differences
between Durkheim and Weber were between a thinker who was traditional,
phi losophically conservative, opti mi stically reformi st, and sometimes naive
and one who was modern, heroic, irreducibly tragic, and at times fatal i sti c.
(Tiryakian, i n hi s Sociologism and Estentialism [Englewood Cli ffs, N.J . :
Prentice-Hall, 1 962] , gives a thoughtful, i f brief, analysi s o f Durkheim's
thought, stressing the i mportance of hi s conception of the relation between
society and morality.) Alvin Gouldner, i n his generally i nsi ghtful i ntroduc
ti on to Socialism (New York: Collier Books, 1 962) , makes two exaggerated
assertions that are opposed, if not contradictory, to one another. Gouldner
sees Durkheim as attempting to build a bridge between the traditions of
Comte and Marx in sociology. But he also presents Durkheim as concerned
with the "f ne-tuni ng" of modern soci ety. I would maintain that at least
some bases for integrating Durkheim and Marx do exist but that Durkheim
himself di d relatively little to bui l d upon them. This was true, for example,
of the problem of relating anomie to class or, more generally, group confict.
But to characterize Durkheim' s idea of needed reforms as "fne-tuning" is
extreme. Durkheim increasingly believed that the problems besetting modern
society were severe. One might well argue that hi s proposed reforms were
excessively vague or inadequate for solving the problems he perceived. But
they were basi c, at least i n certain respects. It i s true, however, that Durkheim
believed modern society would naturally evolve in the direction of"normal
ity, " certainly without violent revoluti on.
1 6. Les Formes elmentaires de Ia vie religieuse (frst pub. 1 9 1 2; 4th ed. ; Pari s:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1 980 ) , pp. 1 -2 .
1 7 . " I n Memoriam: LOeuvre inedite de Durkheim et de ses collaborateurs, "
Amzee sociologique, n. s . , I ( 1 923) , 9.
2
Durkheim' Milieu
Once one has established the eistence of an evil, what it consists of and on what
it depends, when one knows in consequence the general characteristics of the
remedy, the essential thing is not to draw up in advance a plan which fresees
everything; it is to get resolutel to work.
-Suicide
To hi stori ci ze D urkheim' s i deas by restricting thei r range to hi s own i m
medi ate experience and soci al context woul d obvi ously be to lose si ght of thei r
broader rel evance. But it is i nformati ve for reasons of h i stori cal perspecti ve
to si tuate Durkhei m i n hi s own soci al mi l i eu. And the effort is prompted by
Durkheim's tendency to take hi s own soci ety as a test case of the needs of
modern soci ety in general. The broadly ethi cal and phi l osophi cal i mpetus
behi nd Durkheim's thought must be i n the forefront of any approach to hi s
i deas. For hi m the probl em of a j ust soci al order i n modern society presented
itself very much in the light of rational speci fcati on of the pri nci pl es of the
French Revol ut i on i n terms which woul d enabl e people to humani ze and
absorb the i ndustri al revol ut i on. The moral mi ssi on of soci ology i tsel f was
to provide, through an analyti c and comparative study of i nsti tuti ons and
values, ori entati on i n reaching thi s goal. By and large, Durkhei m's l i fe was
a subdued and i ntellectualized passi on devoted to thi s task -scientifc and
moral at the same ti me.
Durkh ei m was born i n 1 8 5 8 i n the town of Epi nal , i n t he province of
Lorrai ne, and di ed in 1 9 1 7 . Ceded to the Germans i n 1 87 1 , the Alsace-Lor
rai ne region housed both the most tradi ti onal i st enclave of French Jewry and
one of the most ardent centers of F rench patri otism. It was returned to F ranee
only at the end of the First World War.
Durkhei m grew up at a ti me when the Jewi sh ghettos of eastern France
were rapi dly breaki ng up. 1 The di si ntegrati on of these communi ti es posed the
threat of soci al unsettl ement and personal di sori entati on whi ch Durkhei m
later was t o analyze i n terms of anomi e. To thi s probl em was added t he l oss
of patrie for those s ufferi ng the consequences of the Franco-Prussi an War.
The early death of hi s father i mposed upon t he young Durkhei m t he
responsi bi li ti es of a che de fmille. Accordi ng to fami li al tradi ti on, D urkhei m
was desti ned to fol l ow i n his father's footsteps by becomi ng a rabbi . Of
course, he was not to fol l ow l i terally the wi shes of hi s family. He was never
to make an express commi tment to any establi shed reli gi ous i nsti tuti on. But
those who found an agnosti c temperament i n Durkhei m i denti fed rel i gi ous
sent i ment wi th ort hodox bel i ef i n a personal dei ty or wi th otherworl dl y
transcendental i sm-questi onabl e i denti fcati ons that Durkheim took pai ns
to di spel i n hi s own def ni ti on of the rel i gi ous phenomenon. The rel ati on
between rel i gi on and soci ety that Durkhei m tri ed to establ i sh theoreti cally
had an analogue i n the personal i ty of this founder of modern soci ol ogy. The
one theme that recurs i n the remi ni scences of hi s fri ends i s the profound
rel i gi os i ty and t he sense of myst i que r unni ng li ke an undercurrent in h i s
di al ecti cal rigor and rati onal i sm. As hi s cl ose fri end Georges Davy recal l ed:
"Thi s convinced rati onal i st always kept, on the fri nge of the orthodoxy of
hi s mi l i eu, a sort of fundamental rel i gi osi ty whi ch took on the al l ure of
mysti ci sm when, wi th t he i mpassi oned ardor of a prophet, he expounded
hi s doctri ne. " 2 And here i s the testi mony of t he founder of the Revue de
nu!taphysique et de morale, Durkhei m's good fr i end Xavi er Leon: "Thi s face
and thi s body of an asceti c, the glowing l i ght of a l ook profoundly buri ed
i n t he orbi t of hi s eye, the ti mbre and the accent of a voi ce ani mated by an
ardent faith that i n thi s hei r of the prophets burned wi th the desi re to forge
and temper the convi cti on of li steners . " l
One sequence of events in Durkhei m's l i fe st ood out wi t h speci al prom
i nence. Durkhei m was not known for hi s sense of humor or taste for irony.
In part , t h e l ack was due to th e i nt el l ectual pur i ty, classi cal restrai nt, and
moral i ncentive of hi s thought. But Durkhei m's outl ook was also i ndi cative
of a strai tlaced tendency to i denti f seri ousness of purpose with sol emnity.
Davy has remarked that Durkhei m's austere concepti on ofl i fe "perhaps even
went to the poi nt of preventing hi m from enjoying wi t hout scrupl es any
pleasure except the Spi noza-l i ke j oy whi ch is brought by enthusi asm for an
Chapte 2 Durkheim' Milieu 27
i dea. "4 The sol e recorded instance of humor and i rony i n Durkhei m's l i fe
was self-di rected, and i t i nvolved religi on. In a rare pun, Durkhei m played
upon the ambigui ty of the French word chaire ("academi c's chai r, " "church
pul pi t ") . Passing in front of Notre Dame Cathedral , Durkhei m turned to a
colleague, Cel esti n Bougie, and remarked, "It's from a chai r like that, that
I ought to be speaki ng. "5
Durkhei m's life seems domi nated by a strong sense of di sci pl i ne that kept
the man together whi l e the academi c moved steadi l y from rung to rung up
the professi onal ladder and ul ti matel y t o a professorshi p at the Sorbonne.
A a young man, however, Durkhei m experi enced a number of cri ses that
revealed how he combi ned a st rong mi nd wi t h a fragi l e and anxi ous spi ri t .
Under the i nfuence of a Cath ol i c i ns tructress, for exampl e, he under went
a passi ng i nfatuati on wi th mysti ci sm. 6 I n Pari s, he prepared for the Ecole
Normale Superi eure at the Lycee Loui s-l e-Grand and lived at the Pensi on
J auffret, where he formed hi s lifelong fri endshi p wi th JeanJaures. But hi s l i fe
at the pensi on was full of angui sh and left him wi th bad memori es. 7 He was
admi tted to the Ecole Normale after having fai l ed two years i n successi on
to place hi gh e nough i n the entrance exami nat i on.
Durkhei m entered t he Ecol e Nor mal e i n 1 879. "Lanson, S. Rei nach and
Levy- Bruhl had j ust been graduated. Bergson, Jaures and Belot had entered
the year before. Rauh and Mauri ce Blonde! were to be admi tted two years
later. Pi erre Janet and Go bl ot entered al ong with Durkhei m. It i s not an
exaggerati on, the ref ore, to say that a veri tabl e phi losophi cal renai ssance was
germi nati ng at the Ecol e Normale. " 8 But once he was fnally i n the Ecol e,
Durkhe im's atti tude was hi ghly ambi val ent. I n hi s l ast year a grave i l l ness
whi ch may have been psychosomati c i n ori gi n compromi sed hi s chances for
the agegation, in which he was nonethel ess received next to l ast. '1
In retrospect, Durkhei m felt that the Ecol e Normal e was a "sci enti fc
and soci al mi l i eu of excepti onal val ue, " and he sent hi s son there. 1 0 He
retai ned a lasti ng respect for two of hi s professors: the hi stori an Fustel de
Coul a nges and the ph i l osopher Emi l e Boutroux. To Fustel , who preceded
Durkhei m i n the advocacy of the comparative met hod and the concepti on
of the i mportance of rel i gi on i n soci al life, Durkhei m dedi cated hi s Latin
thesi s on their common i ntel l ectual ancestor, Montesqui eu. To Boutroux,
who i mpressed Durkhei m most by hi s "penetrati ng and obj ective way of
reconsti tuti ng and rethi nki ng systems, renewi ng and fo undi ng sci enti fcally
before hi s students the hi story of phi l osophy, "1 1 Durkheim dedi cated hi s
thesi s on "The Di vi si on of Labor. "
At a deeper psychologi cal l evel , however, Durkhei m di d not f nd the
Ecol e Normal e al together to hi s l i ki ng. The i mpressi oni st i c humani sm and
di l ettanti sm whi ch he had found repul si ve in cagne (the hi gh school class
prepari ng students for the Ecole Normal e exami nati on) were domi nant
traits of the Ecol e i tself. More i mportant, he i nsti nctively drew back from
the superci l i ous snobbery and defensi ve ai r of noblesse o blige i n an overly
self-consci ous i ntel l ectual el i te.
Hi s i ntel l i gence, sober and avi d for subst anti al trut h, hel d i n horror
the l i terary persi fage and i roni c tone so often to be found i n the
conversati on of the students at the Ecol e Normal e [ normaliens] . . . .
"I h ave seen hi m ( M. Hol l eaux recounts) wi sh ardentl y for the end
of the school year, for vacati on ti me, the moment when he woul d
be abl e t o l i ve agai n among ' good si mpl e peopl e' ( thi s was hi s ex
pressi on) . Absolutely si mpl e, he detested all affectati ons. Profoundly
seri ous, he hated banter [/e ton Iger] .
If many of Durkheim' s character traits recal l the austere Kant, others bri ng
to mi nd Rousseau. One of the happi est ti mes of hi s school years was when
he went i nt o the streets to mi ngle with the effervescent popul ace duri ng
the Jul y 1 4 festi vi t i esY The sense of communal warmth was a force whi ch
was i ncreasingly to break through the Cartesi ani zed neo-Kanti an su rface
of hi s thought, through its col d veneer of devoti on to duty. At the Ecol e
Normal e, moreover, Durkhei m formed several l asti ng and genui ne fri end
shi ps. Hi s fri end Mauri ce Hol l eaux remarked that "few peopl e real l y knew
hi m. Few realized that hi s severity covered al most femi ni ne sensitivity and
that hi s heart, a stranger to faci l e effusi ons of senti ment, encl osed a treasury
of tender goodness. " 1 3
Li nes l ater written by Durkhei m hi msel f about hi s good fri end Octave
Hamel i n coul d be appl i ed to the atti tudes of D urkheim's fri ends toward
their rel ati onshi p with Durkhei m hi mself. Hamel i n had died prematurel y
i n an absurd attempt to save the l i ves of unknown drowni ng peopl e i n spi te
of t he fact that he was unabl e to swi m. Durkhei m edi ted and made ready
for publ i cati on the book on Descartes whi ch Hamel i n never compl eted. In
words that evoke the sancti ty of intimacy i n fri endshi p, Durkhei m wrote of
Hamel i n: "A a man, we thi nk that he bel ongs enti rel y to hi s fri ends, who
pi ousl y keep the cul t of hi s memory. We woul d al most bel i eve that we had
defled hi s memory if we were to al l ow t he publ i c to penetrate the i nti macy
of an exi stence whi ch always Aed accl ai m and whi ch even hi d i tsel f from
the looks of others wi th a sort of j eal ous care. " ' 4
After leavi ng the Ecol e Normal e, Durkhei m was granted a peri od of
relati ve respi te to gather hi mself and hi s thoughts together. In accordance
wi th the tradi ti onal French practi ce that has t o a si gni f cant extent passed
out of exi stence, he began teachi ng at the secondary l evel before movi ng
on t o the uni versi ty. If the pri mary and secondary l evel s i n France repre
sented not stages i n the educati onal process as much as di fferent systems
of educat i on h i ghl y strati fed accordi ng to soci al cl ass, t h e secondar y and
the upper l evel s wer e strongl y i ntegrated wi t h each other. I ndeed, certai n
i ntel l ectual l eaders of the ti me , such as Al ai n, preferred to remai n at the
fcee l evel from a convi cti on that i t was the l ocus of more authenti c teach
i ng. From 1 8 82 to 1 8 8 7, Durkhei m taught at the fcees of Sens, Sai nt
Quenti n, and Troyes. In 1 8 8 5 - 1 8 8 6 , he t ook a year off from t eachi ng in
provi nci al fcees to st udy in Germany. ' 5 Thi s trip was un dertaken after a
conversation with Loui s Li ard, the Di rector of Hi gher Educati on ( Di recteur
de l ' Ensei gnement Superi eur) , a l i fel ong s upporter of Durkhei m. But i t
woul d be a mi stake to thi nk that Li ard showed any speci al or conspi rato
ri al favori t i sm toward Durkhei m. Rather, he saw i n Durkhei m a thi nker
whose convi ct i ons and i deas coi nci ded wi t h hi s own deep commi t ment
to t he renovati on of the French educat i onal system under the auspi ces of
the Republ i c. Li ard had been struck i n hi s own youth by the decadence
of e ducati on under the Second Empi re, and he shared the bel i ef of many
republ i can l eaders that educati onal i nferi ori ty had been a key factor i n
France' s defeat at the hands of the Germans. Thus Li ard' s furtherance of
Durkhei mi an soci ol ogy, whi l e not a uni que event i n hi s acti vel y i nnova
tive life as an admi ni strator, was rel ated to his i dea of the i nsti t uti onal and
mor al needs of the Republ i c.
In Germany, Durkhei m studi ed soci al sci ence and i ts rel ati on to et hi cs,
pri mari l y under the gui dance of Wi l hel m Wundt. He was consi derabl y
i mpressed by the efforts of Al bert Schaefe and the "soci ali sts of the chai r"
to devi se reforms of the economy i n accordance wi th the demands of soci al
ethi cs. Yet he al most cut hi s vi si t short i n order to retur preci pi tatel y to
France because of an overly scrupul ous fear that he woul d not be abl e to
deri ve from hi s stay i n Germany all that he expected. 1 6 Despi te hi s anxi ety,
publ i cati on of two articles based on hi s peri od of st udy i n Germany brought
Durkhei m to the attenti on of the broader publ i c Y The year 1 8 87 marked
the i nst i tut i on i n France of the frst university course i n soci al sci ence. It
was to be taught by Durkheim at the University of Bordeaux. The proposal
for thi s course was i n all probabi l i ty i ni ti ated by Alfred Espi nas, the author
of Les Societes animales and hi msel f a professor at Bordeaux, and it had the
support of Loui s Li ard. 1 8 The mi ni steri al decree, dated Jul y 20, 1 8 87, bore
the si gnature of Eugene Spul l er, who ten years earl i er had brought before
the Chamber of Deputi es the projet de loi of Jul es Ferry on the reform of
h i gher educati on.
Just before the appoi ntment a t Bordeaux, Durkhei m ha d marri ed. Ac
cordi ng to his fri end Davy, "Hi s choi ce coul d not have been happi er both
for hi mself and for the atmosphere of his work. " 1 9 The nature ofDurkhei m's
marriage is a bi ographi cal t opi c deservi ng of further research, for we know
l i t t l e about i t . I suspect that Davy's statement endeari ngly covers a rather
tradi t i onal relati ons hi p in whi ch the wi fe pl ayed a role one mi ght perhaps
i nfer from Durkhei m's t reat ment of ( or si gni fcant si l ences concerni ng)
women i n hi s publ i shed texts: a subordi nate rol e, at ti mes a tel l i ng absence,
i n vi rtue of whi ch women were confned to gendered acti vi ti es assumed to
be i n better keepi ng wi th t hei r nature and apti tudes. In any case, hi s wi fe
apparently had primary conjugal responsi bi li ty in cari ng for the chi l dren and
the househol d whi l e Durkhei m was acti ve as a schol ar and a professi onal .
Hi s wife's mai den name, port ent ously, was Dreyfus, but she does not seem
to have been related t o the famous Dreyfus whose defense Durkheim woul d
l ater take up. Wi th her Durkheim had two chi l dren, a boy and a gi rl .
In a l etter to Marcel Mauss ( who once descri bed Durkhei m as "the pro
fessi onal consci ence personi fed") , 2
0
Durkhei m wrote that he had "passed
hi s frst year of teachi ng at the Faculty i n a trance of unsuccess. "2 1 But, once
agai n, Dur khei m was be i ng excessively uneasy. At about the age of t h i rty,
he started to acqui re the securi ty and stabi l i ty that were probabl y necessary
for him to control his feel i ngs of anxi ety and begi n a peri od of enormous
producti vi ty and creati vi ty.
The frst ful l professorshi p and uni versi ty chai r i n soci al sci ence were
created for Durkhei m at Bordeaux i n 1 896. In 1 902 , he recei ved a call to
Chapte 2 Durkheim s Milieu 3 I
Pari s a a repl acement for hi s fel l ow educator and fri end Ferdi nand Bui s
son, who had been el ected to the Chamber of Deputi es. He was gi ven
Bui sson's chai r in the Sci ence of Educati on in 1 906. As Durkhei m's di sci pl e
Mauri ce Hal bwachs l ater phrased i t, soci ol ogy was not admi tted di rectl y
to the Sorbonne "but was i ntroduced i nto i t through the narrow gate of
pedagogy. "21 Indeed, throughout hi s career Durkhei m devoted from one
thi rd to two-thi rds of hi s teachi ng ti me to pedagogy. He di d not l ook upon
this as a waste of t i me, for he approached educati on soci ol ogi cally, as an
i nsti tuti on having the cruci al functi on of soci al i zi ng the chi l d i nt o t he larger
soci ety. By speci al decree i n 1 9 1 3 , the title of his chai r at the Sorbo nne was
changed to the Sci ence of Educati on and Soci ology. Comte's neol ogi sm,
barbari cal l y combi ni ng Greek logos and Lat i n societas, fnal l y gai ned offcial
recogni ti on in the Uni versi ty of France through the i nstrumental i ty of a
thi nker who questi oned the preponderant rol e of the cl assi cs in tradi ti onal
French educati on. Durkhei m was awarded the Lgion d'homeur but was
deni ed access to the Insti tut de France. Davy remarks that he recei ved news
of both events wi th the same detachment. 23 He had achieved the essenti al ;
t h e superfuous was unnecessary.
In Durkhei m's works, soci ol ogy underwent its "i denti ty cri si s. " Hence
hi s tendency to assert mi l i tantl y and even overstate hi s poi nt of vi ew. In
hi s own France, hi s attempt to found a di sci pl i ne was so successful that hi s
soci ol ogy emerged i n ti me as somewhat a "col l ective representati on. " As
an hi stori an sensitive to the i mportance of soci al theory observed al most a
decade after Durkhei m's death:
Such i ndeed has been the i nf uence of Durkhei m i n our Uni versi ty
that he seems to have monopoli zed soci ol ogy. The latter i n our
mi nd i s so closel y b o und up wi th t he work of Durkhei m that we
have al mos t become unabl e t o real i ze that i t can have an exi stence
beyond hi s works and those of hi s di sci pl es. I n our di scussi ons, i n
our manual s, Durkhei mi an soci ology and soci ol ogy tout court seem
to be more and more synonymous. 2
4
Durkhei m's i ntel l ectual l i fe coi nci ded wi th the fo undi ng and estab
l i shment of the Thi rd Republ i c, whose i ni ti al and more opti mi sti c phase
came to a tragi c end, l i ke Durkhei m's l i fe i tsel f, wi th the traumati c shock
of World War I . The events whi ch heral ded the comi ng of the Republ i c
- the debacl e of the Franco-Prussi an War, fol l owed by the agony of the
Pari s Commune -were i nterpreted by many republ i can l eaders as evi dence
of the i nteral i nstabi l i ty of the Second Empi re rather than as i nauspi ci ous
i ndi ces of conti nui ng foreign and domest i c probl ems. 25 Despi te the al most
mysti cal opt i mi sm engendered by t he mere durabi l i ty of the frst long-l i ved
democrati c republ i c in French hi story, Durkhei m hi mself placed at least
the recurrent domesti c upheavals i n France in the larger context of the
i ndustri al revol uti on and the turbul ent wake of the French Revol ut i on. As
he observed of Sai nt-Si mon's l ong-range, structural theory of European
and especi al l y French hi s tory, whi ch presented t he Revol uti on of 1 78 9 as
a phenomenon whi ch had destroyed certai n vestiges of the o l d order but
whi ch h ad mi scarri ed i n t h e creati on of t he new:
[After t he Revol uti on] royal authori ty was re-establ i shed. But these
revi vals of the past di d not consti tute a sol ut i on. So the probl em is
posed on the morrow of the Revol uti on, at the start of the ni neteenth
centuty, i n the same terms as on the eve of 1 789, onl y i t has become
more pressi ng. The denouement i s more urgent i f one does not wi sh
to see each cri si s produce another, exasperati on the chroni c state
of soci ety, and fnal ly, di si ntegrati on more or less the resul t. Ei ther
compl etel y restore the ol d system or organi ze t he new. It is preci sely
this that i s the social probl em.
As we vi ew i t, i t cannot be posed with greater profundi ty?
6
In the excel l ent j u dgment of Davi d Thomson, "The Thi rd Repub
l i c . . . was at heart an attempt to reconci l e the conf i cti ng forces of modern
France. "27 The republ i can i deal of a j ust modern consensus heal i ng the
wounds of hi story found no more ardent proponent than Durkhei m. 28 In
his i naugural l ecture at Bordeaux, Dur khei m stated his i ntensel y moral goal
i n no ambi guous terms:
Our soci ety must restore t he consci ousness of i ts organi c uni ty . . . .
No doubt these i deas wi l l become trul y effcaci ous only i f they spread
out into the dept hs of soci ety, b u t for that it i s f rst necessary that we
elaborate them sci enti fcal l y i n the u ni versi ty. To contri bute t o thi s
end to the extent of my powers wi l l be my pri nci pal concern, and I
shall have no greater happi ness than if I succeed in it a l i ttl e. 29
The real i ti es of the Thi rd Republ i c were of course less el evated, and
i ts operati onal consensus proved to be purel y negati ve. Astute, i f cynical,
observer-parti ci pants like Adol phe Thi ers were able t o see this fro m the very
begi nni ng. The monarchi st Ri ght, which in the 1 870s had proved unabl e
t o settl e upon a compromi se formul a reconci l i ng t he houses of Bourbon
and Orl eans, accepted t he Republ i c faute de mieux. After the Dreyfus Af
fair, resistance from the Ri ght be came i ncreasi ngly mi l i tant. The far Left
was equally unabl e to propose a constructive alternati ve to exi sti ng pol i ci es.
Between these two extremes, most of those who agreed upon a democrati c
and republ i can form of government di d so wi th the taci t assumpt i on t hat
pol i ti cs woul d not di st urb the basi c confgurati on of vested i nterests i n
soci ety. Symbol i cally, t he Fr ench l egi sl at ure hel d i ts meeti ngs i n a "house
wi thout wi ndows. " French l abor l egi slati on remai ned the most backward
of the "advanced" i ndustri al soci eti es. And French society conti nued to
be hi ghl y gendered and strati f ed, with li ttle equal i ty of opportuni ty, less
equality of reward, and no positive consensus on the l egi ti mate nature of the
social structure or pol i t i cal regi me. The boundari es of i nvi di ous di sti ncti on
between soci al l y di stant and uncooperati ve cl asses cont i nued to be defned
wi th r he Cartesi an ri gor so accurately descri bed by Tocquevi l l e i n hi s Ancien
regime. The youthful promi se of the Republ i c turned i ncreasingly into the
seni le real i ty of a detached, deadlocked democracy superi mposed upon a
stalemated soci ety. 30 In this context, there was l i ttl e chance of developi ng
soci al and poli ti cal i nsti t ut i ons whi ch coul d vi ably control t he di srupti ve
effe cts of the i ndustri al revol ut i on: memori es of the great Revol ut i on cre
ated expectati ons whi ch hei ghtened unrest.
The preci se nature of the economy and of i ts i mpact upon soci ety i n
Durkhei m's France i s a compl ex subj ect that engages experts i n debate. In
the famous di ctum of] ohn Cl apham, France underwent i ndustri al i zati on
wi thout havi ng a full-f edged i ndustri al revol ut i on. 3 1 The rate of economi c
change i n France unt i l the 1 950s was not comparabl e t o that of Ge rmany
or Engl and, but the degree of di spari ty has oft en been exaggerated.
Durkhei m tended to see the problem of i ndustri al i zati on wi thi n the
broad context of modern soci ety as a whol e. But , duri ng hi s own l i feti me,
the rate of change i n F ranee i tsel f, especi ally i n the concentrati on of i ndus tty,
was probabl y more rapi d than it had ever been, and its effects were qui t e
percept i bl e to the sensitive observer. I n fact, the unbal anced nature of the
economi c transformati on i n France exacerbated probl ems common to al l
i ndustri al soci eti es. The one area of modern l i fe i n whi ch t he fami l y retai ned
extensi ve soci al control i n France depended on the role of the bourgeoi s
fami l y frm i n the economy.32 In the large sector of t he economy domi nated
by relatively smal l family frms, producti on was restri cted and pri ces were
kept high to defend the social posi ti on and honor of the fami l y uni t. Thus
workers were depri ved even of the gai ns they mi ght have expected from
i ncreases i n producti vi ty and t he i mperatives of mass consumpt i on i n a
pri vatel y owned and operated economy. 33
In a famous criti que of the Annee sociologique school, A. L. Kroeber stressed
the repugnance of the Durkhei mi ans for feld work. 34 E. E. Evans-Pritchard
took up this pl ai nt and extended i ts scope: "One somet i mes si ghs - if
only Tyl or, Marett, Durkheim and the rest of them could have spent a few
weeks among the peopl e about whom they s freely wrote! "35 Whatever the
j usti ce of thi s sentiment wi th respect to Austral i an abori gi nes or American
Indi ans, i t overlooked the fact that a soci ol ogi st like Durkhei m di d have a
di rect "fel d" experi ence of one massive phenomenon in world history: the
transfor mat i on of modern soci eti es through i ndustri al i zati on. 3 6 The attempt
to make soci ological sense of the complex events he behel d frsthand was basic
to Durkheim's De La Division du tavail social and Le Suicide, and it remained
a fundamental i ssue in his Les frmes elmentaires de la vie religieuse.
Wi thi n the context of hi s own soci ety, Durkheim's i ntent was to el i mi nate
the basi c causes of soci al "pathology" and propose ways t o achi eve a posi tive
consensus through t he vi able reali zation of val ues adequate to the condi ti ons
of modern soci al life. Al though hi s own sphere of i mmedi ate concern was
largely confned to the educati onal system, Du rkhei m di d not bel ieve that
reforms restricted to the i ni ti atives of an educational and sci enti fc estate were
suffci ent. He undoubtedly shared Gambetta's bel i ef that a democratic repub
l i c could not endure "wi thout di stri buti ng educati on wi th both hands. "37 But
Durkhei m recognized clearly t hat uncoordi nated parti al responses to maj or
soci al probl ems woul d i n al l probabi l i ty aggravate pat hol ogi cal condi t i ons
i nstead of alleviating t hem. Changes i n educati on and i n the soci al atti tudes
of educators could be efecti ve only i n conjunction wi th changes of a basic
structural nature i n the pri mary source of social probl ems i n moderni ty-the
economi c and occupati onal spheres. Durkhei ms corporatist proposals were
addressed to this probl em.
A measure of posi ti ve consensus stemmi ng from si mi l ar soci al ori gi ns
and phi l osophi cal convi cti ons di d characterize the educati onal l eaders who
formed Durkhei m's i mmedi ate reference group. One fact emerges when
one exami nes the backgrounds of key fgures i n the educati onal system
who, like Durkhei m, were genui nel y commi t t ed to worki ng toward the
creat i on of a soci al and pol i ti cal order based upon republ i can i deal s. I n
di sproporti onatel y si gni f cant numbers, they were sel f- made men from
margi nal s oci al groups i n t radi t i onally Cat hol i c and status-consci ous
France. These men were afforded the opportuni ty to ri se to posi ti ons of
promi nence i n the nati on through the i nvol vement of more tradi ti onal
el i tes i n t he vi ci ssi tudes of the Second Empi re, the fut i l e maneuveri ngs
of pro- monarchists i n the 1 870s , and, mos t i mportant, the al l egi ance of
tradi ti onal el i tes to anti -republ i can i deol ogi es. Wi th the achi evement of
establ i shed posi ti ons, these newer men assumed an atti tude of" reasonabl e"
reformi sm that, especi al ly after the Dreyfus Affai r, was i ncreasingly open
to t he i nf uence of mysti que.
Durkhei m and certai n of hi s col l aborators on t he Anne sociologique
were of Jewi sh ancest ry. We have al ready noted Durkhei m's rabbi ni cal
heri tage, whi ch was shared by hi s nephew Marcel Mauss. We know,
moreover, the pri mary sci enti f c i mportance Durkhei m attri buted to the
Annee sociologique: " Because i t embraces the enti re domai n of sci ence, "
Durkhei m wrote, "the Annee has been abl e, better than any speci al work,
to i mpart t he senti ment of what soci ol ogy must and can become. "3 8 But
asi de from its sci enti fc i mportance and i ts r ol e i n the Republ i c, t he Annie
school formed "al most a spi ri tual fami l y uni ted by the bond of a common
method and a common admi rati on for i ts maitre. " 3 9 Thi s "l i t t l e soci ety
s ui generis, the cl an of the Annee sociologique, "40 seemed to represent i n
the mi nds and he arts of i ts members a prototype of what the professi onal
group coul d be i n modern soci ety -a suppl ementary ki nshi p, a trul y sol i
dary corps combi ni ng communi t y and a mut ual respect fo r i ndi vi dual i ty.
As Marcel Mauss recalled: " The An nee was not s i mpl y a publ i cat i on and
the wor k of a team. Around i t we formed a ' group' i n al l the force of the
term. " 4 1 In sharp contrast wi th the psychoanal yti c movement, the Annee
school was not marked by extreme si bl i ng rivalry and revolts against the
symbol i c father. ( I t was also less compl i cated and representati ve of the
larger soci ety than the psychoanalyti c movement, for exampl e, in that i t
contai ned no women and generated no si gni fcant i nternal chal l enges to
Durkhei m's authority. ) For i ts members the Annie seemed al most to b e an
i nt emporal moment parfait.
Jul es Ferry, perhaps the foremost fgure i n educati onal reform under t he
Thi rd Republ i c, di d not qui te ft i nto the pattern of t he "marginal man. "
From t he upper-bourgeoi s Protestant establ i shment i n the Vosges, he mar
ri ed (late in l i fe) a woman from the Protestant patri ci ate of Mul house.
But t he men wi th whom he surrounded hi msel f were largely from smal l er
Protestant fami l i es, and they were more i mpregnated than the rather bu
reaucrati c "col d fsh" Ferry wi th t he pi et i st spi ri t found i n Kant hi mself. Of
the men assi sti ng Ferry, especi al l y si gni fcant was the tri ni ty of Ferdi nand
Bui sso n , J ul es Steeg, and Fel i x Pecaut. 42
These three came to France from Swi tzerland. Steeg and Pecaut had
been Protestant mi nisters, and Bui sson a teacher. Ferry appoi nt ed Bui sson
( "my very dear fri end, the appl e of my eye") Di rector of Primary Educati on.
Hi s rol e i n the Republ i c has b een descri bed as that of "l ay hi gh pri est. "43 In
1 898 he was el ected presi dent of the Li gue pour I a Defense des Droi t s de
! ' Homme (League for t he Defense of t he Ri ghts of Man ) . 44 Thi s vol unt ary
associ at i on, of whi ch Durkhei m was an active member, had been founded
by Cl emenceau duri ng t he Dreyfus Ai r t o combat the anti -Dreyfusards.
Bui sson had been appoi nted in 1 896 to the chair in the Sci ence of Educati on
at the Sorbonne, where he was repl aced upon hi s el ecti on to the Chamber
of Deput i es i n 1 902 by Durkhei m.
Jul es Steeg al so became a deputy, and fnal l y Inspector General of Pub
l i c I nstructi on. I nt o the task of devel opi ng a program of moral and ci vi c
i nstructi on i n the school system, he poured hi s i mmense store of spi ri tual
e nergy. Li ke Durkhei m, he was the author of works on moral educati on.
Promi nent among hi s contri buti ons to thi s favori te genre of the peri od was
a Cours de morale a !'usage des instituteurs.
Perhaps the most i nteresti ng fgure i n thi s group was Feli x Pecaut. He
was t he exempl ar of neo-Kant i an mor ali ty, l i beral Protestanti sm, t he culte de
la patrie, and a democratic ci vi c spi ri t. He was appoi nted by Ferry to head
the ecole normale for institutrices at Fontenay-l es-Roses, one of the schools
desi gned to free the women of France from the i nf uence of the Church.
Fontenay-les-Roses has been descri bed as "t he sweet l ay convent where
Pecaut was the f sher of soul s. "45 Pecaut was t he author of a very i nterest-
i ng article on Durkhei m, whi ch sei zed wi th penetrati on the contemporary
i mport of Durkheim' s theory of rel i gi on that was of speci al i nterest to men
l i ke hi mself:
The secret fnality [ of rites] was not to be expressi ons of fai th but
t he means by whi ch t he moral experience i s created and re-created . . . .
In the heart of rel i gi on, one always f nds the mul t i form experi ence
of the moral consci ence . . . . In our ti me we have asked ourselves i f
a moral i ty wi thout rel i gi on coul d j usti f i tself i n the eyes of reason
and especi ally i f i t coul d take hold of men's hearts. To thi s t roubl ed
quest i on, Durkhei m answers t hat there i s onl y one morali ty, created
by soci ety, but whi ch may be thought either theological or positive&,
that is wi th reference ei ther to Go d or to s oci ety . . . . The di ference
i s i n the form of the representati on, not i n i ts obj ect . . . . And how
coul d posi r i ve moral i ty fai l t o act upon men's heart s, si nce at t he
basi s of rel i gi on, t here i s unknown t o i t t he acti on upon i ndi vi dual
consci ences of the collective consci ence?46
Two men were above all ot hers i nst rument al 1 the di ffus i on of
Durkhei mi an soci ol ogy and soci al phi l osophy throughout the educati onal
system: Loui s Li ard and Paul Lapi e. In addi ti on to the contexts i n whi ch
he has al ready been menti oned, Li ard had a hand in the i ntroducti on of
Durkhei mi sm i n secondary school s before World War I . Furthermore, he
i nvi ted Durkhei m to l ecture at the Ecol e Normal e Superi eure to candi dates
for the agregation. From these lectures came the posthumousl y publ i shed
Evolutio n ptagogique en France ( 1 938 ) . Paul Lapi e came under Durkhei m's
i nfence as a professor at Bordeaux, and he subsequentl y became a active
member of the Annee sociologique school . He conti nued Durkhei m's work
as Di rector of Pri mary Educati on, rector of t he Academy of Pari s, and edi
tor of t he Revue pedagogique. After World War I , hi s great i nnovati on was
the i ntroducti on of Durkhei mi an soci ol ogy into the curri cul um of insti
tuteurs i n the state normal school s. Thus Durkheim's i deas coul d be found
at all levels of t he educati onal system. A cri ti c of the r i me observed: "The
requi rement t hat M. Durkhei m's soci ol ogy be taught i n the two hundred
normal school s of France is among the gravest peri l s t o w hi ch our country
i s subj ect ed. "47 Even the s h arp and wi tty Th i baudet remarked, i n hi s Re
publique des profsseurs:
The i ntroducti on of the teachi ng of soci ol ogy i n our normal school s
for imtituteurs by Paul La pi e, upri ght and mi l i tant l ayman [lique ],
the l i neal descendent of the Bui sson, Pecaut, and St eeg of t he Re
publ i c, ma rked a most i mportant date on the s undi al of republ i can
spi ri tual power. Through this measure, the state, i n i ts school s, fur
ni shed to imtituteurs what the Church in its semi nari es frni shed to
the adversaries of the imtituteurs: a theol ogy. Lapi e bel i eved that the
instituteurs woul d react cri ti cally to thi s teachi ng. Not at all. They
reacted theologi cally. 48
To appreci ate the el ement of truth in Thi baudet's characteri zati on of the
functi on of Durkhei mi sm among imtituteurs, one need onl y read the actual
statement of a teacher who enunci ated the l esson he derived from Durkhei m:
' "Durkhei m? ' certai n peopl e sneer. ' That no l onger catches on. Speak to us
of neo-Thomi sm. ' I' m not di sturbed by thi s atti tude. The vai n resurrecti on
of old medi eval catechi sms wi l l l ong have di sappeared when Durkhei mi sm
wi l l sti ll be standi ng. "49
The personal i ti es and i deas of the professor-phi l osopher-admi nistrators
Li ard and Lapi e show the extent of their affni ty wi th Durkhei m. 5 0 Loui s
Li ard i s often credi ted wi th havi ng made over the uni versi ti es i n France
al most si ngl e-handedly. I n hi s Souvenirs d' une petite enfance, Li ard descri bed
wi th warmth hi s adol escence i n Fal ai se, Normandy: hi s l ove for churches
bui l t i n the Mi ddl e Ages, the wooden houses dati ng from t he ffteenth
century, the rui ns of t he castle of the dukes ofN ormandy, and above al l the
ol d colege bui l t i n the shadow of the anci ent fortress. Hi s own instituteurs
i nsti l l ed i n hi m a taste for study through thei r s el f ess devoti on to a cal l i ng
devoi d of personal ambi ti on and a concern for getti ng aheadY
In 1 866 ( wi th the same promot i on as Bui sson), Li ard entered the Ecol e
Normal e Superi eure and became a di sci pl e of Jul es Lachel i er, and, through
hi m, of Renouvi er. Li ard's thesi s, " Geometri cal Defni t i ons and Empi ri cal
Defni ti ons, " was an excellent expressi on of the Cartesi ani zed neo-Kanti an
i sm of the Republ i c; i t was dedi cated to Lacheli er. Another work, Positive
Science and Metaphysics ( 1 878) , centered on t he i dea that "to negate t he
real i t y of the i deal i s t o negate our own reali ty. " Li ard went on to argue i n
very Durkhei mi an fashi on t hat "the soci al functi on of met aphysics i s to
keep up the fai th in an ideal and to arrest two contrary but equal l y deadly
errors: the weakeni ng of activity and uti l i tari an fever. "52
Under the Second Empi re, Li ard bad been s o mi l i t antl y republ i can that
he was di smi ssed fro m hi s E rst teachi ng posi ti on and kept constantl y under
t he survei l l ance of the i mperi al pol i ce. When he became, l i ke Durkhei m
and La pi e after hi m, a professor at Bordeaux, he was overwhel med by the
parl ous state of hi gher educati on. In hi s Histoire de l' enseignement superieur
(History of Higher Education), he descri bed how courses were opened up
to the general publ i c i n order to E ll seats for whi ch there were not enough
students. The audi ence recrui ted i n thi s way was a curi ous medl ey of bon
bourgeois wi th not hi ng to do and beggars i n search of a warm pl ace for a
few hours. Liard's taste for organi zati on mani fested i tsel f at Bordeaux, where
he not onl y recast the structure of hi s own courses but al so drew up plans
for the new Facul t y of Medi ci ne and Pharmacy. He fol l owed "always t he
same method: a priori determi nati on of the needs of each Faculty i n order
to deduce the proper i nstal l ati ons. " I n Li ard's own words, "The method
of my admi nistrative work has always been the Cartesi an met hod. "5 3 At
t he r eques t of Ferry, t he post of Di r ect or of Hi gher Educat i on whi ch was
vacated i n 1 8 84 was flled by Li ard. " ' You wi l l make t he French uni versi
ti es, ' Jul es Ferry h ad t ol d hi m. That was exactl y what he wanted t o do. "5 4
Subsequent l y ( 1 902- 1 9 1 7 ) , Li ard was rector of the Uni versi ty of Pari s,
a posi t i on i n whi ch Lapi e was to succeed hi m. If the met hod of hi s ad
mi ni strative work was Cartesi an, i ts gui di ng pri nci pl e was a vari ant of
Durkheim' s "organi c sol i dari ty. " From the l owest to the hi ghest level and
t hroughout al l departments and facul t i es, t he Uni versi ty of France was t o
be characteri zed by sol i dari st i c cooperat i on among i ts di fferent i at ed parts
i n order to ensure "the real i zati on of a superi or funct i on - the i nt el l ectual
and moral l i fe of the nati on. "5 5
Li ke Durkhei m, Li ard had been l eft fatherless very earl y i n life. Hi s
mother, of ol d Norman stock, was tender and austere, and l i ved constantl y
wi th the i dea of death. She had even sel ected the wood for her coff n. "She
taught her son t hat one t hi ng was worse than deat h. Watchi ng a funeral
p rocessi on pass by in front of t hem, s he said: ' I woul d rather see you bur
ied than see you fai l to do your duty' . "5 6 After a life of duty and devoti on
to a cause, Li ard experi enced World War I a an unbearabl e shock whi ch
hastened hi s death. He consented to bei ng con ned to bed on! y when
"the categorical i mperati ve commanded hi m to reti re. " I n 1 9 1 7, he di ed
of "total exhausti on. " 5 7
The son of an instituteur, Paul Lapi e ret ai ned t hroughout hi s l i fe t he
myst i que of the educa tor's cal l i ng wi t h whi ch hi s father had i mbued hi m.
Andr e Font ai ne recalled t hat when Lapi e was first appoi nted a cee pro
fessor, Fontai ne had remarked: "I don't know what Lapi e's career wi l l be,
but I see hi m very wel l i n t he posi t i on of Li ard . . . . At that t i me as always I
be l i eved Li ard to be the greatest uni versi ty l eader we have ever had. " 58 As a
professor at Bordeaux and as a high admi nistrati ve offci al , La pi e conti nued
to seek t he soci et y of humbl e imtituteurs, and he genui nel y shared t hei r
seieux de la vie. He combi ned the t ypi cal republ i can personal i ty trai ts of
a n austere exteri or and repressed senti ment : for hi m too t he categori cal
i mperative was a sort of symbol i c father. F el i x Pecaut recalled t he i mpact
on republ i can i ntel l ectual s of Lapi e's edi tori al i n the Revue peagogique
ent i t l ed ' Soyons durs' [ ' Let' s Be Hard' ] . Hard on ourselves - that goes
wi t hout sayi ng. " 5 9 On the desk in his offce Lapi e kept a photograph of
Victor Brochard, a bl i nd paral yti c teacher who conti nued to gi ve hi s courses
unt i l hi s death.
La pi e made t ri ps t o The Hague to honor t he memory of perhaps hi s
favori te phi l osopher, Spi noza. Hi s t hesi s was enti t l ed "The Logi c of t he
Wi l l . " I n i t, he defended t he proposi ti on that the wi l l i n the service of reason
always tends toward j usti ce and sel f-sacrif ce. He rej ected the ut i l i tari an cor
rel ati on of reason, wi l l , and sel f-i nterest. Under the i nfuence o f Durkhei m
at Bordeaux, La pi e became attached t o t he i dea t hat l ogi c and soci al ethi cs
had t o be s oci ol ogi cally fed by facts and comparative anal yses. He went
on to wri te Timisian Civilization, Women and the Famil, For Reaon (on
the rati onal i st functi on of secul ar educat i on) , and, after t he Dreyfus A
fair, justice through the State. I n the last work, La pi e argued that the rol e
of the state was not to i ncrease i ts own power or to maxi mi ze i ndi vi dual
economi c acti vi ty. It was to assure the rei gn of j ust i ce. Judi ci al aut hori t y
was the very prot otype ofl egi ti mate publ i c authori t y i n the struggle agai nst
i nj us t i ce. Thi s doct ri ne i mpl i ed the necessi ty of an economi c "magi stracy"
of the state to fur ther soci al j usti ce.
A ti rel ess worker, Lapi e "was hard t o t he poi nt of dyi ng from i t , and
when he fnal l y consent ed t o bei ng confned t o bed, i t was never t o ri se
agai n. "60 On hi s deat hbed, La pi e ut t ered t he sentence: "Thi s bed tyrannizes
over me. " 6 1 On e of the last t i mes Lapi e l eft home i n s pi t e of severe i l l ness
was t o go t o the Soci ete Francai se de Phi l osophi e t o hear a report on the
teachi ng of French i n Buenos Ai res.
Chapte 2 Durkheim s Milieu 4!
A per s onal i t y t ype emerges al most of i t s own accor d from t hes e
sketches of republ i can educators and i ntel l ectual s who were Durkhei m's
peers. But a bi t more att ent i on must be pai d to thei r atti tudes and i deas.
Wi t hi n the rel ati vel y stabi l i zed cont ext of t he Thi rd Republ i c, Durkhei m
and hi s peers const i tuted a reform group that sought structural consensus
wi t hout resort to vi ol ent revol ut i on. The Wltanschauung of republ i can
l eaders was a n amalgam of l i beral democracy, neo-Kanti an spi ri tual i sm,
and "an i mmense and grave patri oti sm, a passi onate and somewhat sad
attachment to a patrie whi ch they wi shed to make more beauti ful, greater,
more worthy, and more sel f-consci ous t han i t i s. "62 The Republ i c was not
only the bureaucrati c provi der of careers t o sati sfy all legi ti mate ambi t i ons;
i t was to provi de "a great and effcaci ous l esson i n mora l di gni ty. "63 The
moral phi l osophy of Kant, whi ch was domi nant among republ i can i ntel
l ectual s, had recei ved i ts more Cartesi an, readi l y assi mi l abl e, and soci al l y
relevant formul at i on i n the works of Charl es Renouvi er. Indeed, the i deas
of Renouvi er pl ayed for the short-l i ved democrati c republ i c of 1 848 a rol e
si mi l ar to t he i deas of Durkhei m i n t he Thi rd Republ i c. For what i t was
wor t h, a cont emporary mot had i t t h at " Dur kh e i mi s m is sti l l Kant i ani sm
but revi ewed and compl et ed by Comteani s m. " 64
The resul tant was a crystal l i zati on of the archetypi cal i dea of the repub
li can i nsti tuti on that woul d assure soci al consensus and sol i dari ty through
a coordi nati on of the educati onal system, the occupati onal sphere, and
the state under the supreme auspi ces of a humani sti c, uni versal i st i c publ i c
phi l osophy. Wi thi n t hi s i deol ogi cal context, one can see cl early emergi ng
an ecumeni cal spi ri t i n rel i gi on and phi l osophy as wel l as a reori entati on
of l i beral Protestanti sm i n the di recti on of ci vi c consci ousness, communi ty
spi ri t, and even a soci ally, morally, and aestheti cal l y grounded i nterest i n
ri tual . Moral phi l osophy i ncreasi ngl y became the rel i gi on of mass democ
racy and i ts concepti on of the essence of al l rel i gi on. The Enl i ght enment
nexus of philosophe and ci ti zen repl aced the medi eval uni on of pri est and
ki ng and, one mi ght add, t h e more pri mi ti ve bond bet ween poet and
sorcerer.
The pedagogi cal effect was the percepti on of moral educati on as the
common core of al l educat i on. And s oci ology, for Durkhei m, had an
i nti mate rel ati on to pedagogy i nsofar as soci ol ogy was a ground work for
moral educati on. Durkhei m t ook as hi s own speci al task the at t empt to
"di scover the rati onal substi tutes for these rel i gi ous not i ons whi ch for so
l ong have served as the vehi cl e for the most essenti al of moral i deas. "65
But a rati onal concept i on of moral i ty coul d not merely cut away rel i gi ous
bel i efs. The one Comtean di ctum Durkhei m always uphel d was the i dea
that one shoul d destroy onl y what one coul d repl ace. Thi s di ctum di s
tanced hi m from a vari ant of anarchi sm prevalent at hi s ti me and qui t e
i mportant i n French i ntel l ectual and cul tural hi st ory down t o the pres
ent. 66 Al though Durkhei m at f rst concei ved hi s proj ect as an attempt to
present moral forces i n thei r "rati onal nudi ty . . . wi t hout recourse to any
mythol ogi cal i ntermedi ary, " hi s i dea of rat i onal i sm was later expanded
to i ncl ude a type of mythol ogy whi ch, i n hi s eyes, compl emented reason
i nstead of contradi ct i ng i t. Soci ety i tse lf, i n hi s t hought , e me rged at t i mes
as an obj ect of bel i ef or even a mythi cal enti ty.
Wi thi n the republ i can i nsti tuti on and i ts rati onal i st cul t, the functi on
of the teacher as a consensus bui l der became central. As Durkhei m saw i t ,
the teacher's mi ssi on was to sel ect and di ssemi nate "those pri nci pl es whi ch
i n spi te of al l divergences are from thi s ti me on the basi s of our ci vi l i za
ti on, i mpl i ci tl y or expl i ci t l y common to al l , and whi ch few woul d dare to
deny: respect for reason, for sci ence, for the ideas and senti ments whi ch
are the b asi s of our democrati c morali ty. "67 The aura of mysti que whi ch
envel oped thi s concepti on of the educator's functi on i s di ff cul t to convey.
In a magni f cent phrase o f Canivez, the cl assroom was "l e l i eu de di scours
retenus" ( the pl ace for hushed di scourse). 68 For Durkhei m, as for s o many
other republ i can i nt el l ectuals, the teacher gathered up i n hi s chalk-marked
hands the lingering strands of the sacerdotal traditi on:
What consti tutes t he authori ty whi ch colors s o readi l y t he wor d of
t he pri est i s the elevated i dea he has of hi s mi ssi on; for he speaks i n
the name o f a god i n whom he bel i eves and t o whom he feel s closer
than the crowd of the profane. The lay teacher can and must have
somethi ng of this senti ment. He too is the organ of a great moral
person who transcends hi m: thi s i s soci ety. Just as the pri est i s the
i nterpreter of hi s god, so the teacher i s the i nterpreter of the great
moral ideas of his time and country.69
Thus t h e uni que, symbol i cally charged cont r i but i on of Dur khei m to
republ i can i deas was the el aborati on of a relatively consi stent theory of
Chapte 2 Durkheim s Milieu 43
moral i ty as the i nsti tuti onal and i deol ogi cal basi s of sol i dari ty i n soci ety.
Not al l republ i can i ntel l ectual s who consti tuted Durkhei m's pri vi l eged
audi ence agreed wi th thi s concept i on of moral i ty. The fne feur of French
neo-Kanti an s pi ri t ual i sm subj ect ed Durkhei m t o a constant b arrage of
cri ti ci sm, i ncl udi ng face-to-face encounters i n the Soci et e Francai se de
Phi l osophi e. Thi s reacti on t o Durkhei m mani fested the tenuous basi s of
consensual pub l i c phi l osophy among educators i n a country l i ke France,
where despi te - or perhaps b ecause of - the extremely central i zed and
bureaucrati zed educati onal system, thi nkers have a penchant for di al ecti cal
di sagreement i f onl y for t he sake of marginal di fferent i at i on. Durkhei m's
celebrated "Determi nati on du fai t moral " of 1 906 ( i ncl uded in hi s Sociologie
et philosophie) provoked an ext ensive "oui , mais" type of di scussi on that cov
ered approxi matel y one hundred densel y pri nted pages of the Bulletin de !a
Sociee Fram;aise de Philosophie. The evocati on of hi s own lcee educati on by
the l ast of Durkhei m's truly mi l i tant di sci pl es i n France, Armand Cuvi l l i er,
i s si gni f cant in this respect. Instead of concentrati ng on the soci al context
of moral i ty i n Durkhei mi an fashi on, hi s phi l osophy professor, the gadfy
Gustave Bel ot, woul d di rect h i s "sarcasms agai nst the ' conscience collective, '
whi ch he called ' l'inconscience collective, ' and agai nst those states of pri mi tive
conformi sm where ' everybody admi ts what no one has real l y thought' . "7 0
The cri ti ci sms of Durkhei m by hi s contemporari es were often cogent
and i nduced by the ambi gui ti es of Durkhei m hi msel f, whi ch at ti mes were
great enough to qual i f him as whi ppi ng boy in i nt roductory phi l osophy
classes. Subsequent cri ti ci sms have often unknowi ngly recapi tulated i deas of
Durkhei m's own peers. Indeed, t he charge of sophistry had suffci ent staying
power to receive an echo in Raymond Aron' s 1 967 analysis of Du rkhei m's
thought. 7 1 But somethi ng more must have been i nvol ved in the reluctance
of Durkhei m's contemporari es to separate hi s b asi c poi nt of vi ew from the
termi nologi cal husk i n whi ch i t often was conveyed.
The fundamental reason was that members of the republ i can el i te were
often commi tt ed to spi ri tual and moral vari ants of extreme i ndi vi dualism
that at ti mes i mpl i ed a secul ari zed Protestant metaphysi c. The rel ati onshi p
be tween the i ndi vi dual and the i deal was concei ved on the model of an un
medi ated nexus havi ng l i ttl e to do wi th sol i darity i n soci ety. Thi s tendency
was mani fested i n t he i nf uenti al metaphysi c of Bergson's Two Sources of
Religion and Morality ( 1 932) , wri tten parti al l y i n reacti on to Durkhei m's
Elementary Forms o [the Religious Lf ( 1 9 1 2) . And one found the taste for
the i ndi vi dual i sm of an i nwardness transcendi ng soci ety even in the doc
tri ne of Al ai n, wi th i ts practi cal reformul at i on of the Cartesi an mi nd-body
dual i sm. Al ai n presented t he rol e of the i ndi vi dual i n soci ety as a negative
conformi sm which sai d "yes" with the body to external constrai nts, but an
eternal, soul-savi ng "no" with the spi ri t. Such noti ons generated resi stance
to Durkhei m's idea that soci ety was a soli dary whol e greater than the sum
of i ts p arts and to the analytic concepts whi ch made theoreti cal sense of
t hi s i dea: soci al structure, conscience collective as i t s psychol ogi cal ground i n
t he personal i ty, norm, and type. Durkhei m, i n bri ef, tended t o shi ft Kant's
noumenal sphere in the di rect i on of the conscience colective of soci ety and
to si tuate the transcendent al ego as a subj ect communi cati ng wi t h ot her
subj ects i n soci ety. Indeed, secular debates about t he i ndi vi dual and soci ety
(l i ke l ater debates about the si gn and meani ng) tended to di spl ace rel i gi ous
anxi eti es about the rel ati on ( or nonrel ati on) between the transcendent and
the i mmanent status of the sacred. The horri f ed reacti on to Durkhei m's
i ni t i ati ve of a thi nker who was perhaps t he best technical phi l osopher of
his t i me i n Fr ance s et t he to ne. I n a l etter t o Dur khei m' s own phi l osophy
professor Emi l e Boutroux, Jul es Lachel i er wrote of an earl i er theori st of
sol i dari ty:
Yo u mus t have read i n the Revue philosophique a very curi ous arti cl e
of Mari on on t he prehi stori c fami ly. Al l that, as I tol d you t he other
eveni ng, is fri ghteni ng, and when i t h as real l y come to pass, we must
i nsi st that i t has not come to pass, that hi story i s an i l l usi on and the
past a proj ecti on and that there is nothi ng true except the absol ute.
There we have perhaps the sol uti on of the probl em of the mi racl e:
i t i s t he l egend whi ch i s t rue and hi story whi ch i s fal se. 72
The i ntellectual and academi c cause abre of Durkhei m's own day,
whi ch opposed hi m to a promi nent fgure of the Republ i c, moved on a
level less elevated than that of the absol ute and of ten less i nteresti ng than
that whi ch separated hi story and l egend. Thi s was hi s notori ous debate wi th
G abri el Tarde, whi ch, l i ke the great debates i n the schol asti c tradi ti on that
i t evoked, di vi ded st udent s i nto two host i l e i ntel l ectual camps. In contrast
wi th Durkhei m's focus upon soci al structure and i mpersonal processes i n
hi story, Tarde's stress was on the spontanei ty and i nventi veness of the i n-
Chapte 2 Durkheim s Milieu
4 5
novative i ndi vi dual . 73 Yet - a Charles Bl onde! has shown i n detail i n hi s
Introduction a ia psychologie colective - the heat of personali ty and di a
l ecti c frequentl y prevented Durkhei m and Tarde fro m real i zi ng the extent
to whi ch t hei r probl ems were compl ement ary. In fact, the thought of the
early Durkhei m and ofhi s opponent Tarde ( who di ed i n 1 904) represented
two hal ves of a di vi ded enti ty - the exteri ori ty and constrai nt of formal
i nsti tuti ons and the repressed emoti on and i nwardness of the i ndi vi dual
personal i ty. Onl y after Tarde's death di d Durkhei m seem to recognize the
"pathogeni c" nature of thi s di chotomy i n i ts extreme forms and propose
a model of t he "normal " soci ety t hat combi ned normati ve di sci pl i ne wi t h
spont aneous commi tment, and t he i nternal i zati on of norms wi t h a margin
of anomi e that allowed for i ndi vi dual creati vi ty.
The substantive i ssues involved in the Durkhei m-Tarde debate were
com promi sed by a severe personal i ty conf i ct. Tarde hi msel f was very much
the grasshopper to the neo-Kanti an ant i n Durkhei m. Hi s career pattern and
st yl e of thought were qui te di fferent from those of Durkhei m. I n cont rast
with Durkhei m, who regularly ascended through t he "normal " i nsti tuti onal
channel s to a professo rshi p at t he Sor bonne, Tarde moved l ateral l y from t he
extra-academi c vantage poi nt of a high place i n t he French magistracy and
sal on s oci ety i nto the penthouse of the French schol arl y worl d: the Col
l ege de France. Hi s more f amboyant way of l i fe had i ts counterpart i n the
carefree, essayi stic, and al most i mpressi oni st i c style of the works i n whi ch
he developed hi s i dea of t he rol e of the i ndi vi dual i n soci ety. As Charl es
Bl onde! has aptl y put i t :
[Tarde] does not have the supersti ti on of order and l ogi c: he wri tes
notes, arti cl es, and, gatheri ng them together, he i nserts a few j oints
and makes of the whol e a book. A certai n di l ettanti sm gives hi m
t he abi l i t y t o smi l e and di ctates to hi m the mos t alert and pi quant
for mu l as on t he gravest subj ect s: "Obedi ence t o duty offers two
advantages: i t absolves you often of the need for foresight [ prevoy
ance] and always of the need for success. "74
If the controversies opposi ng Durkhei m to republ i can i ntel l ectual s seem
i n retrospect to h ave the ai r of fami l y quarrels, the opposi t i on mani fested
on the Ri ght was more seri ous and deepl y rooted. The Ri ght i n Durkhei m's
France was a compl ex phenomenon whi ch an outstandi ng anal yti c hi sto-
ri an of the per i od has treated in terms of "anti-revol ut i onary forces whi ch
were negative enough to want to go back to the years before 1 7 89, and the
counter-revoluti onary forces, whi ch accepted some fr uits of the Revol uti on
but reacted against certain of i ts hi stori cal consequences . "75
The more i ntransi gent and doctri nai re anti revol uti onary forces found
thei r theoreti cal forebears i n tradi ti onali sts l i ke Mai stre and Bonal d. These
conservatives a outrance, who formed, i n Comte's famous phrase, the "I m
mortal Retrograde School " of soci al theory, became ( at ti mes al ong wi t h
Comt e hi msel f) the i nspi rati on for l ater reacti onary movements such as
the Acti on Francai se. Charl es Maurras, the founder of thi s movement,
was of course a sel f-styled di sci pl e of Comt e. Born i n the opposi ti on to
the Dreyfusard vi ctoty, the Acti on Franqai se not only mobi l i zed forces
hosti l e to Durkhei m's Republ i c ( "I a gueuse" - "the sl ut " - the favori te
epi thet of Maunas) but also eventual l y became a mai nstay of the Vi chy
government. The Thi rd Republi c of Durkhei m's ti me was, moreover, the
l ocus not only of the tradi ti onal currents ofJ acobi n and l i beral patri oti sm
on the Left and of anti -Dreyfusard "i ntegral nati onal i sm" on t he Ri ght
but al so of a newer and more radical nat i onal i sm whi ch began to mani fest
i tsel f about 1 905 and reached i ts prewar climax i n 1 9 1 1 . For a hi stori an
of thi s movement, i t was the result of one- upmanshi p i n patri oti c asser
ti ons ( from whi ch onl y the Soci al i st Party managed to refrai n) , and it was
soci al l y based i n the l ower mi ddl e classes of Paris b efore spreadi ng to the
provi nces after the Agadi r i nci dent 76 Thus to some extent the protofascist
nati onal i sm whi ch was to feed the "l eague" movement after World War I
had its ori gi ns in the prewar peri od.
Thos e who pl aced Du rkhe i m i n t he tradi t i on of such conservati ve
t hi nker s as M ai s t r e and B onal d - no t to s p e ak of f ascj sm - were
no t onl y t ot al l y i ns ens i t i ve t o D urkheim' s own hj s t or ical cont ext b ut
p rone to mi s t ake s upe rfci al anal ogj es for p rofound hi s t or i cal cont i
nui t i es . l7 Ce r tai nl y, D urkhe i m s t r es s ed s uch t he me s as communi ty,
aut hor jty, a nd t he des i rab i l i ty o f a s i gni fc a nt me as u re o f hi s t or i cal
cont i nui ty. Bu t i n hi s t ho ught t hey were rel at ed to a r efor mi s t pr oj
ect . Th e s ubs t anti ve c ont ext i nt o whi ch D ur khej m i nt egrat ed t hes e
t hemes was t hat of r e publi can d e mocr acy and i n di vi dual aut ono my
p e r mi t t j ng free accept ance o f nor mat i ve s t r uct ur es i nvol vi ng, no t
ri gi d h i erarchy, b ut par t i ci pat i on a nd represent at j on. The i nt el l ect ual
Chapte 2 Durkheim s Milieu
47
feat of D ur khei m wa s to at t empt to di sengage cert ai n gener al , i f not
uni versal , va l ue s s uch a s communi t y a nd t he ne e d for s oci a l di s ci pl i ne
from react i onar y h i s t or i cal l ongi ngs and to r econci l e t he s e val ues
wi t h s pe c i fcal l y modern needs , t hereby avert i ng s uch "s oci ol ogi cal
mons t r os i t i es " as l at er emer ged i n fasci s m. Th e one p ar t i al but si g
ni fcant except i on to t his gener al i zat i on i s D ur khei m's t reat ment ( or
nont reat ment ) of i s s ues r el at i ng to gender, s exual rel at i ons , and t he
rol e of wome n wh er e hi s i de a s r emai ned b as i cal l y t r adi t i onal a nd h e
res i s t ed o r avoi ded pos s i b i l i t i es of anal ysi s and cr i t i que suggest ed b y
ot her di mens i ons o f hi s t hought .
The counterrevol ut i onary movement i n Durkheim's France took the
forms of l i beral i sm and Bonaparti sm i n pol i t i cs and of l i beral Cat hol icism
i n rel i gi on. More pragmati c in tenor than the antirevol uti onary movement,
it resi sted only selected aspects of the Revol uti on, whose soci al and eco
nomi c i mpl i cations were opposed by l i beral i sm, and democrati c and l i beral
i mpl i cati ons by Bonaparti sm. Li beral Cat hol i cs demanded the ri ght of the
di sestabl i shed Church to run its own school s. Since any extensive anal ysis
woul d be beyond the scope of thi s st udy, i t is suffcient to note that the
more liberal demands ( mani fested in Pope Leo Xl l l 's call for raliement of
Catholi cs to the Republ i c and Marc Sangnier's soci al i deali sm) received l i ttl e
i mpl ementati on i n the Church i n Durkhei m's time. The al li ance of the far
Right and the Cathol i c Church, whi ch conti nued the reacti onary alli ance
of throne and altar, confronted t he newl y formed Republ i c wi th extremi st
obduracy. It was met i n ki nd, wi th the predi ctabl e result that both si des
tended to escal ate thei r demands i n a bi tter syndrome of acti on and reac
ti on. "Church and State were torn apart, not neatly separated: and pol i tical
b i tterness was fed with new fuel . "7 8
The t hreat from the far Right before the Dreyfus Affai r was aggravated
by the fact that the mi l i tary and upper echel ons of the state bureaucracy
( i ncl udi ng the Consei l d' Etat at t he hi ghest level) were staffed i n si gni fcant
numbers by men of react i onary l eani ngs. As Al ai n put i t, wi th some exag
gerati on, i n 1 906: " I n France, there are a great number of radical voters,
a certai n number of radical deputi es, and a very small number of radical
mi ni sters: as for the che de service, they are all reacti onary. The person who
understands thi s well holds the key to our pol i t i cs. "79 The ul ti mate clash
between the Right ( merging the forces of the Church, the Army, the upper
bureaucracy, and anti -Semi ti sm) and the Republ i c ( momentari ly coal esci ng
the forces of the Left) was of course the Dreyfus Affai r. Davi d Thomson
has summari zed the core i ssue i n thi s confrontati on, whi ch appeared as an
apocal ypti c moment of truth t o all t he adversaries:
The fact that Dreyfus was a Jew, and that hi s condemnation led to a
wider drive by the authori tari an mi l i tarists and clericals to exclude not
merely Jews but Protestants and Republi cans from posi ti ons of mi l itary
and admi n istrative power, raised t he issue in dramati c form. It was a
clash of rival absolutisms - a chal l enge of intolerance whi ch bred
an equally severe intolerance amongst the Radicals and Freemasons,
the anti-clericals and Soci al i sts. Democracy had clearly to be a soci al
and pol i ti cal order based on common citi zenshi p and ci vi l i an rights
within the Republ i c: or else it would b e replaced by an authori tarian,
hi erarchi c order, dominated by Church and privileged ruli ng classes in
Army and Civil Servi ce. French logic interpreted the confict in these
clear terms, and the battle began. 3
0
A cruci al long-range probl em i nvolved in the i deol ogi cal confrontati on
of the Right and the Republ i c was t he control of educati on. "The separati on
[ of Church and State] was only the negati ve part of an i deal of whi ch the
posi tive part, or rather the counterpart, i mpl i ed the reuni on of the school
and the State . "8 1 The effort of the Republ i c to purge the Church from the
educati onal system engendered the rel ated probl ems of teachers, curri culum,
and moral educati on. The cl ergy and i ts spi ri tual i nf uence had to be re
placed. We have noted Durkhei m's pri estl y concept i on of the lay teacher
- t he "black Hussar" of the Republi c, in Charles Peguy's telli ng phrase.
Wi th respect to the curri cu l um, i t i s i mportant to recognize the hi stori cal
correl ati on of classical educati on and conservatism i n Durkhei m's France.
Thi s associ ati on l ed a contemporary observer to qui p that the Republ i c
faced two "soci al questi ons": the rel ati on of capi t al and l abor and Lati n
verse. 82 The hi stori cal associ ati on of the defense of a classi cal educati on, of
conservative pol i ti cs, and of a hi ghly strati fed soci al order was t he concrete
basi s for Durkheim's sustai ned attacks upon di l ettantism and Renai ssance
humani sm as anti modern tendenci es subservi ent to the i nterests of a smal l
eli te. Durkhei m's concepti on of reform compri sed the democrati zati on of
education and a curriculum that would gi ve students, along wi th a necessary
Chapter 2 Durkheim' Milieu 49
background i n general culture, the type of trai ni ng that woul d prepare them
for specialized functi ons in modern soci ety. Yet it has not been recognized to
how great an extent the spi ri t of classical phi l osophy remai ned the foundati on
of Durkhei m's soci al phi l osophy. Suicide, wi th its emphasi s on the sense of
legi ti mate l i mi ts and i ts i nti mati on of an i nsti t ut i onally furthered "gol den
mean" i n soci al l i fe, owes much to the cl assi cal tradi ti on.
It i s synopti cal l y useful though excessively stereotypi cal to frame the
questi on of the relati on o f Durkhei m's Republ i c to the Church i n terms of
contrasts: instituteur versus cure; soci al and na rural sci ence versus the classics;
soci al and moral phi l osophy versus ol d-ti me religi on. In any case, a further
poi nt must be made concerni ng Durkhei m's posi t i on on the church-state
con troversy and the battle over educati on: he never made an express poli ti cal
pronouncement on thi s i ssue. He i ndeed l abel ed the Cathol i c Church "a
monstrosi ty from the soci ologi cal poi nt of vi ew. "83 But he di rected thi s
comment agai nst the extremely b ureaucrati c, central i zed, and h ierarchi cal
organizati onal structure of the Church. In the same vei n, he p u t forth a
cri ti que that appl i ed to hi s own Republ i c: "A society composed of an i nfni te
dust of unorgani zed i ndi vi dual s whi ch an hypertrophi ed state tri es to hem i n
and restrai n consti tutes a veri table soci ol ogi cal monstrosi ty. "84 Hi s posi tive
concern in bot h i nstances was the creati on of sol i dari sti c groups in whi ch
communal values woul d be reconci l ed wi th i nsti tuti onal organi zati on and
respect for the ri ghts of the i ndi vi dual .
In addi ti on, one di d not fnd i n Durkhei m the offended, vengeful spi ri t
of the ex-semi nari an Emi l e Combes or t he crude posi ti vi sm embodi ed
i n Paul Bert's compari sons of the cl ergy to t he phylloxera bl i ght whi ch
destroyed the vi nes of France, and of the l aw i mposi ng restrictive state
regul ati on on rel i gi ous establi shments to heal i ng copper sul fate. Nothi ng
was more al i en to Durkheim's spi ri t than penny-ante Vol tai ri ani sm. The
basi c i nspi rati on of Durkhei m's concepti on of reli gi on was ecumeni cal . And
he ul ti matel y recognized, however tendenti ously, the necessi ty of speci al
symbol i sms of a mythi cal nature i ns ofar as they compl emented rather than
contradicted the general rational values basi c to consensus i n modern soci ety.
For di fferent reasons, the soci al metaphysi c whi ch was hi s own ul ti mate
expl anatory approach to rel i gi ous symbol i sm was offensive both to students
of cul ture who saw reli gi on anal yti cal l y "from the outsi de" and to bel i ev
ers who experi enced rel i gi on "from the i ns i de. " B ut t he practi cal thrust of
his thought wi thi n hi s own hi stori cal context was to offer the Church the
same sort of ! i vi ng arrangement i t had offered to pri or reli gi ons i n occupi ed
terri tory: tol erance for thei r symbol i c forms i f they accepted i ts basi c mes
sage. Cathol i ci sm, in other words, had to become a nondi sruptive part of
a l arger soci al consensus.
The classi cal conservative i ndi ctment of the Republ i c, i ts phi l osophy,
and i ts corps of instituteurs was Les Deracines ( The Uprooted, the i deol ogi cal
novel of Mauri ce B anes. But t he best i l l ustrati on of Rightest reacti on to
Durkhei m hi msel f and his parti cul ar rol e i n the Republ i c was the report of
"Agathon, " the pseudonym of Henri Massi s and the s on of Gabri el Tarde,
the more status-consci ous Alfred de Tarde. Thi s work85 was manifes tly i n
spi red by conservative pol i ti cs, tradi ti onal rel i gi on, activist nati onal i sm, and
a romanti ci zed, soci ally el i ti st defense of cl assi cal educati on. I t cl ai med to
represent the domi nant opi ni on of French uni versi ty students i mmedi ately
before World War I .
For t he authors of t he Agathon Report, Li ard had made Durkhei m
"a sort of prefect of studi es . . . the regent of the Sorbo nne, the al l -power
ful maitre. " Durkhei m's posi ti on on key com mi ttees l i ke the Consei l de
I ' Uni versi te de Pari s and the Comi te Consul tati f enabled hi m "to su rvey
a l l appoi ntments in hi gher educat i on. " Under hi s i ron rul e, professors of
phi l os ophy were "reduced t o t he s i mpl e rol e of functi onari es. " Pedagogy
was Durkhei m's "own pri vate domai n. " But soci ol ogy was b efore all el se
the "one o fci al doctri ne at the Sorbonne. " Soci ol ogy had taken the pl ace
of the ol d phi l osophy whi ch had fal l en fro m grace. It had become "the
ki ngpi n of the New Sorbonne. " Movi ng from the conspi ratori al i ndi ctment
to the rhetori cal quest i on, the authors of the Agathon Report concl uded
by aski ng: "Who i s there that does not feel the trul y i nhuman qual i ty i n
thi s debauchery of l ogi c, these col d a nd deducti ve reveri es, these mi sty
analyses of concepts, and what poor food i s offered to the avi d heart and
i ntel l i gence of students? "8 6
Atti tudes toward Dur khei m consti tuted one area i n wh ich extremes
found ad hoc consensus i n France. The standard Marxi st categori zati on of
Durkhei m was that of "bourgeoi s I deal i st, " and the terms of cri ti ci sm fre
quentl y coi nci ded with those of the Agathon Report. The most sustai ned,
i f savagely rhetori cal , treatment of Durkhei m and hi s mi l i eu by ( at l east a
pro tempore) French Communi st cl ose to the controversies of the ti me was
Chapter 2 Durkheim s Milieu 5 I
i n Pa ul Ni zan's Chiem de garde ( The Watchdogs) of 1 932. 8 7 I n thi s youthful
book, Ni zan rewrote Marx's German Ideology to make i t appl y to i ntel l ectual
and educati onal leaders i n the Thi rd Republ i c. One of the most vi ci ousl y
unobtrusi ve of the "watchdogs" of the Republ i c was Durkhei m, the "maitre
of the Moral Fact. "
Durkhei m was necessary for the b ourgeois uni versi ty to enter i nto
possessi on of i ts own doctri nes: thi s strengtheni ng of the spi ri tual
si tuati on, thi s passage from the vague to the dogmati c, from the
obscure to the di sti nct, is rather well expressed in Durkhei m's dec
l arati on to Agathon in November 1 906: "Let's get to work and i n
three years we' l l have a moral i ty. " They had i t al l ri ght. Thi s moral
i ty exi sts . . . . Everythi ng real l y happened as i f the founder of French
soci ology wrote the Division of Labor in Sociey to permi t obscure
admi ni strators to compose a course of i nstructi on desti ned for the
instituteurs. The i ntroducti on of soci ol ogy i nto the normal school s
consecrated the admi ni strative vi ctory of off ci al moral i ty . . . . In
the name of this science instituteurs teach chi l dren to respect the
French patrie, to j usti fy cl ass col l aborati on, to accept everything, to
commune in the cult of the Rag and bourgeois democracy . . . . The
manual s [of the Durkhei m school ] , among other works, mani fest
the power of di ffusi on of thi s doctri ne of obedi ence, of conformi sm,
and of soci al respect whi ch, wi th the years, has obtai ned such credit
and such a numerous audi ence. 88
To engage i n rhetori cal overstatement and to di smi ss Durkhei m in toto
as yet one more "bourgeois i deal i st" or ai ry house i deol ogue of the status
quo was to lose si ght of what he actual l y accompl i shed. A real probl em
for an exi stenti al l y relevant, l i vi ng Marxi sm was the selecti ve assi mi l ati on
of the vali d i nsi ghts of a Durkhei m. Bu t i t i s di ffcul t not to sympathi ze
wi th cri ti cs who found i n Durkhei m excessive abstractness, nai ve soci al
opti mi sm, and tendenti ous vagueness often combi ned wi th dogmati c as
serti on. Despi te hi s growing concern with modern "soci al pathol ogy, " one
probl em Durkhei m never broached i n hi s pedagogical works was the pos
s i bi l i ty that a school system i n whi ch teachers sel ected and di ssemi nated
consensual ideals mi ght fnd i tsel f speci al i zi ng i n the transmi ssi on of the
type of myth that bl i nded peopl e to soci al real i ti es and laid i nadequate
factual bases for soci al reform. No doubt, Durkhei m's own posi ti on i n the
educati onal establ i shment contri buted to the fact that the treatment of the
di ff cult probl em of means to effect the reforms he envisaged was perhaps the
weakest chapter i n hi s thought about modern soci ety. He was forever vague
about the type of practi cal acti vity t hat was rel ated bot h to the acqui si ti on
of concrete knowledge and to t he proj ect of changi ng soci ety i n a desi rabl e
di recti on. A open reckoni ng wi th Marx woul d have deepened Durkhei m's
penetrati on i nt o modern i nsti tuti ons and i deol ogi es. At the very l east, i t
woul d have forced hi m to treat more adequatel y the rol e of economi c fac
tors and soci al conf i ct in modern l i fe . Yet i n his sol e extended di scussi on
of Marxi sm ( i n a review of a work by Antoni o Labri ol a), Durkhei m t ook
speci al pai ns to i nsi st that he had "not i n t he l east undergone t he i nfuence
of Marx. "8 9 I ndeed the i nfuence of Durkhei m i n French soci al t hought
was one reason why a systemati c and derai l ed confrontati on wi t h Marx i n
France was del ayed unti l the 1 93 0s .
What preci sel y was Durkhei m's posi ti on i n the spectrum of practi cal
pol i t i cs? Marcel Mauss has characteri zed Durkhei m's rel ati onshi p to so
ci al i sm i n the fol l owi ng terms:
Durkhe i m was q ui t e fami l i ar wi t h s o ci al i s m at its very s ources,
t hrough Sa i nt- Si mon, Schaeffe, and Karl Mar x who m a F i nn
i s h fri e nd, Ne i gl i ck, h ad advi s ed hi m t o s t udy dur i ng h i s s t ay
i n Lei pzi g. Al l hi s l i fe he wa s r el uct ant to a dhe re t o s o ci al i s m
( pr oper l y s o- cal l e d) b ecause of cert ai n feat ures of t hi s move
me nt : i t s vi ol e nt nature, i ts cl as s charact er - nor e or l es s
wor ki ngmen's - and t her efor e i t s pol i t i cal and even pol i t i
ci an- l i ke t one . Du rkhe i m wa s pr ofoundl y oppos e d t o al l war s
of cl as s or n at i o n. He de s i r e d change o nl y for t he b ene ft of t he
who l e of s oci et y and not of one o f i t s p arts e ve n i f t he l at t er
h a d number s and for ce. He cons i dere d pol i ti c al revol ut i ons
and par l i ament ar y evol ut i o n as s upe rf ci al , cos tly, a nd mo re
dr amat i c than s e r i ous . He t he r e fo re al ways r es i s t ed the i de a of
s ubmi tt i ng hi msel f to a party of p o li t i cal di s ci pl i ne , e s pe ci al l y
an i nt er nat i o na l o ne . Even t he s o ci al a nd pol i t i cal cri si s of t he
Dre yfus Affa i r, i n whi c h h e pl ayed a l arge par t , di d n o t change
hi s o p i ni o n. He t he refore remai ne d uncommi tt e d -he "syn1-
pat hi zed" ( a s i t i s no w cal l ed) wi t h t he s oci al i sts, wi t h J a ures,
wi t h s oci al i s m. But h e never gave hi msel f t o i t . 9 0
Thi s preci s of Durkheim's atti tude toward soci al i sm by hi s nephew
and col l eague must nonetheless be qual i fed. For one thi ng, Durkhei m's
i deas on the possi bi li ti es of corporati sm i n modern soci ety i ncl uded cer
tai n features of democrati c soci al i sm al though his views might not go far
enough to sati sfy those who saw an unacceptabl e di sproporti on between
the "numbers" or putati ve "force" of certai n segments of the popul ati on
and the opportuni ty, i ncome, and weal th al l otted to them. Durkhei m
def ni tel y di d not subscri be to any exi sti ng soci al i st vi ewpoi nt, but he di d
attempt to offer a substi tute for exi sti ng vi ewpoi nts that, he fel t, i ntegrated
thei r desi rabl e, and avoi ded thei r undesi rabl e, aspects. He a pparently di d
not bel i eve i n t he necessity or desi rabi l i ty of apocal ypti c, vi ol ent revolu
ti on in hi s own soci ety or advanced i ndustri al soci et i es i n general . But he
di d see a strong el ement of val ue i n the French Revol ut i on, al though l i ke
Tocquevi l l e he was aware of the respects i n whi ch trai ts of the ancien regime
conti nued i nt o the present despite the Revol ut i on. The Revol ut i on had
fai l ed t o real i ze i t s i deal s i n i nsti tuti ons, b ut these i deal s, whi ch depended
for thei r genesi s and formul ati on on soci al unrest of revoluti onary propor
ti ons, were of lasti ng val ue i n modern soci ety. And a de mocrati c republ i c,
whi ch i tself was a l ong-del ayed frui t of the Revol ut i on, found a l i felong
s upporter i n D urkhei m.
On the whol e, i t woul d be accurate to say that Durkhei m found parli a
mentary evol uti on superf cial when poli ti c b el i ed the promi se of democracy
by remai ni ng wi thi n the structural confnes that detached it from the real
probl ems of soci ety. To a large extent, poli ti cs i n hi s own France di d i ncreas
i ngl y fal l into thi s category as the years wore on. Toward the end of his l i fe,
Durkhei m seemed to reali ze t hi s . He contrasted, we ar e t ol d, t he youthful
hopes engendered by the golden age of the Republ i c with the actual nature
of pol i ti cs ci rca 1 9 1 4 :
The "pol i ti cal ki tchen" was always odi ous t o hi m and he avoi ded
questi ons of personali ty and coteri e. Gambetta was to some extent
hi s i dol : i f he l i ked hi m so mu ch, I thi nk i t was because of the large
and generous spi ri t he found i n hi m. Chatti ng wi t h Durkhei m i n
1 9 1 4, I heard hi m compl ai n that pol i ti cs had become " a very smal l
and medi ocre thi ng. " He had always wanted i t to be grand: that
was the way he saw i t i n his youth 9 1
In anot her respect, it di d not do to cl assi fy soci al i sm as vi ol ent and
purel y worki ng-cl ass i n Durkhei m's t i me. Indeed the compl exi ty of so
ci al i sm and of the probl ems to whi ch it sought a n answer had a great
deal to do wi t h Durkhei m's hesi t ancy. I n hi s own France, there was, for
exampl e, a measure of cooperati on between the rel ati vel y smal l , weak, and
i nternal ly di vi ded t rade-uni on movement and the parl i amentary Soci al i st
Party ( composed mai nl y of bourgeoi s) . But there was no thoroughgoi ng
i ntegrati on on the model of the Bri ti sh Labour Party. The more vi ol ent
strand of s oci al i s m, wi t h i t s doctri nai re i nsi stence upon class conf i ct and
fa luttefnale, was t aken up by anarchosyndi cal i sm. Georges Sorel became
i t s ex post facto theori st by borrowi ng from Marx's theory of cl asses and
Durkhei m's i deas on r el i gi on i n a manner t hat was fa i thful to ne i t he r
Marx nor Durkhei m. The upshot wa s a lyri cal eul ogy of t he "myth of the
general stri ke" and the "poetry of soci al vi ol ence" whi ch were t o provi de
e fervescent energy and empowerment, i f not redempti ve regenerati on, for
a worki ng class in movement . Sorel 's pos i t i on came cl ose to a despai ri ng
defense of an act i vi st phi l osophy of vi ol ence i ndependent of context and
probabl e consequences -Ia politique du pire i n i ts wor st for m. As George
Li chthei m has argued, arx hi msel f rej ected anarchosyndi cal i sm as an
i mmature reacti on and i ncreasi ngl y came to a more reformi st concepti on
of effective soci al acti on i n advanced i ndustri al soci eti es.
France remai ned i mport ant to Marxi sm [ i n the peri od be tween
1 8 71 and 1 9 1 8 ] not merel y for the obvi ous reason, but because
of i ts strategic posi ti on - at any rate down to the 1 8 90s -i n the
propagati on of Marxist doctri ne. Contrary to a wi despread noti on
i t was the frst maj or party where a si gni fcant secti on of the l abour
movement adopted a Marxist pl atform. Thi s event took place i n 1 880,
eleven years before t he German Soci al Democrats fol l owed s ui t . The
pl atform was a "reformi st" one, i n t hat i t taci tl y repudi at ed the A
archi st preachment of armed vi ol ence and t he i ndi genous Bl anqui st
tradi ti on of Pari si an coups d'etat. Instead emphasi s was l ai d on the
need for the worki ng cl ass to bui l d up its organi zati ons as the onl y
basi s of the comi ng col l ecti vi st order. Thi s was a retur to the classic
document of the Fi rst I nternati onal , the Inaugural Adress [of 1 864] ,
and it marked the abandonment by Marx (who hel ped Guesde to
draft the French party p rogramme) of his temporary i nfatuati on with
the utopi ani sm of the Paris Commune. It was preci sel y i n thi s sense
that "Marxism" was then underst ood both by i ts adherents and by
Bakuni n's followers all over Europe. n
Durkhei m hi msel f seems to have cont i nued to i dent i fy Marx and
Marxi sm wi th doctri nai re i nt ransi gence about vi ol ent class confi ct. He
undertook hi s studi es i n soci ali sm i n part because some of hi s most bri l l i ant
st udent s were bei ng converted t o Marxi st forms of soci al i sm. Mauss was
undoubt edl y correct in fndi ng Durkhei m's closest practi cal associ ati on to
be wi th Jaures. ( One mi ght retrospecti vel y add the name of the Leon Bl um
of A L'Echele humaine -For All Mankind. ) The mai n reason for the spl i t
be tween J aures and the Marxi sts i n France was the i ssue of cooperati on
wi th the radicals i n defense of republ i can sol i dari ty. Mauss observed that
"i f i t was Luci en Herr who i n 1 8 86- 1 8 8 8 converted J ames to Soci al i sm,
i t was Durkhei m who i n 1 8 8 9- 1 896 turned hi m away from the pol i ti cal
formal i sm and the shal l ow phi l osophy of the radi cal s. "93 But i n al l prob
abi l i ty Durkhei m hi msel f woul d have concurred wi t h J aures on the i ssue of
pragmati c al l i ances to defend the Republ i c agai nst al l threats. In Li chtheim' s
words: "The fact that Jaures eventual l y i mposed his out l ook on t he party
had much to do wi th the evolution of French Soci al i sm from a worker's
sect i nto a mass movement. "94
Jaures' posi ti on, however, also had much to d o with the tendency of
the Soci al i st Party in France to subordi nate basi c issues to opportuni sti c
consi derati ons, el ectoral maneuvers, and the "pol i ti cal ki tchen. " Why was
it that Durkhei m in this context did not become more pol i t i cal l y active i n
a n attempt to use hi s i ntel l ectual powers and i nf uence t o defend the basi c
moral and phi l osophi cal i ssues to whi ch he always gave pri mary emphasi s?
On thi s one can onl y specul ate. Unl i ke many of hi s di sci pl es, Durkhei m
di d not have an activist temperament. Moreover, he may wel l have bel ieved
that by remai ni ng "above parti es" he had a greater chance of i nf uenci ng
contendi ng groups t o accept hi s concept i on of rati onal reconstructi on. Hi s
def ni t i on of soci al i sm di d i n fact i nfuence both Jaures and Jul es Guesde. 9 5
Summi ng up i n 1 904 the lessons he had l earned from the Dreyfus Afair,
Durkhei m observed:
Writers and schol ars are ci ti zens; i t i s thus evi dent that they have
the stri ct duty to parti ci pate i n publ i c l i fe . . . .
Men of thought and i magi nati on, it does not appear that they
are particularly predesti ned to speci fcally pol i ti cal careers; for these
demand above al l the qual i ti es of men of action . . . .
I t is i n my opi ni on above all through the book, the publ i c l ecture,
and popul ar educati on that our efforts mus t be made. We mus t
above al l be counsel ors and educators . . . .
But whenever a seri ous questi on o f pri nci pl e has been rai sed, we
have seen sci entists abandon thei r l aboratori es and scholars l eave
thei r pri vate off ces to move cl oser to the crowd and mi ngle i n i ts
life. Experi ence has shown that they know how to make themselves
heard.
The moral agi tati on whi ch these events [ of the Dreyfus Affai r]
have provoked has not yet been exti ngui shed, and I am among those
who thi nk that i t mus t not be exti ngui shed; for i t i s necessary . . . .
The hour of rest has not yet come for us. There i s so much to do
that i t i s i n di spensabl e for us to keep our soci al energi es, i n a man
ner of speaki ng, perpetually mobi li zed. Thi s is why I bel i eve that
the pol i cy fol l owed i n these l ast years [ 1 900- 1 904] i s preferabl e to
the precedi ng one. I t has succeeded i n mai ntai ni ng a conti nuous
current of col l ective acti on of a reasonabl e i ntensity. 96
Thus Durkhei m's growi ng sense of crisis led hi m to bel i eve that the
schol ar shoul d move from his "normal" acti vi ti es i nto a posi ti on of more
mi l i tant concern. Indeed al l Durkhei m's maj or works cul mi nated i n a cal l
to acti on. I n the fnal words of Suicide, he perhaps gave cl earest expres
sion to his i dea of the rel ati on between theory and practice: "Once one
has establ i shed the exi stence of an evi l , what i t consi sts of and on what i t
depends, when one knows i n consequence the general characteri stics of
t he remedy, the essenti al thi ng i s not t o draw up i n advance a pl an whi ch
foresees everything; i t i s to get resol utel y to work. "9 7
These consi derati ons enabl e us perhaps to gai n some i nsi ght i nto the
moot questi on o f Durkhei m's rel ati on to the sol i dari st, or sol i dari ty, move
ment -a question on which we have little obj ective evidence. After the turn
of the century, this movement secured extensive support from governments
in power unti l it became "a sort of offci al phi l osophy of the Thi rd Repub
l i c. "n In a sense the concept of "sol i dari ty" came to have i n Durkhei m's
France a status comparabl e to that of "consensus" in recent Ameri can hi s
tory, wi th many of the same obfuscati ons and ambi gui ti es. Sol i dari ty was
a theme - i ndeed an " i dee-force, " i n the expressi on of Alfred Foui l l ee
-devel oped by the pol i t i ci an Leon Bourgeoi s ( who rel i ed on the noti on
of a quasi -contract as the basi s of soci al obl i gati on) ; a j uri st and student of
Durkhei m at Bordeaux, Leon Dugui t; the soci al l y consci ous and humane
economi st Charles Gi de; and the pedagogue Henri Mari on ( whose De La
Solidarite morale of 1 880 predated Durkhei m's work by al most a generati on) .
Despi t e al l t he verbal advocacy of sol i dari ty, few of the concrete welfare
measures proposed by advocates of the movement ever passed into law.
The parl i amentary deadl ock stymi ed al l acti on. For Marxists, sol i dari sm
amounted to a rose-col ored, ri tual i sti c gesture of academi cs of good wi ll
and bad consci ence whose desi re for soci al peace had li ttle relevance to
the r equi r ement s of soci al acti on. I ndeed, "the Left had always sai d that i t
came to nothi ng more than a pretenti ous restatement of the cl assi c slogan,
' Nei ther reacti on nor revol uti on. "'
What hard facts of a hi stori cal nature do we have about Durkhei m's
rel ati on to the sol i dari ty movement? He was named to the Facul te des
Hautes Etudes Soci al es, founded i n part to propagate sol i dari sm, and an
i nternati onal conference on s ol i dari sm ( i n cl uded as part of the Exposi ti on
Uni verselle of 1 900) had Durkhei m as one of i ts guest speakers. Beyond
these t wo facts, t he hi stori cal ground i s l ess f rm, and we are forced to rely
on opi ni on and the nature of Durkhei m's i deas themselves.
Harry Alpert has fatly rejected any associ ation of Durkhei m wi th the
solidarist movement. "It is i mportant not to i denti f Durkheim wi th the
Sol i darity movement. Although he too was immediately concerned wi th
moral questi ons, and attempted to develop the ethi cal consequences of
soci al uni ty, he used the concept of 'solidarite ' i n i ts pre-Bourgeoi s, ob j ec
ti ve, rel ati onal and non-ethi cal sense. " 1 00
Al pert's argument compri sed both
the questi on of hi stori cal rel ati onshi p and the nature of Durkhei m's i deas.
On the latter poi nt, Al pert, i f I understand hi m correctly, mi sunderstood
Durkhei m's usage of the concept of sol i dari ty -a gri evous error, si nce thi s
concept was at the very root of Durkhei m's thought and reappeared i n di f
ferent guises in all his works. Certai nly, Durkheim i nsi sted upon the obj ective
i nterdependence or sol i darity of soci al and cul tural phenomena in all states
of soci ety and hence upon thei r amenabi l i ty to formal l y rati onal , structural,
and functi onal anal ysi s. But absol utel y essenti al to Durkhei m's soci al phi
l osophy was the noti on that soci al normal i ty i s equated wi th substantive
rati onal i ty, especi ally in the latter's moral sense. On the l evel of human and
speci fcally soci al rel ati ons, Durkhei m was not concerned exclusively or
even pri mari l y wi th "obj ective" sol i dari ty ei ther i n t he formal , val ue-neutral
sense or i n the restri cted sense of an i nterdependence of economi c i nterests.
As he stated i n the preface to the frst edi ti on of De La Division du travail
social ( The Division of Labor in Society) , his obj ect was "to treat t he facts of
t he moral l i fe accordi ng t o t he method of the positi ve sci ences. "
1
0
1
Despi te
certai n ambi gui ti es i n the argument of the frst edi ti on of Durkhei m's Erst
maj or work, the development of Durkhei m's thought -i ncl udi ng promi
nently the preface t o the second edi t i on of The Division of Labor -makes
i t abundantly cl ear that the soci al sense of sol i darity for Durkhei m was
pr eemi nent l y moral and that i t i ncl uded both an "obj ecti ve" compone nt
i n i nsti tuti onal and symbol i c structures and a "subj ective" component i n
i nternal i zati on, communal senti ment, and personal commi tment.
Al pert di d not provi de any evi dence whatsoever for the contenti on that
Durkhei m had no rel ati onshi p with the sol i dari st movement. Durkhei m's
own trusted di sci pl e Cel esti n Bougi e, who, i f anyone, shoul d have known,
pl aced Dur khei m wi t hi n t he s ol i dari st movement i n a work publ i shed
( 1 903) duri ng t he latter's l i feti me and i n a larger work publ i shed ( 1 924)
after hi s death. I n 1 903, Bougie argued that i n contrast wi t h uti l i tari an
i ndi vi dual i sm, "soli dari sm hel ps us to oppose these desi ccati ng, dissolving,
and aristocratic forms of i ndi vi dual i sm wi th a democrati c i ndi vi dual i sm, a
fecund pri nci pl e of soci al uni on and acti on, whose mott o is not 'each man
i n hi s own home' [chacun chez soil or ' each man for hi mself' [chacun pour
soil but ' one for al l and al l for one' [chacun pour tous et tous pour chacun] . " 1 0
2
I ndeed Bougi e quot ed Durkhei m hi msel f as asserti ng, "One can say that
there i s not a si ngl e soci ol ogi cal proposi ti on whi ch i s not a direct or i ndi rect
demonstrati on of sol i dari ty. "
1
0'
The key practi cal probl em (as Bougi e saw) was whether and i n what
contexts sol i dari ty was proposed as a qual i ty of the status quo or as a goal
of acti on i mpl yi ng the necessi ty of change. I n Durkhei mi an terms, thi s
amounted to the questi on of the extent to whi ch the exi sti ng soci al order
was "normal" or "pathol ogi cal , " for a pri mary qual i ty of the normal state
of society was the existence of sol i dari ty. The mystifyi ng and i deol ogically
tendenti ous use of the i dea of sol i dari ty to present a "pathol ogi cal " status
quo as if i t were i n all essenti al respects "normal " and thereby to mask vested
i nterest and legi ti mate the repressi on of di ssi dence was percei ved both on
the Left and on the Ri ght. The i dea of sol i dari ty ( l i ke that of consensus)
readi ly functi oned as an i deology passed of as an i ndex of the end of i de
ol ogy. The conservative novel i st Paul Bourget i n hi s L'tape observed of
one of hi s protagoni sts:
Ardent and cri ti cal soul s are not i n the least governed by formul as
as vain and as empty as thi s moral i ty of "human sol i dari ty" whi ch
fl l ed the mouth of the anti cl eri cal professor: He bel i eved he coul d
repl ace by these two words the l i vi ng tradi ti on of order and love
i ncarnated in the Church. He did not see that this expressi on of the
relative dependence of bei ngs with respect to one another had two
si gni f cati ons: the wel l -meani ng one was the only one he wanted to
see. But are not all the feroci ti es of the struggle for l i fe j usti fed by
this formul a? The l i on is i n a state of sol i dari ty with his prey, si nce
he cannot l i ve wi t hout i t; onl y thi s sol i d arity consi sts i n ki l l i ng and
devouri ng i t . 1
0
4
Asi de from its reference to the false opti mi sm of republ i can educators,
this evocati on of the uni verse of soci al Darwi ni sm and the more subtle
movement of Hegel's master-sl ave di al ecti c poi nted to the possi bl e functi on
of the i dea of sol i dari ty i n j usti fi ng expl oi tati on. Despi te certain equi vocal
features of the Division of Labor, i ncl udi ng i ts abstract and mechani sti c ai r
of false opti mi sm, Durkhei m recogni zed thi s poi nt . He i ncreasi ngl y saw
the achi evement of moral sol i dari ty and soci al normali ty as a proj ect of no
mean proporti ons i n modern soci ety a nd one whose real i zati on requi red
basi c structural reforms. To thi s extent, he retai ned the ni neteenth-century
usage of the term "sol i darity" by the Left, whi ch correlated i t wi th basi c social
reform rather than wi th token gestures or the sel f-servi ng attempt to bri ng
peopl e together psychologi cally i n a soci ally "pathol ogi cal " status quo.
The i mportance of the Dreyfus Affai r i n the context of the b attle be tween
the pol i tical extremes and the Republ i c has al ready been touched upon.
What remai ns i s to i ndi cate i ts i mportance i n Durkhei m's i ntel l ectual de
vel opment and to his concepti on of reform i n modern soci ety. The i ntense
engagement of Durkhei m and hi s di sci pl es i n the Dreyfus Affai r i ndi cated
the extent of i ts i mpact upon them. Durkhei m hi msel f was a pri mary obj ect
of attack by the anti -Dreyfusard forces. Hi s classes were di srupted. And hi s
col l aborators, in the wake of a seri es of bombi ngs i n cafes surroundi ng the
Sorbonne, were even l ed to fear for hi s life. 1
0
5
Durkhei m was moved to step i nto the pol i ti cal arena and write hi s
defense of Dreyfus ( i n 1 8 9 8 ) i n oppos i t i on t o Ferdi nand Brunet i ere,
t he Cat hol i c apol ogi st and anti - Dreyfusard edi t or of t he Revue des deux
mondes. Mel vi n Richter has accurately observed: " It is stri ki ng how the
theory el aborated i n Les frmes rMmentaires de fa vie refigieuse turns up at
the very center of the fervent defense Tlndi vi dual i sme et l es i ntel l ectuel s, '
whi ch Durkhei m wrote at the hei ght of the Dreyfus Affai r. " 1 0 6 It mi ght be
added that i n this compl ex i ssue, whi ch i nvol ved t he opposi t i on b etween
j usti ce and the demands of "law and order" i n mai ntai ni ng the status quo,
Dur khei m came out on t he s i de of j us t i ce with an argume nt whi ch was not
onl y mor e sensi ti ve t o the ambi gui ti es i nvol ved than the atti tudes of many
of the Dreyfusards but whi ch revealed much more than hi s own general
discussions of moral i ty an awareness of the compl exi ti es i nvolved i n any
concrete case of choi ce.
The respect f or authori tyhas nothi ng i ncompati bl e wi th rati onal i sm,
provi ded that authori ty i s founded rati onally . . . . I t i s not s uff ci ent
i n convi nci ng men to remi nd t hem of thi s commonpl ace of banal
rhetori c t hat soci et y i s not possi bl e wi t hout mutual sacri f ces and
a certai n s pi ri t of s ubordi nat i on; one must j usti fy i n the [ speci fc]
instance the doci l i ty one asks of them . . . . When, on the contrary,
one i s concerned wi th a quest i on whi ch, by defni ti on, falls under
common j udgment, such an abdi cat i on i s cont rary to al l reason and
consequentl y t o duty. Now, to know whether a tri bunal i s permi tt ed
to condemn an accused person wi t hout hear i ng h i s defense does not
requi re any speci al enl i ghtenment . . . . Me n have asked themselves
whether i t i s proper to consent to a temporary ecl i pse of pri nci pl e
i n order not to troubl e the functi oni ng of a publ i c admi ni strati on
whi ch everybody, by the way, recogni zes to be i ndi spensabl e to t he
securi ty of the stat e. We do not know i f the ant i nomy really poses
i tsel f i n thi s sharp for m; but, i n any case, i f a choi ce i s really ne cessary
between these two evi l s, to sacri f ce what has been up to the pres
ent time our hi stori cal raison d'etre woul d b e to choose the greater
evi l. A organ of publ i c life, however i mportant i t may be, i s onl y
an i nst rument, a means to an end. What good i s i t to conserve t he
means i f one det aches i t from i ts end? 1 07
It was i n thi s defense of Dreyfus , moreover, that Durkheim' s human
i sti c concepti on o f the "normal " rol e of i ndi vi dual i sm i n moder n soci eti es
t ook defni te and asserti ve for m. Durkhei m observed that the i ndi ctment
of i ndi vi dual i sm confounded i t wi th "t he narrow ut i l i t ari ani sm and uti l i
t ari an egoi sm of Spencer and the economi s ts . " He rej ect ed t hi s faci l e
i denti fcati on. "One has an easy ti me i n denounci ng as an i deal wi t hout
grandeur t hi s s habby commerci al i sm whi ch reduces s oci ety t o t he status
of a vast apparatus of product i on and exchange. " On the contrary, the
i ndi vi dual i sm whi ch D urkhei m defended was "the i ndi vi dual i sm of Kant
and Rousseau, of the s pi ri tual i sts - that whi ch the Decl arat i on of the
Ri ghts of Man t r i ed more or l ess s uccessfully t o transl ate i nto formul as,
that whi ch we at present t each i n o ur school s a n d whi ch has beco me t he
ba s i s o f o ur moral catechi sm. " Accordi ng t o thi s s or t of i ndi vi dual i sm,
dut y consi st ed i n t urni ng away fro m our personal concerns and "our
empi r i cal i ndi vi dual i ty i n order to seek uni quely what our nat ure as men
demands i nsofar as we s hare i t i n common wi t h al l ot her me n. " Thi s
i deal t ranscended t he l evel of egoi st i c ut i l i t ari an ends t o such an ext ent
t hat i t seemed t o be "marked wi t h rel i gi osi ty" and t o be "sacred i n t he
ri tual sense of t he word. " The probl em wa s " t o compl et e, extend, and
organi ze i ndi vi dual i sm, not t o restri ct and combat i t . " Refecti on al one
coul d ai d i n "fndi ng a way o ut of t he present diff cul t i es. " Wi t h a rare
i roni c f ouri sh, Durkhei m concl uded: " I t i s not i n medi t at i ng upon La
Politi que tiree de l'criture sainte [ Bos s uet's "Pol i t i cs Deri ved from t he
Very Words of Sacred Scri pt ure"] t hat we wi l l ever fnd the means of
organi zi ng economi c l i fe and i nt r oduci ng more j usti ce i nt o cont ractual
rel ati ons . " 1 08
But what is perhaps most si gni fcant is that Durkheim's intense awareness
of the cruci al rol e of reli gi on in soci al l i fe i tsel f became promi nent about
the t i me the Dreyfus Affi r was breaki ng. In a 1 907 l et ter to the Revue m!o
scholastique, Durkhei m asserted:
It was onl y in 1 895 t hat I had a clear understandi ng of t he capi tal
rol e pl ayed by rel i gi on i n soci al l i fe. It was i n that year that for the
f rst time I found the means of approaching the study of rel i gi on
soci ol ogi cally. It was a revel ati on to me. The course of 1 895 marks a
l i ne of demarcati on in the development of my thought, so much so
that all my previ ous research had to be taken up agai n wi th renewed
efort i n order to be placed i n harmony wi th these new vi ews. 1 09
Durkhei m i n good scholarl y fashi on went on to f nd the sci enti f c basi s
of hi s reori entati on i n the studi es of rel i gi ous hi story he had undertaken
at the ti me, notabl y the works of Robertson Smi th and hi s school . But i t
was no acci dent that the "revel ati on" came t o hi m about the ti me he was
deepl y i nvol ved i n the Dreyfus Affai r. For the i nvo lvement that consti
tuted a peak experi ence of republ i can i ntel l ectuals had all the marki ngs
of Durkhei m's i dea of an effervescent soci al move ment carri ed al ong by
the quasi -rel i gi ous force of a mysti que whi ch revi ved and reani mated
great revol uti onary i deal s of the past. Charl es Peguy -the constant cri ti c
who, wi t h i mpassi oned parti al i ty, saw i n Durkhei m onl y the off ci al rep
resentati ve of p etty rat i onal i sm and state power -nonethel ess expressed
a concepti on of the Dreyfus Affai r whi ch Durkhei m shared: " Our Drey
fusi sm was a rel i gi on . . . . j usti ce a n d trut h , whi ch were so loved by us and
to whi ch we gave everythi ng, were not at al l the truth and j usti ce of the
concept, of books; they were organi c, they were Chri sti an. "
1 1 0
For Durkhei m, the rassemblement of me n of good wi l l i n defense of
Dreyfus ( who at ti mes assumed the status of a t ot emi c embl em symbol i c
of col l ecti ve val ues) enabl ed modern l i fe to transcend for a moment i t s
ordi nary "moral medi ocri ty. " From the t i me of the Dreyfus Affai r -i . e . ,
duri ng t he second hal f of hi s i ntel l ectual l i fe - Durkhei m, i nstead of
focusi ng on the rol e of formal constrai nts, stressed the i mportance of com
munal senti ment, col l ective i deal s, and rel i gi ous symbol s i n soci al l i fe .
At l east unt i l Worl d War I . The war came as a rude awakeni ng to
men l i ke Durkhei m, shatteri ng many o f thei r i ntel l ectual assumpti ons
and the foundati ons of thei r personal exi stence. Bri ce Parai n, i n hi s La
Mort de Jean Madec, sei zes the contrast between the mo r al atmosphere
of Ia belle epoque, when thi ngs seemed ful l of hope quand meme, and the
post war senti ments of i ntel l ectual s i n France who were faced wi th an
"obstructed p ath. "
I grew up among the school masters who organized the Republ i c
after the Dreyfus Affair. They were good, honest, rel i abl e - but
they demanded t oo much of ma n and of themselves . . . . Thus they
beli eved very strongl y i n the reign of j usti ce; their morality fl apart.
It requi red t oo much sai ntl i ness. One woul d have preferred the
type of heroi sm whi ch i s more bri l l i ant and whi ch gets al ong bet
ter wi t h a certai n i nsouci ance whi ch i s necessary for l i fe. Thei r
pri nci pl e sai d: i f you do good, you have onl y done your duty, but
i f you d o evi l , you must be puni s hed. Well, evi l was done al l the
same, and nobody was around to puni sh t he wi cked. The war put
an e nd t o thei r d ream. What i n effect does someone owe whe n he
has recei ved not hi ng and wi l l recei ve not hi ng? ' ' '
Duri ng t he war Durkhei m ral l i ed to the union sacrre and be came
i ntensel y i nvol ved i n admi ni strati ve work and propaganda. 1 12 The mos t
that can b e sai d about hi s propagandi sti c pi eces i s that t hey are among
the most level-headed speci mens of a rather paranoi d genre. At ti mes they
offered vehi cl es for t he expressi on of hi s t hought , e. g. , i n hi s attempt,
i n L'lemagne au-dessus de tout - Germany above Al - to portray the
German nati onal character and def ine i mperi al i sm, wi th speci al reference
to the works of Hei nri ch von Trei tschke. 1 1 3 Hi s conf dence in the j usti ce
of hi s own country's cause was nei ther di mi ni s hed by consi derati ons of
l ong-term causati on nor mi ti gated by concern about t he postwar settle
ment . The i ntensi ty ( but not the mere fact) of hi s propagandi sti c efforts,
however, must be seen i n the l i ght of hi s anxiety over the fate of his onl y
son. He received defni te news of hi s son's d eath at the front onl y after a
prol onged peri od of uncertai nty. For the first ti me, Durkhei m seemed to
face the temptati on of madness. " I need not tel l you , " he wrote to Georges
Davy, "of the anguish in whi ch I l i ve. It is an obsessi on of every i nst ant
whi ch hurt s me more t han I s uppos ed. " Durkhei m was haunt ed "by the
i mage of this exhausted chi l d, alone by the roadsi de i n t he mi ddl e of t h e
ni ght and t he fog . . . . That i mage hel d me by the throat. " 1 1 4 When he
f nall y recei ved defini te word of hi s son's death, the man who had wri t
ten movi ngl y of the spi ri tually restorati ve powers of ri tual i n moments of
cri si s wi thdrew i nto a terri bl e si l ence whi ch prevented hi m from so much
as talki ng about hi s feel i ngs wi t h hi s cl osest fri ends: " Don' t s peak t o me
about my son unt i l I t el l you t hat i t 's possi b l e. " 1 1 5 "Above al l , don't speak
to me of hi m. " 1 1
6
" Don' t answer me. Al l that weakens and exhausts me. " 1 1 7
Iron sel f- di sci pl i ne remai ned the domi nant force in Durkhei m's l i fe, and
i t f nally broke hi m. In 1 9 1 7 he di ed o f what has been cal l ed a " broken
heart. " But hi s own mel anchol i c loss and hi s i nabi l i t y to mourn mi ght be
understood l ess i n terms of hi s personal ethos than as a testi mony t o the
defci t of effective soci al processes, i ncl udi ng ri tual s of mourni ng, i n secul ar
soci ety - a defci t hi s thi nki ng tri ed i n certai n ways to address.
Notes
Chapter 2 Durkheim s Milieu 65
I . Georges Wei ll, Histoire du mouvement social en France, 1 852- 1910 (Paris:
Alcan, I 9 I I ) , pp. 469-483.
2. "Emile Durkheim," Revue fanraise de socioLo gie, I ( I 960) , 6.
3 . Revue de metaphysique et de morale, XIV ( I 9 I 7) , 749. Compare the tes
timony of Rene Maublanc, "LOeuvre sociologique d' Emile Durkhei m: '
Europe, XII ( 1 930) , 298. See also Ivan Streski, Durkheim and the fezus of
France ( Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I 997) .
4. "Emile Durkheim, " p. 6.
5. Reported by Bougle, "L'Oeuvre sociologique d' Emile Durkheim," Europe,
XII ( 1 930) , 28 1 .
6. Georges Davy, "Emil e Durkheim: L'Homme, " Revue de nhysique et de
morale, XVI ( I 9 I 9) , I 83 .
7. Dav, i n commemorative issue, Annates de l'Universite de Paris, No. I
(Jan . -March I 960) , I 9.
8. Harry Alpert, Emile Durkheim and His Sociolog (frst pub. I 939; New
York: Russell & Russell, I 9 6 1 ) , pp. I 6- I 7.
9. Davy, "Emile Durkheim: L' Homme, " Revue de metaphysique et de morale,
XVI ( I 9 I 9) , I 87. The disorder was diagnosed as erysipelas, an acute
febrile disease associated with intense local infammation of the skin and
subcutaneous tissue. The agrtgation is the competitive examination quali
fing successful candidates to hold teaching posts in French high schools
( lctes) .
I O. Ibid. , p. I 84.
I I . Ibid. , p. I 87.
I 2. Ibid. , p. I 88.
I 3. Quoted in Davy, "Emile Durkheim, " Revue ftanraise de sociologie, I ( 1 960 ) ,
8.
I 4. Preface to Le Systhne de Descartes (Paris: Alcan, I 9 I I ) , p. v.
I 5 . Alpert, p. 32. For an analysis of the French lc te and university system, see
Pierre Bourdi eu and Jean-Claude Passeron, The Inheritors: French Students
and Their Reltion to Culture, trans. Richard Nice (frst pub. I 964; Chi
cago: University of Chicago Press, I 979) . See also Fritz Ringer, Fiels of
Knowldge: French Academic Culture in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, I 992) .
I 6. Davy, AnnaLes de f' Universite de. Paris, No. I (Jan. -March I 960) , I 9.
I 7. "La Philosophie dans les universites allemandes, " Revue interntionle de
f'enseignement, XI I I ( 1 887) , 3 I 3- 338, 423-440; and "La Science positive
de la moral e en Al l emagne," Revue philosophique, XXIV ( 1 887) , 33- 58,
1 1 3- 1 42, 275-284.
1 8 . Rene Lacroze, Annales de l'Universite de Paris, No. 1 (Jan. -March 1 960) ,
26.
1 9. Annales de l'Universite de Paris, No. 1 (Jan. -March 1 960) , 1 9.
20. Marcel Mauss, "In Memori am: I; Oeuvre inedite de Durkheim et de ses
col laborateurs , " Annie sociologique, n. s. , I ( 1 923) , 9.
2 1 . Quoted by Davy, Annales de l'Universittde Paris, No. 1 (Jan. -March 1 960) ,
1 9.
22. I n trod. , Emi l e Durkheim, LEvolution Pedagogique e n France (Paris: Alcan,
1 938) , p. 1 .
23. "Emi l e Durkheim: I: Homme, " Revue de mta physique et de morale, XI
( 1 9 1 9) , 1 90.
24. Roger Lacombe, La Mehode sociologique de Durkheim: Etude critique
(Pari s: Alcan, 1 926) , p. 1 . The conti nuing presence of Durkheim i n
French sociology was indicated b y the fact that the immediate string of
successors to his chair i n sociology at the Sorbonne were hi s di scipl es P.
Fauconnet, M. Halbwachs, and G. Davy. After World War I I , however,
the inf uence of Durkheim in French sociology waned. The holders of the
two chairs in sociology at the Sorbonne, Raymond Aron and, to a lesser
extent perhaps, Georges Gurvitch, were more often than not hostile critics
of Durkheim. The centenary of Durkheim's birth i n 1 958 passed almost
unnoticed i n France, partly because of the Al gerian crisis that brought de
Gaulle to power. The celebration at the Sorbo nne ofDurkheim's centenary
took place almost two years later, long after si mi l ar ceremonies in other
countries. In certain ways , however, a later generation of social thinkers in
France attempted to revive interest i n Durkheim with an understanding
guided by the sympathetic desire to discover and develop what is still alive
in his thought. This attitude may be found, for example, in the perceptive
introduction by Victor Karady to an edition of the very Durkheimian
works of the roung Mauss -a publi cation which is itself a phenomenon
of importance (Marcel Mauss, Oeuvres, 1 Les Fonctions du sacre [ Paris:
Les Editi ons du ;i nui t, 1 968] ) . The neglect of Durkheim after the war
was due in part to the impact of structural ism on anthropol ogy, general
methodol ogy, phil osophy, and even ;arxism (as well a to the vogue of phe
nomenology and exi stenti al i sm). Re-eval uation ofDurkheim might make
it possible to retain the elements of structuralism that cl earl y constitute a
genuine theoretical advance over Durkheim whil e phasing out those of its
i nclinations which induce sterile formalism and damaging obscurantism. It
might al so provide one basis for a critical analysis of the relations between
Chapter 2 Durkheim s Milieu 67
structuralism and varieties of poststructurali sm. Durkhei m's legacy is of
course qui te important for Pierre Bourdi eu. I ts si gni fcance for Georges
Bataille has in general not been refected i n the work of poststructuralists
and would merit extended treatment. One mi ght argue that Batail le over
interpreted, or even mi si nterpreted, Mauss on the gift in terms of potlatch
as depense (excessive, gratuitous expenditure) and went on to revise if not
reverse Durkheim's emphasis on the rol e of normative limits by construing
the latter predominantly as invitations to more or less radical transgressi on
and ecstatic excess. In Bataille radical transgression becomes the avenue to
at least momentary transcendence in the quest for a secular sacred. Bataille's
orientation has left its mark on poststructuralism.
25. One even fnds an echo of the republi can attack on the Second Empire,
which frequently l ent itself to ideological uses as a basis for a l egitimating
myth of the Republic and its original purity, i n Leon Bl um's comment in A
L'Echefe humaine (Paris: Gallimard, 1 945) : "The Empire had been gui l ty,
but the Republ i c was onl y unfortunate [malheureuse] (p. 4 1 ) .
26. Emi l e Durkheim, Socialism, trans. Charlotte Sattler, ed. with Introd. by
Alvin Gouldner ( New York: Coll i er Books, 1 962) , p. 1 60.
27. David Thomson, Democracy i n France ( London, New York, Toronto: Ox
ford University Press, 1 958) , p. 27. See also Yves Deloge, Ecofet citoyennete:
f'individualisme republicain de jules Ferry a Vichy: controverses (Paris: Presses
de Ia Fondation nationale des sciences politi ques, 1 994) ; Sanford Elwitt,
The Making ofthe Third Republic: Clss and Politics in France 1868-1884
(Baton Rouge: Loui si ana State University Press, 1 975) and The Third
Republic Dended: Bourgeois R{rm in France (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1 986) ; William Logue, From Philosophy to Sociolog:
The Evolution ofFrench Liberalism 1870- 1914 (Dekalb: Northern I l l i noi s
University Press, 1 983) and Charles Renouvier: Philosopher ofLibert (Baton
Rouge: Loui si ana State University Press, 1 99 3 ); Laurent Muccielli, La
Deouverte du social: naissance de Ia sociologie e n France 1870- 1914 (Paris:
Editions de la decouverte, 1 998) ; Philip Nord, The Republican Moment:
Strufles fr Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1 995) ; and Phyl li s Stock- Morton, Moral Educ ation for
a Seclar Soc iet: The Development ofmoral e la'igue in Nineteenth-Century
France (Albany: State University of New Yor Press, 1 988) .
28. Cf Alpert, pp. 28f
29. "Cours de science soci ale, " Revue internationale de l'nseignement, XV
( 1 888) , 48-49.
30. For a concise account of t he social bases of t he Third Republ i c, s ee Thom
son, chap. i i . See also the compact and intricate essay of Stanl ey Hoffmann,
68 Emile Durkhem: Soiologist and Philosophe
"Paradoxes of the hench Political Community, " in Stanley Hoffmann
et a!. , In Search ofFrance (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 963) .
See also Susanna Barrows, Distorting Mirrors: Visions ofthe Crowd i n Late
Nineteenth-Century France ( New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 9 8 1 ) ; Jean
Bauberot, La Morale li'que contre l 'ordre moral (Paris: Edi ti ons du seui l ,
1 997) ; Christophe Clurle, La Crise l iteraire a l epoque du naturalisme:
roman, theate e politique (Paris: Presses de ) ' Ecole Normale Superieure,
1 979) , Les Elites de I Republique (Paris: Fayard, 1 987) , and Naissance des
'intellectueLr' 1 880-1900 (Pari s: Edi ti ons de mi nui t, 1 990) ; Bernard Lacroix,
Durkheim et le pol itique ( Montreal: Presses de Ia Fondation Nationale des
Sci ences Politiques, 1 982) ; Christophe Prochasson, Les annees electriques,
1880- 1 91 0 (Paris: Edi ti ons de Ia decouverte, 1 9 9 1 ) , Les intellectueLr, le
socialisme et fa guerre, 1900-1938 (Paris: Edi ti ons du seui l , 1 993) , and
Paris 1900. Essai d'istoire cultrele (Paris: Caiman-Levy, 1 999) ; Sylvia
Schafer, Chilren in Moral Danger and the Problem ofGoZernment in Third
Republ ic France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 997) ; and Judi th
Wi shni a, The Proletarianizing ofthe Fonctionnaires: CiZil SerZice Wrkes
and the Labor Mowment under the Third Republic (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State Uni versi ty Press, 1 990 ).
3 1 . See his Economic Deuel opment ofFrance and Germany (4th ed. ; Cambridge:
University Press, 1 936) , especially pp. 232ff. For a thought-provoking
account of the rapid and disruptive transformation of French society and
culture i n the crucial period preceding 1 968, see Kristin Ross, Fast Cars,
Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering ofFrench Cul ture (Cam
bri dge, Mass. : MI T Press, 1 995)
32. Jesse Pi tts, "Conti nui ty and Change i n Bourgeoi s France, " i n Stanley
Hoffmann et al., In Search ofFrance. On the way in which social attitudes
of businessmen affected economi c activi ty, see David Landes, "French En
trepreneurship and Industrial Growth i n the Nineteenth Century, " joural
ofEconomic History, IX ( 1 949) , 45- 6 1 , and " Business and the Business
Man: A Social and Cultural Analysi s, " i n E. M. Earle, ed. , Moden France
(Pri nceton: Princeton University Press, 1 95 1 ) .
33. Loui s Chevalier, i n his Clsses faborieuses et classes dangereuses (Paris: Pi on,
1 958) , has observed that from 1 848 to 1 870 small industry not onl y pre
domi nated but was on the increase in Paris ( pp. 76ff. ) . ror Chevalier, the
prevalence of cri me in the Paris region duri ng the nineteenth century was
due to the pathological state caused primarily by demographic change. The
rapid inf ux of people into Paris caused a crisis situation which resulted
not onl y in high crime rates but in class conf ict of extreme virulence.
Ci ti ng an interesting statistic on the issue of class consciousness versus
Chapte 2 Durkheim s Milieu 69
professional consci ousness, Chevalier noted that, at the end of the Empi re
and the begi nni ng of the Third Republic, the i nd ication of occupation on
electoral l i sts tended increasingly to change from a precise denotation of
metier t o a desi gnati on of soci al class as "worker" ( p. 1 73) .
34. "History and Science i n Anthropology, " American Anthropologist, XI I
( 1 93 5 ) , 539-569.
35. Theories ofPrimitive Religion (London: Oxford University Press , 1 965) , p.
67. See also p. 6, where Evans-Pritchard observes i n the manner of Levi
Strauss: "I t is a remarkable fact that none of the anthropologists whose
theories about pri mi tive religion have been most i nfuenti al had ever been
near a pri mi tive people. It i s as though a chemist had never thought i t
necessary t o enter a laboratory. "
36. Cf Jean Duvignaud, Durkheim (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1 965) , p. 1 3 .
37. Quoted i n John Eros, "The Positivist Generation of French I ntellectuals, "
Sociological Review, I I I ( 1 95 5 ) , 265.
38. Les Regles de f methode sociologique ( 1 5th ed. ; Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1 963) , p. xi i .
39. Davy, "Emi l e Durkhei m: "CHomme, " Revue de mitaphysique et de morale,
XVI ( 1 9 1 9) , 1 94 .
40. Ibid., p. 1 95.
4 1 . "I n Memori am, " p. 2.
42. See Adrien Dansette, Religious History ofModern Fr ance ( New York: Herder
& Herder, 1 9 6 1 ) , I I , 54f. See also Georges Duveau, Les Instituteurs (Pari s:
Edi ti ons d u Seui l , 1 957) , pp. 1 22ff.
43. Duveau, p. 1 22.
44. John Scott, Republican Ideas and the Liber af7adition in France, 1870- 1914
( New York: Col umbi a Uni versi ty Pres s ) , pp. 1 8 5 - 1 86.
45. Duveau, pp: 1 1 7-1 1 8 .
46. Felix Pecaut, "Emi l e Durkhei m, " Revue pedagogique, n. s . , LXXII ( 1 9 1 8) ,
1 4- 1 5 .
47. Jean Izoulet; quoted i n Gtin Bougie, Bilan de la sociofogie franraise con
tempor aine (Pari s: Alcan, 1 93 5 ) , p. 1 68n.
48. Albert Thibaudet, {, a Repubfique des profsseurs (Paris: Grasser, 1 927) , pp.
222-223.
49. Maublanc, 'TOeuvre sociologique d' Emi l e Durkhei m, " p. 303.
50. On Li ard, s ee Er nes t Lavi sse, "Loui s Li ard, " Revue intenationafe de
f'enseignement, LXI I ( 1 9 1 8) , 8 1 -89; s ee also G. Ri bi ere, Revue des cours
et des confrences, XI I ( 1 904) , 1 - 1 3 , 49- 65, 97- 1 1 3 , 1 45- 1 6 1 , 1 93-200,
which i ncl udes an extensive analysis of Liard's publi shed works. On Lapi e,
see the statements by Cel esti n Bougie, Fel i x Pecaut, Andre Fontai ne, and
Xavier Leon in the Revue peagogique, XC-XCI ( 1 927) , 1 1 5- 1 66.
5 1 . Many peopl e realized the extent to whi ch the mystique of the instituteur was
the symboli c recompense for the fact that he was mi serabl y underpaid. In a
circular to instituteurs i n 1 8 3 3 , Franois Guizot remarked: "The resources
which the central power has at i ts di sposal wi l l never succeed in making
the simpl e professi on of instituteur as attractive as i t i s useful . Society is
unabl e to give back to those who consecrate themselves to i t al l that they
have done for it. It is necessary that a profound sentiment support and
animate the instituteur, that the austere pleasure of havi ng served men
and contributed to the publ i c good become the worthy salary which hi s
conscience al one gives hi m. It is hi s gl ory to exhaust hi msel f i n sacrifces
and expect his recompense frm God al one" (quoted i n Duveau, p. 54) .
52. Quoted i n Ribiere, pp. 49, 65.
53. Lavisse, pp. 86-87.
54. Lavisse, p. 88.
55. Quoted i n Ribiere, p. 9.
56. Lavisse, pp. 82-83.
57. Lavisse, pp. 98-99.
58. Fontaine, Revue peagogique, XC-XCI ( 1 927) , 1 65 .
59. Pecaut, ibid. , pp. 1 22- 1 23.
60. Leon, ibid., p. 1 60.
6 1 . Fontaine, ibid. , p. 1 66.
62. Andre Canivez, }tdes Lagneau: Esai s ur Ia condition du profsseur de philoso
phie jusq ua Ia fn du ) siecle, Association des Publ i cati ons de l a Facul te
de Strasbourg, 1 965, p. 275. See also Cl aude Digeon, La Crise allemande
de l pemee jmzaise, 18 70- 1914 (Paris: Presses Universi taires de France,
1 959) .
63. Speech of Paul Armand Chal lemei-Lacour before the Senate, Dec. 1 9,
1 888; a quoted in Maurice Barres, Les Deracines, I (frst pub. 1 8 97; Paris:
Pion, 1 959) , 64.
64. Repotted by Bougi e, "L' Oeuvre soci ol ogi que d' Emi l e Durkhei m, " p.
283.
65. Emi l e Durkhei m, L'taucatimz morale (frst pub. 1 925; Paris: Presses Uni
versitaires de France, 1 963 ) , pp. 3, 9, 7-8.
66. See Ri chard D. Sonn, Anarchism and Cultural Politics in Fin-de-siecle
France ( Li ncol n: University of Nebraska Press, 1 989) and Peter Starr, Log
ics ofF ailed Revolt: French Teory Afer May '68 (Stanford, Cal i f. : Stanford
University Press, 1 995 ) .
67. Emi l e Durkhei m, Education et sociologie (Pari s: Al can, 1 922) , p. 62.
68. Canivez, p. 275.
69. L'ducatimz morale, pp. 72-73.
70. Armand Cuvillier, Ou va la sociologie .mzaise? (Paris: Li brai rie Marcel
Riviere, 1 9 53) , p. 42.
7 1 . Les Etapes de Ia pensee sociologique ( Paris : Gallimard, 1 987) , pp. 394ff
72. Letter of Jan. 1 , 1 87 8, "Lettres , " Bi bl i otheque Nationale.
73. For a bri ef analysis ofTarde's thought, which attempts to show how Tarde
was much more than the theorist of the "laws of i mi tati on, " see the intro
duction by Terry N. Clark to Gabriel Trde mz C ommwz ication and Social
Infuence ( Chi cago: University of Chicago Press, 1 969) .
74. Introduction a Ia psychologie collective (frst pub. 1 927; Paris: Armand Coli n,
1 964), p. 37. Thi s neglected work contains an excellent comparison of
Comte, Durkheim, and Tarde.
75. Thomson, pp. 27-28. See also the complementary, farther rangi ng ( i f less
historically ti ght) analysis by Rene Remond of changi ng manifestations of
traditionalist, conservative-liberal, and nationalist tendencies, La Droite en
France (Paris: Aubier, 1 963) .
76. Eugen Weber, The Nationalist Revival in France, 1905- 1914 (Berkeley:
University of Cali forni a Press, 1 959) . See also Robert Soucy, Fascism in
France: The Case oM aurice Barres (Berkeley: University of Californi a Press,
1 972) , French Fascism: The First We, 1 924- 1933 (New Haven, Conn. :
Yale University Press, 1 986) , and French Fascism: The Second Wve (New
Haven, Conn. : Yale Universi ty Press, 1 995) ; and Zeev Sternhell, Neither
Right nor L(: Fascist Ideolog in France ( Berkeley: Universi ty of California
Press, 1 986) .
77. For the argument relating Durkheim to conservatives and tradi ti onalists,
see Robert Nisbet, "Conservatism and Sociology, " American joural ofSoci
olog, LVI I I ( 1 952) , 1 65- 1 75. The theme of Durkheim's conservatism was
muted in Ni sbet's long essay in Emile Durkheim (Englewood Cliffs , N. J. :
Prentice-Hal l , 1 965) and his Sociological T mditimz (New York: Basic Books,
1 966) . An important i dea adumbrated in "Conservatism and Sociol ogy" is
not further developed in Nisbet's two later works . (It is discussed i n Nisbet's
foreword to 7e Wrks ofjoseph de M aistre, trans. and in trod. by Jack Lively
[ frst pub. 1 965; N. Y: Schoken Books, 1 97 1 ] , pp. xi -xvi i i . ) This is the
i dea of phi l osophi cal conservatism. Nisbet argues that a thi nker may have
conservative values although he does not defend the status quo or reacti on.
I t is i n thi s philosophical sense, I think, that Durkheim was conservati ve.
For the assertion of Durkheim's relation to "i ntegral nati onali sm, " see
M. M. Mitchell, "Emi l e Durkheim and the Philosophy of Nationali sm, "
Political Science Quarterl, XV ( 1 9 3 1 ) , 87- 1 06. See also George Catlin's
i ntroducti on to Durkhei m's Rules ofSociological Method ( frst pub. 1 93 8 ;
N. Y. : Free Press, 1 964) . For the charge of i rrati onali sm and protofas cism,
see Willi am M. McGovern, From Luther to Hitler (London: George G.
Harrap, 1 946) , chap. i x.
78. Thomson, p. 1 43.
79. Elements d'une doctrine radicale (Paris: Gallimard, 1 925) , p. 25.
80. Thomson, p. 1 4 1 .
8 1 . Thibaudet, p . 1 96.
82. Alfred Fouillee, "La Reforme de l' enseignement phi l osophi que et moral
en France, " Revue des deux mondes, XXX ( 1 880) , 333- 369.
83. "Associations de culte, " Libres Entretiens, 1 s t series (Paris: Bureau des "Li b res
Entretiens") , p. 369.
84. Preface t o 2d ed. , De La Division du travail social (7th ed. ; Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1 960) , p. xxxii.
85. L'sprit de Ia nouvele Sorbomze (Paris: Mercure de France, 1 9 1 1 ) . See also
the same authors' less interesting Les ]eunes Gens d'ujourd'ui (Paris: Pion,
1 9 1 3) .
86. L'sprit de Ia nouvelle Sorbomze, pp. 99, 1 0 1 - 1 02, 1 1 0.
87. Paris: Maspero.
88. Ibid. , pp. 1 09- 1 1 0.
89. Revue philosophique, LXI V ( 1 89 ) , 647. On this problem, see Armand
Cuvillier, "Durkheim et Marx, " Cahiers internationaux de sociologie, I V
( 1 948) , 75-97.
90. Introd. , 1 s t ed. , Emi l e Durkhei m, Le Soci al i sme, i n Soci al i sm, pp. 34-
3 5 .
9 1 . M. Holleaux, quoted i n Davy, "Emi le Durkhei m: IHomme, " Revue de
mta physique et de morale, XVI ( 1 9 1 9) , 1 89.
92. Marxism: An Historical & Critical Study (New York: Praeger, 1 96 1 ) , p.
228.
93. Mauss, l ntrod. , Soci ali sm, p. 34.
94. Li chthei m, pp. 228-229.
95. Mauss, l ntrod. , SociaHsm, p. 35.
96. 'TEl i t e et I a democratie, " Revue bleue XXI I I ( 1 904) , pp. 705-06.
97. Le Suicide (Paris: Presses Universitaires de france, 1 960) , p. 45 1 .
98. Celestin Bougie, Le Solidarisme (Pari s: Marcel Gi ard, 1 924), p. 7. See also hi s
earlier study L'Evolution d u Solidarisme (Pari s: Bureau de La Revue politique
et parlementaire, 1 903 ) , an extract from Revue politique et parlementaire,
March 1 903. J . E. S. Hayward, in "Solidarity: The Social Hi story of an Idea
i n Ni neteenth Century France, " Interational Review ofSocial History, n. s . ,
I V ( 1 95 1 ) , 261 -284, contends that solidarity as an idee:rce was associated
in the ni neteenth century with leftist and reformi st movements and that
i n the Thi rd Republi c i t i ncreasingly became an ideology j usti fi ng the
status quo. He places Durkheim in the latter context without attempting
to j ustif this classi fcati on. The problem concerning Durkheim is touched
upon briefy i n Melvin Richter's excellent article, "Durkheim's Politics and
Political Theory, " in Kurt H. Wolff, ed. , Essays on Sociolog and Philosophy
(New York: Harper & Row, 1 964), p. 1 8 8 . On the role of the concept of
solidarity in early nineteenth-century France, i ncl udi ng its radical use by
workers, see William Sewell, Work and Revolution in France: The Language
of Labor fiom the Ol Regime to 1848 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1 980 ). Sewell argues that a democratic corporatism with socialist
components was dominant in labori ng classes during the peri od treated
in his study.
99. Richter, op. cit.
1 00. Alpert, p. 1 78.
1 0 1 . Division du travail social, p. xxxvi i .
1 02. "LEvolution du Solidarisme, " p. 28. For the explicit reference to Durkheim,
see p. 3 .
1 03 . Ibid. , p. 7. The quotati on i s repeated i n Bougi e's Le Solidarisme, p. 1 2.
1 04. Pari s: Li brai ri e Artheme Fayard, 1 946 (frst pub. 1 9 1 4 ), p. 207.
1 0 5 . See Terry N. Clark, "Emi l e Durkheim and the Insti tutionalization of Soci
ology, " Archives europeemzes de sociologie, IX ( 1 968) , 63-64. See al so Eugen
Weber, The Nationalist Revival in France; Charles Andler, La Vie de Lucien
Herr (Paris : Rieder, 1 932) , pp. 1 1 2- 1 50; Romain Rolland, Peguy (Paris:
Albin Mi chel, 1 944), I , 306ff. ; and Daniel Halevy, Peguy et "Les Cahiers
de la quinzine" (Paris: Bernard Grasser, 1 94 1 ) , pp. 68-80
1 06. "Durkhei m's Politics and Political Theory, " p. 1 75 .
1 07. "Ll ndividualisme et les intellectuels , " Revue bleue, 4th series, X ( 1 898) ,
1 0, 1 2 .
1 08 . I bi d. , pp. 7-8, 1 3 .
1 09. XV ( 1 907) , 6 1 3 .
1 1 0. Quoted i n Romain Rol land, Peguy, p. 85.
1 1 1 . Paris: Grasser, 1 945, p. 71 . For the French intellectual scene between the
two wars and after, see H. Stuart Hughes, The Obstructed Path (New York:
Harper & Row, 1 968) .
1 1 2. A list of Durkheim's commi ttees in Davy, "Emi le Durkhei m: CHomme, "
Revue de meta physique et de morale, XI ( 1 91 9) , 1 93 , i ncl udes: Consei l
de l ' Universi te, Comi te des travaux historiques et sci enti fques, Comi te
consul tati f de l' ensei gnement superi eur, Commi ssi on des etrangers au
mi nistere de l ' I nterieur, Comite fran<ais d' i nformati on et d' acti on aupres
des j ui fs en pays neutre, Fraternite franco-americaine, Pupilles de ! ' Ecole
publ i que, Comite de publication des Etudes et documents s ur la guerre,
Comite de publi cati on des lettres a tOllS les Francais, Ligue republicaine
d'Alsace-Lorraine, Societe des amis de Jaures, and Pour le rapprochement
universitaire.
1 1 3 . In L>emagne au-dessus de tout (Paris : Col i n, 1 9 1 5) , Durkhei m made
an interesting application of his concept of anomi e to the problem of
i mperi ali sm. For Durkhei m, i mperi al i sm was a form of anomi e fostered
by domi nant i nsti tuti ons like the state and mi l i tary, and a thinker l i ke
Treitschke attempted to legitimate i nsti tuti onalized anomi e i n the form of
a national wi l l to power. The l i mi tl ess expansion of the power of a state at
the expense of other states was for Durkheim "a morbid hypotrophy of the
will, a kind of will mani a" (p. 44) . Durkheim realized that anomie might
be furthered by dominant i nsti tuti ons, i nsti lled into the personali ti es of
citizens through education, and legitimated by i ntellectuals. Even i n his
later work, however, he only at times extended hi s i nsi ghts to broach an
analysis and critique of coloni ali sm. Colonialism i s not, for example, an
issue in hi s Eememary Forms oft he Religious Lf or i n his refecti ons about
the relation of sociology to anthropology.
1 1 4 . Davy, Amzales de l 'Universite de Paris, 2 1 . I would further note that i t
i s i nteresting to compare Durkhei m's conception of Germany's pri mary
responsi bil i ty i n causing the war with the si mi l ar thesis later made famous
by the German hi stori an Fri tz Fischer.
1 1 5 . Ibid.
1 1 6. Davy, "Emil e Durkhei m, " Revue fmzfaise de sociologie, I ( 1 960) , 1 2 .
1 1 7. Quoted by Raymond Lenoir, "L'Oeuvre sociologique d' Emi le Durkhei m, "
Europe, XI I ( 1 930) , 295.
3
The Division of Social Labor
We believe that our research would not merit an hour' trouble fit had onl a
speculative interest. Jwe separate with care theoretical from practical problems,
it is not in order to neglect the latter; it is, on the contrary, to put ourselves in
a better position to resolve them.
- The Division of Labor i n Sociey
Quo vais ?
The Division of Labor in Sociey has acqui red in modern soci al thought
the dubi ous status of a sacred text that i s al most a dead l etter. l t i s a work
that i s referred t o wi th the pro frma awe that schol ars reserve for recogni zed
classi cs, but to whi ch l i ttl e real reference i s made in the anal ysi s of probl ems.
Indeed Durkhei m hi ms elf, as wel l as hi s di sci pl es, never returned t o the
massi ve and cumbr ous concepts of organi c and mechani cal sol i dar i t y t hat
were "absol utel y fundamental i n hi s fr s t maj or wor k. " ' Tal cot t Parsons,
despi te hi s bel i ef that the work has never received the recogni ti on i t mer
i ts, fel t obliged to observe, "i t i s, however, a book whi ch i s far from bei ng
compl et e or cl ear i n many of t he most essenti al poi nt s , and i s di sti nctl y
diffcul t to i nt erpret . "2
I t i s di ffcul t to deci de whet her The Division of Labor mer i ts attenti on
i n i tsel f or whether i ts val ue deri ves pr i mar i l y from i ts pl ace i n the general
devel opment of the thought of Durkhei m and hi s s chool . And i t i s di ff
cul t to under st and why certai n comment ators, even Parsons hi mse l f, were
tempted to construe t hi s work as i ndi cat ive of a defni ti vel y formul ated
"frst posi ti on" i n Du rkhei m's thought whi ch was l ater sub j ected to dras
ti c r evi si on. The work ought rather to b e seen as an i ni t i al , tentati ve, and
somewhat ambi val ent expl orat ory essay put t i ng fort h cert ai n probl ems
76 Emle Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher
and themes whi ch i n the course of Durkhei m's i ntel l ectual l i fe were to be
-wi th varyi ng degrees of adequacy -modi fed, ref ned, and devel oped.
Durkhei m once compared the experi ence of peopl e i n archai c soci eti es to
a "pri mi tive nebul a" whose l aws were i n al l essenti al s t o be conserved i n
modern soci eti es. 3 In some measure, thi s metaphor appl i es to t he rel ati on
of The Division of Labor to Durkhei m's own l ater works.
Durkhei m, as we know from Marcel Mauss, had at frst concei ved hi s
thesi s i n terms of i ndi vi dual i sm and soci al i sm - a theme whi ch recalled
the 1 8 3 3 essay De L7ndividualisme et du socialisme of the Sai nt-Si moni an
Pi erre Leroux. Thi s popul ar work had been i nf uenti al i n bri ngi ng t he
term "soci alism" i nto general currency.4 But t he theme of The Division of
Labor was l ater recast i n t he more sci enti fcal l y asepti c framework of t h e
rel ati on between t he i ndi vi dual and soci ety. I n a turn of phrase remi ni scent
of Rousseau i n the Social Contract, D urkhei m posed the questi on: " How
i s i t possi bl e for the i ndi vi dual i n becomi ng more autonomous to depend
more cl osel y upon soci ety? How can he be at the same ti me more personal
and more sol i dari sti c? "5
Some of t he more i deol ogi cal reasons why Durkh ei m recast the t h e me
of hi s frst maj or work were rel ated t o t he obvi ous hesi tanci es i n i ts l i ne
of argument and t he t i mi di t y i n i t s ref ecti ons on refor m. Durkhei m
undoub t edl y remembered t he h arassment of Alfred Espi nas and the
furor caused by hi s thesi s, "Ani mal Soci et i es. " Paul Janet , a member of
Durkhei m's own thesi s j ury, had tri ed t o convi nce Espi nas t o modi fy a pas
sage on Auguste Comt e in hi s i ntroducti on and, because Espi nas refused,
had had the enti re i ntroducti on suppressed before publ i cati on. 6 Duri ng
the defense of Durkhei m's thesi s, Janet l ost hi s composure, rapped on the
tabl e, i nvoked God, and warned Durkhei m that soci ol ogy l ed to madness. 7
Emi l e Boutroux, to whom the thesi s was dedi cated, coul d not accept thi s
ambi val ent honor "wi thout maki ng a gri mace. "8 I t was si gni f cant that
the ti tle of Durkhei m's suppl ementary Lat i n thesi s on 1ontesqui eu re
ferred to hi s predecessor's cont ri but i ons to pol i t i cal sci ence rather than to
soci ol ogy. Durkhei m's hesi tancy to us e the new word "soci ol ogy" was one
smal l i ndi cati on that soci ol ogy was suspect, not because of i ts rel i ance on
orthodox conservati ve i deas to bol ster the status quo, but because i t was
unsettl i ng, at times for reasons contemporari es were unabl e to formul ate
cl earl y or accurately. Despi te Durkheim's attempt, i n hi s earl y work, to allay
Chapter 3 Te Division ofSocial labor 77
suspi ci ons on t hi s score, hi s soci ol ogi cal approach t o probl ems i nvolved a
new way of seei ng thi ngs and, consequently, a reorderi ng of modes of i n
terpretati on. Pol i ti cal l y and soci al l y, i t seemed t o i mply, however obl i quel y
at t i mes , t he necessi t y of bas i c s t r uct ur al reform for s t abl e or der t o be pos
si bl e i n modern s oci et i es . Maus s r epor t ed t hat Durkhei m "cl ashed wi t h
t ouchy moral i sts and cl as s i c or Chr i s t i an economi sts fo r thei r obj ecti ons
to col l ecti vi sm, whi ch t hey s t r uck at t hrough his Division of Labor. Due
t o conf i cts of t hi s ki nd, he was excl uded from pr ofessorshi ps i n Pari s. "9
Bordeaux i tsel f i n Durkhei m's t i me be came a short-l i ved i ntel l ectual center
because of t he o ppos i t i on of est abl i shed powers i n the capi t al to newer
currents i n soci al t hought .
Indeed, the fact that The Division of Labor coul d have caused such a st i r
seems surpri si ng i n retrospect, si nce i t i s ambi guous bot h i n i ts theori es and
in its pol i ti cal i mpl i cati ons. Ostensi bly, the pri mary focus of The Division of
Laborwas the structure of modern soci ety, the process of moderni zati on, which
had brought that structure into existence, and the relation of structure and
process to moral sol i dari ty among peopl e i n soci ety. In good Gal l i c fashi on,
the book was di vi ded i nto three pri nci pal parts: ( 1 ) an anal ysi s of organi c and
mechanical sol i dari t y and thei r relati ons to i ndi vi dual s and groups i n soci ety;
( 2) an i nvestigation of the process of change whi ch purportedl y had l ed from
the mechani cal sol i dari ty of pri mi tive and tradi ti onal soci eti es to the organic
sol i dari ty of modern soci eti es based on The Division of Labor; (3) a study of
pathol ogical forms in whi ch The Division of Labor di d not function to create
sol i dari ty in soci ety.
Thus, Durkhei m approached moderni ty and the i ndustri al revol uti on
through the s t udy of The Division of Labor. I n thi s way, he met the clas
sical economi sts on t hei r own native grounds. But these grounds were to
be explored and thei r soci ol ogi cal features percei ved in such a way that
t he resul ti ng human geography woul d no l onger be fami l i ar to the hei rs
of Adam Smi th. The very ti tl e of the work, De La Division du travail social
-whi ch has been mi stransl ated The Division of Labor in Society i nstead of
"The Di vi si on of Soci al Labor" -was i tsel f hi ghly si gni fcant. The di vi si on
of social l abor was for Durkhei m i denti cal i n i ts br oadest sense wi th soci al
differenti ati on, and i n i ts narrower and more speci fcal l y modern sense wi th
advanced occupat i onal speci al i zati on. But i n Durkhei m the focus shi fted
away fr om the economi c role of the divi s i on of l abor, e. g. , in i ncreasi ng
producti vi ty. It fel l i nstead on the functi on of the di vi si on of! abor i n relating
peopl e to one another i n soci ety. From economi c product to soci al process
and t he qual i ty of human l i fe - t hi s for Durkhei m was the soci ol ogi cal
perspecti ve on the di vi si on of l abor.
In fact , Durkhei m's frst maj o r work seemed t o show a l ack of concern
wi th economi c probl ems. Durkhei m's methodological goal was to fu rther the
i dea of a uni fed soci al sci ence by stressi ng the extra-economi c di mensi ons
of economi c activity. Hi s i ncreasi ngl y apparent i deol ogi cal p urpose was to
subordi nate the economy and materi al i sti c motives to the moral and cul tural
needs of peopl e i n s oci ety. But hi s mode of affrmat i on often approached
di sci pl i nary i mper i ali sm and di sdai n for the di smal sci ence wi t h i ts speci fc
form of abst ract i on. I ndeed, i n Durkh ei m' s concept i on of economi cs, t he
mi nd- body dual i sm functi oned to relegate economi c acti vi ty t o t he sphere
of the l i teral l y materi al and the i ndi vi dual . By the end of hi s ! i f e, Durkhei m
consi dered economi c acti vi ty to be the pr ofane par excel lence. Hi s enti re
concept i on of the probl em not onl y fai l ed to offer i nsi ght i nto the nat ure
of economi c i nst i t ut i ons; i t al so di d l i t t l e t o i l l umi nat e the moral and rel i
gi ous aspects of modern economi c acti vi ty t ha t Max Weber treated i n The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.
Durkheim's i dea of economi cs was one case i n whi ch the normative and
critical aspects of hi s thought submerged the analytic. For he saw the unl i mi ted
desi re for commodi ti es and unregulated economi c acti vi ty ( the "free" market)
as promi nent i nstances of modern soci al pathology. Thi s poi nt of view woul d
become mani fest in Suicide. But the di sti ncti on between soci al "normali ty"
and "pathol ogy" was basi c to the general argument of T he Division of Labor.
I n that book, Du rkheim i ntrodu ced his basic defni ti on of moral i ty and hi s
i dea of the i nt i mat e associ ati on b etween soci al normal i ty and t he prevalence
of sol i dari ty i n soci ety. "We can say in a general manner, " he observed, "that
the characteri sti c of moral rules is to enunciate the fundamental condi ti ons of
soci al sol i dari ty. " L 0 The correlation of soci al normali ty, sol i darity, and morality
reveal ed the foundati on of Durkheim's t hought i n organi zing pri nci pl es t hat
were methodologi cal and normati ve at one and the s ame t i me.
In hi s concepts of mechani cal and organi c sol i dari ty, Durkhei m fo
cused upon "normal " states of soci ety. A consi derati on of "pathol ogi cal "
phenomena i n modern soci ety was restri cted to a concl udi ng secti on whi ch
was di sproport i onately s mal l i n compari son wi t h the gravi ty of t he prob-
l ems treated; i t was al so rather di ssoci ated from, or at l east i nadequatel y
rel ated to, the precedi ng di scussi on of normal states of soci ety. The resul t
was that at ti mes soci al "normal i ty" was i t sel f normal i zed, and the di sti nc
ti on between t he normati vely desi rabl e or l egi ti mate state of soci ety and
the empi ri cal l y prevalent or domi nant - even moreso the evol uti onary
expectati on -was effaced.
A maj or ambi gui ty i n Durkheim' s argument stemmed from the l ack
of cl ari ty about the concepts of t he mechani cal and t he organi c. I n terms
of hi s master met aphor of the tree of soci ocul tural l i fe, i t was uncl ear ( 1 )
where given cases, and especi al l y enti re soci eti es, f t i nto hi s concepti on of
the mechani cal and the organi c, and ( 2) whether and how these concepts
appl i ed to the common, transhi stori cal trunk ofsoci ety and to i ts typol ogi cal
branches. Furthermore, Durkhei m rel i ed on the concepts of the mechani cal
and the organi c to correl ate a seri es of cl assi fcati ons whose factual basi s was
far from certai n and whose frui tful ness i n research was far from apparent.
The conf uence of these probl emati c features made The Division of Labor not
onl y the most i nertl y abstract ofDurkhei m's works but the l east convi nci ng
i n i t s abi l i t y t o h andle theoreti cal abstracti ons wi th l ogi cal i ntel l i gi bi l i ty and
i nformati ve relevance.
Mechanical and Oganic Solidarit
The di sti nct i on between mechani cal and organi c sol i dari t y was s i mi l ar
to numerous other pol ar opposi ti ons i n t he work of early soci al thi nkers.
I t was anal ogous , for exampl e, to Charl es Horton Cool ey's di st i ncti on
be tween pri mary and secondary groups. And i t had areas of overl appi ng
wi t h Ni etzsche's concept s of the Di onysi an and the Apol l oni an and wi th
Weber's oppos i t i on between chari sma and b ureaucrat i zat i on. Durkhei m
hi ms el f, as we shal l see, t ri ed to rel at e hi s concept s t o Ferdi nand Tinni es'
i nf uent i al contrast between Gemeinschaf ( c ommuni ty) and Gesellchaf
( soci ety) . To s ome extent, the common root of al l these opposi ti ons was the
di sti nct i on b etween communitas and di fferenti ated structure. ( Durkhei m
hi msel f di d not use the t erm comnumitas. But I t hi nk i t hel ps t o formul ate
the concept he tri ed to convey i n a term l i ke "mechani cal sol i dari ty. " In
contrast wi t h di fferenti ated structure, communitas consti tutes the ( probl em-
ati c) el ement of communal i denti ty in experi ence. The term communitas
has been empl oyed by Vi ctor Turner i n The Ritual Process, di scussed l at er
i n thi s chapter. )
But the terms "mechani cal" and "organic" b etrayed a pecul i ar dual i ty i n
Durkhei m's thought. On the one hand, they seemed i ndi cative of the most
pretenti ous sort of posi ti vi sm. The analogi es evoked were physi cal and bi
ol ogi cal . On the other hand, the terms were saturated wi th symbol i c val ue.
Romanti c thought had made the organic the synonym of the authenti c and
living, and the mechani cal i denti cal wi th the false and dead.
Thi s dual i ty i n connotati on bel i ed the fact that Durkhei m di d not know
precisely where he was going in his frst maj or work. Li ke much modern
wri ti ng, The Division of Labor was a dissertati on i n search of a thesi s. I n t he
mos t general sense, the term "mechani cal " referred t o sol i dari ty through "si
mi l i tudes" (or what might be termed "communal i dentity" ) ; "organic" referred
to sol i dari ty through di fferenti ation with reci proci ty and cooperati on among
di fferentiated but complementary parts. In referring to the genesis of soci al
sol i dari ty, Durkhei m related hi s soci ological pri nci pl es to the noti on in com
mon-sense psychol ogy that peopl e love bot h what resembl es them and what
is di fferent from yet complements them.
To refer to community as mechanical was paradoxical. I n the works of other
social thinkers, the concept of the organi c was i nti matel y bound up wi th the
notion of communi ty. In The Division of Labor, the fact that overshadowed
the concept of organic soli dari ty was the absence of signifcant communi ty i n
modern life. Durkheim recognized thi s fact but seemed bewildered about how
to come to terms wi th i t . The concl udi ng secti on, on "pathologi cal" forms of
The Division ofLabor, showed that Du rkheim was not offering t he concept of
organic sol i dari ty as a si mpl e l egiti mati on of t he modern status quo. But does
The Division of Labor i ndi cate he bel i eved that soli dari ty i n modern soci ety i s
even theoretically possi bl e wi thout signi fcant communi ty? The fact that he
fai l ed to treat the relati on of bureaucracy to organic solidarity does not help
to cl ari fy hi s i nt ent . Nor does t he absence of a full di scussi on of t he relati ons
between modern, uni versalistic humani sm and t he values adapted t o more
concrete, face- to-face communi ti es.
At ti mes Durkhei m seemed to sense the need for a measure of both or
gani c and mechani cal sol i dari ty i n any "normal " ( or normatively desi rable)
soci ety: "It is not necessary to choose once and for all between [ organi c and
Chapter 3 Te Division ofSocial labor 8 I
mechani cal sol i dari ty] and condemn one i n the name o f the other; what i s
necessary i s t o give each at each moment o fhi story the place which i s proper
to i t . " 1 1 But i t was only i n wri ti ngs of a l ater date that Durkheim became more
expl i ci t about t he possible role of communi ty i n modern soci ety. Hi s advocacy
of professi onal groups that would allow for some measure of decentralizati on
had as one of i ts most essential features the desire to remedy the l ack of com
muni ty i n modern life. And his last maj or work, The Elementay Forms of the
Religious Li, was postul ated on the convi cti on that a signi fcant measure of
conti nui ty was necessary between the bases of legi timate order in "pri mi tive"
and modern soci eti es.
Al though Durkheim's i deas about modern soci ety became cl earer i n t i me,
one feature of The Division of Labor whi ch cont i nued t o be characteri sti c of
hi s thought was the tendency t o see "pri mi tive" soci eti es pri mari ly, i f not ex
clusively, in terms of soci al si mi l i tudes, homogeneity, and communal i denti ty,
to the exclusion of di fferenti ati on among rol es i n the group or among groups
in the larger social context. This exaggerated i dea of "pri mi tive" conformism
became the basi s for the chapter in The Rules of Sociological Method on the
cl assi fcati on of soci al types (chapter i v). I t was i n fact one basi c reason why
Durkheim's proj ect for a comp arative cl assi fcati on of social types remained
li ttl e more than a pious hope. I n The Rules, as i n The Division of Labor,
Durkhei m gratui tously postul ated a hypotheti cal horde as the basis of group
formati on i n soci ety, and hence the "natural" basi s of classif cati on of soci et
i es i n terms of increasi ngly compl ex combi nati ons of the nonexi stent pri mal
horde. Indi vi dual s in the horde "do not form in the i nteri or of the total group
any speci al groups which di ffer from the group as a whol e; they are j uxtaposed
atomi cally. " 1 2 Du rkheim was forced to concede that no histori cally known
societies corresponded to thi s Darwi ni an not i on of the undi fferenti ated
"protoplasm of the soci al realm. " But the force of this model of pri mi tive
homogenei ty was so constrai ni ng in Durkhei m's mi nd t hat he concl uded,
wi th no appeal to evidence, that the "si mpl est" types of "pri mi ti ve" soci ety
were "formed i mmedi atel y and wi t hout any i ntermedi ary by a repeti ti on of
hordes . " 1 3 The horde, whi ch became a "segment" of a larger "segmental" so
ci ety by recapi tulati ng the atomi sti c j uxtaposi ti on of i ts members in i ts own
rel ati ons ( or nonrelati ons) wi th other hordes, was for Durkhei m the clan. A.
R. Radcliffe-Brown detected wi t h acumen how this soci ol ogi cal l y fal se and
mi sl eadi ng concepti on of groups in "pri mi ti ve" societies remained basic even
in The Elementary Forms oft he Religious Lf: "One of the results ofDurkheim's
theory is that it over-emphasizes the cla and clan sol i darity. Totemism does
more than express the unity of the cl an; i t also expresses the uni ty of totemi c
soci ety as a whol e i n t he rel ations of the cl ans t o one another wi thi n t he larger
soci ety. " 1 4 0ne coul d add that totemism mi ght also be related to tensi on and
confi ct wi t hin and between groups.
The tendency to see phenomena in "pri mitive" societi es i n terms ofidentity,
homogenei ty, and confusion was carri ed to absurd lengths i n Luci en Levy
Bruhl 's attempt to make the Pl atoni c pri nci pl e of mystical "parti ci pati on" the
sol e basi s of experi ence among the "pri mi tives. " Despi te hi s own cri ti ci sm of
Levy- Bruhl's tendency to see an unbri dgeabl e gap between forms of experi
ence in "pri mi t ive" and modern soci eti es, a strong el ement of the tendency
remai ned i n Durkhei m's attempt to fnd the source of rel i gi ous bel i efs i n
undi ferenti ated concepts l i ke "mana. " And Durkhei m often conti nued t o see
the type of communal i denti ty that i s at most attai ned wi t hi n conf i ct groups
i n revol uti onary "effervescence" and wi t hi n a stabl e soci ety onl y peri odi cally,
in ri tual acti vi ti es, as the exclusive functi onal pri nci pl e of sol i dari ty in ongo
ing "pri mi ti ve" soci eti es. Durkhei m's t hought , however, was not domi nated
by the abstract force of concepts alone or by the generally unsympatheti c
ethnocentri sm of a Levy- Bruhl . What remai ned from beginning to end in hi s
concepti on of "pri mi tive" soci eti es was the i dea of savage experience as the
total real i zati on of the communal bond that he fel t was mi ssi ng in modern
soci eti es. Yet it is no exaggerati on to say that a fundamental basis for the
advance of soci al and cultural anthropol ogy beyond Durkheim has been the
appl i cati on of the pri nci pl e of di fferenti ati on to symbol i c systems and soci al
stru ctures i n "pri mi tive" soci eti es, or, even more forcefully, the questi oni ng of
whether any common l abel ( much l ess the designati on pri mi tive) ft s certain
societies or, instead, reli es on the tendenti ous opposi ti on between "them"
and "us. " Along wi t h such questi oni ng has come a ful l er appreci ati on for
both the nature of experience in these soci eti es and the role of di ferences
and di fferent i at i ons i n all cultural symbol i sms and soci al systems. Hi ghly
compl ex occupati onal speci al i zati on might not be typical of certai n soci eti es.
Nor were uni versalistic val ues ( whi ch appl i ed to al l peopl e i n certai n si tua
ti ons, i ndependent of personal status) or functi onal l y speci f c norms (whi ch
were l i mi ted to certai n spheres of exi stence di fferentiated from other spheres).
But certai n sorts of di fference and di ferenti ati on were cruci al in "pri mi tive"
soci eti es: the probl em was thei r precise nature and relation to i ssues Durkheim
found i mportant.
The di ffcul ty of relati ng the uni versal and typi cal condi ti ons of sol i dari ty
i n modern and "pri mi tive" soci eti es was compounded i n The Division of L a
bor by the i ncl usi on of other concepts and phenomena under the rubri cs of
mechani cal and organic sol i dari ty. Under mechanical sol i dari ty, Durkhei m
i ncluded - al ong wi th si mi l i t ude, or communal i denti ty, i n "pri mi ti ve"
society ( i ndeed "tradi ti onal" soci eti es i n general) - the noti on of conscience
collective, repressive or penal sancti ons as the mos t obj ective i ndex of thi s type
of soli dari ty, and the idea of segmental structure. Under organi c sol i darity, he
i ncluded - along with di fferenti ati on i n modern soci ety - the idea of the
weakeni ng, i f not t he eclipse, of comcience collective, resti tuti ve sancti on as
the most obj ective index of this type of sol i dari ty, the noti on of "organized"
structure, and the emergence of universalisti c values and i ndi vi dual i sm. A I
i nti mated earli er, at poi nts in this i ntri cate exercise in opposi ng modern and
"other" soci eti es, Durkhei m threatened to fall i nt o the trap of si mi l ar duali sti c
attempts to cl assi f the universe of soci eti es known t o cultural hi story: the
basi ng of "sci enti fc" classi fcati on i n s oci ol og on t he vague and tendenti ous
opposi ti on between "them" and "us. "
Perhaps t he most pl ausi bl e way to pursue an anal ysi s of t hi s aspect of The
Division of Labor i s to take apart the i dea clusters of mechani cal and organi c
sol i dari ty, whi ch were to decompose of their own weight over the years, and to
show how Durkhei m and hi s di sci pl es defned and redefned thei r conceptual
components unti l new and more (or l ess) relevant cl assi fcatory schemes ap
peared on the hori zon of thei r thought.
Conscience Collctive
The core concept of Durkhei mi an soci ol og whi ch The Division of La
bor i ncl uded under mechani cal soli dari ty was t hat of conscience collective.
Durkhei m defned the concept t hus:
The totali ty of bel i efs and senti ments common to average members
of t he same soci ety forms a determi nate system whi ch has i t s own
life; one can call i t the col l ective or common consci ence . . . . It i s re-
alized only in i ndi vi dual s [ but] it is the psychic type of soci ety, a type
which has its properti es, its condi ti ons of existence, and its mode of
devel opment. 1 5
Elsewhere Durkhei m woul d i ndi cate how the conscience colective mi ght
remai n perti nent to excepti ons i n soci ety, even when i t was transgresse d.
The conscience colective, i n contrast wi th the i ndi vi dual and the event, was
si tuated on the l evel of structure. In one sense, it was the soci opsychol ogi cal
ground of a common culture i n members of soci ety. I n French, the word
conscience had the ambi val ent meani ngs of "conscience" and "consciousness. "
Durkhei m, h owever, often stressed that aspects of the conscience collective
mi ght be unconsci ous. And the concept, both in i ts consci ous and uncon
sci ous aspects, appl i ed above al l to norms, constrai ni ng symbol i c systems,
and moral or reli gi ous senti ments. Within the French tradi ti on, the concept
recalled Comte's not i on of consensus and Rousseau's i dea of volonte gbzerale.
I t also was si mi l ar to Freud' s concept of the superego. Durkhei m's noti on
of "collective representati on" ( somewhat l i ke Freud' s "ego i deal ") stressed
more speci fcally the conscious component of comcience collective. The ideas,
val ues, and symbols expressed in collective representati ons were sou rces
of l egi ti mati on for i nsti tuti onal practi ces and actual behavi or in soci ety.
Wi thout goi ng i nt o the complex qual i fcati ons that woul d be requi red i n
any extended di scussi on, one mi ght also not e that the concept of comcience
collective -especi ally in its unconsci ous or i mpl i ci t aspect -resembles l ater
noti ons, such as Ferdi nand de Saussure's lngue (i n contrast to parole) and
Levi -Strau ss's structure (i n contrast to event) . But Durkhei m also at ti mes
retai ned a sense of ways i n whi ch the concept coul d not be i nserted i nto a
system of bi nary opposi ti ons but i nstead i nformed practi ces or actual uses
that had a degree of fexi bi l i ty i n hi story and soci al l i fe. St i l l , at i ts most
dubi ous, conscience collective approxi mated vague and tendenti ous noti ons
of nati onal character.
The hi story of Durkhei m's i ntellectual development was in large part
the story of hi s re-emphasi s of factors i n soci al l i fe i ni t i ally di scussed under
the rubri c of conscience collective. Yet, wi thi n the confni ng context of me
chani cal soli dari ty, he associ ated the conscience collectivewi t h repressive penal
sancti ons and communal i denti ty. Repressive sancti ons, for Durkhei m, were
t he most obj ecti ve i ndex or cri teri on of mechani cal sol i dari ty: they i mposed
expiatory puni shment upon the person who ofended the comcience collective,
especi al l y in i t s religi ous demands. Thi s puni shment was in contrast wi t h
resti tuti ve sanct i ons (correlated wi th organi c sol i dari t y) , whi ch si mpl y tri ed
to rei nstate the status quo ante, e. g. , through the payment of damages. The
confnement of the conscience colective to norms defni ng cri mes l eadi ng
to repressive sancti ons proved i n t i me to be too restrictive a noti on for
Durkhei m, al though he never l ost i nterest i n the probl em of cri me and
puni s hment a nd i ts rel ati on to the "hard core" of the conscience colective.
The correlation of comcience co!ectivewi th communal i denti ty or si mi l i tudes
i n the "i nternal mi l i eu" of the group i mposed more extreme and at ti mes
mi sleadi ng restri cti ons on usage (restri cti ons whi ch, i n one sense, conf icted
wi th the emphasi s on repressive sancti ons, for, wi thi n l i mi t s, soci ety tended
to be more communal when i t was less repressive and more repressi ve when
i t was l ess communal ) . But the emphasi s upon the i mportance of communi ty
i n a normal state of soci ety was to be retai ned by Durkhei m. And i t revealed
the i nfuence of Rousseau on his thought, especially i n the bel i ef that com
muni ty was mos t pr onounced i n "pri mi tive" soci et i es.
In ti me Durkhei m's concepti on of "normal i ty" i n modern soci ety re
sci nded the narrow correl ati on of conscience collective, mechani cal sol i dar
ity, and tradi ti onal soci ety. The frst edi ti on of The Diviion of Labor i tself
presented humani sm -the i dea of a common human nature and uni versal
val ues as t he ul ti mate basi s of personal di gni ty - as the hi ghest cul tural
i deal of modern soci ety. Humani sm was the uni versal i sti c comcience col
lective of modern soci eti es, and it enj oi ned the sent i ment of communi ty
among all men qua men ( often i n bli ndl y gendered and speci es-speci fc
terms whi ch Durkhei m repl i cated rather than cri ti cal l y analyzed) . But i ts
abstract values and i magi nary i denti fcati ons seemed to evolve al most as the
uni ntended consequence of a process of el i mi nati on of other, more concrete
values, attachments, and face-to-face rel ati ons. Later, Durkhei m argued that
uni versal i sti c humani s m need not be i ncompati bl e wi th mo re part i cul ar
( but not narrowly parti cul ari sti c) forms of comcience colective. Mi l i tant
nati onal i sm contradi cted a uni versal i sti c humani sm; but l i beral patri oti sm
compl emented i t. In Durkhei m's concepti on of corporati sm, moreover, the
i nsi stence upon the necessi ty of communal i ntermedi ary groups was con
j oi ned wi th the i dea that a normal , soli dari sti c soci al system i n moderni ty
woul d requ i re nor ms and l aws whi ch defned the rel at i onal condi t i ons of
reci procity and cooperati on among differenti ated el ements or i ntermedi ary
groups i n the larger soci al context. The speci al i zed professi onal and other
parti cul ar contents of experi ence mi ght be restri cted to a gi ven group ( and
serve as the experi enti al basi s for a parti cul ar component of the conscience
collective of that group) . But , for sol i darity to predomi nate over parti cu
l ari sm, rel ated groups woul d have to share a conscience collective contai ni ng
norms whi ch def ned the j usti fed modes of i nteracti on, mutual expectati on,
and exchange wi th one another. Thi s requi rement placed a di mensi on of
organi c sol i darity within the province of the conscience colective. In fact, we
fnd an awareness of thi s requi rement i n the di scussi on of contract l aw and
i ts normati ve soci al context i n The Division of Labor i tsel f.
Crime and Punishment
The Division of Labor stressed the soci ol ogi cal i mportance of the com
parati ve study of legal systems. It pl aced speci al emphasi s on the rol e of
organi zed sancti ons i n soci ety. Thi s emphasi s h ad both me thodol ogi cal
and substanti ve bases.
Methodol ogi cally, the organized sancti on was an obj ective and rel atively
mani fest component of soci al structure. Thus a focus upon it reduced the
possi bi l i ty of subj ective or i deol ogi cal di storti on of facts i n the i ni ti al ori
entati on of research. As Durkhei m remarked i n hi s preface: "To submi t an
order of facts to sci ence, i t is not suffci ent to observe them wi th care, to
descri be and cl assi f them. But, what is more di ffcult, one must, in the
words of Descartes, fnd the way i n whi ch they are sci enti fc, that i s discover
i n them some obj ective el ement whi ch allows exact determi nati on and, i f
possi bl e, measurement. " 1 6
Durkhei m's later thought was less "posi ti vi sti c" in that i t nei ther made
thi s degree of methodol ogi cal obj ecti vity the cri teri on of al l si gni fcant
research nor mai ntai ned a pr i mary e mphas i s upon formal constrai nts and
sancti ons. And, in marked contrast to i mportant tendenci es i n soci al sci ence
that conti nue to thi s day, hi s approach never made a feti sh of measurement.
But i t di d retai n the subs tantive basi s of the focus on sancti ons, whi ch i t
i ntegrated i nto a not i on of obj ecti vi ty more adapted to t he compl ex, mean
ingful demands of soci ocul tural enqui ry. Sancti ons coul d serve as an i ndex
of sol i dari ty in the "normal" state of soci ety onl y because they shared in the
nature of the soci al system i n general . For, i n the "normal" state of soci ety,
customary or wri tten l aw was t he mos t organi zed and stabl e di mensi on of
soci al structure . 1 7 Through i ts sancti ons, a soci ety put i ts authori zed power
where i t s mouthed i deal s were. One apparent defect of The Division of
Labor was t he fact that Durkhei m, despi t e his l egal i sti c focus, di d not treat
the probl em of l aw and sancti ons i n a soci ety characterized by si gni fcant
confi ct and marked di fferences among soci al groups i n terms of weal th,
status, and power. What does l aw express and how does i t functi on i n a
soci ety riven by confi ct? Marx's answer was categori cal : law serves the i n
terests of t he rul i ng cl ass.
Durkh ei m never provided a comprehensive and more nuanced answer to
the questions raised by the probl emati cs ofl aw i n a conf ict-ridden, stratifed
soci ety. Hi s later writi ng contained onl y scattered references to the probl em.
In Suicide, he observed i n passi ng: "When the l aw represses acts whi ch publ i c
senti ment j udges t o be i nofensive, i t i s the l aw which makes us i ndignant, not
the act whi ch i t puni shes. " 1 8 One i mportant probl em whi ch the propagandistic
Worl d War I pamphl et Germany above Al emphasized was the cri si s generated
by a confli ct between legal i mperatives and the demands of a humani sti c ethi c.
Although the severity of this confict challenged hi s opti mi sti c evolutionary
assumpti ons about the non-authori tari an and democratic course of l aw and
government in modern soci ety, Durkhei m's answer was unequi vocal . In con
trast to the school of j uri di cal posi ti vism i n Germany, whi ch had exercised
some infuence on his early thought, Durkheim wi thout hesitation placed the
humanistic conscience colective of modern soci ety above legal duties to the
state. Had he lived longer, Du rkheim might well have confronted in more
pressing terms the probl em of the relation between hi s theory of val ue and
the issue of civil di sobedi ence. 1 9
What was the nature of cri me and the criminal from Durkhei m's soci o
logi cal perspecti ve? The cri mi nal was di fferent from others. This di ference
lay in t he cr i mi nal 's i nfringement of nor ms and values i n wh i ch oth ers found
i dent i ty through communal allegi ance and shared commi t ment . Cri me
di srupted the conscience colective. In Durkheim's neo-Kanti an and some
what personi fi ng concepti on, puni shment was the way a law responded to
transgression by reasserting its own threatened authori ty. As he phrased i t i n
a later work:
A violated law must bear wi tness to the fact that despi te appearances
i t is always itself, that i t has l ost nothi ng of i ts force and authori ty in
spite of the act which negates i t . In other words, it must affrm i tsel f
in the face of the offense and react in a way that mani fests an energy
proporti onal t o the energy of the attack whi ch i t has undergone. Pun
i shment is nothi ng other than this meani ngful manifestati on. 20
St i l l , from Durkhei m's perspecti ve, sancti ons in soci ety were essenti al l y
di ferent from the condi t i oni ng of ani mal s. D urkhei m was never "pos
i ti vi sti c" i n the behavi ori st i c or even formal i sti c sense. One of hi s own
later cri ti ci sms of pragmati sm (i n hi s Pragmatism and Soci ol ogy) was i ts
proxi mi ty t o purely behavi ori sti c expl anati ons of human acti vi ty. In turni ng
to the rol e of i nteral i zed norms i n peopl e, Durkhei m argued that "pun
i shment i s onl y a si gn of an i nternal state; i t is a notati on, a language by
whi ch . . . the publ i c consci ence of soci ety . . . expresses the senti ment whi ch the
blameworthy act i nspi res i n i t . " 2 1 Durkhei m di d bel i eve that when val ues
were deepl y rooted i n the comcience colective, puni shment mi ght become
an al most i nsti nctive react i on. But the emot i on i nvol ved i n t hi s passi onate
response to cri me was not pure affecti vi ty. I t was afect or sent i ment more
or less meani ngfully, and perhaps unconsci ously, structured by norms and
symbols that i nterposed themselves between sti mul us and response. Indeed,
puni shment served to counter the unsettl i ng, at ti mes traumati c, threat of
anxi ety and anomi e afecti vi ty attendant on a chal l enge to one's normati ve
structure of experi ence.
These were the general noti ons of cri me and puni shment, frst sketched
in The Division ofLabor, whi ch Durkheim would retai n and devel op. In The
Rules ofSociological Method, however, he poi nted to an error in his domi nant
concepti on of cri me and the cri mi nal i n hi s frst maj or work: "Contrary to
current i deas, the cri mi nal no longer appears as a radi cal l y unsoci abl e or
parasi ti cal element, a fo reign and unass i mi l abl e body wi t hi n soci ety; he i s
a regular agent of soci al l i fe. " 22 The Division of Labor, by Durkhei m's own
admi ssi on, had stressed the negative nature of the cri mi nal and hi s rel ati on
t o soci ety - a vi ewpoi nt on the "devi ant" whi ch al most ref ected the at
ti t ude of the conformi st. In his concepti on of the possi bl e soci al normal i ty
of cri me, Durkhei m di al ecti cally percei ved t he posi ti ve or producti ve el e
ment i n cri me.
A certai n rate of cri me was an essenti al and i nevi tabl e consti tuent of
the heal thy or normal soci ety. Funct i onally, cri me provi ded the occasi on
for a more or l ess dramat i c di spl ay of soci al sol i dari t y i n puni s hment . Si
mul t aneously, i t t ested exi sti ng i nst i t ut i ons and rel at i ons, i ndi cat i ng t hat
soci al structures were fexi bl e enough t o al l ow for a measure of change.
I ndeed, the cri mi nal and the i deal i st were rel ated by a hi dden funct i onal
nexus between transgressi on and transcendence, whi ch at ti mes portended
a certai n i denti ty of nature. "For soci ety to evol ve, i ndi vi dual ori gi nal i ty
mus t break through; for that of the i deal i st , who dreams of goi ng beyond
hi s cent ury, t o mani fest i tsel f, that of the cri mi nal , who i s bel ow t he level
of hi s t i me, must b e possi bl e. One does not go wi t hout the other. "2 3
Even in t he most " nor mal " soci et y t ha t came cl osest t o real i zi ng i ts
val ues, there woul d be a necessary gap between i deal di scourse or sacred
text and practi cal real i ty. Hence, one had the exi stence of anomi e and i n
determi nate i ntersti ces i n whi ch the cri mi nal woul d always f nd a pl ace.
Imagi ne a soci ety of sai nts, an exempl ary and perfect cloister. Cri mes
in the st ri ct sense woul d be unknown t her e. But faul ts whi ch seem
veni al to the vulgar woul d rai se the same scandal as ordi nary mi s
demeanors i n ordi nary consci ences. Thus i f thi s soci ety found i t sel f
armed wi t h the power to j udge and puni sh, i t woul d qual i fy these
act s as cri mi nal and treat t hem as s uch. 2 4
Thus i n al l states, types, and mi l i eus of soci ety, the nature of cri me sai d
somet hi ng pr ofound about t he nat ure of soci ety. Cri me and conformi t y
were t hemselves bound toget her by a st ruct ure of reci proci ty. I ndeed,
especi al l y i n peri ods of rapi d t ransi t i on, i t mi ght be i mpossi bl e to di st i n
gui sh cl earl y and di st i nctly between the i deal i st and the cri mi nal , for bot h
mi ght ambi val entl y part i ci pat e i n the destructi ve and creati ve pot ent i al of
anomi e. Wi th the col l apse of f xed and stabl e reference p oi nt s, i t woul d
a t t i mes be di ffcul t to t el l who was above and who bel ow the l evel of the
ti me. Durkhei m's frequent references to the tri al of Socrates rested upon
an awareness of t hi s di l emma and t he probl ems i t present ed for moral
j udgment .
For Durkhei m, moreover, the contradi cti ons and equ i vocati ons of crime
represented l i ke a di storted mi rror i mage the uncertai nti es of conformi ty.
Reveali ng hi s recogni ti on of the tendenci es of one for m of modern hu
mani sm whi ch were anti theti cal to hi s own growi ng desi re for communal
warmth i n moderni ty, he percepti vel y observed:
Such are t he characteri sti cs of our i mmoral i ty that they make t hem
selves remarked more by cunni ng than by vi ol ence. These charac
teristics of our i mmoral i ty are, moreover, those of our morali ty. It also
becomes more cold, self-consci ous, and rati onal. Sensi bi l i ty pl ays an
ever more restricted rol e, and t hi s i s what Kant expressed i n placi ng
passion beyond moral s. 25
So great was Durkhei m's bel i ef i n the i mportance of the i nti mate rel a
ti onshi p between crime and conformi ty that i t l ed to what was for hi m a
truly signifcant step: the reorganizati on of materi al i n the Annt sociologique.
Begi nni ng wi th Volume IV, Durkheim i ncl uded a secti on on the functi oni ng
of moral and j uri di cal rul es i n whi ch he i ncl uded both stati sti cs and an
analysis of conformi ty and devi ance. ( Thi s secti on was paral l el ed by one
on the genesis and structure of norms and i nsti tuti ons. ) The explanatory
basi s of thi s cl assi fcatory reorgani zati on was the reali zati on that di sobeying
a rul e was a way of relati ng to i t. The typological variati ons of conformity
were matched by vari ati ons of cri mi nal i ty. As Mauss later observed: "I n an
epoch when few stati sti ci ans recognized the fact, he di sti ngui shed between
vi ol ent cri mi nality directed against persons i n b ackward classes and popul a
ti ons and t he mi l der cri mi nali ty agai nst goods (fraud, abuses of confdence,
etc. ) i n commerci al classes and urban, pol i ced popul ati ons. "26 Here we have
an i nkl i ng of what Sutherl and was to call "w hi re-collar cri me. "2 7 Whatever
the probl emati cs of the manner in whi ch he appl i ed i t to speci fc cases,
the general pri nci pl e which underl ay Durkhei m's concepti on of crime was
the idea that an i nst i tut i onal order or value system expressed i tself in i t s
forms of devi ance or transgressi on i n a manner ful l y compl e me ntary to i t s
expressi on i n i ts forms of "respectabl e" behavi or. Thus for Durkhei m cri me
i tsel f was not a soci al di sease. Rather, the crime rate became a symptom
of soci al pathol ogy when i t rose above or fel l bel ow certai n thresholds of
collecti ve tol erance: then i t poi nted to severe causes of pathol ogy i n soci ety
and attested to the need for soci al reform.
It woul d, moreover, be false to concl ude, on the grounds that Durkheim
assimilated ordinary crime and ideological cri me, that Durkhei m's theory of
Chapter 3 Te Division ofSocial labor 9 I
crime was convincing evidence of hi s status quo conservatism. Luci en Gol d
mann, for example, has written, "It shoul d be poi nted out that [ Durkheim's
defni ti on of crime] i ncl udes acts as di fferent as the deed of Jesus driving
money changers from the temple, the activity ofThomas Miintzer, Karl Marx
or Lenin, on the one hand, and, on the other, the latest hold-up or murder. "28
Thi s conAation, for Gol dmann, is one proof of "the conservative perspective
in which all of Durkhei m's soci ology is i mpl i ci tly elaborated and whi ch al
lows us to explain a great many other features of both hi s work and that of
his di sci pl es. " Gol dmann concludes, "the assi mi l ati on of the revol uti onary to
the cri mi nal naturally turns the reader against the former. "29
Durkhei m's poi nt was that, especi al l y i n peri ods of rapi d transi ti on,
me mbe rs of s oci ety woul d t hems el ves exper i ence a mb i va l e n ce i n the
j udgment of certai n phenomena. That the i deol ogi cal cri mi nal coul d
hi msel f p arti ci pate i n thi s ambi val ence was shown by the case of Socrates.
Ye t D urkhei m di d real i ze that the characteri sti c of ordi nary cri me was
i ts parasi ti cal status vi s-a-vi s exi sti ng norms and i nst i t ut i ons, whereas
i deol ogi cal cri me ( or, at ti mes, the i deol ogi cal aspect of cri me) pl aced i n
gues t i on the e xi s t i ng rul es or pol i ci es. Durkhe i m, i n an arti cl e, tri ed to
take account of a cri ti ci sm by Tarde that was s i mi l ar to Gol dmann's but
that, i n contrast, stressed t he radi cal i mpl i cat i ons of Durkhei m's theory
of cri me. I n other words, Tarde fel t that t he approximat i on of the revolu
ti onary to the cri mi nal naturally turned the reader i n favor of the l atter.
Durkhei m repl i ed:
I s ai d [ i n The Rules] that i t was useful and even necessary that i n
any soci ety the col lective type not repeat i tsel f i d enti cally i n al l con
sci ences . . . . When I tri ed to show how cri me coul d have even direct
uti l i ty, the onl y exampl es I cited were those of Socrates and the
phi l osophi cal hereti cs of al l ti mes, the precursors offree thought . . . .
Then I sai d that the existence of cri me had a generally i ndi rect and
someti mes di rect uti li ty: i ndi rect, because cri me could end only i f
t he conscience colective i mposed i tsel f upon i ndi vi dual consci en ces
wi th such i ncorri gi bl e authori ty that all moral transformati on was
rendered i mpossi bl e; direct, because someti mes, but only someti mes,
the cri mi nal was the precursor of a future moral i ty . . . . In all ti mes,
the great moral reformers condemned the reigning moral i ty and were
condemned by i t . 30
Despi te the debatabl e nature of Durkheim's moral futuri sm and hi s
omi ssi on of t he poi nt ( s o i mportant for Wal ter Benj ami n) that what loses
out hi stori cally mi ght be of value and worth redeemi ng for the present and
future, he di d i ndi cate the dialectical relation between crime and conformity.
This involved both t he destructi ve and creative aspects of anomi e that were
pre-emi nentl y marked in i deol ogi cal cri me. Cert ai n questi onabl e features
of the argument i n The Di1ision of Labor, however, woul d be onl y parti ally
mod i n ed in the course of ti me.
Durkhei m never adequatel y i nqui red i nto the crisi s i n the modern con
sci ousness of puni shment created by the puzzl i ng i ntersecti on of an i deology
of i ndi vi dual responsi bi l i ty, the theory of soci al determi nants, and the i dea
of "mental i l l ness. " Nor di d he ever treat t he psych ol ogi cal i nternal i zati on
of norms and val ues wi th the care that woul d faci li tate the bui l di ng of
bri dges to the i nsi ghts of Freud. I n hi s i nvesti gati on of cri me, Durkhei m
di d not treat sel f-puni shment, whi ch mi ght have masochi sti c di mensi ons,
or the functi on of t he puni shment of others i n acting out someti mes sadi sti c
sacri fci al scenari os, suppressi ng one's own cri mi nal tendenci es, or relieving
one's frustrati ons and anxi et i es. In Durkh ei m, there was l i ttl e fee l i ng for t he
possi bi l i ty t hat peopl e might commi t cri mes, a s they mi ght turn t o sui ci de,
i n order to fnd expi atory puni shment for a pre-exi sti ng sense of gui l t stem
mi ng from an expli ci t act, an overwhelmi ng desi re, or the general structure
of a repressi ve collecti ve or i ndi vi dual consci ence.
In hi s Ci1ilization and Its Discontents, Freud asserted that hi s i ntenti on
was "t o represent the sense of gui l t as t he most i mportant probl em in the
evol uti on of cul ture, and to convey that the pri ce of progress in ci vi l i za
ti on i s pai d i n for fei ti ng happi ness through the hei ghteni ng of the sense of
guilt. " 3 1 Despi te hi s i nsi stence upon the role of expiation in puni shment,
Durkhei m devoted scant attention to the probl em of gui l t -a critical l acuna
i n hi s attempt to rel ate self and soci ety. Even i n hi s Education morale, whi ch
contai ned some of hi s most acute observati ons on the soci al determi nants
of character format i on, he tended on t he whol e to restri ct h i msel f to prob
lems of soci al structure, sol i dari ty, and bl ame. Thus cri me and puni shment
di d consti tute an area i n whi ch Durkheim's curi osi ty was stunted by hi s
pos itivism and obj ecti vi sm.
In The Di1ision of Labor, moreover, the same probl ems that pl agued
hi s concepti on of comcience collecti1e b eset hi s theory of cri me. Associ ati ng
crime i n a one-di mensi onal manner wi th social homogeneity and communal
i denti ty, he failed to explore ful l y the ways i n whi ch cri me was related to
differenti ati on. The sector of modern l i fe that supported t he correl ati on of
differenti ati on and resti tuti ve sancti on was that of t he functi onally speci fc
di vi si on of labor, or speci ali zati on, in formally rati onal i zed contexts. But
Durkhei m's tendency t o uni versalize t he correlati on of communal i dentity
and penal sancti on l ed hi m to i gnore or underesti mate cruci al features of
soci al l i fe.
Durkhei m's i dea that t he cri mi nal was different from others was asso
ciated wi th the i dea that crime itself was a departure from the communal
i dent i ty assured by t he conscience collective. The latter preconcepti on pre
vented Durkhei m from seei ng that the cr i mi nal mi gh t di ffer from ot hers i n
devi ati ng from norms sti pul ati ng di fferenti ati on and that cri me i tself mi ght
consi st i n bri nging together i n i l l i ci t communal i denti ty "thi ngs" whi ch
ought to remai n separate. Cri me as deviation from norms prescri bi ng di f
ferenti ati on was in certai n respects si ngularly si gni fcant in the "pri mi tive"
soci eti es that Durkhei m i nterpreted i n terms of homogenei ty and com
munal i dent i ty. Durkhei m's undi al ecti cal concepti on of the role of com
munal i dentity i n cri me accounted for t he fact that, whi l e he recognized the
i mportance of ri tual i nterdi ct i n creati ng the reli gi ous nature of cri me and
the role of the i ncest taboo i n ki nshi p, he was never fully able to account
theoreti cal l y for these observati ons. Thus, for exampl e, he never rel ated the
i ncest taboo to di fferenti ati on among ki nshi p groups and never saw the
way i n whi ch i ncest was (as t he Chi nese characters whi ch stand for i ncest
express i t) a "confusi on of relati onshi ps. " Nor di d he devote anal yti c and
critical attenti on to the dubi ous di fferenti ati on and i llegi ti mate prohi bi ti ons
involved i n the genderi ng of rel ati ons, for exampl e, those confni ng women
to certai n del i mi ted soci al rol es and occupati ons. Indeed hi s own analysis
( notabl y in Suicide) at ti mes symptomati cally repli cated stereotypes related
to prevalent mal e gender anxi eti es.
Durkhei m's l ong arti cl e e n ti tl ed "Deux Loi s de ! ' evol ut i on penal e"
( "Two Laws of Penal E voluti on")32 represented an extended footnote t o
the di scussi on of crime i n The Division of Labor. I n this arti cl e, he tri ed
to formul ate tendenti al regul ari ti es i n the development of penal sancti ons.
Hi s focus shi fted from resti tutive to repressive sancti ons i n modern soci ety.
He approached the probl em through the evoluti onary bi as of "l aws" of
94 Fmile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher
qual i tative and quanti tative development i n puni shment. Hi s law of qual i
t ative vari ati on asserted that puni shments tended to become l ess rel i gi ous
i n nature. I n modern soci ety, puni shment was i ncreasi ngl y restri cted t o the
depri vati on of l i berty through i ncarcerati on i n speci al houses of detenti on.
( Thi s i nsi ght was of course l ater i mportant in the work of Mi chel Foucaul t
for whom Durkhei m was not, however, an expl i ci t reference poi nt. )
In Durkheim's second I aw, the el ement of soci al opti mi sm whi ch exi sted
as an undercurrent in The Division of Labor emerged fully to the surface
of his thought. It stated that the i ntensi ty or severi ty of puni shment varied
di rectly with the extent to which soci eti es bel onged to a si mpl er or "l ower"
type and wi th t he extent to whi ch t he central government was absol ute.
Thi s i dea was more nuanced t han t he t endency i n The Division of Labor
t o correlate "cruel and unusual puni shments" wi t h "pri mi ti veness, " for i t
recogni zed a second vari abl e i n the nature o f the central government - a
factor that was not perti nent to many "pri mi tive" soci eti es. But Durkhei m
apparentl y di d not bel i eve that authori tari an government was a real pos
si bi l i ty i n modern soci eti es. Indeed, the enti re probl em of the nature of
gover nment , whi ch di d not readi ly ft i nto t h e s i mple-comp l ex schema of
soci al organi zati on, was depri ved of soci ol ogical relevance. "Thi s speci al
form of pol i ti cal organi zati on [ i . e. , authori tari ani sm] does not pertai n to
the congenital consti tuti on of soci ety but to i ndi vi dual , transi tory, and
conti ngent condi t i ons. "3 3 Despi te hi s thesi s on Montesqui eu, Durkhei m
at thi s stage of hi s thought was far from l earni ng the l essons i n pol i ti cal
soci ol ogy that hi s great predecessor taught.
The general i zed correl ati on of "si mpl e" or "undi fferenti ated" soci ety
wi th severe puni shment , however, could not wi thstand the onslaught of
evidence. In this respect, Durkhei m's l oral Education (which began as a
lecture course j ust after the publ i cati on of 'Two Laws of Penal Evol uti on")
represented a si gni fcant advance i n hi s concepti on of crime and puni sh
ment. Commenti ng on t he research of the ethnographer Sebal d-Rudol f
St ei nmet z, Durkhei m observed:
A priori, one mi ght bel i eve that it is t he rudeness of pri mi tive mores,
the barbari sm of the frst ages whi ch gave bi rth to thi s [severe] system
of puni shment . But the facts are far from concordi ng wi t h this hy
pothesi s, h owever natural it may frst appear . . . . In the great maj ori ty
of cases, di sci pl i ne is of great mi l dness [ i n "pri mitive" soci eti es] . The
Indi ans of Canada love thei r chi l dren tenderly, never beat them, and
do not even repri mand them. 34
A l i ttl e l ater Mauss, wri ti ng about a "pri mi ti ve" soci ety ( that of the
Todas) i n the Annee sociologique, asserted: "Penal law does not exi st to
any si gni fcant extent. I t i s probabl e that the cause of thi s absence i s the
extreme mi l dness of mores i n these popul at i ons. "3 5 Curi ously, Durkhei m
hi msel f observed i n an Annee review that predated hi s "Two Laws of Penal
Evol ut i on": "The rol e of di sci pl i ne grows wi t h ci vi l i zat i on. The noti on of
rul es, of i mperative norms, whi ch hol ds such a great place i n our morali ty
has nothi ng pri mi tive about i t. It is thus natural that educati on becomes
i mpregnated wi th a certai n austerity. "36
These rather overstated observati ons on the repressi ve role of developi ng
ci vi l i zati on were supplemented i n Durkhei m's Moral Education wi th a l i ne
of argument t hat di d greater j ustice to the functi on of authori tari an gov
erment by pl aci ng i t in the broader context of authori tari an and oppressive
i nsti tuti onal structures in general. In early modern hi story, corporal pun
i shment found a pri vi l eged sanctuary i n the type of school that was marked
by maxi mal soci al di stance between teacher and pupi l and a claustrati on
of chi ldren that i sol ated them from thei r fami l i es and the rest of soci ety.
Thi s educati onal si tuati on, Durkhei m concl uded, easi l y "degenerates i nto
despoti sm. " The means of avoi di ng thi s danger was to prevent the school
"from cl osi ng i n upon i tself. . . and assumi ng too professi onal a character. "
Thi s coul d be effected only by multi plyi ng the school 's poi nts of contact
wi th the external world. "In i tsel f, the school, like all consti tuted groups,
tends toward autonomy. I t does not easi l y accept control . Yet control i s
i ndi spensabl e for i t, not onl y from an i ntel l ectual , but from a moral poi nt
of vi ew. "37
Durkhei m went on to elaborate a more i nclusi ve theory of severe and
vi ol ent puni shments, whi ch he extended beyond the school to compri se
such phenomena as col oni al i sm. Corporal puni shment i n the school was
" . 1 f 1 , a partJ cu ar case o a aw.
Every ti me two popul ati ons, two groups of i ndivi dual s, of unequal
cul ture fnd themselves i n sustai ned contact, certai n senti ments
develop whi ch l ead the more cul ti vated group or the group whi ch
bel i eves i tself to be more cultivated to do vi ol ence to the other. Thi s
can be observed very frequently i n col oni es and i n any country where
representatives of a European ci vi l i zati on fnd themselves at grips
wi th an i nfer i or ci vi l i zati on. Wi thout violence havi ng any uti l i ty,
and although i t presents grave dangers to those who i ndu lge i n i t and
who expose themselves to fearful repri sal s, i t breaks out i nevi tabl y . . . .
There is produced a veri table drunkenness, a shameless exal tati on
of the ego, a sort of megalomani a whi ch l eads to the worst excesses,
whose ori gi n i s not diffcul t to perceive . . . . The i ndi vi dual does not
contai n hi msel f un l ess he i s faced wi th moral forces whi ch he respects
and upon which he dares not trampl e. Otherwi se, he knows no l i mi ts
and asserts hi msel f wi thout measure or bound. 3 8
Here Durkheim di d bri efy address the problem of col oni al i sm and even
related its vi ol ent excesses to the "subli me" feel i ng of exaltati on. His fnal
observation obscured the way soci al values and pol i ti cal or mi l i tary practices
- not si mply l i mitless i ndi vi dual assertion - may themselves be cruci al
i n exacerbating col oni al excesses. But hi s valuable insight was that the truly
relevant variable i n the severity of punishment is the degree of authori tari
anism i n social insti tutions. Authoritarian structures or relations tended to
convert puni shment i nto a systematic but often anomi cally unstabl e form of
extreme vi ol ence that mi ght be met by the extremely vi ol ent reacti on of the
oppressed.
Traditional D irentiation
The di sti ncti on between segmental and organi zed struct ures 1 The
Division ofLabor paral l el ed that between the si mple and the complex, the
mechanical and the organic, the pri mi ti ve and the modern. 39 The di scussi on
of segmental structures had the meri t of bri ngi ng out the i mportance of
relatively smal l and self-suffci ent populati ons i n soci eti es marked by strong
communal ties, i nheri ted status, attachment to tradi ti ons (represented soci o
logically by the prestige of el ders) , l ocal terri tor ( or vicinage) , religi ous bel i ef
and practi ce, and the i mportance of ki nshi p. However, Durkhei m's i dea of
segmental structures i ncreased the di ffcul ty of rel ati ng the vari ous factors
that he inventoried, for i t reinforced the preconcepti on that certain societies
were based exclusively on homogeneous groups j uxtaposed, i n Durkheim's
si mi l e, "li ke the rings of a ringworm. "40 Durkheim apparently di d not sense
the absurdity in the i dea of a structure that was not i n any sense organized. He
could even make the i ncredi bl e assertion that i n "primiti ve" soci eti es "ki nshi p
i tself is not organized. "41
Given Durkheim's taste for bi ol ogical metaphors, i t i s interesting to spec
ulate what mi ght have been the efect on his thought i f he had known about
the genetic code. The Division of Labor rel i ed on the i dea that undi fferentiated
protopl asm was the basis of organisms. In his later years, Durkheim did seem
to be on the brink of newer ideas whi ch prefgured the great shift in soci al
and cultural anthropology that was to be effected in France by Marcel Mauss
and Cl aude Levi-Strauss.
In 1 903, Durkhei m observed in an arti cle on methodol ogy wri tten i n
col l aborati on wi th Paul Fauconnet:
These el ementary forms exist now here i n a state of even relative i sol a
ti on whi ch permi ts di rect observati on. Indeed, one must not confound
them wi th pri mi ti ve forms. The most rudi mentary societies are sti l l
complex, al though they have a confused compl exi ty. They contai n i n
themselves, l ost in one another [perdues les tmes dans les autres] , but
sti l l real, all t he elements which wi l l be differentiated and developed
in the course of evol uti on.42
The questi on begged in thi s quotati on is whether t he confusion l i es in
the complexity of certain soci eti es or in the understanding of the observer.
Durkheim's thought i tself appeared in slightly clearer form in his Pragmatisme
et Sociologie (reconstituted from a course given j ust before his death), in whi ch
he enunciated the i dea of a "pri mitive nebul a. "
When Spencer affrms that the uni verse proceeds from the homo
geneous to the heterogeneous, thi s formul a i s i nexact. What exists
at the ori gi n i s also heterogenei ty, but it is heterogeneity i n a state
of confusion. The i ni ti al state is a mul ti pl icity of seeds, of modal i
ti es, of di fferent acti vi ti es, not onl y mi xed together, but, so to speak,
l ost i n one another so that i t i s extremely di ffcul t to separate them.
They are i ndi sti nct from one another. It i s thus that i n the cell of
monocel l ul ar bei ngs all vi tal functi ons are as i f gathered up: al l are
found there; only they are not separated. The functi ons of nutri ti on
and the functi ons of rel ati on seem confounded, and i t is di ffcul t to
di sti ngui sh them. In soci al l i fe, thi s pri mi tive state of i ndi vi si on i s
st i l l more stri ki ng. Religious li, for example, i s rich wi t h a mul t i tude
of forms of t h ought and activity of al l sort s. I n t he order of th ought,
i t compri ses: ( I ) myths and rel i gi ous bel i efs , ( 2) an i nci pi ent sci ence,
(3) arts, aestheti c el ements, notabl y song and musi c. All these ele
ments are gathered up [ ramasses] i n a whol e, and i t seems di ff cult to
separate them: sci ence and art, myth and poe try, moral i ty, law, and
reli gi on - al l are confounded [ confndu] or rather mel ted [ondu]
i nt o one anot her. 43
Thi s was Durkhei m's most complete and percepti ve statement of the
probl em which began to intri gue hi m in The Division of Labor. To fnd
a more adequate concepti on of the nature and role of di fferenti ati on i n
"pri mi t i ve" soci eti es, one must turn from Durkhei m hi msel f to a work
which perhaps marked the begi nni ng of truly modern soci al and cultural
anthropology i n France: The Gif, by Marcel Mauss. Cl a ude Levi -Strauss
has compared the experi ence of the anthropol ogist i n readi ng thi s essay to
that of Mal ebranche i n f rst readi ng Descartes. For, despi te i ts suggestively
unf ni shed qual i ty and the honeycomb of erudi ti on wi th which i t is l aced,
thi s l i ttl e essay seems to bri ng together i maginati ve conceptual i zati on and
massive evi dence in a manner i ndi cating a l i fe spent i n i nti mate contact wi th
basi c probl ems and an awareness of the way t hi ngs fal l i nto pl ace wi thout
l osi ng thei r l ocal color.
Mauss fully reali zed that the fact that one never f nds one homogeneous
group i n i sol ati on but fnds always at l east two associ ated groups is i ndeed a
cruci al fact for soci ol ogical theory. The i dea of an i sol ated, undi fferenti ated
horde as the basi s of soci al l i fe was untenabl e. Through an analysis of gift
exchange, Mauss sought "a set of more or less archeologi cal concl usi ons on
t he nature of human transacti ons" whi ch a mounted t o l i t t l e less than a gen
eral theory of the rol e and nature of di fferenti ati on and exchange i n human
soci eti es. 44 The fundamental status of the exchange of gifts i n "pri mi ti ve"
soci eti es revealed the universali ty of soci al di fferenti ati on whi ch i n certai n
contexts served t o "bi nd cl ans together and keep them separate, di vi de thei r
l abor and constrai n them to exchange. "45 In hi s study of the gi ft, moreover,
Mauss sought "t he answer to the questi on posed by Dur khei m about t h e
rel i gi ous ori gi n of economi c val ue. "46
What underl ay and i nformed the exchange of gi fts i n certai n soci et
i es was a structure of reci proci ty that l ed men i n groups to relate to other
groups through t he obl i gati on to give gifts, accept them, and render gifts
in return. Members of i ndi genous soci eti es conceptual i zed t hi s structural
pri nci pl e -whi ch normatively combi ned spontanei ty and constrai nt, i n
terest and obl i gati on, freedom and necessi ty -i n the i dea that i mmanent
i n the gift was a rel i gi ous and magi cal force bi ndi ng peopl e to return what
they received. Thus recei ving a gift was a dangerous as wel l as a grati fi ng
experi ence, for it obli ged the receiver to reci procate, at ti mes wi th i ncreased
largesse, often under the pai n of magi cal sancti on.
Di fferenti ati on always i mpl i ed a measure of confi ct among di fferent
i ated ent i ti es. But i n certai n cases ( e. g. , i n Nor t h Ameri ca a nd Mel anesi a)
"ami abl e rivalry" compati bl e wi th mutual respect gave way to bouts of
excessive, even arrogant, gift-giving whose purpose was to establ i sh po
l i ti cal and moral superi ori ty. The ci rcl e of reci proci ty was broken by the
domi neeri ng gesture and the uni l ateral di sdai n whi ch crushed one's ri val
wi th largesse. Gi ft exchange, i n a sense, i nverted the pri nci pl e of capi tal i s
ti c accumul at i on by i ns t i t uti onal l y requi ri ng men t o gi ve more than t hey
t ook rather t han t o pr oft by taki ng mor e t han they gave. I n t he potlatch
-the "monster chi ld of the gift system" -the "agoni sti c" component i n
largesse attai ned t he tragic level of hubri s i n ostentati ous di splay: enormous
quanti ti es of gifts were not gi ven b u t cont empt uously destroyed or thrown
into the sea. The po tl atch revealed why men mi ght be feared and suspected
of treachery, especi ally when beari ng gifts. The fear of t he gift one could
not repay was expressed i n the ambi val ence of t he German Gi, meani ng
both "present" and "poi son. " I n a s uppl ementary arti cl e on the s ui ci de
of a Gal l i c chi ef, Mauss devel oped further t he extr eme compl exi ty of the
moral psychol ogy of gift exchange by recounti ng the tal e of a l eader who,
unabl e t o reci procate i n ki nd, gave t he onl y t hi ng comparabl e i n val ue to
what he had recei ved: his l i fe .
But t he gi ft i n "pr i mi t i ve" soci eti es was never an i s ol ated phe nome non.
I n hi s concept of the fait social total, Mauss revised and reformul ated
Durkhei m's i dea of a "pri mi t ive ne bul a. " I t was no t t hat i deas were
uni quel y confused or di fferenti ati ons lacki ng i n certai n soci eti es, but that
di fferenti ati ons tended to be cumulative in nature and to engage experi ence
on a mul ti pl i ci ty of l evel s s i mul taneo usly: "In these ' early' soci eti es, soci al
phenomena are not di screte; each phenomenon contai ns all the threads of
whi ch the s oci al fabri c i s composed. I n these total soci al phenomena raits
sociaux totaux] , as we propose to cal l them, al l ki nds of i nst i tuti ons fnd
si multaneous expressi on: reli gi ous, l egal , moral , and economi c. In addi t i on,
the phenomena have t hei r aestheti c aspect and they reveal morphol ogi cal
types. "
4
7
The difference between "pri mi tive" and modern soci eti es that Durkhei m
sought coul d, i n the li ght of Mauss's i deas, be formul ated, I thi nk, as follows.
Certain societies accumulated relations among roles, groups, persons, values,
and ideas in a way which set l i mi t s to economi c growth and technol ogi cal
control of nature, but whi ch also i mpli cated peopl e in an i ntri cate, i nclu
si ve network of spi ri tual and symbol i c rel at i ons wi th one anot her and t h e
cosmos. Modern soci eti es di sti ngui shed sharply between nature and cul ture
( as between humans and other ani mals), di ssoci ated i nsti tuti onal spheres
from one another ( fami ly, j ob, pol i ti cs, art, rel i gi on, and so on), defned
often depersonali zed rol es i n functi onal l y speci fc ways, obj ecti fed nature
i n the i nterest of mani pul ati on and control ( at the l i mi t as "raw materi al" ) ,
and furthered technol ogi cal mastery and t he accumul at i on o f economi c
goods, often ( i f not typically) a t t he expense of the envi ronment. The say
ing "Busi ness is busi ness" was a meani ngfully tautol ogi cal expressi on of
thi s ori entati on. In modern soci ety di fferenti ati ons tended to be detached
from one another i n rel atively clear and di sti nct, Cartesi an compartments
of acti vi ty and boxes of experi ence. Advanced speci al i zati on, in the modern
di vi si on of l abor, was one promi nent form of t hi s phenomenon.
What were t he i mpl i cati ons of t hi s contrast between "pri mi ti ve" and
modern soci eti es for the probl em of rel ati ng self and soci ety? In "pri mi ti ve"
soci eti es, the relati on between the self and soci al experi ence was more en
compassi ng, l i ke the rel ati on between people and nature, b ecause i ndi vi dual
and group gave more of themselves i n each rel ati onshi p and i n more many
sided ways. Indi vi duali ty was subordi nated to personhood i n a sense that
mi ght di mi ni sh or even seem to deny any exi st ent i al di stance between th e
i ndi vi dual and his or her roles or subj ect posi ti ons. I n ul t i mate forms, the
i ndi vi dual found meani ng for his or her own l i fe i n the cosmi c archetype
that countered the role, if it did not negate the reali ty, of chronol ogi cal ,
i rreversi ble time and mi ght to some si gni fcant extent mi ti gate the anxiety
ri dden confrontati on of the i ndi vi dual wi t h death.
Chapter 3 Te Division ofSocial labor I 0 I
In modern soci ety, each rol e or group involved only a del i mi ted invest
ment of the sel f and called for only a l i mi ted commi tment, at times largely
restricted to external conformi ty or the sti pul ati ons of a contract motivated
by sel f- i nterest. Individuality became a keynote of soci ocultural lif e, at times
i n ways that masked related forms of someti mes extreme dependence on oth
ers. The group was less a mi l i eu of exi stence, the devel opment of the person
less a communi ty proj ect, the "personal" more markedly di sti ngui shed from
t he "offci al" capaci ty, t he "private" from t he "publ i c, " occupati on mor e a
techni cal ly, professi onally, and economi cally rati onali zed enterpri se, and the
search for i denti ty an i ndi vi dual quest whi ch often produced more weak
books than strong personal i ti es. The way i n whi ch a person experi enced
thi ngs or rel ated to ot her peopl e tended to be "one-di mens i onal . " Reacti ons
to thi s state of affai rs mi ght prompt vari ous types of group mobi l i zati on and
col l ective affrmati ons of, or quests for, a shared i denti ty.
In The Gi, Mauss drew cri tically accentuated moral and pol i ti cal con
cl usi ons wi th speci fc reference to forms of modern soci ety. Analytically, he
contrasted t he i ns t i t uti ons of a cap i t al i st i c economy wi th those rel ated to
gift exchange.
Let us now test the noti on to whi ch we have opposed the i dea of gift
and di si nterestedness: that of i nterest and the i ndi vi dual pursui t of
uti l i ty . . . . If si mi l ar moti ves ani mate Trobri and and Ameri can chi efs
and Andaman clans and once ani mated generous Hi ndu or Germani c
nobl emen i n thei r gi vi ng and spendi ng, they are not to be found i n
the col d reasoni ng of the busi nessman, banker or capi tal i st. In those
earli er ci vi l i zati ons one had i nterests but they di ffered from those of
our ti me. There, i f one hoards, i t i s onl y to spend later on, to put
peopl e under obl i gati ons and t o wi n fol l owers. Exchanges are made
as wel l , but onl y of l uxury obj ects l i ke cl othi ng and oraments, or
feasts and other things t hat are consumed at once . . . . It is onl y our
Western soci eti es that qui te recently turned man i nto an economi c
ani mal . . . . For a l ong ti me, man was somethi ng qui te di fferent; and
i t i s not so long ago now si nce he became a machi ne - a cal culat
ing machi neY
One mi ght of course qual i fy Mauss's hyperbol e, whi ch to some extent
was pol emi cal , for exampl e, by noti ng charitable giving i n certain capi tal i sti c
contexts. Sti l l , Mauss hi msel f went on to consi der reform i n a tram of
thought reveali ng that one bas i c sense i n whi ch Durkhei m and hi s school
were conservati ve was i n the desi re to return to what they saw as bedrock
fundamental s of human exi stence t hat were depreci ated in modern l i fe
and parti cularl y deval ued in capi tal i sti c market-ori ented acti vi ty. These
el ementary forms of soci ocul tural l i fe provi ded a dai l y bread of sol i dari ty
and led peopl e to experi ence the necessary contradi cti ons, l i mi nal i nvi ta
ti ons, and anomi e breakthroughs of existence i n all thei r tragi c profundi ty.
For Mauss as for Durkhei m, basi c i nst i tut i onal change adapted to modern
condi ti ons mi ght enabl e peopl e t o fnd a path back t o the wi sdom of" pri mi
ti ve" soci et i es that was expressed i n nobl e reci procal gift-giving.
We shoul d return to the old and el emental . Once agai n we shall
discover those moti ves of action still remembered by many soci eti es
and cl asses: the j oy of giving i n publ i c, the deli ght i n generous arti s
ti c expendi ture, the pl easure of hospi tality i n the publ i c or pri vate
feast. Soci al i nsurance, sol i ci tude in mut ual i t y or cooperat i on i n
the professi onal group and al l those moral persons called Fri endly
Soci eti es, are better than the mere personal securi ty guaranteed by
the nobl eman to hi s tenant, better t han the mean l i fe afforded by the
dai l y wage handed out by managements, and bet ter even than the
uncertai nty of capi tal i st savings . . . . For honor, di si nterestedness, and
corporate solidarity are not vain words, nor do they deny the neces
sity for work. We shoul d humani ze the other l i beral professi ons and
make al l of them more perfect. That woul d be a great deed, and one
Durkhei m already had i n view. I n doi ng t hi s we shoul d, we bel i eve,
return to the ever- present bases of law, to i t s real fundamental s and
to t he very heart of normal soci al l i fe. 49
The probe i nto the probl ems whi ch hel d the attenti on of the Durkhei m
school has b een cont i nued by a thi nker who has acknowl edged the i ndi rect
inf uence ofDurkhei m and t he more di rect, informal, and fr ui tfully personal
i nfuence of Marcel Mauss: Cl aude Levi -Strauss. La Pensee sauvage ( The
Savage Mind consti tuted a nodal poi nt i n the development of Levi -Strauss.
( I say more about i ts rel ati on to Du rkheim' s thought when I di scuss t he re
lati on of the human sciences to epi stemology.) In thi s extremely di ffi cul t and
professedly provi si onal pause i n hi s work, Levi -Strauss broached probl ems
Chapter 3 Te Division ofSocial labor ! 03
whi ch had been downplayed in the t hought o f Durkhei m. These probl ems
i ncl uded people's perceptual and metaphori c rel ati ons wi th nature, t he
medi ati on between sensati on and t he i ntel l ect, the nature of t i me, cosmi c
structures of experi ence, and t he di al ect i c bet ween the real and the i magi
nary. Indeed, i t woul d not be goi ng too f to argue that La Pemee sauvage i s
basi cal l y a study i n the epi stemol ogy of percepti on whi ch em pl oys materi al
drawn from "pri mi tive" or "savage" soci eti es i n a "cruci al experi ment" i n
t he el aborat i on of a general t heory. I n hi s own concepti on of the rel at i on
of soci ol ogy to phi l osophy, Durkhei m was fully aware of the symbol i c and
structural bases of cul ture and soci ety, but he was bound by a hi ghly speci fc
metaphysi c i n hi s i nterpretati on of t hi s i dea. The work of Levi -Strauss goes
beyond Durkhei m's soci al metaphysic i n i ts contenti on t hat the not i on of
mut ual respect as the compl ement of sel f-respect must be extended to the
more generous, l ess narrowly anthropocentri c, i dea that one cannot respect
oneself or others wi thout respecti ng the whol e of nature. Thi s gift of broader
sol i dari ty i s entai l ed i n Levi-Strauss's convi cti on that true humani sm mus t
begi n beyond "man" -that i t "does not begi n wi t h oneself, but pl aces the
wor l d above l i fe, l i fe above man, respect for ot h ers above egoti sm. " A more
i nti mate knowledge of certai n soci eti es enabl ed Levi -Strauss t o reassert the
pri macy of Rousseau i n modern cul t ural thought ( and of the Kant who
was greatly i nf uenced by Rousseau) , whereas Durkhei m pl aced ul ti mate
fai t h i n a Cartesi ani zed neo- Kanti ani sm whi ch cul mi nated i n a dual i sti c
concepti on of mi nd and body and l eft l i t tl e epi stemol ogi cal room for Kant's
faculty of aestheti c j udgment.
On the more ci rcumscri bed probl em of the contrast between "pri mi
tive" and modern soci eti es wi th respect to the exi stence of di fferenti ati on,
Levi -Strauss observed:
We know the taboo on parents-i n-l aw or at l east i ts approxi mate
equi val ent. Through i t we are forbi dden t o address the great of this
world and obl i ged to keep out of their way . . . . Now, i n most soci eti es
t he posi t i on of wi fe gi ver is accompani ed by soci al ( and someti mes
also economi c) superiori ty, that of wife taker by inferi ori ty and depen
dence. This i nequal i ty be tween affnes may be expressed obj ecti vely
i n i nsti tuti ons as a Aui d or stable hi erarchy, or it may be expressed
subj ectively i n the system of i nterpersonal relations by means of
pri vi leges and prohi bi ti ons.
Thus nothi ng mysteri ous i s attached to these usages whi ch our
own experi ence unvei ls to us from the i nsi de. We are di sconcerted
onl y by thei r consti tutive condi ti ons, different i n each case. Among
oursel ves, they are cl earl y detached from other usages and l i nked
together i n a nonequi vocal context. In contrast, i n exoti c soci et
i es t he same usages and the same context are, as i t were, ensnared
[ engl ues] i n other usages and a di fferent context: that of fami l y ti es,
wi th whi ch they seem to us i ncompati bl e. We fnd i t hard to i magi ne
that i n private the son-i n-l aw of the Presi dent of the French Republ i c
shoul d see i n hi m the chi ef of state rather than the father-i n-law. An d
although the Queen of Engl and' s husband may behave as the frst
of her subj ects i n publ i c, there are good reasons for supposi ng that
he i s j us t a husband when they are al one together. It is ei ther one or
the other. The superfci al strangeness of the taboo on parents-i n-l aw
ari ses from i ts bei ng both at the same ti me.
Consequentl y as we have found already i n the case of operati ons
of understandi ng, the system of i deas and attitudes appears here onl y
a i ncarnated . . . . What appears to us [ i n modern rel ati onshi ps] as
greater soci al ease and greater i ntellectual mobi l i t y i s thus due to t he
fact that we prefer to operate wi th detached pi eces [ pi eces detachees] ,
if not i ndeed with small change [Ia monnai e de Ia pi ece] , whi l e the
nati ve is a hoarder: he is forever tying the threads, ti relessly turni ng
over on themsel ves al l aspects of reali r, whether physi cal , soci al , or
mental . We traffc i n our i deas; he makes of them a treasure. Sav
age thought [Ia pensee sauvage] put s in practi ce a phi l osophy of
fni tude. 5 0
Freud' s concept of transference woul d compl i cate Levi -Strauss's formu
l ati ons and lead one to see somewhat di fferently the rel ati on between t he
"pri mi ti ve" and the modern. In any event, the frst great theoreti cal work of
Levi -Strauss, Les Structures elment aires de la parente ( The Elementary Struc
ture of Kinship) , was tacitly posi ted on the extensi on ofDurkhei m's category
of organic sol i dari ty (in the sense of di fferenti ati on and reci proci ty) to the
study of ki nshi p structures i n "pri mi tive" soci eti es. In a summary whi ch
Levi -Strauss gave of hi s general concl usi ons, he observed:
Now, i n exactly the same way that the pri nci pl e of sexual di vi si on of
l abor establ i shes a mutual dependency between t he sexes, compelli ng
Chapter 3 Te Division ofSocial labor I 05
them thereby to perpetuate themselves and to found a fami ly, the
prohi bi t i on of i ncest establi shes a mutual dependency between fami
l i es, compel l i ng them, i n order to perpetuate themsel ves, to gi ve ri se
to new fai l i es. It i s through a strange oversi ght that the si mi lari ty
of the two processes i s generally overl ooked on account of the use
of terms as di ssi mi l ar as division, on t he one hand, and prohibition
on the other. We coul d easily have emphasi zed onl y the negative
aspect of The Division of Labor by calli ng it a prohi bi t i on of tasks;
and conversely, outl i ned the posi tive aspect of i ncest-prohi bi ti on
by cal l i ng i t the pri nci pl e of The Division of Labor of marri ageable
ri ghts between fami l i es. For i ncest-prohi bi ti on si mpl y states that
fami l i es (however they shoul d be defned) can onl y marry between
each other and that they cannot marry i nsi de themsel ves. 5 1
The role of differenti ati on i n "pri mi ti ve" soci eti es was al so investigated
by Levi-Strauss in a study of totemism whi ch preceded La Penste sauvage. I n
Le 1otemisme aujourd'hui ( 1otemism) , he i nterpreted totemi sm on the mos t
general t heoreti cal level as t he assert i on of a homol ogy between a bi nar
opposi ti on between natural speci es and a bi nary opposi ti on between soci al
groups . Levi -Strauss found the onl y speci fci ty of totemi sm as a cul tu ral
phenomenon to be the privileged rol e of natural speci es as l ogi cal operators.
The logi cal "si mi l i tude, " moreover, was postul ated nei ther wi thi n soci ety
as a homogeneous whol e nor between the group and a natural speci es. The
"si mi l i tude" referred to comparabl e di fferences between natural speci es and
soci al groups. Durkhei m's l ater theory of religi on compri sed a concepti on
of a gl obal totemi c i nsti tuti on combi ni ng rel i gi on, ki nshi p, and ali mentary
taboos. In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Lf, Durkhei m woul d argue
that the totem was si mul taneousl y the "family" name of the clan and the
sacred obj ect of rel i gi ous devot i on, and he would center hi s i nterpretati on
on the i dea of an i denti fcati on between a sol i dary soci al group ( the clan)
and an essenti al pri nci pl e of religi ous meani ng asserted by him to be t he
"hi dden" referent i n the fgurative and emblemati c representation of a natural
speci es. Du rkhei m argued that thi s "hi dden" referent was society i tsel f, and
religion for Durkhei m had an essentially social meani ng. For Levi-Strauss,
religion had a soci al aspect, but i t i ncl uded this aspect in a broader network
of rel ati ons, i ncl udi ng promi nently people's rel ati on to nature. To temism
did not have an i nvari ably religi ous functi on. The logical i dent i ty affrmed
J OG Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher
by totemi sm, moreover, referred to the rel ati on between i nternally di ffer
enti ated seri es of natural and soci al groups. And the enti re noti on of an
original social and cultural complex gravi tati ng around the totem formed
an untenabl e "totemi c i l l usi on. "
Through the usage of a n ani mal and pl ant nomencl ature ( i ts uni que
di stinctive characteri sti c) , the al l eged totemi sm does no more than
express in i ts own way -by means of a code, as we would say today
- correlati ons and opposi t i ons whi ch can be formal i zed i n other
ways, e. g. , among certain tri bes of N orth and South Ameri ca by op
posi ti ons of t he type sky/earth, war/peace, upstream/downstream,
red/whi te, etc. The most general model and the most sys temati c ap
pl i cati on of thi s i s perhaps to be found i n Chi na, i n the opposi ti on
of the two pri nci pl es Yang and Yi n, as mal e and femal e, day and
night, summer and winter, the uni on of whi ch resul ts in an organized
totality ( t ao) such as the conjugal pair, the day, or the year. Totemi sm
is thus reduced to a parti cul ar fashi on of posi ng a general probl em:
how to make opposi ti on, i nstead of bei ng an obstacl e to i ntegrati on,
serve rather t o produce i t . 5 2
Thus totemi sm for Levi -Strauss amount ed to a s ubcas e of the general
probl em of maki ng di fferenti ati on the ground of integrati on - the very
probl em whi ch Durkhei m had earlier conceptual i zed in terms of organic
sol i dari ty. The hi ghly complex role of more or less comprehensi ve, cumu
lative di fferenti ati ons i n symbol i c systems and soci al structure (concei ved
analyti cally as one type of symbol i c system rather than as an i nvariably
autonomous, "sui generis realm of soci al facts") has been further extended
by Levi-Strauss into the study of mythology, a problem area that Durkhei m
l argely passed over in si l ence. Si nce thi s aspect of Levi -Strauss' s thought
i s both the most i ntri cate and the l east accessi ble to the nonspeci al i st, we
shall have to be content wi th i ts mere menti on. It i s, however, safe t o say
that the thought of Levi -Strauss has thoroughl y expl oded Durkhei m's i dea
of si mpl i ci ty, homogenei ty, and di ffuseness as the essence of "pri mi tive"
soci eti es. In its pl ace, there have arisen probl ems of such magni tude that
moder soci al sci enti sts often feel compel l ed to call upon other speci al i sts,
e. g. , mathemati ci ans, and thereby i nvoke the modern di vi si on of l abor i n
order t o track certai n soci eti es' "pri mi tive" complexi ty and possi bl y tran
shi stori cal i mpl i cati ons.
But the transcendence of Durkhei m's ethnocentri sm has in practi ce
often l ed to the l oss of hi s profound i nterest i n the nature and course of
modern soci eti es. Judging from Levi -Strauss's own work, the major probl em
of the ethnol ogi st i s no l onger objecti vi ty i n rel ati on to experi ence i n other
soci eti es because of hi s commi tments i n modern soci ety but detachment
from the probl ems of modern soci ety because of commi tment to the ways
of other soci eti es. This atti tude easi l y shades i nt o el egi ac remembrance, a
form of aestheticism whi ch, in its soci al i mpl i cati ons, has li ttle to di sti ngui sh
it from less elevated forms of escapi sm and divertissement. Yet it was Levi
Strauss who i n hi s " I naugural Address" formul ated, i n spi te of hi s apparent
rel uctance, t he pregnant possi bi l i ty sensed by Mauss and vaguely fel t by
Durkhei m h i msel f.
I f i t were - and t ha nk God i t is n ot - expect ed of t he anthro
pol ogi st that he presage the future of humani ty, no doubt he woul d
concei ve i t , not as a prol ongat i on or a transcendence of present
forms, but rather on the model of an i ntegrati on, progressi vely
uni fyi ng the ch aracteri sti cs proper t o cold soci eti es [ i . e . , t h e type
of order, approxi mated i n "pri mi ti ve" soci eti es, whi ch rests on the
primacy of reversi bl e, cyclical time] and hot soci eti es [ i . e. , histori cally
turbul ent change and "progress , " approxi mated i n modern soci et
i es] . Hi s refecti on woul d take up the thread of t he ol d Cartesi an
dream of placi ng machi nes, l i ke automata, i n the servi ce of man.
He woul d follow the traces of thi s dream i n t he soci al phi l osophy
of the ei ghteenth century up unti l Sai nt-Si mon. For, i n announci ng
t he passage "from the government of men to the admi ni strati on of
thi ngs, " the l atter anti ci pated the di sti ncti on between [ materi al ]
cul ture and soci ety and the convers i on, whi ch i nformati on theory
and el ectroni cs enabl e us at l east t o percei ve as possi bl e, from a type
of ci vi l i zati on which hi stori cal becomi ng i naugurated in the past
-bu t at the pri ce of a transformati on of men i nto machi nes -to
an i deal ci vi l i zati on whi ch could succeed i n transformi ng machi nes
i nto men. Then, cul t ure havi ng recei ved t he burden of manufactur
i ng progress, soci ety woul d be l i berated from the mi l l enni a! curse
whi ch forced i t to ensl ave men i n order to progress. Thenceforth,
hi story coul d make i ts elf. And soci ety - pl aced above, or bel ow,
h i story -coul d once agai n assume t hat regul ar and al most crystal
l i ne structure whi ch the best preserved of pri mi ti ve soci eti es teach
108 Emile Dukheim: Sociolist and Philosopher
us is not contradictory to human nature. In this perspective, even if
utopian, social anthropology would fnd its highest justifcation, for
the forms of life and thought which it studies would no longer have
only historical and comparative interest. They would correspond to
a permanent choice for man which social anthropology, especially in
our most somber hours, would have the mission of safeguardingY
This notion of reconciling progress with legitimate order in modern
society, which Durkheim expressed in his own way in terms of the dialectic
of anomie and a structurally informed conscience colective, brought the
Durkheim school beyond the retrogressive memories ofComte. It showed
the way to an idea of the legitimately conservative possibilities of modern
society. Given the nature of status quo institutions and conditions in mod
ern society, however, this vision increasingly led to what might be called a
selectively radical conservatism requiring basic structural change. For only
structural change would permit the use of modern material culture in ways
compatible with a (re)turn to fundamentals in social life through structural
transformation involving the planned avoidance of unwanted change.
Ye one crucial problem left by Durkheim has not been adequately
resolved by French thinkers infuenced by him. Durkheim perceived in
an exaggerated fashion the importance of community in "primitive" so
cieties. Lucien Levy-Bruhl's stress on this idea was even more one-sided.
Durkheim, moreover, increasingly saw the need for signifcant commu
nity in all "healthy" societies. The problem he left was that of the precise
relationship between community and diff erentiated structure at various
levels of t he "tree" of social life. A danger in the methodological revision
ism of Claude Levi-Strauss is the radical de-emphasis of the problem of
communtty.
For f urrher insight into this problem, one may turn t Victor Turner,
one of the most important English-speaking anthropologists signifcantly
infuenced by the thought of Durkheim. Turner deserves more adequate
coverage than he receives here, for in his treatment ofDurkheim's thought
as a living tradition, he showed himself to be a thinker of a stature com
parable to Levi-Strauss's. I shall confne myself to a few brief indications
of the line of argument in the three concluding chapters of one ofTurner's
most synthetic works, The Ritual Proess. 54
Chapter 3 The Divtston ofSocial rabor 1 09
The Ri tual Process in a sense revives the probl em posed in The Division
of Labor. For Turner focuses on the roles of structural differenti ati on and
communitas as compl ementary and di al ecti cally (or di al ogi cally) related
aspects of t he soci al system. C ommunitas i s more di ff cult to grasp than
structure. But a study of i t is vital and i s rel ated to the understandi ng of
structure itself.
Communi tas i made evi dent or accessi bl e, so to speak, only through
its j uxtaposi ti on to, or hybridization with, aspects of social struc
ture. Just as i n Gestalt psychol ogy, fgure and ground are mutual l y
determi native, or, as some rare el ements are never found i n nature
i n thei r puri ty but only as components of chemi cal compounds, so
communi tas can be grasped onl y i n some rel ati on to structure. Just
because the communi tas component i s el usi ve, hard to pi n down, i t
is not uni mportant. Here the story of Lao-Tse's chari ot wheel may
b e apposi te. The spokes of the wheel and the nave . . . to whi ch they
are attached woul d be usel ess, he sai d, but for the hol e, the gap, the
empti ness at the center . . . which is nevertheless i ndi spensabl e to the
functi oni ng of the wheel . 5 5
In this quote, Turner probl ematizes i denti ty by suggestively l i nki ng com
munitas to generative empti ness or absence rather than to any substanti al
or rei fed noti on of communi ty. For Turner, moreover, i n any soci ety com
munitas may exi stenti al l y erupt i n the extreme experi ence of i ndi vi dual s,
e. g. , i n mystical states. In a relatively stabl e, ongoi ng soci al system, however,
communitas is normatively integrated with structure, for example, in ri tual s
such as ri tes of passage that meani ngful ly rel ate t he l i mi nal or t ransi ti onal
stages of a person's devel opment to hi s or her l i fe cycle as a whol e. In a soci ety
excessively bound by formal structures, communitas may be i deol ogi cally
affrmed by resti ve segments of the popul ati on. Revol uti on i tself represents
a l i mi nal state of society as a whol e. Turner concludes that "communi tas
breaks i n through the i ntersti ces of structure, i n l i mi nal i ty; at the edges of
structure, i n margi nal i ty; and from beneath structure, i n i nferi ority. It i s
al most everywhere hel d to be sacred or ' hol y, ' possi bl y because i t transgresses
or dissolves the norms that govern structured and i nsti t uti onali zed rela
ti onshi ps and is accompl i shed by experi ences of unprecedented potency. "56
Hence communi tas woul d paradoxi cal l y seem rel ated to a certai n mode of
anom1e.
I I 0 Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher
Through the concept of communitas, Turner i s abl e to relate - at
ti mes i n perhaps t oo faci l e or i nsuff ci entl y devel oped a manner - such
seemi ngl y di verse phenomena as "neophytes i n the l i mi nal phase of ri t ual ,
sub j uga ted aut ocht hones, smal l nati ons, court j est ers, hol y mendi cants,
good Samari tans, mi l l enari an movements, ' dharma bums , ' matri l ateral i ty
i n patri l i neal systems, patri l ateral i ty i n matri l i neal systems, and monast i c
orders . " 5 7 The mere i ndi cati on of the probl ems Turner treats shows the
conti nui ng relevance of the questi ons rai sed i n Durkhei m's The Division
of Labor. To some extent, Turner's i deas i nform my later di scussi on of
development s i n Durkhei m's thought.
Theor ofChange
After hi s di scussi on of mechani cal and organi c sol i dari ty i n normal
states of soci ety, Durkhei m's focus i n The Division of Labor shi fts to the
process of change, whi ch purportedl y has l ed from one type of sol i dar
i ty to the preponderance of t h e other. I n vi ew of stereotyped not i ons of
Durkhei m's "static" bi as, it i s si gni fcant that the questi on of change i s at the
center of hi s f rst major work. Increasi ngly, hi s reformi st goal was the type
of i nsti tuti onal structure that woul d l i mi t uncontrol l ed hi stori cal change
and establ i sh l egi ti mate order. In this sense, stabi l i zati on was i ndeed hi s
ai m. But , analytically and empi ri cal l y, Durkhei m was not obl i vi ous t o t he
probl em of change. The questi onabl e feature of The Division of Labor and
of Durkhei m's thought as a whol e i s not the neglect of hi stori cal change
bu t the i d ea of it Du rkhei m at ti mes entertai ned. Du rkhei m often assumed
that an essenti al si mi l ari ty of structure i n two soci eti es or soci al types, one
of whi ch was ( or was bel i eved to be) i n some sense logically "si mpl er" than
the other, permi tted the inference that the second soci ety had evolved hi s
tori cally from the frst by a process of i ncreasi ng compl exi ty of structural
devel opment . Thi s preconcept i on enabl ed the t heori st to pl ay havoc wi th
the relati onshi p between logi c and t i me.
In fa ct, D urkhei m' s ent i re evol ut i onary framework i n hi s first ma
j or work often amounted to an uncri ti cal rel i ance on Spe ncer' s i dea of
evol ut i on as a movement from homogenei ty to di fferent i at i on. In hi s
First Principles, Spencer ha d for mul at ed hi s general i de a of evol ut i on
Chapter 3 Te Division ofSocial labor I l l
t hus: "Evol uti on i s an i ntegrati on of matter and concomi tant di ssi pati on
of moti on; duri ng whi ch the matt er passes from a rel atively i ndefni te,
i ncoherent homogenei ty to a relatively defni te, coherent heterogenei ty; and
duri ng whi ch the retai ned mot i on undergoes a paral l el t ransformat i on. "5 8
I n hi s parody of Spencer, Wi l l i am James bri ngs out the confusi on under
the verbi age of t hi s "grand theory" of change from homogenei ty to di f
ferent i at i on: "Evol ut i on is a change from a no-howi sh, unt al kaboutabl e,
al l -al i keness to a somehow i sh and i n general tal kaboutabl e not-al l -al i keness
by conti nuous sti cktogetherati ons and somethi ngel si fcati ons. "5
Durkhei m's dependence on di ffuse i deas of evol uti on for hi s model
of change accounted, no doubt, for the fact that The Division of Labor
has no genui ne hi stori cal di mensi on. The known process of change -or
"moder ni zat i on, " a term whi c h i s at ti mes a bare-faced euphemism - i n
"pri mi ti ve" soci eti es took t he form of col oni al i sm, i mperi al i sm, a nd "cul
ture contact " wi th soci et i es whi ch had already at t ai ned economi c, mi l i tary,
and t echnol ogi cal superi ori ty. Yet Durkhe i m h ad l i t t l e to say about t hi s
process, a process whi ch coul d be documented hi st ori cally. Indeed, the
uproot i ng of "pri mi ti ve" soci et i es by " hi gher" types of ci vi l i zati on made
the "pri mi ti ve" man i n modern hi story prone, among other thi ngs, to
anomi e s ui ci de - a fact whi ch Durkhei m di d not di scuss, even i n Sui
cide. Moreover, the modern i ndust ri al s oci et i es whi ch most concerned
Durkhei m had devel oped, not from a general type of "pri mi ti ve" or tra
di ti onal soci ety, but , wi th a great deal of turmoi l , from a feudal past . As
Tocquevi l l e had u nderstood, as experi ence in France made evi dent, and
as Durkhei m hi msel f seemed to real i ze in his less grandl y theoreti cal mo
ments, t he preci se nat ure of t he hi stori cal devel opment from a feudal pas t
was i nti mately rel ated t o t he speci f i c probl ems faced by var i ous Western
count ri es in the modern peri od. In the Uni ted States, whi ch l a cked a
pronounced feudal past , a heri tage of slavery and raci sm created severe
di ffcul ti es for the achi evement of consensus in ways whi ch di ffered ac
cordi ng to regi on. Of these mat t ers, Durkhei m sai d not hi ng. And one
of the most bl atant omi ssi ons in hi s di s cussi on of modern soci ety i n the
West was the absence of any extended treatment of the speci fc nature of
soci al st ruct ure i n Ge rmany and its rel ati on to Ge rmany' s domesti c si tu
ati on and i nternati onal posi ti on. Durkhei m touched upon the "German
probl em" onl y i n propagandi sti c pamphl ets toward the end of hi s life. And
i fhe had wanted to i nvesti gate an i nternal process of change from "pri mi
ti ve" cul t ures to Western practi ces and bel i efs , the l ogi cal hi st ori cal pl ace
to start woul d have been pre-Socrati c Greece. The Division of Labor, i n
bri ef, often subordi nat es real probl ems and hi st ori cal processes t o model s
at l east as abstract as those of the cl assi cal economi sts whom Durkhei m
never t i red of cri ti ci zi ng.
Al though Durkhei m's di scussi on i n The Division of Labor gi ves l i t t l e
hi st ori cal i nsi ght i nto si gni fcant cases of change, i t i s nonethe l ess i nter
es t i ng for hi s general concept i on of s oci al process and for what i t reveal s
concerni ng hi s u ncertai nti es about mod er n s oci ety. The abstract qual i t y
of hi s argument deri ved largel y fro m the fact that he was addressi ng hi m
sel f not p os i ti vel y to empi r i cal evi dence and probl ems i n the anal ysi s of
soci ety, but predomi nantl y to t he model s of o ther theori sts. Durkhei m
presented massi ve change i n soci ety as a process i n whi ch i ntegrated soci al
structures are s ubj ected t o condi ti ons beyond thei r control and whi ch
resul ts in a t ransi t i onal phase o f pathol ogi cal d i sord er befo re soci ety can
reorgani ze on new structural bases.
Wi th the fre quent l y false and s uperfci al ri gor of monocausal the
ori es of t he ti me, D urkhei m sel ected population pressure as the cause of
t he ups et i n t he funct i onal bal ance of s oci ety. Hi s val i d poi nt was t hat
demogr aphi c condi t i ons are al ways s oci al l y rel evant as wel l as affect ed
by soci al forces and t hat a wel l -ordered soci ety requi res a normati vel y
cont rol l ed popul at i on pol i cy. I n fact, shi fts i n pop ul ati on di d have spe
ci al i mportance i n caus i ng unwant ed change i n " pri mi ti ve" soci et i es
wher e norms and b el i e fs general l y functi oned to keep popul at i on down
t o manageabl e proport i ons . The cmci al rol e of demography i n "devel
opi ng" and modern soci eti es has, of course, be come i ncreasingly obvi ous.
But a met hodol ogi cal ly pert i nent cri t i ci sm i s that Du rkhei m's extreme
monocausal i sm prevented hi m fro m devoti ng s uff ci ent at t ent i on to
ot her factors - e . g. , t echnol ogy and i deol ogy - i n processes of maj or
soci al change.
Theoreti cal l y and i deol ogi cal l y, thi s model of change, whi ch envi si oned
a passage from "normal " structure through a peri od of "pathol ogi cal " tran
si ti on to a new form of "normal " structure, had great i mportance. For
Du rkhei m as for earl i er thi nkers s uch as Sai nt - Si mon, Comte, and J . S.
Chapter 3 Te Division ofSocial labor I 13
Mi l l , modern soci ety was passi ng through a transi ti onal phase in whi ch
pathogeni c causes had not yet been ful l y transcended. Durkhei m's con
cepti on of ut i l i tari ani sm was deri ved from the thought of Bentham and
Spencer, and i t was i nf uenced by Soci al Darwi ni sm. Had he studi ed the
thought of Mi l l , for exampl e, he mi ght have di scovered i deas that cor
roborated hi s own theori es. But, gi ven hi s concepti on of uti l i tari ani sm,
hi s model of change enabl ed Durkhei m to si tuate i t (as wel l as Soci al
Darwi ni sm) as a theory rel ati ng to a peri od of rapi d transi ti on and soci al
pathol ogy. Durkhei m argued i n Soci al Darwi ni an fashi on that popul ati on
pressure caused an i ncreased struggle for exi stence whi ch resul ted i n ti me
i n the survi val of the fttest. But he di d not i denti fy the fttest wi th those
i ndi vi dual s or soci al uni ts that maxi mized thei r own self- i nterest or s urvived
rabi d competi ti on and struggle. Thi s enti re state of affairs for him was
an aspect of transi ti on and pathol ogy. Rather, he envi si oned a process of
evol uti on that woul d eventuate i n the survi val of the fttest frm of social
structure, i . e . , the "normal" state that woul d cooperati vel y empl oy the soci al
contri b uti ons of all members of soci ety for the common good.
The most obvi ous i nterpretati on of Durkhei m's asserti on that "every
thi ng happens mechani sti cal ly" (tout se passe mecaniquement) is in terms
of a comprehensi ve posi ti vi sti c theory o f causati on that excl udes the pos
si bl e i nterventi on of human agency and consci ous effort or control i n
the hi stori cal pr ocess. Here, however, one must di sti ngui sh be tween the
passage from the normal to the pathol ogi cal and the passage from the
pathol ogi cal to the normal . In The Division of Labor, the asserti on that
"everythi ng happens mechani sti cally" appeared i n Durkhei m's treatment
of change from one i ntegrated soci al system to the transi ti onal state of
pathol ogy. Apparently, Durkhei m di d bel i eve that a maj or and di sori ent
ing departure from a vi abl y i ntegrated soci al order was caused i ni ti al l y
by i mpersonal , mechani sti c processes that i n thei r soci al l y relevant form
were not i nt ended. Peopl e did not choose to abandon a tradi ti onal mode
of cul tural i ntegrat i on: they wer e forced out of i t by ext er nal condi t i ons
such as popul ati on pressure. Here Durkhei m's i deas were si mi l ar to those
of both Rousseau and Darwi n.
But Durkhei m was much l ess cl ear abo ut the rel ati on of mechani sti c
process to other factors i n the passage fro m pathol ogy to normal i ty. He
seemed to rely on a Darwi ni an noti o n of "natural sel ecti on" i n a pr ocess
I 1 4 Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher
of evol uti on. And he argued that one coul d not attri bute the functi ons
of soci al i ns t i t ut i ons to t he mani fest i ntenti ons of soci al agents. But
Durkhei m never ful l y sorted out the i nt eracti on i n t he hi stori cal process
of such factors as i nt ent i onal agency, uni nt ended consequence, uncon
sci ous moti vat i on, anomi e, and t he structure and funct i oni ng of i nst i tu
t i ons. Si gni fcant i deas he devel oped are that soci al consci ousness ari ses
i n response t o soci al di sorder and that soci ol ogy, as the most advanced
consci ousness of moder n soci ety, has the task of i nformi ng meani ngful
soci al acti on. How these i deas are rel ated t o the over-al l understandi ng of
the hi st ori cal process or to the more l i mi t ed ques t i on of the i nt ent i onal
act i on of soci al and pol i t i cal agents remai ns a bl ank chapt er i n Durkhei m's
t h ought .
Residual Doubts
One feature of The Division of Labor t hat has puzzled many commen
tators i s Durkhei m's extensi ve treatme nt of t h e rel ati on of The Division of
Labm to happi ness. Yet t hi s questi on was i mportant for Durkhei m i n terms
ofbot h the theori es he opposed and the theories he defended. The i dea that
the division ofl abor as the handmai d of economic growth bri ngs happi ness
and i s i ndeed the resul t of a consci ous pursui t of happi ness consti tuted a
favori te theme of ut i l i tari ans and cl assi cal economi sts. Durkhei m did not
i nvesti gate t he possi bi l i t y t hat the pursui t of happi ness mi ght functi on
i deol ogi cally as a for m of false consci ousness. Hi s rej ecti on of the corre
lati on between happi ness and the di vi si on of labor relied upon a stati sti cal
means of testi ng the proposed rel ati onshi p. Durkhei m argued that there
was no posi tive i ndex of happi ness that carried methodol ogi cal convicti on.
But, he observed, there was an obj ective i ndex of col l ective unhappi ness:
the suicide rate. If economi c progress brought happi ness, the sui ci de rate
shoul d drop. But "on t he con trary, true sui ci de, i . e . , sad s ui ci de, i s i n an
endemi c state among ci vi li zed peopl es. "G o Thus economi c growt h, at least
under the extremely unstabl e condi ti ons which have accompani ed i t i n
modern hi story, does not bri ng happi ness. Thi s poi nt woul d be mor e fully
el aborated i n Suicide, whi ch responded to the correl ati on of unhappi ness
and sui ci de i n The Division of Labor, Durkheim rel ated all di srupti ve change
Chapter 3 The Division of Social Iabor I I 5
to anomi e and saw the degree of happi ness possi bl e in l i fe to be dependent
on overcoming runaway ( but not all) anomi e and si mul taneousl y creati ng
sol i dari ty i n soci ety.
Qui t e apparent i n t he frst edi t i on of The Di1ision of Labor was
Durkhei m's attempt to fnd a mi ddle way between the compl acency of
uti l i tari ans and the moral ni hi li sm of prophets of doom. I f Durkhei m at
times in the f rst edi ti on seemed to share more of the compl acency of the
uti l i tari ans and classi cal economi sts, i t was not because he agreed with thei r
i dea of l egi ti mate order, but because he opti mi sti cally bel i eved i n an evo
l uti onary movement of modern soci ety toward hi s own i deal of l egi ti mate
order, however uncertai n he may have been about i ts preci se nature or mode
of attai nment. Clearl y, Durkhei m rejected Comte's bel i ef that the di vi si on of
l abor necessari ly entai l s soci al di sorder. But he was tempted, as he so often
was, to affrm the opposi te of another theori st' s vi ew: at ti mes he seemed to
argue that The Di1ision of Labor per se created soci al sol i dari ty.
Durkhei m also wanted to di sti ngui sh his posi ti on from that of Ferdinand
Tonni es, i n whom he saw a theori st with an excessi vely negati ve view of
modern soci ety. I n fact, Durkhe im's tendenti ous i deas about "pri mi ti ve"
soci eti es were due less to ethnocentri c noblesse oblge than to a desi re to
avoid the di re concl usi ons of modern prophets of doom. Durkhei m tended
to i nvert Tonni es' equati ons by fndi ng i n modern organi c sol i dari ty the
vi rtues Tonni es pl aced i n "pri mi tive" Gemeinschaf ( communi ty) and to
ascri be to "pri mi ti ve" mechani cal sol i dari ty t he defects Tonni es found i n
modern Gese!lschaf ( soci ety) . Durkhei m at poi nts saw pri mi ti ve soci eti es as
mi ni ature mass soci eti es wi thout any "organic" structure, characterized by
herd conformi ty and repressive puni shments, and hel d together by bonds
whi ch were weaker and l ess stabl e than those i n modern soci ety. 6 1 Tonni es,
i n Gemeinschaf und Gesellchaf, had stated hi s posi ti on i n these terms:
The theory of Gesellschaf deals wi th the arri fci al constructi on of an
agregate of human bei ngs whi ch superfcially resembles the Gemein
schaf i ns ofar as the i ndi vi dual s live and dwell together p eacefully.
However, in Gemeinschaf they remai n essenti al l y uni ted in spi te
of al l separati ng factors, whereas i n Geselschafi they are essentially
separated i n spite of all uni t i ng factors. In the Gesellchaf, as con
trasted with the Geeinschaf, we fnd no actions that can be derived
from an a pri ori and necessarily exi sti ng unity; no actions, therefore,
whi ch mani fest the wi l l and spi ri t of the uni ty even if performed
by the i ndi vi dual; no acti ons whi ch, i nsofar as they are performed
by the i ndi vi dual , take pl ace on behal f of those uni ted wi th hi m.
I n t he Gesellschaf such acti ons do not exi s t . On t he contrary, here
everybody is by hi msel f and i sol ated, and there exists a condi ti on of
tensi on agai nst all others.
62
Tinni es asserted that Durkhei m's i deas of mechani cal and organi c soli
darity were "altogether different" (anz und gar verschieden) from hi s own. 63 In
an I 889 article on T inni es' book, Durkheim, wi th comparable intransigence,
made an apparent efort to accentuate the positive in modern soci ety.
The poi nt where I separate myself from hi m is i n hi s theory of Ge
sellschaf. I f I h ave understood h i m, Gesellschaf i s characteri zed by a
progressive devel opment of i ndi vi dual i s m, whose di spersive effects
the state's acti on coul d for a whi l e prevent. It would be essenti ally a
mechani cal aggregate; everythi ng that remai ned of trul y collective
l i fe woul d resul t not from spontanei ty but from the ent i rely exter
nal i mpul si on of the state. In a word, t hi s i s soci ety as concei ved by
Be nt ham. Now I bel i eve that the l i fe in great soci al aggl omerati ons
i s j ust as natural as that i n l i ttl e aggregates. It is not l ess organic or
l ess i nternal . Beyond purely i ndi vi dual movements, there i s i n our
contemporary soci eti es a properly collective activity whi ch i s as nat u
ral as t hat of smaller soci eti es of the past. I t i s assuredly di fferent;
i t consti tutes a different type, but between these two speci es of the
same genus, however di verse they may be, there is no di fference of
nature. To prove i t woul d take a book. 64
Th e book was The Division of Labor. But t he book remai ned ambi guous
about whether and how exi sti ng forms of The Division of Labor or thei r
d evelopmental tendenci es created soci al and moral sol i dari ty. The argument
conceal ed a "mi ssi ng l i nk" i n t he evol uti onary chai n.
Uncertai nty also characterized Durkhei m's treatment of modern i ndi
vi dual i sm and i rs rel ati on to sol i dari ty. I n addi ti on to ot her aspects of t he
probl em, Durkhei m later tri ed to di sti nguish between forms ofi ndi vi dual i sm
compati bl e with soli dari ty and excessi ve, atomi zi ng i ndi vi duali sm or ego
i sm, parti cul arl y in the economi c sphere. The Division of Labor attempted
to correlate i ncreasi ng soci al di fferenti ati on, u ni versali sti c values, and i ndi -
Chapter 3 Te Division ofSocial labor I I 7
vi dual i sm. But its i dea of the relation of i ndi vi dual i sm to soli dari ty was veiled
in darkness. At ti mes, Durkhei m stressed the i mportance of personal dignity
and the i ndi vi dual choice of a functi on i n keeping with humane values and
one's capaci ti es. At other times, he seemed to argue that all i nsti tuti onal i zed
or i deologically shared i ndi vi dual i sm is the egoistic expressi on of a self- ef
facing conscience colecti ve -despi te his own attempt to base sol i dari ty on
phenomena bound up wi th modern i ndi vi dual i sm.
I f [ moder i ndi vi dual i sm and the cul t of the person] are common
i nsofar as they are bel i efs shared by the communi ty, they are i ndi
vidual i n thei r obj ect. I f al l wi l l s are turned toward t he same end,
thi s end is not soci al . Thus i ndi vi dual i sm i s i n an enti rel y excepti onal
si tuati on i n the conscience colective. I t i s from soci ety that i t draws
its force, b ut i t i s not to soci ety that it attaches us: i t i s to ourselves.
Consequently, i t does not consti tute a truly soci al bond. This is
why theorists who make this senti ment the exclusi ve basi s of thei r
moral doctri ne may wi th j usti ce be met wi th the reproach that they
di ssolve soci ety. 65
Another matter left in doub t i n The Division of Labor was the rela
ti onshi p of di fferenti ati on to strati fcati on, class formati on, gendered rol es,
and structures of domi nati on i n soci ety - and t hei r rel ati on, i n turn, to
reciprocity and sol i darity. Thi s was a notable omi ssi on in a purportedl y
general soci ol ogy of a worl d i n whi ch the hi stori cal pri ce of abundance and
"hi gh" culture for the few had typi cally been the expl oi tati on of the many.
Here Durkhei m's failure to come to terms wi th Marx and become aware of
Weber l essened drasti cally the relevance of hi s soci ology to both the under
standing of hi stori cal soci eti es and the el aborati on of hi s own concepts of
normali ty and pathol ogy. And here more than anywhere else i s a basi s for
the charge that Durkhei m was a "bourgeoi s i d eal i st" whose thought d i verted
attenti on from the real i ti es of hi stori cal soci ety. Apparently, Durkhei m di d
not bel i eve that functi onal di ferenti ati on n ecessari ly involves strati cati on
and di scri mi nati on or that the nature of a functi on somehow entai ls a di f
ferenti al eval uati on of roles or groups in terms of hi gher and lower. But he
apparently di d bel i eve t hat all di fferenti ated soci al orders were correlated
wi th some typ e and measure of strat i fcat i on whi ch i n modern soci ety woul d
be based on meri t or achi evement. 66
1 1 8 Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher
What the causes, mechani sms, consequences, or pri nci pl es of thi s
correl ati on mi ght be, ei ther typol ogi cal l y or uni versal ly, was never ful l y
exami ned by D urkhei m. Even i n hi s proposed model of a normal , sol i
dari st i c form of modern soci ety, he di d not offer a sustai ned, searchi ng,
and detai l ed enqui ry i nto t he probl em of power, prest i ge, and economi c
reward i n vari ous i nst i t ut i onal spheres and i n t he overall soci al order.
Only certai n el ementary ideas emerged fro m hi s di scussi ons, and they
were hardly adequate to the probl ems rai sed. These i deas are di scussed
i n the next two chapters.
Contract and Solidarity
Durkhei m's taci t acceptance of Spencer' s concept i on of evol uti on was
not i ndi cati ve of hi s esti mati on, i n The Di vi si on of Labor, of the thought
of the Engl i sh theori st. Hi s general l y cri ti cal reacti on to Spencer i s mos t
apparent i n Book I , chapt er vi i , i n whi ch he contrasts Spencer's i dea of
co ntractual s ol i dari t y wi t h hi s own i dea of organi c sol i dari ty. Thi s pi v
otal chapter i mmedi atel y precedes Durkhei m' s di scussi on of change from
mechani cal t o organi c s ol i dari ty, but i t i ntroduces t he concl udi ng secti on
on pathol ogi cal forms of The Division of Labor by bri ngi ng o ut ways i n
whi ch devel opment i n modern soci ety has not reached a stage adequat e
to serve as a functi onal b as i s of s ol i dari ty.
For Spencer, i ndustri al soci ety was based upon a vast cash nexus of
pri vate contracts sancti oned by a l ai ssez-fi re pol i ce s t at e. "The typi cal
form of soci al rel ati on woul d be the economi c rel ati on st ri pped of al l
regul at i on. "67 I f thi s ki nd of market rel ati onshi p characteri zed soci ety,
Durkhei m reasoned, there woul d b e l i ttl e i f any sol i dari ty.
I n the fact of economi c exchange, the di fferent agents remai n out
si de one another, and wi th the t ermi nat i on of the operat i on each
one E nds hi msel f al one agai n. Consci ences are onl y s uperf ci ally i n
contact; they nei t her penetrat e nor adhere strongl y to one another.
If one gets to t he bot t om of thi ngs, one wi l l see that al l harmony
of i nterests conceal s a confi ct whi ch is l atent or si mpl y adj ourned.
For wher e i nterest reigns al one, t here is not hi ng to restrai n egoi sm,
and each ego E nds i tsel f on a warl i ke foot i ng wi t h al l others. Any
Chapter 3 Te Division ofSocial labor I I 9
truce to thi s eternal antagoni sm cannot b e l ong-range. Indeed,
i nterest i s the l east constant of al l thi ngs i n the worl d. Today i t i s
i n my i nterest t o uni t e wi th you. Tomorrow t he same reason wi l l
make me your enemy.
68
Thus Tinni es' cri t i que, excl uded by the front door, seemed to gai n
entry by the b ack. Durkhei m's own pos i t i on was summed up i n the as
sert i on that "not everythi ng is contractual in the contract. "69 Du rkhei m
meant t hat the cont ract coul d not be reduced to ad hoc acts of wi l l among
pri vate part i es, b u t t hat i t presupposed a framework of norms and l aws
uphel d and sanct i oned by soci al agenci es. As exampl es, he ci t ed the re
qui rements of the French Code, whi ch forbade the maki ng of contracts
by an i ncompet ent and contracts concerni ng thi ngs whi ch coul d not be
sol d or i nvol vi ng i l l i ci t deal i ngs. There were al so posi tive obl i gati ons i n
contract law, for i nstance those enabl i ng a j u dge t o grant a del ay t o a
debt or under certai n condi t i ons.
The cruci al subst ant i ve ques t i on, however, was whet her and t o what
ext ent t he i n terve nt i on of t he st at e or o ther soci al agenci es was restri cted
to po li ce functi ons and the enforcement of t he rul es of the game i n a
prof t-ori ented market economy. Were the condi t i ons of organi c sol i dar
ity fulf l l ed by the pursui t of sel f- i nterest in market rel ati onshi ps as l ong
as one di d not break t he l aw ( thro ugh theft, fraud, and so on) ? I n ot her
words, was Durkhei m at b es t s cor i ng a debater's poi nt s agai nst Spencer
by present i ng an academi c rei nt erpret at i on of t he s ame fact s, or was h e
argui ng t hat sol i dari ty i n soci ety requi red structural bases very di fferent
fro m those envi saged by Spencer and the economi sts?
At thi s j uncture of the argument, Durkhei m began to make cri ti cal
comments and to l ay down general pri nci pl es whi ch took hi m far b eyon d
l egal procedures o r the " formal " freedom of cont racti ng part i es and i nt o
subst antive consi derat i ons of soci al j usti ce. Thi s prerequi si t e of sol i dari ty
i n soci ety cannot be concei ved as the aut omat i c resul tant of market forces
or even as a possi bl e achi evement of a Keynesi an welfare state. Du rkhei m's
remarks i mpl y that b as i c structural reform i s requi red to provi de the
ground work of sol i dari ty i n soci ety.
No doubt , when men uni te by contract, i t i s because si mpl e or com
pl ex di vi si on ofl abor has made them need one another. But for them
to cooperate harmoni ously, it is not suffci ent for them to enter i nt o
rel ati ons nor even to feel t he state of mut ual dependence i n whi ch
they fnd themselves. I t i s further necessary t hat the condi ti ons of
thi s cooperati on be fxed for the enti re durati on of thei r rel ati on
shi p. I t i s necessary that the duti es and rights of each be d efned, not
onl y i n vi ew of the si tuati on as i t presents i tsel f at the moment of
contract, but i n previ si on of ci rcumstances whi ch may devel op and
modi f i t. Indeed, i t i s necessary not to forget that i f the di vi si on of
l abor makes i nterests i nterdependent, i t does not confound them;
i t l eaves them di st i nct and r i val . . . . Each contracti ng party, whi l e i n
need of the other, seeks to obtai n what he needs at the l owest pri ce,
that i s, to acqui re the most ri ghts possi bl e i n return for the fewest
obli gati ons pos s i bl e. 7
For sol i dari ty to be created in this context, the conscience collecti ve re
lati ng di fferenti ated functi ons woul d have to sti pul ate i nsti tuti onal norms
that woul d establ i sh and sancti on rel ati onal condi ti ons of reci proci ty. Onl y
the generally accepted norm coul d l ocate the "mi ddl e term between the
ri val ry of i nterests and thei r sol i dari ty. " Hence Durkhei m concl uded that
"there is only a di fference of degree between the l aw whi ch regul ates con
tractual obl i gati ons and [ t he laws] whi ch fx other soci al duti es of ci ti zens . "
And he asked whether t he absence of effecti ve soci al control of key sectors
of the economy "was not the effect of a morbi d state" of soci ety. 71
Si gni fcantly, however, Durkhei m real i zed that regulati ve norms woul d
not el i mi nate al l confi ct i n soci ety. Al though he di d not devote adequate
attenti on to the probl em of confi ct i n i ts vari ous forms and functi ons, he
di d see that confi ct i n i tsel f was not "path ol ogi cal " a nd that, wi t hi n l i mi ts,
i t mi ght be conducive to "normal " i ntegrati on. "Normal " soci al order, he
bel i eved, was not stati c equi l i bri um. Conf i ct was one component of soci al
dynami cs. The pathol ogi cal began onl y when conf i ct was unregulated.
To what extent conf i ct shoul d be regul ated i n order to arri ve at a "mi ddl e
term" - a normative gol den mean or compromi se formati on that coul d
not be confated wi th a status quo juste milieu -was a di ffcul t questi on
Durkhei m never fully answered. But, i n general , Mauss's term "ami abl e
ri valry" wel l expressed Durkhei m's i de a .
Durkhei m went on t o rej ect the myth of freedom of contract and to
pose the probl em of the relati on between bargaining posi ti ons in soci ety and
Cte 3 7u Division of Socia labor I 2 I
the social regulation of contract. For Spencer, the object of contract was t
ensure that te worker received the equivalent of the outlay his work cost
him. Durkheim believed that contract could never fll such a role without
contracts "being much more closely regulated than they are today." Classical
economists replied that the law of supply and demand would automatically
re-establish economic equilibrium. Durkheim countered that this view
neglected the social fact that workers living in poverty could not move
on to higher paying jobs. Even for classes with greater mobility, changes
of occupation took time. "In the meanwhile, unjust contracts which are
antisocial by defnition have been executed with the complicity of society,
and, when equilibrium has been established at one point, there is no reason
for its not breaking up at another."72
In one of his very frst articles, Durkheim was even more explicit about
the myth of equating formal legal freedom with real contractual freedom
in society:
What can the poor worker reduced to his own resources do against
the rich and powerful boss, and is there not a palpable and cruel irony
in assimilating these two forces which are so manifestly unequal? If
they enter into combat, is it not clear that the second will always and
without diffculty crush the frst? What does such a liberty amount
to, and does not the economist who contents himself with it become
guilty of taking the word for the thing?73
In the discussion of contract and organic solidarity in The Division of
Labor, Durkheim went on to draw a very radical conclusion from the idea
of social justice:
If a contract is not just, it is destitute of all authority. In any case,
the role of society cannot be to reduce itself to the passive execu
tion of contracts. It must also determine under what conditions
they are executable and, if necessary, restore them to their normal
form. The agreement of parties cannot render just a clause which
in itself is unjust, and there are rules of justice whose violation
social justice must prevent, even if it h been consented to by the
interested parties.74
Thus even when soci ety depended most ful l y o n The Division of Labor,
I t could not resolve i tsel f into "a dust of j uxtaposed atoms" havi ng only
"exteri or and passing contacts" with one another. According to Durkhei m,
peopl e cannot l i ve together "wi thout mutual understandi ng and, conse
quentl y, wi t hout becomi ng bound t o one another in a strong and durabl e
manner. Al l soci ety is a moral soci ety . . . . The i ndi vi dual is not suffci ent
unto hi msel f"75
Moern Social Patholoy
Durkhei m's refecti ons on contract were conti nued i n hi s concl udi ng
secti on on pathol ogi cal forms of the di vi si on of l abor. In the pathol ogi cal
state, the di vi si on of labor di d not funct i on to create sol i dari ty but, on th e
contrary, was related to soci al cri si s and di sease. Bi ol ogy, for Durkhei m,
was the sci ence wi th the greatest i nterest for soci ol ogy, al though he always
made cl ear that this i nterest was l i mi ted to the metaphors and analogi es that
bi ology mi ght provi de . The two sets of concepts wi th bi ologi cal analogues
that had greatest i mportance for soci ol ogy were, of course, the not i ons of
structure and functi on and the di sti ncti on between the normal and the
pathologi cal . Asi de from hi s general met hodol ogical bel i ef t h at i n soci ol
ogy as i n bi ology the study of the pathol ogi cal was compl ementary to the
study of the normal , Durkhei m turned to the study of p athol ogy for the
speci fc reason that hi stori cal l y the di vi si on of l abor "woul d not have been
the obj ect of such grave accusati ons i f i t really di d not devi ate more or less
from the normal state. "7 6 Thus, despi te the apparent convi cti on i n hi s frst
major work t hat soci ety i n ti me woul d "mechani sti cally" t end to assume
a normal or i ntegrated form, Durkhei m di d recogni ze that thi s condi ti on
had not yet been reached.
The pathol ogi cal forms Durkhei m treated were the anomi e, the forced,
and what might be termed the alienated, division ofl abor. It i s signifcant that
his core concept of anomi e made its frst appearance in hi s earli est work and
in a context i nt i matel y related to i l l egi ti mate const rai nt or expl oi tative struc
tures. In fact, the concept of anomi e, whi ch was to receive i ts ful l theoreti cal
development i n Suicide, already took on i n The Division of Labor features of
what Marx had concei ved as structural contradictions i n soci ety.
Durkhei m began hi s di scussi on of the anomi e di vi si on of! abor by giving
speci fc cases, some of which he also i ncl uded in Suicide: "The frst case of
this genus i s furni shed by i ndustri al or commerci al crises, by bankruptci es,
whi ch are so many parti al ruptures of organi c sol i dari ty; they bear wi tness
to the fact that at certain points of the organi sm, certai n social functi ons
are not adj usted to one anot her. " I nstead of decreasi ng wi th the di vi si on
of l abor, i ndustri al and commerci al cri ses had i ncreased wi th i ts advance.
Durkhei m recogni zed, however, that crises coul d not be unequi vocal l y
correl ated wi th economi c growth i n general , for enterpri ses had become
concentrated to a greater degree than they had mul t i pl i ed. Indeed, he went
on t o observe that "smal l i ndustry, where l abor is l ess di vi ded, offers the
spectacl e of a rel at i ve harmony between worker and boss; i t i s onl y i n bi g
i ndustry t hat conflicts ar e i n a bi tter state. "77 Anomi e i n bi g i ndustry, ac
cordi ng to Durkhei m, was due to an absence of functi onal coordi nati on. He
di d not consi der the possi bi l i ty that i mpersonal bureaucrati c organi zati ons
whi ch mi nutel y coordi nated functi ons and rol es on an i nstrumental and
formally rati onal level mi ght produce anomi e on the level of substantive
i r r at i onal i ty by denyi ng or margi nal i zi ng face-to-face rel ati ons and foster i ng
meani ngl ess human rel ati onshi ps.
Durkhei m found a "more striking" case of anomi e i n the conf ict of
l abor and capi tal . "To the extent that i ndustri al functi ons become more
speci ali zed, so far from soli dari ty i ncreasi ng, t he struggl e becomes more
li vel y. "78 Rel yi ng on Emi l e Levasseur's Les Classes ouvrieres en France jusqua
I Revolution ("The Working Classes i n France up to the Revol uti on, " 1 8 59) ,
Durkhei m observed that before t he ffteenth century confi cts had been
i n frequent, largely becau se master and apprenti ce were al most equal s. I n
many meti ers, the apprenti ce coul d l ook forward to becomi ng a master i n
hi s turn. Begi nni ng wi th the ffteenth century, condi ti ons began to change,
but conf i cts remai ned restricted to matters beari ng on speci fc gri evances.
With the comi ng of bi g i n dustry i n the seventeenth century, the third stage
i n the process of growi ng class confi ct b rought the separat i on of worker
and boss, the genesi s of t wo al i en "races" i n the factori es, and the bi rth of
revol uti onary i deol ogi es.
After thi s bri ef but i l l umi nati ng sl i ce of hi story, Durkhei m enunci ated
hi s own i dea of the cl ose rel ati onshi p between anomi e and expl oi tati on.
In a sense, soci al di sorder deri ved both from the absence of t he ri ght ki nd
of regul ati on and the presence of the wrong ki nd of regul ati on. More
speci fcal! y, expl oi tati on coul d be seen as an el ement i n a broader f eld
of anomi e, for i t involved an i rrati onal contradi cti on be tween the condi
ti on or i nsti t ut i onal posi t i on of a group and i ts val ues and needs, i f not
t he values and needs of soci ety as a whol e. At t hi s poi nt i n t he argument,
Durkhei m's fai th i n a "mechani sti c" trend over ti me toward i ntegrati on
began to fal ter; at most, he bel i eved that i ntegrati on woul d be achieved onl y
i n a post-revol ut i onary phase of soci al pathol ogy. In a pre-revol uti onary
soci al context, "mechani sti c" and i mpersonal processes woul d not be forces
for i ntegrat i on and sol i dari ty.
There i s, however, one case where anomi e can be produced even
though conti gui ty [ among functi ons] i s suffci ent . I t i s when the
necessary regul ati on can be establ i shed only at t he pri ce of transfor
mati ons of which the soci al structure i s no longer capabl e: because
the pl asti ci ty of soci eti es i s not i ndef ni t e. When i t i s at i ts end, i t
may make i mpossi bl e even necessary changes. 79
Thus, accordi ng to Durkhei m, soci ety mi ght E nd i tsel f i n a structural
bi nd i n whi ch a hi stori cal conj uncti on of anomi e and expl oi tati ve i nsti
tuti ons woul d requi re revol ut i on for possi bl e st ruct ural transformat i on.
Durkhei m never bel i eved t hat i n the modern context vi ol ent apocalypse
was necessary for structural reform - he never consi dered i t suffci ent i n
a ny context - but he di d i ncreasi ngl y see the need for basi c structural
change effected through arduous, i f i l l -def ined, effort.
By thi s poi nt i n the argument, the ful l range of Durkhei m's concept of
anomi e, whi ch receives ful l er exposi ti on i n Suicide, becomes more evi dent.
In the E rst edi t i on of The Division of Labor, Durkhei m di d provi de suf
fci ent grounds for rej ecti ng any att empt si mpl y to i dent i f anomi e wi th
a total absence of i nsti t ut i ons, norms, or val ues - a si t uat i on whi ch i n
Du rkhei m's usage of t he term "anomi e" consti tu ted only an extreme case.
The Durkhei mi an def ni ti on of "anomi e" referred to the absence of gen
eral l y accepted limiting norms. Thus contradi cti ons i n the soci al system,
i ncl udi ng normati ve contradi cti ons, were, i n Durkhei m's sense, anomi e
because t here was no norm of a hi gher order t o resolve t he st ruct ural
probl ems that they caused. And i nst i tut i ons or i deologi es mi ght be anomi e
i n the sense t h at they i mposed limitless asser t i on or expans i on, whi ch for
Durkhei m was i nvari abl y bound up wi th substanti ve i rrati onal i ty i n the
l arger soci ety. One cannot b egi n to understand the full extent to whi ch
Durkhei m had a noti on of substanti ve reason and the ways i n whi ch
hi s concept of soci al pathol ogy has o ften been di storted if one does not
understand the s cope and i mpl i cati ons of hi s concept of anomi e and the
i mportance for hi m of an i nsti tuti onal l y based sense of l egi ti mate l i mi ts
in soci ety.
I n The Di vision of Labor, as i n Suicide, Durkhei m treated as anomi e
an i nsti tuti onal system whi ch structural l y i mpos ed l i mi tl ess, maxi mi zi ng
acti vity upon members of soci ety: a proft-ori ented market economy. Hi s
i deas on the anomi e "anarchy of the market" coi nci ded wi th those of both
Comte and Marx, who i n t hi s ci rcumscri bed respect were i n agreement .
Durkhei m wr ot e: ' Today t here are no l onger r ul es whi ch fx t he number
of economi c enterpri ses and, i n each branch of i ndustry, producti on i s not
regul ated i n a way that makes i t remai n at t he level of consumpti on . . . . Thi s
l ack of regul ati on does not permi t a regul ar harmony of functi ons. "8 0
Al though he prudentl y refrai ned from maki ng prescri pti ve recom
mendati ons on t he necessity of social control for i ntegrati on and sol i darity,
Durkheim di d go on to assert that the economists' idea of the re-establishment
of economic equi l i bri um through the free play of market forces ignored the
social havoc wrought by the market. "The economists demonstrate, i t i s true,
that thi s harmony becomes re-establi shed by itself when it i s necessary, thanks
to the rise or fall of prices whi ch, accordi ng to needs, sti mulates or slows
down producti on. But in any case it re-establishes itself i n this way only after
ruptures of equi l i bri um and more or less prolonged troubles . "8 1
Durkheim found another case of anomi e in modern soci ety in the lack
of coordi nati on among speciali zed di sci pl i nes: "Sci ence, which is fragmented
i nto a mul ti tude of detai l ed studi es which do not f t together, no longer forms
a sol idary whol e. What mani fests best this absence of concert and uni ty i s
t he wi despread theory that each parti cul ar science has an absolute value. "82
Hence Durkhei m di d not endorse t he tendency toward the autonomization
of differenti ated spheres of activity in modern soci ety. The integration of
science and of soci ety were compani on goals of hi s endeavor. And his l i ne
of thought i mpl i es that structural change and cultural reorientati on are the
prerequi sites for maki ng any i nterdisciplinary study of modern soci ety more
than a large-scale investigation of fragmentati on, parti al truths, and i nteral
i nconsi stencies. Wi thout such change, the university itself threatened to be
a rather vacuous i dea - an i nsubstantial catch-all for a seri es of expansive
microcosms gravi tati ng i n their own orbi ts.
Next Durkhei m turned to the "constrained" ( i n the sense of "forced")
di vi si on of l abor; t he di scussi on both resumed hi s enqui ry i nto contract and
overlapped wi th hi s treatment of anomi e. He began wi th a pregnant obser
vati on that reveals hi s ful l awareness that certai n types of laws or i nsti tuti onal
norms mi ght abet conf ict, disorder, and mal ai se i n soci ety.
I t i s not suffci ent t hat there be rul es, however, because someti mes t he
rul es themselves are t he causes of evil. This i s what occurs i n class wars.
The i nsti tuti on of classes [ apparently intended here to si gni f orders
or estates] or of castes constitutes an organization of The Division of
Labor, and i t is a strictly regulated organizati on; i t i s, nevertheless, a
frequent cause of dissensi ons. The lower classes, not sati sfed, or no
longer satisf ed, wi th the role which custom or law has devolved upon
them, aspire to dispossess those who are exercising these functi ons.
From thi s there ari se civil wars, whi ch result from the manner i n which
labor i s di stri buted. s3
Thus the pr obl em of s oci al confl i ct was not ent i r el y i gnored i n
Durkhei m's f irst maj or work. In a di rect criti cism of Tarde's theory of i mi
tati on, Durkhei m recogni zed that ri si ng expectati ons mi ght be i nvol ved i n
the genesi s of soci al conf i ct, perhaps a s one component of a more compre
hensi ve process of structural change and soci al uprooti ng. Hi s i deas on thi s
subj ect were si mi lar t o Vilf redo Pareto's theory of the "ci rculati on of el i tes. "
Imi tati on of one class by another takes pl ace onl y if there are "predi sposi ng
grounds . " "For needs to spread from one class to another, i t is necessary that
di fferences whi ch ori gi nally separated the cl asses should have di sappeared
or di mi ni shed. It i s necessary, through changes produced i n soci ety, that
some become competent i n functi ons whi ch formerl y were beyond them,
whi l e others l ose thei r ori gi nal superi ority. "84 Once a l ower class percei ved
that opportuni ti es for i ts growi ng abi l i ty to exerci se certain functi ons were
cl osed off, it was moti vated to assert its pr erogati ves, i f need be through
revol uti onary acti on.
Durkhei m di sti ngui shed sharpl y between constrai nt, i n the sense of
obli gati on rooted i n commi tment to l egi ti mate norms, and pathol ogi cal
constrai nt based upon pure power and the real i ty or threat of force and vi o
l ence. "If the commi tment whi ch I have torn fro m someone by threateni ng
hi m wi th death i s moral l y and legally nul l , how could i t be val i d if, i n order
to obtai n i t, I have profted from a si t uat i on of whi ch I was not t he cause,
i t is true, but whi ch puts someone el se under the necessity of yi el di ng to
me or dying? "ss Durkhei m bel i eved that in modern soci ety the creati on of
sol i darity depended upon the abol i ti on of i l l egi ti mate constrai nt both i n
j ob opportuni ti es and i n the i nterrel ati ons of groups and functi ons. On the
level of j ob opportuni ty, the democrati c values of modern society enj oi ned a
more compl ete passage from i nheri t ed status to the recogni t i on of equali ty
of opportuni ty and achi evement. In an arti cle on Albert Schaefe written
ei ght years before the publ i cati on of The Division of Labor, Dur khei m was
qui t e clear about the need for one basi c type ofi ndi vi dual l i berty in modern
society:
I f by these words [ " i ndi vi dual l i berty"] one means the faculty of
vi ol ati ng the pri nci pl e of causal i ty, of wi thdrawing from al l soci al
mi l i eus i n order to posi t oneself as an absolute, there is no meri t
i n sacrif cing i t. I t i s a st eri l e i ndependence; i t i s t he plague of al l
moral i ty. The one thi ng whi ch must be uphel d i s the ri ght to choose
among al l functi ons the one whi ch we j udge t o be the most i n accord
wi th our nature. 86
In The Division of Labor, the i dea of equal i ty of opportuni ty as a func
ti onal prerequi si te of i ntegrati on in modern soci ety led Durkhei m to a very
radi cal conclusi on that he woul d later expand and modif.
If one class in society is obl i ged, in order to live, to have its services
accepted at any pri ce, while another class can do wi thout them, thanks
to the resources i t control s -not necessari ly because of some soci al
superi ori ty -the second unj ustl y i mposes its l aw upon the frst. In
other words, there cannot be rich and poor from bi rth wi thout there
bei ng unj ust contracts. 87
True equal i ty of opportuni ty, unj ustly i nhi bi ted by exi sti ng forms offami l i al
i nheri t ance of weal th, was for Durkhei m made al l t he more necessary by
the col l apse of rel i gi ous l egi t i mati on of t he soci al order. The humani sti c
concepti on of soci al structure as a purel y human creati on l ai d it open
to the cl ai ms of peopl e. As an enti rely human wor k, "i t coul d no l onger
oppose i tsel f t o human demands. " Thi s ci rcumstance made t he reconci l i
ati on of The Division of Labor wi th an " i deal of spontanei ty" al l the more
i mperati ve. 88 Equal i ty of opport uni ty was the frst functi onal prerequi si te
of j ust contract and sol i dari ty i n modern soci ety. But i t was al so necessary
"to rel ate functi ons to one another. "8 9 Thi s was possi bl e only i f f uncti onal
contri buti ons wer e f exi bl y l i mi t ed and adj usted t o one another by shared
norn1s.
Durkhei m's concept of achi evement cannot be i denti fed wi th a gener
al i zed performance pri nci pl e i n soci ety. Li mi tl ess competi ti ve achi evi ng
was for h i m a cons pi cuous case of ano mi e. Ach i eve me nt i n Durkhei m's
"normal " soci ety had the very classi cal meani ng of ful f l l i ng onesel f i n
ways compl ementary t o the sel f-fulf l l ment of others. Li mi tl ess stri vi ng
woul d be restri cted to a margi nal aspect of the average personal i ty and to
margi nal groups of excepti onal i ndi vi dual s. Thi s l i ne of argument agai n
brought Durkhei m face t o face wi th the need for a conscience colective i n
modern soci ety.
The l ast pathol ogi cal form of The Division of Labor was l eft unnamed
by Durkhei m. But the concept of al i enati on expresses hi s basi c i dea. Thi s
pathol ogical form was exempl i f ed i n the extreme di vi si on ofl abor i n whi ch
funct i ons "were di stri buted i n such a way that they di d not offer suff ci ent
matter for the acti vi t y of i ndi vi dual s. " Here Durkhei m t ook yet another
step away fro m t he economi sts and what has become known as Tayl ori sm
or Fordi sm. I n so doi ng, he di d not content hi msel f wi th the di scovery of
a " human factor" among the resou rces mobi l i zed by the process of pro
ducti on. Hi s concepti on of the normal state of the di vi si on of l abor was
directly ori ented t o the human worker rather than the economi c process.
The di vi si on of l abor i mposed duti es i f and onl y i f, i t provi ded the means
for an i n- dept h devel opment of t he self compat i bl e wi t h reci proci ty wi t h
others. " However one may represent the moral i deal , " Durkhei m remarks,
"one cannot remai n i ndi fferent to a degradati on of human nature. I f mo
ral i ty has as i ts goal the perfecti on of the i ndi vi dual , i t cannot permi t the
i ndi vi dual to be rui ned to such a degree; i f i t has soci ety as i ts end, i t can
not l et t he very source of moral lif e stagnate: for the evi l does not menace
economi c functi ons al one, but al l soci al funct i ons, however elevated they
may be . "90 Thus Durkheim's i ndi ctment of the di l ettanti sm of Renai s
sance man, whi ch he correlated wi th undemocrati c forms of el i ti sm, was
compl emented by an equal l y severe i ndi ct ment o f extreme speci al i zati on.
Moreover, he fully recogni zed that i mprovi ng l ei sure-ti me acti vi ti es and
the l evel of general cul ture di d not resol ve the probl em of maki ng j obs
meani ngful . "The di vi si on of l abor does not change i t s nat ure be cause i t
i s preceded by general cul ture. No doubt i t i s good for t he worker t o be
abl e t o i nterest hi ms el f i n art, l i terature, et c. But i t i s no l es s bad for hi m
t o be treated al l day l ong l i ke a machi ne . " 9 1
By t hi s poi nt , i t shoul d be obvi ous where the "mi ssi ng l i nk" bet ween
the di vi si on of l abor and sol i darity was to be found: i n the speci fcal l y
soci ol ogi cal i ssue of t he institutional organization of the di vi si on of l abor
wi th respect to l egi ti mate, l i mi ti ng norms and substanti ve val ues, as wel l
as the hi stori cal processes whi ch mi ght l ead to the genesi s of a desi rabl e
state of soci ety. It was not the di vi si on o f labor per s e whi ch created ei ther
sol i dari ty or di sorder, but the nature of the di vi si on of l abor and t he way
i n whi ch it was i nsti tuti onally organi zed.
Durkhei m's di d not i n h i s frst maj or work an al yze cl osel y exi st i ng
soci al real i ti es and t he ways i n whi ch they mi ght be transformed to make
soci ety more l i vabl e. He offered no systemati c i nvesti gati on of the state,
bureaucracy as an i nsti tuti onal form, the army, the economy, educati on,
the fami ly, gender, rel i gi on, exi st i ng occupat i ons, and thei r i nterrel ati ons
i n soci ety as a whol e. Hi s treatment of t he economy was confned to the
speci fc features that concerned hi m most from a moral poi nt of vi ew. He
di d not, for exampl e, treat capi tali sm as an i nsti tuti onal system and attempt
to trace i ts stages of devel opment or proj ect i ts probabl e course. Nor di d he
try to appl y hi s concepts of normal i ty and pathol ogy i n a consi stent appre
ci at i on and cri ti que of exi sti ng real i ti es. I t was, to some extent, annoyance
at Durkhei m's fai l ure to i nvesti gate more i nt ensi vel y exi sti ng soci al forces
and t hei r concrete effects on the lives of human bei ngs that prompted his
own di sci pl e Cel est i n Bougi e to observe i n a 1 90 1 arti cl e, " Theori es of
the Di vi s i on of Labor , " i n the Annee sociologque i tsel f:
One can i ndeed fear that the di vi si on of l abor, as i t becomes per
fect ed, tends i n certai n respects to i solate i ndi vi dual s and make i l
l usory t he i nterrel ati ons formerly bel i eved to be effecti ve i n creati ng
consensus among peopl e. When rel ati ons between producers and
consumers, or entrepreneurs and workers, remai n di rect and man
to-man, then one mi ght b el i eve t hat speci al i zat i on bri ngs wi th i t
certai n associ ati ons of i deas and s ent i ment s whi ch nat ur al l y i nc l i ne
those whom i t brings i n contact t o respect one another. But when
these rel ati ons become abstract, when some wor k for others wi t hout
bei ng i n cont act wi t h or seei ng one another, can the moral effect
be the same? Is not one of the consequences of the rol e of money
i n our soci eti es the repl acement al most everywhere of concrete,
l i vi ng, and human rel ati onshi ps by i mper sonal and abstract rel a
ti ons? . . . To the extent that the di vi si on of l abor i s responsi bl e for
the devel opment of o ur enti re commerci al system, one can say that
i t makes habi t ual the tendency no l onger t o see men above thi ngs,
[ but ] to treat men as thi ngs. 92
Durkhei m's own di scussi on of anomi e, forced, and al i enated forms of
the di vi si on of l abor - despi te i ts extreme general i ty and hypotheti cal
ai r -di d i mpl y the necessi ty of basi c structural reforms b efore sol i dari ty
coul d be created in modern soci ety. Li ke all of Dur khei m's maj or works,
The Di1ision of Labor ended wi t h a call to act i on:
We feel onl y t oo much how l abori ous a task i t i s t o bui l d t hi s so
ci ety where each i ndi vi dual wi l l have the pl ace he meri t s, wi l l be
rewarded as he deserves, and where everybody, consequently, wi l l
spontaneousl y work for the good of each and al l . . . . I t has been s ai d
wi t h j usti ce t hat moral i ty - and by t hi s mus t be understood not
onl y moral doctri nes b ut cust oms -i s goi ng through a real cri si s.
What precedes can he l p us to underst and t h e nature and causes o f
this si ck condi t i on. Profo u nd changes have been prod uced i n the
structure of our soci eti es i n a very short ti me . . . . The functi ons
whi ch have been di srupted i n the course of the upheaval have not
had ti me to adj ust themsel ves t o one another; t he new l i fe whi ch
has emerged so s uddenl y has not been abl e to be come completely
organi zed, and above a l l , i t has not been organi zed i n a way t h at
sati sfies the need for j usti ce whi ch has grown more ardent in our
hearts. I f thi s i s s o, t he remedy for t he evi l i s not t o seek t he revi val
of tradi ti ons and practi ces whi ch, no longer correspondi ng to pres
ent condi ti ons of soci ety, can l i ve only an art i fci al , false li fe. What
we must do i s br i ng t hi s anomi e t o an e nd and f n d the means for
Chapter 3 Te Division ofSocial labor I 3 I
maki ng the organs whi ch are sti l l wasti ng themsel ves in di scordant
movements concur harmoni ousl y . . . . In a word, our f rst duty i s to
create a moral i t y . . . . What ref ecti on can and mus t do is mark the
goal t hat must b e attai ned. That is what we h ave tri ed to do. 9 3
Hence, the requi rement for s ol i dari ty was t o create a moral i ty not i n
t he abstract or purel y di scursively but wi t h respect t o i nsti tuti onal practi ces
and forms of soci al rel ati on. What soci al and pol i ti cal agents mi ght respond
to t hi s cal l was a questi on not rai sed, much less answered, by Durkhei m.
But Durkhei m seemed to concl u de , however hal ti ngly, that communi ty
and di fferenti ated structure were compl ementary el ements of soci ety and
cul ture t hat al l normal types of soci ety woul d have t o i ntegrate i n thei r
own speci f c ways.
J 32 Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher
Notes
1 . Robert Ni sbet, ed. , Emile Durkheim (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice Hal l ,
1 965) , p. 30.
2 . The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory (frst pub. 1 937;
Glencoe, I l l . : Free Press, 1 949) , p. 308.
3. Pragmatisme et sociologie (Paris: Li brairie Phi losophi que J . Vri n), 1 955.
4. George Li chthei m, Origins of Socialism (New York: Praeger, 1 968) , p. 56.
5. Preface to 1 st ed. , De La Division du travail social (7th ed. ; Paris: Presses
U niversitaires de France, 1 960 ), p. xl i i i .
6. Raymond Lenoir, " LOeuvre sociologique d' Emi l e Durkheim, " Europe, XXI I
( 1 930) , 294.
7. Celestin Bougi e, ibid. , p. 28 1 .
8 . Bougie, ibid.
9. Marcel Mauss, I n trod. , 1 st ed. , Emi le Durkhei m, Le Socialisme; i n Socialism,
trans. Charlotte Sattler (New York: Collier Books, 1 9 58) , p. 34.
1 0. Division d u tavail social, p. 393.
1 1 . Division du tavail social, p. 393.
1 2 . Les Regles de l methode sociologique ( 1 5th ed. ; Paris: Presses U niversitaires de
France, 1 963 ) , p. 82.
1 3 . Ibid. , p. 83.
1 4. Stucture and Function i n Primitive Societies (London: Cohen & West, 1 961 ) ,
p . 1 29.
1 5 . Division du tavail social, p. 46.
1 6. Ibid. , p. xl i i .
1 7 . Ibid. , p. 29.
1 8 . Le Suicide ( frst pub. 1 897; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1 960) , p.
426.
1 9. Marcel Mauss, "I n Memoriam: COeuvre inedite de Durkheim et de ses col
laborateurs," Amu sociologique, n. s . , 1 ( 1 923) , 9.
20. LEducation morale (frst pub. 1 92 5 ; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1 963 ) , p. 1 3 9.
2 1 . Ibid. , p. 1 47.
22. Regles de fa methode sociologique, pp. 7 1 -72.
23. Ibid. , p. 70.
24. Ibid. , p. 68.
25. Leons de sociolgie (Paris: Presses Universitai res de France, 1 960) , p. 1 42.
26. Mauss, " I n Memori am, " p. 1 2 .
27. Edwin Hardin Sutherland, White Collr Crime (New York: Dryden Press, 1 949).
Chapter 3 T Division ofSocial rabor 133
28. The Human Sciences and Philosophy, trans. Hayden V Whi te and Robert
Anchor (f rst pub. 1 966; London: Cape Editions, 1 969) , p. 38.
29. Ibid. , pp. 38, 40.
30. "Cri me et sante soci al e, " Revue philosophique, XX ( 1 8 95) , 520-5 2 1 .
3 1 . Si gmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (Garden Ci ty, N.Y. : Double-
day Anchor Books, 1 958) , p. 90.
32. Amu!e sociologique, I V ( 1 899- 1 900) , 65- 95.
33. Ibid. , p. 70.
34. Education morale, p. 1 54.
3 5 . Marcel Mauss, review of\ H. Rivers, The Todas, i n Annee sociologique, X
( 1 906- 1 909) , 3 1 4.
36. Review of S. -R. Steinmetz, "Das Verhaeltniss zwischen Eltern and Kindem
bei den Naturvoelken, " in Annee sociologique, I I I ( 1 898- 1 899 ) , 446.
37. Education morale, pp. 1 64- 1 65 .
38. Ibid. , p. 1 6 1 .
39. Division du tavail social, pp. 1 49ff.
40. Ibid. , p. 1 50.
4 1 . Ibid.
42. "Soci ol ogi e et sciences sociales , " Revue philosophique, LV ( 1 903) , 477-478.
43. Pragmatisme et sociologic, pp. 1 9 1 - 1 92.
44. Marcel Mauss, The Gf, trans. Ian Cunni son ( frst pub. 1 925; New York:
Norton, 1 967) .
45. Ibid. , p. 71 .
46. Ibid. , p. 70.
47. Ibid. , p. 1 . Mauss related the study of total social phenomena to a "holi sti c"
methodology conceived i n terms remi ni scent ofHegel: "We are deali ng then
with somethi ng more than a set of themes, more than i nsti tuti onal elements,
more than i nsti tuti ons, more even than systems of institutions divisible into
legal, economi c, religious and other parts. We are concerned with ' wholes, '
wi th systems in their enti rety . . . . I t i s only by considering them as wholes
that we have been able to see their essence, thei r operation and thei r living
aspect, and to catch the feeting moment when the society and its members
take emoti onal stock of themselves and their si tuati on as regards others . . . .
Hi s torians bel i eve and j ustly resent the fact that soci ologi sts make too many
abstracti ons and separate unduly t he vari ous elements of society . . . . Whereas
formerly sociol ogi sts were obliged to analyse and abstract rather too much,
they shoul d now force themselves to reconsti tute the whole . . . . The study of
the concrete, whi ch is the study of the whole, i s made more readily, is more
i nteresting and furni shes more explanations in the sphere of sociology, than
the study of the abstract" ( pp. 77-78) . Mauss's di scussi on of the fit social
134 Ele Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher
total, however, often seemed to lead more in the direction of apprehendi ng the
complex, overdetermi ned, and hybri di zed -rather than total ized -nature
of certain "concrete" social and cultural phenomena or processes.
48. Ibid. , pp. 73-74.
49. Ibid. , p. 67.
50. La Pensre sauvage ( Pari s: Pl an, 1 962 ) , pp. 352- 353.
5 1 . Claude Levi-Strauss, "The Family, " i n H. Shapiro, ed. , Man, Culture, and So
ciety (frst pub. 1 956; New York: Oxford University Press, 1 960) , p. 277.
52. Le Totrmisme aujourd'ui (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1 962) , pp.
1 27- 1 28.
53. Cl aude Levi-Strauss, "Leron i naugurale, " Jan. 5, 1 960, College de France,
No. 3 1 , pp. 43-44.
54. Victor Turner, The Ritual Process (Chi cago: Aldi ne, 1 969) .
55. Ibid. , p. 1 27.
56. Ibid. , p. 1 28 .
5 7. Ibid. , p. 1 25 .
58. Herbert Spencer, First Principles (New York: Appl eton, 1 864) , p. 407.
59. Quoted i n Gi lbert Hi ghet, The Art ofleaching (New York: Knopf 1 954) , p.
207.
60. Division du tavail social, p. 226.
6 1 . Ibid. , p. 1 20.
62. Ferdinand Tinni es, Communit and Society, Charles Loomi s, trans. and ed.
(New York: Harper Torch books, 1 963) , p. 64.
63. Quoted i n Harry Alpert, Emile Durkheim and His Sociolog (f rst pub. 1 939;
New York: Russell & Russell, 1 9 6 1 ) , p. 1 8 5 .
64. Review ofTinnies, Gemeinschaf and Gesefchaf, Revue philosophique, X I I
( 1 889) , 42 1 .
65. Division du tavail social, p. 1 47.
66. See Durkheim' s review of Celestin Bougi e's Essais sur le regime des castes
(Paris: Alcan, 1 908) , i n Annee sociologique, X ( I 906- 1 909 ) , pp. 384-387.
One of Durkheim' s basic poi nts i n this review is that hierarchy i s not due to
the di vi si on of l abor itself but, i n castes, to a speci fc sort of ritual pri nci pl e.
Bougi e had analyzed castes in terms of a combi nati on of heredi tary di vi si on
of labor, hierarchical organi zati on, ri tual repul si on, and endogamy. For a more
extensi ve structural anal ysi s of hi erarchy, see Loui s Dumont, Homo hierar
chicus (Paris: Galli mard, 1 966) . See al so the course given by Roger Basti de,
"Formes elementaires de Ia stratifcation soci ale, " Centre de Documentati on
U ni versitaire, Pari s. Bas tide observes that even i n "pri mi tive" soci eti es where
there is no si gni fcant strati fcation among groups, there is always stratifca
ti on among individuals on the basis of performance. I nterestingly enough,
Chapter 3 The Division ofSocial rabor 135
Bastide retains the general neo-Kantian fame of reference of the Durkhei m
school, but he argues that "the fault of Kant was to base hi s thought upon
a particular culture, i . e. , that of bourgeois and puri tan German society, i n
order to disengage the a pri ori form of the moral law" ( p. 83) . Bastide, i n
my opi ni on, makes too much of i nti mati ons of stratifcation i n The Division
of Labor. True, Durkhei m spoke of the central state in organic sol i darity,
but he always conceived of it in a democratic form that involved a highly
specialized type of strati fcati on. And Durkheim had little to say about so
ci oprofessional hierarchy. Bastide, moreover, observes that Levi-Strauss "i s
i n the process of rewri ting the Critique of Pure Reason'' ( p. 82) , but he fails
to notice that Levi-Strauss is of ten much closer to the Critique of jugment
in his emphasis upon the centrality of aesthetics and percepti on. But Bast ide
is to the poi nt in calling for a continuation of Durkheim' s work of rewriting
the Critique of Practical Reason i n a way that would be less ethnocentric and
genuinely comparative, focus upon values and the process of evaluating, and
concentrate upon entire societies instead ofanalyti cally abstracted structures
detached from history.
67. Division du travail social, p. 1 80.
68. !bid. , p. 1 8 1 .
69. !bid. , p. 1 89.
70. Ibid. , pp. 1 90- 1 9 1 .
7 1 . Ibid. , pp. 1 9 1 , 1 93.
72. Ibid. , pp. 1 94- 1 95.
73. Revue philosophique, XI ( 1 886) , 73.
7 4. Division du travail social, p. 1 94.
75. Ibid. , p. 207.
76. !bid. , p. 8 .
77. Ibid. , pp. 344, 346.
78. !bid. , p. 345.
79. Ibid. , p. 3 61 n.
80. !bid. , p. 35 8.
8 1 . Ibid. , pp. 358- 359.
82. Ibid. , p. 347.
8 3 . Ibid. , p. 367.
84. Ibid. , pp. 368- 369.
8 5 . Ibid. , p. 376.
86. "Albert SchaefHe, " Revue philosophique, I ( 1 885) , 88.
87. Division du travail social, p. 378.
8 8 . !bid. , p. 347.
89. Ibid. , p. 374.
90. Ibid. , pp. 383, 363.
9 1 . Ibid. , p. 364.
92. I V ( 1 90 1 - 1 902) , 1 06- 1 07.
9 3 . Division du tavail social, p p . 404-406.
4
Suicide and Solidarit
There is on one truly serious philosophical problem: suicide. To judge that l
is or is not worth living is to answer the fmdamental question o [philosophy.
-Al bert Camus, L Mythe de Sisyphe
In a coherent and animated society there is from al to each and from each to
al a continual exchange of ideas and sentiments -something like a mutual
moral support -which makes the individual, imtead of being reduced to his
own frces alone, particiate in the colective energ and fnd in it sustenance
fr his own li when he is spiritual& exhausted.
-Suicide
The Object and Limitations ofSuicide
A obvi ous difference separated Suicide from The Division of Labor.
The Division of Labor began with concepts. Suicide began with a concrete
probl em that was conceived as an avenue of approach t o the understandi ng
of soci ety and cul ture as a whol e. Thi s s hi ft i n focus di d much to di ssi pate
the ai r of detached abstracti on that hung li ke a pal l over Durkhei m's frst
maj or work.
Another si gni fcant di fference was the di rect emphasi s on soci al pa
thol ogy i n modern soci ety and the clearer concepti on of the necessity and
di recti on of structural change to achi eve legi ti mate soci al order. Sui ci de was
of pri mary i nterest t o Durkhei m, not as an i sol ated tragedy in the l i ves of
di screte i ndi vi dual s, but as an i ndex of a more wi despread state of pathol
ogy i n soci ety as a whol e. Al ong wi th other symptoms of modern soci al
pathol ogy, sui ci de, when i nterpreted soci ol ogi cally, poi nted to basi c causes
of di sorder and di sori entati on whi ch revealed the rel ati on of personal crisis
to col l ective mal ai se.
And more clearly than i n The Division of Labor, Durkhei m showed
awareness of the value and l i mi tati ons of i ndi vi dual i sm i n soci ety. Excessive
i ndi vi dual i sm was sympt omat i c of soci al di si ntegrati on. But in the normal
state of modern soci ety, i ndi vi dual ri ghts woul d be protected i n a manner
that would not entai l self-defeati ng, atomi zi ng extremes.
Underlying the di fferences between the two works, however, were conti
nui ti es and i ndi cati ons ofl ess signi fcant developments i n Durkhei m's i deas.
The focus of Durkhei m's analysis remai ned the rel ati on of self and soci ety.
And the root pri nci pl e of organi zati on - methodol ogi cal and normati ve
at the same t i me -was t he di sti ncti on between normal i ty and pathology
i n soci ety. The attack upon uti l i tari ani sm conti nued. And it was more ob
vi ousl y conj oi ned wi t h the rej ecti on of vi olently apocalypti c soci al i sm. The
selecti on of t he problem of sui ci de i tsel f seems t o i ndi cate that for Durkhei m
the greatest i nternal threat to the stabi li ty of modern soci eti es was di si nte
grati on, not wi th a bang but a whi m per. The hi gher sui ci de rate among the
soci al l y pri vi l eged ( managers, members of the l i beral professi ons) i ndi cated
for hi m that al l segments of modern soci ety had a real exi stenti al i nterest i n
fundamental change. I ndeed, t he a nomi e absence of meani ng i n experi ence
had speci al relevance for privileged groups that were l i berated from economi c
need and from the i ncenti ve to carry on provi ded by the desi re for afuence.
Wi th the penchant for i ndi scri mi nate overstatement often characteri stic
of the Annie school, Gast on Ri chard parti al l y recogni zed thi s poi nt i n hi s
review of Suicide i n t he f rst vol ume of the Annie sociologique:
This book i s one of those works whi ch j usti f all the hopes whi ch
enl i ghtened ob servers of t he great modern cri si s pl ace i n soci al sci
ence. Parti es ( and at ti mes i ndi vi dual s as wel l ) use soci al sci ence,
but i t can be put to the uses of none of them. Durkhei m proves i t .
Soci al i sts a nd economi sts are di smi ssed back t o back wi th a proof of
thei r i ncompet ence. What can remai n of t he thesi s of class conf ict
consi dered as a fundamental l aw of social structure i f i t i s proved
that the regi me of unl i mi t ed compet i t i on des troys the happi ness
and the exi stence of the capi tal i st class even more than that of the
prol etari at ? Now, i s not t he t hesi s of cl ass conf i ct more t han ever
the foundati on of so-cal l ed sci enti f c soci al i sm? On the other hand ,
how can one cel ebrate wi th the old fai thfuls of the Manchester
school the emanci pati on of economi c forces i f one sees how these
Chapter 4 Sui ci de and Solidrit 139
unchai ned forces can b e homi ci dal - how the quest for weal th
engenders di sgust for exi stence? 1
The mai n l i nes of Durkheim' s argument were as cl ear-cut as they were
compel l i ng. After deal i ng wi th i ni t i al probl ems of def ni ti on, Durkhei m
began by di sti ngui shi ng between the sui ci de rate and the i ndi vi dual case
of sui ci de. The rate, which di spl ayed a constancy o r tendenti al regular
ity over ti me, was the specif cally soci ol ogi cal phenomenon. It could not
be expl ai ned by a random di stri buti on of purel y i di osyncrati c motives
or i n ter - i ndi vi dual i mi tati on. When t h e s ui ci de rate rose above or fell
bel ow a certai n threshold, i t be came an i ndex of soci al pathology. Whi l e
Durkhei m left thi s threshol d undef ned, hi s analysis i mpl i ed that i ts de
termi nati on bore upon the rel ati on of the sui ci de rate to the di si ntegrati on
of substanti vely rati onal structures and soci al l y germane affective bonds
i n soci ety. The expl anati on of the rate depended i ni ti al l y upon i ts corre
l at i on wi th soci al con di t i ons , i ns t i t ut i onal structures, cul tural val ues, and
symb ol i c systems. The meani ngfulness of this correl ati on depended upon
i ts i nterpretati on wi t h reference to t he i nterveni ng vari abl e of sol i dari ty
or i ntegrati on in soci ety.
Thus, the subj ect o f soci al sol i dari ty and i ts rel ati on to substanti ve ra
ti onal i ty retai ned i n Suicide the central i mportance it had ass umed i n The
Division of Labor. The hi gher-order typology i n terms of whi ch Durkhei m
cl assi fed vari ous soci al and cul tural phenomena i n Suicide had as i ts focal
poi nt the nature and degree of sol i dari ty i n s oci ety: the polar opposi tes
of egoi sm and al trui sm, anomi e and fatal i sm, were relevant to the sui ci de
rate through the functi onal rel ati onshi p between soci al sol i dari ty and the
phenomena whi ch they characteri zed.
On the basi s of these consi derati ons, Durkhei m arri ved at hi s famous
sui ci de " l aw. " Thi s i s perhaps the onl y si gni fcant l aw-l i ke statement i n
soci ol ogy, but i n the works o f soci ol ogi sts i t has received di vergent formu
l ati ons. Al though Durkhei m hi mself never provi ded a proposi ti on whi ch
formul ated hi s "l aw, " i t may be stated thus: the sui ci de rate vari es i nversel y
wi th the i ncreasi ng degree of sol i dari ty i n soci ety, unt i l the degree of sol i
dari ty reaches a certai n threshol d, at whi ch poi nt t he covari ati on becomes
di rect. But thi s " l aw" i s much l ess si gni fcant than the i n ter pretati ve effort
Durkhei m made t o make sense of i t .
The el ementary ambi gui ti es apparent i n The Division of Labor none
theless conti nued t o pl ague Suicide. I ndeed, Durkhei m's soci al metaphysi c
became i ncreasi ngly mani fest. The metaphysi cal component of hi s thought
was never concerned wi t h t he subst ant i al exi stence of some sort o f "group
mi nd" detached from i ndi vi dual members of soci ety. Rather i t deal t wi th
the more subtl e probl em of the concept i on of soci ety and soci al sol i dari ty
as provi di ng the essenti al meani ng and ul ti mate real i ty b ehi nd al l forms of
cul tural symbol i s m. Durkhei m never fully s aw how soci al sol i dari ty i tsel f
mi ght be enri ched when i t became one aspect of a more comprehensi ve
uni verse of meani ng. Hi s ul t i mat e expl anat ory gesture was i nvari abl y
reducti oni sti c. In t he terms of hi s soci al metaphysi c, al l cul t ural phenom
e n a be came ext ernal si gns of soci al real i ty - i ci ng on t he cake of soci al
cust om or soci al act i on.
If, as i t i s of t en sai d, man has a dual nat ure, i t i s becaus e there i s
s uper i mp os ed upo n physi cal man a soci al man. Now the l atter
pr es uppos es ne cessari l y a s oci ety whi ch he expresses and serves.
When s oci e ty di s i ntegrates, when we no l onger feel i t acti ng
and l i vi ng aro und and about us , al l t hat t here i s of the s oci al
i n u s fi nds i t s el f devoi d of obj ecti ve fou ndat i o n. Ther e i s onl y
an arti fci al combi nat i on of i l l us or y i mages, a phant asmagori a
whi ch a l i t t l e ref l ect i on s ufi ces t o whi s k away. Cons e que ntly,
there is not hi ng to serve as an end for o ur act i ons. Yet t hi s s oci al
man i s t he whol e of ci vi l i zed man; i t i s he w ho represents t he
val ue of exi s t ence. 2
I n hi s me taphys i cal moment s, Dur khe i m was a l mos t l ed to l os e a good
cause through bad arguments by concei vi ng a necessary condi t i on and
a vi t al necessi ty as exclusi ve, sel f- cont ai ned real i ti es. The soci al matri x
of cul tural and symbol i c experi ence became mater et magistra. I n fact,
Suicide already contai ned the i nterpretati on of rel i gi on whi ch woul d be
more fully devel oped i n The Elementary Forms: "The power whi ch has
i mpos ed i tsel f upon man's respect and whi ch has become t he obj ect of
hi s ador at i on is soci ety, of whi ch the gods were o nl y the hypostati zed
form. Rel i gi on i s i n a word the system of symbol s through whi ch soci ety
becomes consci ous of i tself; i t is the manner of t hi nki ng appropri ate to
the col l ecti ve b ei ng. "
Chapter 4 Suicide and Solidarit !41
I n cert ai n ways Suicide was a n advance over The Division of Labor
because i n t he for mer t he ambi gui t i es of a soci al i zed and Cart esi ani zed
neo- Kant i ani s m became so t ransparent t hat t hey were al most i nconse
quent i al . Durkhei m' s confusi on was especi al ly apparent i n hi s i dea of t he
rel at i on of psychol ogy t o s oci ol ogy. By "psychol ogy", Dur khei m meant
a number of t hings whi ch were not al t oget her i dent i cal . He meant t he
st udy of (1) t he psychophysi cal sel f anal yt i cal l y consi dered i n i sol at i on
fr om soci et y and capabl e onl y of sensat i on; (2) the mos t general , i l l - de
fned psychi c t rai t s of t he human b ei ng, e. g. , sexual desi re or p at ernal
affect i on; (3) t he i nner, pri vat e, and unobservabl e aspect s of t he sel f; ( 4)
t he i n di vi dual i zed aspect s of t he sel f; and (5) the si ngul ar i ndi vi dual i n
hi s or her con crete par t i cul ari ty. Soci o l ogy was di rectl y co n ce r ne d wi t h
none of t hes e meani ngs of t he psychol ogy of the i ndi vi dual . I n cont rast ,
soci ol ogy was di rect l y concerned wi t h soci al psychol ogy and t he way i n
whi ch col l ective feat ures were i nt ernal i zed by t he pe rs on. The confusi on
i n Durkhei m' s thought appeared i n two ways. Fi rst , the l anguage he
used i n maki ng t he above poi nt s was at t i mes amb i guous . Se cond, he a t
t i mes s eemed t o c oncei ve of t he per s on as a mere compos i t e of t h e s oci al
sel f and t he psychophysi cal sel f It was t hi s second sour ce of confusi on
that stemme d fro m hi s Cart esi ani zed neo- Kant i an refor mul at i on of t he
dual i sm bet ween mi nd and b ody. Thus, Du rkhei m at ti mes seemed t o
argue i n Suicide t ha t t he i ndi vi dual had no rol e i n t aki ng hi s or her own
l i fe. One's psychophysi cal cons t i t ut i on predi sposed one to a great er o r
l esser degree t o t he causal act i on of speci fcal l y soci al forces. Indi vi dual s
were fel l ed by "sui ci dogenet i c" soci al forces act i ng l i ke some fant ast i c
deat h ray.
One i nst ance o f Durkhei m's confusi on was i n t he di chot omy he
see me d t o p ose b etween cogni t i on and i nt ent i on i n acts of s ui ci de . He
began b y def ni ng s ui ci de as "every case of deat h whi c h resul t s di rect l y
or i ndi rectl y from a pos i ti ve or negati ve act of the vi ct i m hi msel f whi ch
he k n ows wi l l produce t hi s resul t "4 Unl ess i nvest i ga t i on ( e. g. , t hr ough
t he us e of dept h psychol ogy) reveals ot herwi se, an act whi ch i s per
for med by a per s on who knows t he cons equence of hi s a ct i s pr i ma facie
consi dered i nt ent i onal . Yet - b ecause of hi s s us pi ci on of psychol ogy
- Durkhei m, i mmedi at el y b efore offer i ng hi s def ni t i on, i mp ugned
an i nt erest i n i nt enti ons wi t h an argument whose gener al i ty s eemed t o
14 2 Emile Durkheir: Sociologist and Philosopher
excl ude even t he cogni t i ve el ement i n hi s own def ni t i on. "I nt ent i on i s
t oo i nt i mat e a t hi ng t o be s t udi ed fro m t he out si de by mor e t han gross
approxi mat i ons. It even escapes sel f- observati on. " 5
Durkheim has a t times been mistakenly criticized for i ncl udi ng a cognitive
el ement in his defni ti on of sui ci de. But the value of his defni ti on i n thi s
respect is i n its recogni ti on that sui cide i s a relatively complex act that requires
i ni ti ative and the coordi nati on of thought and activi ty. A more relevant obj ec
ti on i s that Durkhei m was not clear about the relati on of hi s concepti on of
t he role of cogni ti on to h i s cri ti ci sm of the focus on mani fest i ntenti ons and
to the probl em of a more general theory of motivation. Yet a crucial chapter
of Suicide itself ( Book II, chapter vi) attempted to relate sociological catego
ri es to psychol ogical expressions and personality types. Thus, any i dea that
Durkhei m simply ignored psychological factors obvously misses the mark.
The b asi c poi nt i s t hat he was often confused or ambi guous, i n part because
of the Cartesianized, neo-Kanti an strand of hi s thought, whi ch l ed hi m at
times to postulate a duali sti c division between the "outer" and the "inner"
. .
m expenence.
At t i mes the main target o f Durkhei m's attack was t he use of nai ve i nt ro
spection and the psychological categories of offcial gatherers of statistic to pro
vi de adequate accounts of moti vati on. But Jack C. Douglas has observed:
Unfortunately for Durkhei m's own arguments, the offcial categor
izations of a death as caused by "suicide" were generally most dependent
on t hei r i mputati ons of an intention to die by one's own action: si nce
one of the cri ti cal di mensi ons of meani ngs involved i n the statutory
defni ti ons of "suicide" as a cause of death and i n the general com
monsense meani ng of "sui ci de" i n the Western worl d i s preci sely that
of "i ntenti on to di e, " the offcial categorization of "sui ci de" can i n
general be only as valid as offcial categorizations of"i ntenti on. " Si nce
Durkhei m thought offcial categories of i ntenti ons or motives t o be
completely invalid and unrel i abl e, h e s hould have concl uded the same
thi ng about off cial statistics on sui ci de. 6
Dougl as' concl usi on becomes more forceful when i t i s real i zed that shared
atti tudes toward sui ci de i nfuence t he reporti ng of sui ci des, so that the more
sol i dary groups al so tend to be more rel uctant about reveal i ng sui ci des to
t he outsi de worl d. Furthermore, the i mportance of conceal ment assumes
Chapter 4 Suicide and Solidarit 143
maj or proporti ons given the smal l fracti on of the popul at i on commi t t i ng
sui ci de ( between one hundred and t hree hundred per mi l l i on) . Indeed, some
stati sti ci ans have argued that, even asi de from probl ems of conceal ment, the
numbers involved are too smal l for stati sti cally si gni fcant variations and, i n
any event, for i nferring far-reachi ng soci al and cul tural proposi t i ons about
mi l i eus or contexts. 7
Ambi gui ty i n the concepti on of the rel ati on of psychology to soci ology
also appeared in Durkhei m's di scussi on of psychopathology and sui ci de.
Al though he recognized a "soci al fact or" i n psychopathology, he restri cted
hi s di scussi on t o maki ng inverse or i nconclusive correlations b etween rates of
sui ci de and rates of" i nsani ty" i n terms of age, sex, rel i gi on, and nati onali ty.
He di d not address h i msel f t o t he probl ems of t he funct i onal a nd cul t ural
defni ti on of psychopathol ogy and the rel ati on of rates of psychopat hology
to cul tural vari abl es. But onl y by consi deri ng these probl ems coul d he have
arrived at a more perti nent concepti on of psychopathol ogy, its si gni fcance
i n different types of ci vi l i zati on, and i t s possi bl e rel ati on to sui ci de and
soci opathi c states. Curi ously, however, hi s own di scussi on of personal i ty
types stressed the speci al i mpor t ance i n modern sui ci des of what woul d
today be cal l ed mani c-depressive syndromes (whi ch he correl ated wi t h
anomi e-egoi sti c sui ci de) . 8
Ambi gui ty arose as well in Durkhei m's concept i on of case hi stori es. I n
general, he recogni zed t he ful l y compl ementary rel ati onshi p of t he us e of
case hi stori es and an analyti c approach centeri ng on i nst i t ut i onal and cul
tural condi t i ons. At ti mes he accuratel y saw the speci fci ty of case hi story
i n i ts focus on t he concrete i ndi vi dual in whom general factors assumed a
parti cul ar confgurati on: "We cannot d educe all the parti cul ari ti es whi ch an
i ndi vi dual case may present, because there are some whi ch depend upon the
speci fc nature of the subj ect . Each sui ci de gives t o hi s act a personal mark
whi ch expresses hi s temperament [ and] the speci al condi t i ons i n whi ch he
i s placed, and whi ch consequentl y cannot be expl ai ned by t he soci al and
general causes of t he ph enomenon. " 9 At ot her ti mes , however, t he soci ol o
gi sti c reformul at i on of t he mi nd-body dual i sm l ed Durkhei m to conceive
the i ndi vi dual personal i ty as a mechani cal combi nat i on of psychophysi cal
and soci al factors: "Everythi ng depends upon the i ntensi ty wi th whi ch the
sui ci dogeneti c causes have acted upon the i ndi vi dual . "10 Whether because
of met hodologi cal and metaphysical i nhi bi t i ons or because of the unavail-
abi l i ty of useful documents, the fact remai ns t hat Durkhei m did not use
case hi st ori es and ot her empi ri cal evi dence t o i l l ust rat e hi s argument. Here
agai n there was a conti nuati on of the i nsti tuti onal and l egal formal i sm of
The Division of Labor i n the fai l ure to substanti ate an analysi s wi th concrete
evi dence and to consi der the way i n whi ch soci al factors are experi enced
by peopl e. And l i ke the earl i er work, Suicide often rested on a (much more
successful ) coordi nati on of the models of earl i er theori sts. Hi st ori ans l i ke
Roger Lacombe and Al bert Bayet were especi al l y sensi ti ve t o t he absence
of documentati on whi ch mi ght reveal whether and how the i nst i tut i onal
contexts and analyti c vari abl es di scussed by Durkhei m mani fest themselves
operatively in actual events and experi ence. As Bayet puts i t i n hi s Le Suicide
et Ia morale:
What is really a grave di ffculty is t hat one must take the aut hor's
word for thi ngs. Where are the usages whi ch prove that Protestants
"puni sh s ui ci de"? How i s t he "drawi ng away" from those who touch
t he sui ci de expressed? What facts per mi t one to say that common
moral i ty bl ames sui ci de? Du rkhei m does not t el l us . No doubt he
bel i eves t ha t t he moral i ty of hi s t i me i s hi s own and he knows i t . . . .
But t he testi mony o f the greatest phi l osopher cannot, from the sci
enti fc poi nt of view, repl ace observations s ubj ect ed t o control and
cri ti ci sm. 11
On a conceptual level, certai n ambi gui ti es evi dent in the typol ogy of The
Division of Labor also persi sted i n Suicide. In keepi ng wi th the emphasi s on
modern soci al pat hol ogy, t he category of egoi sm repl aced t hat of organi c
sol i dari ty, and anomi e became a central probl em. But the anal yti cal di s
soci ati on of reali ty was at ti mes carri ed over from Durkhei m's frst major
work. Thus Durkhei m seems at poi nt s to have be l i eved that a concept l i ke
egoi sm appl i ed to a di screte set of hi stori cal phenomena ( e. g. , Protestant
i sm) and that the concept of anomi e appli ed to other phenomena ( e. g. ,
capi tal i sm) . Durkhei m di d not ask whether hi s analytic vari ables appl i ed
si mul taneousl y t o a number of i nst i t ut i onal contexts ( e. g. , whether Protes
tanti sm or capi tal i sm, to a greater or l esser extent, was characteri zed by bot h
egoi sm and anomi e) or whether i nst i t ut i onal contexts or symbol i c systems
were hi st ori cally related to one another i n ways which could be i l l umi nated
by t he appl i cati on of model s (vi de Weber i n The Protestant Ethic).
But j ust as t he t ypol ogy i n The Division of Labor was bas ed i mpl i ci tl y
upon a not i on of the t ranshi st ori cal condi t i ons of soci al nor mal i ty, t he
Suicide t ypol ogy was based i mpl i ci tl y upon a not i on of t he t ranshi st ori cal
causes of soci al pat hol ogy. I n fact , the i de a of a coincidentia oppositorum
seems t o surface i n the not i on t hat any extremely pat hol ogi cal soci al st at e
woul d i n s ome way di spl ay a part i cul ar combi nat i on of t he general causes
of soci al pat hol ogy. One vi rt ue of t he concept of anomi e was i t s abi l i t y
to medi at e t he mi nd- body dual i s m; i t s howed how organi cal l y r oot ed
desi re and aggressi veness exi st ed i n di al ect i cal r el at i on t o bi ndi ng nor ms
and symbol s , er upt i ng chaot i cal l y i n cas es of normati ve and symbol i c
breakdown or e mergi ng predi ct abl y when cert ai n nor ms and s ymbol i c
systems t hems el ves p res cr i bed or cel eb rat ed excess and u n l i mi t ed asser
ti on. And Dur khei m concl uded that anomi e and egoi sm were "general l y
onl y two di ffer ent aspects of t he same state of soci et y. " 12 Th us, i n Suicide
t he s econd and mor e Hegel i an st r and of Durkheim' s t hought s t r ongl y
assert ed i ts el f and t ended t o overl ay hi s Cart esi ani zed neo- Kant i ani s m
wi t h a more di al ect i cal not i on of experi ence and anal ysi s.
I n o n e c r uc i a l r es pect , however, thi s was n o t t h e case. Al t h ough
Dur khei m i nt ended hi s s t udy of s ui ci de to ser ve as a means of approach
to t he anal ysi s of soci et y as a whol e, he di d not adequat el y i nvesti gate
t he rel ati on of hi s vari abl es to soci al phenomena i n the gl obal soci al
cont ext . The o nl y ar ea in whi ch he ext ended hi s anal ysi s was in a di scus
si on of h omi ci de. Durkhei m fai l ed i n Suicide to rel at e hi s s oci ol ogi cal
and cul t ural vari abl es not onl y t o t hei r i ndi vi dual and i nt er-i ndi vi dual
mani fest at i ons ( sui ci de and homi ci de) , but t o more s peci fcally soci al
forms of act i on and react i on. Yet , one t ypi cal response t o anomi e and t he
anxi et y i t provoked was t he at t empt t o "rei ntegrate" exper i ence t hr ough
col l ect i ve act i on and group mob i l i zat i on. I ndeed, i t woul d s eem t hat
anomi e l ed t o s ui ci de onl y i n associ at i on wi t h egoi s m. I n cases where
at omi s t i c i ndi vi dual i sm was not present or coul d b e over come, anomi e
mi ght gi ve way t o t he format i o n of gr oups wh i ch r es ponded t o severe
di si ntegrati on by seeki ng new and perhaps more demandi ng, even au
t hori t ari an or fanat i cal , for ms of sol i dari t y and at t i mes engagi ng i n
col l ect i ve vi ol ence. The p reci se manner i n whi ch t hi s c oul d take pl ace
depended, of cour s e, upon s pe cif c hi st ori cal ci rcumst ances and modes
of group mobi l i zat i on.
Here there was a basi s for convergence with the i deas of Marx - a basi s
upon which Durkhei mhi msel f fai l ed to bui l d. Durkhei m was to make at least
an obli que reference t o capi tali sm i n hi s di scussion of anomi e. But he di d not
provide an i ntensive and di rect investigation of the structural contradictions i n
a capi tali st economy. Nor di d he see class-consciousness as an in regrating force
that counteracted the effects of anomi e in the "internal mi l i eu" of a group.
The very focus upon sui ci de as the key problem for an analysis of modern
society may be seen as diverting attenti on from t hi s possi bi l i ty and from the
revolutionary potenti al Marx bel i eved i t hel d.
At the other end of the i deological spectrum, the relation of anomi e to t he
ri se of extreme authoritarianism was another possi bi l i ty Durkhei m ignored.
Thi s matter has received extensive coverage i n subsequent li terature. Karl
Mannheim, for example, observed:
The secret of taboo and the col l ective formation of symbols in pri m
i ti ve soci eti es is mai nl y that t he free expression of i mpulses i s hel d i n
check by the various mechanisms of social control and directed towards
certain obj ects and actions which beneft the group. Only the i mpul
sive energies whi ch have been set free by the disintegration of soci ety
and are seeki ng i nt egration about a new obj ect have those eruptive
destructive qual i ties whi ch are customarily and vaguely regarded as
characteristic of every type of mass behavior. What the dictatorships in
certain contemporary mass-soci eti es are striving to do is to coordi nate
through organizations the i mpulses whi ch the revolutionary period un
chained and to di rect them towards prescri bed obj ects. The consciously
gui ded fxation of mass i mpulses upon new obj ectives takes the place
of earli er forms of wish fxation whi ch found their obj ectives organi
cal ly, that i s to say, through a slow selective process. So, for instance,
the attempt is made to create a new reli gion, the function of whi ch
i s frst to d estroy the old emotional setting, and then to make these
di si ntegrated i mpulses more subservi ent t o one' s own ai m through the
use of new symbol s. 1 3
I n a certain context or group, anomi e mi ght foster sui ci de. In a comple
mentary aspect of the group's life, i n another context, or i n the same context
over ti me, anomie mi ght lead to vari ous types of group mobi li zati on and
i deol ogical assert i on. Problems of thi s sort, however, could be investigated
only by hi stori cal analysis wi thi n the context of soci ety as a whole over ti me
Ch 4
Sucde ad Sldat 147
in a manner that went beyond one-dimensional correlations ofvariables such
as anomie with phenomena such as suicide rates.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, one might conclude that
Durkheim's Suicide has limited value as an attempt to use a particular
problem as a means of approach to an analysis of society as a whole. It
may be argued that Durkheim was basing highly signifcant interpreta
tions and practical conclusions upon statistically insignifcant information.
In this respect, two things may be said in defense of Durkheim. A crucial
aspect of his argument was that social and cultural forces that account f or
suicide rates are operative, consciously or unconsciously, in people wh are
not moved to take their own lives. To put it crudely, the few people who
commit suicide i modern society are indices of a much larger number of
distraught or disoriented people who are handling their malaise in more
or less constructive ways. One of the apparent implications of Durkheim's
discussion is that, as a rule, people in primitive societies, when left to their
traditional forms of existence, tended to sacrifce theirlives in defense of thir
values, while people i n moder societie were driven to the extreme act as
a sig of personal negation and a vote of no confdence in society, either in
spite of shared values or because of an absence of values. Durkheim clearly
perceived the crisis of meaning and legitimacy in moder n societies. The
second defens is that, from a normative perspective, even a small number
of suicides represent a morally and spiritually scandalous sacrifce of life,
epecially when the "sacrifce" is meaningless.
Aie and Eois
Durkheim's typolog in Suicide attempted to provide a conceptual
framework for the systematic classifcation of social and cultural causes of
extreme! y high or extremely low suicide rates, which served as one objective
index (among others} of states of social pathology. The typology may be
represented diagrammatically thus:
anomie
egtsm

altruism
fatalism
148 Emile Durkheir: Sociologist and Philosopher
Anomi e and fatal i sm were conceptual l y pol ar opposi t es, as were egoism
and al trui sm. Anomi e si gni fed the absence of an i nst i t ut i onally grounded
and i deologi cally l egi ti mated sense of subst antive l i mi ts i n soci ety and the
personal i ty. The absence of an i ngrai ned sense of l i mi t s was for Durkhei m
the soci ocul tural cause of di sori entati on and aggression i n soci ety. In the
normal soci ety, a normative sense of l i mi ts became i n t i me a person's second
nature, i ndeed hi s or her mode of bei ng; i t was, moreover, the onl y possi bl e
basis of sol i dari ty i n soci ety. Fat al i sm, in contrast, was caused by t he setti ng
of l i mi ts that were excessively authori tari an i n repressive or oppressive ways
and whi ch, by t hat token, resul ted in rules whi ch were themselves obstacl es
t o sol i dari ty. "Egoi sm" referred, i n i t s most general sense, to a state i n whi ch
t he pri nci pl e of i ndi vi duati on was carried to t he extreme of parti cul ari sti c
and self-centered atomi sti c i ndi vi dual i sm. Conversely, "altrui sm" denoted a
state of excessive communi ty, whi ch in i ts fguratively i ncestuous i nt i macy
submerged the i ndi vi dual i n the group and i nhi bi t ed sol i dari ty in soci ety
as a whol e.
The Suicide typology had the meri t of transcendi ng certai n l i mi tati ons
of t he "organi c" and "mechani cal " schema of The Division of Labor. I t al so
clarifed Durkhei m's i dea of t he relation of soci ol ogy to moral i ty. On the
level of soci ety as a whol e, the argument i n Suicide i mpl i es that any normal
or heal thy soci al system would be based upon some opt i mal combi nat i on
of communi ty, a reci procal rel ati onshi p among di fferent part s ( i ndi vi dual s,
rol es, groups) , and an aut onomously accepted, di sci pl i ned sense of substan
ti ve l i mi ts to personal or col l ective assert i on. In thi s l i ght, t he fundamental
moral functi on of i nsti tuti ons and val ues i n soci ety was seen as the provision
of the obj ectively given and subj ectively i nternal i zed foundati on for these
qual i ti es in a conscience colective that furthered vi able soli dari ty i n soci ety
as a whol e. Integrati on i n the normal or good ( but not perfect) soci ety thus
involved si mul taneously the rel atively ( but not total l y) coherent nature of
i nsti tuti onal norms and symbol i c systems, t he aut onomous and spontane
ous acceptance of norms and symbol s by the i ndi vi dual , and the creati on
of meani ngful moral sol i dari ty i n soci ety as a whol e.
In Suicide i t al so becomes clear that Durkhei m di d not conceive of the
normal or healthy society a a crystal pal ace. Even the normal soci ety woul d
contain a marginal leaven of anomie, egoism, and extreme altruism. Some types
of soci ety woul d normally develop certain of these characteristics more than
other types. Communi ty was developed i n "pri mi tive" soci eti es to an extent
i mpossi bl e and undesirable in large and functi onally differentiated modern
soci eti es, whi l e egoism i n modern soci eti es was an excessive development of the
cardinal emphasi s on i ndi vi dual rights and personal responsi bi l ity. Moreover,
certai n mi l i eus wi thi n a soci ety woul d normally have certain extreme tenden
cies that, wi thi n li mi ts, were necessary and posi ti ve forces in the development
of soci ety as a whol e. A measure of anomi e corresponded to an element of
"free play" i n society and the personal i ty: anomie i ndetermi nacy and dari ng
risk were condi ti ons of progress and prerequi si tes of an abi l i ty to respond
creatively to changes i n relevant conditions of existence. And anomie would
be especi al l y typi cal of arti sti c and innovative mi l i eus. Egoi sm was to some
ext ent a concomi t ant of i nt el l ectual ori gi nal i ty. To thi s ext ent , Durkhei m
recognized the i mportance of t he consi derati ons that preoccupi ed a theori st
like Gabri el Tarde or were i ncluded i n Weber's noti on of personal electi on as
an element of chari sma.
But Durkhei m consi dered pathologi cal the di storted, unbalanced, or
runaway devel opment and general i zati on of these qual i ti es i n soci ety. The
soci opat hi c began at the poi nt at whi ch the concei vably val uabl e except i on i n
society tended to become a h armful rul e. Thus, for Durkhei m as for Aristotle,
a vice was i n the last analysis an excessive devel opment of a virtue. In fact,
the concept of anomi e i n its pri mary meani ng of an absence of a sense of
legi ti mate l i mi ts recalls the noti on of hybris. And i mpl i ci t i n sui ci de and i ts
typology was an opti mal poi nt ofintersecti on ofDurkheim's variables that cor
responded to the Greek i dea of a golden mean. Nowhere else was Durkhei m's
i ndebtedness t o the classical tradi ti on of Western phi l osophy more telling.
And nowhere else was the vision of his own France -wi th i ts i nsi stence on
mesure -as the guardian of what was valid i n thi s tradition more apposi te.
In the normal soci ety, the gol den mean - normatively i ncarnated i n the
conscience colective -woul d restri ct hybris to the excepti onal i ndi vi dual or
the extraordinary feat whose shocking si ngulari ty ambivalently fascinated and
repel l ed society as a whol e.
Durkheim's concept of anomi e as t he absence of a normative sense of l e
gitimate l i mi ts at t i mes covered a great deal of territory rather i ndi scri mi nately.
The meani ng of anomi e as an operati onal concept, its relati on to egoism, and
its connecti on with such "structural" probl ems as strati fcati on, expl oi tati on,
scarci ty, and group confi ct have been sources of confusi on.
150 Jnile Durkheir: Sociologist and Philosopher
The b as i c cause o f general i zed anomi e was r api d and uncont rol l ed
change i n t he condi t i ons, i nst i t ut i ons, or val ues const i t ut i ve of the soci al
system i n t he l argest s ens e. The relevant effect of runaway change was t he
uns et t l i ng di s pl acement , uproot i ng, and di s ori ent at i on of t he gr oups or
categori es affect ed by hi st ori cal change. Rapi d transformat i on mi ght have
posi t i ve value fo r soci al devel opment onl y at cert ai n e uphor i c phases of
t ransi t i on ( e . g. , a cl assi cal revol ut i on) . An after-bi rt h of b anal i zed and
mi sdi rect ed hybris pl agued modern s oci ety. Pr omet heus had b een taken
down fro m hi s predest i ned rock and made over i nto a face i n t he crowd.
And tragedy had be come t ri vi al i zed. Modern soci ety needed s t r uct ural
reform that woul d bri ng l egi t i mat e s t abi l i zat i on and p u t a st op to ir
r at i onal , r unaway c h ange i mpos ed by the st at us quo and i ts hi s t or i cal
t endenci es . For i n moder n s oci et y t he pat hologi cal funct i oni ng of t he
s t at us quo frequent ly exacerbated anomi e and hel ped det er mi ne t he i r
rat i onal component s of s oci ol ogi cal l y and phi l os ophi cal l y uni nfor med,
merel y sel f- i ndul gent pr otests agai nst i t . I n a pat hol ogi cal st at us quo,
one of t he l egi t i mat e funct i ons of s oci ol ogy ( i n Durkhei m's s ens e) was
t h e di ffus i o n of a cons ci ousness of pr obl ems wi t hi n t h e soci et y and of
t he ways i n whi ch t hey coul d b e over come i n an at t empt t o achi eve
s ubs t anti ve rat i onal i t y and soci al j us t i ce. Hi gh s ui ci de rates cons t i t ut ed
a pr obl em of t hi s s or t . And Durkhei m's cl assi cal s t udy of t hei r causes and
concomi tants concl uded wi t h a recommendat i on of st ruct ur al reform
and a cal l t o act i on.
A l i mi t ed meani ng of "anomi e , " as i t s et ymol ogy suggest ed, was "a
s t at e of compl et e nor ml essness and meani ngl essness of exper i ence at
t endant upon i ns t i t ut i onal and mor al breakdown . " The psychol ogi cal
expressi on of anomi e i n the i ndi vi dual pers onal i ty was t he feel i ng of
anxi et y and fr ust rat i on. I n t he abs ence of meani ngful s ymbol i c systems
and norms that cont r ol l ed anxi ety and provi ded a connective ti ssue i n
s oci ety, t he i ndi vi dual be came prey t o l i mi t l ess desi res and mor bi d fears.
In one i mport ant sense, Dur kh ei m' s concept of anomi e s i t uat ed Hobbes' s
defantly defensi ve and power-hungry ma n as a personal i t y type wi t hi n a
speci f c, pat hol ogi cal st at e of s oci ety. Hobbes i an man di d not represent
"human nat ur e" but onl y one p at hol ogi cal possi bi l i t y of human nat ure
that emerged and was pronounced i n an anomi e st at e of s oci ety. Di s t rus t
and an obs essi ve fear of ot hers b ecame a preval ent mo de of s oci al i nter-
Chapter 4 Suicide and Solidrit 151
act i on o nl y when nor mative st ruct ures fai l ed t o create an i ns t i t ut i onal
foundat i on fo r s ol i dari ty.
The term "anomie" also referred to the presence of extreme di storti ons and
i mbalances in the social system, which might lead to the nightmarish state
of normlessness. In this sense, "anomie" recalls Marx's notion of structural
contradictions. Durkheim formul ated thi s notion i n terms of a contradiction
between fel t needs and expectations on the one hand, and values and i nsti
tuti onali zed means of satisfaction on the other. Structural contradi cti ons
were a basi c cause of passi ng ruptures i n the soci al system that might have
more or less durabl e effects for the overall shape of soci al life. Moreover, the
general theory of anomi e revealed that the effect of ei ther a depression or an
economi c boom mi ght be si mi l ar in the uprooti ng, soci al di spl acement , and
moral di sorientation of peopl e. In a depressi on, the economi c means at one's
di sposal dropped bel ow one's customary level of expected sati sfacti ons. I n
a windfall si tuati on, one's means soared above one's accustomed needs and
might further unsettle one's level of expectati on. Bot h i mbalances di storted
the tradi ti onal structure of experi ence and generated anxiety. Rapi d change
i n economi c posi t i on, which mi ght come to the i ndi vidual in t he appearance
of good or bad l uck, thus had si mi l ar soci ol ogical and soci o-psychological e
fects. Impl i ci t i n this enti re li ne of argument was a return to the theme of the
soci al , moral , and psychological costs of economi c growth whi ch preoccupi ed
Durkhei m i n hi s frst maj or work. 1 4
A has already been observed, from Durkheim's vi ewpoi nt expl oi tati on
coul d be seen as a variant of anomi e, i nsofar as i t i nvolved a contradi cti on
be tween i nsti tuti onal practi ces or soci al condi ti ons and the fel t needs or
values of an oppressed group, i f not of soci et y as a whol e. The one area i n
whi ch Durkheim proved unabl e to appl y this i nsi ght was gender, the rel ati on
between the sexes, and thei r beari ng on marri age. Durkhei m was by and
l arge unabl e to thi nk cri ti cally about the category of gender and, i n contrast
to hi s general i nsi stence on soci ol ogi cal expl anati ons for soci al phenomena,
had at best a equi vocal , i n part natural i zed or essenti al i zed understandi ng
of i t . I n The Division of Labor he relied on a neo-Ari stotel i ean and common
sensi cal psychology to argue that opposi tes attract, and homosexual desi re
or the possi bi l i t y of stabl e, morally l egi ti mate rel ati ons, i ncl udi ng marri age,
between homosexuals or l esbi ans seemed enti rel y beyond hi s ken. I n Suicide
he provi ded an overly general, prej udi cially gendered expl anati on of speci f c
152 Inile Durkheir: Sociologist and Philosopher
di fferences i n sui ci de rates between unmarri ed or divorced men and women,
i n vi rtue of whi ch women were l ess negatively affected by cel i bacy or divorce
( or, conversely, benef ted less from marri age ) . He simply appeal ed to hi s
transhi stori cal model of a hypothesi zed, presoci al organic b alance whi ch was
upset by the passage to soci ety and cul ture ( and had t o b e i nst i t ut i onally
recreated) in order to argue that women, excluded from anomi e social areas
and confned to the conj ugal fami ly, had greater proxi mi ty to the p utative
organic or i nsti nctual equi l i bri um. Thi s si t uat i on presumabl y made them
less i n need of the regul atory restraints of marri age on sexual desire. In thi s
manner he di d not focus analyti cally and cri ti cal l y on the very probl em of
exclusi on but i nstead partially naturalized that very exclusion of women from
economi c and profes si onal acti vi ti es and could envi si on an i ncreased soci al
rol e for them only through an i ntensifcation of gendered differences: b ecause
of t hei r presumed "natural " apti tudes, women woul d become i ncreasi ngly
speci al i zed i n aestheti c funct i ons. He di d not offer the seemi ngl y obvi ous
soci ologi cal expl anat i on t hat women conf ned, i f not cl austra ted, wi thi n the
conj ugal fami ly mi ght be prone to a vari ant of "fatal i sti c" sui ci de i n good
part because of t hei r excl us i on from ot her areas of soci al and publ i c life.
(A readi ng of Haubert's Madame Bovary woul d have been enough to sug
gest such an expl anat i on. ) He thus ei ther kept women wi t hi n t he conj ugal
fami ly, which on hi s own analysis brought t hem ( i n contrast t o men) l i ttl e
of soci al val ue and even had adverse effects on them when the family was
chi l dl ess, or relegated them to what he saw as less "seri ous" sides of soci al
life, i mpl i ci tl y i gnori ng them i n hi s treatment of the corporative groups that
were the key to hi s i dea of benefci al soci al refor m.
Nonethel ess, Durkhei m's overall soci ol ogi cal approach, whi ch i nsi sted
on the analysi s and reform of soci al causes - not merel y sympt oms - of
soci al probl ems, provi ded the bases for a non-essenti al i zed analysis of the
fami ly, gender, and sexual relati ons that he hi msel f was unable to devel op.
For exampl e, i n hi s di scussi on of anomi e, Durkhei m wrote:
Di sci pl i ne can be useful only i f i t i s consi dered j us t by the peopl es
subj ected t o i t. I f i t maintains i tsel f only through habi t and force,
peace and harmony exi st only i n appearance. The spi ri t of unrest and
di scontent is l atent. And superfcially restrai ned appetites waste I i tt l e
time i n becomi ng unl eashed. Thi s i s what happened i n Rome and
Greece when the bel i efs on which the ol d organization of the patricians
and plebei ans rested were shaken, and in our modern soci eti es when
ari stocrati c prej udi ces began to lose their sway. 1 5
I n t he context of t he classi cal i dea of expl oi tati on, one clearly defned group
benefted from the i nj usti ces i mposed upon another clearly defned group.
Al i enati on, however, mi ght res ul t from a contradi cti on between needs or
values and i nsti tuti onal patterns or soci al condi ti ons t hat created a feel i ng
of frustrati on, meani nglessness, and hosti l i ty to the "system" even when a
group had not b een di rectly subj ected to i nvi di ous expl oi t at i on. Indeed,
al i enati on mi ght be experi enced by groups that were privileged or that
materi al l y benefted from expl oi tati on. The frustrati ons of the pri vi leged
i n an anomi e si tuati on generated a type of restlessness that, i n the absence
of constructi ve alternati ves, mi ght feed the sui ci de rate or fnd other nega
tive ou tl ets.
In this respect, a li ttle-noti ced aspect ofDurkhei m's argument was cruci al.
He went beyond the i deas of structural contradi cti ons and gaps to a not i on
of i nsti tuti onali zed or i deological anomi e. Where i nsti tuti onal and i deol ogi
cal anomi e exi sted, l i mi tl ess or excessive asserti on was actually prescri bed or
l auded, wi th what Durkhei m consi dered typi cal l y damagi ng consequences
for soci ety as a whol e. He saw thi s form of le mal de l'njni (i nfni ty si ck
ness)16 i n numerous aspects of modern cul ture, e . g. , i n romanti ci sm. But i t
was especi ally i n hi s concepti on of the economy that he advanced beyond
the analysi s of The Division of Labor to a perspecti ve that anti ci pated the
si mi l ari ti es be tween l i beral capi tal i sm and a certai n sort of soci al i sm.
Governmental power, i nstead of bei ng the regulator of economi c life,
has become its i nstrument and servant. The most opposi te schools
-orthodox economi sts and extreme socialists -agree that i t should
be reduced to the role of a more or less passive i ntermedi ary between
di fferent social functi ons. One si de wishes it to be si mply the guard
ian of i ndi vi dual contracts. The other side delegates to it the task of
collective bookkeeping, i . e . , to chalk up the demands of consumers,
to transmi t them to producers, to i nventory aggregate income, and
to distribute it according to a set formula. But bot h si des refuse gov
ernment the right to subordi nate other soci al organs and have them
converge toward a hi gher goal. On all si des, men declare that nations
ought to have as thei r sol e or pri nci pal obj ective the achievement of
industrial prosperity. Thus the dogma of economic materialism serves a
the basi s of these seemingly opposed systems. And since these theori es
merely express the state of opi ni on, i ndustry, i nstead of bei ng vi ewed
as a means to an end which transcends i t, has become the supreme
end of i ndi vi dual s and soci eti es. 1 7
For Durkhei m thi s state of affairs and the i deologi es that legitimated i t
consti tuted a paradigm case of i nsti tuti onalized and i d eologi cal anomi e.
Thus t he appeti tes whi ch i ndustry activates have been freed from al l
limiting authority. The apotheosis of well-beinghas, i n sanctifing these
appeti tes, placed them above all human law. To check them seems to
be a sort of sacrilege . . . . Here is the origin of the effervescence whi ch
reigns i n this part of soci ety [ the economy] and from i t has spread to
all the rest. I t i s because the state of cri si s and anomi e i s constant and,
so to speak, normal. From the top to the bot t om of the l adder, desires
are sti mulated without the possi bi li ty of satisfacti on. Nothi ng can calm
them, because the goal toward which they aspire i s i nfnitely beyond
anything that can be attai ned . . . . Henceforth the least setback leaves
one unable to recover . . . . One may ask whether it i s not especi al l y thi s
moral state which today makes economic catastrophes so productive
of sui ci des. For in a soci ety with a healthy moral di sci pl i ne, men are
better able to cope with the blows of fortune . . . . And yet these di spo
si ti ons have become so i nbred that soci ety has grown to regard them as
normal . I t i s conti nually repeated that i t is man's nature to be eternally
di ssati sfed, to advance constantly wi t hout rest or respi te toward an
indefnite goal. The passi on for i nfni ty i s daily presented as a mark
of moral di sti ncti on, whereas i t can appear only within unregulated
consciences which el evate t o the status of a rule the lack of regul ati on
from whi ch they suffer. The doctrine of the most rapi d progress at any
price has become an article of fai th.
18
Such statements i ndi cate a frequentl y ignored di mensi on of Durkheim's
concept of anomi e, bri ng out its critical edge, and refut e the i dea that he
i denti fed soci al health and normality with conformi ty to any and every ki nd
of status quo. On the contrary, hi s normative and phi l osophi cally grounded
i dea of soci al normal i ty enabled hi m to work out somethi ng l i ke a concept
of the pathology of normalcy wi thi n certain extstmg states of soci ety. 19 It
even provided the basi s for a cri ti que of some of his own more questi onabl e
analyses or arguments.
We are now i n a posi ti on t o understand better Durkhei m's i dea of t he re
lation of anomi e to egoi sm and the more cogent elements of his concepti on of
the relati on of soci ol ogy to psychology. Egoi sm, i n the sense of atomi sti c i n
di vi dual i sm, obvi ousl y had a large area of anal yti c and empi ri cal overl appi ng
wi t h i ndi vi dual i sti c forms of anomi e, and both mi ght be i nst i t ut i onal i zed
or i deologi cally j usti f ed. But Durkhei m's neo-Kant i an assumpt i ons made
possi ble a di st i nct i on between anomi e and egoi sm whi ch, whi l e allowi ng
for events i nvol vi ng both anomi e and egoi sm, was analyti cally "clear and
di s t i nct . " I n this sense, "anomi e" referred to a pat hol ogy ( and pathos) of
practi cal reason and "egoi sm" t o a pat hol ogy of theoreti cal reas on.
Sui ci des of bot h types [anomi e a nd egoi sti c] suffer from what mi ght
be cal l ed i nf ni ty si ckness [ le mal de l'i nj ni] . Bu t thi s si ckness does
not t ake t he same for m i n the t wo cas es . I n egoi s m, i t i s cons ci ous
i ntel l i gence whi ch i s affect ed and whi ch becomes hypert r ophi ed
beyond meas ure. In anomi e, i t i s s ens i bi l i t y whi ch i s overexci t e d
and unhi nged. I n t he former, t hought , t hrough const ant t urni ng
b ack upon i tsel f, no l onger has an obj ect . In the l att er, passi on,
no l onger recogni zi ng any l i mi ts , no l onger has a goal . The f rst
l oses i tsel f in the i nf ni t y of the dream; the second, i n the i nf ni ty
of d esi re.
20
Thus anomi e, i n t hi s more speci al sense, was related to the "practi cal , "
appetitive, and active facul ti es: desi re, passi on, and wi l l , especi al l y the wi l l
to power. Egoi sm was rel ated to t he i magi nati ve, i ntel l ectual , cogni ti ve, and
"t heoreti cal " facul t i es.
I n fact , the more phi l osophi cally speci al meani ngs of "anomi e" and
"egoism" were cl osest t o Durkhei m's concept i on of personal i ty types and
psychological expressions of his soci ol ogi cal vari abl es. Despi t e i ts l ack of
empi ri cal subst ant i ati o n ( e. g. , through the anal ysi s of case st udi es) , Book
I I , chapter vi , of Suicide i s pr oof of t he i nadequacy of t he preval ent i dea
t hat Durkhei m, even on a theoreti cal l evel , i gnored t he probl em of soci al
psychol ogy and the i nternal i zati on of soci al norms and condi t i ons. Here he
argued that anomi e was expressed i n anxi ety and mani c agi tati on, egoism
in depressi on and mel ancholy. In fact, hi s concepti on of thei r soci o-psycho
logical mani festati ons helps to expl ai n why he correlated anomi e, but not
the more effet e, passi ve, and i nner-di rected egoi sm, wi t h t he possi bi l i ty of
homi ci de. And i t was from l i terature and phi l osophy t hat he deri ved t he
examples of t he rel ati on of soci al factors to i ndi vi dual personal i ty, whi ch he
di d not provi de i n t he form of empi ri cal case st udi es. He ci ted t he cerebral
and i ndeci sive heroes of Lamarti ne as cases approxi mati ng the pure form of
egoi sm. Drawi ng on cl assi cal phi l osophy, he di sti ngui shed be tween the more
detached and i ntrospective stoi cal, and t he more di sabused and skepti cal
epi curean, vari ants of egoi sm. I n a rare moment of tragi c i r ony, he observed
of the egoi sti c frame of mi nd: "However i ndi vi duali zed each one may be,
t her e i s al ways s omet h i ng whi ch remai ns c ol l ecti ve: i t i s t he depressi on and
the melancholi a whi ch result from t hi s exaggerated i ndi vi duat i on. One
communes i n sadness when one has not hi ng else i n common. " 2 1 Later, i n hi s
Moral Education, Durkhei m was even more bi t t er: "Human acti vi ty . . . di s
si mulates nothingness by decorati ng i t wi th the speci ous name of infnity. " 22
In Suicide he offered as an exampl e approxi mati ng t he pure form of anomi e
the out l ook of Rene, t he hero of Chat eaubr i and, who excl ai med: "I s i t my
faul t i fl fnd l i mi t s everywhere, i f what i s fni t e has no val ue for me? "2 3 But ,
as we have already observed, Durkhei m di d recogni ze t he possi bi l i ty -and
i ndeed t he probabi l i ty i n certai n st at es of soci ety - of a combi nat i on of
t he i deal types of anomi e and egoi sm i n t he "mani c-depressi ve" personal i ty
which displays "an alternati on of depressi on and agi tati on, dream and acti on,
waves of desi re and the medi tati ons of the mel anchol i c. "24
Sti l l , Durkhei m di d not suffciently entertai n t he possi bi l i ty that certai n
areas of soci ety and cul ture, such as art and the thought of contest at ory
i nt el l ect ual s, mi ght, even in "normal " or nor mati vel y l egi ti mat ed condi
ti ons, represent rel ati vel y safe havens for radi cal experi ments and even
hyperbol i c or excessi ve i ni ti ati ves i nvolvi ng extreme st at es that were both
si gni fcant in t hemselves and had at l east i ndi rect beari ng on soci al life.
Nor di d h e devot e ext ended at te nt i on (as di d Mi khai l Bakh t i n ) to certai n
soci al i nst i t ut i ons ( for exampl e, carni val ) i n whi ch l egi ti mated transgres
si on mi ght be l ocat ed and, to s ome ext ent , made a part of the ongoi ng
rhyt hm of soci al li fe. Durkhei m di d see a l i mi t ed rol e i n modern soci et i es
for anomi e as wel l as for cert ai n soci al milieux as speci al be arers of anomi e
and egoi sm, but he di d not provi de a di ferenti ated vi ew of t hei r possi bl y
creati ve as well as dest ructive cont ri but i ons to s oci ety as a whol e. Whi l e he
di d l at er envisage feasts as effervescent events t hat recreated soci al values i n
ways t hat mi ght a t t i mes b e di sconcerti ng, Durkhei m' s thought was cl earl y
i nhospi t abl e to unrestrai ned advocacy or cel ebrati on of excess i n any area
or to t he concept i on of l i mi ts as mere pretexts for breaki ng t aboos . He
nonet hel ess di d have openings i n hi s t hought for a more sust ai ned under
standi ng of actual and possi bl e i nteracti ons between normati ve l i mi t s and
excessive, at t i mes radi cal l y transgressi ve, challenges t o them. But he di d
not devel op them i nto a nuanced, compl ex b asis for anal ysi s and j udg
ment . After Durkhei m, of course, the probl em of l i mi t s and excess became
a fashpoi nt of French cri t i cal t heory, wi t h st ructural i sts often stressi ng a
s omet i mes for mal i dea of l i mi ts a nd pos tst ructural i sts a not i on of excess
whi ch went back to Georges Batai l l e's underst andi ng of depense (excessi ve
expendi ture) vi a a rather one-si ded readi ng of t he gift presumabl y i n terms
of potl at ch -a readi ng that t ended t o reverse Durkhei m's stress on l i mi t s
and t o el i de Ma uss's affni ty wi t h Durkhei m i n t he emphasi s on t empered
forms of gi ft exchange rel at ed to "ami abl e rivalry. "
Al t hough h e di d not ful l y i nvestigate i ts i mport for collecti ve beh avior,
the probl em of the rel ati on of scarcity to aggressi on and conAi ct i n soci ety
was basi c to Durkhei m's noti on of anomi e. He recogni zed two forms of
scarci ty rel evant t o soci al l i f e. The frst was de fcto scarci ty i n the form, for
exampl e, of i nsuffci ent natural resources in rel at i on to popul ati on and the
exi sti ng st at e of technol ogy. The second was a form that depended on the
cul tural defni ti on of scarci ty, as well as on t he i nsti tuti onal creati on or soci al
condi ti oni ng of scarcity effected by t he apporti onment of thi ngs of soci al
and cul t ural val ue and, of course, of any economi c surpl us. The probl em
of soci al order and sol i dari ty was concerned wi th the di al ecti cal rel ati on of
these two types of scarci ty, for i nstance the abi l i t y of the second to shape
or di st ort the frst -an abi l i ty that i n cert ai n ways mi ght i ncrease wi t h t he
development of sci ence and technol ogy. Durkhei m's i ni ti al concept i on of t he
probl em i mpl i ed t he ci rcul ari ty and t endent i ousness of argument s defendi ng
i nst i t ut i ons, whi ch thems elves aggravated scarci ty, by an i ndi scri mi nat e re
l i ance on the universal prevalence of scarci ty. But , wi thi n l i mi ts, i t also
i mpl i ed the relati vi ty of expl oi tati on and the ethnocentri sm of arguments
whi ch restri cted the possi bi l i ty of pl eni tude to modern soci eti es possessed of
advanced technology. Def ni ti ons of what consti tuted l egi ti mate expectati on
and need, beyond the requi rements of bi ol ogi cal s urvival, vari ed accordi ng
t o soci al type. One of Durkhei m's contenti ons was that the relative poverty
of tradi ti onal soci eti es was i tself often a basis for the l i mi t at i on of desi res
and expectati ons to a level at whi ch they could be i nsti tuti onal l y sati sfed
wi th avai l abl e resources. Thi s was the basi s for the correl ati on of poverty,
i n certai n soci eti es, with low sui ci de rates. And especi al l y i n "pri mi tive"
soci eti es, the i nsti tuti onal defni ti on of legi t i mate needs oft en seemed to
be consensually accepted by all i nterested groups.
In soci et i es undergoi ng a process of "moderni zati on, " the devel opment
of soci al order and sol i dari ty amounted i n large part t o t he creati on of i nst i
t ut i ons and tradi ti ons t hat viably real i zed newer values and were consen
sual ly accepted as t he basi s for a defni t i on of l egi t i mat e needs. I n modern
soci eti es, part l y because of the funct i onal i mperati ves of t he advanced
degree of divisi on of l abor, achievement tended to replace inheritance as
the basi s of status i n soci ety. The probl em of soci al order, however, resi ded
i n the relati on of status to strati fcati on, scarci ty, and anomi e. In Suicide,
Durkhei m seemed to assume the exi stence of s ome sort of strati fcati on i n
al l soci eti es. But , as i n The Division of Labor, h i s treatme nt of strat i fcati on
was mi ni mal and hesi t ant and tended t o rai se quest i ons rather than furni sh
answers. Once agai n, he fai l ed to i nqui re i nto the pri nci pl es or pri nci pal
causes of strati fcati on i n vari ous types of soci ety. And hi s focus was clearly
on anomi e. Durkhei m relied on the trui sm that, whatever the elements of
strati fcati on in s oci ety, they would have t o be compl ementary, rather than
contradi ctory, to forms of reci proci ty, and consensual ly accepted as j us t , i f
sol i dari ty was to prevail i n soci ety as a whol e. I f forms of strati fcati on, e. g. ,
in economi c reward, were to be el i mi nated or even substanti al l y reduced,
a sense of l egi ti mate l i mi ts enshri ned i n a conscience colective woul d be al l
the more necessary to i nduce the more tal ented or powerful to accept equal
treatment wi th the medi ocre or powerl essY
The elementary and reiterated poi nt of Durkhei m's argument was that
runaway anomi e, i ncl udi ng i t s i nst i t ut i onal i zed vari ety, made the probl em
of sol i dari t y and soci al order i nsol ubl e, because i t bot h maxi mi zed scarcity
and eliminated the possi bi l i ty of reci proci ty in social relations. In a state of
soci ety i n whi ch desires were perpetually sti mul ated and status always i n
doubt, mutually invasive and aggressive relati ons were i nevi table. A soci ety
that combi ned achievement values and anomi e faced devastating probl ems,
for it gave rise to the type of person who was constrained to be preemptively
rapaci ous in his o r her dealings with others and anxiously uncertai n i n his or
her every acti on. Through a combi nati on of i nsti tuti onal change and advanced
technology, modern soci eti es mi ght be able to transcend the cruder forms of
economi c expl oi tati on. But economi c exploi tati on, despi te its i mportance,
was not the sol e cause of restlessness and confi ct i n soci ety. And afuence
alone was not a sol uti on to the soci al probl em of scarcity. In the absence of
consensually accepted norms whi ch defned wi thi n f exible l i mi ts an opti mal
set of compati bl e alternatives i n the j ust al l ocati on of resources, any surpl us
- however great i t mi ght be i n absol ute terms - woul d be soci al l y and
psychologically experienced i n terms of uncooperative competi ti on for scarce
val ues. And anomi e on t hi s level woul d prevent t he sol ut i on of th e problem
of creati ng soci al mi l i eus and symbolic forms whi ch would permi t peopl e to
feel at home i n the world, at least t o some vi able extent.
In some measure, Durkhei m tried to provi de more concrete answers to
these probl ems i n hi s corporati st proposals and his theory of morali ty and
rel i gi on. Hi s underlying concern, however, was t o overcome uncontrol l ed
scarci ty and anomi e by creati ng appropri ate i nsti tuti onal norms and cul t ural
values. This overcomi ng requi red the di vorce of achi evement from l i mi tl ess
achi evi ng, i t s correl ati on wi th vi abl e self-ful fl l ment, and i t s reconci l i ati on
wi th the humani sti c i deal whi ch asserted that human beings were equal i n a
sense more basi c than all the senses in whi ch they were unequal . Durkhei m
more than i nti mated that i n a state of soci ety marked by extreme anomi e and
egoism, people were in fac t al ready equal i n a respect perhaps as fundamental
as all the respects i n whi ch they were unequal -i . e. , i n thei r common anxiety
and i sol ati on. The probl em was to use thi s condi ti on, which so easi l y l ent
i tself psychologi cally t o destructive compensatory reacti ons, as a moti vati on
for the creati on of a j ust soci ety. Only through a sense of j us t i nst i tut i onal
l i mi t s coul d soci ety conj oi n modern achi evement val ues wi th the humane
classical i deal s of personal mat urat i on and l egi ti mate soci al order as t he
coordi nat e foundat i ons of sel f-ful f l l me nt and s ol i darity. I ndeed, i n one of
hi s very frst arti cles Durkhei m enunci ated the i dea that was to serve as the
i nspi rati on of Suicide and of hi s soci al phi l osophy of f ini tude i n general:
"How I prefer the words of the old sages who recommend before al l el se the
full and tranqui l possessi on of oneself No doubt , the spi ri t as i t develops
needs to have b efore i t vaster hori zons; but for all that i t does not change
/ 60 Jnile Durkheir: Sociologist and Philosopher
i ts nature and remai ns fni t e. "2 6 One mi ght add that, in t hi s context, the
very desi re for transcendence mi ght be di spl aced i n the di recti on of radi cal
transgressi on, which woul d al so pose probl ems for a vi abl e rel at i on between
normati ve l i mi t s and challenges to t hem.
Soci ety and personal i ty as compl ementary i nt egrated whol es whose
fni te fullness was acti vated and agi tated by a marginal leaven of anomi e:
thi s was Durkhei m's essential vi si on throughout hi s life. And he increasingly
saw the heal thy society as one that bot h i nsti tuti onal l y constrai ned and
spontaneousl y evoked the commi tment of all but the i ncorri gi bl y cri mi nal
and the extraordi nari l y creati ve. It accompli shed thi s feat by foundi ng the
domi nant sense of sol i dari ty and "wholeness" in a conscience colective that
represented a cul t urally relat ive vari a nt of subst ant i ve reason t hat Aexi bl y
di sci pl i ned t he i magi nati on and control l ed desi r e and wi l l .
Altruism and Fatalism
Durkhei m began hi s discuss i on of al trui sm wi th t he fol l owi ng general
pronouncement:
In the orderi ng of life, nothi ng i s good wi thout measure [ mesure] .
A bi ological characteristic can fulfll the ends i t must serve only i f i t
does not go beyond certain l i mi ts. The same pri nci pl e appl i es to soci al
phenomena. I f excessive i ndi vi duati on leads to sui ci de, insuffcient
i ndi vi duati on produces the same effect. \hen a man i s detached from
soci ety, he readily kills hi mself; he also kills hi msel f when he is too
strongly i ntegrated i nto soci etyY
Thus al t r ui s m, i n contrast t o egoi sm, was charact eri st i c of a s oci al
cont ext marked by excessi ve i nt egrat i on and s ol i dari t y, es peci al l y i n
ext reme communal for ms . Fat al i sm, i n cont rast t o anomi e, character
i zed a soci al context marked by "an excess of r egul at i on t hrough whi ch
sub j eer s fnd t hei r future pi t i l essl y wal l ed up and t hei r pas s i ons vi ol ent l y
i nhi b i te d by an op pressi ve di sci pl i ne . "2R But Durkhei m bel i eved t hat nei
t her al trui sm nor fatal i sm was si gni f cant i n modern soci ety. In hi s view,
modern soci ety in the West was characteri zed by egoi sm and anomi e, by
mi ni mal communi ty, and by i nst i t ut i onal structures that mi ght be rigid
Chapter 4 Suicide and Solidrit 1 61
and authori tari an but were often comparatively beni gn in nature. Moreover,
for hi m, oppressive or repressi ve features of moder n i nst i t ut i ons woul d
be met , not by fatal i st i c resi gnati on, but by mi l i t ant , i mpat i ent prot est
t hat often at t ai ned by i ts demands anomi e hei ght s compl ement ary t o
t hos e of t he domi nant system. The pecul iarly uns t abi li zi ng force of t hi s
combi nat i on of factors di d not es cape Durkhei m, al though he fai led t o
rel ate i t to t he pos s i bl e genesi s of neof atal i sti c oppressi on and aut hori tar
i an regi ment ati on in soci ety.
For Durkhei m extreme al trui sm was a trai t of tradi ti onal , and especi al l y
of "pri mi t i ve, " soci et i es. Durkhei m's di scussi on of the possi bl e extremi sm
of self-sacri fci al devoti on t o o thers made apparent the superfci al i ty of
i nt erpret at i ons that present h i m as the uncondi t i onal advocate of sol i dari t y
i n soci ety. Al l forms of excess were ant i pat het i cal t o hi s basi c phi l osophy,
a t l east i nsofa r as t hey became general i zed i n soci ety.
I n extremel y al t rui st i c contexts, sui ci de mi ght i n certai n cases be obl i g
at ory ( e. g. , the pract i ce of sut t ee among wi dows in I ndi a) , be consi dered
a supererogatory vi rtuous act ( e. g. , martyrdom for a caus e) , or si mpl y be
t h e resul t of a t ot al involve me nt i n t he col l ecti vi ty a nd i t s ma n y rel i gi ous
cust oms. Another form of sui ci de cl assi fed by Durkhei m as al t rui st i c was
t he sel f- i mmol at i ng t ype i n whi ch an offense agai nst a deepl y root ed val ue
created a sense of gui l t so strong that sui ci de became a mode of expi at i on.
Exampl es of al t rui st i c sui ci de i n one for m or anot her abounded i n tradi
ti onal soci et i es. Si mi l ar to the obl i gat i on of sut t ee was the i n j unct i on t hat
retai ners not survive t he deat h of t hei r chi ef or patron. Dani sh warri ors
commi t t ed sui ci de to escape the i gnomi ny of dyi ng i n bed. For the Go ths,
nat ural deat h was shamefu l ; t he myt hi cal puni shment for i t was condem
nati on t o eternal stagnati on i n caves f lled wi t h venomous ani mal s. The
Vi si goths had a hi gh rock, named t he Rock of Ancest ors, fro m whi ch ol d
men t hrew themselves when t hey were t i red of l i fe and fel t t hemselves to
be a burden to t he communi ty. Among t he Spani sh Cel t s a fut ur e life of
glory was reserved for s ui ci des, whi le hel l awai t ed t hos e who di ed of i l l ness
or ol d age. These mi ght be called sui ci des of strength. Al trui sti c sui ci de al so
had i t s appeal to the weak who had no other vi abl e al ternati ves. Sui ci des
expressi ng prot est mi ght be di rect ed by t he oppressed agai nst a powerful
oppressor and, i n ri t ual form, be concei ved as i mposi ng upon the adver
sary a b urden of gui l t of crushi ng pr opor t i ons . In a sense, ri t ual sui ci de
mi ght funct i on as the symbol i c vengeance of the weak, who "al trui sti cally"
conferred upon t hei r enemi es an i magi nary gift of deat h.
Isolated i nstances of al t rui st i c s ui ci de of course occurred i n modern
soci ety. There was, for exampl e, the mother who sacri fced her l i fe i n order
t o save her chi ld fr om harm. But the i nsti tuti onal context that Durkhei m
treated extensi vely as embodyi ng a modern vesti ge of "pri mi tive" morali ty
was the mi l i tary. In fact, thi s was the onl y secti on of hi s chapter on al trui sti c
sui ci de i n whi ch Durkhei m ci ted stati sti cs. They showed hi gher sui ci de rates
among mi l i tary men than among ci vi l i ans and a tendency for the sui ci de
rate to i ncrease wi th the durat i on of mi l i tary servi ce. The st at i st i cs i ndi cated
that the nature of mi l i t ary organi zati on and the t ype of soci al psychol ogy
i t fostered expl ai ned t he rate di fferenti al s. As was t he case among "pr i mi
ti ves , " t he extreme s pi ri t of abnegati on and collective sol i dari ty i nduced
mi l i t ary men t o pl ace l i t t l e val ue on t hei r own i ndi vi dual exi st ence and
t o be ready to ri sk t hei r lives for a point d'honneur. The Suicide rate of the
mi l i tary over t i me, however, was following a downward trend. Durkhei m
found the reason in t he decl i ne of the ol d mi l i tary spi ri t and the i nfuence
of modern val ues and condi t i ons i n fost eri ng a more fexi bl e di sci pl i ne and
greater i ndi vi dual i sm wi thi n the mi l i tary i tself?9
The nature and si gni fcance of al trui sti c sui ci de were of course qui t e
di ferent from t hose of egoi sti c or anomi e s ui ci de. At rui st i c sui ci de was
prompt ed by an affrmat i on of the norms and val ues of soci ety and was at
t i mes even honored by the relevant group. Egoi sti c and anomi e suicides were
i nduced by despai r, anxi ety, and s ufferi ng and were generally condemned
by soci ety.
In hi s di scussi on of egoi sti c sui ci de, however, Durkhei m touched on
t he possi bl e genesi s i n modern soci ety of extreme and, i ndeed, fanati cal
"al trui sti c" contexts whi ch depressed the rate of sui ci des caused by egoi sti c
condi ti ons. Hi s bri ef but poi nt ed di scussi on - hi s onl y si gni fcant refer
ence i n Suicide t o soci al confi ct -reveals hi s awareness of the " i ntegrating"
funct i on of social confi ct .
Great soci al commo ti ons , like great popul ar wars, i n Aame col l ecti ve
sent i ment s, st i mul at e party s pi ri t and pat ri ot i sm, pol i t i cal fai t h and
nati onal fai t h, and by concentrat i ng act i vi t i es toward t he same goal ,
determi ne, at l east for a ti me, a stronger i ntegrati on of soci ety. Thi s
sal utary i nf uence is not due to the cri si s i t s el fbut to t he st ruggles of
which the crisis is the cause. Si nce they obl i ge men to come together
to conf rant a common danger, the i ndi vi dual thi nks l ess of hi msel f
and more of the common cause. Moreover, one underst ands how
t hi s i ntegrat i on may not be purely momentary but may at t i mes
survive t he causes whi ch were i t s i mmedi at e occasi on, especi ally
when i t i s i nt ense. 30
Earli er, in hi s di scussi on of the correl at i on of i ntel l ect ual p ursui ts and
egoi sm, Durkhei m had appl i ed t he same pri nci pl e of the i nt egrat i on of
groups and personal i ti es through shared soci al antagoni sm to the Jews, who
a voi ded sui ci de by combi ni ng i ntel l ectual i sm wi t h ethni c sol i dari ty.
It is a general l aw t hat r el i gi ous mi nor i t i es , in order to be abl e t o
mai nt ai n t hems el ves mor e s ecur el y agai nst t he hat reds of whi ch
t hey are t h e obj ect s , or s i mp l y t h rough a s or t of e mul at i on, m ake
an effor t to be s uper i or i n knowl edge t o s ur r oundi ng pop ul at i ons.
Thus Pr ot es t ant s t he ms e l ves s h ow mo re t ast e fo r l ear ni ng when
t hey are a mi nor i ty. The Jew seeks educat i on, not t o repl ace hi s
col l ecti ve prej udi ces wi th t hought - out not i ons , b ut s i mpl y t o be
be t ter ar med i n t he struggl e. For hi m t hi s i s a means of com pen
s at i ng for t he d i sadvant ageous s i t uat i on wh i c h i s cr eat ed fo r h i m
b y opi ni on and a t t i mes b y t he l aw. Si nce l earni ng i n i tsel f has
l i t t l e effect on vi gorous t r adi t i ons , he s uper i mposes hi s i nt el l ectual
l i fe on hi s cus t omar y act i vi t y wi t hout havi ng the for mer c ut i nt o
t he l at t er. Hence t he compl exi t y of hi s physi ognomy. Pr i mi t i ve
i n cer t ai n ways, he i s i n ot her ways a cerebr al and ref ned t ype.
Thus he j oi ns t he advantages of l i t t l e groups of t he pas t wi t h
t he b enef i ts of t he i nt ens e cul t ure of our gr eat cont e mpor ar y
s oci et i es . He has al l t he i nt el l i gence of mo derns wi t hout s hari ng
t hei r d es pai r. 5 1
I t would, of course, be di ffcul t not t o see an el ement of bi ographi cal nos
talgia in thi s portrai t , as well as a part i al i nt i mat i on of Durkheim' s reformi st
hopes for professi onal groups.
Dur khei m devoted onl y a bri ef foot not e t o "fat al i st i c" sui ci de, for he
bel i eve d t hi s type t o b e largely o f hi st ori cal i nt erest . Al t hough hi s concept
of fat al i s m seems t o har k back t o t he di scussi on of t he const rai ned o r
forced di vi si on o f l abor in hi s frst maj or work, Dur khei m di d not refer
to t hi s pr obl em in t he l at er b ook. In par t , t hi s was becaus e the i de a of
fat al i sm i n Suicide was not rel at ed t o t he exi stence of expl oi tati ve st ruc
t ures al one. I t di al ect i cal l y compr i s ed b o th t he op pressi ve or repressi ve
nature of i nst i t ut i onal nor ms and the nature of i ndi vi dual or col l ecti ve
response t o t he m. Fat al i s m, i n ot her wor ds, i mpl i ed the ki nd of resi g
nat i on t o "moral or mat er i al despot i sm" that l ed, not to s pont aneous or
organi zed pr ot es t , b u t t o s ui ci de ( or perhaps t o cr i me) . 3 2 Fr om hi s t or y
Dur khei m dr ew exampl es of t he s ui ci des of sl aves. Fr om modern soci
et y, he ci t ed the l ess i nst i t ut i onal l y per t i nent i nstances of wi ves wi t hout
chi l dren and of hus bands t oo i mmat ure t o as s ume t he r esponsi bi l i t i es
of m arri age; he di d not rai se t he ques t i on of t he rel at i on of t h es e cases
t o the soci ocul t ural def ni t i on o f t he rol e of t he mar r i ed woman, t he
genderi ng of r ol es i n gener al , t he rel at i on of t he s exes , or t he nat ure of
t he modern fami l y.
Durkheim' s br i ef di scussi on o f fat al i st i c s ui ci de has t he mer i t of j ust i
fi ng t he i ncl usi on i n t he defni t i on of s ui ci de of a cogni t i ve factor t hat
i mpl i ed t he abi l i t y of t he i ndi vi dual t o assess t he obj ecti ve s i t uat i on a nd
t o take a form of act i on t hat requi red a si gni fcant measure o f i ni t i at i ve.
For s ui ci de t o be a t ypi cal react i on t o oppressi on, aut hori t ari ani sm woul d
have t o be s t r ong enough t o check mor e effecti ve forms of prot est , b ut
not s o st rong a s t o el i mi nat e al l pos s i bi l i t y o r ho pe o f resi st ance. I t has
been r emar ked t hat i n s i t uat i ons appr oxi mat i ng t ot al oppr es s i on, t he
sui ci de r at e, i nst ead of ri si ng, tends t o dr op. Thi s was, for exampl e, true of
Nazi concent rat i on camps . 3 3 In t he cont ext of ext reme aut hori t ari ani sm,
condi t i ons mi ght i nduce di sempowerment , an i nabi l i t y t o make obj ecti ve
assessments, a loss of the sense of personal i dent i t y a nd "ego boundar i es , "
and even what Freu d t er med "i denti f cat i on wi t h t he aggressor. " Thus a
s i t uat i on of ext r eme s oci al pat hol ogy mi ght excl ude even the o pti on of
sui ci de as an exi st ent i al response.
Al though Durkhe i m fai l e d t o i nvest i gat e adequat el y t he genesi s a nd
nat ure of ext remel y aut hori t ar i an at t empt s a t i nt egrat i on, i t may be ob
served t hat hi s b el i ef t ha t modern West ern soci et i es woul d give bi r t h,
not t o fatal i sti c sui ci des, but t o a combi nat i on ofl i beral i zed i ns t i t ut i onal
nor ms ( or at l east beni gn aut hori t ar i ani s m) and for ms o f prot es t s hot
through wi t h anomi e has be e n bor ne o ut b y a t l east cert ai n devel opment s
s i nce hi s deat h. One i nst ance has be e n t he mut at i on of sexual norms
and at t i t udes. Dur khei m's own t i me was t he peri od dur i ng whi ch Freud
t reat ed hyst eri a caused by ext remel y repressi ve sexual norms. Si nce t hat
t i me, pur i t ani cal offci al mor al i t y has b een i ncreasi ngl y under cut by a
sexual revol ut i on that has combi ned greater permi ssi veness with di sori
ent at i on concerni ng i t s l egi t i mat e l i mi t s . Even prophets of l i berat i on
have been l ed t o speak of "repressi ve desubl i mat i on. " The confused st at us
of sexual at t i t udes i s onl y one aspect of t he moder n cri si s of l egi t i macy
whi ch Durkhei m percei ved. As Eri k Eri kson has observed: "The pat i ent
of t oday s uffers most under t he probl em of what he shoul d b e li eve i n and
who he s houl d - or i ndeed mi ght - be or become; whi l e t he pat i ent
of earl y ps ychoanal ysi s suffered m ost under i n h i bi t i ons wh i ch prevent ed
hi m fr om bei ng what or who he t hought he was. "3 4 The "i dent i ty cri si s"
i n i t s ext reme forms i s of course a psychol ogi cal anal ogue of anomi e.
In what was for Durkhe i m a " heal thy" or i ntegrated s oci ety, much of
t he cr i s i s woul d be taken out of t he s ear ch for i d ent i ty, and "i denti ty"
i tsel f mi ght be more f exi bl e and even f ui d t o t he extent that i t was not
anxi ety- r i dden and defensi ve.
Durkheim an Weber
If asked to name the soci ol ogi cal classi c par excellence, most soci ol ogi sts
woul d hesi tate between Suicide and The Protestant Ethic. But the extent to
whi ch these two works are compl ementary as cont ri but i ons t o the analysis
of moder soci al and cul tural hi story has been l i t tl e recogni zed.
Both Durkhei m and Weber, i n thei r concept i on of modern soci ety,
stressed the i mport ance of the comparative met hod in i nvesti gati ng maj o r
processes of cul tural transformati on. Thei r foci converged on the rel ati on
of i deol ogi es or val ue systems to i nst i t ut i ons, a trai t of Durkhei m's work
t hat became i ncreasi ngl y pr omi nent wi th hi s growi ng i nterest i n rel i gi on. I n
The Division of Labor, Durkhei m treated anomi e and a cri si s of transi ti on
i n terms of the breakdown of one type of soci al system under the i mpact
of demographi c pressure and the ri se of newer i nst i t ut i ons and val ues. But
i n compari son wi th Weber' s el aborate i nvesti gati on of feudal i nst i t ut i ons,
symbol i c systems, urbani zat i on, and b ureaucracy, t he level of di scussi on
in Durkhei m's frst maj or work was of mi ni mal hi stori cal i nterest. Despi t e
the fact t hat i t shared Durkhei m's constant tendency to devote i nsuffci ent
attenti on to the preci se nature and hi stori cal speci fci ty of symbol i c bel i efs
and i nst i t ut i onal practi ces, Suicide was often more to the poi nt . Suicide at
tempted an analysis of t he functi ons and consequences of i nsti tut i ons and
val ues whose hi stori cal genesis and symbol i c nature Weber later investigated
i n The Protestan t Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism ( 1 920) .
I ndeed, t he over al l r el at i ons hi p b et ween t he i de as of Du rkhe i m
and Weber reveal s an a ppar ent p ar adox t ha t woul d mer i t ext ensi ve
i nvest i gat i on. The basi c assumpt i ons of t hese t wo thi nkers were often
di ametri cal l y opposed. Weber ' s t hought rested on t ragi c and i r oni c as
s umpt i ons . He c ombi ne d a Ni et zschean met aphysi c wi th a ne o- Kant i an
met hodol ogy. For \ eber , as for Ni et zsche, real i ty was anomi e. Meaning
ful st ruct ures were fctive proj ect i ons of the huma n mi nd. Any not i on of
a correspondence be tween concept and real i ty was out of the ques t i on. A
concept di d not represent real i ty; i t acti vely shaped or even const ruct ed
i t . Knowl edge, for Weber, t hus had a hi ghl y pr obl emat i c b as i s . Funda
me nt al co nAi ct , mo reover, was an i nescapabl e fac t of life. Huma n val ues,
whi ch were cruci al i n the at t empt t o i mpose order on chaos, often exi st ed
i n a st at e of i ncommensurabi l i t y and i rreconci l abl e conf i ct wi t h one
anot her. The choi ce of val ues was, i n the l ast anal ysi s, the subj e cti ve,
exi stenti al deci s i on of t he i ndi vi dual , and thi s ul t i matel y i rrati onal deci
si on det ermi ned one' s enti re pe rs pecti ve on real i ty. ( Durkhei m provi ded
a largely cri t i cal apprai sal of the t hought of Ni e tzsche i n hi s Pragmatisme
et sociologie. But he seemed to know Ni etzsche' s i deas onl y from second
ary sources. ) Soci ol ogi cal met hod, for Weber, involved t he el aborat i on of
"one-si ded" analytical model s ( or "i deal types") of t he attempts of peopl e t o
i mpose order on chaos. I n a sense, i t was ul ti matel y a hi gher-order fct i on
or cont rol l ed, formal l y rat i onal , ut opi an exerci se: a met af ctive styl i zati on
of more or less effective and reali ty-consti tuti ng soci al fcti ons, ut opi as, and
i magi nari es. Moreover, Weber mai nt ai ned that research i n soci al sci ence
was i ni ti ally gui ded by subj ective values, but once si gni fcant probl ems were
sel ected, the resul ts obtai ned mi ght i n some restri cted sense be obj ecti ve
and val ue-neutral . In terms of i ts concl usi ons, soci al sci ence confronted an
i rrati onal uni verse wi th formal l y rati onal met hods, but i t remai ned si l ent
about substanti ve values.
Du r khei m os ci l l at ed b et ween a Car t es i ani zed ne o- Ka nt i a n and a
mo re Hegel i an di al ect i cal concept i on of s ci ence. Hi s t ory, for hi m, was
t he scene of a s t ruggl e bet ween meaningful order and anomi e chaos. Bu t
t he preval ence of order was nor mal , a nd excessi ve a nomi e was pat ho
l ogi cal . I n cont r as t t o Web er, Dur khei m di d not fnd t he knowl edge of
r eal i t y t o be i t s el f hi ghl y pro b le mat i c. Durkhei m' s epi s t emol ogy was a
vari ant of t he "correspondence" t heory o f t r ut h. And it ul t i mat el y was
s ubor di nat ed t o a very t r adi t i onal ki nd of met aphys i c. Except for an
i rreduci bl e margi n of anomi e, essent i al real i t y was rat i onal l y s t ruct ur ed,
and sci ence coul d di s cover i t s l aws. Durkhei m' s i de a of s oci al s ci ence
cl os el y i nt egrat ed cogni t i ve and nor ma ti ve as pect s . Val ues coul d b e
r a t i onal l y k n own . An d a vi a bl e h ar mony o f val ues was pos s i b l e i n t h e
nor mal s oci ety. Fr om Du rkhei m's pe r s pect i ve, Weber was t heor i zi ng
from wi t hi n an anomi e cont ext and pr opos i ng, a t b es t , a t enuous b as i s
for rat i onal i t y wi t hi n t he conf nes of a nomi e . From Web e r's per s pec
ti ve, D ur khei m was be i ng i rrel evantl y t radi t i onal , hopel essly nai ve, and
bl i ndl y ut opi an. The appar ent par adox, however, i s t hat , on t he b asi s of
s uch ant i t het i cal a ss umpt i ons , Durk h e i m and Webe r arr i ved a t l argel y
compl e ment ary r es ear ch i nt erest s and s peci fc anal yses i n t hei r i nves
t i gat i on of cul t ure and s o ci e ty.
D ur khei m cl assi f ed Pr ot es t ant i s m unde r egoi sm and s omewhat
sket chi l y expl ai ned i ts correl at i on wi t h r el ati vel y hi gh s ui ci de rat es ( i n
cont r as t wi t h J uda i s m and Cat hol i ci s m) by drawi ng a t t e nt i on t o t he
abs ence of sol i dari t y i n a r el i gi ous s oci et y t hat i ns t i t ut i onal i zed i ndi
vi dual i s t i c free enqui ry. Pr ot es t ant i s m reduced t o a mi ni mu m t he nexus
bet ween symbol i c cul t and exi s t ent i al c ommuni t y t hat Du r khei m was
l at er t o present as t he essence of t he rel i gi o us phenome non. Webe r may
not have s hared t he phi l os ophi cal l y cri t i cal i nt ent of Dur khe i m, b ut he
di d concur i n t he essent i al s o f t he anal ysi s.
In i t s extreme i nhumani ty t hi s doct ri ne [ predesti nati on] must above
all have had one consequence for the l i fe of a generati on which
surrendered to i ts magni fcent consi stency. That was a feel i ng of
unprecedented i nner l onel i ness of the si ngle i ndi vi dual . I n what was
for the man of the age of t he Reformat i on the most i mport ant t hi ng
i n l i fe, h i s et ernal sal vati on, he was forced t o meet a desti ny whi ch
had been decreed for hi m from eterni ty. No one coul d hel p hi m. No
pri est . . . . No sacraments . . . . No church . . . . Fi nally, even no God. For
even Chri st had di ed only for t he el ect, for whose beneft God had
decreed hi s martyrdom from eterni ty. Thi s, the complete el i mi nati on
of salvation through the Church and the sacraments (which was i n Lu
therani sm by no means developed to its fnal concl usi ons), was what
formed the absolutely d ecisive di fference from Cathol i ci sm. The great
hi st ori c process i n the devel opment of reli gi ons, the el i mi nat i on of
magic from the worl d [die Entzauberung der Welt -di senchantment] ,
whi ch had b egun wi t h the old Hebrew prophets and, in conj uncti on
wi t h Hel l eni sti c sci enti fc thought, had repudi ated al l magical means
t o salvation as supersti ti on and si n, came here t o i t s logical conclusi on.
The genui ne Puri tan even rejected all si gns of reli gi ous ceremony at
the grave and b uri ed hi s nearest and dearest wi t hout song or ri tual
i n order that no supersti ti on, no t rust i n the effects of magical and
sacramental forces on sal vati on, shoul d creep i n. 3 5
Thus Dowden, whom Weber quot ed, wrot e: " The deepes t communi t y
[ wi t h God] i s found not i n i nst i t ut i ons or corporat i ons or churches but i n
t he secrets of a sol i tary heart . " 3 6 Thi s concept i on of t he essenti al rel i gi ous
si tuati on as t hat of a sol i t ary i ndi vi dual whose sal vati on had been deci ded
by a total l y t ranscendent , hi dden di vi ni ty mi ght be seen as a symbol i c
represent at i on whi ch si mul t aneously made sense of, and funct i oned t o
sust ai n, a sense of mel anchol i c i sol at i on and anomi e anxi et y i n a per i od
of hi stori cal t rans i t i on. Thi s mi ght have vari ous cons equences i ncl udi ng
the format i on of extremel y i nt egrat ed groups under chari smat i c l eaders,
as i n the case of Cromwel l ' s "army of sai nt s. " Here peopl e react ed t o ex
t reme i sol at i on and anxi ety, fostered by rel i gi ous symbol i sm, by seeki ng
demandi ng and mi l i tantl y fanati cal forms of soci al i ntegrati on. But what
concered Weber was another hi st ori cal pos s i bi l i ty: the rel ati onshi p of
the rel i gi ous doctri ne of predest i nat i on and Deus Absconditus ( " Hi dden
God" ) t o an et hi c of "thi s-worl dl y asceti ci sm" whi ch combi ned anxi ety
about one's fat e wi th a ri gorous for m of i ndi vi dual i st i c sel f- di sci pl i ne,
achi evement, and formal l y rat i onal acti vi ty i n o ccupat i onal life. Thi s re
l at i onshi p Weber, of course, concei ved as vi tal in the format i on of an el i t e
of capi t al i st i c entrepreneurs whose i nf uence hel ped det ermi ne t he shape
of modern soci et y i n the Wes t .
It i s necessary to not e , what has o ften been forgot t en, t hat t he
Refor mat i on me ant not t he el i mi nat i on of t he Church' s cont rol
over everyday l i fe, but r at her t he s ubs t i t ut i on of a new for m of
cont r ol for t h e p revi ous o n e . I t meant a repudi at i on of a c ont rol
whi ch was very l ax, at t hat t i me scarcel y percept i bl e i n pract i ce,
and hardl y mor e t han for mal , i n favo r of a regul at i on of t he whol e
of conduct whi ch, penet rat i ng t o al l depart ment s of pri vat e and
publ i c ! i f e , was i nf ni t el y bur dens ome and earnest l y enforced. 37
Thus , where Dur khei m stressed the rol e of anomi e i n mo der n hi s
tory, Weber e mphasi zed the bi rt h of a new "nomi e" or di sci pl i nary et hi c.
But Weber hi ms el f t ended t o s i t uat e t he new "nomi e" on t he formal l y
rat i onal l evel of t he adj us t ment of means t o ends; and he percei ved a
cert ai n t ype o f i ns t i t ut i onal i zed anomi e o n t he level o f ends in modern
act i vi ty. What were t he r el at i onshi ps among t he rel i gi ous doct r i ne of
predest i nat i on, t he t ot al i nvest ment of the sacred i n the t ranscendent ,
t he new formal l y r at i onal "nomi e" or et hi c of ascet i c s el f- di s ci pl i ne i n
a cal l i ng, capi t al i s m, and t he el ement of i ns t i t ut i onal i zed anomi e or
l i mi tl essness on t he l evel of ends whi ch, accordi ng t o Dur khei m, was
t he negati on of s ubstant i ve r at i onal i ty? In a s ens e, the pr obl e m of the
Prot est ant sectari an who b el i eved i n predest i nat i on decreed by a hi dden
God was for Webe r t he pr obl em of obj ecti ve i ndi ces . It was t hi s need for
a vi si bl e si gn of a st at e of el ect i on whi ch one coul d never di rectl y know
or be ent i rel y sure of t h a t provi ded t h e i n t el l i gi bl e b ut uni ntended l i nk
bet ween t he Protestant rel i gi ous pr obl emat i c a nd t he et hos of capi t al i s m.
Worl dl y s ucces s i n t he form of l i mi tl ess compet i t i ve achi evi ng p ur s ued
wi t h as cet i c r i gor and funct i onal r at i onal i ty, and concei ved as t he struc
tural mot i vat i on of work i n an occupat i onal cal l i ng, became the vi si bl e
i ndex of personal salvat i on. Al t hough he not ed t he i mport ance of ot her
fact or s , i t was t he comb i n at i on of i ns t i t ut i onal i zed l i mi t l essness on t h e
level of ends and funct i onal l y r at i onal cal cul at i on a nd di s ci pl i ne on t he
l evel of means t hat s eemed to be the t rul y di s t i ncti ve cri t eri on of t he
capi t al i s t et hos i n Weber' s mi nd.
The i mpulse t o acqui si ti on, pursui t of gai n, of money, has i n i tself
not hi ng to do wi th capi t al i sm. Thi s i mpulse exi sts and has exi sted
among wai ters, physi ci ans, coachmen, arti sts, prosti tutes, di shonest
offcials, sol di ers, nobl es, crusaders, gambl ers, and beggars . . . . Un
l i mi ted greed for gain is not in the least i denti cal with capi tal i sm, and
i s sti ll less i ts spi ri t . . . . But capi tal i sm i s i denti cal wi th the pursui t of
proft, and forever renewed proft, by means of conti nuous, rati onal ,
capi tal i sti c enterpri se . . . . We wi l l def ine a capi tal i sti c economi c acti on
a one whi ch rests on t he expectati on of proft by the uti l i zati on of
opportuni ti es for exchange, t hat i s on ( formally) peaceful chances
of proft . 3 8
Thi s concept i on of capi t al i sm was not , i t may be added, dependent
upon t he pri vat e ownershi p or even control of t he means of product i on;
i t ref erred to the i ssues of how i nst i t ut i ons funct i oned and t he nat ure of
cont rol . Webe r i denti f ed as t radi t i onal , i n contrast wi t h t he capi t al i sti c
ethos, the at t i t ude based on a sense of l egi ti mat e l i mi t s i n the mut ual
adj ust ment of needs and i ns t i t ut i onal i zed means of sati sfacti on. Weber's
perspect i ve enabl ed hi m to emphasi ze t he new "no mi e" i nvolved i n s ober
bourgeoi s self-di sci pl i ne and rati onal i ty i n t he adj ust ment of means t o
ends. From Durkhei m's perspecti ve, thi s s i t uat i on would appear as one
case of a combi nat i on of a pathol ogy of "practi cal" reason ( i nst i t ut i onal i zed
l i mi tlessness o r anomi e) and a subsi di ary pat hology of "theoreti cal " reason
(funct i onal rat i onal i t y di rected to l i mi tless ends) .
Thus Weber bel i eved he had found a genet i c l i nk bet ween rel i gi ous and
economi c phenomena whi ch i n t he epoch of cl assi cal l i beral i sm t ended
t o separat e i nt o di screte i nst i t ut i onal spheres. i nst ead of el aborat i ng a
refor mi st proj ect in t he manner of Durkhei m, Web er di spassi onatel y and
i roni cally observed of the fut ure:
No one knows who wi l l l i ve i n thi s cage i n the fut ure, or whet her
at the end of t hi s tremendous devel opment ent i rel y new prophet s
wi l l ari se, or t here wi l l be a great rebi rt h of ol d i deas and i deal s,
or, i f nei t her, mechani zed pet ri fcat i on, embel l i shed wi t h a sort of
convulsive sel f- i mportance. For of t he l ast stage of t hi s cul t ural
devel opment , i t mi ght wel l be t rul y sai d: "Speci al i st s wi t hout spi ri t ,
sensual i st s wi t hout heart ; thi s nul l i t y i magines i t has at t ai ned a level
of ci vi l i zati on never be fore achi eved. " 3 9
F Anlsis to Reorm
Suicide concl uded wi th proposal s for a corporati st reform of modern
soci ety. I n presenti ng hi s pl ea for corporative groups, Durkhei m was sensitive
to the heri tage of suspi ci on associ ated with the i dea of corporati sm because
of the devel opment of corporati ve organi zati ons in t he ancien regime. Cer
t ai nly, the uses to whi ch corporative establ i shments were put under fasci sm,
after Durkheim' s death, have compounded thi s negati ve reputati on. Yet the
cont i nui ng di ffculty i n resol vi ng the probl ems di scussed by Durkhei m,
as wel l as the emergence of corporative features i n all advanced i ndustri al
soci eti es, may be grounds for renewed i nterest i n the speci fc nature of
Durkhei m's i dea of corporati s m.
Suicide contai ned Durkhei m' s most poi nted concept i on o f the prob
l emati c nature of modern soci ety, and whatever one may concl ude about hi s
noti on of reform, thi s work wi ll cont i nue to be remembered for i ts i nsi ght
i nto modern soci al di srupt i on and mal ai se. The modern age, for Durkhei m
as for so many thi nkers i n the ni net eent h century, was an age of transi ti on.
It was a peri od i nterveni ng between an earl i er type of i ntegrated soci ety
and a hoped-for i ntegrated soci ety of the future. The Division of Labor i n
cl uded an expl oratory and i nconclu sive conceptual i zati on of these types of
i ntegrati on, and i t concl uded wi th a di scussi on of pathologi cal phenomena
i n modern soci ety. Suicide focused i n a more expl i ci t and central way on
moder soci al pat hology. In hi s key concept of anomi e, Durkhei m tried
to account for the severe i mbal ances, di ssoci ati ons, and contradi cti ons of
an age of transi ti on. The concomi tant of anomi e i n the l i ves of peopl e was
profound , at ti mes traumati c, di sori entati on -what other soci al theori sts
di scussed as al i enat i on. The soci ol ogi cal study of sui ci de was for Durkhei m
a preci se way to investigate the di sruptive features of modern l i fe. And hi s
proposal s for reform were based on the fai t h that modern soci ety woul d i n
t i me achi eve l egi ti mate order.
In the concl udi ng secti ons of Suicide, Durkhei m remarked that the ri se
of syntheti c phi l osophi es of pessi mi sm was one i ndi cati on that the current
of soci al mal ai se i n modern life had passed all b ounds and had attai ned
a pathol ogi cal state. In normal states of soci ety, maxi ms and sayings that
expressed the ne cessary el ement of s ufferi ng i n life were not systemati zed
i nto a domi nant mood or Weltanschauung. They were counterbal anced i n
soci ety and cul ture by senti ments of a di fferent sort. But i n modern soci ety,
pessi mi sm had become the basi s of phi l osophi cal systems, and thi s devel
opment was not restri cted to i sol ated phi l osophers like Schopenhauer.
One must also account for all those who, under di fferent names,
start out under the i nfuence of the same spi ri t. The anarchi st, the
aesthete, the mysti c, the soci al i st revoluti onary, i f they do not despai r
of the future, at least agree wi th the pessi mi st i n shari ng the same
feeli ng of hatred or di sgust for the st at us quo and the same need
t o destroy or escape from reali ty. Collecti ve melancholy woul d not
have i nvaded consci ousness t o thi s poi nt i f i t had not been subj ect
t o a morbi d development . Consequently, the development of sui ci de
whi ch results from i t i s of t he same nature. 40
The pri mary i ntenti on of Durkheim was t o grasp t he over-all nature of the
social system, bot h i n i ts domi nant i nst i tuti ons and the reactions evoked by
t hem. Only on thi s basi s could a rational conception of reform be elaborated.
Moral issues were uppermost i n Durkheim' s i dea of reform, but hi s under
standi ng of morality was a speci al one related to the reconstructi on of soci ety.
There i s n more accurate i ntroducti on to hi s concepti on of reform and i t s
rel ati on t o morali ty t han hi s own words i n the concl usi on t o Suicide.
Just as sui ci de does not proceed from man' s di ffcul ti es i n life, so
t he means of arrest i ng i t s progress i s not t o make t he struggle l ess
di ff cul t and l i fe easi er. I f more peopl e ki l l themselves today t han
formerly, t hi s i s not because we must make more pai nful efforts to
mai nt ai n o u rselves or because our l egi t i mat e needs are less sati s
fed; i t i s because we do no t know the l i mi t s of our l egi t i mat e needs
and we do not percei ve the meani ng of our e ffort s. I t i s i ndeed
cert ai n that at al l l evel s of the soci al hi erarchy, average wel l -bei ng
has i ncreased, al though t hi s i ncrease has not always taken pl ace i n
the mos t equi t abl e proport i ons. Thus t he mal ai se from whi ch we
suffer does not come from an i ncrease i n t he number and i ntensi ty
of obj ecti ve causes of s ufferi ng; i t attests, not to a greater economi c
mi sery, but t o an al ar mi ng moral mi s ery.
But we mus t not decei ve ourselves about the meani ng of t he
word "moral . " When one says of an i ndi vi dual or soci al probl em that
i t i s enti rel y moral , one generally means that i t does not respond t o
any treatment but can b e cured only through repeated exhortati ons,
methodi cal obj urgati ons, i n a word t hrough verbal acti on. But i n
real i t y t he ment al syst em of a peopl e i s a system of def ni t e fo rces
which cannot be deranged or rearranged through si mpl e i nj uncti ons.
I t real l y corresponds t o t he way soci al el ements are grouped and
organi zed. I t i s far from t he t rut h t hat , i n analyzing as "moral " the
si ckness of whi ch the abnormal progress of s ui ci de i s the sympt om,
we i nt end t o reduce i t t o s ome sort of s uperf ci al i l l ness whi ch can
be conj ured away wi th soft words. On the cont rary, the al terati on
of mor al t emperament whi ch i s t hus reveal ed bears wi tness to a
profound al terati on of our soci al st ruct ure. To heal t he one, i t is
necessary to reform the other. 11
Durkhei m was one of t he frst soci al thi nkers t o see clearly t he cri si s
of l egi ti macy and meani ng i n modern soci ety. Hi s t hought i ndi cated an
awareness of the real s uffering and genui ne values di storted i n the i deo
l ogi cal reacti ons of prophets of doom. But he di d not advocate a "pol i ti cs
of cul tural despai r" based on i ndi scri mi nate and destructive cri ti ci sm of
moderni ty, romanti c nostal gi a for an i deal i zed past, and utopi an vi si ons
of a t otally i ntegrated and authori tative soci e tyY Nor di d he cel ebrate the
sympt oms of excessi ve di sori ent at i on and anomi e as t he di st i nctive marks of
moderni ty or the recurrent, transhi stori cal apori as ofWestern metaphysi cs.
The i nt ent of hi s proposal s for reform was to extri cate the valid el ement i n
i nchoate and possi bl y dangerous stri vi ngs for communi ty and shared values
and t o embody this valid element i n a subst antively rational concept i on of
reconstructi on in modern soci ety.
Notes
1 . I ( 1 896- 1 8 97) , 404-405. The evol uti on of Ri chard's i deas i ndi cated that the
Annee school had its i nternal confi cts. Richard i n ti me became one of the
most hosti l e cri ti cs of Durkheim and a source of the idea that his thought
was ri ddl ed wi th unresolved contradi cti ons. The key issue that antagonized
Richard (himself a Protestant) was the i ncreasi ngly critical edge i n Durkheim's
soci ology of reli gi on that came down qui te negatively upon Protestanti sm.
2 . Le Suicide (frst pub. 1 897; Pari s: Presses Uni versitaires d e France, 1 960) , p.
228.
3. Ibid. , p. 352.
4. Ibid. , p. 5.
5. Ibid. , p. 4.
6. "The Soci ol ogical Analysis of Soci al Meani ngs of Sui ci de, " Archives europee
nnes de sociolgie, VI I ( 1 966) , 259- 260.
7. Cf F Achi l le-Del mas, Psychologie pathologique du suicide ( Pari s: Alcan,
1 933) .
8 . For the di scussi on of psychopathol ogy, see Le Suicide, Book I , chap. i .
9 . Ibid. , p . 3 1 2 .
1 0. Ibid. , p. 337.
1 1 . Paris: Alcan, 1 922, p. 3. Roger Lacombe's stri ctures are to be found i n his
La Methode sociologque de Durkheim (Pari s: Alcan, 1 926) , where he dwells
on the poi nt that correlati ons and stati sti cs are relatively uni nteresti ng i f
i nterpretations are not feshed out and substantiated.
1 2 . Le Suicide, p. 325 .
1 3 . M and Society in an Age ofRecomtruction (New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World, 1 940) , p. 62.
1 4 . Durkheim's asserti on that prosperity fostered hi gh sui ci de rates was challenged
by his di sci pl e Mauri ce Halbwachs i n his Les Causes du Suicide (Pari s: Alcan,
1 930) . Halbwachs also stressed the need for a clearer concepti on of the rela
tion of soci ol ogy and psychology and cri ti ci zed Durkhei m's tendency to focus
upon one-dimensional correlations of sui ci de rates wi th factors abstracted
from soci ety as a whole. This stress on soci al psychology led Halbwachs to
undertake an i mportant and i nfuenti al study of col l ective memory (por
tions of whi ch have been translated as On Colective Mory, ed. , trans . ,
with an i ntro. by Lewis A. Coser, Chicago: Uni versi ty of Chi cago Press,
1 992) . Hal bwachs noted the importance of urbani sm, which overlapped
with membership i n Protestant sects, and proposed that types of ci vi l i zati on
were more i ncl usi ve and hi storically useful uni ts of anal ysi s. The assertion
Chapter 4 Suicide and Solirit 175
that the s ui cide rate tends to drop with prosperi ty was further s upported by
the statisti cal evidence and i ts i nterpretation in Andrew F Henry and James
F Short, Suicide and Homicide (Glencoe, Il l i noi s: Free Press, 1 954) . The
key question was of course whether prosperity was related to uprootedness
and frustration. If there was no positive correlation between suicide rates
and peaks of a busi ness ccle, there might still be one between sui ci de and
long-term upward changes in a group' s posi ti on related to basic processes of
economic transformation. Neither Halbwachs nor Henry and Short addressed
themselves to thi s broader historical questi on. The analysis of Henry and
Short, however, had the merit of bringing to the center of analytic attention
the role of stratifcation, the concept of relative deprivation, and the relation
of the choice of an object of aggressi on (self or other) to the situation of the
relevant group. Suicide was generally found to be a response to frustration
among high-status groups, for whom a depression had greater impact in
terms of relative loss. l1oreover, a low-status group might become increasingly
frustrated in the face of prosperity that it did not share. Aggressi on bred by
frustration in low-status groups, however, found an outlet in homicide rather
than sui cide, because the more integrated nature of these groups provided
"love obj ects" upon whom anxiety and frustration might be projected. I n
Durkheim's terms, anomie led to sui ci de only when i t wa conj oi ned with
eg01sm.
1 5 . Le Suicide, p. 279. Si nce the original publication of my study, much attention
has been devoted to the important problem of Durkheim's questionable
treatment of gender and the way i n which it was symptomatic of male anxi
eti es about femi ni s m and "devirilization. " See, for example, Gender and the
Politics ofSocial Rerm in France, 1870- 1914, ed. Eli nor A. Accampo e al.
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 995 ) ; Jenni fer l1. Lehm
ann, Durkheim and Women (Lincoln: Uni versi ty of Nebraska Press, 1 994) ;
and Janet Hi ns on Shope, "Separate but Equal: Durkheim' s Response t o the
Woman Questi on, " Sociological Inquiry 64 ( 1 994) , pp. 23-36. See also the
Cornell University dissertation of Judith Surkis, "Secularization and Sexuality
i n Third Republic France , " chap. 3. For a di scussi on of related problems in
the German context, see the Cornell University dissertation ofTracie l1atysik,
" Ethics, femi ni ni ty, and Psychoanalysis in Early Twentieth-Century German
Cul tures. "
1 6. Ibid. , p. 324. In hi s Education morale ( f i rst pub. 1 925 ; Pari s: Presses Univer
sitai res de France, 1 963) , Durkheim continued hi s attack upon "this dissolv
i ng sensation of the infnite" (p. 35 ) . Nowhere more than i n hi s correlation
of anomie and the quest for i nfni ty was Durkheim closer to an i mportant
dimension of Greek phi l osophy.
1 7. Le Suicide, pp. 283-284.
1 8 . Ibid. , pp. 284-287. I n psychoanalytic terms, i t may be observed that one case
of anomi e involved limitless ego ideals, while fatalism resulted fom rigid and
repressive superego demands. One form of anomi e sui ci de may be fruitfully
compared to what Herbert Hendi n, in his Suicide and Scandinavia (New
York: Doubleday Anchor, 1 965) terms "performance sui ci de. " Of one of hi s
cases Hendi n wri tes: "Hi s dreams under hypnosi s were of the most elemental
kind. In one i nstance they revealed him runni ng to catch a boat and j us t
mi s s i ng i t. I n hi s associations ' mi ssi ng the boat' symbolized the low opi ni on
whi ch he had of hi s enti re career. Hi s legal ambiti ons were excessive and he
found i t i mpossi bl e to compromise with hi s grandiose s uccess fantasies. The
aggressiveness which stemmed from this grandiosity i nterfered with hi s actual
performance, a constellation frequently observed in patients with extremely
high and rigid standards for themselves. What is seen as fai l ure causes an
enormous amount of sel f-hatred, and sui cide amounts to a self-i nfi cted
p uni shment for having failed" ( p. 26) . Hendi n suggestively but somewhat
si mplistically attempts to explain the Scandinavian suicide phenomenon of
Sweden and Denmark with high rates but Norway with a low rate by patterns
i n child-rearing and their sociopsychological concomitants. His conclusi ons
may readily be translated i nto Durkheimian terms. In Sweden, Hendin found
a combination of anomie and egoi sm. Li mi tless ends in performance and
achieving were combined with i solation and coldness i n i nterpersonal rela
ti ons. An expression in Swedish literally means "to ki l l with si l ence. " I n
Denmark, he found a strongly integrated and excessively al trui sti c family
structure that, with separation upon the children's reaching adulthood, gave
way to uprootedness and feelings of dependency l oss. I n Norway, a greater
balance was established, and the verbal expressi on of emotion functi oned as
a sort of safety valve.
1 9. In his classical article "Social Structure and Anomi e, " Robert K. Merton posed
the problem in terms of a contradiction between l i mi tless cultural values and
limited instituti onal means of attaining them. Thi s was exemplifed for him
in the conf li ct in the United States between the pursuit of wealth and the
available opportuni ti es open t members of soci ety for making "big money. "
After being subj ected to criticism on the grounds that he was identifing
normative conflict and anomie, Merton in a rej oi nder admi tted confusion
in hi s earlier formulation and argued that structural conflicts might lead to
anomi e in the deli mi ted sense of norml essness. The original article and the
rej oi nder may be found in Social Theory and Social Structure (rev. ed. ; Glencoe,
I l l . : Free Press of Glencoe, 1 964) , pp. 1 3 1 - 1 94. Whatever the semantic gain in
this revi si on, it served to divert attention from the problem of institutional-
Chapte 4 Suicide and Solidrit 177
ized and ideological anomi e which t1erton seemed to perceive earlier in the
American desire for "just a li ttle bi t more" of the good things i n li fe regardless
of how much one already had. In terms ofDurkheim's formulati on, the cases
of norml essness, normative contradi cti on, and normatively constrained or
praised l i mi tl essness shared t he irrational quality of an absence of an i nsti tu
ti onal l y grounded sense of !egitimate l i mi ts that was essential for reciprocity
and solidari ty. I t would be interesting to trace the relations between anomie,
egoism, and the stress on aporia and double binds i n deconstruction. For
a discussion relevant to this topic, see my History and Reading: Tocquevile,
Foucault, French Studies ( Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 2000) , esp.
chap. 4. I t woul d al so be of i nterest to investigate the relations between
anomi e, egoism, and trauma. On this i ssue, see my Writing History Witing
Tauma (Baltimore: The Johns Hopki ns University Press, 2 00 1 ) .
20. Le Suicide, p. 324. Compare Nietzsche on the relation o f i nfni te desire to
egoi sm: "From an i nfni te horizon he withdraws i nto himself, back into the
small egoistic circle, where he must become dry and withered; he may pos
si bl y attain to cleverness but never to wisdom . . . . He i s never enthusi asti c,
but bl i nks hi s eyes and understands how to l ook for hi s own proft or hi s
party's i n the proft or loss of somebody el se" (Friedrich Ni etzsche, T [e
and Abuse of History, Indianapolis and New York: Library of the Liberal Arts,
1 9 57, p. 64) .
2 1 . Le Suicide, p. 230.
22. P 42.
23. Le Suicide, p. 325. Although Durkhei m referred to Chateaubriand, i t may be
observed that a magnifcent anatomy of anomie -indeed a myth of the times
-was provided by Balzac in Le Peau de chagrin. See also Education morale,
p. 35 , where Durkheim refers to Goethe's Faust as the literary personage
who may be viewed as "the i ncarnation par excellence of the senti ment of
the i nfni te. "
24. Le Suicide, p. 326. Here one may refer to the protagonist in Dostoevsky's
Notes From Uound. See my discussion in History, Politics, and the Novel
( I thaca, N. Y. : Cornell University Press, 1 987) , chap. 2.
2 5 . Ibid. , pp. 278-279.
26. "La Science posi ti ve de I a moral e en Al l emagne, " Revue philosophique, XXI V
( 1 887) , p. 41 . Of maj or french writers fol lowing Durkhei m, t he one with
basic assumpti ons closest to his own was probably Albert Camus. A highl y
i l l umi nati ng essay could be written comparing these two fgures who are
rarely discussed together. From the initial i nsi ght into modern society as one
characterized by anomi e and anxiety, through a consideration of the problem
of suicide, to the ultimate affrmation of a normative sense of l i mi t s , these
two thinkers defended the type of conventional wisdom which they believed
had become highly unconventional i n the modern world. On Camus, see
my History and Memory afer Auschwitz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1 998) , chap. 3.
27. Le Suicide, p. 233. Compare t he early Nietzsche on the need for l i mi ti ng
hori zons: "A l i vi ng thi ng can onl y be healthy, strong and productive wi thi n a
certain hori zon; if it is i ncapable of drawi ng one around itself, or too selfsh
to l ose i ts own view i n another's, i t will come to an untimely end" ( The Use
and Abuse of History, p. 7) .
28. Le Suicide, p. 3 1 1 .
29. Ibid. , pp. 259- 260.
30. Ibid. , p. 222.
3 1 . Ibid. , pp. 1 6 9- 1 70.
32. Ibid. , p. 3 1 1 .
33. Eli e Cohen, Human Behavior in the Concentratz'on C (New York: Norton,
1 953) , p. 1 5 8 .
34. Childhood and Society (New York: Norton, 1 950) , p . 239.
3 5 . The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit oJCapital'sm (New York: Scribner's , 1 958) ,
pp. 1 04- 1 0 5 .
3 6 . Ibid. , p. 2 2 1 , n. 1 6.
37. Ibid. , p. 36.
38. Ibid. , p. 1 7.
39. Ibid. , p. 1 8 2 .
4 0 . Le Suicide, p. 424.
41 . Ibid. , pp. 444-44 5 .
42 . For an acute analysis of ni hi l i sti c social cri ti ci sm i n pre-Nazi Germany, see
Fri tz Stern, The Politics ofCultural Despair (frst pub. 1 9 6 1 ; Garden City.
N. Y. : Doubleday, 1 965 ) .
5
Theor
y
and Practice
It is not good fr man to live on a war foting in the midst of his immediate com
panions. This sensation of general hostility the mutual deance which results frm
it, the tension which it necessitates are deplorable states when the are chronic. I
we love war we alro love the joys of peace. And the ltter have all the more value
fr men to the extent that the are more profundly socialized that is to say (or
the two words are equivalent) more profundly civilized.
- Preface to t he second edi ti on of
The Division of Labor in Sociey
Economic fmctions are not ends in themselves. The are onl means toward an
end and organs ofsocial l(. Social lif i s above all a harmonious community of
(rts, a communion ofmindr and wills with a common end. Sociey has no raison
d' etre (it does not bring men a little peace -peace in their hearts and peace in
their commerce with each other I industy can be productive onl by troubling
this peace and causing war it is not worth the trouble it costs.
-Profssional Ethics and Civic Morals
Sociolog, Histor, an Reorm
An i nt ense i nvol vement i n t he Dreyfus Affair, the t i me- consumi ng
preparat i on and edi t i ng of t he Annee sociologique, a growi ng i nterest i n
rel i gi ous symbol i s m, and a related concern wi th el aborati ng hi s myst i que
l aden soci al phi l osophy -al l these factors combi ned to prevent Durkhei m
from carryi ng to compl et i on t wo studi es i n comparati ve hi st ory: a hi st ory
of soci al i sm and a hi st ory of corporati s m. It i s i mportant t o recogni ze t he
i nt i mat e connect i on be tween t hes e t wo unf ni shed proj ect s. They were
rel ated bo th to each other and to hi s i dea of necessary structural change
/80 Jnile Durkheir: Sociologist and Philosopher
i n moder n s oci ety. I ndeed, t hey represent ed the concrete basi s for hi s
at t empt ed Auebung - hi s di al ect i cal synthesi s - of radi cal i sm, con
servati sm, and l i beral i sm for t he achi evement of "normal i ty" i n moder n
soci ety. Thus i t makes s ens e to t r eat as a uni t i n t he devel opment of hi s
t hought t hose works i n whi ch he di scussed corporat i sm and soci al i sm:
the concl udi ng chapter, on "practi cal consequences , " i n Le Suicide; Le
Socialisme; Lefons de sociologie ( transl ated as Profssional Ethics and Civic
Moral) ; LE ducation morale; and the i mpor t ant preface to the second edi
t i on of De La Division du travail social.
All t hese works were t hought out i n t he per i od ext endi ng roughl y
from 1 8 96 to 1 902. Thi s may be consi dered the mi ddl e peri od i n the
devel opment of Dur khe i m's t hought . Before i t came The Division of Labor
and The Rules of Sociological Method. The broader ambi t i on of t he l at t er
met hodol ogi cal t reat i se was to provi de a soci ol ogi cal versi on of Descartes's
di scourse on met hod. It approached general theory t hrough the uncert ai n
perspecti ve i mpl i ci t i n Durkhei m's frst maj or work. From i t s concept i on of
soci al facts t o i ts mechani st i c theory of causat i on, The Ruls ofSociological
Method was t he e x pl i ci t s t at ement of t he more a nal yt i cal l y di ssoci at ed,
Cartesi ani zed neo-Kant i an st rand of Durkhei m's t hought . I t present ed
soci ety pri mari l y as an "obj ecti vated" act i on syst em t hat soci ol ogi sts were
t o i nvesti gate by st udyi ng di scret e, l i near cause-and-effect rel at i onshi ps.
In t hi s book, Durkhei m t ended to focus on t he most obj ecti f ed aspects of
soci al l i f e, di sregardi ng the probl em of t he i nternal i zati on of soci al norms
and the meani ngful nat ure of human acti vity. Al though obj ecti vi ty i n s o
ci ol ogy was always hi s concern, he subsequently modi fed hi s narrow focus
on the "exteri ority" and "constrai nt" of soci al facts and provi ded greater
i nsi ght i nto the meani ng of hi s famous di ct um that soci al facts shoul d b e
treated l i ke "t hi ngs. " After t he t urn o f t he century, he was preoccupi ed
wi t h preparatory s t udi es for The Elementary Forms and wi t h t he revis i on of
hi s theoreti cal assumpt i ons t o accommodat e hi s more mat ur e concept i on
of t he r el at i on of t heor y to pr act i ce and of met hodol ogy t o phi l os o phy.
Hence, the speci fcs of his not i on of structural change in modern s oci ety
are to be found pri mari l y in the works of his mi ddl e per i od.
The archi t ect oni c goal of Durkhei m's i dea of structural reform was
si mpl e b u t ambi t i ous : consci ous and s ubs tanti vel y rat i onal soci al control
of t he economy and al l forms of part i cul ari st i c i nterest or power. The el-
Chapte 5 Theory and Practice 1 81
ementary soci al uni ts i n hi s proposed reform -corporative or occupati onal
groups - woul d at some si gni f cant l evel be smal l enough t o provi de a
communal , face-to-face mi l i eu for t hei r members. But the broader scope of
regi onal , nat i onal , and i nternati onal exchange in large and hi ghl y complex
modern soci eti es required more i ncl usi ve organi zati on, pl anni ng, and soci al
control . Absol u tely fundamental at all levels was the exi stence of aut ono
mous l y accepted and deepl y i nternal i zed i nsti tuti onal norms whi ch def ned
l egi ti mate l i mi t s wi th respect t o di fferenti ated funct i ons and i ndi vi dual
assert i on, created t he necessary condi ti ons for reci proci ty, and provi ded
t he basi c st ruct ure for deci si ons i n speci fc cases and controversi es. Thi s ,
i n s t ar k out l i ne, was t he moti vati ng i dea o f Durkheim's venture i n creative
and h i stori cal l y i nfor med s oci al refor m, whi ch he expl i ci t l y refused to
det ai l in t he form of an i t emi zed bl uepri nt . Des pi t e his feel i ng that soci al
act i on involves unpredi ct abl e turns and creati ve el an, he di d give certai n
di recti ves for the attai nment of soci al "heal th" i n moder n ti mes.
In a cri t i cal revi ew of a work whi ch based i t s anal ysi s of soci al i sm upon
t he t hought of Marx, Durkhei m fatly asserted, "As for us , al l t hat i s es
s ent i al i n s oci al i s t doct ri ne i s found i n the ph i l osophy of Sai nt - Si mon. " 1
Thi s statement mi ght be taken a s the l ei t mot i f of Le Socialisme, Durkhei m's
only compl et ed work on the hi st ory of soci al i sm. 2 He had begun hi s study
of soci al i sm i n part because some of hi s b ri ghtest st udent s were bei ng won
over to Marxi sm. Pol emi cal ani mus was not total l y absent from hi s Social
isme. Bri ef b ut stri ngent cri t i ci sm of Marx was p layed off agai nst extensi ve
and l avi sh prai se of Sai nt -Si mon. Marx' s Capital was i ndeed recogni zed as
the "strongest work" of soci al i st t hought . 3 But this accol ade was bestowed
al most as a means of damni ng wi t h fai nt prai se. It prefaced an argument
t hat Capital l acked convi nci ng sci enti f c proofs and s t ood out onl y be cause
of the even greater def ci enci es of other soci al i st works, j udged from a
sci enti f c poi nt of view. But t hi s at t i t ude was par t of Durkhei m's broader
concept i on of soci al i sm as an i nt ens e, sympt omat i c r esponse and a fervi d
i deol ogy - "a cry of gri ef, s omet i mes of anger, uttered by men who feel
most keenly our col l ecti ve mal ai se. "4 Despi t e the apparent el ement of rash
generali zati on i n his esti mati on of soci al i st l i terature, Durkhei m's argument
did lead hi m to concl ude that, at least o n a sympt omat i c level, soci al i sm
had to b e taken seri ously. Sci ent i fc refutati on of detai l ed poi nts of soci al i st
thought was merel y a "l abor of Penelope. " A more di al ecti cally adequat e
perspecti ve was needed to discover the causes of soci al i st i deology i n soci ety
and to assi mi l ate the el ements of truth soci al i sm cont ai ned.
In certai n respects, the thought of Sai nt-Si mon had a privileged posi ti on
for Durkhei m as an approach to a more adequate perspecti ve. Indeed, he
stated that "asi de from Cartesi anism, there i s nothi ng more i mportant i n the
enti re hi story of French philosophy. At more than one poi nt these two phi
l osophi es can legiti mately be reconci led wi th one another, for t heywere both
i nspi red by the same rati onali st fai t h. "5 Thus Sai nt-Si moni sm took i ts pl ace
besi de Cartesi ani sm and neo-Kanti ani sm as a constructive force i n shapi ng
Durkheim's rati onal i st perspecti ve.
Thi s consi derat i on helps to s i t uat e mor e preci sel y the i nfuence of
Comt e on Durkhei m's search for th e laws of soci al l i fe. Durkhei m scored
the injustice of Comte's reference to hi s associ ation with Sai nt-Si mon as a
"morbi d li ai son in hi s early youth wi th a depraved j uggler. "6 According to
Durkhei m, Comte clearly owed Sai nt-Si mon much more than he someti mes
acknowledged. But Durkhei m admi tted that i t was no easy task to di scover
unity or coherence i n Sai nt-Si mon's thought. Hi s work was "a l oose seri es of
papers, i nnumerabl e brochures, pl ans and l i sts of arti cl es forever out l i ned but
never realized. " 7 Durkhei m was not one t o underesti mate the i mportance of
organizati on and synthesi s i n relation t o outbursts of genius and begui li ng
di gressions. I n Soci al i sm he asserted that the honor of bei ng the foundi ng
father of soci ology, currently ascri bed to Comte, should i n j ustice be awarded
to Sai nt -Si mon. In a later arti cle, Durkhei m repeated the assertion that "i n a
sense all the fundamental i deas of Comte' s soci ology may already be found in
Sai nt-Si mon. "8 But he added the stricture that the "truly creative act consi sts
not i n throwi ng out a few beauti ful i d eas whi ch begui le the i nt elli gence but
i n graspi ng i deas frmly i n order t o make them fecund by placi ng them i n
contact wi th thi ngs, coordi nati ng them, provi ding i ni tial proofs i n a manner
that makes ideas both logi cally assi milable and open to verif cation by oth
ers. Thi s is what Comte did for soci al sci ence . . . and i t i s why he deserves to
be consi dered its father and why the name soci ol ogy whi ch he gave the new
sci ence remai ns defni ti ve. "9
Thus Sai nt-Si mon was the chari smati c i nspi rat i on for soci al sci ence,
but Comte was i t s systemati c organizer. In hi s own analysis of Sai nt-Si mon,
Durkhei m undoub tedly saw the earl i er prophet of Paris through the pri sm
provi ded by the more di sci pl i ned thought of Comte. Asi de from i ts relati on
Chapte 5 Theory and Practice 183
to hi s Cartesiani zed neo-Kanti ani sm, Durkhei m's i ni ti al emphasi s upon the
"exteriori ty" and "constraint" of thinglike "soci al facts" may have owed a great
deal to the l eaden gray soci al world of Comte. Comt e, however, was expl i ci t
i n expressi ng hi s penchant for authori tari an hi erarchi es and bureaucrati c
structures for exercising control . Hi s i dea of consensus and order has been
ftti ngly descri bed as a Cathol i ci sm wi thout Chri sti ani ty. Even Comt e's latter
day openness to the i nfuence of brotherhood and love remai ned permeated
wi th i di osyncrati c fantasi es, and i t cul mi nated i ntellectually i n a "religion of
humanity" whi ch was often l i ttl e more than an i ndi vi dual i sti c worshi p of
heroes of the past. Durkhei m i ncreasi ngly moved away from t hi s frame of
reference in an attempt to combi ne i nsti tuti onal constrai nt wi th communal
sent i ment . Thi s idea of soci al normal i ty was also th e poi nt of departure i n
hi s i nterpretati on of reli gi on.
l E Comte went t o extremes i n hi s po ltechniciens admi r at i on for for mal
rati onal i ty and b ureaucrati c order, Sai nt- Si mon, i n Durkhei m's opi ni on,
went t oo far t o t he opposi t e extreme of r omant i c pas s i on and spontanei ty.
Thi s j udgment was in fact the sol e basi s of t he cri t i ci s m of Sai nt- Si mon i n
Durkhei m's wor k on soci al i sm. I n one s t r and of hi s argume nt , Durkhei m
affr med t he mi nd- body dual i sm i n uncompr omi si ng for m. Hi s reacti on
to Sai nt - Si mon' s i nsi stence on the erot i c aspect of love was to remark that
hi s predecessor fai l ed t o appreci at e t he Chri sti an message. The panthei sti c,
pagan t hrust of Sai nt -Si mon's New Christianity subverted the Chri sti an i dea
t hat "t he di vi ne, bound and as i f i mpri soned i n matter, t ends to free i tsel f
to ret urn to God, from Whom i t came . " 1 0 Such s ent i ments, whi ch were
pr omi nent i n Durkhei m's soci al me taphysi c, were strongly represented i n
the out l ook of the fne jeur of republ i can spi ri t ual i st i c phi l os ophers who
were often Durkhei m's i nt ended audi ence and reference group.
A second strand of Durkhei m's argument appl i ed to the fantasi es of
a total l i berat i on of t he erot i c that were preval ent among one group of
Sai nt - Si moni ans . I t al so appl i ed t o i mages of consumer bl i ss, eul ogi es of
unl i m i red e nt r epr eneur i al drive, a nd the gener al i zat i on of Promet hean
val ues. I ndeed, Dur khei m argued t hat the t hought of Sai nt - Si mon and
t he worl dl y phi l osophy of t he i deol ogi sts of capi t al i sm - the economi sts
- were di fferent s ymp toma ti c expr es s i ons of "the s a me s oci al st at e"
and shared "the same sensuous and ut i l i t ari an tendency" and the same
"fundament al pr i nci pl e. " 1 1 For Durkhei m, t hi s pri nci pl e of endl ess need
and l i mi t l ess asserti on as a domi nant soci al force was pat hogeni c i n al l
i t s manifest at i ons, i ncl udi ng t he technocrati c and the eroti c. I n hi s basi c
cr i t i que of Sai nt - Si mon, Durkhei m i n fact utt ered certai n st ri ctures that
were to be repeated verbati m i n hi s di scussi on of anomi e i n Suicide. He
concl uded that ul t i mately Sai nt -Si mon offered "as a remedy an aggravati on
of the evi l. " 1 2
What were the elements i n Sai nt-Si mon's concepti on of reform that
Durkhei m beli eved were t o be detached from thei r anomi e context and
given new meani ng i n a desi rable state of soci ety? In contrast to i nsi stently
egalitarian as well as revol uti onary views, Durkheim' s very defni ti on of so
ci alism depended primarily on the perspective of Sai nt-Si mon: "We denote
as soci al i st every doctri ne whi ch demands the connect i on of al l economi c
functi ons, or of certai n among t hem, which are at t he present t i me di ffuse
to t he di recti ng and consci ous centers of society. " 1 3 In contrast wi t h Comte,
Sai nt-Si mon di d not b el i eve that the di vi si on of l abor necessarily led t o soci al
di si ntegrati on. Sai nt-Si mon's i dea of soci al i sm embodi ed hi s concepti on of
the manner in whi ch organi c soli darity among hi ghly differenti ated functions
coul d be generated i n modern soci ety.
In accepting thi s concepti on of soci al i sm, Durkhei m rejected defni ti ons
based on the abol i t i on of private property, collecti vi sm, and the working
class. On the subj ect of property, he observed that i1arx hi mself envi si oned
the collective ownership only of the means of producti on. The basi c ques
ti on was the relati onshi p of fami l i al i nheri tance, collective ownership of the
means of producti on, and i ndi vi dual property. Durkhei m's own corporati st
proposals would embody hi s speci fc answer to thi s questi on. But he noted i n
a prefatory manner that cri ti ci sm of i nheri tance involved the most complete
and radical affrmati on of the ri ght of pri vate property i n hi story. Inheritance
was a vestige of "old fami l i al communi sm. " It had nothing to do with the
achievement or work of the i ndi vi dual. "In order that property may be sai d
to be truly i ndi vi dual, i t is necessary that i t be the work of the i ndi vi dual
and of h i m al one. " I n t hi s sense, "private property is that whi ch begi ns wi th
the i ndi vdual and ends wi th hi m. " Thus the decli ne of the i mportance of
ki nshi p had two i nsti tuti onal consequences that were yet to be fully realized:
the restriction of private property to the indivi dual who acqui red i t and the
creation of a more signifcant soci al agency i n modern soci ety for the trans
mi ssi on of wealth and capi tal . 1 4
Moreover, col l ecti vi sm i n general was not s peci fc to soci al i sm; ac
cordi ng to Durkhei m, "There has never been a soci et y in whi ch pri vate
i nterests have not been s ubordi nat ed to soci al ends; for thi s s ubordi na
ti on i s t he very condi t i on of al l communi t y l i fe . " 1 5 To the charge that
col l ecti vi sm meant aut hor i t ar i ani s m, Dur khei m answered, "If t here i s
an aut hori t ari an soci al i sm, there i s al so one whi ch i s essenti ally demo
crat i c. " 1 6 Nor coul d exclusi ve concern for t he fat e of t he worki ng class
be i denti f ed wi th soci al i sm. The b et terment of workers' lives was one
goal of t he organi zat i on of the economy, "j us t as class war i s onl y one of
t he means by whi ch t hi s reorgani zati on coul d resul t , one aspect of t he
hi st ori c devel opment pr oduci ng i t . " 1 7 Soci al i sts wer e correct i n argui ng
t hat "there i s presentl y an e nt i re s egment of the e conomi c worl d whi ch i s
not trul y and di rectl y i nt egrated i nto s oci ety. " Members of the worki ng
class "are not full-f edged members of s oci ety, si nce they part i ci pat e i n
t he communi ty's life onl y t hrough an i mposed medi um" - the capi t al i st
class whi ch deprives workers of s oci al j us t i ce. 1 8 Soci al i st s were al so ri ght
i n argui ng that the l egi ti mate demands of the expl oi t ed coul d not be met
by wel fare dol es or char i ty. " Ch ari ty o rgani zes n o t h i ng. I t mai nt ai ns t h e
status quo , i t can onl y att enuat e the i ndivi dual s ufferi ng that t hi s lack of
organi zat i on engenders . " 1 9 Onl y through st ruct ural change that woul d
provi de i ns t i t ut i ons for t he regul at i on of t he economy and al l groups
i nvolved i n i t , not through measures rest ri cted to the worki ng cl ass al one,
mi ght soci al j us t i ce be created i n mode r n s oci ety.
What was Durkhei m's concept i on of t he rel ati on of soci ol ogy to hi story
and ethnography, and what were the i mpl i cat i ons of the rel ati onshi p for
hi s i d ea of reform in mod ern soci ety? A general answer to t hese quest i ons
i s provi ded by the dual bases of Durkhei mi sm: t he hypot het i cal "tree"
of soci al l i fe and the di st i nct i on between "normal i ty" and "pathology. "
Durkhei m clearly rejected the concept i on of uni l i near evol ut i on i n Comte's
famous law of t he t hree stages:
Whatever Pascal may have sai d -and Comte mistakenly took up hi s
celebrated formul a - manki nd cannot b e compared to a man who,
having lived through all past centuri es, sti ll subsists. Rather, humani ty
resembl es an i mmense fami l y whose di fferent branches, whi ch have
i ncreasi ngly diverged from one another, have become l i ttl e by l i t t l e
detached from the common trunk to live thei r own l i ves. Besi des,
what assurance i s there that t hi s common t runk ever exi sted?20
In his gui di ng model of the tree of soci ocul tural lif e, Durkhei m combi ned
a f exible theory of the transhistorical wi th a noti on of different "social species"
or types. Hi s concepti on of the common trunk and i ts relation to "pri mi tive"
societies owed much to Rousseau. Hi s i dea of typological branches and its rela
t i on to hi story derived i n large part from Sai nt-Si mon. He was also i ndebted
to Sai nt-Si mon i n his speci fc concepti on of modern hi story, as wel l as i n hi s
more comprehensi ve i deas of soci al normal i ty and pathology. Asi de from the
i nfluence of earlier soci al theori sts, thi s chapter of Durkheim' s thought was
of course al so permeated wi th bi ological analogies, at ti mes wi th confusing
results. On the whol e, however, Durkheim recognized the l i mi tati ons as well
as the value of the "organismic" metaphor.
The trunk of the tree of social life represented the elementary condi ti ons
or "functi onal prerequi si t es" of soci ety. They were approxi mated in the most
cl ear and di sti nct form i n "pri mi tive" soci eti es. And at ti mes Durkhei m, wi th
some misgiving, converted hi s logi cal model i nto an evol uti onary timetable
by arguing that the "common trunk" was indeed present in i ts pure form i n
"totemi c society. " The more general methodological point was that "primi tive"
soci eti es in thei r relative si mpl i ci ty presented privileged cases for "crucial
experi ments" which attempted to deduce the transhistorical bases of society
and culture.
In thi s respect, Durkhei m underwent a si gni fcant change of opi ni on. Hi s
early thought, e. g. , i n The Rules ofSociological Method, tended t o denigrate
the i mportance of ethnography in comparison wi th hi stori ography. 2 1 Under
the combi ned i mpact of better ethnographic research i n the feld and a shi ft
in theoretical and phi l osophi cal focus, hi s later thought made ethnography
t he anchor poi nt of general soci ology ( or, in t he sense of Levi -Strauss, of
anthropology). In The Elementary Forms, Durkhei m chi ded hi stori ans for
ignoring the theoreti cal i mportance of ethnographic materi al for an under
standi ng of the transhistorical bases of soci ety that the obj ects of hi stori cal
research woul d reveal in di fferent mani festati ons. 22 One of the examples he
was fond of ci ti ng was the relation of Polynesian taboo to Roman sacer -a
poi nt which Marc Bloch woul d develop in his study of royal ri tuals of heal
i ng, Les Rois thaumaturges.
But Dur khei m never lost i nt erest in the rel at i on of so ci ol ogy to hi st ory
and i t s i mport ance for t he def ni t i on of soci al t ypes. And t hi s i nt erest was
especi al l y marked i n the works of hi s mi ddl e p eri od. The probl em of the
r el at i on of hi st ory t o s oci o logy gave ri se, i n Durkhei m's France, to di sci
pl i nary s quabbl es and i mper i al i s t i c pos t ur i ng t hat accor ded i l l wi t h hi s
i dea of "organi c sol i dari t y. " However i mport ant t hese debates may have
been for the pl ay of pers onal i ty, t he def ni t i on of f elds of compet ence,
compet i ti ve professi onal cl ai ms t o i ns t i t ut i onal aut onomy and aut hori t y
over obj e ct s of di scourse and p ract i ce, and t he hi st ori cal devel opment of
t he di s ci pl i nes , t hei r i nt el l ect ual fo undat i on was oft en mi ni mal Y
I ndeed, i t i s si gni fcant t hat t he debat e over hi st ori ci sm never reached
i n France t he hei ghts of i nt ensi t y and di vi si veness t hat i t di d i n Ge rmany.
One obvi ous reason was t hat hi st ori ci sm had not made as great an i mpact
i n Fr ance and, therefor e , di d not for m as i mpos i ng an obst acl e t o thi nk
ers mor e concer ned wi th modes of experi ence or i ent ed t o t he pres ent o r
fu t ure. I n Fr ance, real i sm i n the novel ha d , i n the works of s uch f gures
as Bal zac, appl i ed t o cont empor ar y real i t i es pr i nci pl es of unders t andi ng
t ha t , i n Ger many, h ad b een largely r est ri ct ed to an appreci at i on of t h e
pas t . And i n s omeone l i ke Bal zac t he resul t was a vi si onary real i sm t hat
was sensi ti ve t o t he r ol e of symbol and myt h i n cul t ur e. Real i sm i n t he
novel decl i ned t owar d t he end of t he ni net eent h centur y. To s ome ext ent ,
Dur khei mi an s oci ol ogy, i n i t s at t empt t o penet r at e cont emporary soci al
real i t i es, may be seen as t he hei r of t he real i st i c novel . It i s, however,
t r ue that Durkhei m's earl y t hought shared features o f nat ur al i sm, whi l e
hi s l at er t hought concei ved val ues and symbol s i n a manner remi ni scent
of symb ol i s m. To t hi s ext ent , t he devel opment of hi s t hought paral l el ed
t he di vi si on of l i t erat ure i nt o nat ural i st i c and symbol i st t endenci es. But
on i t s mor e di al ect i cal or rel at i onal s i de, Durkheim' s t hought ret ai ned
the i nt ent i on to be found i n the vi s i onary r eal i s m of a Bal zac. And i t
di d t hi s i n a manner t hat i ndi cat ed no t onl y a n i ncreasi ng awareness of
t h e r ol e of affect and myt h i n s oci et y but al s o s ome sensi t i vi t y t o t h e
probl em of i nt egrat i ng a concept i on o f moder n s oci ety wi t h an under
s t andi ng of hi s t ori cal devel opment . The goal of a comprehensi ve or even
t ot al i zi ng s oci al hi s t ory was a feature of the Dur khei mi an heri t age to b e
preserved and develope d b y the Annales s chool under 1 arc Bl och and
Luci en Febvre.
On a t heoret i cal l evel , Durkhei m concei ved the basi c rel at i onshi p
be tween hi st ory and soci ol ogy to be one of i nterdi sci pl i nary coopera
ti on i n the defni t i on of si gni f cant pr obl ems. He observed t hat st udi es
deal i ng wi t h soci al phenomena presented a strange di chot omy. On one
si de, there was "a rather i nchoat e mul t i t ude of sci ences or quasi -sci ences
whi ch had t he same obj ect but were i gnorant of t hei r ki nshi p and t he
profo und uni t y of t he facts they st udi ed, often onl y vaguely sensi ng t hei r
rati onal i ty. " On the ot her s i de was soci ol ogy, "whi ch was aware of t hi s
uni t y b ut whi ch gl i ded t oo hi gh above t he facts to have any effect upon
t he way i n whi ch they were s t udi ed. " Thus t he mos t urgent reform was
"to make the s oci ologi cal i dea descend i nto the speci al t echni ques and in
t ha t way t ransform t hem i nt o real soci al s ci ences . " On l y in t hi s way coul d
soci ol ogy become more t han an "abstract metaphysi cs, " and t he works of
speci al i st s more t han "monographs wi t hout ei t her l i nks t o one anot her
or expl anatory val ue. " 24
Met hodol ogi cally, t radi t i onal hi st ori ography approached the st udy of
soci ety t hrough a narrat i ve of events and t he lives of i ndi vi dual s. Wi t hout
a t he oreti cal compl ement , narrative was not expl anat ory, because i t di d not
address i tsel f t o t he probl em of compari son. " Hi st ory makes al l compari
sons i mpos s i bl e, because i t arranges facts i n l i near seri es and on di fferent
levels. Preoccupi ed wi t h di st i ngui shi ng phenomena from one anot her and
marking the place of each in t i me, the hi stori an loses sight of si mi l ari t i es. "25
The recounti ng of a seri es of di sparate facts di d not const i t ut e a l ogi cal
orderi ng pr i nci pl e. For chronol ogy was, as a rul e, merel y a more fami l i ar
form of chaos. Here Durkhei m di d not address t he speci fc ki nd of order
at t ri but ed or i mpart ed t o facts t hrough vari et i es of narrati ve whi ch coul d
not be reduced t o chronol ogy al one. Hi s mor e soci al -sci entif c i dea of
order woul d also be shared by t hose affl i at ed wi t h the Amzales whi ch
woul d confront the possi bi l i t i es of narrati ve only l ong after Durkhei m's
deat h. Durkhei m's poi nt was, however, well taken i nsofar as an argument
or eval uative o ri ent at i on e mbedded i n a convent i onal narrati ve i s not
cri t i cal l y ope n for i nspect i on and debat e and mus t be extri cated and more
expl i ci tly formul ated t o be an obj ect of cogni tively and et hi copol i ti cal l y
responsi bl e i nvesti gat i on.
The comparative met hod was for Durkhei m t he l aboratory of a more
analyti c, expl anatory, and normatively expl i ci t approach to the st udy of
soci ety, for i t represented the soci al sci enti st's analogue of experi mentati on:
"Cl aude Bernard remarked l ong ago that the essence of experi mentati on
i s not t he operat or's abi l i ty to produce phenomena arti fci ally. Arti fce i s
onl y one means whose goal i s t o pl ace t he fact under study i n di fferent
ci rcumstances and to see i t i n di fferent forms so that rel evant compari sons
may be made. "2 6 But Durkhei m was especi al l y wary of t he formal i st i c
t empt ati ons of an analyti c and model -bui l di ng soci ol ogy. In a di rect cri ti
ci sm of Spencer and Comt e, he remarked that the soci ol ogi st's "excessively
general i nterpretati ons are i mpot ent in contact with the facts" and that thi s
i mpotence had "i n part produced the di strust t hat hi story has often fel t
for soci ol ogy. "2 7 He also expl i ci tl y rej ected Georg Si mmel's concepti on of
soci ol ogy as t he el aborati on of i deal -typi cal constructs ( e. g. , for ms of com
muni ty, di fferenti ati on, domi nat i on, strati fcati on, and confi ct ) . Durkhei m
recogni zed that a sci ence had to be formed on the basi s of abstract ideas and
analytic di sti ncti ons. But he i nsi sted: "It i s necessary that abstracti ons be
met hodically elaborated and that they di vi de facts accordi ng t o thei r natural
arti cul ati ons. Otherwi se abstracti ons degenerate i nto i maginary constructs
and a vai n mythology. "28
Methodologically, these i deas often rel i ed on a very conservative if not
naive epi stemol ogy. But they also l ed t o a focus on i nst i t ut i ons and t o a
desi re for a cl ose worki ng rel ati onshi p wi th hi story. "Inst i tut i ons have to
exteri or i nci dents the same rel ati onshi p as the mode and functi oni ng of
organs i n the i ndi vi dual have to the vari ous acti ons whi ch fl l our dai ly
li ves. Only through an i nst i tut i onal focus can hi story cease t o be a narrative
study and open i tsel f to sci enti fc anal ysi s . " Events like "wars, peace trea
ties, i ntri gues of courts or assembl i es, or the acts of statesmen" seemed to
follow no defni te laws. In any event, " i f these laws exi st, they are the most
di ffcul t to discover. " On t he ot her hand, "i nst i t ut i ons -whi l e of course
evolvi ng -conserve thei r essenti al trai ts duri ng long peri ods of ti me and
someti mes duri ng an enti re col l ecti ve exi stence, because they express what
i s most profoundl y cons t i t ut ive of any soci al organizat i on. " I nst i t ut i ons
al so presented "striking si mi l ari t i es" i n di fferent soci eti es. "Thus typologi es
become possi bl e and comparative hi story i s born. "29
Hence soci ol ogy was in essence a comparative study of the genesis, struc
ture, and functi oni ng of i nsti tuti ons. To the li st i n thi s defni ti on, the later
Durkhei m would undoub tedly have added the problem of the relation of
i nsti tuti ons to bel i efs, values, and i deologi es. Referring to hi s own professor
of hi story, for whom this probl em was a central issue, Durkhei m observed in
the preface to the frst volume of the Annee socio!ogique:
Hi story can be a sci ence only to the extent that i t explains, and expla
nati on cannot proceed except through compari son. Otherwi se, even
si mpl e descri pti on i s hardly possi bl e; one cannot adequatel y descri be
a uni que fact, or a fact of whi ch one has onl y rare i nstances, because
one does not see i t adequatel y . . . . Fustel de Coul anges was fond of
repeati ng that true soci ology i s hi story: nothi ng i s more i ncontestable,
provi ded t hat hi st ory is carri ed on soci ol ogi cal l y. 30
Soci ol ogy, as Durkhei m once put i t , was like the grammar of hi storyY
Changing the met aphor, he observed that hi story pl ayed, "i n the realm
of soci al real i ti es, a role analogous to that of the mi croscope in the study
of nat ure. "3 2 In an i mportant review of works by Gaetano Salvemi ni and
Benedetto Croce, Durkhei m argued t hat hi story as a "nomotheti c" ( l aw
seeking) sci ence and hi story as an "i di ographi c" ( parti cul ari zi ng) art were
"desti ned to become i nseparabl e. " There was no opposi t i on or paralyzing
anti nomy between them, but "only di fferences of degree. " Sci enti f c hi st ory,
or soci ol ogy, coul d not do wi t hout the "di rect observati on of concrete fact s. "
And hi story had to become i nformed by t he general pri nci pl es of soci ol
ogy. Al l hi story requi red sel ect i on among fact s, and thi s, i n t urn, i mpl i ed
the use of cri t eri a that made compari son possi bl e. "In real i ty, " Durkhei m
concl uded, "t here are not two di s t i nct di sci pl i nes but two di fferent poi nt s
of view whi ch, far from excludi ng one another, presuppose one another. "33
Except for hi s i nsi stence on cooperati on, Durkhei m di d not address the
probl em of i nsti t uti onal i mpl i cati ons of thi s observati on for the organization
of di sci pl i nes i n the universi ty.
We have already had reason to not e that Durkhei m's actual practi ce at
t i mes diverged from t he t heoreti cal posi ti on i ndi cated above. Per haps t he one
work i n whi ch hi s analysis both came closest to the hi story of the hi stori ans
and made an informative use of narrative was hi s Evolution ptdagogique en
France.34 Thi s work was restri cted to the development of educati on i n France.
But i t clearly was based on broad "comparative" knowledge of different soci al
systems. Its focus was t he development of i deol ogi es of educati on i n the
context of t he evol uti on of i nst i t uti ons. The resul t was a remarkabl e soci al
hi story of i deas that revealed a sense of i l l umi nati ng detai l and a sensi ti vi ty
to the compl exi ty of soci al li fe often absent i n Durkheim' s more famous
works. I ndeed, t he hi ghest accolade one can best ow upon t hi s s t udy i s a
cri teri on of all good hi story: its argument bel i es summary.
How were Durkhei m's met hodol ogi cal vi ews rel ated to eval uat i on and
refor m? Durkhei m apparentl y di d not bel i eve that the hi st ori cal process
as a whol e had a meaningful pl ot or structure. He did not, for exampl e,
subscri be to Hegel's t heodi cy of hi st ory. Hi story di d not have a meani ng.
But peopl e i n soci ety part i ci pat ed i n the creati on of at l east l i mi ted mean
i ng, whi ch exi sted i n a tense di al ecti c wi t h anomi e forces. At l east by
i mpl i cati on, Durkhei m seemed t o envi sage the hi st or i cal pr ocess as one of
osci l l at i on between varyi ng states of order and chaos -t h e "organi c" a nd
"cri ti cal " peri ods of Sai nt -Si mon.
Yet Durkhei m's i dea of the rel at i on of consci ous human act i on t o thi s
process was never clearly stated. Hi s evoluti onary opti mi sm seemed t o i mpl y
that there was an i mpersonal or unconsci ous process that effected, over ti me,
a devel opment of soci ety i n the di rect i on of i nt egrati on and vi abl e order.
Most often, h i s tendency in hi s t orical a nalysi s was to de- emph asi ze t h e role
of i nt ent i onal acti on i n at t empt s to shape meani ngful forms of exi stence.
At t i mes he di d attri but e some wei ght t o i ndi vi dual devi ance or excepti onal
performance as a force for soci al change. For exampl e, he presented great
phi l osophers, l i ke Socrates, as i ndi vi dual s who crystalli zed wi th hei ghtened
percepti veness the tendenci es of an age and acted as heral ds of the fut ure.
But he certainly rejected a "great man" i nterpretati on of hi story. And gener
ally he i nsi sted i n extreme fashi on on the role of i mpersonal processes and
i nst i t ut i onal forces in a hi story devoi d of proper names.
One probl em was t hat Durkhei m proved unabl e to i ntegrate fully, or at
l east to rel ate i ntel l i gi bl y, a met hodology geared t o causal anal ysi s and one
sensi tive to meani ngs. The ques t i on of meani ng and i t s l i mi t s woul d have
requi red cl oser attenti on to the rol e of concrete agents i n hi st ory, both as
i ndi vi dual s and i n groups. I n hi s l ater e mph asi s on i nternal i zed val ues and
"collecti ve representati ons, " Durkhei m recogni zed t he i mportance of t he
percepti on and i deological i nterpretati on of soci al and cul t ural phenomena.
But he never worked out an adequate noti on of the di al ect i cal rel ati on of
these factors to i mpersonal processes and l ong-term structural causati on. Hi s
only at t empt t o account for t he genesi s of "col l ecti ve representati ons" was
the vague i dea that they somehow emerged from the "collecti ve substratum"
before attai ni ng a relative autonomy i n enteri ng i nto combi nati ons wi th one
another. 3 5 Thi s i dea amount ed at best t o a reformul at i on of t he not i on that
soci al exi stence preceded soci al consci ousness -a reformul at i on whi ch was
vaguer than the 1arxi st vari ant, si nce it di d not contai n even a rudi men
t ary t heory of the format i on of i deol ogi es. Durkhei m woul d have gai ned
much from cl oser attenti on to the cont emporary German controversy over
methods (Methodenstreit) , from whi ch Ma Weber benef ted so greatly.
Durkhei m's domi nant pos i t i on was wel l expressed in an exchange
wi t h t he hi st ori an Charl es Sei gnobos. Sei gnobos hi msel f took an extreme
Rankean posi t i on on the i mportance of i ndi vi dual wi l l i n hi story and of
eyewi t ness reports i n hi stori ograp hy. Durkhei m asserted:
The questi on i s t o know i f i n hi story one can really admi t only
consci ous causes, t hos e whi ch me n t hemselves at t r i but e t o t he
events and act i ons of whi ch t hey ar e agents . . . . I t i s not a quest i on
of events but of i nner motives whi ch coul d have det ermi ned t hese
events. How may one know these mot i ves? There are onl y t wo pos
si bl e procedures. Ei t her one t ri es to di scover them obj ectively by
an experi mental method: nei t her t he agents nor t he wi tnesses of
the events were abl e to do t hi s . Or one tri es t o arri ve at t he m by
an i nner met hod of i nt rospect i on . . . . Now everyone knows how
much consci ousness i s full of i l l us i ons . For a long time, there has
not been a psychol ogi st who bel i eves i nt rospecti on can reach t o
profound causes. Every causal rel at i on i s unconsci ous, and i t must
be found after t he event; by i ntrospecti on one arrives onl y at facts
but never at causes. 36
On the basi s of thi s comment, one mi ght have expected Durkhei m to
pay more sustai ned at t ent i on to the probl em of collecti ve psychology i n
other than the common-sensi cal terms on whi ch he often rel i ed. I have
already ment i oned this defci t in his t hought . His not i on of an unconsci ous
remai ned i nertl y st ruct ural and largely unrel ated to such processes as re
pressi on, deni al , and di spl acement. And he did not work out a concept
of subl i mat i on whi ch woul d seem requi red for hi s understandi ng of the
el aborat i on and i nternal i zat i on of desi red and desi rabl e norms and val ues.
Anot her di ffcul ty generated by hi s approach i s that i t seemed to l eave hi s
calls to acti on i n the present suspended i n mi d-ai r, for i t offered l i ttl e b asi s
for exi stenti al commi t ment to a col l ective proj ect . But i n hi s concept i on
of soci al act i on i n modern soci ety, Durkhei m di d seem to see a si gni f cant
role for moti vated i nqui ry i nto the causes of di sori ent at i on and consci ous
attempts t o concei ve and i mpl ement desi rabl e change. A constant theme
of hi s thought was t hat a hi stori cal l y i nformed soci ol ogy woul d give peopl e
some measure of cont rol over the hi st ori cal process. How di d a soci ol ogi cal
consci ousness offer thi s possi bi l i ty?
Combi ned wi t h the "cruci al experi ment , " compar ati ve hi story was
a means of arri vi ng at a not i on of t he t ree of soci al l i fe. Et hnography,
when subj ect ed to theoreti cal el aborat i on, was especi ally i mpor t ant for
t h e deve l opme nt of an i dea of t he t r anshi st or i cal b ases o f cul t ure and
soci ety. Comparati ve hi story i l l ustrated and tested t he resul ts of t hi s theo
reti cal el aborati on. More speci fcal ly, i t made possi bl e the del i neati on of
s oci al types or "speci es" and furni shed t es t cases of ways i n whi ch types
of soci al st ruct ure funct i oned i n nor mal or pat hol ogi cal ways. Relevant
compari son al so i l l umi nat ed genet i c processes of "becomi ng, " thereby
provi di ng knowledge of t rends i n vari ous soci al s i t uat i ons . I n accordance
wi t h Comte's di ctum "Sa voi r pour prevoi r; prevoi r pour pouvoi r" ( " Know
i n order to foresee; foresee i n order to b e able t o cont rol " ) , knowledge
offered effecti ve i nsi ght i nto the dangers and possi bi l i t i es of al ternati ve
courses of soci al act i on.
Asi de from i ncorporati ng bi ol ogi cal anal ogi es falling somewhere be
tween Darwi n and Lamarck, Durkhei m's concept s of normal i ty and pathol
ogy were mor e sophi st i cat ed versi ons o f Sai nt -Si mon's i dea of organi c and
cri ti cal peri ods i n hi st ory. Li ke Sai nt -Si mon, Durkhei m bel i eved modern
soci et y to be, i n si gni f cant ways, pat hol ogi cal . He di scussed at l engt h and
wi t h apparent agreement Sai nt -Si mon's model of evol ut i on i n Western
Eur ope in t erms of a growing conf i ct be tween a rel i gi o-mi l i t ary and a
sci ent i fc-i ndust ri al type of soci ety. In France, t hi s had cul mi nat ed i n the
great Revo l ut i on, wh ose nat ure, causat i on, and consequences Durkhei m
saw i n a basi cal l y Sai nt - Si moni an way:
A two-fol d need gave rise to i t: the need to be extri cated from the
past and the need to organize the present. The Revol uti on met only
the frst of these needs. I t succeeded in striking the fnal blows at the
old system. It abol i shed all that remai ned of feudali sm - even royal
authority - and all that survived from the old temporal power. But
on the l and thus cleared, the Revol uti on bui l t nothi ng new. It asserted
that one was no longer obli ged to accept t he old bel i es but di d not
attempt t o elaborate a new body of rational bel i efs that all mi nds
coul d accept. -7
The Revol ut i on had destroyed the ol d order, b u t i t mi scarri ed i n the
creati on of t he new. It gave bi rt h t o the hi ghest i deal s of modern soci ety,
but i t di d not speci f and establ i sh these i deal s in i nst i t uti ons and rati onal
bel i efs. At t he st art of t h e ni neteenth cent ury, aft er the Revolut i on h ad
run its course, the basi c probl em of a new soci al order was presented i n
the same terms as i n 1 789. Onl y the probl em ha d become more urgent. A
stabi l i zed revol ut i onary settl ement was, for Durkhei m, necessary "i f one
does not wi sh t o s ee each cri si s produce anot her, exasperati on the chroni c
state of soci ety, and fnally, di si ntegrati on more or less the resul t. " Thi s
was t he way i n whi ch Sai nt-Si mon had posed the soci al questi on, and for
Durkhei m i t coul d not " be posed wi t h greater profundi ty. "3 8
Durkhei m's later t hought frequentl y revealed t he i nf uence of Bergson's
i deas of creati ve evol ut i on and elan vital. By means of these concept i ons,
he was abl e t o i ntegrate some of the Prometheani sm of Sai nt -Si mon i nt o
hi s perspecti ve. Thus he stressed more o ften t he creative s i de of anomi e
and i ts rel at i on t o newer cul t ural possi bi l i t i es. Thi s t endency can be found
i n The Elementary Forms, notabl y i n i ts concepti on of the generati ve rol e
of col l ective effervescence. It i s al so evi dent i n the onl y compl eted sect i on
of hi s proj ect ed magnum opus "La Moral e":
Life, al l li f e, i s ri ch wi t h an i nf ni te number of seeds of every variety,
of whi ch s ome are at present devel oped and correspond especi al l y
t o t he present exi genci es of t he mi l i eu b u t of whi ch many are dor
mant, t emporari ly unused, and undevelope d. These wi l l perhaps
be awakened t omorrow under new ci rcumstances. All l i fe i s change
and i s refactory to stati c states. A li vi ng bei ng i s not made for a
si ngle end; i t may lend i tsel f t o very d i ffer ent ends and to mul t i pl e
s i t uat i ons . . . . So mu ch t he mor e i s t hi s t r ue of human nat ure: hi s
tory is not onl y t he natural framework of human l i fe; man i s a
product of hi s tory. 39
I n hi s Evolution pedagogique, Durkhei m i nsi st ed that i t was i mpossi bl e
at any given mome nt t o draw up a bl uepri nt of human nat ure:
For the weal th of past product i on does not i n t he l east aut hor i ze us
to assign a l i mi t to the producti on of the future or t o t hi nk that a da y
wi l l ever come when man, havi ng reached t he end of hi s creati on,
wi l l be condemned t o repeat hi msel f perpet ually. Thus one arrives
at a concept i on of man, not as a system of def ni te el ements whi ch
may be number ed, but as an i nfni tel y fexi bl e and versati l e force
capabl e of taki ng on the most di verse aspects under the pressure of
ever renewed ci rcumstances. 40
Thus Durkhei m arri ved at a very f exi bl e i dea of the hypot het i cal
t r unk of t he tree of soci al life: i t represent ed an unl i mi t ed set of cul t ural
possi bi l i t i es. Each t ype of soci ety woul d reali ze a l i mi t ed subset of t hese
possi bi l i t i es i n normal or pathol ogi cal form. Al though cul t ural possi bi l i ti es
were unl i mi ted i n t heory, any combi nati on of them i n a normal state of
s oci et y woul d i t s el f b e l i mi t ed and woul d i nsti l l i n members of soci ety a
normati ve sense of l i mi t s l eavened onl y by a creati ve margi n of anomi e.
Especi ally si gni fcant i n LEvolution peagogique was Durkhei m's concept i on
of t he Mi ddl e Ages. For Sai nt -Si mon, of course, t he soci ol ogi cal i nt erest of
the me di eval peri od was i ts achi evement of one possi bl e form of organi c
i ntegrati on. Al though Durkhei m never ful l y adhered t o an i deal i zed vi ew
of the Mi ddl e Ages, he di d present i t as a peri od based on a tense and
creati ve bal ance be tween fai t h and reason, s pontanei ty and i ns t i t ut i onal l y
grounded const rai nt . There was for Durkhei m "somet hi ng exci ti ng and
dramatic" in the spectacl e offered by "this tormented epoch tossed between
respect for t r adi t i on and the call o f free enqui ry. " Thi s peri od was far from
bei ng "pl unged i n a sort of qui et ude and i ntel l ectual t or por . " It was in fact
"i nt ernally di vi ded and drawn i n cont radi ct ory di recti ons. " Durkhei m's
reacti on to t hi s state of affai rs may come as a surpri se to t hose who have
presented hi m as the rigid, i f not aut hori t ari an, champi on of Cartesi an
constrai nt, formal rati onal i ty, and sti l l -l ife order i n soci ety.
Thi s i s one of the moment s when t he human spi ri t was mos t full of
effervescence and creati ve of new thi ngs . . . . Men had not yet t ri ed
to separat e these two i nseparabl e aspects of human life [ i . e . , fai t h
and reason] . Men had not yet undertaken the canal i zati on and t he
dammi ng up of t hese t wo great i nt el l ect ual and moral currents i n
a vai n attempt to pr event t hem from meeti ng! How much more
living was t h i s general and t umul t uous me lee of al l i deas and al l
senti ments than the arti f cial and apparent cal m of t he centuri es
whi ch fol l owed! . . . We must i ndeed modi fy our nati onal humor.
We mus t again fnd the taste for free and varied l i fe wi t h all the
acci dents and i rregul ari ti es i t i mpl i es . 4 1
Images of organic growth and relati vely slow evol ut i on appl i ed only
t o devel opment wi thi n a normal state of soci ety or organi c peri od. The
creat i on of normali ty i n moderni ty was a col l ect i ve p roj ect . And even
wi t hi n t he normal state, soci ety was not a stati c obj ect b ut a li vi ng whol e
that overcame general i zed anomi e through a tense, dynami c bal ance of
the essenti al el ements of soci al "heal th. " Durkhei m opposed nei ther the
study of hi story nor the vi tal el ement of creati ve change i n soci al life. Hi s
pol emi cal ani mus was reserved for pathol ogy i n t he sense of generali zed
anomi e, excess, and runaway change; and i t i mpl i ed a repudi at i on of the
type of "hi stori ci sm" whi ch legi t i mat ed anomi e or i t s concomi tants i n a
"transi ti onal " peri od of uncontrol l ed change. Thus Durkhei m observed of
hi s i nterest i n soci al st ruct ure:
Thi s branch of soci ol ogy i s not a sci ence of the purely stati c. For
t hi s reason, we deem i t i mproper to adopt thi s term [ of Comt e] ,
whi ch expresses poorly the poi nt of view from whi ch soci ety ought
t o be consi dered. I t i s not a quest i on, as has somet i mes been sai d
[ by John St uart Mi l l , followi ng Comt e] , of consi deri ng soci ety at a
given moment, i mmobi l i zed by an abstracti on, but on the contrary,
of analyzing i ts formati on and accounti ng for i t . No doubt the phe
nomena that have to do wi th structure have somet hi ng more stabl e
about them than h ave functi onal phenomena. But be tween t hese
two orders off act there are onl y di fferences of degree. St ructure i tself
i s encountered i n becomi ng [le devenir] , and one can i l l umi nat e i t
only i f one does not l ose si ght of the process of becomi ng. Structure
i s formed and di si ntegrated conti nually. I t i s life that has arrived
at a certai n degree of consol i dat i on. To di sti ngui sh i t from the life
from whi ch i t deri ves or from the life whi ch i t determi nes woul d
amount t o di ssoci ati ng i nseparabl e thi ngsY
In hi s Moral Education, Durkhei m returned to his concepti On of the
state of modern soci ety wi th a renewed sense of urgency: "We are at present
passi ng through a cri ti cal peri od. Indeed there i s not i n hi story a cri si s as
grave as that of European soci eti es duri ng the past century. "43 In Socialism,
Durkhei m remarked upon t he si gni fcant rel ati onshi p among the ri se of
soci ol ogy, soci al i sm, and rel i gi ous revival in modern soci ety. Al ong wi th
other later works, The Elementary Forms ofered i nsi ght i nto the role of thi s
rel ati onshi p i n Durkhei m's own thought, and i t revealed a sense i n whi ch
revol uti onary turmoi l harbored a posi ti ve component and a gui de to the
creati on of soci al heal th. For The Elementary Forms contai ned a stri ki ng
paral l el between soci al revo lution and t he ori gi ns of col l ecti ve l i fe, whi ch for
Durkhei m were coi nci dent wi t h th e genesi s of religi on. Revol ut i on appar
entl y i nvol ved, i n hi s mi nd, a return to the pr i mordi al passage from nature
to cul ture i n the modi fed form of a transi ti on from one type of soci ety to
another. And the secul ar was i mpl i cated i n more or less unconsci ous dis
pl acements of the religi ous. Indeed there was a sense in which a revol uti on
was a return to the ori gi ns of soci ety, a ki nd of ori gi nary, sacrali zi ng, pri mal
l eap fro m one soci al type to another. And the very val ues and i deal s t hat
served as gui des t o future acti on were generated i n l i mi nal , revol uti onary
epochs of "col l ecti ve effervescence. " "Col l ecti ve effervescence" i tsel f meant,
for Durkhei m, not a mani festati on of crowd psychol ogy i n general, but a
spontaneous, sacral i zi ng elan vital open to communitas and the quasi -rel i
gi ous possi bi l i t i es i n soci al li f e. (These possi bi l i t i es i ncl uded, as they di d i n
the French Revol ut i on, di spl aced rel i gi ous or secul ari zed forces that mi ght
take i nsti tuti onally anti -cl eri cal form. ) As he put i t i n an i mportant arti cl e,
the revol uti onary apogee of the cri ti cal peri od was evangelical, i n t he ety
mol ogi cal sense of the word:
Li fe is lived wi th such i nt e nsi ty and wi th such abandon t hat it fl l s
consci ousness and clears i t al most compl et el y of egoi st i c and vulgar
preoccupati ons. The i deal tends to become one with reality; this is
why men have the i mpressi on that the time i s at hand when it will
become real i ty and when the kingdom of God will be real i zed on
earth. 44
But life at thi s mi l l enni a! pi tch of quasi -rel i gi ous i ntensi ty coul d not be
conti nued as the basi s of a stabl e, ongoi ng soci al system:
The i l l usi on is never durabl e b ecause thi s exaltati on cannot l ast: i t i s
t oo exhausting. Once t he cri ti cal moment has passed, t he soci al fabr i c
l oosens up, i ntel l ectual and senti mental commerce slows down, and
indi vi dual s fal l to thei r ordi nary l evel . Then everyth i ng whi ch was
said, done, and felt duri ng the peri od offecund torment survives only
i n the form of a memory -a presti gi ous memory to be sure, like the
reali ty i t recalls, but wi th which i t i s no longer confounded. 45
The truly successful revol ut i on, accordi ng to Durkhei m, was one that
gave bi r t h in t i me to a "normal " soci ety. The normal society wou l d embody
a twofold rhythm of col l ective l i fe i n whi ch ordi nary, day-to-day acti vi ti es
that contami nated i deals wi th uti li tari an concerns and self-i nterest woul d
alternate wi th speci al symbol i c acti vi ti es. In these communal and festive
activities, the "presti gi ous memory" and extraordi nary i ntensi ty of value
creat i ng revol ut i onary t i mes woul d be revived. These "ri tual " acti vi ti es
woul d themselves rei nvi gorate norms and symbol s by gi vi ng them a sense
of i mmediacy i n the experi ence of members of soci ety and by generati ng a
living force whi ch coul d be carri ed into the daily round. Through ri tual , the
val ues created duri ng the "great ti mes" of the past would become avai l abl e
as a source of renewal for l i fe i n the present. Most i mportant, perhaps, the
communitas - the communal i denti t y among equal s -approxi mat ed i n
l i mi nal events l i ke revol uti on woul d, to some vi abl e ext ent , be i nst i t ut ed i n
ritual as a component of soci al sol i darity. Memb ers of soci ety woul d ritually
realize commmunitas, the vital force of all stabl e -but not stati c -soci ety.
And thi s reali zati on woul d fow i nto dai l y life a a quasi -mythi cal bel i ef or
affectively charged, living fai th that mi tigated the dangers ofboth structural
di ferenti ati on and self-i nterest. Thus, paradoxi cally but understandably,
the mos t hi stori cal l y t urbul ent of events - revol ut i on -woul d be most
successful, i n Durkhei m's opi ni on, when i t gave ri se t o t he most stabi l i zi ng
features of soci al l i f e: ri tual and myth.
Thi s conception of the revitalizing and reinforcing functi on of communal
ceremoni es and feasts i ndi cates the sense i n whi ch Durkhei m b eli eved that
al l "healthy" soci eti es requi red ri t uals rel ated to the "ri tual atti tude" of sacred
respect for basi c commi tments and values. Needl ess to say, these speci al ,
ri tual acti vi ti es woul d be compati bl e wi th reason onl y i f the values and
norms they l egi ti mated were nei ther fanatically i rrati onal nor systematically
contradi cted by ordinary experi ence. Hi s idea of the condi ti on of ri tual i n
a normal state of soci ety i s i mpl i ed i n Durkheim' s analysis rather than ful l y
el uci dated. But i t i s at l east consi stent wi th his over-all argument to observe
that ri tual s whi ch exacerbate i rrati onal pol i ci es and fantasti c vi si ons wi thout
modul ati ng them si mpl y reinforce the unhi nged and unbalanced nature of a
dubi ous status quo. But , as l ong as they were l i mi ted or framed wi thout can
celing all risk, the out bursts of anomi e excess, affective overAow, or chaoti c
uni ty i n ri t ual ( ordi nari l y i l l i ci t sexual uni ons, sacri l egi ous buffoonery, rol e
i nversi on, and other forms of radi cal communitas) funct i oned catharti cal l y
wi thi n the total economy of cul tural life to assure vi abl e bal ance. And i n
revol uti onary transi ti ons, they mi ght i n thei r extreme forms get out of hand
and at ti mes be vehi cl es of desi rabl e soci al change. In a more expl i ci t way,
Durkhei m saw t hat , in the "normal " state of soci ety, ordi nary real i t i es and
operative i nsti tuti ons woul d not hypocri ti cal l y or self-deceptively contradi ct
cul tural values but represent onl y "standard devi ati ons" from them. In a
"pathol ogi cal " context where values and nor mative expectati ons were sys
temati cally upset i n practi ce, the ri t ual setti ngs that di d exi st mi ght functi on
as purdy escapist i l l usi ons or be seen through as vulgar shams.
The task of structural change i n modern soci eti es marked by s i gni fcant
pat hol ogy was t o revive t he i deal s of cl assi cal revol ut i ons of t he past and
to real i ze t hem vi abl y t hrough a sort of cul t ural revol ut i on of good fai t h.
The cri t eri on of success i n t hi s endeavor woul d be t he genesi s of a desi r
abl e rhythm of soci al li fe. Val ues and norms const i t uti ve of t he conscience
colective woul d gui de or di nary pract i ce wi t h an al l owance for "standard
devi ati ons" due to normal human fai l i ngs. The conscience colective woul d
be peri odi cally recreat ed i n pure form i n "ri t ual " cont ext s of communal
s pontanei ty and j oy. Thus the "normal " or normati vely d esi rabl e s oci ety
woul d combi ne the "constrai nt" of obl i gatory i nst i t ut i onal norms wi th the
"col l ecti ve effervescence" of moti vated commi t ment , communal spont ane
i ty, affecti ve i nt ensi ty, and a dynami c leaven of anomi e openness. Norma
ti ve constrai nt woul d not be i ncompat i bl e wi t h chari smati c expressi veness
and an el ement of ri s k. Onl y i n such a soci ety coul d quasi -rel i gi ous sym
bol i sm fu nct i on aut henti cal l y as t he sacred canopy of l egi t i macy for t he
soci al order. Durkhei m's correl at i on of s oci ol ogy, rel i gi ous revival, and
soci al change provi ded t he background for hi s reform proposal s.
C mporatism
Durkheim' s corporati sm is frequentl y i gnored or at most consi dered
to be an example of personal predi l ecti on that was extraneous to the mai n
body of t hi s thought. It was, on the contrary, an i ntegral component of hi s
perspective, whi ch appli ed hi s general i dea of social normal i ty t o the problem
of structural change i n modern soci ety. Essenti al to thi s vi si on of modern
soci al normali ty was a tri angul ar model of the st at e, the corporative group,
and the i ndi vi dual , exi sti ng i n a tense di al ecti cal bal ance.
Durkheim's concepti on of the si tuati on and needs of modern soci ety was
based upon an analysis of hi stori cal evol ut i on i n Western Europe. Corpo
rati ve groups such as the commune, the gui l d, and t he estate had become
i ncreasingly restrictive at the same t i me that t hei r i mportance decl i ned wi th
the growi ng power of the central state. At first the conBi ct between the st at e
and corporative groups had a posi t i ve functi on. For i t was the concrete
hi stori cal basi s of i ndi vi dual ri ghts. "It i s from the conBi ct of soci al forces
that i ndi vi dual l i berti es are bor. "46 But the extreme devel opment of thi s
process of ri si ng state power and i ndi vi dual emanci pati on from i ncreasingly
oppressive i nt ermedi ary or secondary groups threatened to have negative
consequences. I t uni ntenti onal l y cul mi nated in a soci al si tuati on i n whi ch
the state, as the sol e si gni fcant organized p ower, confronted the atomi zed
i ndi vi dual . Thi s confrontati on "had l ong si nce been prepared by progres
sive central i zati on under the ancien regime. " But "the great change which
the French Revol ut i on accompl i shed was t o carry this leveling process to a
poi nt hi therto unknown. "47
Wi thout the countervailing prot ect i on of secondary groups, the i ndi
vi dual l i bert i es f rst won through the i nterventi on of the state became bot h
of dubi ous exi stenti al val ue for the i ndi vi dual and of uncertai n durati on i n
t he face of st at e power. "Thus, by a seri es of endless osci l l ati ons, we pass
alteratively from aut hori t ari an regul at i on, whi ch excessive ri gi di ty makes
i mpotent, t o systemati c abstenti on whi ch cannot last because of the anarchy
i t provokes . "4 8 Si mul taneously, the largely uncontrol l ed devel opment of t he
economy gave ri se to classes whose rel ati ons were not based upon generally
accepted norms but upon unequal market power. 49
The probl em of modern soci ety, according to Durkhei m, was to create
broadly agreed-upon i nsti tuti ons whi ch viably realized the democrati c values
brought t o the forefront of consci ousness duri ng the cl assi cal revol ut i ons
of the past . Before proposi ng a normati ve tri angle of state regul at i on, i n
di vi dual ri ghts, and decentral i zed corporat i sm, Durkhei m reviewed ot her
concei vable opt i ons.
He expli ci tly rej ect ed authori tari an state collecti vi sm and rigidly cen
tralized bureaucrati c control . The state was "too di st ant fr om the compl ex
mani festati ons" of economi c and occupati onal li fe. It was "a heavy ma
chine . . . cut out only for general and si mpl e tasks . " Its invariably uni form
acti ons lacked "the f exi bi l i ty needed to ad just to an i nfni te di versi ty of par
ti cular circumstances. " I t was "always oppressive and leveling. "5 0 In bri ef, the
state, through i ts centralized bureaucracy, maxi mi zed authori tari an structure;
and t hr ough i deol ogi es l i ke mi l i tant nat i onal i s m, i t provi ded communitas
only i n aggressively vi ol ent and i rrati onal ways.
The study of the fami l y and ki nshi p had an i mportance to Durkhei m
whi ch i s not adequatel y ref ected i n the relatively small amount of publi shed
materi al he devoted to the subj ect. In general , he saw a process of "concen
trati on" of t he fami ly i n t he course of European hi story: over ti me t he basi c
ki ns hi p uni t had come to i ncl ude fewer persons perfor mi ng fewer functi ons.
The modern nucl ear fami ly conti nued to have an i mportant soci al role for
Durkhei m, p art i cularly in nurturi ng chi l dren, temperi ng men's desi res, and
counteri ng sexual excess. And he was a staunch defender of the sancti ty of
marri age and an adamant opponent of di vorce by mut ual consent -views
which at ti mes brought him cl ose to ordi nary conservati sm. But he did not
bel i eve the fami ly to b e a focal poi nt for over comi ng modern anomi e. One
probl em area on whi ch he, li ke t he di sci pl es of Sai nt-Si mon, pl aced speci al
emphasi s was that of i nheri tance.
The i nsti tuti on of i nheri tance i mpl i es that there are ri ch and poor
from bi rth, i . e. , there are i n society two great classes, linked, however,
by all sorts of i ntermedi ari es; one i s obli ged, in order to live, to have
the other accept i t s services at any pri ce whatsoever; the other is able
to do wi thout these services, thanks to the resources i t possesses, even
though these resources do not correspond to services rendered by those
who enjoy them. As long as an opposi ti on as dear-cut as thi s exists in
soci ety, more or less successful pal l iatives will mi tigate the i nj usti ce of
contracts; but, i n pri nci pl e, the system wi l l fnction under condi ti ons
whi ch do not permi t i t t o be j ust. 5 1
Fami l i al i nheri t ance was a vest i ge fro m t he pas t whi ch i nhi bi t e d
equal i ty of opp or t uni t y i n educat i on and i n t he choi ce of an occupat i on
t hat was i n keepi ng wi t h one's t al ent s . " I t i s evi de nt t hat t he educat i on
of our chi l dren ought not t o depend upon chance, whi ch det ermi nes
t hei r bi rth i n one pl ace r at her t han another, and t o cert ai n parent s rat her
t han ot hers . " 5 2 I ndeed, Dur khei m asser t ed t hat "a day wi l l come when
a man i s no l onger per mi t t ed t o l eave, even by t es t ament , hi s for t une t o
hi s descendant s, j us t as he i s no l onger per mi t t ed to l eave t hem hi s func
ti ons and t i t l es . " 5 3 As a practi cal pr opos al , however, Durkhei m s eemed t o
advance a compr omi s e formul a t hat rest ri ct ed fami l i al i nher i t ance t o a
pe rcentage of the fami ly weal th roughl y pr opor ti onal t o t he i mport ance
of t he fami l y as an i nst i t ut i on i n moder n soci ety. Thi s i dea bot h accorded
wi t h exi sti ng fami l i al s ent i ment and al l owed for a st ore of weal th t hat
coul d b e us ed for s oci al purpos es . But given t he dangers of excessi ve s t at e
power and r i gi d b ureaucrat i c cont rol , t hi s s ol ut i on created t he pr obl em
of est abl i shi ng a r epos i t or y for t he t ransmi ssi on of weal t h i n s oci ety.
And great er equal i t y of oppor t uni ty in t h e access to educat i on a nd t he
c h o i ce of occupat i ons di d not sol ve t he probl em of t he nat ur e of soci al
st ruct ures or affect t he pr i mar y source of general i zed anomi e i n moder n
soci et y: t he economy.
Accordi ng to D urkhei m, educat i on i tsel f was powerl ess to act as a
maj or lever for bas i c s oci al change. It coul d pl ay a r ol e onl y wi t hi n a
br oader movement for r at i onal refor m. Educat i on was "onl y t he i mage
and refecti on of s oci ety. " I t was " he al t hy when pe ople s enj oy[ ed] a state
of heal t h. " But i t be ca me "cor rupt ed wi th t hem, wi t hout bei ng abl e t o
modi fy i t sel f through i t s own i ni t i at i ve . " Educat i on coul d reform i t sel f
onl y i f soci et y was reformed. To reform s oci ety, one had t o attack "the
causes of t he evi l " fro m whi ch soci ety s uffered. 5 4 Here Dur khei m di d
not do j us t i ce t o t he i ncreasi ngl y i mpor t ant pos i t i on of educat i onal
i ns t i t ut i ons i n modern s oci et i es as agenci es or affl i at es of government,
partners of economi c ent er pr i s e, l oci of research and deve l opment , more
or less cont est ed si t es for t he generat i on and di ssemi nat i on of knowl edge
and i deol ogy, and me di a of sel ecti on and trai ni ng. But hi s concept i on of
pr i ori t i es i n st ruct ural reform was cogent .
The s t at e of t he e conomy was t he ba s i c cause of mo der n s oc i al
pat hol ogy . On t hi s poi nt , Dur khei m s eemed t o agree wi t h Marx. But
Durkhei m's largely moral concept i on of t he pr obl em was not grounded i n
anythi ng comparabl e t o M arx's attemp t t o provi de a det ai l ed i nst i t ut i onal
anal ysi s of t he sour ce of "cont radi ct i ons" i n t he economy.
The mos t bl amabl e acts are so o ft en absol ved by success t hat t he
l i mi t bet ween what i s per mi t te d and what i s pr ohi bi ted, what i s
j us t and what i s not , no l onger has anyt hi ng f xed about i t ; i t seems
s us cept i bl e t o al most arbi t rary change by i ndi vi dual s. Such an
i mpreci se and i ncons t ant moral i t y i s no l onger abl e t o cons t i t ut e
a d i s ci pl i ne. The r es ul t i s t hat t hi s ent i r e s pher e of col l ect i ve l i fe
is in large par t depr i ved of t he moderat i ng act i on of regul at i on.
I t i s t hi s anomi e st at e t hat i s t he cause of t he i ncessant l y recur
rent conf i cts and the vari ous di sorders of whi ch the economi c
wor l d offers s o sad a spect acl e. Si nce not hi ng restrai ns t he acti ve
forces and assi gns them bounds that they are obl i ged to respect ,
t hey t end to devel op wi t hout l i mi t and come i nt o col l i s i on wi t h
one anot her, ba t tl i ng and weakeni ng t hemsel ves. To be s ur e,
t he st rongest s ucceed i n compl et el y crushi ng t he weakest , or i n
s ubordi nat i ng t hem. But i f t he conquer ed mus t for a t i me resi gn
themsel ves t o s ubor di nat i on under const rai nt , they do not consent
t o i t . Cons equently, t hi s cannot cons t i t ut e a st abl e equi l i br i um.
Truces i mpos ed b y vi ol ence a r e never anyt hi ng but provi si onal ,
and t hey sat i sf no one. Human p assi ons hal t o nl y be for e a mor al
power t hat they r es pect . If all aut hori t y of t hi s ki nd is l acki ng, t he
l aw of t he st rongest prevai l s. And, l at ent or act i ve, t he st at e of war
i s n ecessar i l y c h ro ni c. Th at such a st at e of anarchy i s a morbi d
phenomenon i s s el f- evi dent , s i nc e i t cont r adi ct s t he ve r y e nd of
al l s oci ety, whi ch i s t o s uppress, or at t he very l eas t t o moder at e,
war among me n by s ubo rdi nat i ng t he phys i cal l aw of t he strongest
t o a hi gher law. 5 5
Dur khei m saw the devel opment of lab or uni ons and management
groups as an i ni t i al but i nadequat e st ep i n t he ri ght di r ect i on. Pr ocedur es
l i ke col l ect i ve bargai ni ng di d no t overcome excessi vel y anomi e r el at i ons ;
t he resul t was an ext remel y precari ous s t abi l i t y t hat was qui t e compat i bl e
wi t h egoi s m and power conf i ct s.
Syndi cat es of empl oyers and l abor uni ons are di st i nct from one
anot her, which is legitimate and necessary, b u t there i s no regul ar
contact b etween t hem. There exists no common organi zati on whi ch
bri ngs them together wi thout denyi ng thei r i ndi vi dual i t y and i n
whi ch t he y ma y el aborat e i n common a regul ati on t hat , by fxi ng
t hei r mutual rel ati ons, i s i mposed upon b o th wi th a common au
thori ty. Cons equently, i t i s always t he law of the strongest whi ch
settl es conf i ct s, and the state of war prevai l s compl et ely. Except for
acti ons whi ch fal l under common moral i ty, employers and work
men are, i n thei r mut ual rel ati ons, i n t he same si t uat i on as two
aut onomous states, b u t of unequal power. Li ke peopl es through
the me di um of t hei r govern me nt s , they can make contracts. But
these contracts i nd i cate onl y t he respecti ve state of mi l i tary forces
conf rooti ng one anot her. They are l i ke treati es whi ch i ndi cat e the
respecti ve st at e of mi l i t ary forces be tween two b el l i gerents. They
consecrate a de facto st at e; they cannot create a j us t state [ un I at
de droit] . 5 6
The professi onal or corporative group was the crux of Durkheim's i dea
of a possi bl e means of creating a tense bal ance among the elements of soci al
j usti ce and health i n modern soci ety. In a sense, Durkhei m's corporati ve i dea
appl i ed t he pri nci pl e of Occam's razor -t o make onl y as many assumpti ons
as necessary -to the i ntri cate problem of soci al "normali ty" i n the context
of the advanced degree of the division of l abor and the generalized exchange
of goods and services. Through functi onal decentralizat i on, the corporative
group could si mul taneously provi de a counterweight to the central state and
a social context in which communitas and a more cumulative arti culati on of
soci al and cul tural experi ence mi ght devel op. Acti ng i n accordance wi th the
fundamental economi c and occupati onal functions of modern soci ety, the
corporati ve group woul d also have a role in the i nheri tance of wealth, educa
ti on, economi c regulation, welfare services, pol i ti cal representat i on, and artistic
creation. Most i mportant, i t would be a center of genuine communal com
mi tment -to a signifcant extent a real existential (not si mpl y an i maginary)
group -with the moral power to restrain anomi e and transcend egoism. In
the corporati ve group, peopl e would come to know one another and enjoy
what might be called a supplementary ki nshi p.
Durkhei m deri ved hi s i dea of the need for corporati ve groups partl y
from a hi st ori cal survey that hi s proposed comparat i ve hi s t or y of thi s for m
of soci al organi zati on was t o have det ai l ed. On t he bas i s of t he l essons
he drew from hi s i nvesti gati on of comparati ve hi st ory, he felt j ust i fed
i n asserti ng t hat corporat i sm corresponded t o a permanent funct i onal
need i n soci et i es whi ch had passed beyond t he stage of an agri cul t ural
economy. Compari son i tself, however, di d not sol ve speci fcally modern
probl ems; i t merel y helped one t o di st i ngui sh si mi l ari t i es and di fferences,
revealed normal and pathol ogi cal funct i oni ng i n di fferent soci al types,
and enabl ed one better t o si t uat e s peci f cally moder n condi t i ons, dangers,
and possi bi l i t i es.
I n Greece, at l east unt i l the Roman conquest , corporat i ons were un
known, becaus e economi c occupat i ons were soci al l y des pi s ed and con
si gned t o forei gners. In Rome, on the contrary, they dated from t he earli est
t i mes of t he Republ i c. Si gni fcantly, t he Roman corporat i ve group dur i ng
t he per i od of t he Republ i c was a reli gi ous confraterni ty. Under t he Empi re,
however, corporative groups b oth reached thei r fullest devel opment and, i n
part because of ci vi l wars and i nvasi ons , fell under the domi nat i on of t he
st at e. "Thi s was the rui n of the i nst i t uti on. " 5 7 The central poi nt here, for
Durkhei m, was that an adequat e compari son had to consi der soci et i es at
comparabl e stages of devel opment. One coul d not , for exampl e, general i ze
about the vi abi l i ty of an i nsti tuti on on the basi s of i ts decadence or abuse.
After t he fal l of Rome, "i f an economi st had taken st ock of t he si t uat i on, he
woul d reasonabl y have concl uded, as economi sts l at er di d, t hat corporative
groups had not , or at l east no l onger had, any rai son d' etre, that they had
di sappeared once and for al l , and he undoub tedly woul d have t reat ed any
at t empt to reconst i t ut e t hem as retrogressi ve and unreal i zab l e. "5 8
The rebi rt h of cor por ative gr oups i n t he Mi ddl e Ages showed that t he
hypotheti cal economi st li vi ng i n t he " Dark Ages" woul d have been wrong.
In fact , the i mportance of corporative groups i n the medi eval per i od was
greater than i n Rome. I n Rome, the corporati ve group was not a p ubl i c
i nst i t ut i on. But i n t he Mi ddl e Ages i t became t he ver y foundat i on of the
commune. In a di fferent form, i t retai ned moral and reli gi ous functi ons
and was a cent er of communal feasts and bang uets. And, as i n Rome,
i t provi ded a l ocus of i nt i macy less restri cted than the fami l y and more
personal than the ci ty. A poi nt whi ch woul d become i ncreasi ngly relevant
wi th the devel opment of Durkhei m's t hought was that i n bot h cases "all
rel i gi ous communi ty consti tuted a moral mi l i eu, j ust as all moral di sci pl i ne
t ended i n t i me t o assume a rel i gi ous form. "5 9 I f t he case of Rome revealed
the danger of st at e domi nat i on, the ancien regime p oi nt ed to t he danger
of the possi bl e domi nat i on of one s oci oeconomi c group by another. In
t he medi eval peri od, strati f cati on wi t hi n t he corporati ve group was often
not ri gi d or hi ghl y marked, si nce the apprent i ce coul d as a r ul e become
a mas t er i n hi s t urn. By t he end of t he ancien regime, corporat i ons had
become i nstrument s through whi ch masters expl oi t ed workers. Thi s de
vel opment l ed t o the format i on of trade uni ons out s i de t he pal e of the
corporati ve organi zat i on.
60
But t here i s no i ns t i t ut i on whi ch does n o t a t s ome t i me degener
ate, e i ther be cause i t cannot change and becomes i mmobi l i zed
or because i t devel ops i n a uni l at eral di rect i on . . . . Thi s may be a
reason t o reform it but not to decl are i t per manentl y usel ess and
dest roy i t . . . . If from t he ori gi n of the ci t y unt i l t he zeni t h of t he
Empi re, from t he dawn of Ch ri s t i ani t y unt i l modern t i mes, t hey
have been necessary, i t i s because t hey answer permanent and p ro
found needs. The fact that after havi ng di sappear ed the f rst t i me ,
they were reconst i t ut ed by t hemselves and i n a new form rebut s
any argument t hat t hei r vi ol ent di sappear ance at the end of t he
l ast cent ury i s a proof t hat t hey are no l onger i n harmony wi t h t he
new condi t i ons of col l ecti ve exi s t ence. 6 1
One pr obl em t he corporati ve group fai l ed to meet I n early moder n
t i mes was t hat t he commune proved to be t oo rest ri ct ed a framework
for the regul at i on of commerce, whi ch was becomi ng nat i onal and i n
t ernat i onal . ( The cont emporary t ransnat i onal corporat i on woul d pose
even more severe di ffcul t i es for t he vi abl e organi zati on of cor porati ve
groups . ) A second pr obl em ha d t o do wi t h the s t r uct ur e of aut hor i t y i n
t he corporati ve group i t sel f - a pr obl em t ha t subsequent hi s t or y has
exacerbat ed, al ong wi th t he ques t i on of rel ati ons be tween t he corpo
rati ve group and t he st at e. Al tho ugh Du rkhei m was not as cl ear or as
comprehensi ve as he mi ght have been, hi s concept i on of t he st ruct ure of
aut hori t y i n corporative groups was essenti al l y democrati c, and i t i ncl uded
i ndu st ri al democra cy.
Speci al i zed regul at i ons can b e made onl y b y el ect ed assembl i es
charged wi t h representi ng t he corporat i on. In t he present st at e
of i ndustry, t hese assembl i es, as wel l as t he t ri bunal s whi ch appl y
profess i onal regul ati ons, obvi ousl y ought to i ncl ude representati ves
of empl oyers and empl oyees . . . i n proport i ons correspondi ng to the
respecti ve i mpor tance at t ri but ed by opi ni on to these two factors
i n product i on. But i f i t i s necessary t hat bot h be present i n t he
d i rect i ng counci l s of t he corporat i on, i t i s no less i ndi spensabl e t hat
t hey form at t he bas e of t he corporat i on di s t i nct and i nde pendent
groups , for t hei r i nt erest s ar e t oo often ri val and ant agoni st i c. For
t hem to be abl e to t ake p osi t i ons freely, t hey mus t take pos i t i ons
separat el y. The t wo gr oups t hus cons t i t ut ed coul d s ubs equentl y
desi gnat e t hei r represen tati ves to t h e co mmon assembl i es. 62
Durkhei m argued that "the already so powerful and so clumsy hands of
the state" were i ncompetent and dangerous i nstruments for the provi si on
of soci al welfare and the detai led regulati on of the economy. Thus, he con
cluded that the problem of the anomie and egoism fostered by the anti pathy
between centralized b ureaucrati c rigidity and atomized i ndi vi duali sm could
be resolved only by forming, "outsi de the state, but subject t o i ts acti on, a
duster of collective forces whose regulative i nfuence can be exercised wi th
more variety. "63 But he readily acknowledged the tendency of secondary or
i ntermedi ary groups t o develop i n the di recti on of closed soci eti es charac
terized by "the despoti sm of routi ne and professi onal egoi sm. "64 To check
thi s tendency and to protect the rights of the i ndi vi dual, the democrati c state
was to retain l i mi ted but crucial functi ons. "Only the state can oppose to the
parti culari sm of each corporati on a consciousness of general uti l i ty and the
necessi ti es of organi c equi l i bri um. "65
A defni ng feature of the democrati c st at e, for Durkhei m, was i ts achieve
ment of consci ous awareness of the needs of all soci al groups through the
open communi cati on assured by representative i nsti tuti ons. 66 Hi s concepti on
of the democrati c state in the normal soci ety was both legislative and moral.
Using hi s peculi ar phi l osophical vocabul ary, he desi gnated the state as the
representative ( but not the incarnation) of the conscience collective. Its speci fc
functi on was to elaborate "collective representations" i n the form of laws valid
for soci ety as a whol e.
A st ri ki ng defe ct of Du rkhei m' s pol i t i cal soci ol ogy i n s uch works as
Profssional Ethics and Civic Morals was the neglect of executi ve l eadershi p
a n d pol i t i cal part i es . Hi s negl ect of execut i ve l eadershi p mi gh t be seen as
a refect i on of t he do- not hi ng nat ure of t he st at e i n hi s own Thi rd Re-
publ i c. Bu t he was not , i n fact, advocat i ng the reduct i on of gover nment
t o t he status of a debat i ng s oci et y i n a cont ext mar ked by severe s oci al
pr obl ems . Nor was hi s negl ect of pol i t i cal par t i es rel ated t o an at t empt
t o di s cr edi t parl i ament ari sm i n t he manner of f gures on b o th t he far
l eft (for exampl e, t he earl y Wal ter Benj ami n a nd t he equi vocal Georges
Sorel ) and the far ri ght (for exampl e, Charl es Maurras, Pi erre Dri e u La
Rochel l e, and Carl S chmi t t ) , i ncl udi ng mor e react i onary advocat es of
cor por at i s m. Dur khei m was a f rm s uppor t er of parl i ament ary govern
ment and did not advocate a "one par ty" st at e. But at t i mes he di d s eem
cl os e t o an i dea of a "no p arty" s t at e, or at l eas t t o a vi si on i n whi ch p ar
t i es , l i ke i nt erest groups , woul d pl ay a very s ub ordi nat e rol e. Bas i cally,
Du rkh e i m was present i ng a no rmati ve c oncept i on of t he r ol e of t h e state
i n the "normal " soci ety. Here al l part i cul ar i nt erest s and agenci es woul d
b e regul at ed by l i mi t i ng nor ms . And t he s t at e woul d be a legal ent i t y
whose l aws appl i ed the nor ms and val ues of t he conscience collective. Earl y
i n hi s l i fe, Dur khei m cri t i ci zed Mont esqui e u for t heoret i cal l y separat i ng
l aw and et hi csY In Dur khei m's "normal " s oci ety, b o th l aw and et hi cs
woul d fnd t he i r u n i tar y s our ce i n normat i ve pr i nci pl es e mbodi e d i n t he
consci ence col l ecti ve.
Indeed, accor di ng t o Dur khei m, s el f-gover nment woul d most ade
quatel y f ll soci al needs and t he general condi ti ons of normati ve pl ural i sm
be best real i zed i f cor porat i ve groups themsel ves b ecame the b as i c uni ts
of pol i t i cal represent at i on. Thi s i dea was in keepi ng wi t h his general view
t hat in moder n s oci et y t erri t ori al uni t s l acked b o th cul t ural i dent i t y and
t he means t o cope wi t h pr obl ems s t emmi ng fr om advanced t echnology
and i ndus t r i al i s m. " The onl y d ecent ral i zat i on whi ch, wi t hout breaki ng
up nat i onal uni ty, p er mi t s t he mul t i pl i cat i on of cent ers of common l i fe
is what mi ght b e cal l ed profssional decentralizatio n. "68 Regi onal and
l ocal gr oupi ngs correspondi ng to pr obl ems whi ch coul d be handl ed at
t hese levels woul d cont i nue t o exi st , b ut t he br unt of acti vi ty wi t hi n a
st r uct ural l y t ransfor med s oci et y woul d fal l upon p ro fess i o n al or cor po
rative gr oups .
Thus cor porati ve groups , i nt ernal l y characteri zed b y a democrat i c
s t r uct ur e of aut hor i t y and r el at ed t o one anot her b y normat i vel y con
t rol l ed, ami abl e ri val ry under the general auspi ces of t he democrat i c st at e,
were for Durkhei m the sol e means of overcomi ng anomi e and assuri ng
s ol i dar i t y i n moder n s oci ety. In essence, t he goal Dur khei m i ndi cat ed
i n hi s i dea of t he corporati ve gr oup wa s t ha t of rai si ng s oci et y above t he
mundane l evel of t he mer el y economi c.
I f we j u dge t he m [ i . e . , cor por ati ve gr oups ] t o be i ndi s pens abl e, i t i s
not becaus e of t he economi c servi ces t hey coul d r ender but be cause
of t he moral i nf uence they mi ght have. What we see above al l i n t he
professi onal group i s a moral power abl e to rest rai n i ndi vi dual ego
i sm, mai nt ai n i n t he heart s of workers a l i vel i er s ent i ment of t hei r
common s ol i dar i ty, and prevent t he law of t he strongest from bei ng
appl i ed so br ut al l y i n i nd ust ri al and commerci al rel at i ons. 69
Dur khei m admi t t ed t hat i t was di ffc ul t t o see how o ccupat i ons
"coul d ever be el evated to t he di gni t y of mor al power s . I ndeed, t hey are
for med of i ndi vi dual s whi ch not hi ng attaches to one anot her, who are
even di sposed t o treat one anot her l i ke ri vals and enemi es rather t han
l i ke cooperat ors. "7 0 But he nonet hel ess remai ned opt i mi s t i c. I n hi s mi nd
t he pr ofessi onal group represented t he "funct i onal equi val ent" t hrough
whi ch t here coul d be i nst i t ut ed what he saw as t he essence of soci al i sm.
Corporat i sm woul d make soci al i sm more t han a bread-and-but t er i ssue.
It woul d respond t o t he soci al i st "aspi rat i on for a rearrangement of t he
soci al st ruct ure, by rel ocat i ng the i ndust ri al set -up i n the t ot al i t y of the
soci al organi sm, d rawi ng i t out of the s hadow where i t was funct i on
i ng aut omati cal l y, s ummoni ng i t i nt o t he l i ght and t he cont rol of t he
consci ence [ or consci ousness: la comcience] . " Through cor por at i sm t he
s oci al ques t i on woul d be come, "not a ques t i on of money or force , " b u t
"a ques t i on o f mor al agents . " 7 1
The concept i on ofDurkhei m a s a mi l i t ant nat i onal i st a nd " fery j i ngo"
came from his war t i me pamphl ets and a mi sconcept i on of the nat ure of
hi s more s er i ous t hought . 7 2 Whether or not hi s pr opagandi st i c pamphl ets
act ual l y j us ti f ed t hese characteri zati ons i s debat abl e. In hi s concept i on
of t he st at e and the nat i on i n hi s more seri ous wor ks , Durkhei m showed
hi msel f to be a l i ber al pat ri ot who appl i ed t o t he rel ati ons among states
t he same pri nci pl es of soci al sol i dari ty that he appl i ed to group rel ati ons
i n t he "normal " domes t i c context. He was attracted t o the i deal of worl d
government . But he found i t so far di s t ant from t he real m of feas i bi l i t y
t hat he pr opos ed i nst ead a sl i ghtl y l es s u topi an goal of reconci l i ng hu-
21 0 Jnile Durkheir: Sociologist and Philosopher
mane val ues and nor mati ve l i mi t s t o col l ecti ve assert i on wi t h t he state
syst e m. Hi s i deal i st i c expressi on of pat ri ot i sm was cl ose to t he i deas of
a Mazzi ni .
I f each st at e adopt ed as i t s essent i al t ask not t o grow or t o extend
i t s fronti ers but to deal wi t h i ts own autonomy as best i t coul d,
t o cal l to an ever greater moral l i fe t he vast ra j ori t y of i t s own
me mbe rs , then al l cont r adi ct i ons be tween nat i onal and h uma n
moral i t y woul d di sappear. I f the state had no fur t her goal t han
t o make i t s ci t i zens men i n t he ful l sense of the word, t hen ci vi c
duti es woul d be onl y a part i cul ar for m of the general dut i es of
humani t y . . . . Thi s pat ri ot i sm does not excl ude all nati onal pr i de.
Col l ecti ve pe rsonal i t i es, l i ke i ndi vi dual personal i t i es, cannot exi st
wi t hout havi ng a certai n sent i ment about themselves and what they
are. And thi s s ent i ment always has somet hi ng p ersonal about i t . As
l ong as states exi st, there wi l l b e soci al sel f-est eem, and not hi ng i s
mor e l egi ti mate. But soci eti es can s e e t hei r sel f-esteem, not i n bei ng
greater or weal thi er, but i n bei ng more j us t , bet t er organi zed, and
i n havi ng a bet t er moral cons t i t ut i o n . Needl ess to say, we h ave not
yet reached the ti me when thi s pat ri ot i sm rei gns supreme, i f ever
such a t i me can comeJ3
These elevated sent i ments di d not confront probl ems rel at ed t o t he vast
di spari ti es in power and wealth among existing states, and they fai l ed t o en
gage coloni al and i mperi al i sti c reali ti es often encrypted i n i deal i sti c rhetori c.
And Durkhei m di d not l i ve to see hi s i deal s tested by the harsh real i ti es of
World War I. Such consi derati ons render even more di ffcul t of attai nment
the t ype of generous, humane patri oti sm Durkhei m envi saged.
What may one concl ude about Durkhei m's proposed refor ms ? In one
sense, hi s corporat i st pr oposals requi red bas i c, st ruct ural refor m. They
enj oi ned soci al cont rol of the economy rel ated, h owever vaguel y, to dem
ocrat i c val ues. In addi t i on, t hey i mpl i ed a qual i tati vel y di fferent form of
relati onshi p among peopl e i n modern soci ety. But Durkheim' s formul ati ons
remai ned enti rel y t heoret i cal . They were i ndeed vague and, for thi s very
reason, open to confi ct i ng i nterpret at i ons and di vergent appropri at i ons.
Hi s concept i on of pol i ti cs was oft en excessi vely hi gh-mi nded and i mprac
tical. His hatred of the "pol i t i cal ki tchen" i nhi bi t ed a full understandi ng of
pol i t i cal i nterests and an at t empt to rel ate them cogentl y t o hi s own i deas.
Chapte 5 Theory and Practice 2 1 1
Nor can hi s reforms b e j u dged adequat e to the severe probl ems t hat he at
l eas t part i al l y percei ved. Moreover, Durkhei m ofered no i ns i ght i nt o t he
ques t i on of means of real i zi ng hi s pr opos ed reforms. Thi s was an especi al l y
di sabl i ng o mi ssi on i n a case where the means empl oyed woul d hel p to
shape the envi saged end. Durkhei m's at t empt to rel ate theory and practi ce
broke down at t he most vi tal poi nt . Al though one may certai nl y doubt
whet her any i nt el l ect ual or comment at or arri ved a t a bet t er art i cul at i on of
t hes e di ff cul t i f not i nt ract abl e i s s ues , one may nonethel ess ques t i on t he
fashi on i n whi ch Durkhei m's vi s i on t ended to s hade off i nt o a pi ous hope
about an i ndet ermi nat e fut ur e t ha t b ore l i t t l e rel at i on t o soci al real i ti es
or t hei r apparent devel opment al tendenci es. At a cruci al j unct ure of t he
argument , opt i mi s m took t he pl ace of hard t hi nki ng. Nor di d Durkhe i m
i n l ater life ret urn t o the i ssues rai sed by hi s reform proposal s. Rather, he
i ncreasi ngl y devoted hi ms elf t o t he i nvesti gati on of rel i gi on and t o t he
devel opment of hi s own hi ghl y i deal i st i c soci al phi l os ophy.
The Individual and Society
What was Durkhei m's concept i on of the rol e of the i ndi vi dual in so
ci et y? Whi ch type of i ndi vi dual i sm di d he at t ack and whi ch t ype di d he
defend? And how wer e t hes e ques t i ons rel ated to Durkhei m's key di st i nc
t i on between soci al normal i t y and pat hol ogy?
The speci fc t ype of i ndi vi dual i sm that Durkhei m attacked was excessive
i ndi vi duat i on, or at omi st i c, possessi ve i ndi vi dual i sm. Suicide analyzed t he
pat hogeni c effects of de fcto and i nst i t ut i onal i zed egoi sm and t raced i t s
rel at i on t o anomi e. Durkhei m saw ut i l i tari ani sm as t he i deol ogi cal l egi ti
ma ti on of extreme i ndi vi dual i sm. One functi on of comparati ve st udi es
and "cruci al experi ment s , " he t hought, was t o provi de the perspective t hat
permi t ted hi m to argue t hat ut i l i t ari ani sm ( and ot her vari ants of at omi sti c
i ndi vi dual i s m) at t empt ed to transfor m a transi ti onal aberrat i on i nt o a
uni versal moral and cul t ural t r ut h. For Dur khei m, ut i l i t ari ani sm was
"contradi cted by everythi ng whi ch hi st ory and comparati ve ethnography
teach us about the moral l i fe of humani ty. "74
Essenti al to Durkheim's own posi t i on was a basi c model of the human
bei ng. As not ed earl i er, at ti mes t hi s model was dubi o usly gendered, wi t h
men more creatures of l i mi tl ess desi re and women, less involved in deregu
lated areas of soci al acti vi ty and closer to a p utati ve organi c equi l i bri um of
need and desi re. Moreover, there was a sense i n whi ch, for Durkhei m and
others at the ti me, gender and sexual i ty were so closel y mapped onto, or even
i denti fed wi th, one another t hat homosexuali ty coul d not arise as an expl i ci t
quest i on. Indeed t he i nterest i n general model s of t he human bei ng or the
someti mes obsessive concern wi th the abstract probl em of the i ndi vi dual
and soci ety readi l y diverted attenti on from more concrete, conf i ctual , and
ethi copol i ti cal l y fraught i ssues i n soci ety and cul ture. Sti l l , the meri t of
Durkhei m's vi ews was t o i ndi cate that a cri ti que of normal i zati on ( or the
confati on of the normati ve wi th t he stati sti cally average or domi nant) di d
not el i mi nat e but rather cal l ed for an attempt t o work out an al t ernati ve
normativity, at ti mes i ncl udi ng normati vi ti es with whi ch Durkhei m mi ght
not agree (for exampl e, one that di d not excl ude or render abj ect but , on
the contrary, l egi ti mated non-heterosexual practi ces).
Durkhei m conceived of the human bei ng i n t he "st at e of nature" as an
i sol ated i ndi vidual outsi de al l soci ety. Thi s concepti on reduced the individual
t o his or her organic a nd psychophysical gi vens. The psychol ogi cal capaci ty
of the i ndi vi dual i n the "state of nature" was l i mi ted t o sensati on. But needs
were l i mi ted as wel l by organi c functi oni ng and i nsti nct.
The rol e of soci ety and symbol i sm i n human life depended, i n the most
general sense, on whether soci al structure assumed normal or pat hologi cal
form. At thi s poi nt , Durkhei m's soci ol ogy and hi s value theory were uni t ed.
Central t o bot h was t he i nst i t uti onal i zed norm or value enshri ned i n t he
conscience collecti ve. The conscience collective became Durkhei m's analogue
for Kant's practi cal reason and Rousseau' s volonte genera/e.
Soci al structure and conscience collective were aspects of the same reali ty.
In the "normal " state of soci ety, i nsti tuti onal i zed norms and values woul d
be both obj ectively struct ured ( l i ke "things") and subj ecti vely i nternal i zed.
In thei r obj ecti ve aspect, i nst i tuti ons were characteri zed by ext eri ori ty and
constrai nt. I n the "normal " state of soci ety, however, constrai nt was i dent i cal
with obl i gati on, duty, and a sense of responsi bi l ity. It was related to the sense
of legi ti mate l i mi ts and mesure, whi ch for Durkhei m was essenti al for all
morali ty and sol i dari ty in soci ety. This role of i nst i t ut i onal norms was well
expressed in a statement Durkhei m quot ed from Rousseau's Emile: "If the
laws of soci et i es, like those of nature, be came so i nfexi bl e that no human
force coul d ever bend them, dependence upon men woul d become depen
dence upon thi ngs l "7 5 In hi s Moral Educatio n, Durkhei m expressed i n hi s
own way t he meani ng of the "thi ngli ke" qual i ty of i nhi bi ti ons i mposed by
i nst i t ut i ons and i nternal i zed norms i n t he "normal " state of soci ety: "When
a man wi th a healthy moral consti tuti on tries to commi t an act whi ch mo
ral i t y bl ames, he feels somet hi ng whi ch stops hi m j ust as i f he tri ed t o pi ck
up a rock whi ch i s t oo heavy for hi m. " 7 6 Thus, i n t hi s natural i zi ng anal ogy,
t he moral i nhi bi t i ons created by i nsti tuti onal norms woul d b e a wei ghty
as rocks i n the personal i ty.
Ext er i or i t y and cons t r ai nt as cr i t er i a of i ns t i t ut i onal norms were
st ressed by Durkhei m i n hi s earl y t hought . He came t o see i n t i me t hat
i n t he "normal " or normati vel y l egi ti mat ed state of soci et y t h ese aspects
of i nst i t ut i ons woul d be combi ned wi t h thei r desi rabi l i ty. I n t he p reface
to the second edi t i on of The Rules of Sociological Method, he obs erved:
"I nst i t ut i ons may i mpos e themselves upon us, b u t we are attached to
them; they put us under obl i gat i ons, and we l ove them; they constrai n
us, and we fnd our welfare i n thei r funct i oni ng and thei r very const rai nt .
Moral i sts have often poi nted out t hi s ant i t hes i s bet ween t h e t wo concept s
of ' the good' and ' dut y' whi ch p resent t he t wo di fferent and equal l y real
aspects of moral life. "77
The desi rabi l i t y of i nst i t ut i ons was dependent on thei r provi si on of
vi abl e ways and means of real i zi ng val ues. Ideals formed the soul of l egi ti
mate i nst i t ut i ons. And such works as Moral Education made expl i ci t the
rel ati onshi p between the desi rabi l i t y of i nst i t ut i ons and the exi stence of
communal groups. Through communal life, i ns t i t ut i onal i zed acti vi ty ap
proached the i deal and t ook on overtones of spont anei t y and chari smat i c
el an. I n a sense, t he desi rabi l i ty of i nst i t ut i ons was t o communi t y as obl i g
atory const rai nt was to di fferenti ati on and a sense of l egi ti mate l i mi t s.
In t he "normal" st at e of soci ety, there was no fatal antagoni sm, although
there mi ght wel l be possi bl y creati ve tensi on, between soci ety and the i n
di vi dual . Wi th reference to the relati on between i nst i t ut i onal norm and
organi c need, Durkhei m argued t hat di sci pl i ne was "t he means by whi ch
nature normally reali zes i tsel f and not the means of reduci ng or destroy
i ng i t . "78Thi s non-asceti c i dea mi ti gated the anti pathy be tween mi nd and
body ( homo duplex). More generally, Durkheim argued that there was no
"total antagonism which makes t ot al or part i al abdi cat i on of his own nature
2 1 4 Emile Durkheir: Sociologist and Philosopher
the pri ce of an i ndi vi dual's attachment to soci ety. " On t he contrary, "the
i ndi vi dual i s trul y hi msel f and abl e t o reali ze hi s own nature onl y i f he at
taches hi msel f to soci ety. " The i ndi vi dual's need for normati ve l i mi ts and
communal attachments was shown in Durkhei m's study of sui ci de. Man was
more prone to kill hi msel f when he was "detached from all col l ecti vi ti es"
and li ved "more l i ke an egoi st . "79
The nature of i nst i t ut i ons in t he normal state of soci ety was to com
bi ne a constrai ni ng sense of normative l i mi ts wi th an i nt ernal i zed sense of
commi t ment . Thei r functi on was t o create mor al sol i dari ty, whi ch was , for
Durkhei m, as vital to the l i fe of t he i ndi vi dual as i t was to the orderi ng of
soci ety. Thi s noti on of i nsti tuti ons i n t he normal state of soci ety was i mpl i ci t
t n Durkhei m's asserti on, whi ch has often been quot ed out of cont ext :
Never has t he qual i fcati on of moral been appl i ed t o an act whi ch
has for i ts obj ect only the i nterest of t he i ndi vi dual or t he per fec
ti on of t h e i ndi vi dual underst ood i n a purely egoi sti c ma nner. If t he
i ndi vi dual who I a m doe s not consti tut e an end whi ch has i n i tsel f
a moral character, thi s i s necessari l y true al so of i ndi vi dual s who are
my equal s and who di ffer from me only i n degree. From thi s one
may concl ude t hat , i f there i s a moral i ty, i t can have as i t s obj ecti ve
only th e group for med by a pl ural i ty of i ndi vi dual s, i . e. , soci ety,
under the condi t i on t hat soci ety may be consi dered a a personal i ty
qual i tati vely di sti nct from the i ndi vi dual s who compose i t . 0
Durkhei m's mode of expressi on was not devoi d of ambi gui ty, and the
ambi gui t y was rel ated to soci al metaphysi c. But the rel ati on of thi s argument
t o hi s t heory of value can be clearly formul at ed: Sel f-seeki ng, egoistic sel f
perfecti on ( i ncl udi ng the pl easures of the sel f) , or slavi sh subservi ence to
the parti cul ari sti c interest of another indivi dual , consti tuted aspects of soci al
pathol ogy. For Durkhei m, l egi ti mate moral regulati o n depended upon the
exi stence of a conscience collective t hat was l ogi cal l y di sti nct from a sum
of atomi sti c i ndi vi dual s i n that i t was formed by a desi rable structure of
i nsti tuti onal norms and val ues.
In the "pathol ogi cal " state of soci ety, t h e nature and funct i on of i nsti
tuti ons changed, for they mi ght be part of t he probl em i nstead of part of
the sol ut i on. In the pathol ogical state, the soci al status quo di storted the
i nsti nctual balance of the "state of nature" and added newer di sl ocati ons of
Chapte 5 Theory and Practice 2 I 5
i ts own. Anomi e, especi al l y in certai n extremely deregulated areas of soci ety
( such as modern economi c life or i nternati onal rel ati ons) , converted cul ture
i nt o a l ever for an i nfni te wel l of organi c or more subl i mated responses
that knew no l i mi ts. Man was prey to unl i mi ted desi re or t o the hunger for
power over others. Wi ll, the spi ri tual i zed passi on, was l i ke desi re in that
i t became unhi nged when i t was detached from rati onal commi tment to
l i mi ti ng norms. The concept of anomi e confned to a speci fc soci ol ogi
cal context the "state of nature" i n Hobb es's sense: man was a wol f to hi s
nei ghbor because of the di strust and di sl ocati on engendered by the absence
of substantively l i mi ti ng norms. Anomi e al so revealed the way i n whi ch the
Freudi an i d (as Freud real i zed) was not a purel y organi c force but i nstead a
l i mi nal , hybri di zed l ocus of dri ves i mpel l i ng an organism di s ori ented by a
certai n state of soci et y and cul ture.
One promi nent aspect of soci al p athol ogy was ( to use the well-known
phrase ofT S. El i ot ) a "di ssoci ati on of sensi bi li ty" -a di ssoci ati on whi ch
Durkhei m's own narrowly analytic tendenci es at ti mes repl i cated. The cru
cial case of di ssoci at i on, which Durkheim transcended i n hi s concepti on
of soci al normal i ty, was that bet ween constra i nt and what was desi rabl e
i n soci al life and i n the personal i ty. Thi s di ssoci ati on mi ght, for exampl e,
be seen i n t he anomi e contradi cti on between i nsti t ut i ons and the cul tural
val ues or i deal s whi ch i nsti tuti ons were supposed t o embody. To the extent
that i nsti tuti ons were houses of constrai nt al one, they were al i enati ng and
oppressi ve. At most, they were obj ects of ambi valent i nternali zati on that
led to compulsi ve performance by "hol l ow men" i nternally di vi ded agai nst
themsel ves. Insti tuti ons that constrai ned wi t hout eli ci ti ng genui ne commi t
ment were soul l ess; they hel ped to i nsti gate anomi e i deal i sm, neoromanti c
excess, and often mi sgui ded, even vi ol ent and putati vely regenerative quests
for communitas i n al i enated segments of soci ety.
The contrast between constrai nt and desi rabi l i ty was i n certai n ways
si mi l ar to Weber's opposi t i on between bureaucrat i zat i on and chari sma.
Extreme bureaucracy was a soci al form based upon constrai ni ng structures
di ssoci ated from communitas. And the maxi mi zati on of structure typi cal l y
fostered movements that tri ed to maxi mi ze communitas. Chari smati c b reak
through involved not only the heroi c vi rtuosi ty of the i ndi vi dual l eader -a
trai t whi ch Weber tended to overemphasi ze - but also the chari smati c
communitas of followers. Indeed, there was often a puzzl i ng rel ati onshi p
between anomi e, communitas, and i ndi vi dual i sm i n radi cal movements.
And t he maxi mi zati on of communitas typi cal l y gave way, i n hi st ory, to the
"Thermi dori an reacti on" of a maxi mi zati on of structure and constrai nt. As
we have already not ed, the successful revol uti on - or t he s uccessful soci al
movement i n general - accordi ng to Durkhei m, was one that broke thi s
tragi c cycle by integrating constrai ni ng structure and "desi rabl e" communita
i t he same ongoi ng soci al system.
Attempti ng to speci f hi s own vi si on of the i nt i mat e bond between
constrai nt and desi rabi l i ty i n the normal state of soci ety, Durkhei m hi m
self referred to Hobbes and Spencer. Hobbes , recognizing the anomi e and
destructive nature of di ssoci ated spont anei ty, had become the theori st of
i mperative order and pure constrai nt. Rej ect i ng a despot i c order based on
constrai nt al one, the ut i l i t ari ans and classi cal economi sts had come forth
as the theori sts of spontanei ty, often presenti ng "all col l ective di sci pl i ne
as a sort of more or l ess tyranni cal mi l i t ari sm. " They fai l ed to s ee t hat "i n
reali ty, when di sci pl i ne i s normal , when i t i s everythi ng i t ought to be, i t
i s enti rel y di fferent. I t i s both the s ummi ng up and t he condi t i on of al l
c ommon l i fe, whi ch means as much i n t he hearts of i ndi vi dual s as t hei r
own lives . " 8 1 Theori sts l i ke Hobbes and Spencer opt ed for one horn of a
di l emma. But the probl em of l egi ti mate soci al order coul d b e resolved onl y
by el i mi nat i ng the di l emma i tsel f.
These words "constrai nt" and "spont anei ty" do not have in our
termi nol ogy t he meani ng whi ch Hobbes gives t o the former and
Spencer to the latter . . . . The pri nci pl e we expound would create a
soci ol ogy which sees in the spi ri t of di sci pl i ne the essenti al condi t i on
of al l common life, whi l e at the same t i me foundi ng i t on reason
and on t rut h. R 2
Durkhei m's mat ure t hought i t sel f provided t he t heoreti cal t ool s to si t uat e
and transcend the controversy t hat earl i er had di vi ded Gabri el Tarde and
hi msel f. Earli er, Durkhei m seemed t o champi on pure constrai nt and formal
obl i gat i on. Working wi t hi n the same over-all frame of reference, Tarde i n
equal l y one-si ded fashi on espoused t he cause of i nner s pontanei ty and the
excepti onal i ndi vi dual . Durkhei m seemed t o be the offcial advocate of the
formal , publ i c, external , "false" sel f, and Tarde the devi l's advocate of the
nonconformi st, pri vate, i nner, dari ng sel f, whi ch in modern French cul tural
hi story had usual l y been taken as the "real" sel f and the untouchabl e core
of the personal i ty. Both, i n effect, had sei zed upon one di ssoci ated el ement
of soci ety and t he personal i ty i n one type of soci al pat hol ogy. Thi s context
di d seem t o posi t a total anti pathy between soci ety and t he i ndi vi dual i n
the form of an opposi t i on between mass conformi t y and i ndi vi dual affr
mati on i f not transgress i on. But, i n Durkhei m's l ater concepti on of soci al
normal i ty, thi s di chot omy woul d be el i mi nat ed. Genui ne commi t ment
woul d replace mass conformi ty. And, except i n the case of certai n trul y
excepti onal i ndi vi dual s, t he antagonism between sel f and soci ety woul d b e
reduced t o margi nal proporti ons and perhaps assume more creati ve mean
i ng for all concerned.
I t has already been observed t hat Durkheim's concepts of soci al normal i ty
and pathol ogy di d not go far beyond the poi nt of tentati ve formul ati on. Hi s
noti on of soci al pathol ogy especi ally sufered from i nadequate theoreti cal
elaborati on. A closer exami nati on of Marx's thought - and of Marx's own
use of Sai nt-Si mon - woul d have been most informative. For exampl e, some
di sti ncti on between pre-revol ut i onary, revoluti onaty, and post-revoluti onary
peri ods seemed necessaty. Durkhei m hi msel f seemed to bel i eve t hat revo
l ut i on mi ght b e i nevi tabl e when soci ety found i tsel f i n a certain sort of
structural bi nd. Revol uti on i tself, he thought, was effective i n i t s el i mi nati on
of certai n vestiges of an ol d order, val uabl e i n the genesis of soci al i deal s, and
generally unsuccessful i n the reali zati on of i deals i n a new i nsti tuti onal order.
Revol uti on appeared to b e on the borderl i ne between social pathology and
normali ty. Modern society - and especially his own France - seemed for
Durkhei m to represent a post-revolutionary context that suffered from an
afterbi rth of di sori entati on and runaway change. Its pathology was in some
ways post-revol uti onary. And thi s seemed to i mpl y that i n modern soci ety
vi ol ence woul d generally be self-defeating and t hat a different type of soci al
acti on was mandatory. But precisely how these i deas related to his concepti on
of normali ty and pathol ogy and to other aspects of modern soci ety - e. g. ,
i ndustri al i zati on - remai ned unclear.
Let us return to Durkhei m's i dea of the rel at i on of t he i ndi vi dual to
soci e ty. At ti mes Durkhei m was led b y both mechani st i c dual i sm and an
emergent soci al myst i que to present a di ssoci ated not i on of the "whol e
man" as a mere composi t e of the organi c and the soci al self. Thi s tendency
was apparent i n such i mpor t ant arti cl es as "Representati ons i ndi vi duelles
et representati ons col l ectives" ( "Indi vi dual Representati ons and Col l ec
t i ve Representati ons , " 1 898) and "Le Dual i sme de la nature humai ne et
ses condi t i ons soci al es" ("The Dual i sm of Human Nature and It s Soci al
Condi ti ons, " 1 9 1 4) . At ot her t i mes, the more di al ecti cal or relati onal aspect
of hi s t hought - whi l e mai nt ai ni ng a pri mary emphasi s upon col l ecti ve
norms and shared symbol s - led to a more compl ex concepti on of the
i ndi vi dual t hat resi st ed reduci ng hi m or her to a mechani cal combi nat i on
of a bodi l y organi sm and a soci al sel f. Thi s allowed Dur khei m t o provi de
furt her i nsi ght i nt o t he quest i on of t he i ndi vi dual i n vari ous types and
states of soci ety.
At all t i mes, t he i ndi vi dual had a de facto cul tural status that deri ved
ul t i matel y from ontol ogi cal and epi st emol ogi cal s ources. " From the t i me
there i s consci ousness, there i s a s ubj ect who conceives hi msel f a s di st i nct
from al l that i s not hi msel f - a subj ect who says ' 1 . "' 8 3 The pathol ogi cal
state of soci ety carri ed t he i nevi tabl e degree of exi stenti al tensi on between
the i ndi vi dual and soci ety to unnecessary hi stori cal proporti ons. In contrast,
the normal state of soci ety mai nt ai ned the degree of exi stenti al t ensi on
t hat corresponded to t he margi n of anomi e i ndet ermi nacy i n t he soci al
st ruct ure. But i t compl ement ed and suppl emented thi s wi t h foundi ng
soci al st ruct ures on consent. As earl y as The Division of Labor, Our khei m
had assert ed that "soci al life i s spont aneous wherever i t i s normal , and i f
i t i s abnormal i t cannot l ast . "8
4 Consent , however, was not i denti cal wi t h
a sum of ad hoc act s of i ndi vi dual wi l l . I t s pri mary obj ect was a conscience
collective combi ni ng l i mi t i ng norms and communal val ues essenti al for
moral sol i dari ty in soci ety.
A s peci fc charact eri st i c of mo d er n s oci et y was t hat t he conscz ence
collective i tsel f i n certai n ways i nst i t ut i onal i zed i ndi vi dual i sm as well as
anomi e. This became pathogeni c when it reached the extreme of at omi st i c
i ndi vi dual i sm and runaway, unchecked excess. But there was a val i d core
i n modern l i beral i sm. It was embodi ed i n t he i dea of personal di gni t y and
i ndi vi dual ri ght s. " Human pers onal i t y i s a sacred t hi ng; we do not dare
vi ol ate i t and hol d ourselves at a di stance from the sanctuary of the person;
at the same ti me, the good par excellence i s communi on wi t h another. "85
The basi c goal of Durkhei m's corporati sm was t o est abl i sh a normative
tri angle of communi ty, i ndi vi dual ri ghts, and state regul ati on under the
general gui dance of uni versal , humane val ues.
Durkhei m even furni shed a rudi mentary theory of the genesis of vari ous
types of rel ati onshi p between the i ndi vi dual and soci ety. I n The Division
of Labor, he made reference to the "i ndet ermi nat i on of the consci ence col
lecti ve" i n moder n soci ety. I n "pri mi tive" soci eti es, norms often had a ri t ual
arti cul ati on that directly structured concrete events. Durkhei m's concepti on
of "pri mi ti ve si mpl i ci ty, " however, was i tsel f somewhat si mpl i st i c: "The
very si mpl i ci t y of moral practi ces makes them take the habi t ual form of
aut omati sm and, i n these ci rcumstances, automati sm s uff ces. Si nce soci al
life i s always the same and di ffers l i ttl e over space and t i me, unsel fcon
sci ous habi t and t radi t i on cover al most everythi ng. " Tradi t i on mi ght have
a presti ge and aut hori t y t hat left l i t t l e room for reasoni ng and i nqui ry. As
s oci et i es became more compl ex, i t was "more di ffcul t for moral i t y to fun c
t i on through a purel y aut omat i c mechani sm. " In hi ghl y compl ex modern
soci et i es, ci rcumstances were never i denti cal , and norms had a concept ual
st ruct ure t hat requi red the exerci se of j udgment i n thei r appl i cat i on t o
concret e cases and events. Moreover, soci et y was i n "perpet ual evol ut i on. "
Thi s i mpl i ed t hat moral i ty had to be "suppl e enough to be transformed
when i t became necessary. " The di st ance between concept ual norm and
concrete event created a n i nterval of i ndetermi nacy i n moral l i fe whi ch
necessi tated ref ecti on, personal responsi bi l i ty, i ni ti at i ve, and choi ce i n
i ndi vi dual s. When anomi e i ndet erminacy was extreme, t he "desi re to get
ahead" mi ght expose the i ndi vi dual t o "exci t at i on beyond al l measure unti l
he knows practi cal l y no l i mi t s . "86
When Durkhei m spoke of the need for t he "ri tual at t i t ude" of sacred
respect i n modern soci ety, he seemed to bel i eve that the obj ect of this atti tude
woul d be norms and val ues autonomousl y accepted as l egi ti mate. Durkhei m
did not envision a concrete ri tual i zati on of modern life, except, perhaps, i n
peri odi c ri tual contexts (whose nature he di d not real l y specify) . Moreover,
he argued that cri ti ci sm woul d b e bot h necessary and funct i onal in a hi ghly
compl ex soci al order. "The sacred character of moral i ty ought not protect
i t from cri ti ci sm as i t di d i n t he case of r el i gi on. "8 7 Const ructive cri ti ci sm
woul d not i mpai r basi c commi tments i nsofar as they were rati onally j usti f
abl e. Indeed, i t mi ght serve as a "feed-back" mechani s m i n the appl i cati on
of norms t o concrete cases. Wi th reference to one of Sai nt-Si mon's di sci pl es,
Durkhei m observed: "What escaped Bazard i s that the further one advances
i n hi st ory, the more one sees the traits of the cri ti cal peri od prol onged i nt o
the organi c peri od. In fact, the more culti vated a peopl e, the less does the
dogma that uni f es i t bar free exami nati on. Refecti on, cri ti ci sm exi st next
t o fai th, pi erce t hat very fai t h wi thout destroyi ng i t, and occupy an always
larger pl ace in i t .
"88
The i ndi vi dual ri ghts defended by Durkhei m i ncl uded pri vate property
as a materi al basi s of moral autonomy.
Thi s i ndi vi dual l i bert y whi ch is so dear to us supposes not onl y the
facul ty to go about as we pl ease; i t i mpl i es the exi stence of a ci rcl e of
thi ngs whi ch we may di spose of as we wi l l . Indi vi duali sm woul d onl y
be a word i f we di d not have a materi al sphere of acti on i n whi ch we
exercise a sort of soverei gnty. When one says t hat i ndi vi dual property
i s a sacred thi ng, one only states i n symbol i c form an i ndubi tabl e
moral axi om; for i ndi vi dual property i s the materi al condi ti on of the
cul t of the i ndi vi dual . 89
Durkhei m rel ated t hese i deas t o t he noti on that l egi ti mate propert y i n
modern soci ety was i ncreasi ngly the propert y acqui red by t he i ndi vi dual
through hi s own effort rather than through i nheri tance. He di d not draw
the seemingly obvi ous i nference that a certai n mi ni mum of property was
necessary for al l i ndi vi duals i n a soci ety based upon i ndi vi dual l i bert y and
i ncreasi ng equal i ty of opport uni ty. He di d have a concepti on of a cei l i ng
on property, but i t was qui te moral i sti c. He i nterpreted t he l abor theory of
val ue as a concept of di stri bu tive j usti ce that requi red that i ndi vi dual s be rec
ompensed accordi ng to thei r soci al cont ri but i ons. In this sense, di stri buti ve
j usti ce mi ght requi re strati fcati on because of the val ue system i n terms of
whi ch functi ons and contri buti ons were apprai sed. But counterbal anci ng
thi s i dea was that of the norm of communi ty, whi ch requi red a certai n
equal i zati on of rewards. The concepts of di stri buti ve j usti ce relative to di f
ferenti ated funct i ons and of equal i ty based on communal values were among
t he bases for Durkhei m's di sti ncti on between soci al i sm and communi sm i n
Socialism. The i dea t hat Durkhei m leaned more toward communi sm than
toward soci al i sm (whi ch he did not defne i n egal i tari an terms) i s i n part
j usti fed by hi s apparent concepti on of communi t y as a hi gher pri nci pl e
that bot h mi ti gated the "harshness" of di st ri butive j usti ce and represented
i ts l i mi t i ng ideal i n a "heal thy" s oci ety. In a s t ate me nt whi ch was enti rely
i n keepi ng wi th hi s growing emp hasi s on the i mportance of communi t y i n
all "normal " soci eti es, he observed: "Chari ty [in the bi bl i cal sense] is t he
feel i ng of human sympathy freei ng i tself from the l ast i negal i tari an con
si derati ons and effacing or denyi ng t he parti cul ar meri t of thi s fnal form
of heredi ty transmi ssi on - t he transmi ssi on of mental capaci ty. It i s thus
only the apogee of j us t i ce. "9 0
Durkhei m's not i on of the role of the i ndi vi dual i n soci ety also recognized
aesthetic consi derati ons. The response of the individual to shared norms and
values might involve i magi nati ve creativity and uncommon sensitivity above
and beyond t he call of duty. Indeed, i n a mot i n t he epi grammati c tradi ti on
of t he French moralistes, Durkhei m asserted: "There are vi rtues whi ch are
acts of madness, and i t i s thei r madness which consti tutes t hei r grandeur. "91
Hi s cent ral poi nt here as el sewhere, h owever, was t hat t he dai l y bread of
moral life was to be found i n soci al practi ces and i nsti tuti onal norms i n the
broadest sense. These deserved frst-order at tenti on before a di scussi on of
s ubj ective vari ati ons made sense.
In a word, we do not support the exclusive thesi s t hat moral l i fe has
no i ndi vi dual aspect but that the soci al aspect i s the pri nci pal part
and that one must frst investigate i t i f one wi shes to know what the
i ndi vi dual aspect consi sts of. I t i s not a quest i on of denyi ng one of
the two poi nts of vi ew for the beneft of the other, but of reversing
the order of pri ori ty ordi nari l y recogni zed between them. 92
Thus , from Durkhei m's perspecti ve, the essenti al rati onal e for i ndi vi dual
resi stance t o soci al pressure was not i ndi vi dual opi ni on or self -asserti on. It
was i nf armed j udgment that contrasted the exi sti ng state of soci ety to t he
way soci ety ought to be.
The very pri nci pl e of rebel l i on i s t he same as t he pri nci pl e of con
formi sm. An individual conforms to the true nature of society when
he obeys tradi ti onal moral i ty. And he conforms to the true nature of
soci ety when he rebels agai nst thi s morali ty . . . . In the moral realm
as i n al l other real ms of nature, the reason of the individual i s not
pri vi leged because i t i s t he reason of t he individual. The only reason
for which one may l egi ti matel y, here as elsewhere, claim the right
to intervene and to elevate oneself above hi stori cal moral reali ty in
order to reform i t i s not my reason or your s; i t i s i mpersonal , human
reason, whi ch i s trul y real i zed onl y i n sci ence . . . . What I oppose to
the collecti vi ty is t he coll ecti vi ty i tself; but more and bett er consci ous
of i tselL93
In the context of Durkheim's concepts of normal i ty and pat hol ogy, the
i dea expressed somewhat ambi guously i n t h e quoted passage can be more
clearly formul ated: The i ndi vi dual had the ri ght and duty t o oppose a patho
l ogi cal st ate of soci ety. But he or she di d thi s, not i n hi s or her own i nterest,
but i n t he i nterest of furtheri ng the emergence of a normal or desi rabl e state
of soci e ty. Durkhei m's extreme mode of affrmati on at ti mes seemed to deny
that there was any subj ecti vi ty or even i ndi vi dual agency i n thi s acti on, even
i n t he making of a commi tted decisi on. But his essential purpose was to deny
t hat there was a purely "perspecti val , " deci si oni st , or subj ecti vi st posi ti on
i n moral i ty. Instead, he affrmed moral i ty t o b e sci ent i fc, i n t he sense that
i t involved rati onal argument about obj ective consi derati ons. Nowhere else
did Durkhei m come closer to a soci ol ogi cal reformul at i on of the i dea of
natural law. He contended that, at the very least, one coul d reason about
value j udgments and t hat a soci ol ogical concepti on of the probl em gave
content to t h e reasoni ng process. Essenti al to moral i t y was t he consensually
accepted norm and value that created sol i dari ty in soci ety. One's awareness of
the val i di ty of the "normal " state endowed moral acti on wi th an overriding
goal - the creation or mai ntenance of soci al "normal i ty. "
One di mensi on of Durkhei m's concepti on of the relati on between soci ety
and the i ndi vi dual deserves speci al ment i on. In ti me, Durkhei m provi ded
some i nsi ght i nt o the probl em of psychopat hol ogy. I n h i s earl y t hought , hi s
desi re t o establ i sh a methodologically aut onomous foundat i on for soci ol ogy
l ed hi m to emphasi ze the di sti ncti ons between soci ol ogy and psychology.
Later, he broached the probl em of soci al psychology. He also touched at
l east peri pheral l y on the probl em of the rel ati on between normal i ty and
pat hology in soci ety and the personal i ty.
In The Rules and el sewhere, Durkhei m observed t hat soci al normali ty
and psychological normal i ty were not i denti cal concepts. 94 Social normal
i t y and pathol ogy were rel ated to t he nat ure and funct i oni ng of soci al
structures. Psychol ogi cal normal i ty was a type of soci al conformi ty, and
psychopathology amounted to a type of soci al devi ance. The normal soci ety
woul d contai n a margi nal number of psychopathol ogi cal i ndi vi dual s, j ust
as i t woul d contain a margi nal number of ot her types of "devi ants" ( i ncl ud-
i ng i deal i sts and creative excepti ons as well a cri mi nal s) . 11 a pathol ogi cal
state of soci ety, the extreme structural faul ts i n t he organi zati on of soci al
life woul d gi ve ri se to a di storted rate of psychopathol ogy.
i Vol ume I V of the An nee sociologique, Durkhei m used the ti tl e "Mad
ness as a Soci al Fact. " In a book review, he argued t hat "soci al states are
refected in mental ali enati on" and observed that rates of psychopat hol ogy
vari ed with soci al context. 95 As mi ght be expected, Durkhei m was more
suggestive on the level of s tructural causati on t han he was on that of psy
chol ogi cal descri pt i on or analysi s. Nor did he i nvesti gate the shi fts i n t he
very meani ng of psychopathological phenomena wi t h changing soci ocul tural
states and contexts i n the ri chly suggestive manner of Mi chel Foucaul t. 96
But h e di d see t he possi bi l i ty of a study whi ch woul d t reat madness in t he
same manner i n whi ch he had treated sui ci de. I n Suicide i tself, Durkhei m
di scussed the psychologi cal mani festati ons of anomi e anxi ety and egoi sti c
wi thdrawal . In exami ni ng the psychol ogy of egoi sm, he underscored the
possi bi l i t y of a schi zoi d spl i t between i nner and outer reali ty.
I n turni ng away from t he external worl d, consci ousness folds i n
upon i tself, takes i t s el f as i t s own uni que obj ect , and undertakes as i t s
pr i nci pal t as k sel f-observati on and self-analysis. But by t hi s extreme
concentrati on i t merely deepens the chasm di vi di ng i t from the rest
of the uni verse . . . . If it i ndi vi dual i zes i tsel f beyond a certai n poi nt ,
i f i t separates i tsel f t oo radi cally from other b eings, men or thi ngs, i t
f nds i tsel f unabl e t o communi cate wi t h t he very source of i t s normal
nouri shment and no l onger has anythi ng to whi ch i t can appl y i tself.
I t creates not hi ngness wi thi n by creati ng i t wi t hout , and has not hi ng
left to ref ect b ut i ts own mi sery. I t s onl y remai ni ng obj ect of thought
i s i ts i nner not hi ngness and t he resul t i ng melancholy. 97
Hence a certai n type of narci ssi sm eventuated i n mel anchol i c i sol at i on
or, at t he l i mi t , ni hi l i sm. One concl usi on that Durkhei m hi msel f di d not
draw was that t he concept of psychopathol ogy was methodologi cally easi er
to appl y but ph i l os ophi cally more dubi ous t han h i s own concept of soci al
pathol ogy. 98 As a form of soci al devi ance, psychopathol ogy often seemed
to be readi l y det ect abl e. But i t s rel at i on to other i ssues, such as cri mi nal
responsi bi l i ty, mi ght be probl emat i c, and i t s very avai l abi l i ty made tempti ng
an i denti fcati on of all unusual phenomena as psychologi cally aberrant. The
noti on of soci al pathol ogy was more di f cult to defne. Thi s diffculty, as
wel l as i deol ogi cal reasons, may expl ai n the i l l reput e of the concept among
soci al sci enti sts i n contrast wi th the bet t er fort une of psychopathol ogy. Yet
from a phi l osophi cal vi ewpoi nt, Durkhei m's concept of soci al pathology had
a stronger cri ti cal basi s and was, i n a sense, logi cally pri or. From Durkhei m's
perspecti ve, it woul d seem that the normal person woul d have to be con
cei ved normati vel y wi th reference to the normal soci ety. He or she woul d
be the person who l i ved i n accordance wi th meani ngful , l egi ti mate norms,
appl yi ng them wi t h the requi si te fexi bi l i ty and harbori ng wi t hi n hi m- or
hersel f a marginal l eaven of anomi e. He or she woul d be a "conformi st" i n
a very speci al sense of the term. And even i n the normal state of soci ety,
t he i deological "devi ant" woul d not be unequi vocal l y in the wrong. I n fact ,
Durkhei m seemed to att ri bute a greater causal i mportance to the exceptional
i ndi vi dual in the normal state of soci ety, for in this context i ndi vi dual hybris
woul d correspond to the el ement of possi bl y creative anomi e i n experi ence.
And i t woul d bear a more posi ti ve rel ati on to soci ety as a whol e: i t woul d
evoke a shared sense of the possi bl e or, concei vabl y, t he tragi c whi ch ri tual
and other symbol i c forms woul d si mul taneousl y hei ghten and mi ti gate. The
right kind of soci al i ntegrati on woul d i tself hel p save the creative excepti on
from extreme psychopathology.
In the pathol ogi cal state of soci ety, t he unquesti oni ng conformi st mi ght
retai n some sembl ance of mental bal ance at the pri ce of f urtheri ng di si n
tegrating forces i n soci ety at l arge. The person wi t h a psychopathol ogi cal
adaptati on mi ght be more or less off course than the conforming soci opat h:
he or she mi ght experi ence i n exaggerated form the causes of anxi ety i n
soci et y or reveal i n obl i que and di st orted fashi on t he symbol i c bases of
soci al normal i ty mi ssi ng i n t he status quo. (Thus one mi ght suggest that
the schi zophreni c l i ved i n l i mi ti ng form the dual i sm b etween i nner sel f
and outer real i ty; the comp ulsive neuroti c performed ri tual s whi ch had l ost
thei r way.) Durkhei m never gave t o hi s own concepti on of soci al psychol
ogy and i ts rel ati on t o the i ndi vi dual a trul y convi nci ng forul at i on, and
I have extended hi s thought i n a certai n di recti on. Despi te t he dangers of
over-i nterpretati on, i t mi ght not be stretchi ng hi s thought t oo far t o see i t
as tendi ng toward a cul tural concepti on of psychopathol ogy t hat provi ded
the basi s for a cri t i que of the very concept of "mental i l l ness. " For wi thi n
the framework of hi s thought, the very category of mental i l l ness mi ght wel l
appear as a defensive response t o di sconcerti ng and dangerous phenomena
i n a formal l y rati onal , bureaucrati zed soci ety whi ch had good i nsti tuti onal
reasons to fear for i t s own soci al sani ty. In t hi s sense, a di fferent appreci a
t i on of certai n phenomena woul d i t sel f requi re t hei r l i mi ted st at us and thei r
i nserti on i nt o a si gni fcantly di fferent soci ocul tural context. 99
The central poi nt is t hat Dur khei m's i dea of t he rel ati on of soci ol ogy to
moral phi l osophy was based upon the coordi nate axes of hi s thought: the tree
of soci al life and the concepts of normal i t y and pathol ogy. The di sti nctive
task of the comparati ve met hod was to arrive at types that did not go to
mut ually rei nf arcing extremes: the nomi nal i sm of tradi ti onal hi stori ography
and the extreme realism and quest for universals of tradi ti onal phi l osophy.
Toward t he end of h i s l i fe, however, Durkhei m t ur ned t o t he concern wi t h
human nature t hat characteri zed tradi ti onal phi l osophy. Thi s concern was
central to his Elementary Forms. From Durkhei m's soci ol ogical and cul tural
perspecti ve, the concept of human nature coul d be reformul at ed: "human
nature" referred t o t he possi bi l i t i es of symbol i c experi ence correspondi ng
to the trunk of the tree of soci al lif e. These possi bi l i ti es coul d take normal
or pathol ogi cal for m.
I n t he mos t general terms, what characteri zed t he normal soci ety? Fi rst
and foremost , i t was based upon a conscience collective that embodi ed a
tense bal ance of i nst i t ut i onal norms and cul tural symbol s. The core of the
conscience collectivewas a vari ant of practi cal reason whi ch Durkhei m termed
!a morale, or t he collecti ve type. In thei r appl i cati on t o concrete events by
average individuals, the norms and values of the conscience collective suffered a
"fal l i ng off" from i deal perfect i on. To ask more of ordi nary soci al life woul d
be to fal l prey to anomi e i deal i sm, fanati cal l y d emandi ng p erfecti on from
all people at al l ti mes. But to revitalize soci al li fe and t o remi nd members
of soci ety i n a dramati cal l y forceful way of thei r obl i gati on to show sacred
respect for shared values, speci al "ri tual " acti vi ti es were necessary. In ri tual ,
t he conscience collective was performatively expressed and regenerated in
i nt ense and puri fed forms t hat transcended t h e i nevi tabl e compromi ses
of everyday life. And through ri tual , communitas woul d be i nst i t ut i onal l y
reali zed and controlled. The normal soci ety woul d al so contai n a dynami c
l eaven of anomi e - i ncl udi ng more anomi e di spl ays of communitas. But
anomi e woul d be l i mi t ed t o a marginal aspect of t he average personal i ty and
to marginal or liminal groups in soci ety. Ei ther extreme of the bel l -shaped
curve of moral practi ce woul d reveal margi nal categori es of cul ture-beari ng
i deal i sts ( or perfecti oni st devi ants) at one end and of cri mi nal devi ants at
the other. I n the normal soci ety, devi ants presenti ng i deol ogi cal challenges
to the existing order mi ght attain ri tual status and, invested wi th ambi valent
sacred values, become the obj ects of dangerous fasci nat i on.
The functi on of the conscience collective i n t he normal st at e of soci et y
was t o st ri ke a vi abl e balance between st ruct ure and communitas - the
dual b ases of sol i dari ty in society. Obj ect i ve and i nternal i zed at the same
t i me, the conscience collective woul d create a meani ngful sense of l egi ti mate
l i mi t s. "Al l l i fe . . . i s a compl ex equi l i bri um whose di verse el ements l i mi t
one another, and t hi s equi l i br i um cannot be broken wi t hout sufferi ng and
si ckness. " 1 0 Common to the bi ol ogical organi sm and soci et y was a structure
whose normal functi oni ng depended on a dynami c equi l i bri um of mut u
al l y l i mi t i ng parts. The elementary postul ate of Durkhei m's phi l osophy was
the fni t e nature of all lif e. Indeed, one i nteresti ng aspect of his natural i sti c
metaphors representi ng hi s understandi ng of soci ety was the medi ati on of
the duali sm between nature and soci ety, mat ter and mi nd, whi ch another
t endency of hi s thought affr med in extreme for m. One may detect here a
cosmol ogi cal undercurrent that was more expansi ve than his soci al meta
physi c. Moreover, Durkhei m in ti me became sensi ti ve to the dangers of
excessive formal rat i onal i ty and constrai nt as pri nci pl es of soci al l i fe; t hi s
sensi ti vi ty coi nci ded wi t h hi s growi ng awareness of the need for si gni fcant
communi t y i n all soci ety and hi s sense of t he i mportance of the content
of norms and val ues. One of hi s cri t i ci sms of Kant was of hi s predecessor's
fai l ure to recognize that all human nature requi red l i mi tati on, "our rati onal
nature as wel l as our passi onate nat ure. " " Our reason i s not a transcendental
faculty. It i s part of the worl d and, consequently, i t must fol l ow the law of
the world. The uni verse i s l i mi t ed, and all l i mi t at i on presupposes forces
whi ch l i mi t . " 1 0 1 Hence Durkhei m soci al i zed a fni te concepti on of reason
and brought i t i nto sustai ned contact with soci al probl ems.
I n hi s earl y thought, Durkhei m saw l i ttl e future for reli gi on i n modern
soci ety. Wi th the expansi on of hi s concept of reason, hi s vi ew of the future of
rel i gi on changed. He came t o argue that a ri tual atti tude of sacred respect was
at the root of all commi tments and t hat peri odi c, festive ri t ual observances
woul d be necessary to revi ve and rei nvi gorate these commi tments. Hence the
moder sci enti fc and cri ti cal consci ousness seemed to requi re a newer defni -
ti on of the rel ati onshi p between fai th and reason. For Durkhei m, moreover,
the basi c nexus exi sted, not between rel i gi on, the radi cally transcendent,
and the categorical i mperati ve, but between reli gi on, i deal yet thi s-worl dly
practi ces ( i ncl udi ng ri tual ) , and communal spontaneity. The sacred di d not
serve pri mari l y t o enforce t he stri ctness of obli gati ons; i t seemed t o enable
one to overcome a sense of compul si on by making soci al norms desi rable and
even giving peopl e a feeli ng of bei ng at home in t he worl d. " I t is far from
t r ue t hat t he not i on of t he i mperative i s t he t r ue characteristi c of t he reli gi ous
si de of moral i ty. On the contrary, one coul d show that the more a morali ty
i s essentially rel i gi ous, the more the i dea of obl i gati on i s effaced. " 1 02 Here
Durkhei m di d relate reli gi on to the overcomi ng, or at least the mi ti gati on,
of tragi c anti pathi es i n human exi stence.
Wi th the i dea of t he potenti al of communi ty and the sacred i n modern
soci ety, Durkhei m at l east parti al l y re-evaluated the nature of myth and i ts
rel ati on to reason. He seemed to i mpl y that, i nsofar as myth di d not con
t radi ct t he substanti ve rat i onal i t y of the conscience collective, i t mi ght well
serve to convey forms of understandi ng whi ch complemented or suppl e
ment ed l i t eral t rut h.
There i s and there wi l l always be a pl ace i n soci al l i fe for a form of
t rut h whi ch wi l l perhaps express i tsel f i n secul ar for m b u t whi ch wi l l ,
despite everything, have a mythologi cal and rel i gi ous foundati on. For
a l ong t i me t o come, t here wi l l be t wo tendenci es i n every soci ety: a
t endency toward obj ecti ve and sci ent i fc truth and a t endency toward
t ruth seen from the i nsi de, or mythol ogi cal t rut h. 1 0 1
A probl em wi t h mythol ogi es i n a state of soci al pathology was t hat they
often i ntensi fed unnecessary cont radi ct i ons and destructi ve forces that
outraged reason instead of compensati ng for its necessary defects. Li berated
from rati onal con trol, myth and ri tual gravitated toward i rrati onali ty and
maniacal agi tati on, whi ch mi ght i ncl ude a quest for regeneration through
quasi-sacrif cial violence. The basic goal of Durkheim's thought was to retai n
rati onal i ty and the modern cri ti cal consci ousness whi l e openi ng soci ety to
repressed or avoided forms of human experi ence. The attempt to reconsi der
the sacred and assess i ts possi bl e role in a revi talized modern soci ety was one
of the basic moti vati ons of Durkheim's masterpi ece, The Elementmy Forms
of the Religious Lie.
228 Ele Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher
Notes
1 . Review of Gaston Richard, Le Socialisme et Ia science sociale, Revue phi
losophique IV ( 1 897) , 20 1 .
2. First given as a lecture course i n 1 895- 1 896, thi s study was publ i shed
posthumousl y i n 1 928 as Le Socialisme (Pari s: Al can) . An Engl i sh trans
lation by Charlotte Sattler has been publ i shed wi th an i ntroducti on by
Al vi n Goul dner: Socialism (New York: Col li er Books, 1 962) . The frst
translation was under the ti tl e Socialism and Saint-Simon ( Yellow Spri ngs,
Ohi o: Anti och Press, 1 95 8 ) . References throughout are to the Col l i er
Books edi ti on.
3 . Socialism, p. 40.
4 . Ibid. , p. 4 1 .
5 . Ibid. , p. 1 42.
6. Ibid. , p. 1 44.
7. Ibid. , p. 1 24.
8 . " La Soci ologie en France au X! Xe si ecl e, " Revue bleue, 4th seri es, XI I I
( 1 900) , 6 1 1 -6 1 2.
9 . Ibid. , p. 6 1 2 .
1 0. Socialism, p. 233.
1 1 . Ibid. , p. 238.
1 2. !bid. , p. 245.
1 3. !bid. , p. 5 4.
1 4. !bid. , pp. 47-48.
1 5 . !bid. , p. 48 .
1 6. Ibid. , p. 49.
1 7. Ibid. , p. 5 8 .
1 8 . Ibid. , pp. 59- 60.
1 9. Ibid. , p. 5 8 .
20. "Cours de sci ence soci al e: Leon d' ouverture , " Revue interationale de
l'enseignement, XV ( 1 888) , 3 3 .
2 1 . Les Regles de Ia methode sociologique ( 1 5t h ed. ; Pari s: Presses U niversi taires
de France, 1 963) , p. 1 32.
22. Les Formes elbnentaires de Ia vie religieuse ( 4th ed. ; Paris: Presses U niver
si taires de France, 1 960) , p. 5 .
23. For an account of t hi s di scussi on, s ee H. Stuart Hughes, The Obstructed
Path ( New York: Harper & Row, 1 968) , chap. i i . For the attitude of a
contemporary hi stori an, see Luci en Febvre, Combats pour l'histoire (Pari s :
Col i n, 1 95 3 ) , pp. 422- 423. See also Laurent Mucci ol li , La Decouverte du
Chpe 5 Theory a Pratice 229
social: naissance de Ia sociologi e Fr ance ( 1 870- 1914) (Paris: Editions de
Ia Decouverte, 1998).
24. "La Sociologie en France au XIXe siecle," p. 648.
25. "La Science positive de I a morale en Allemagne," Revue philosophique,
XIV (1887), 282.
26. "Introduction a I a sociologie de Ia famille," Ann als de I Facule de Lettres
de Bordea, 1888, p. 262.
27. R de Ia mthoe sociolgique, p. 110.
28. La Sociologie et son domaine scientifique" (frst pub. 1900); in Armand
Cuvillier, O va I sociolgi fanfaie?(Pais: Librairie Marcel Riviere, 1953 ),
pp. 181-182. See also Emile Durkheim and P Fauconnet, "Sociologie et
sciences sociales," Revue phiosophique, LV {1903), 481.
29. "Sociologie et sciences sociales," p p. 486-487.
30. 1896-1897; in Kurt Wolff, ed., Essy onSoioogand Phiosophy(frstpub.
1960; New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 342-343.
31. "Sociologie et sciences sociales" (not the same article a the one written
with P Fauconnet), in De I methoe das les s ciences (Paris: Alcan, 1909),
pp. 281-282.
32. ibi., p. 280.
33. Annie sociolgiue, I V {18991900), 124-125. Fr an excllent analysis of
Durkheim's conception of the relation of history and sociolog, see Rob
ert N. Bellah, "Durkheim and History," in Robrt A. Nisbet, ed., Eme
Durkheim (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 153-176.
3 4. Llutio pique e France, In trod by Maurice Halbwachs (2 vo Is.;
Paris: Alcan, 1938).
35. See Emile Our kheim, Sociolgi et philosophie (Paris: Presses U niversitaires
de France, 1963), pp. 42-43.
36. Bulleti de I Soite Franfaise de Philosophie, session of May 28, 1908
(Paris: Colin, 1908), p. 230.
37. Soialism, pp. 158-160.
38. ibi.
39. "Introduction a Ia morale," Revue phiosphique, LXXXIX (1920), 89.
40. /_Evolutio pque en France, l I, 199.
41. Ibid., pp. 95,124, 158-159.
42. "La Sociologie et son domaine scientifque," pp. 189-190.
43. L'ducatin morae (Paris Presses Universitaire de France, 1963 ), p. 41.
44. "Jugements de valeur et jugements de realite," in Sociolgi et piosophie,
p 133. The essy was first given orally before the I nternational Congress of
Philosophy at Bologna and published in 1911 in the Rvue de met phyique
et de morale.
230 Emile Durkheim: Sociologist a1d Philosopher
45 . Sociologie etphilosophie, pp. 1 33- 1 34.
46. Leons de sociologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1 950) , p. 78
(trans. under the tide Professi onal Ethics and Civic Morals) .
47. Le Suicide (Paris: Presses U niversitai res de France, 1 960) , p. 447. One may
note the si mi larity ofDurkheim's ideas to those ofTocgueville in his A1cie1
regime.
48. Le Suicide, p. 437.
49. Socialt"sm, p. 437.
5 1 . Leo1s de sociologie, pp. 250- 25 1 . Durkheim saw i n inheritance a general
characteri sti c that could be used for the objective classifcation of types of
ki nshi p. "I f one tries to di sti nguish and classif di fferent types of the family
according to the literary descriptions of travelers and, at ti mes, hi stori ans,
one i s in danger of confoundi ng the most di fferent types. I f, on the con
trary, one takes as the basi s of classifcation the j uri di cal consti tuti on of the
fami ly and especially the right of i nheri tance, one has an obj ective criterion
which, without being i nfallible, nonetheless obviates many errors" (Regles
de la methode sociologique, p. 45) .
5 2. Educatio1 et sociologie (Paris: Alcan, 1 922) , p. 5 1 .
5 3. "La Famille conj ugale, " Revue philosophique, XCI ( 1 92 1 ) , 1 0.
54. Le Suicide, pp. 427-428 .
5 5 . Preface to 2d ed. , De La Divisio1 du travail social ( 7th ed. ; Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1 960) , pp. i i -i i i .
56. Ibid. , pp. vi i -vi i i .
57. Ibid. , P X.
5 8 . Ibid.
59. Ibid. , p. xvi.
GO. " 1 t i s fa frm a fact that the corporation had retained i n the eighteenth
century the benefcial effects i t had i n the Middle Ages. The line of demar
cation between masters and workers was sharp . . . . Just as the bourgeoi s
scorned the artisan, the latter scorned the worker who had no apprentice"
(Socialsm, p. 1 03 ) .
G I . Divisio1 du travail social, pp. xvi, xi .
62. Ibid. , p. xxi x n.
63. re Suicide, p. 437.
64. !bid. , p. 439.
6 5 . Ibid. , p. 442.
G G . Leons de sociologie, pp. 1 08ff.
67. M mztesquieu a1d Rousseau: Foreru11ers ofSociology, trans. Ralph Manheim,
Foreword by Henri Peyre (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1 960 ),
Chapte 5 Theory and Practice 23 I
pp. 22-23. Durkhei m traced one l i ne of French social thought leading
from Montesquieu and Rousseau through Sai nt-Si mon and Comte to
hi mself and his school . It is interesting to contrast this tradition with the
less opti mi sti c strand leading from Montesquieu through Tocqueville and
Comte to thinkers l i ke Raymond Aron. On Tocqueville see my History
and Reading: Tocquevifle, Foucault, French Studies (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2000) , chap. 2.
69. Division du travail social, pp. xi -xi i .
70. Le Suicide, p. 438 .
7 1 . Socialism, pp. 6 1 , 62, 247.
72. George Si mpson, lntrod. t o Emi l e Durkheim, The Division of Labor in
Societ, trans. George Si mpson (New York: Macmi l lan, 1 933) , p . xxvi i . See
also the interpretation of George Catlin, In trod. to Emi l e Durkhei m, The
Rules of Sociological Method, trans. Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 9 38) .
7 3. Lerons de sociofogie, pp. 90-9 1 .
74. Annie sociofgique, X ( 1 905 - 1 906) , 354.
75 . Quoted i n Montesquieu and Rousseau, p. 88.
76. Education morale, p. 36.
77. Regfes de fa methode sociofogique, pp. xx-xxi , n. 2.
78. Education morale, p. 44.
79. Ibid. , p. 58.
80. Sociologie et phifosophie, p. 52.
8 1 . Lerons de sociologie, p . 3 6.
82. Regfes de fa methode sociofogique, p. 1 23.
8 3. Education morale, p. 8 3.
8 4. Division du travail social, p. 1 80.
8 5 . Sociologie et philosophie, p . 5 1 . Durkheim di d not see how dignity was a goal
of social action that could neither be si mply assumed as a given nor postu
lated in an unqual ifed manner. Events such as the First World War, not to
mention later events such as the Holocaust, as well as "everyday" occurrences
in the treatment of others, like chi l d abuse and wife battering, make the
si mpl e assumption of dignity open to questi on. And the excl usionary use
of dignity wi th respect to women and peopl e of color, along with its role
in denigrating nonhuman ani mal s, render suspect any unquali fied or abso
lute affirmation of digni ty. Moreover, one would have to inquire critically
into the idealist functi ons of dignity to construe as i nferi or or even abject
certain activities (such as sex) or parts of the body (what Mikhai l Bakhti n
referred to as "the lower body stratum") . And di gni ty would legitimately
be contested as a value by t he grotesque, t he carnival esque, and even t he
vulgar. Is there, for example, a genui nely funny j oke that i s dignif ed?
8 6 . Education morale, pp. 45 , 1 29, 42-43.
87. Sociologie et philosophie, p. 69.
88. Socialism, p. 25 8.
8 9. Lefons de sociologie, p. 202.
90. Ibid. , p. 258.
9 1 . Sociologie et philosophie, p. 1 2 5 .
92. Revi ew of Alfred Foui llee's Les Ebnents sociologiques de Ia morale, Gustave
Belot's En quet d'une morale positive, and Adolphe Landry's Principes de
moral rationnele, i n An nee sociologique, X ( 1 905 - 1 906) , 3 6 1 .
93. Sociologie et philosophie, pp. 95- 96.
94. Regles de Ia methode sociologique, p. 66. See also "Crime et sante sociale, "
Revue philosophique, XX ( 1 895) , 523.
95. Revi ew ofG. A. Duprat's Les Causes sociales de Ia flie, i nAnnee sociologique,
IV ( 1 899- 1 900), 475-476.
96. See Mi chel Foucaul t, L'istoire de Ia flie a l'!ge classique (Pari s: Pi on,
1 9 6 1 ) and R. D. Lai ng, The Divided Sel ( frst pub. 1 960; Baltimore:
Pengui n Books, 1 965 ) . Laing provides a sensi tive phenomenological de
scri ption of schizoid and schizophrenic di ssociation of the personali ty i n
response t o double b i nds and a state of" ontological" i nsecuri ty. The most
obvi ous defciency i n Laing's thought is the absence of an adequate soci
ological dimension both in explaining the genesis of psychopathological
phenomena and in proposing reforms. Except for his investigation of the
"schizophrenogenic" family, his conception of society is di sappoi nt i ngly
vague. On the level of reform, Laing came to advocate what might be
called a mi nd-blasting technique. He looked to the psychopathological
experience itself under controlled condi tions as a deviant force that can
shake people loose from mad conformity in a pathological society. As a
social sol uti on, the dubiousness of thi s proposal is evident. In addi ti on,
the basically private or, at most, small-scale communal approach of Laing
did not address i tself to the problem of large-scale social transformati on
affecti ng major i nsti tuti ons. I n one di mensi on of hi s complex account,
Foucault was more relevant for a soci ologi cal and hi storical understanding
of madness. On Foucault's hi story of madness, see my History and Reading:
Tocquevile, Foucault, Fench Stuies, chap. 3 .
97. Le Suicide, pp. 3 1 4-3 1 5 .
98. Freud made a si milar poi nt. See hi s Civilization and Its Discontents, trans,
J. Riviere (London: Hogarth Press , 1 95 3 ), pp. 1 4 1 - 1 42: "If the evol uti on
of ci vilizati on has such a far-reaching si mi larity wi t h t he development of an
Chapte 5 Them and Practice 233
i ndi vidual, and if t he same methods are employed in both, would not the
di agnosi s be j usti fed that many systems of civi l i zati on -or epochs of i t
-possi bl y even the whole of humanity have become ' neurotic' under the
pressure of the civi l i zi ng trends? To anal yti c di ssecti on of these neuroses,
therapeuti c recommendations might fol l ow which would claim a great
practical i nterest . . . . The diagnosis of col l ective neurosi s, moreover, will be
confronted by a special di fcul ty. In the neurosis of an individual we can
use as a starting poi nt the contrast presented to us between the pati ent and
his environment which we assume to be ' normal . ' No such background as
this woul d be avai l abl e for any society si milarly affected; i t woul d have to be
suppl i ed i n some other way. And wi th regard to any therapeutic application
of our knowledge, what woul d be the use of the most acute analysis of social
neuroses, since no one possesses the power to compel t he community to
adopt the therapy? In spi te of al l these diffcul ti es, we may expect that one
day someone wi l l venture upon thi s research i nto the pathology of civilized
communi ti es. " The " background" for the analysis of social pathology was,
according to Durkheim, to be found in comparative studies and the inves
tigation of the relation of condi tions, insti tutional structures, and cultural
values. One of the "uses" of this type of di agnosis would be in furthering
legitimate critique and practice, i ncl udi ng the critical understanding of
"mental i l l ness" and of the role of those who do have the power or i nfuence
to enforce conformi ty in a signifcantly pathological sociocul tural context.
On the "therapeutic" level of social reform, Durkheim was less adequate
and only intimated the potential and dangers of various forms of pol i tical
action. For a sometimes si mpli sti c devel opment in a direction comparable
to that of Durkheim but within the Freudian tradition, see the works of
Erich Fromm, especi al l y The Sane Societ.
99. A si mi l ar i n terpretation is appl i ed to the thought of Marcel Mauss by
Claude Levi-Strauss in his very i mportant i ntroduction to Mauss's Sociologie
et anthrpologie (frst pub. 1 950; Paris: Presses Universitaires d France,
1 968) , pp. xvi ii-xxi i. Even Mi chel Foucault, in his early, excellent Maladie
mentale et psychologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1 954) , com
mi ts the error of i denti fyi ng Durkhei m's concept of social pathol ogy with
psychopathology and mental i l lness ( p. 75) . Wi thi n the Amzee school , the
problem of the relati onshi p between soci al pathology and psychopathology
was explored by Mauri ce Halbwachs in les causes du suicide (Pari s: Al can,
1 930) . And the problem was a central concern i n the work of Charles
Bl onde! .
1 00. Education morale, p. 34.
1 0 1 . Ibid. , pp. 95- 96.
1 02. Sociologie et philoso phie, p. 1 02.
I 03 . Pragmatisme et sociologie, ed. and I n trod. by Armand Cuvillier (Paris: Li
brairie Phi losophique J . Vri n, 1 95 5) , p. 1 84; reconstructed from students'
notes for a course given i n 1 9 1 3- 1 9 1 4.
6
The Sacred and Societ
A seeki ng, a searchi ng.
To seek whi t her?
To search t he l and, t o seek t he ori gi n,
To seek out t he base, t o search out t he unknown,
To seek out t he at ua [ spi ri t ] .
May i t be effect ual .
-A Maori di viner' s spel l
By common accord, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Lif i s
Dur khei m's most ambi t i ous work. But consensus di si ntegrates i n t he eval
uat i on ofDurkhei m's achi evement. Mos t schol arly opi ni on falls somewhere
be tween the two extremes represented by the reactions of Robert Lowie and
Tal cot t Parsons. Lowi e condemned Durkhei m wi th faint prai se: "Whi l e by
no means i ncl i ned to j oi n in the paeans of prai se that have been i nt oned i n
Durkhei m's honor, I repeat t hat hi s essay i s a not ewort hy ment al exerci se
and would rank as a l andmark i f di al ect i c i ngenui t y s uffced t o achi eve
greatness in the empi ri cal sci ences. " 1 Parsons, on t he ot her hand, prai sed
Du rkhei m wi th b u t fai nt reservat i on:
Whi l e ost ensi bl y st udyi ng onl y a narrowl y t echni cal emp i ri cal
mat eri al whi ch mi ght be t hought t o be of l i t t l e general i nterest, he
manages to make i t t he vehi cle for unusually far-reachi ng theoreti cal
reasoni ng. So, while Les frmes elmentaires de la vie religieuse i s i n
one aspect a t echni cal monograph on Aust ral i an t ot emi sm, i t i s at
the same ti me one of the few mos t i mportant works on soci ol ogi cal
t heory . . . . In fac t onl y when a monograph i s at t he same t i me an es
say in theory can it be the highest type of empi ri cal s t udy. Durkhei m
had the facul t y of combi ni ng the t wo aspects in a way that provi ded
model s for future s oci ol ogi sts. Unfort unatel y, i t i s unl i kel y t hat
many wi l l at t ai n thi s preemi nence i n the combi nat i on. 2
Ther e i s more t o t hi s di fference of vi ews t han t he standard opposi t i on
between t he empi ri cal f eldworker and t he theoreti cal concept b ui l der.
Both because i t carri ed pr omi nent t endenci es o f Durkhei mi an soci ol ogy
to t hei r extreme logi cal concl usi on and because i t exacerbated the per
manent ambi gui t i es of Durkhei m's thought, The Elementary Forms has
l ent i tsel f, not onl y t o cont radi ct ory eval uat i ons, but al so t o di vergent
i nt er pr et at i ons. I ts argume nt me rged vari ous cur r ent s of t hought i nt o an
en com passi ng, oceani c form of di scourse that at ti mes seemed to subvert
di fferences among sci ent i fc theory, mythol ogy, and phi l osophy. Thus the
i ni t i al probl em i s how to come t o t erms wi t h thi s si ngul ar work - thi s
al most sacred text - whi ch has had the power to al l ure and repel at the
same t i me. Instead of traci ng Durkhei m's poi nt s i n the exact order i n
whi ch he made t hem, I bel i eve i t i s anal yt i cal l y useful t o approach The
Elementary Forms under three overl appi ng but di sti nct headi ngs: the theory
of rel i gi on, soci ol ogi cal epi st emol ogy, and soci al met aphysi c. I n thi s way,
one may at t empt to grasp the nat ure of the argument as a whol e, i t s pl ace
i n Dur khei m's t hought , and i t s rel at i on to the s hape of moder n cul t ure
and Durkhei m' s reformi st hopes.
The Theory ofReligion
By the t i me he wrote The Elementary Fo rms, Durkhei m was convi nced
that reli gi on was the matrix of ci vi li zati on and the pre-emi nent form of soci al
l i fe. In a preface t o the Annie sociologique, he explai ned why soci ology shoul d
accord p ri ori ty t o rel i gi on i n i ts i nvestigati on of cul ture and soci et y:
Religion contai ns i n i tsel f from the very begi nni ng, even i f i n an
i ndi sti nct state, al l the elements whi ch, i n di ssoci ati ng themselves
from it, arti cul ati ng themsel ves, and combi ni ng with one anot her
i n a thousand ways, have given ri se to the vari ous mani festati ons of
collective l i fe. From myths and legends have i ssued forth sci ence and
poetry; from rel i gi ous ornamentati ons and cult ceremonials have come
the plastic arts; from ritual practice were bor law and moral s. One
Chapter 6 The Saced and Societ 237
cannot understand our percepti on of the world, our phi l osophi cal
concepti ons of the soul, of i mmortality, of l i fe, i f one does not know
the religious bel i efs that are thei r pri mordi al forms. Ki nshi p started out
as an esse nt i al l y rel i gi ous t i e; puni s hment , contract, gift, and ho mage
are transformati ons of expi atory, contractual, communal , honorary
sacri fces, and so on . . . . A great number of problems change their
aspects completely as soon as their connections with the soci ology of
religion are recognized. Our eforts must therefore be ai med at tracing
those connecti ons. 3
In The Elementary Forms, Durkhei m's object was to trace the connecti ons
between rel i gi on and soci ety on t he hi ghest l evel of general i ty by seeki ng
t he essenti al consti tuents of reli gi on that represented a permanent aspect of
human nature i n soci ety. "What we want is to fnd a means to di scern the
ever present causes on whi ch depend the most esse nt i al fo rms of rel i gi ous
thought and practi ce. " 4 I n other words, Durkhei m was worki ng at the most
basi c l evel of t he t ree of soci o-cul tural lif e. He sought t he common trunk of
speci fcally human experi ence, whi ch woul d be di fferenti ated accordi ng to
varyi ng condi ti ons i n di fferent types of soci ety. Moreover, i t was contextually
clear that he was pri mari l y concerned with the nature and role of reli gi on
i n t he "normal" fo rm of soci al l i fe. Thus h i s last major work, l i ke the stud
i es whi ch preceded i t, was at l east i mpl i ci tly concei ved wi th reference to
the two coordi nat e bases of Durkhei m's thought: the paradi gm or model
of the t ree of s oci al l i fe and the root di sti ncti on between t he normal and
t he pathol ogi cal .
The method Durkhei m empl oyed was that of the "cruci al experi ment . "
Th rough concentrated anal ysi s of a l i mi ted range of related facts, he at
tempted t o arrive ul t i mately at the formul ati on of general l aws. Durkhei m's
"cruci al experi ment" focused on "pri mi ti ve" soci eti es and, more speci fcally,
on Australi an soci eti es and used the Ameri can Indi ans as a sort of control
group. The pri nci pal anal yti c reason for thi s choi ce was met hodol ogi cal .
The relative si mpl i ci ty of "pri mi ti ve" soci eti es made them the most pl ausi bl e
obj ects of study i n the attempt to defne the essence of reli gi on and the
permanent i n h uman nature. It may be observed, moreover, that the general
methodologi cal vi ewpoi nt was analytically i ndependent of the speci fc theory
of t otemi sm, the evoluti onary tendenci es, and the soci al met aphysi c wi th
which i t became associ ated in the course of Durkheim' s argument.
The pr obl em of i ni t i al defni t i on, whi ch was always si gni f cant i n
Durkhei m' s work, assumed par amount i mport ance i n The Elementary
Forms. The defni t i on of t he rel i gi ous phenomenon was m uch mor e t han
a prel i mi nary st ep i n t he ori ent at i on of research. I t e mbodi ed a s ummar y
of what was essent i al i n rel i gi on a nd per manent i n human nat ur e. Def
ni t i on was t hus rel at ed t o s ubs equent argument i n accordance wi t h t he
Car t esi an di ct um t hat a chai n i s as s t r ong as i t s f rst l i nk.
Dur khei m b egan by rej ect i ng general def ni t i ons of r el i gi on i n terms
of a personal di vi ni ty or radi cal l y t ranscendent al myst eri es. As he ha d
put i t i n a n earl i er art i cl e, t he not i on of di vi ni t y was onl y a "secondary
epi s ode" i n t he hi story of rel i gi ons . 5 Buddhi sm offered a pr omi nent ex
a mpl e of a maj or rel i gi ous system wi t h out di vi ni t i es . I n addi t i on, ma ny
rel i gi ons provi ded cases o f ri t ual s wi t hout gods or , i ndeed, of gods who
were concei ved as t he products of ri t ual act i on. From these consi derati ons
Durkhei m deri ved t he general pr i nci pl e t hat t he meani ng, effcacy, and
s oci al funct i on of cul t were i ndependent of t he i dea of di vi ne i nterven
t i on.
Dur kh ei m's di scuss i on of t ranscendent al myst er i es was more t heo
reti cal ly el abor at e t han hi s comment s on t he not i on of di vi ni ty. The no
t i on of t he i nexpl i cabl y myst eri ous ( or t he t ot al l y ot her ) was reci procal l y
rel ated t o t he not i on of a n aut onomous real m of nat ure. Bot h not i ons
were al i en t o "pr i mi ti ve" man. I ns t ead, he ha d an experi ence of le mer
veilleux - t he wondr ous - whi ch compr ehended both t he processes of
nat ure and t he doi ngs o f humans .
For hi m there i s not hi ng strange i n t he power of voi ce or gesture t o
comman d the el ement s , t o s t op or hasten t he mot i on of the stars,
to br i ng rai n or cause i t t o cease, etc. The ri tes whi ch he employs
to assure the fer t i l i t y of the s oi l or the fecundi t y o f ani mal speci es
on whi c h he i s nour i s hed do not appear more i rrat i onal i n hi s eyes
than the techni cal pr ocesses of whi ch our agri cul tural i sts make use,
for the same purpose, do t o ours. The powers whi ch he puts i nt o
pl ay by these di verse means do not seem t o hi m t o have anyt hi ng
especi al l y myst eri ous about them . . . . Tha t i s why t he mi r acul ous
i nt ervent i ons whi ch t he anci ent s at t r i but ed t o t hei r gods were
not to t he i r eyes mi r acl es i n the mode r n s ens e of t h e word. For
t hem, t hey wer e bea uti ful , r ar e, or t er r i bl e spectacl es, or causes
of surpri se and wonder (thaumata, mirabifia, miracuf) ; but they
never saw t hem as gl i mpses i nt o a mysteri ous worl d whi ch reason
cannot penet rat e. 6
Durkhei m con ceded t h a t t h e fee l i ng of s uper natural myst er y had
cons i derabl e i mportance i n certai n rel i gi ons , not abl y Ch ri s t i ani ty. But i t
coul d not be concei ved as a bas i c el ement of Chri sti ani ty i t sel f si nce i t was
subj ect to si gni fcant vari ati ons and even total ecl i pse in Western hi st ory.
A fort i ori , i t coul d not be seen as the essence of all rel i gi on.
Thi s concept i on of the supernatural and transcendental mystery was
hi ghly si gni fcant. Durkhei m's thought was a forerunner of modern "death
of God" t h eol ogi es, i ns ofar as t h ey use " God" to refer to t h e radi cal l y
transcendental or t otally ot her di vi ni ty of Chri st i ani ty who may even be
recogni zed as absent . I n addi t i on, he seemed to i ndi cat e t he possi bi l i ty of
overcomi ng pos i ti vi st i c concept i ons of sci ence t hrough a phi l osophy t hat
i ntegrated modern rat i onal i sm i nt o a more comprehensi ve vi si on of vali d
experi ence. And he shi fted the center of gravi ty i n rel i gi ous i nterpretati on
from t he s upernat ural t o a noti o n of Le mervei/eux i nt i mat el y bound up
wi t h the sacred and commu nity.
Durkhei m def l ned rel i gi on thus:
A rel i gon i s an i n regrated system of bel i e and p racti ces relating to
sacred thi ngs, that is to say, thi ngs s et apart and forbi dden - bel i efs
and practi ces whi ch uni te into one and t he same moral communi ty
called a church all those who adhere to them. The second element
whi ch thus f nds a place i n our defni t i on i s no less essenti al than
the frst ; for by showi ng that the i dea of reli gi on i s i nseparabl e from
t hat of a church, i t shows that reli gi on mus t be an emi nently col
lecti ve thi ng. 7
The defni t i on compri sed two related el ements, one substanti ve, t he
ot her funct i onal . The subs tantive el ement asserted t hat rel i gi on i nvolved
a percept i on of the worl d i n terms of the di st i ncti on between the sacred
and the profane. The second el ement asserted that rel i gi on funct i oned to
create moral communi ty i n soci ety.
Th e second e l ement of Durkhei m's defni t i on is more cont roversi al
than the frst. In one sense, Durkhei m's concept i on had a cri ti cal edge
t hat was rel ated to hi s i dea of soci al normal i ty. It was al so rel ated to hi s
soci ol ogi cal at t empt t o provi de modern soci ety, and s peci f cal l y hi s own
Thi rd Republ i c, wi t h a secul ar moral i t y t hat al l owed fo r a reconcei ved
rel ati on t o the sacred. I mpl i ci tly, i t seemed to deny rel i gi ous l egi ti macy to
churches based on extreme bureaucrati zati on. 1ore expl i ci tly, it i mpugned
the val i di t y of rel i gi ous syst ems t hat funct i oned t o at omi ze i ndi vi dual s
i n soci ety. Moreover, i t di d not consi der the context i n whi ch rel i gi on or
quasi -rel i gi ous i deol ogi es mi ght i ntegrate a group i nternal l y but i ntensi f
conf i ct i n the broader s oci ety. Obvi ously, Durkheim's def ni ti on appl i ed
onl y t o t he functi on of rel i gi on i n the normal st at e of soci et y; i t appl i ed
t o pathol ogi cal st at es only as an expressi on of evol ut i onary opt i mi sm or
an i nd i cat i on of proj ect ed goal s.
I t mi ght be observed, however, that a more "value-neutral" and predi ctive
line of argument was open which Durkheim did not take. He might have
argued that rel i gi on in a context of extreme bureaucrati zati on or atomi sti c
i ndi vi dual i sm served the i nterest of relati vely small and privileged el i tes but
that a mor e communal experi ence of t he sacred had greater mass appeal . Thi s
approach woul d h ave l ed to the problem of the rel ati onsh i p between certain
concepti ons of the sacred and certain social fncti ons. The case of Protes
tanti sm was si gni fcant in thi s respect. Sectarian Protestanti sm, whi ch arose i n
part as a reacti on against bureaucrati c corrupti on ( e. g. , the commerci ali zati on
of i ndulgences), concei ved the sacred i n radi cally transcendental and super
natural terms that functi oned to create an unmedi ated, i f i nscrutable, l i nk
between a hi dden di vi ni ty and atomi zed i ndi viduals. As Weber observed, t hi s
att i tude was mai ntai ned only among a select el i te, whi l e t he larger popul ati on,
especi ally i n rural areas, fell back upon more cosmi c and communal forms of
reli gious experi ence that i ncl uded elements of magi c. Thus Durkheim's no
ti on of the rel ati onshi p between the sacred and communi ty mi ght have been
associ ated wi t h popul ar or mass rel i gi on and perhaps wi th developmental
possi bi l i ti es in modern secular societies, i ncl udi ng his hopes for Thi rd Re
publ i c France. I n t hi s sense, he mi ght have s uppl emented Weber's i dea of t he
"bureaucrati zati on of charisma" wi th a countervai li ng i dea of t he tendency of
popul ar movements to react against routi ni zati on and atomi zati on i n a shared
chari smati c quest for a more communal experience of the sacred. To the extent
that the correlation held between a communal concepti on of the sacred and
popul ar devotion - or between its absence and mass unrest -pl ausi bi l i ty
Chapter 6 Te Saed and Societ 241
woul d be lent to the clai m that Durkhei m had at l east discovered a permanent
or transhi stori cal aspect of human nature i n soci ety. In one form or another,
the bond between the sacred and communi ty woul d make its relevance fel t
i n al l soci al contexts.
Like hi s defni ti on of religi on, Durkhei m's attempt to distingui sh religion
from magic had both substantive and functional components. And i t too
seemed most probl emati c on the soci of uncti onal level whi ch recei ved the
bul k of hi s attenti on.
Substantively, Durkhei m hel d that both reli gi on and magi c depended
upon the di sti ncti on between the sacred and the profane. They di ffered,
however, i n thei r ori entati ons to the sacred. Religion presented a "ritual at
ti tude" toward t he sacred experi enced i n purel y symbol i c terms. If rel i gi on
involved an experience of the sacred as, so to speak, an end i n i tself, magic
took the sacred as a means. It placed "sacred forces" in a causal circuit geared
to the achievement of practi cal , uti l i tari an effects. In extreme forms, this
mani pul ati on of the sacred br ought about its profanat i on. I t may be paren
theti call y noted that thi s poi nt of vi ew was appli ed by Hubert and Mauss,
i n thei r '' Theori e generale de I a magi e, " to the rel ati ons hi p between magi c
and technol ogy. 8 From thi s poi nt of view, technology seculari zed magi c as
a means of control l i ng seemi ngly desacralized or di senchanated objects i n
the worl d.
Durkheim's di sti ncti on between reli gi on and magi c paral l el ed the oppo
si t i on, i n hi s moral phi l osophy, b etween the normati ve and the ut i l i t ari an.
Magi c, for hi m, al most seemed t o i mpl y a mi sappropri at i on of t he publ i c
fund of sacred values for pri vate and parti cul ari sti c i nterests. Thi s aspect
of hi s argument was especi al l y pronounced i n the more soci ofunct i onal
el ement of hi s di st i nct i on. Here, however, he proposed di fferenti al charac
teri sti cs that were not uni versal i n i nci dence and whi ch, furthermore, har
bored i nt ernal contradi cti ons i n thei r appl i cat i on to di fferenti ated types.
In consi deri ng social functi ons, Durkhei m argued that religion was i ncon
ceivabl e wi t hout a church but t hat "there was no church of magi c. "
Between the magician and the i ndividuals who consult hi m, as between
these i ndi vi duals themselves, there are no lasting bonds which make
them members of t he same moral communi ty, comparabl e to t hat
formed by believers i n the s ame god or t he observers of t he same cul t.
The magician has a clientele and not a church, and it i s very possi bl e
that his cli ents have no rel ati ons wi th one another, even to the poi nt
of not knowing one another; even the relations which t hey have with
him are generally acci dental and transi ent; t hey are like those of a sick
man with his doctor. 9
Thus the magi ci an might provide services for i ndi vi duals whose per
sonal probl ems were not adequately resolved i n the domi nant system. Yet
Durkheim' s argument harbored a number of di ffcul ti es. These related both
to the nat ur e of symbol i c systems and to thei r soci al functi ons in a "church"
of bel i evers. In the context of The Elementary Forms as a whol e, a church
obvi ously meant a sol i dari sti c corporative group that especi ally emphasi zed
the exi stence of moral communi ty among i ts members. But Durkhei m di d
not attempt to rel ate thi s noti on t o the probl em of hi ghly bureaucratized
churches or hi ghl y i ndi vi dual i sti c sects.
In order to appreciate Durkheim's conception of religion and i t s rel ati on to
magic, i t is useful to distinguish between ( 1 ) symbol i c systems that integrate
religion and magic as elements of a more i ncl usive paradigm, ( 2) symbol i c
systems that di ssoci at e religion from some forms of magi c, and (3) symbol i c
systems t hat di ssoci ate reli gi on from al forms of magi c. These three types
of symboli c systems may then be related to the exi stence and strength of a
church, in the l i mi ted sense of a sol i dari sti c corporative group.
I n "pri mi ti ve" soci eti es, magi c and religion were, typi cally, integrated
elements of the same over-all p aradi gm. Durkhei m at times seemed to rec
ognize t hi s. But he did not see the ways i n which bot h rel i gi on and magic
served to integrate the same corporate group (or "church") . A rain ri tual
whi ch i nsured a good crop for the group as a whole di d not work i nvi di ously
for the benefl t of speci al or private i nterests. And i t was i n "pri mi tive" soci
eti es, where the i ntegrati on of the meani ngful content and soci al functi on
of reli gi on and magi c was strongest, t hat the el ement of moral communi ty
was most marked .
The hi story of Chri sti ani ty in the West, whi ch was often Durkheim' s
i mpl i ci t frame of reference, revealed di fferent devel opments. As i t became
increasingly bureaucrati zed and l ess communal , Cathol i ci sm di d di ssoci
ate reli gi on and certai n forms of magi c. "Whi te" or benefcent magi c was
assi mi lated i nto the domi nant symbol i c system as mi racl e. "Bl ack" or ma-
l efcent magic was relegated t o the sphere of di abol i cal forces. In mi ssi onary
terri tori es, elements of other symbol i c systems that coul d not be integrated
into the establi shed paradigms were frequentl y di smi ssed as "bl ack" magic.
And chari smati c deviants, who upset the bureaucrati c admi ni strati on of sa
cred values and might be most feared when they developed followi ngs, were
of ten condemned as witches or sorcerers. The strongest communal bonds
i n such a context mi ght wel l be generated between self ess di sci pl es and the
chari smati c "deviant" who used magical prowess as an i nstrumental support
for a revoluti onary propheti c message. Wi thi n t he domi nant organi zati on,
communi ty was s ubordi nated t o the i mperatives of a bureaucrati c, hi erar
chical structure.
I n sectari an Protestant i s m, th e t endency was t o purge al l magic from rel i
gi on and to brand all magical el ements as signs of wi tchcraft. The denigration
of vi si ble symbolism and its effcacy was attendant upon the establ i shment
of an unmedi ated nexus b etween the "i nner" self of the i ndi vi dual and a
transcendental, hi dden divinity who was totally other. The degree of commu
ni ty deri ved fr om reli gi on was decreased to a mi ni mum. The reli gi ous group
was a sect i n whi ch members hi p was vol u ntary on the par t of the i ndi vi dual
and subj ect to quasi -contractual approval of one's personal qual i fcati ons
by members of the sect. Magi c was enti rel y a matter of extra-religious and
i rrel i gi ous pri vate consul tati on; i t was hi ghl y suspect i n the li ght of transcen
dentally ori ented rel i gi ous bel i ef, the radical secul ari zati on of "this-worldly"
experi ence, and the i dea that worldly success was related to reli gi ous el ecti on
only as an external i ndex. But tensi on was created between an extremely
transcendental theol ogy, whi ch could be used as a basi s of exi stence only by
an el i te, and the tendency of the common "man" (and the common in all
"men") to fall back upon paradi gms that allowed an ambi valent fasci nati on
wi t h the symboli sm of magi c and sorcery. Even pri vate consul tati ons wi th a
magi ci an mi ght give rise to feeli ngs of dependency that contrasted sharply
with the i ndi vi dual i sti c nature of the establi shed religious system. Indeed a
magi ci an might develop affective bonds wi t h t hose he or s he assi sted - bonds
theori zed i n psychoanalysis i n terms of transference.
In br i ef, i t woul d seem that when the condi t i ons of Durkhei m's defi
ni t i on of rel i gi on appl i ed, the condi t i ons of rel i gi on's di st i nct i on from
magi c di d not , and vi ce versa. It was i n systems wi t h a high degree of i n
tegrati on be tween the meaningful content and soci al funct i ons of rel i gi on
and magi c t hat moral communi t y was mos t marked. One basi c di ff culty
i n hi s at t empt t o di sti ngui sh sharply between rel i gi on and magi c i n t he
"pri mi tive" cont ext was hi s failure to see t hat genui ne bel i ef i n a symbol i sm
mi ght well involve a bel i ef i n the causal effcacy of t hat symbol i s m. The
di fference be tween the "merely" symbol i c and t he symbol i c as an obj ect of
genui ne bel i ef was set forth by Durkhei m hi ms el f i n an earl i er work:
Contemporary i deas make us i ncl i ned to see mere symbol s or modes
of allegorical fgurati on. But i t i s a general rul e t hat practices do not
take on at frst merely symbol i c characteristics. Thi s type of symbol i sm
is a form of decadence and i t comes onl y when thei r pri mi tive sense
is lost. Symbols b egin not as external signs but as efficaci ous causes
of soci al rel ati ons. 1 0
The probl em, of course, was that from a cri ti cal s t andpoi nt Durkhei m
recogni zed the i l l usory aspect s of magi c. If he was t o save rel i gi on and
make i t compat i bl e wi t h rat i onal i sm, he seemed obl i ged t o di ssoci at e i t
fro m magi c and i ts di scredi t ed falsehoods . The ant i pat hy bet ween t he
col l ectively normati ve and t he par t i cul ari sti cal l y ut i l i t ari an, whi ch was
essent i al t o hi s own moral phi l os ophy, served t hi s need. As we shal l see,
however, the i ssue left open by hi s s oci al me taphysi c was whet her hi s sal
vagi ng operat i on was unt enabl y reduct i oni s t i c and whether i t adequately
account ed for the di mensi on of causal effcacy i n sacred symbol i sm.
At t hi s poi nt one mi gh t have e x pe ct ed Dur khei m t o t urn di rectl y t o
a s t udy of t he sacred and t he p rofane i n b el i ef and ri t ual pr act i ce, us i ng
an i n- dept h anal ysi s of a s mal l set of "pri mi tive" s oci et i es as a bas i s of
general i zati on. One mi ght al s o have expected hi m t o provi de a det ai l ed,
cri t i cal , comparat i ve st udy of sacri fce, i t s rol e i n soci et y ( at t i mes i n
secul ari zed for m) , and i ts rel at i on t o both vi ct i mi zat i on and gift-givi ng
i n bui l di ng communal sol i dari ty. A hi ghl y s i gni fcant expl orat ory study i n
t hi s di rect i on ha d al ready be e n compl et ed by Hub er t a nd Ma us s i n t hei r
"Essai sur I a nat ure et l a fonct i on du s acrif ce" ( "Sacri f ce: Its Nat ure and
Funct i on" ) . 1 1 I n l i ne wi t h the earl i er work of Durkhei m and hi s school ,
the pr i mary probl em woul d have b een t he rel at i onshi p and rami f cati ons
of two set s of correl ated oppos i t i ons : sacred-profane and communitas-di f
ferent i at ed st ruct ure. Thi s focus woul d have provi ded i nsi ght i nt o t he key
ques t i on of how rel i gi ous bel i efs and pract i ces const i t ut ed the ul t i mat e
Chapter 6 Te Saed and Societ 24 5
s ource of l egi t i mat i on i n soci et y and how they funct i oned i n rel at i on t o
s ol i dari ty.
Instead, Durkhei m at t hi s poi nt turned to the evol uti onary probl em of
t he earl i est known form of religi on. Thi s preoccupati on was one basi s for
t he exaggerated i mportance he attri buted to totemi sm in the hi story of re
l i gi ons. I ndeed, it i nhi bi t ed him from analyzing obj ect i vely bot h the extent
to whi ch totemi sm di d or di d not have rel i gi ous aspects and the probl em of
other facets of rel i gi on i n the soci eti es he i nvesti gated. But t he concentrati on
upon totemi sm had another b asi s i n Durkhei m's thought. In the course
of hi s argument, the term "ori gi n" t ook on three senses: t he evol uti onary
sense of a hi stori cal starti ng poi nt; the analytic sense of a permanentl y ap
pl i cabl e paradi gm or a model of "ever present causes"; and t he sense of a
l egi ti mati ng mythi cal source or fns et origo. The evol uti onary si gni f cati on
was i n fact the least i mportant, si nce Durkhei m hi msel f was very cauti ous
concerni ng i t s perti nence. On the other hand, the anal yti c and mythi cal
meani ngs seemed to merge i n hi s mi nd and to b ecome the pri mary basi s
for hi s i nterest in ori gi ns. Insofar as i t was not si mpl y an adj unct of the
cont emporary anthropol ogi cal quest to fnd the "secret of the t ot em" (i n the
phrase of Andrew Lang) , totemi sm was i mportant i n The Elementary Forms
largely because it proved convenient for Durkhei mi an soci al metaphysi c and
for the myth of ori gi ns which helped to l egi ti mate i t and, wi th it, soci ology
i tsel f i n Durkhei m's encompassi ng, i ndeed grandi ose, concepti on of i t. By
seemi ngly provi di ng the genealogical ori gi n of reli gi on and soci ety, soci
ol ogy performatively furni shed i ts own foundi ng myth and underwrote i ts
transformative mi ssi on i n modern soci ety.
Durkhei m prefaced his account of t ot emi c bel i ef and ri t ual wi t h a
refut at i on of competi ng theori es of the ori gi nal form of rel i gi on. Natur
i sm derived rel i gi on from the pri mi ti ve personal i zati on of awesome forces
of nature. In the l i ngui sti cally ori ented formul ati on of Max M Li ller, thi s
concepti on of natural processes was attri buted to the met aphori c power
of l anguage. In t hi s sense, accordi ng to Dur khei m, rel i gi on was "an i m
mense met aphor wi t hout obj ective val ue . " 1 2 Ani mi sm, whi ch recei ved i t s
most i nHuenti al formul ati on i n the works of E. B. Tyl or, mai ntai ned that
the mi ni mal defni t i on of rel i gi on rested on a bel i ef i n spi ri ts or soul s. The
ori gi n of thi s bel i ef was the reli ance of the "pri mi ti ve" mi nd on the i dea of
spi ri ts i n order to i nterpret dreams. The reasons for Durkhei m's rej ecti on of
bot h naturi sm and ani mi sm were i denti cal : these theori es ei ther i gnored the
sacred or reduced i t to a groundless i l l us i on. "Not onl y woul d the s ymbol s
through whi ch rel i gi ous powers are conceived mask i n part t hei r t r ue nature,
but , furthermore, behi nd these i mages and fgures there woul d be only the
ni ghtmares of uncul ti vated mi nds. Reli gi on would in the last analysi s be
only a systemati zed and li ved dream wi t hout any foundat i on i n reali ty. " 1 3
Despi te i t s parti al val i di ty, Durkhei m's el aborate and somewhat t edi ous
cri t i que of naturi sm and ani mi sm had al l the qual i ti es of a refut at i on of
heresi es. He di d not as k what the r ol e of the rel ati onshi p between humans
and nature mi ght be i n religi ous systems or what part met aphor (which i s not
always "mere" met aphor) mi ght have i n arti cul ati ng t hi s rel ati onshi p. And,
al though the Austral i ans referred to the mythi cal past as "dream ti me, " he di d
not i nqui re i nto the pl ace of the "ni ght si de" of li fe in religi ous experi ence.
I n fact, he seemed to concei ve dreams i n a narrowly Cartesi an manner that
deni ed them al l cogni ti ve val ue. Nor di d he rej ect reducti oni sm as a mode
of i nterpretati on. Prefacing hi s own reduct i oni st i c i nterpretati on of totem
i sm, he si mpl y deni ed the val i di ty of competi ng forms of reducti oni sm i n
naturi sm and ani mi sm. The refutati on of h e resi es i n s hor t was a prerequi si te
of apol ogeti cs. The styl e of argument became i ncreasi ngl y theol ogi cal .
Certai n aspects of Durkhei m's treatment of totemi sm were analytically
i ndependent of his social metaphysi c. But the growing i nterpenetrati on of
hi s theory of totemi sm and his social metaphysic certainly contri buted to hi s
i mpermeabi li ty to mounti ng evidence t hat falsifed some of hi s elementary
assumpti ons. Durkhei m beli eved that totemi sm was a global i nsti tuti on that
combi ned ki nshi p and reli gi on. I n other words, he assumed that the same
group ( the clan) shared both ki nshi p and reli gi on and that the same object
( the totem) was the fami l y name or embl em and the object of reli gi ous sym
bol i sm.
The pri mary source for facts on t he Australi an t ri bes, whi ch were t he
presumed object ofDurkhei m's crucial experiment, was t he exemplary mono
graph by Si r Baldwi n Spencer and Franci s James Gi l l en, The Native Tribes of
Central Australia. 1 4 The Arunta ( or Aranda) tri be recei ved extensive treatment
by Spencer and Gi llen and by Durkhei m. What were the fits cruciaux? There
was no i denti ty among the patrilocal territorial group, the parti l i neal exogamic
group, and the totemi c group wi th a territorial base. Religion was di spersed
through various el ements of cultural lif e, i ncludi ng religious confraterities not
i denti cal wi th the former groupings. The totemi c groups, moreover, were not
strongly consti tuted as corporate enti ti es. The central rol e of t he intichiuma
ceremony of the totemi c groups, whi ch Durkhei m attempted to i nterpret i n
predomi nantly religious terms a s a "pri mi ti ve" sacrifce involving oblati on and
communi on, di d appear to be predomi nantly magico-economi c in nature.
To Durkheim's di smay, Si r James Frazer had already made thi s poi nt. Indeed,
Mauss hi msel f had argued i n the Amzee sociologi
q
ue that the seemi ng act of
"communion" i n the "totemi c sacri fce" was performed by the t ot emi c group
i n order t o consume the sacred element of the totem and thereby free i t for
profane consumpti on by other groups. 1 5 Thi s consumpti on created a meta
phori c l i nk between the intichiuma ritual and the ordinary economi c life of
soci ety. The mani fest purpose of th e ri tual was to assure the reproducti on of
the ani mal speci es. Moreover, exogamic marri age rules appli ed to patri li neal
moi eti es (or phratri es) and to marriage classes wi thi n them determi ned by
generati on. The totemi c affl i ati on, i n contrast, di d not regulate exogamy and
was determi ned by the ancestral totemi c spi ri t mythologically associated with
the spot at which the mother believed herself to have conceived the chi l d.
I n the face of s i mi l ar evi dence whi ch coul d not be i ntegrated i nto the
paradigm of a gl obal totemi c i nsti tuti on, Durkhei m resorted to i ngeni ous
and factually gratui tous evolutionary arguments. Indeed hi s general response
to hostile evidence for which he could not otherwise account was to argue
gratuitously that i t corresponded to a later ( or earlier) state of society than
the one he was addressing. Indeed evoluti onary ideas were more i mportant
i n Durkheim's attempt to relate the "ori gi nal" totemi c i nsti tuti on to known
facts about certain soci eti es than in his attempt to relate these to other types
of soci eti es. In such Annee articles as "La Prohi bi ti on de l ' i nceste et ses origi
nes" ( 1 896) , "Sur l e totemisme" ( I 900) , and "Sur I' organisation des soci etes
australiennes" ( I 903) , he had lai d the groundwork for The Elementary Forms
by attempti ng to explai n away counterevidence by imaginative accounts of
the "original" totemi c i nsti tuti on and how it had evolved into one known
form or another. The pri mary i mpressi on lef by these efforts is comparable
to that left by Ptolemai c astronomy when i t was compelled to resort to i n
creasi ngly i ntri cate epi cycles in order to account i n some way for i ncreasingly
unmanageable evidence.
It mi ght b e mai ntai ned that even if one concedes that Durkhei m fai l ed
to provi de an adequate general t heory of t ot emi sm, t hi s fai l ur e di d not
i nval i date hi s general theory of rel i gi on. Obj ecti vely, t ot em1 sm woul d
be rel evant to a general theory of rel i gi on onl y i nsofar as i t pr ovi ded i n
cert ai n cases an i nst ant i at i on of rel i gi ous symbol i sm. Aft er al l , Durkhei m
hi msel f was pri mari l y i nterested i n rel i gi on and i t s rel ati on to soci et y.
And i n The Elementary Forms, he argued t hat t he sel ecti on of t he totem as
a rel i gi ous symbol was at frst arbi t rary. From an obj ect i ve poi nt of view,
this l i ne of argument i s convincing, and it even makes one wonder why
Durkhei m was so i nsi stent about the i mportance of t ot emi sm. The reason
for hi s i nterest i n totemi sm becomes less puzzl i ng onl y i n the context of
hi s soci al metaphysi c. Once totemi sm was i mpl i cated i n hi s metaphysi c
of soci ety whose foundi ng myth si multaneously l egi ti mated soci ol ogy, i t
became i nvested wi t h al l t he symbol i c values t h a t fol low i n t he trai n of a
basi c commi t ment . In t hi s sense, Durkhei m' s steadfastness in the defense
of an "ori gi nal" t ot emi c i nst i t uti on was much more than a case of seni l e
hardeni ng of the i nterpreti ve categori es or psychologi cal i nvolvement i n a
pet theory It i nvolved an afecti ve and evaluative i nvestment or "cathexi s"
i n the strongest sense of the word.
To devel op an idea of Durkh eim' s t h eory of rel i gi on , l et us try t o di s
entangle the elements of Durkhei m's di scussi on that were not altogether
subservi ent to his social metaphysi c and hi s "soci ol ogi s m. " Bel i efs and ri t u
al s consti tuted the compl ementary modes through whi ch peopl e i n soci et y
rel ated to the sacred. Although he recogni zed the i nt i mat e rel ati onshi p
between ri tual and myth i n rel i gi ous cul ts, Durkhei m di d not balance hi s
treatment of ri t ual s wi th a theory of myths. Hi s analysis of bel i efs concen
trated i n rather Platoni c fashi on upon conceptual paradi gms or i deas that
were presumed to be basi c to rel i gi ous bel i efs. 1 6
Durkhei m di vi ded ri tual s i nt o t he fol l owi ng types (whi ch are perhaps
more adequatel y concei ved as el ements present i n varying combi nati ons i n
speci fc ri tual s) : the ri tual i nterdi ct, or taboo, separati ng the sacred from
t he profane; t he sacri fce, compri si ng t he el ements of obl ati on ( offeri ng or
gift) and communi on t hrough cons umpt i on or di s pos i t i on of t he sacri fci al
vi cti m ( the vi ct i m bei ng the typi cal offering or gift); t he mi met i c ri t ual ,
whi ch had speci al relevance for bel i efs about causati on; the representati ve
or commemorati ve ri t ual ; and the pi acul ar or mourni ng ri tual relati ng
to sorrowful events li ke death. The negati ve cul t i nvolvi ng taboos served
generally as a preparati on for the posi tive cul t (sacri f ci al , mi met i c, com-
Chapter 6 The Sced and Societ 24 9
memoratl ve, and pi acul ar ri tual s) by sett i ng peopl e and things off from
t he profane wor l d. Ei t her i n peri odi cal l y recurrent form or as a reacti on to
pot ent i al l y unsettl i ng cri ti cal events, the role of ri tual was to mai ntai n and
dramati cal l y re-create t he meani ngful symbol i c uni verse that functi oned
. .
to In regrate soci ety.
Thus, for Dur khei m, the center of reli gi on as an operative o r perfor
mative force was the cul t. And central to the cult was the nexus between
symbol i c mani festati on and sol i dari ty, especi al l y i n i t s i ntensel y communal
forms. Peopl e experi enced the strongest bonds wi t h one another when they
demonstrated t hat they hel d the same thi ngs sacred.
From our poi nt of view, i t is readi l y seen how the group of regularly
repeated acts which form the cult assume once again all thei r i mpor
tance. In fact, whoever has real l y practi ced a rel i gi on knows qui te well
that it i s the cult which gives ri se to the i mpressi ons of joy, of i nteri or
peace, of sereni ty, of enthusiasm whi ch are, for the faithful, l i ke an
experi mental proof of thei r bel iefs. The cul t i s not si mpl y a system of
si gns by whi ch the faith i s outwardly translated; i t is a collecti on of the
means by whi ch fai th i s created and re-created peri odi cally. Whether
i t consi sts of materi al acts or mental operati ons, i t i s always thi s whi ch
i s effcaci ous Y
Hence t he pri mary i mportance Durkheim attri buted t o t he alternati on
between ordinary profane acti vi ti es and sacred, ri tual occasi ons in the "nor
mal" rhythm of soci al life. Indeed, it was only in The Elementary Forms that
hi s concepti on of the normal soci ety came to full frui ti on. In and through
festive celebrati on, the symbol i c values whi ch gui ded social life would be
performatively reinvigorated and receive t he power t o prevent unwanted
historical change while regenerating what was of historical and soci al value.
Anomi e could be kept within tolerable bounds only i f members of society
were peri odically reminded i n intense ways of the bases of thei r common
cul tural world and thei r sol i dari ty. Ri tual and feast were thus the medi a of
living memory that reproduced bonds and reinforced i nsti tuti onal norms i n
a sol i dari sti c soci ety.
1 8
Durkhei m's i nterpretati on of reli gi ous bel i efs was i n one sense i nfuenced
by t hi s concept i on of cul t . He began with t he assumpt i on t hat t he totem
was i n fact a rel i gi ous symb ol . But his subsequent argument coul d be ap-
pl i ed to any rel i gi ous symbol . For he went on to affrm that the fgurative
representati on of the sacred obj ect was more sacred than the obj ect ( e. g. ,
the pl ant or ani mal speci es) i tsel f. From t hi s poi nt on, Pl at o was Durkhei m's
maltre depenser. The fgurati ve representati on of a sacred obj ect deri ved i ts
rel i gi ous qual i ty from a hi gher source. The totemi c embl em recei ved i t s
sacredness through partaki ng of an archetypi cal t ot emi c pri nci pl e. On a
still hi gher level of abstracti on, the t ot emi c pri nci pl e, in t urn, related to the
Maori concept of mana. Especi al l y i n Durkheim' s ul t i mat e and essenti ally
moral concepti on of i t, mana mi ght well be compared t o Pl ato's concept of
the Good or t o the analogous Chri sti an i dea of the indwelling of the Hol y
Spi ri t i n the hearts of t he j us t .
The meani ng of t he concept of mana and anal ogous concepts i n al l
cul tures remai ns a poi nt of cont ent i on among anthropol ogi sts. Robert
Henry Codri ngt on, whom Durkhei m fol l owed i n t hi s respect , def ned
"1nana" thus:
There is a bel i ef i n a force altogether di sti nct from physical power,
which acts in all ways for good and evil; and which it is of the greatest
advantage to possess or control. This i s mana. I think I know what our
peopl e mean by i t . . . . It i s a power or i nf uence, not physical and i n a
way supernatural; but i t shows itself in physical force, or in any ki nd
of power or excellence which a man possesses. Thi s mana i s not fxed
i n anything . . . . All Melanesian religion consists, in fact, in getting thi s
mana for one' s self, or getti ng i t used for one' s beneft. 1 9
Mana thus corresponded, i n the frst instance, t o a n i mpersonal force
i mmanent i n the world and yet beyond ordi nary capaci ti es or processes. It
could be related to the noti on of cosmi c unity and t o the feeling of le merveil
leux. Mani festing itself in exceptional events and powers, it was nonetheless
behi nd the order of the universe, whi ch was not extraordi nary i n i ts dai ly
manifestations but wondrous i n i ts total i ty - and even epi phanous i n i ts
detai l s when they were seen i n a certai n l i ght. In bri ef, mana represented the
uni tary source of the sacred, the ecumeni cal core of all reli gi on. In speci fc
events, bel i efs, and ri tuals, mana became differenti ated and separated from
the profane. And the reali ty for whi ch mana stood was the pri mary object of
the ri tual atti tude of sacred respect and the magical bel i ef i n symbol i c effcacy.
As Durkhei m observed:
A Dakota Indi an . . . expressed thi s essential consubstanti ali ty of all sa
cred things in a language full of reli ef. "Everything which moves stops
here or there at one ti me or another. The bi rd whi ch fi es stops at one
pl ace t o make i t s nest, at another t o rest frm i t s fi ght. The man who
walks, stops when he wi shes. lt i s the same wi th the god [/a divinite'
The sun, so bright and magnifcent, i s one place where he st opped. The
trees, the ani mals are other places. The Indi an thinks of these places
and sends a prayer to them i n order to reach the place where the god
has stopped and recei ve assistance and blessings. " In other words, the
wakan [ a term s i mi l ar i n meani ng to "mana"] (for t hi s is what he was
tal ki ng about) comes and goes through the world, and sacred thi ngs
are the poi nts upon whi ch i t alights. 2
Once Durkheim's argument reached this poi nt , however, i t did not follow
the lead of the Dakota Indian i n intimating that the root of"primitive" religion
and the essence of all religion was an i ntui ti on of the solidarizing force bi ndi ng
all existence -i ncludi ng the compassi onate or empathi c bondi ng of humans
wi th all "others" i n the cosmos. Rather, i t rewrote the cosmi c allegory i n a sui
generis soci al di recti on and turned to the questi on of the ori gi n of mana (and
analogous concepts like wakan) i n a fashi on that led to the development of
a social metaphysi c.
Sociolog and Episteolo
For the most part, Durkhei m's soci ological epi stemology was a corollary
of his social metaphysic. But, as in the case of hi s theory of religi on, one may
attempt to extricate other elements of the argument and si tuate them i n the
context of hi s thought as a whol e.
The soci ol ogy of religion had, in Durkhei m's mi nd, an i ntegral relation
to epi stemological probl ems, since he beli eved that the frst "collective repre
sentati ons" were religious i n nature.
I f phi l osophy and t he sci ences were born of rel i gi on, i t i s because
rel i gi on i tself began by taki ng the pl ace of t he sci ences and ph i
l osophy. Bu t i t has been less frequentl y noti ced that reli gi on di d not
confine i tsel f to enri chi ng the human mi nd , formed beforehand,
wi t h a certai n number of i deas; i t contri but ed t o formi ng the mi nd
i tself. Men owe to rel i gi on not onl y a not abl e part of the content
of thei r knowledge but al so the form i n whi ch thi s knowledge has
been el aborated.
2 1
In all soci et i es, moreover, the col l ective representati ons that formul ated
el ementary types of l egi ti mati on had at l east a quasi -rel i gi ous character.
I ndeed "col l ecti ve represent at i on, " i n Durkhei m' s usage of the t er m,
seemed t o cover t he gamut from shared verbal behavi or based on deepl y
rooted bel i efs, through el aborate "i deol ogi es, " t o more or l ess sophi sti cated
theoreti cal refecti ons. I t pri mari l y referred, however, to t he shared model
or paradi gm that funct i oned as a mode of expl anati on and j us t i fcat i on i n
soci ety, especi al l y as t he core of t he conscience collective that he treated i n
hi s moral phi l osophy as Ia morale. I t compri sed bot h cogni ti ve and norma
ti ve el ements. Wi th the devel opment of theoreti cal ref ecti on, and notabl y
wi t h the emergence of soci ol ogy, cognitive and normati ve el ement s became
i ncreasi ngly di fferenti ated. But t hey were never enti rel y di sj oi ned. In hi s
own soci ol ogy, for exampl e, t he hi gher-order paradi gms of normal and
pathol ogi cal processes embodi ed hi s i dea of the i nti mate rel ati on of the
cognitive and the normati ve.
Durkhei m di d not expl i ci tly rai se the probl em of the rel ati on b etween
epi st emol ogy and the soci ol ogy of knowledge, and the two of ten seemed
very cl ose i n hi s t hought Y He was avowedl y preoccupi ed wi t h a very ele
mentary ki nd of analysi s, and he was even more pal pabl y concerned wi t h
the probl em of vali di ty. I ndeed, perhaps t he central i ssue t reated i n a course
he gave aft er the publ i cat i on of The Elementary Forms (and subsequ ently
reconstructed i n the book Pragmatis me et sociologie) was epi st emol ogi cal .
Here he opposed a cl assi cal l y "hard" concept i on of t rut h to t he "l ogi cal
ut i l i t ari ani sm" of pragmat i st s who equat ed t ruth wi t h pract i cal success or
t he sati sfi ng i l l us i on. And he di d not s i mpl y equat e t r ut h or val i di ty wi t h
soci al consensus. Rat her he asserted t he i mpersonal and compel l i ng nat ure
of t rut h, whi ch i mposed i tsel f wi t h rati onal convi ct i on. "Truth i s a norm
for t hought , j ust as t he mor al i deal i s a norm for conduct . "2 3 Moreover, he
f atl y rej ect ed an i nvari ant correl ati on of t r ut h wi t h happi ness.
Truth i s often pai nful . I t may di sorgani ze thought and t r oubl e
the sereni ty of the spi ri t . When a man recogni zes i t , he i s at ti mes
obliged to transform hi s enti re mental organi zat i on: thi s provokes a
cri si s whi ch leaves hi m di sconcerted and di sabl ed. If, for exampl e, i n
adul t hood he suddenl y realizes t hat hi s reli gi ous bel i efs l ack sol i di ty,
he may col l apse morally. Hi s i ntel l ectual and emoti onal life is par
al yzed . . . . Thus i t is far from the case that truth i s al ways attracti ve
and s educti ve. Qui te of ten, i t resi sts us, opposes our desi res, and has
a hard qual i ty about i t . 24
I t i s si gni fcant t hat , i n hi s di scussi on of t rut h, Durkhei m poi nt ed to
t he role of what mi ght be termed the deconversi on experi ence and the way
t he loss or del i gi ti mati on of reli gi on mi ght b e traumati c and di sori enti ng.
The "truth" of s oci ol ogy i tsel f involved worki ng through thi s t rauma and
si mul taneously worki ng out a new, cri ti cally "rati onal" basis for bel i ef and
practi ce that would nonetheless functi on as a secul arized di spl acement of
rel i gi on. Moreover, i n Durkhei mi an soci ol ogy, the basi c di sti ncti on b etween
normal i ty and pat hol ogy provi ded a cri ti cal apparatus that i nvolved the
probl em of validi ty. In Marxi an terms, one mi ght say that a pathol ogi cal
state was an al i enated empi ri cal real i ty t hat gave ri se t o i deol ogy as a form
of fal se consci ousness. I n The Rules, Durkheim formulated the concepti on
of false consci ousness i n terms of Descar tes's not i on of praenotiones and
Bacon's idea of idola. "As products of ordi nary experi ence, thei r obj ect i s t o
pl ace our acti ons i n harmony wi t h the envi roni ng world. They are formed
by practi ce and for i t . Now a representati on can play this role usefully whi l e
bei ng theoreti cally false. " 2 5
Unl i ke Marx, however, Durkhei m di d not relate i deol ogy as a form of
false consci ousness t o class domi nati on and expl oi tati on. Thus , he di d not
di scuss t he conti nui ty between normative l egi ti mati on and cogni ti on i n the
di storted for m of collecti ve mi srepresentati ons t hat attempted to present
a pathol ogi cal st at e as i f i t was normal , e. g. , by construi ng t he i nterest of
one group as the good of soci ety as a whol e. As a consequence, he fai l ed to
treat t he functi on of i deol ogy in the st abi l i zati on of a pat hol ogi cal soci al
order. Thi s fai l ure was especi ally si gni fcant i n view of Marx's concepti on
of rel i gi on as a promi nent form of i deologi cal di storti on and mysti f cation
i n an expl oi tative soci ety.
Certai n things, however, seemed clear i n the development of Durkheim's
thought as a whol e. The truth woul d be unsettl i ng and subversi ve i n a
"pathological" si tuati on that had been i deologically accepted as legi ti mate.
But it would be essential to an obj ective analysis of that si tuati on and to the
reconstructi on of soci ety on a "normal" (or desirable) basis. Rati onal means to
effect a passage from pathology to normality varied wi th historical condi ti ons.
Durkhei m found modern soci ety t o be signifcantly pathologi cal, but he di d
not believe vi ol ent revol uti on t o be necessary or desi rabl e for the achievement
of structural change. In a state of normali ty, moreover, the knowledge of the
truth woul d offer the most authenti c basis for legi ti mati on of the existing
order and the means to conf ne anomie to a marginal status. For i n the normal
state, the normati ve and cognitive paradi gms whi ch constituted a coherent
worldview and i ntegrated soci ety as a whole could be j ustly conceived as an
applied functi on of the truth. In all soci eti es, this state would involve an op
t i mal combi nat i on of communi ty and reci proci ty, and a relati onshi p between
values accepted as sacred and average performance i n daily living that di d not
pass b eyond t he l i mi t s of "standard devi ati on. "
Durkhei m's epi stemol ogi cal assumpti ons revealed the most profound
sense i n which he was a phi l osophi cal conservative. In hi s mi nd, there ex
isted a comprehensive correspondence b etween the foundati ons of truth and
knowledge in general and th e prevalence of order and sol i dari ty in society.
Essential to human existence was the i nsti tuti on of normative and i nterpretive
paradigms that made sense of shared experience and si mul taneously provided
the background against which to evaluate change.
These consi derati ons make possi bl e an esti mati on of Durkheim's re
l at i on to Bergson and the pragmat i st s. Early in his life, Durkhei m was
cast in the role of the archenemy not only of Tarde but also of Bergson.
Hi s i nsi stence on formal structures of obl i gati on and, more broadly, hi s
Cartesi ani zed, neo-Kanti an brand of rati onal i sm were often developed wi t h
i mpl i ci t reference t o Bergson as the modern exempl ar of mysti ci sm and
anti rati onal i nt ui t i oni s m. I n hi s l ater thought, however, Durkhei m was
parti all y i nf uenced by Bergson i n two restri cted but i mport ant ways. Fi rst,
Durkhei m recognized the rol e of "col l ective effervescence" as an ambi val ent
elan vital t ha t was necessary i n t he passage from path ol ogy t o nor mali ty.
Second, he saw that in t he normal st at e i tsel f, communal spont anei t y was
t o be reconci l ed wi t h duty, j ust as "col l ecti ve effervescence" retai ned i ts
relevance as a spi ri tual mi l i eu for a generous and expansive rati onal i sm. But
Durkhei m always rej ect ed the i deol ogi cal gl ori fcati on of change, mobi l
ity, empi ri cal f ui di ty, i ndi vi dual transcendence, exi stenti al t urmoi l , and
Chapter 6 The Sared and Societ 255
" buzzi ng confusion" - i n bri ef, the symptoms of anomi e - as mysti cal
ends i n themsel ves. In a pathol ogi cal state of soci ety, a pri mary funct i on
of rat i onal change was to put a st op to uncontrol l ed, rampant , runaway
change. In a normal state, the val ue of change was related di al ecti cally
to the predomi nance of order, and it had value not for i ts own sake but
onl y i nsofar as i t cont ri but ed t o a bet t er soci al or der whi ch, i n moderni ty,
requi red spaces for cri ti ci sm and contestat i on.
I n The Elementay Forms of the Religious Lf, Durkhei m's mani fest goal
was to defne the elements of truth i n religion.
I n fact, i t i s an essenti al post ul at e of soci o l ogy t hat a h uman i n
sti tuti on cannot rest upon error and l i es . Otherwi se i t coul d not
l as t . I f i t wer e not founded on t he nature of thi ngs, i t woul d have
encountered in thi ngs a resi stance over which it coul d not have tri
umphed. So when we commence the study of pri mi ti ve rel i gi ons, i t
i s wi th the convi cti on that they hol d t o real i ty and express i t . Thi s
pri nci pl e wi l l be seen t o recur ti me and agai n i n the course of the
analyses and di scussi ons whi ch follow, and the reproach whi ch we
make agai nst the school s from which we have separated ourselves
i s that they have i gnored i t . No doubt , when only the l etter of the
formulae i s consi dered, these rel i gi ous bel i efs and practi ces seem
di sconcerti ng, and one i s tempted to attri bute them to some sort of
deep-rooted aberrati on. But one must know how to go underneath
the symbol to the real i ty whi ch i t represents and whi ch gives i t i ts
true meani ng. 26
Wi thi n hi s own frame of reference, thi s concepti on of rel i gi on meant
t hat Durkhei m was defni ng rel i gi on and i ts rol e i n terms of the normal state
of soci ety. At times, however, he seemed to generalize his vi ewpoi nt so that
i t appl i ed to all states of soci ety. At the very l east, he pl aced hi s concepti on
of the truth of rel i gi on wi t h i n the context of h i s opt i mi s t i c bel i ef i n an
emergent evol uti onary strai ni ng toward normal i ty i n all soci ety. Thus The
Elementary Forms, taken as an i sol ated work, mi ght be i nterpreted to have
ei ther orthodox conservative or l i beral i mpl i cati ons, al though its concl usi on
made i t obvi ous that Durkhei m concei ved normal i ty i n modern soci ety as
a goal of acti on. One basi c reason for the i mpreci si on of The Elementary
Forms in its treatment of concrete probl ems was the i ncreasi ng i mportance
of abstract social metaphysi c in Durkheim' s thought. I n the context of hi s
thought as a whol e and i t s appl i cati on to modern soci ety, however, he may
be seen as empl oyi ng hi s study of "pri mi ti ve" reli gi ons to compl ete hi s i dea
of the normal st at e and t o derive a general concepti on of ends i n basi c
structural change.
The most signifcant and i nfuenti al general feature of Durkhei m's ap
proach was his i nterpretati on of epi st emology as the analysis, on the most
fundamental level, of t he structural arti cul ati ons of cul tural experi ence ( and
t hei r rel ati on t o anomi e) . The obj ect of epi stemol ogi cal analysis i n t hi s
sense was to uneart h the more or l ess rel ated set of paradi gms or categori es
whi ch, i n varyi ng combi nati ons, i nformed symboli c experi ence expressed
i n word and acti on. The i nti mate l i nk between an epi stemol ogically ori
ented s oci ol ogy and phi l osophy was man i fest. Soci ol ogy woul d cul mi nate
i n what mi ght be termed ( i n the expressi on of Ernst Cassirer) a phi l osophy
of symbol i c forms.
The promi se i n thi s concepti on of epi st emology as the archaeology of
cul tural experi ence was formul ated by Marcel Mauss: "We must frst of al l
draw up as compl ete as possi bl e a catalogue of categori es, begi nni ng wi th
those whi ch manki nd i s known t o have empl oyed. I t wi l l then be seen t hat
there have been, and that there sti l l are, many dead moons, and others pal e
or obscure, i n the frmament of reason. " 2 7
Thi s perspective en j oi ned a correlati on of epi stemology wi t h soci ety and
cul ture. The attempt to l i mi t epi st emol ogi cal i nqui ry to an i nvesti gati on of
t he mi nd of t he i sol ated i ndi vi dual was a symptom of i deol ogi cal di storti on.
From Durkheim's poi nt of view, sol i psi sm and the probl em of other mi nds
mi ght be seen, not as components of an epi stemol ogical theory, but as
probl ems for epi stemol ogi cal investigation and phi losophi cal cri ti ci sm. They
were symptomati c el ements of the same pathol ogical context of atomi sti c
i ndi vi dual i sm that i ncl uded ut i l i tarian ethi cs, economi c sel f-i nterest, and
narrowly empi ri ci st methodology. Isolati on was the l i mi ti ng case of the com
mon medi um of all symbol i c systems: i nteracti on involving communi cati on.
Onl y sensati on was conf ned t o the i ndi vi dual organi sm; but symbol i s m,
and especi ally t he concept , was an obj ect of communi cati on.
A concept i s not my concept. It i s common to me and ot her men
or, i n any case, i t can b e communi cat ed t o t hem. But I cannot make
a sensat i on pass from my consci ousness i nto the consci ousness o f
anot her; i t i s narrowl y bound up wi t h my organi sm and my per
sonal i ty, and i t cannot be detached from them . . . . By themselves
i ndi vi dual consci ousnesses are cl osed to one another. They can
communi cate only by means of si gns whi ch t ransl at e t hei r i nt ernal
st at es. For t he commerce whi ch is establ i shed among t hem to b e
abl e t o cul mi nat e i n communi on, i . e . , i n a fusi on o f al l parti cul ar
sent i ment s i n a common sent i ment , t here must be si gns expressi ng
these senti ments whi ch themselves are fused i n a sol e and uni que
resul tant. I t i s t he appearance of t hi s resul tant whi ch enabl es i n
di vi dual s t know t hat t hey ar e u ni t ed and whi ch makes t hem
consci ous of t hei r mor al uni ty. 28
Thi s vi ewpoi nt gave speci al i mportance to the soci al i zati on process i n
epi st emologi cal i nvesti gat i ons. For, i n t he f ow of communi cat i on t hat
made t he i ndi vi dual a member of soci ety, t here woul d be t ransmi tt ed i n
operati ve for m t he b asi c categori es of experi ence and t he anomi e i ncon
si st enci es whi ch t ypi fed soci al life. Thi s di d not necessari l y i mpl y that
t he i ndi vi dual was merel y a passi ve receptacl e of t radi t i onal paradi gms
and creati ve i nt eract i on. But i t di d mean that he or she coul d form hi s
or her own i deas onl y agai nst the background of common experi ence or
common di sori ent at i on. And those i deas woul d have t o be addressed to
common pr obl ems and ass ume accessi bl e form if t hey were to have ot her
t han i di osyncrati c or psychopathol ogi cal meani ng.
Cruci al for Durkhei m was the basi s i n soci ety of all maj or symbol i c
systems and modes of communi cat i on. Thi s i dea, whi ch rai sed probl ems
at t he i ntersecti on of epi stemology and soci al psychol ogy, whi ch Durkhei m
di d not treat, appl i ed t o the natural sci ences as wel l as to rel i gi on or mo
rali ty.
In real i ty, sci ence is somet hi ng pre-emi nentl y soci al , however great
the role of i ndi vi dual s may be i n i t. I t i s soci al be cause i t s met hods
and t echni ques are the work of t r adi t i on, and t hey constrai n t he
pers on wi t h an aut hori t y comparabl e t o t hat of rul es of l aw o r
moral s. They are t rul y i nst i t ut i ons whi ch appl y t o t hought , j us t
as j u ri di cal and pol i t i cal i nst i t ut i ons are obl i gatory met hods of ac
t i on. In addi t i on, s ci ence is soci al because it ut i l i zes not i ons whi ch
domi nate al l t hought and i n whi ch all of ci vi l i zati on i s condensed:
the categori es. 2 9
The role of neo-Kanti ani sm i n Durkheim's thought was revealed in the
signifcance he attri buted to the categori es. "If the mind is a syntheti c ex
pression of the worl d, the system of categories is a synthetic expression of the
human mi nd. "3 0 The categori es, for Durkhei m, were the fundamental logi cal
i nsti tuti ons of the human mi nd conceived as a soci ocultural reali ty with an
organic base. By identifing the category wi th hi s own noti on of the collec
ti ve representation, he si mul taneousl y grounded i t i n culture and society and
expanded its range of appl i cati on to encompass all forms of symbol i c experi
ence. "De quelques formes pri mi tives de classifcation" (Primitive Classfcation,
1 90 1 ) , written by Durkheim i n collaborati on wi th Mauss, had the virtue of
demonstrating, with some oversi mpl i fcati on, the systematic and meani ngful
character of classif catory systems in "primi tive" soci eti es. Despi te the ten
denti ousness of his own ul t i mat e scheme of interpretation, the fundamental
step Durkheim took was t o open up to epi stemologi cal refecti on the entire
gamut of human cul tures and symbolically i nformed systems, incl uding social
structure and rel i gi on.
Although the postul ates of hi s own social metaphysic j eopardized hi s effort,
Durkhei m further i ntended hi s concepti on of epi stemology t o serve as a way
of overcoming the anti nomy between, or at l east of providing a compromi se
formati on l i nki ng, empi ri ci sm and apri ori sm.
The rati onal i sm whi ch i s i mmanent in a soci ological theory of knowl
edge is an i ntermedi ary between empi ri ci sm and cl assi cal apri ori sm.
For the frst, the categories are purel y arti fci al constructi ons; for the
second, they are, on the contrary, natural givens. For us, they are i n a
sense works of art, but of an art which imi rates nature with a perfection
suscepti ble of growing wi thout l i mi t . J l
The category, in ot her words, was nei t her a purel y nomi nal i st i c l abel nor
the natural scaffol di ng of t he mi nd. I t was si mul taneousl y a soci ocul tural
given and the product of human acti vi t y -an hi stori cal monument b ui l t t o
wi thstand t he erosive pressure of anomi e. On t he whole, however, Durkheim
remained closer t o the apri ori st side of the cl assical antagoni sm, and hi s
soci al metaphysi c revealed the extent to whi ch he was unabl e t o transcend
dual i sm through a more di al ecti cal or di al ogi c mo de of t hought . He was
possessed of an i nordi nat e sense of the concept ual presence of categori es.
Thi s was i ndi cated i n hi s speci fc i nterpretati on of structural analysis and the
i mportance of the concept. ' To concei ve a thi ng i s si mul taneousl y to grasp
more adequatel y its essenti al el ements and to si t uat e it wi thi n a whol e; for
each ci vi l i zati on has i t s organized system of concepts whi ch characteri ze i t .
Before thi s system of not i ons, the i ndi vi dual mi nd i s i n t he s ame si t uat i on
as t he Nous of Pl ato before t he worl d of l deas. "3 2
In The Elementary Forms, t he probl em of determi ni ng the essenti al con
st i t uent s of rel i gi on j oi ned that of compari ng sci ence to symbol i c systems
prevalent i n "pri mi tive" soci eti es. Yet i n thi s respect Durkheim' s argument
was al most enti rel y s ubordi nated to hi s soci al metaphysi c. As a preface to
t he di scussi on of t he metaphysi cal chapter of Durkhei mi sm, i t i s i nterest
i ng t o compare t he at t empt of Cl aude Levi -Strauss to address h i msel f to
probl ems si mi l ar to those of Durkhei m.
Although Levi -Strauss refuses to admi t a phi l osophi cal i nt ent i on, hi s
book La Pensee sau vage ( The Savage Mind mi ght wel l be taken as a st udy
i n epi stemol ogy. In thi s work, Levi -Strauss sought out a st ruct ure of the
mind that was pre-emi nentl y characteri sti c of certai n soci eti es b ut which
represented a permanent gi ven, or at least an ever-present possi bi l i ty, i n
human experi ence. Thus t he obj ect of i nvesti gati on was not t he thought
of the savages but savage thought as a symbol i c form or archetypi cal mode
of arti cul ati ng experi ence. The English t er m "savage thought" ( and even
more so, "the savage mi nd, " with i ts resurrecti on of Luci en Levy-Bruhl and
his penchant for unbri dgeabl e anti pathi es between the pri mi ti ve and the
modern) obvi ousl y fai l s t o capture the relevance and symbol i c weight of
the French expressi on. La pensee sauvage refers ambi guously to cul ture (a
structure of the human mi nd) and to nature ( to a speci es of f ower, the wi l d
pansy) . Thus i t not onl y l i terally denotes, but met aphori cally expresses, the
t ype of comprehensi ve paradi gm that correlates cul ture and nature.
Wi thi n Ia pensee sauvage, one may di sti ngui sh two di al ect i cally related
levels, or ( i n the Hegelian sense) "moments. " La pensee sauvage consti tutes
une theorie du sensible or a structure of percept i on, but i t operates s i mul ta
neousl y on two levels: t he li teral and t he metaphori c. Often its met i cul ous
classifcations of natural phenomena can be correlated wi t h those of posi ti ve
sci ences l i ke botany, whi ch approach real i ty on the same strategi c l evel of
percepti on. In al l cases, i t manifests a close and sustai ned attenti on to natural
phenomena and processes that are open to sensory percept i on. Moreover,
Its technol ogy, e. g. , in metal-worki ng, reveals the product, not of chance
di scovery, b ut of experi mentati on. In t hi s sense, the "Neol i thi c revol ut i on, "
bringing t he art s of ci vi l i zati on li ke agri cul ture, pot t ery, and weaving, whi ch
sti l l remai n as a foundat i on of modern cul t ure, was an achi evement of Ia
pensee sauvage.
But observati on, wi t hi n the context of Ia penste sauvage, i s not separated
fro m ot her l evel s of experi ence to resul t i n a pos i ti vi st i c noti o n of nat ure.
Nor i s t echnol ogy seen as an expressi on of uni l at eral domi nat i on over
nature by humans; i t i s rat her a medi at or bet ween cul ture and nat ure. In
other words, both observat i on and appl i ed knowl edge are i mpl i cat ed i n
mor e encompassi ng st ruct ures whi ch pl ace t hem wi t hi n a br oader s cope
of nor mat i ve regul ati o n , i magi nat i ve mut ua l i ty, and emot i onal response.
"Envel opi ng t erms, whi ch confounded i n a sort of surreal i ty the obj e cts
of per cept i on and the emot i ons t hey aroused, pr eceded anal yti c reduc
t i on in t he st ri ct s ens e. "3 3 Not i ons are "ensnared" in i mages l i ke bi rds
i n qui ckl i me, and t hey i mpl y an i ntri cat e net work of correl at i ons and
correspondences among vari ous levels of experi ence. The ul t i mat e logi
cal i nt ent i on of t hi s mode of t hought i s cosmi c . And promi nent i n t he
at t empt t o cl assi f t he el ement s of t he known uni verse i n a meani ngful
manner are correl at i ons b etween soci al a nd nat ural phenomena. " The
mythi cal system of represent at i ons serves t o est abl i sh rel at i ons of homol
ogy between natural condi t i ons and s oci al condi t i ons. Or more exactly, i t
defnes a law of equi val ence among meani ngful contrasts whi ch are si t u
at ed on several l evel s: geographi cal , met eorol ogi cal , zool ogi cal , b ot ani cal ,
t echni cal , economi c, soci al , ri t ual , rel i gi ous, phi l os ophi cal . " 34
From t hi s poi nt of vi ew, t he i nt i mat e rel at i ons bet ween rel i gi on and
magi c wi t hi n the cont ext of Ia penste sauvage be co me mani fest . They
represent compl ementary di recti ons taken by t he i magi nat i ve mut ual i ty
of humans and nat ure.
If i t can i n a sense be sai d t hat r el i gi on consi st s of a humani zat i on
of nat ural laws and magi c of a nat ur al i zat i on of human act i ons
- t he t reat ment of cer t ai n human act i ons as i f t hey were an i n
tegral par t of physi cal det ermi ni sm - t hi s i s not t o s ay t hat t hese
are al t ernati ves or stages i n an evol uti on. The ant hr opomorphi s m
of nat ure ( of whi ch rel i gi on consi st s) an d t he phys i omor phi s m
of man ( by whi ch we have defned magi c) cons t i t ut e two com
ponent s whi ch are always gi ven, and vary onl y i n pr opor t i on . . . .
Each i mpl i es t he ot her. There i s no rel i gi on wi t hout magi c, any
more t han there i s magi c wi t hout at l east a trace of rel i gi on. The
not i on of a supernat ure exi st s onl y for a humani ty whi ch at t ri but es
supernat ural powers t o i t sel f and i n ret urn ascri bes t he powers of
i ts superhumani t y t o nat ur e. 3 5
We have already observed t hat for Levi-Strauss totemi sm i s not the global
i nsti tuti on invariably combi ni ng ki nshi p and religion that i t was for Durkheim.
It is an instance of the general logical principle of differenti ati on and inte
grati on. Wit h i n t he context of !a penseesauvage, totemi sm posi ts a metaphori c
homology between a bi nary opposi ti on of natural speci es ( the totems) and a
bi nary opposi t i on of human groups. This orderi ng pri nci pl e is avai lable for
a complex variety of uses in soci ety. But i ts usage as a pri nci pl e of ki nshi p
may not coi nci de wi th reli gi ous bel i ef, and vi ce versa. From Levi-Strauss's
vi ewpoi nt, t he attempt to explai n away facts by unfounded evoluti onary
hypotheses has no relation to sci enti fc theory. The theoretical probl em, at a
higher level of understanding, is to discover the higher-order paradigms that
account for the actual correl ati ons among aspects of cultural lif e or represent
possi ble vari ati ons of them.
For Levi-Strauss, all thought employs the same formal logi cal pri nci ples,
such as opposi ti on and correlati on. In thi s sense, no thought is "prelogi cal. "
But si gni fcant differences do exist both between symbol i c forms and between
t hei r actual preval ence i n di fferent soci eti es. I n t he pri nci pal fel ds of modern
life characterized by technology and bureaucracy, I pensi sauvage i s rather
wilted; i t fourishes largely i n marginal areas, such as certain forms of art. The
level of concrete percepti on has di mi ni shed i mportance, and it i s di ffcul t to
concei ve of truly credi ble paradigms that i ntegrate or at least relate the l i teral
and the metaphori c i n shared experi ence. Positive sci ence appears as a "do
mesti cated" form of t hought t hat approaches real i ty on a more soph i sti cated
strategic level -that of conceptual formul ati on and mathemati cal notati on
-and i t resul ts i n a more operati onal knowledge of nature. But the pri ce i t
often pays i s fragmentati on and the ali enati on ofhumans from more inclusive
structures of experi ence. Symbol i sm, in general, tends to become formally
rationalized and emoti onally neutralized.
Thi s bri ef di scussi on of Levi -Strauss's t hought i s i nt ended merel y to
i ndi cate the areas of vital i nterest t ouched upon in Durkhei m's i dea of a
soci ol ogical epi stemol ogy. The probl ems that I have s uperfcially treated di d
recei ve some at tenti on from Dur khei m, b u t hi s i deas remai ned di sparate
and were gi ven a sembl ance of coherence only through the medi um of
hi s soci al met a physi c. 36
Yet what seem li ke gai ns i n compari son wi th Durkhei m may al so i n
vol ve possi bl e l osses. In a thi nker l i ke Levi -Strauss, one at t i mes senses an
unresol ved tensi on bet ween human warmth and formal i sm, cl ari ty and
obscuranti st preci osi ty, a feeli ng for the i nterplay between the l i teral and the
metaphori c, and a somewhat technocrati c fasci nati on for the mani pul at i on
of analytically reduced "l ogi cal operat ors. "3 7 Durkhei m's soci al met a physi c
was hi s surrogate for rel i gi ous bel i ef and hi s i nspi rat i on for soci al act i on.
Unfort unately, i n conf di ng i n somet hi ng as pal pabl y i neffective as soci al
met aphysi c, Durkhei m di ssi pat ed bot h hi s massi ve i ntel l i gence and hi s
genui ne spi ri t ual i nt ensity. From hi m one mi ght have expect ed a more
convi nci ng at t empt t o forge a synthesi s bet ween uncoordi nat ed el ements
of moder n experi ence and t he heri tage of deval uated s ymbol i c for ms .
Social Ahysic
Like ot her comparabl e systems of t he t i me - e . g. , t hose of Marx
or Freud - Durkhei m's soci al me taphysi c ul t i matel y conceived of in
terpretati on i n the for m of reduct i oni sm. lt presented a truncated and
i mpoveri shed not i on of reali ty that i d enti f ed adequat e analysi s wi th t he
sacri f ce of t he compl exi t y and di versi ty of human exper i ence on t he
al tar of a uni l ateral fxat i on. To al l probl ems i n hi st ory and phi l os ophy,
Durkhei m fel t j usti f ed i n offeri ng what came i n t i me to b e a prefab
ri cated and mechani cal "soci ol ogi cal " sol ut i on whose very predi ct abi l i t y
and faci l e app l i cab i l i ty were i ndi cat i ons of s uperfci al i t y and ci rcul ari ty.
The operati onal ups hot of Durkhei mi an soci al met aphysi c was a soci ol o
gi sti c met hodol ogy whi ch recentl y has taken t he form of radi cal soci al
constructi vi s m. Thi s i nt er pretive schema accounted for al l symbol i cally
i nformed phenomena i n terms of the contrast b etween soci al real i ty ( or
anti -essent i al i st soci al const ruct i on) and cul tural "dress . " In ot her words,
human experi ence was i nt erpreted as i f soci et y ( often a vague concept i n
i tsel f) or some s peci f ed s oci al di mensi on (gender, sexual i ty, race, class) was
the basi c const i t uti ve reali ty and al l other aspects of culture were deri vati ve
or secondary mani festati ons. A soci ol ogi st i c met hodology was t o be found
even i n theori sts who rej ect ed ot her el ements of Durkhei m's heri tage, e. g. ,
t he relati ve de-emphasi s of s oci al confi ct and i t s funct i ons. For exampl e,
Edmund Leach fel t j usti f ed i n p refacing hi s i mpor t ant work, The Political
Systems of Highland Burma, wi t h t he decl arat i on:
My vi ew here i s t hat r i t ual act i on and bel i ef are al i ke to be under
s t ood as fo rms of symbol i c st at ement about t h e s oci al order . . . .
Cul t ur e provi des t he for m, t he "dress" of the soci al s i t uat i on. As
far as I a m concerned, the cul t ural s i t uat i on is a gi ven factor, i t i s
a pr oduct and an acci dent of hi s t ory. I do no t know why Kachi n
women go hatl ess wi th bobbe d hai r b efore t hey are marri ed, b u t
assume a t ur ban afterwards, any more than I know why Engl i sh
women put a ri ng on a part i cul ar fnger to denot e the same change
i n soci al s t at us ; al l I am i nterested i n i s that i n thi s Kachi n cont ext
t he assumpt i on of a t urban by a woma n does h ave thi s s ymbol i c
si gni f cance. I t i s a st at ement about the s t at us of the woman. 3 8
The l as t i ng achi evement of Levi - St raus s i n ant hr opol ogy was t he
awareness t hat symbol i c systems, especi al l y i n cert ai n s oci et i es , engaged
probl ems of meani ng and coherence; t hat t hei r reduct i on to soci al fact ors
( or ut i l i t ar i an needs , economi cs, bi ol ogy, and so fort h) mi ght i t sel f be a
reB ecti on of modern et hnocent ri sm; and t hat t he pr obl em was, rather, the
rel at i onshi ps among vari ous l evel s of experi ence and si gni fi ng p ract i ces.
But soci ol ogi sm, soci al fu nct i onal i sm, and radi cal soci al const ructi vi sm are
t h e operat i onal "r at i onal i zat i on" ( i n t h e Weber i an sense) of Dur khei m's
t hought , whi ch at t i mes consci ously empl oy t he l anguage of per s pecti ves,
i nterests, and arbi trary i ni t i al def ini ti ons. Durkheim' s soci ol ogi sm was par t
and parcel of a genui nel y met aphysi cal vi ew. Dur khei m not onl y r et ai ned
t he cl assi cal commi t ment to truth and real i sti c def ni t i on, but hi s search
for t he real i ty of thi ngs was conveyed i n an i ncreasi ngly mysti que-l aden
form of di s cours e whi ch he used to recount an el aborat e myt h of ori gi ns
and an i deol ogy of modern soci ety whi ch had a di s t i ncti ve rol e i n hi s
own Thi rd Republ i c.
In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Li, the argument that rel i gi on
was the ori gi n of cul ture cul mi nated i n the i dea that soci ety was the ori gi n
and essence of rel i gi on. Si nce the frst i deas of humans were representati ons
of rel i gi ous reali ty, soci ety was consequentl y al so t he ori gi n of the catego
ri es. In The Elementary Forms, the piece of argument di rectly addressed to
the i denti ty of God and soci ety was l i ttl e more than a form of pars pro toto
legerdemai n followed by a stri ng of rhetori cal questi ons:
[ The totem] i s the outward and vi si bl e form of what we have cal l ed
the totemi c pri nci pl e or god. But i t is al so t he symbol of t he deter
mi nate soci ety cal l ed the cl an. It is i t s fag; i t i s the si gn by whi ch
each clan di sti ngui shes i tsel f from t he others, the vi si bl e mark of i ts
personal i ty, a mark bore by everything whi ch i s a part of the clan
under any ti tl e whatsoever, men, beasts, or things. So i f it i s at once
t he symbol of t he god and of t he soci ety, is t hat not because t he god
and t he soci ety are onl y one? How coul d t he embl em of t he group
have been abl e to b ecome the fgure of thi s quasi di vi ni ty i f the group
and the di vi ni ty were two di sti nct enti ti es? The god of t he clan, the
totemi c pri nci pl e, can therefore be nothi ng else than t he cl an i tsel f,
personi fed and represented to the i magi nati on under the visible form
of the ani mal o r vegetable whi ch serves as t ot em. 3 9
Thus Durkhei m fel t ent i t l ed to concl ude, not onl y that religi ous bel i ef
and ri tual had soci al functi ons, or even soci al aspects, but that they were
speci fcally, or sui generis, soci al in essential reality and ori gi n. Of ri tual ,
he wrote:
Everything l eads us back to the same i dea: i t i s that ri tual s are above
all else the means by which the soci al group reaff rms i tself peri
odi cally. From t hi s, we may perhaps arrive at a hypotheti cal recon
structi on of t he manner i n whi ch t he totemi c cul t must pri mi tively
have been born. Men who feel themselves uni t ed in part through
bonds of bl ood b ut sti l l more through a communi ty of i nterests and
traditions assemble and become consci ous of their moral uni ty . . . .
The moral eff cacy of ri tual , whi ch i s real , l ed men to bel i eve i n
i t s physical eff cacy, whi ch i s i maginary . . . . The trul y useful effects
whi ch ceremoni es produce are l i ke t he experi mental j usti fcati on of
the el ementary practi ces of whi ch they are composed. 40
The full sweep and nature of the argument in The Elementary Forms are
better understood if one sees it i n the light of Durkhei m's preparatory articles
on rel ated probl ems, especi al l y his study of the i ncest t aboo. 4 1 Durkhei m
began wi th the root assumpti on that soci al sol i dari ty and soci al structure
were ul t i mat e real i ti es and expl anatory pri nci pl es. Conti nui ty wi t h hi s
earl i er thought was embodi ed i n the bel i ef that communi ty was pri or to
the structural differenti ati ons whi ch stemmed from i t . Begi nni ng wi th the
i dea of a group of peopl e who had some sense of thei r moral and soci al
communi ty, Durkhei m i ntroduced the i dea of "collecti ve effervescence" as
a transi ti onal force that led to the genesi s of rel i gi ous cul ts. Col l ecti ve ef
fervescence was in thi s sense a sacral i zi ng, mana-l i ke el an, whi ch i ntensi fed
the sense of communi ty unti l i t attai ned religious proporti ons and propel l ed
humans from the s t at e of nat ure i nt o t hat of cul t ure and soci ety.
I n hi s arti cl e on the i ncest t aboo, Dur khei m was even more speci f c
in hi s el aborat i on of a soci ol ogi sti c myth of ori gi ns. Sei zed by an i nten
si f ed sense of t hei r own sol i dari ty, the group sel ected a t ot em to serve as
i ts embl em. Its uni ty was sol i di fed by the myth of a common t ot emi c
ancestor whose bl ood was imagi ned to Row i n t he vei ns of t he c l a n. The
associ at i on b etween t he i magi nary mythi cal bl ood of t he communal clan
and the very real menstrual bl ood of i ts femal e members presumabl y pro
voked horror at t he i dea of cl an endogamy. Thus, al though t otemi sm was
i n fact a restri cted phenomenon and the pr ohi bi t i on of i ncest a uni versal
phenomenon, the myth of ori gi ns, whi ch led from soci al sol i dari t y to
t ot emi sm, caused Durkhei m to believe that i ncest deri ved from a speci fc
t otemi c taboo. Evol uti onary i deas, i n t hi s way, t ook on a ful l y mythi cal
cast. I ndeed Durkhei m's di ffcul t y wi th probl ems of gender and sexual i ty
was here mani fest i n a part i cularly bewi l deri ng, questi on-begging form.
He rel i ed on a l ogi c ( or non-l ogi c) of associ ati on t o l i nk the met aphori c
bl ood mythi cal l y shared by the cl an and the real menst rual bl ood of i t s
women member s i n order to provi de a pseudo-expl anati on for t he pr o
hi bi t i on of i ncest. Women, whom Dur kheim descri bed as "a t heat er of
bl oody mani fest at i ons, " were si ngl ed out , even scapegoated, as a poi nt of
spreadi ng contagi on t hat provoked ri tual anxi ety or phobi a in the men of
t he cl an - a sacred horror whi ch somehow pr oduced t he i ncest t aboo.
The profound i l l ogi c of t hi s seemi ng l ogi c of associ ati on not onl y deri ved
the uni versal ( the i ncest taboo) fro m the parti cul ar or at best the typi cal
( totemi sm) ; i t further parti cularized or locali zed the "origin" of the universal
i n the gendered, sexed "nature" or state of women.
Durkhei m confronted the obvi ous probl em of why, on hi s view, there was
not a spread of ri tual horror, via menst ruat i on, to all women, eventuati ng
i n a t aboo, or at l east a sense of ri tual danger and di sgust, not onl y wi th
respect to i ncest but t o all (hetero )sexual relati ons. Appeali ng, i n ci rcul ar
fashi on, t o evol uti onary or devel opmental assumpti ons, he "expl ai ned" that
thi s broader contagi on di d i ndeed occur but onl y at a l ater stage, that i s, after
the decl i ne of t ot emi c i nsti tuti ons and in weakened or di l uted form. Gi ven
the almost transparent logi cal di ffculti es i n hi s account, one i s t empt ed to
concl ude that Durkheim manhandled his insights concerni ng sexuali ty, t he
sacred, and t aboo by i mpl i ci tl y begi nni ng wi t h a prej udi ci al post ul at i on or
experi ence of ri tual horror at contami nati on through the menstrual bl ood of
women that he proj ectively empl oyed to el aborate an i mpl ausi bl e "theory"
of the origin of the i ncest taboo - a "theory" whi ch was l i ttl e more than
a speci ous secondary revision. Sti ll, his views had signifcant symptomati c
val ue i nsofar as they were not i di osyncrati c to hi m but i ndicative of more
preval ent anxi eti es and quasi-ritual fears of cont ami nat i on that ch aracterized
men at the t i me or even in some more general but i ndetermi nate manner
- anxieties and fears that mi ght, in the context of the ambi val ence of the
sacred, be combi ned wi th a sense of mystery and attracti on/repul si on sur
roundi ng sexual i ty. They al so had t he mer i t of maki ng expl i ci t and openi ng
t o cri ti cal scruti ny at l east one vari ant of "i rrati onal " response to sexual i ty
that could not be reduced to matters of hygi ene, medi cal i zed precauti on,
or i ndeed any form of i nstrumental rati onali ty. Durkhei m sensed the ways
i n whi ch sex could not be made enti rel y "safe" in that it was i mpl i cated i n
t he di al ecti c of puri t y and danger wi t h t i es t o the sacred, t he ri tual i sti c, and
the strangely di sconcerti ng. Whatever one may thi nk of hi s speci fc way of
theori zi ng thi s compl ex of probl ems, he put i t on the agenda of soci al and
cul tural thought i n a manner t hat later thi nkers, such as Georges Batai l l e,
Rene Gi rard, Mi chel Foucaul t, and J ul i a Kristeva, woul d take up i n t hei r
own more or l ess probl emati c ways.
Apparent i n Durkhei m's soci al metaphysi c of religion was the extent to
whi ch hi s argument depended on modern presupposi ti ons whi ch in fact
were typical of one i mportant di mensi on of his thought as a whol e. From
the very out set , Durkhei m analyti cally di ssoci ated i ntel l i gi bl e reality i nt o
a real m of materi al nature and an aut onomous realm of soci al facts. He
concei ved thi s realm of soci al facts i n "hyperspi ri tual" terms and i dentif ed
i t i ncreasi ngly wi th the ob j eer of i deal i st i c phi l osophy. In t he extremely
dual i sti c, Cartesi ani zed neo-Kanti an tendency of Durkhei m's thought, the
human being was homo duplex - a composi te of a body and an ideal or
spi ri t ual soci al self.
Du rkhei m di d not devot e suffci ent at t ent i On to the i nt eract i ons
bet ween body and mi nd, even when t hey coul d be formul ated l i t erally,
e. g. , geneti cal l y o r psychosomat i cally. Possi bl e met aphori c rel ati ons often
seemed to be compl etel y beyond hi s ken. Indeed hi s tendency to pr omot e
a t ense, at t i mes ambi val ent dual i t y bet ween i nteracti ng forces i nt o a bi
nar i st i c mi n d- body ( or soci et y-i ndi vi dual ) dual i s m i n h i bi t ed hi s abi l ity
to el aborat e a not i on of the soci o-symbol i c di mensi ons of the body i tself.
And hi s analysi s of t he symbol i c effcacy of ri tual negl ected t o consi der t he
very real effects of rel i gi on and magi c on the organi c and psychol ogi cal
processes of the bel i ever.
Epi stemol ogi cally, Durkhei m's dual i st i c concept i on of human nature
led hi m to restri ct hi s atte nt i on to s ens at i on, whi ch he correl ated wi th
the "i ndi vi dual " body, and the concept , whi ch he correl ated wi th the spe
ci fcally, hyper-spi ri tual i sti cal l y soci al . Thi s frame of reference was fully
devel oped i n hi s 1 898 arti cl e, "I ndi vi dual Representati ons and Col l ecti ve
Representati ons. " The "i ndi vi dual representati on" was t he sensat i on. The
"collective representati on" was the concept. Durkhei m devoted no attenti on
i n hi s understandi ng of epi stemol ogy to percept i on, i magi nati on, emot i on,
personal uni queness, and the rel at i on of t hought t o acti on. Thi s omi ssi on
created a l ogi cal gap bet ween hi s epi st emol ogi cal presupposi t i ons and such
of hi s methodol ogical noti ons as "soci al morphol ogy" ( whi ch i n general was
comparabl e to the anthropological not i on of "materi al cul ture") , senti ment,
anomi e, the rol e of the i ndi vi dual i n cul ture, and the rel ati on of theory
and practi ce i n the passage from pat hol ogy to normal i ty. I t al so accounted
for h i s cur i ous concept i on of economi cs as the study of t he i ndi vi dual and
t he materi al - a not i on t hat di d l i ttl e j ust i ce t o t he probl em of economi c
i nst i t ut i ons. In br i ef, t he extremel y dual i st i c assumpt i ons of hi s soci al
met aphysi c and i t s epi stemol ogi cal corol l ari es subordi nat ed a tensel y and
openl y di al ecti cal ( or di al ogi c) concept i on of experi ence t o a ri gi d i dea of
di sj uncti ve ant i nomi es or bi nary opposi t i ons.
When Durkhei m came to devote speci al at t enti on to the sacred, he
was faced wi t h a pr obl em of classi f cati on created by t he presupposi ti ons
of one el ement of hi s thought. He solved i t by pl aci ng the sacred i n the
category of the speci fcally soci al and i nterpreti ng i ts vari ous mani festa
ti ons as "superposi ti ons" of the soci al and the "hyperspi ri t ual . " I n hi s "Le
Dual i s me de I a nat ure h u mai ne et ses condi t i ons soci al es" ( 1 9 1 4) , whi ch
he frst presented as a speech to hi s spi ri t ual i st i c, neo-Kanti an peer group
at the Soci ete Fransai se de Phi l osophi e, Durkhei m argued t hat the basi c
cont ri but i on of The Elementary Forms was to show that t he soci ol ogy of
reli gi on provi ded confrmati on for t he tradi ti onal i dea of a dual i sm b etween
body and spi ri t in man. In other words, Durkhei m asserted that his i nt er
pretati on of rel i gi on revealed that the mi nd- body dual i sm was an essenti al
characteri sti c of human nature -a vi ewpoi nt that seems to rai se the speci fc
(i f not the pathologi cal) t o t he uni versal. Thus Durkhei m's pri mary l i ne of
devel opment i n an i ncreasi ngl y i deal i st i c di recti on was to be found i n hi s
growing rel i ance on ant i nomi es or bi nar y opposi t i ons - a reli ance whi ch
cul mi nated i n the i dea of homo duplex. He conceived of the passage from
nature to cul ture as the spi ri tual arousal of the i nert or qui escent grou p, l i ke
the conglomerate body of s ome i ncredi bl e Frankenstein monster, through
the electri c charge of"collective effervescence" which mysteriously generated
t he "hyper spi ri t ual " i deal s of ci vi l i zat i on.
But bot h i n hi s emphasi s on sacred communi t y and i n hi s soci ol ogi cal
(or soci ol ogi sti c) reformul at i on of the i dea of homo duplex, Durkhei m's
thought represented a reacti on agai nst extreme variants of secul ari zati on i n
modern cul ture. Metaphors and i magi nati on, excl uded from ot her spheres
of experi ence, Hooded Durkhei m's i dea of the soci al thro ugh the narrow
channel left open by his conceptual i sti c and spi ri t ual i sti c tendenci es. Wi th
i ncreasi ng abandon, Durkhei m gave hi msel f, not to devel opi ng concrete
i mages of soci al life, but to composi ng allegori es i n the form of abstract
conceptual prose poems about the true nature of soci ety. The sacred was
soci ety expressed metaphori cally. Incarnati on found i ts real i ty i n the pro
cess of soci al i zati on. Roles assumed t he quali ty of sancti fed calli ngs. And
t he educator had a truly pri est-li ke fun ct i on as the i ntermedi ary between
soci ety and i ts members.
The b eli ever bows down before God be cause i t i s from God t hat
he b elieves he receives hi s bei ng, and part i cul arl y hi s ment al bei ng,
his soul . We have the same reasons to feel thi s senti ment for the
col l ecti vi tyY
What i ndeed is di sci pl i ne if not soci ety conceived as what commands
us, dictates orders, and gives us laws? And i n the second element of
morali ty - the attachment to a group -i t i s again soci ety that we
f nd, but concei ved this ti me as a good and desi rable thi ng, an end
whi ch attracts us, an i deal to be reali zed. In the former sense, i t appears
to us as an authori ty whi ch contains us, fxes li mi ts which resist our
infringements, and b efore whi ch we bow wi t h religious respect; i n the
latter sense, i t i s a fri endl y and protecti ng power, a nursi ng mother,
from whom we receive the pri nci pal part of our i ntellectual and moral
substance and toward whom our wills are turned in an elan of grati tude
and love. In one case, i t is l i ke the j ealous and fearful god, the severe
legislator, who does not permi t his orders to be transgressed; in the
other, i t is the di vi ni ty who cares for us and for whom the bel i ever
sacrifces hi mself with j oy.
What consti tutes the authori ty whi ch colors r readi ly the word of the
pri est is the elevated i dea he has of his mi ssi on; for he speaks i n the name
of a god i n which he believes and toward which he feels closer than the
crowd of the profane. The lay teacher can and must have somethi ng
of t hi s sent i ment . He too i s the organ of a great moral person which
transcends hi m; this is soci ety. Just as t he priest is the interpreter of
his god, so the teacher is the i nterpreter of the great moral i deas of hi s
ti me and country.43
In short, soci ety has "all that it takes [tout ce qu'il fut] to i nspi re the
i dea of the sacre d, "because i t i s to i ts members what a god is to b eli evers. "44
Durkheim perceived soci al metaphysics as the symbol i c groundwork for a
conception of social ethics that allowed for sentiment and emoti on. Indeed the
much-heralded "death of God" was but a prelude to t he bi rt h of Soci ety.
One will noti ce the analogy between thi s line of reasoning and that by
whi ch Kant demonstrates God. Kant postul at es God because, wi thout
thi s hypothesi s, morali ty i s uni ntelli gi ble. We postul ate a soci ety spe
cifcally di sti nct from i ndi vi dual s b ecause otherwise morality i s wi thout
an obj ect and duty wi thout an anchor poi nt . . . . Between God and
soci ety one must choose . . . . I may add that, from my poi nt of view,
thi s choi ce leaves me indifferent, because I see in di vi ni ty only soci ety
transfgured and concei ved symbol i cally. 45
So, one must choose, but the choi ce is a non-choi ce in that God is the
symbol of Soci ety. (Heads I wi n; tails you lose. ) Still, there i s an i mportant
sense i n which, from begi nni ng to end, moral i ty consti tuted the center of
Durkheim's thought. And he bel i eved that hi s substantively rational conception
of morality was not undermi ned but forti fed and completed by his social
philosophy. Some quasi-religious basis was necessary for all morality and social
soli darity. But the belies that justi fed religion had increasingly lost credibility
in the modern world. For Durkheim, sociolog itself had the task of providing
a theoretical foundation for religion -a foundation that would simultaneously
serve as its own ultimate legitimati on. Hence Durkheim made the almost Thomis
t i c effort to reconcile reason and faith, but i n a secularized fashion adapted to the
needs of modern society.
The vi si on of a soci ety based upon truth and j ust i ce and abl e to reconci l e
reason and the ri tual atti tude of sacred respect was vi tal to Durkhei m' s i dea
of structural reform i n modern soci ety. It was al so i mport ant for hi s i dea
of t he speci al mi ssi on of soci ology i n hi s own France. Soci al myst i que was
i ntended as a means of strengtheni ng resolve and i nspi ri ng action for the
achi evement and mai nt enance of the normal soci ety. In The Elementary
Forms, Durkhei m's concl udi ng call for a revival of the spi ri t and a renewal
of the work of the French Revol uti on gave vi brant proof that hi s last ra jor
work was conceived agai nst the background of the need for soci al acti on to
effect a passage from pathology to normali ty in modern soci ety.
If we fnd i t diffcul t to i magine what the feasts and ceremonies of the
future could consist i n, thi s i s because we are goi ng through a stage of
transition and moral medi ocri ty. The great things of the past whi ch
flled our fathers wi th enthusiasm do not exci te the same ardor i n us,
ei ther because they have passed i nto common usage to such an extent
that we are unconsci ous of them, or else because they no longer answer
our present aspirati ons . . . . In a word, the old gods are growing old or are
already dead, and others are not yet born. This i s what made vain the
attempt of Comte to organize a religion wi th old hi stori cal memori es
artifcially revived. I t i s from life i tself and not from the dead past that
a li vi ng cul t can emerge. But thi s state of i ncerti tude and confused
agitation cannot last forever. A day will come when our societies will
know again those hours of creative effervescence in which new ideals
wi ll surge up and new formulas wi ll crystallize to serve for a while as a
Chapter 6 The Saced and Societ 27 I
gui de to humani ty. Once these hours have been experi enced, men will
spontaneously fed the need to keep their memory alive through feasts
which peri odi cally reproduce their creations. We have already seen how
the French Revol ut i on establ i shed a whol e cycle of hol i days to keep
the pri nci ples with whi ch it was inspired i n a state of perpetual yout h.
If thi s i nst i t ut i on qui ckly fell away, i t was because the revoluti onary
fai t h lasted but a moment, and di sappoi ntment and di scouragement
rapi dly succeeded the frst moments of enthusiasm. Although the work
mi scarried, i t enables us to imagine what might have happened i n other
condi t i ons; and everything leads us to believe t hat i t wil l be taken up
again sooner or later. 46
Si nce Durkheim's death, quasi -reli gi ous i deol ogi es have i ndeed often be
come soci al and poli ti cal i n nature. And hi s social metaphysi c (which at least
had the vi rtue of bei ng expl i ci t and manifestly open t o questi on) has been
displaced into perhaps even more deceptive, prevalent, and frequently unques
ti oned forms of radical social constructivism through which all meaning and
value are assumed to be sui generis soci al in nature and ori gi n. Unfortunately,
l i ttl e i n modern hi story has realized Durkheim's generous hope for a solidar
i sti c society based on reason and j usti ce. Durkhei m died before his opti mi sm
could be severely tested by ra jor contemporary events. On a more theoreti
cal level, however, he at ti mes seemed to sense the tenuous basi s of a soci al
metaphysic whi ch reli ed on questi onable binaries and accepted the breakdown
of comprehensive normati ve and cogni tive paradigms as the ne plus ultra of
modern experience. At these ti mes, he offered i nti mati ons of an integration of
the natural sci ences, technology, and soci al structure into gri ppi ngly i nclusive
structures that extended the gift of sol i dari ty to all of existence. Before hi s
neo-Kanti an colleagues at t he Soci et e Franaise de Phi l osophi e, he observed:
"Nothi ng tells us that nature will not take up in the future, in a new form, the
moral quality whi ch i t has lost. Perhaps a t i me will come when we wi l l fnd it
morally blameworthy t o perform any unnecessary destructi on. "47
The one basi c aspect of symbol i c systems i n certai n soci eti es that The
Elementar Forms p laced i n sharp relief was the i mportance of the microcosm
macrocosm schema i n the comprehensive formulati on of shared experience.
Social metaphysi c i nduced Durkhei m to percei ve the cosmi c archetype as a
generalized proj ecti on of t he speci fcal l y social i nst i t ut i on. But a mi nor t heme
of The Elementary Forms was the manner i n which t he social microcosm might,
however self-questioningly, be integrated i nto cosmic paradigms which allowed
for an i ntelli gi ble arti cul ati on of other aspects ofbot h li teral and metaphori c
perspectives on reali ty. Whether one reads The Elementar Forms as t he nar
row and somewhat mystifed basis for an i deology of the speci fcally social
and the exclusively moral or as a probl emati c intimation of some broader
vision of culture in the most comprehensive sense, one may conclude that
i n i t Durkhei m became the Plato of the Australi an blackfellows i n order to
emerge as the Angelic Doctor of consensual soci ety.
Notes
Chapter 6 The S and Societ 27
1 . Robert Lowie, Primitive Religion (f rst pub. 1 924; New York: Universal Press,
1 952) , p. 1 57.
2. Tal cott Parsons, The Structure ofSocial Action (frst pub. 1 937; Gl encoe,
I l l . : Free Press , 1 949) , p. 4 1 1 . Later Parsons made a simi lar eval uati on: "An
thropological research has enormously enriched our knowledge in this fel d,
though Durkheim's codifcation and analysis of Australian totemism remains
perhaps the most eminent single monographic contribution, because it is
both a great monograph and much more than that" (In trod. to Max Weber's
The SociologofReligion [ Boston: Beacon Press, 1 963] , p. xxvi i ) . See also On
Durkheim' Elementary Forms ofthe Religious L{(, ed. N. J . Allen, W. S. F
Pickering, and W Watts Miller (London: Routledge, 1 998) .
3 . I I ( 1 897- 1 898) ; i n Kurt Wool f ed. , Essays o n Sociolog and Philosophy (frst
pub. 1 960; New York: Harper & Row, 1 964) , pp. 350-3 5 1 .
4. Les Formes elimentaires de la vie religieuse (4th ed. ; Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1 9 60) , p. 1 1 .
5 . " De La Defini ti on du phenomene religi eux, " Annie sociologique, I I ( 1 897-
1 898) , 1 3 .
G. Formes ilimentaires de la vie religieuse, pp. 35- 36.
7. Ibid. , p. 6 5 .
8 . Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, "Esquisse d' une theorie generale de Ia
magi e, " Annie sociologique, VII ( 1 9 0 1 - 1 902) ; reprinted in Marcel Mauss,
Sociologie e anthropologie (frst pub. 1 950; Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1 988) , pp. 3- 1 4 1 .
9. Formes ilimentaires de !a vie religieuse, pp. 6 1 - 62.
1 0. Lerons de sociologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1 950) , p. 222.
1 1 . Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, "Essai sur I a nature et l a fonction du sac
rif ce," Annie sociologique, II ( 1 897 - 1 898) ; in Mauss, Oeuvres, I: Les Fonctions
sociales du sacri, ed. Victor Karady (Paris: Les Editions du Mi nui t, 1 968) ,
pp. 1 93- 30 1 . See also Roger Caillois, L' Homme et le sacri (Paris: Gallimard,
1 9 50) , and Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profne (frst pub. 1 957; New
York: Harper & Row, 1 9 6 1 ) . Eliade's other works, especially his Cosmos and
History (frst pub. 1 954; New York: Harper & Row, 1 959) , are important i n
this respect. Equally relevant are the works of Rene Girard, especially Volence
and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (frst pub. 1 972; Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1 979) and Things Hiddm Since the Foundation
of the Wrl, trans. Stephen Bann and Michael Metteer (frst pub. 1 978;
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 9 89) .
1 2 . formes elbnmtaires de Ia vie religieuse, p. 1 1 4 .
1 3 . Ibid. , p . 97.
1 4. London: Macmi llan, 1 899. Thi s work was reviewed i n detail by Durkheim
(i n i ts political and soci al aspects) and Mauss (in its religious aspects) in An
nee sociologique, 1 1 1 ( 1 898- 1 899) , 330- 336, 205-2 1 5 .
1 5 . I l l ( 1 898- 1 899) , p. 2 1 5 .
1 6. f Durkheim put i t: "It is not our intention to retrace all the speculations into
which religious thought, even of the Australians alone, has entered. What we
wish to reach are the elementary noti ons at the basis of religi on; but there i no
need to follow them through all the developments, sometimes very intricate,
which mythological imagination has given them since primitive times. We shall
make use of myths when they enable us to understand these fundamental no
tions, but we shall not make mythology itself the object of our study. Moreover,
i nsofar as mythology is a work of art, it does not fall within the j urisdiction of
the science of religions alone. Also, the mental processes which underlie it are
too complex to be studied indirectly and tangentially. It constitutes a diffcult
problem whi ch must be treated i n itself, for itself, and with a method peculiar
to itself" (Formes elrmtaires de Ia vie religieuse, pp. 1 4 1 - 1 42) .
1 7 . Ibid. , p. 596.
1 8 . One aspect of ritual which Durkheim's own devotion t o Ia vie serieuse pre
vented him from treating adequately was its tolerance of comic relief. He
gave little attention to rituals which i ncluded buffoonery and even obscene
raillery or which inverted established pri nci ples of moral sobriety, dignity,
authority, and hierarchy. Yet these aspects of ritual, which provided controlled
and li mited outlets for immoral, vulgar, subversive, and at times unconsci ous
desires, might functi on both to test and to validate the solidity of norms
and i nsti tuti ons in the rest of soci al l i fe. They also i ndi cated ways i n which
religion went beyond moral noti ons of good and evil. Here the work of
Bakhtin may be seen as providing a vital supplement to Durkheim' s thought.
On Bakhtin, see my Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language
( Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1 983) , chap. 9.
1 9 . Quoted in Formes elbnentaires de la vie religieuse, pp. 277-278. I n his i n
troduction to Sociologie et anthropologie, by :arcel :auss ( frs t pub. 1 950;
Pari s: Presses Universitaires de France, 1 968) , Cl aude Levi-Strauss gave an
extremely operational and rather demystifed i nterpretation of mana as a
concept si mi l ar to what linguists term the "poi nt zero" of communi cation.
I n other words, mana would be a place-holding or filler concept that indi
cated a blank space in communi cation that required further speci fcati on for
meaning to be imparted. In thi s sense, mana would be si mi lar to the French
espece de true ("something or other"). This i nterpretation i s a good example
Chaper 6 Th S a Soiet 27 5
of the ecesively operational side of Levi-Strauss and of his tendenc to
stres similarities among "primitive" and modrn societies, of ten at th price
of reducing things to their lowest common denominator. In the mystique
f lied interpretation ofDurkheim, on the contrary, mana came close to being
the "point infnity" of communication. An interpretation by R. Godfrey
Lienhardt comes closer to Durkheim's sense of the term: "Vrtus, prestige,
authority, good fortune, infuence, snctity, luck, are all words which, under
certain conditions, give something near the meaning .... Mana sometimes
means a more than natural virtue or power attaching to some person or
thing, different from and independent of the ordinary naturalconditions of
either .... I once had a tame pig which, before hevy rain, would always cut
extraordinary capers and squeak and run like mad .... All the Maori sid that
it was a pig posessed of mana: it had more than natural powers and could
foretell rain. The mana of a priest ... is proved by the truth of his predc
tions .... Mana in another sense is the accmpaniment of power but not the
power itself .... This is the chiefs mana .... The warrior's mana is just a little
something more than good fortune" ("Religion," in H. Shapiro, ed., Man,
Cuture, and Soiet [frst pub. 1956; New York: Oxf ord University Pres,
1960], p 316). Weber's notion of charisma was similar to mana insofar as
the latter received expresion in an exceptional individual. One might als
compare mana to Walter Benjamin's notion of aura.
20. Formes elbnentaires d I vie rieuse, pp. 284-285.
21. Ib., p. 12.
22. For an attempt to formulate the relationship btween epistemology and the
sociology of knowledge, s Peter Brger and Thomas Luckmann, Th Social
Constructin of Realit (Garden Cit, N. Y .: Doubleday, 1966).
23. Pragmatism et sociologi (Paris; Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1955), p.
197.
24. Ib., p. 155. While radical scial constructivism may be seen in certain ways
as th extreme, operationalized analogue of Durkheim's socal metaphys c,
the latter harbored traditional elements, restraints, and ambivalences that
might have fruitful dimensions and be open to formulations in other terms.
Thus, within the context of his social metaphysic, Durkheim retained an
emphasis upon the role of truth in his conception of things. "If sciety is a
specifc reality, it is not an empire within an empire. It is a part of nature,
and indeed its highest manifestation. Now it is impossible that nature should
differ radically from case to cas in regard to what is most essential. The
fundamental relations that exist among things-those which it is precisly
the function of the categories to express-cannot be essentially dissimilar
in the dif ferent realms. I f ... they are more clearly disengaged in the social
276 Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosoplm
world, it is nevertheless i mpossi ble that they should not be found elsewhere,
though in more disgui sed forms" (Formes elbnmtaires de Ia vie religieuse, pp.
25- 26) . As a defense of the universal appl i cability and truth of categories
that were presumed to be speci fcally soci al in ori gi n, this piece of argument
was unfortunately about as cogent as the idea that a photographer takes
good photographs because he is himself photogenic. Wi thi n the context
of Durkheim' s social metaphysic, however, the problem was similar to the
theological question about whether something i s true because it comes from
God or whether God created i t because i t i s true.
25 . Les Regles de Ia methode sociologique ( 1 5th ed. ; Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1 963) , p. 1 6. Compare Karl annhei m's conception of ideology
as false consci ousness: "The concept 'ideology' refects the one discovery
which emerged from pol i ti cal confi ct, namely, that ruling groups can in
their thi nki ng become so intensively interest-bound to a s i t uation that they
are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their
sense of domi nati on. There i s implicit i n the word ' ideology' the insight that
i n certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the
real condi ti on of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes
it" (ideolog and Utopia [New York: Harcourt, Brace 1 936] , p. 40) . Robert
Paul Wolff provides this pertinent gloss: "I deology is thus self-serving i n
two senses. Fi rst, and most si mply, i t i s the refusal to recognize unpleasant
facts which might require a less fattering evaluation of a pol i cy or institu
tion or whi ch mi ght undermine one's claim to a right of domination. For
example, slave owners in the antebellum South refused to acknowledge that
the slaves themselves were unhappy. The i mpl i cation was that i f they were,
slavery woul d be harder to j usti f. Secondly, ideological thi nki ng is a denial
of unsettl i ng or revolutionary factors in society on the pri nci pl e of the self
confrmi ng prophecy that the more stable everyone believes the si tuati on to
be, the more stable it actually becomes" ( "Beyond Tolerance, " in A Critique
ofPure Tolerance [ Boston: Beacon Press, 1 965 1 , pp. 39-40) . See also the more
i ntricate, Lacanian notion ofi deology in Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of
ideolog (London: Verso, 1 989) .
26. formes elinmtaires de Ia vie religieuse, p. 3 .
2 7. "Psychologie e t sociologie: Extrait de Ia concl usi on du debar, " in Sociologie
et anthropologie, p. 309.
28. Formes elinmtaires de Ia vie religieuse, pp. 6 1 9, 329.
29. Review of Wilhelm Jerusalem's "Soziologie des Erkenni s, " i n Annie soci
ologique, X ( 1 906- 1 909) , 44.
30. "Sociologie religi euse et theori e de I a connai ssance, " Revue de riaphysique
et de morale, XVII ( 1 909) , 757.
Chapter 6 The Saed and Societ 277
3 1 . formes elbnentaires de fa vie religieuse, p. 26, n. 2.
32. Ibid. , p. 622.
33. Claude Levi-Strauss, Le Tothnisme aujourd'hui (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1 9 62) , p. 1 46 .
34. Claude Levi-Strauss, La Pensee sauvage (Paris: Pion, 1 962) , p. 1 2 3 . I n contrast
to Levi-Strauss, Pierre Bourdieu is often closer to Durkheim' s sociologi sm as
an ultimate explanatory gesture. As a consequence, he provides only l i mi ted
i nsi ght i nto the speci fc work and play of cultural forms, especially works
of art and literature. In The Ruls ofArt: Genesis and Stucture ofthe Literary
Fiel (trans. Susan Emanuel ; frst pub. 1 992; Stanford, Calif. : Stanford Uni
versity Press, 1 995) , he even puts forth the soci ol ogi sti c fantasy of producing
a sociological account of the insertion of the artifact in the feld that, i n i ts
thoroughness, would furni sh a generative formul a reproducing the arti sti c
obj ect in another (soci ol ogical) register, thereby resul ti ng i n a ki nd of soci o
l ogi cal clone that would "explai n, " or even render redundant, the literary
artifact. Still, Bourdieu provides valuable i nqui ri es into the broader feld or
context of cultural artifacts, and the relation between fel d and artifact may
be understood differently than Bourdieu allows.
35 . Ibid. , pp. 292-293.
36. Durkheim recognized the possibility of a symboli c l ogi c that focused upon
the common formal principles of al l thought. ( See Les Regles de fa methode
sociologique, p. xvi i i . ) But, a early as The Division o Labor and The Rules,
he asserted the particular i mportance of concrete and i nformed observation
i n symboli c systems that were promi nent in "primitive" societies. (See Les
Regles, p. 1 5 , and De La Division du travail social, 7th ed. , p. 275. ) At times
he recognized the existence of correlations between society and nature i n the
symbolism of these societies. In The Elemmtary Forms itself he observed that
the "confusi ons" i n "primitive" thought did not stem from an ani mi sti c, an
thropomorphi c i nsti nct, which immoderately extended features of humanity
to all of nature: "Primitive men . . . have not conceived the world in their own
image any more than they have conceived themselves in the world's image:
they have done both at the same time. Into the idea they have formed of
things, they have undoubtedly made human el ements enter; but into the
idea they have formed of themselves, they have i nt roduced elements com
i ng from things" (/_es formes elbnmtaires de la vie religieuse, p. 337) . See al so
De La Division du tavail social, p. 273, and Formes elbnentaires, p. 320.
Durkheim apparently di d not sense the contradiction between these ideas
and his own social metaphysic, which interpreted religious symbols and the
categories as derivative projections or "superposi ti ons" of the specifcally
social. Yet he was always clear about the systematic c1uality of thought in
278 Emie Durkheim Socio and Philosoher
"primitive" societies. (See his and Marcel Mauss's Primitive Classifcation
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963], pp. 77-78, 81, a translation
of "De quelques formes primitives de classifction," Ann!e sociolgique, V
[ 190 1-1902].) With some inconsistency in his formulations, Durkheim
also saw the integration of cognition, practice, imagination, and emotion
in comprehensive forms of symbolism. (See, for example, Pragmatisme et
sociologi, p. 161; Primi tive Classication, p. 85-86; and De L Division du
travail social, p. 69 . ) The notion o a comprehensive ordering or codification
of experi ence in certain symbolic systems was an important element of his
idea of a "primitivenebula,"which is treate in another context in Chapter 3,
above. Moreover, Durkheim rejected Levy-Bruhl's notion of the "prelogical"
character of primitive thought. For Durkheim, there was no gap between
"primitive" and moer thought or between the logic of relig ous thought
and that of scientifc thought. The contents or terms employed might dif
fe, but the mental processes were essentially t same. 'The explanations of
contemporary science a surer of being more objective because they are more
methodical and bcause they rest on more careully controlled observations,
but they do not diffa in nature fom those which satisf primitive thought"
(F omes!lbnentaires, pp. 340-341). Finally, Durkheim conceived the difer
ence between the experimentalism and theoretical flsifability of scientifc
propositions, on the one hand, and the symboli c necessity and "imperme
ability to experience" (or circularity) of myth and ritual, on the other, not
in strictly logical, but in psychologcal terms. Btween the commitment to
a ritual and the unwillingness to abandon a well-tested scientifc theory in
the fac of initial counterevidence, there was, for him, only a diference of
degree (see Fmes !lbnentaires, pp.515-516).
37. Compare the criticism Edmund Leach h made of Levi-Strauss: "He fails
to allow for the fct that, whereas the symbols used by mathematicians are
emotionally neutral -ix is not more exciting than x just because i is an
imagnary number -the concrete symbols used in primitive thought are
heavily loded with taboo valuations. Consequently psychological fctors such
as 'evasion' and 'repression' tend to confuse thelogical symmetries" (Nez .rk
Review of Books, IX [Oct. 12, 1967], 8). Por a discussion of"poststructural"
figures, notably Michd Poucault and Jacques Derrida, see my Histor and
Reading: Tocquevill, F'ucault, F'rench Studis (Toronto: University ofToronto
Press, 2000).
38. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964 (frst pub. 1954), pp. 14, 16. Leach changed
his position, largely under the inA uence of Levi-Strauss. A. R. Radclife
Brown, who is himself largely responsibl e for the infuence of Durkheim
in Anglo-American social anthropology, nonetheless criticized Durkheim's
Chapter 6 The Saed and Societ 279
theory of religion in these terms: " I n every human society there i nevitably
exist two different and i n a certain sense conficting conceptions of nature.
One of them, the naturalistic, i s i mpl i ci t everywhere i n technology, and i n
our twentieth century European culture, with i ts great development of con
trol over natural phenomena, has become explicit and preponderant i n our
thought. The other, which mi ght be called the mythological or spi ri tual i sti c
concepti on, i s i mpl i ci t in myth and i n reli gi on, and often becomes expl i ci t
i n philosophy" (Structure and Function in Primitive Societ [ London: Cohen
& West, I 9 52] , p. I 30) . As i ndi cated earlier, radical social constructivism
of various sorts (including discursive constructivism) has recently become
important, and i ts relation to Durkheim's social metaphysic (or sociologism
i n general) is typically not noti ced. One fnds i t at times i n the infuential
work of Frank Ankersmit, Judi th Butler, Joan Scott, and Hayden White. It
has the value of critically reversing conventi onal essentialism and bri ngi ng to
the foreground factors (such as performativity or gendered presupposi ti ons)
obscured in conservative epi stemologies ( i ncluding Durkheim's) . But to the
extent i t remains within a framework of reversal, it does not provide the
basis for a more thoroughgoing critique and rearticulation of assumpti ons.
On these i ssues, see my Writing HistorY Writing Trauma (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2 00 I ) .
39. Formes elbnentaires de Ia vie religieuse, p . 236.
40. Ibid. , pp. 553, 5 I 3 .
4 I . "La Prohibition de l ' i nceste et ses origi nes, " An nee sociologique, I ( I 896- I 897) ,
I -70; trans. Edward Sagarin, Incest: The Origins and the Development ofthe
Incest Taboo (New York: Lyle Stuart, I 963) . Judith Surkis discusses this article
and its i mpl i cations in her Cornell University dissertation, "Secularization and
Sexuality i n Third Republ i c France, " chap. 4. I am indebted to her analysi s
for certain ideas expressed i n the next two paragraphs .
42. Sociologie et philosophie (frst pub. I 924; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
I 963 ) , p. I 08.
43. !Education morale ( frst pub. 1 934; Pari s : Presses Universitaires de France,
I 963) , pp. 78, 72- 73.
44. Formes elbnentaires de Ia vie religieuse, p. 245.
45 . Sociologie et philosophie, pp. 74-75.
46. Formes elbnentaires de Ia vie religieuse, p. 6 I I .
47. Bu!eth2 de Ia Societe Fran'ise de Philosophie, sessions of Feb. I I , March 22,
1 906 (Paris: Al can, p. 1 70) .
Epilogue
Thi s book focuses on the worki ngs o f Durkhei m's thought. Durkhei m's
rel ati on to hi s own hi stori cal context is a si gni fcant i ssue whi ch, for my
purposes, i s treated largely as a b ackground factor that hel ps t o inform an
understandi ng of hi s thought. In one i mportant sense, Durkhei m's thought
was a response to the probl ems confronti ng the Thi rd Republ i c i n France.
But hi s i deas were not merely symptomati c of hi s mi li eu and are informed by,
but not reduci bl e t o, an understandi ng of hi s parti cular context. In addi ti on,
whatever hi s l i mi t at i ons i n thi s respect, he hi msel f was concerned about
t he nature and workings of modern soci et i es i n general. And hi s reacti on
t o pri or thi nkers and i ntellectual tradi ti ons was most often a sel ective and
di scri mi nati ng response, as i t tends t o be i n all ra j or thi nkers.
In general , I have s ubordi nated the probl em of i ntellectual i nf uences on
Durkhei m t o t hat of the structure and dynami c of hi s thought. And I have
tri ed to analyze and understand that thought through a tense conj uncti on
of mut ually i nformati ve, i nteracti ng approaches: accurate reconstructi on
and di al ogi c exchange. Reconstructi on involves t he attempt to si tuate and
comprehend somet h i ng i n i ts own ti me and terms, not by denyi ng one's
i mpl i cati on in i t but by counteracti ng one's i nevi tabl e proj ective or i ncor
p orative tendenci es through careful research and cl ose readi ng. Di alogi c
exchange b ri ngs a more acti ve i nt erchange wi th another's thought that calls
for a response on the par t of the reader - a response that at t i mes el i ci ts
unreal i zed possi bi l i t i es and hel ps carry t hat thought i nto the present and
fut ure. Part of t he success of such an exchange, wh i ch - far from bei ng
tel eol ogi cal - expl i ci tl y and performatively l ooks back i n order t o ref ect
critically on the past and ask how i t bears on the fut ure, i s its abi l i ty to
i nduce ot her readers to engage and argue with its i nterpretati ons and i m
pl i cat i ons. My own approach i s di al ecti cal not i n seeki ng a hi gher synthesi s
but i n bei ng di al ogi c and i n affrmi ng t hat one must conti nual l y retur to
basi c probl ems i n the attempt to work through t hem.
A for Durkheim's i nf uence on others, there are not abl e omi ssi ons i n thi s
book. The thought ofT al cott Parsons does not receive the expl i ci t attenti on
i t deserves, because Parsons' i deas have i mpl i ci tly condi ti oned much of what
I h ave wri tten, oft en as a cri ti cal foi l, and because the emphasi s of the pres
ent work i s pri mari l y on soci al thought in France. I refer onl y scanti l y to
the work of the Amzee school , although I devote s ome attenti on to Marcel
Mauss. And I try t o i ndi cat e t he ways i n whi ch Cl aude Levi -Strauss, t he
"i nconstant di sci pl e, " bui l t , often i n highly cri ti cal or probl emat i c ways,
upon the Durkhei mi an heri tage. But i mport ant t hi nkers like Maur i ce
Hal bwachs, Marcel Granet , and Georges Davy are shortchanged, because
I bel i eve that the work of the An nee school can be better treated i n a broader,
more syntheti c study of moder n French soci al thought.
Thi s b ook, t hen, concent rat es on t he t hought of Durkhei m and at
tempts t o reconst i t ut e hi s i deas i n a way t hat i s fai thful to hi s present at i on
of t hem, i ndi cat es hi s concern for i mpor t an t probl ems i n soci al l i fe , and
responds t o hi s thi nki ng i n ways that ma y at t i mes hel p t o carry i t forward
cri t i cally and cons t r ucti vely. What may one concl ude about Durkhei m' s
t hought i tself?
On a practi cal level, Durkhei m att empted a reconci l i ati on, or at least an
art i cul ati on, of liberal, conservative, and radical tradi ti ons. The domi nant
force i n hi s t hought was what I h ave t ermed h i s phi l os ophi cal conservati sm,
and thi s served as the capstone of hi s cri ti cal and constructi ve attempt at
arti cul ati on. Above al l , Durkhei m want ed the emergence of a soci et y t hat
vi ably related l egi ti mate order and progress, reason and sent i ment , structure
and creati vi ty. Wi th i ncreasi ng i nsi st ence, he saw modern soci ety as passi ng
t hrough a transi ti onal peri od that confront ed peopl e wi th the probl em of
anomi e. Anomi e was especially pronounced i n the economy. And the corpo
rati ve group was Durkheim's speci fc means of overcomi ng soci al "pathology"
and i nsti tuti ng "normal i ty" i n mod ern l i fe. In general, he tri ed to work out
a sel ective and di scri mi nati ng cri ti cal perspecti ve on moder n soci ety. Given
hi s view of soci al normality, he asked what deserved t o b e preserved and
what ought to be changed i n modern soci al life. But often Durkhei m was
not penetrati ng enough i n hi s investigation of exi sti ng soci al reali ti es and not
t h oroughgoi ng enough in hi s concept i on of needed reforms. Hi s t ende n cy
t o avoi d the hard probl em of s peci fc processes and agents of change was
abetted by his i ncl i nati on to envi si on ideals abstractly and t o proj ect thei r
approxi mate reali zati on i nt o an i ndetermi nate future.
Durkhei m's thought vaci l l ated be tween an anal yti c di ssoci at i on o f
real i ty and a more o r less open di al ecti cal vi si on. At ti mes there s ur faced
Fpilogue 283
between these two types of thought a more tragi c sense of life. But the
tragi c sense was the most mut ed el ement of Durkhei m's thought. Hi st ory,
for Durkhei m, was often the anomi cal l y uprooti ng, tragic process of soci al
pat hology. But hi s i nsi ght i nt o t he tragi c el ements of hi st ory, as wel l as the
forceful ness of hi s di alectical visi on of thei r overcomi ng, was i mpai red by
the nature of hi s reckoni ng wi th Marx. A more di rect confrontati on wi t h
Marx woul d at l east have sharpened Durkhei m's i deas. And i t mi ght have
provi ded hi m with a concept i on of "praxi s" which revealed how peopl e
i n concrete si t uat i ons experi enced soci al pat hol ogy, wi t h i t s somet i mes
t raumat i c effects, and how they at t empt ed to come t o terms wi th i t . As i t
was, Durkhei m remai ned largely caught up between a Cartesi ani zed neo
Kanti ani sm and a Hegeli an noti on of di alecti cs. Thi s bind faci l i tated hi s
ul t i mat e turn toward soci al metaphysi c as the i nst rument of logi cal cl osure
for hi s t hought . Soci et y i tself became the surrogate for God i n moder n life
and, si mul taneously, t he ori gi n that provi ded ul t i mat e l egi ti mati on for the
new di sci pl i ne of soci ol ogy i tsel f.
The most thought-provoki ng aspect of Dur khei m's t hought was the
more ope n, self-cri ti cal di alectical ( or di al ogi c) di mens i on a nd i ts rela
t i on to his phi l osophi cal conservati sm. Also si gni fcant was his i nsi ght
i nto secul ari zati on as i nvol vi ng nei ther the seamless cont i nuat i on nor the
decisive termi nati on of rel i gi on b ut i t s compl ex di splacements i n modern
life -i t s repet i t i on or reproduct i on wi t h more or l ess si gni f cant, at ti mes
di srupti ve, changes - i ncl udi ng i ts rol e i n Durkhei mi an soci ol ogy i tself.
Moreover, with respect to both Durkhei m and Marx, there is a sense i n
whi ch an appr oach t hat i s basi cally soci al , and has a strong normati ve or
practi cal di mensi on, may recognize but not affrm tragedy. Conversely, a
tragic ori entati on ( such as that of Jacques Lacan) may admi t a restri cted rol e
for ethi cs and soci al acti vi ty whi ch, when not confated wi th tragedy, are at
best pl atforms for a presumabl y hi gher-order drama - even s ubordi nate
duti es i f not divertissements.
I n Durkhei m the concepts of th e tree of soci al life and of soci al normali ty
and pathol ogy provi ded a "hol i sti c, " anal yti c and nor mative perspective that
offered some l i nk between theory and practi ce. Durkhei m di d see hi story
i n di alecti cal terms as a t ense st ruggle between anomi e forces and mean
i ngful order. But absent was a concrete noti on of the rol e of peopl e i n thi s
process. Li ke Hegel , Durkhei m often leaves one wi th a vi si on of hi story in
t erms of pr ocesses i n good part abstracted from human agents and at ti mes
represented i n bl i ndl y gendered terms.
Although Durkhei m fai led t o devel op a concrete noti on of peopl e as
agents i n hi st ory, he di d i nt end hi s i deas t o serve as gui des to soci al act i on.
Hi s concepts of the tree of soci al l i fe and of soci al normal i t y and pathol ogy
furni shed a way of coordi nati ng a concept i on of transhi stori cal values and a
cri ti cal theory of moral rel ati vi sm. There were certai n transhi stori cal values
-autonomy, reci proci ty, communi ty, and the sacred. But t hei r mani fest
ations depended on speci fc hi stori cal and s oci al circumstances. To the extent
that moral relati vi sm led t o t hei r real i zati on in the normal state of a given
type of soci ety, i t was j ust i fed. To the extent that i t conferred l egi ti macy
on pure subj ect i vi ty, deci si oni s m, or pathol ogi cal states of s oci ety, it was a
sympt omat i c form of "false consci ousness. "
The goal of s oci al l i fe was the creati on and mai ntenance of a st at e of
soci ety that was both rat i onally j ust i fed and symbol i cally l egi ti mated. Thi s
was not a stati c st at e. I t i ncl uded and requi red a si gni fcant measure of
change that corresponded to t he destructi ve and creati ve role of anomi e i n
life. At t i mes Durkhei m real i zed that, i n modern soci et i es, t hi s rol e, al ong
wi t h t hat of cri ti ci sm and contestat i on, woul d b e si gni fcant. St i l l , once t he
normal s t at e had been vi ably achi eved, one's fundamental commi t ment was
t o i t s mai ntenance and to the use of freedom i n evaluati ng al ternati ves and
wardi ng off unwanted change. Anomi e, i n thi s state of commi tment, woul d
for t he mos t par t be restri cted to a margi nal aspect of t he ordi nary personal
i ty and to a margi nal group of extraordi nary i ndi vi dual s i n soci ety. Hence
t here was a pl ace for Prometheus but not one to be confused wi th t hat of
"everyman. " Thi s not i on of soci al normal i ty was essenti al t o Durkhei m's
phi l osophi cal conservati sm.
By and l arge, Durkhei m proved unabl e to extend hi s own commi t ment
to the poi nt of thi nki ng and worki ng more compl etel y for the real i zati on
of hi s vi si on. I n thi s respect, he i s not atypi cal of the modern i ntel l ectual ,
especi ally o n e s i tuat ed i n t he academy. But i t i s possi bl e t o deri ve from
Durkhei m an appreci ati on of the rare combi nat i on of i ntel l ectual ri gor and
moral fervor that respects careful, di scri mi nat i ng thought and avoids self
ri ghteous dogmati sm. Moreover, he proved abl e bot h to i ntervene effectively
in current debates and to provi de thought of enduri ng value. I f anythi ng,
the quest i ons of expl anati on, understandi ng, prescri pt i on, and act i on that
Fpilogue 285
Durkhei m rai sed were more compl ex and probl emati c than he admi tted.
Durkhei m came to bel i eve that ul t i matel y one needs secul ar di spl acements
of rel i gi on t o make sense of thi ngs. Hi s meri t was i n seeki ng modal i ti es
of di spl acement t hat compl emented reason i nstead of contradi cti ng i t . I t
woul d seem obvi ous t hat an exi stenti ally gri ppi ng mode of thought and
pract i ce must do more than Durkheim's soci al metaphysi c was abl e t o do.
But Durkhei m may be credi t ed wi t h seeki ng not a narrowl y i nstrumental or
techni cal rat i onal i ty but a substanti ve, soci ally i nformed concepti on of rea
son that did not exclude act or requi re a phobi c, quasi -ri tual i sti c anti pathy
to ri tual and rel i gi on. In thi s respect hi s work retai ns a t hought - provoki ng
p ower of contestati on even for those who may not agree wi th hi m.
Alain (Emile Chartier), 29, 44, 47
Alpert, Harry, 57- 58
Ankersmit, Frank, 279n
Aristotle, 1 49
Aron, Raymond, 22n, 43, 66n, 23 1 n
Bacon, Si r Francis, 253
Bakhtin, t1i khai l, 1 56, 23 1 n, 274n
Bakuni n, Mi chael, 55
Balzac, Honore de, 1 77 n, 1 87
Barres, Mauri ce, 5 0
Barthes, Rol and, vi i
Basti de, Roger, 1 3 5n
Bataille, Georges, vi i , 67n, 1 57, 266
Bayer, Al bert, 1 44
Bazard, Saint-Amand, 2 1 9
Bel ot, Gustave, 27, 43
Benjamin, Walter, 92, 208, 275n
Bentham, Jeremy, 1 1 3
Berger, Peter, 275n
Bergson, Henri , 27, 43, 1 94, 254
Bernard, Claude, 1 8 9
Bernstein, Eduard, 1 8
Bert, Paul, 49
Bl och, Marc, 1 86- 1 87
Blonde!, Charles, 45 , 233n
Blonde!, Maurice, 27
Bl um, Leon, 5 5 , 67n
Bonald, Loui s de, 1 5 , 46
Bossuet, Jacques Benigne, 6 1
Bougle, Celestin, 27, 58, 1 29, 1 34n
Bourdieu, Pierre, vi i , 22n, 67n, 277n
Bourgeois, Leon, 57
Bourget, Paul, 59
Boutroux, Emi le, 27, 44, 76
Brochard, Victor, 40
Inex
Brunetiere, Ferdinand, 60
Bui sson, Ferdinand, 3 1 , 36, 38
Buder, Judi th, 279n
Camus, Albert, 1 37, 1 77n- 1 78n
Canivez, Andre, 42
Cassirer, Ernst, 256
Chateaubriand, Francois Auguste,
1 5 6, 1 77n
Chevalier, Loui s , 68n- 69n
Cl apham, John, 33
Cl emenceau, Georges, 36
Codrington, Robert Henry, 250
Col umbus, Chri stopher, 22n
Combes, Emil e, 49
Comte, August, 2, 4, 1 1 , 1 5 , 24n, 3 1 ,
4 1 , 46, 76, 84, 1 08, 1 1 3, 1 1 5,
1 2 5 , 1 82- 1 85 , 1 89, 1 96, 23 1 n,
270
Cooley, Charles Horton, 79
Coulanges, Fustel de, 27, 1 90
Croce, Benedetto, 1 90
Cuvi l l i er, Armand, 43
Darwin, Charles, 1 1 3, 1 93
Davy, Georges, 2, 26, 30-3 1 , 63, 6n,
282
Deleuze, Gilles, vi i
Derrida, Jacques, vi i , 278n
Descartes, Rene, 4, 6, 86, 98, 1 8 0
Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 1 77n
Douglas, Jack C. , 1 42
Dowden, Edward, 1 6 8
Dreyfus Affair, 9, 33, 35- 36, 40, 47-
48, 52, 55- 56, 59-62, 1 79
Dri eu La Rochelle, Pierre, 208
2R8 Emile Durkheim: Sociologist a1d Philosopher
Dugui t, Leon, 57
Durkheim, Emi le, "Determination
du fai t moral," 43 ; "Deux Lois
de ' evolution penale," 93- 95;
The Divisio1 ofLabor i 1 Society,
34, 5 8, 75 - 1 36, 1 37- 1 4 1 , 1 44-
1 45 , 1 48 , 1 5 1 , 1 53, 1 58 , 1 7 1 ,
1 79- 1 80, 2 1 8-2 1 9, 277n; "Le
Dual i sme de I a nature humaine
et ses conditions sociales, " 2 1 8 ;
The Eleme1try Forms ofReligious
L(, 20-2 1 , 34, 44, Go, 8 1 - 82,
1 05 , 1 40, 1 8 0, 1 86, 1 94, 1 97,
225, 227, 235-279; L'volutio1
peagogique e1 Fra1ce, 1 90,
1 95 ; Germa1y Above All, 63,
87; r: Individualisme et l es imel
lectuels," GO; Moral Educatio1,
92, 94-95, 1 56, 1 75n, 177n, 1 80,
1 97, 2 1 3 ; "La Morale," 2 1 , 1 94;
Mo1tesquieu a1d Rousseau: Fore
ru11e ofSociolog, 230n-2 3 1 n ;
Pragmatisme et Sociologie, 97,
1 66, 252; Primitive Classijcatio1,
25 8; Projssio1al Ethics a1d Civic
Morals, 1 79- 1 80, 207; "Represen
tations i ndi vi duelles et representa
tions col l ecti ves, " 2 1 7-2 1 8 ; The
Rules ofSociological Method, 4,
8, 1 2, 8 1 , 88, 1 80, 1 86, 2 1 3 ,
222, 253, 277n; Le Socialisre,
1 80- 1 8 1 , 1 97; Sociolog a1d Phi
losophy, 43; Suicide, 25 , 34, 49,
56, 87, 93, I l l , 1 22, 1 24, 1 25,
1 37- 1 78 , 1 80, 1 84, 2 1 1 , 223
El i ade, Mi rcea, 273n
El i ot, T S . , 2 1 5
Eri kson, Eri k, 1 6 5
Espi nas, Alfred, 3 0, 76
Evans-Pritchard, E. E. , 34
auconnet, Paul , GGn, 97
Febvre, Luci en, 1 87, 228n
Ferry, Jul es, 30, 36, 39
Fischer, Fritz, 7 4n
Flaubert, Gustave, 1 52
Fontaine, Andre, 40
Foucault, Michel, vi i -vi i i , 94, 223,
232n, 233n, 266, 278n
Fouillee, Alfred, 57
Frazer, Si r James, 247
Freud, Sigmund, 84, 92, 1 04, 1 64-
1 65 , 2 1 5 , 232n-233n, 262
Fromm, Eri ch, 233n
Gambetta, Leon, 34, 53
Gaulle, Charles de, GGn
Gide, Charles, 57
Gillen, Francis James, 246
Girard, Rene, 266, 273n
Goblot, Edmond, 27
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 1 77n
Goldmann, Lucien, 9 1
Goul dner, Alvin, 24n
Granet, Marcel, 282
Guesde, Jul es, 54- 55
Guizot, Fran<oi s, 70n
Gurvi tch, Georges, 22n, GGn
Hal bwachs, Maurice, 3 1 , GGn, 1 7 4n-
1 75n, 233n, 282
Hamel i n, Octave, 28-29
Hayward, J. E. S . , 73n
Hegel, Georg Wil helm Friedrich, 7,
1 0, 59, 1 9 1 , 283
Hendi n, Herbert, 1 76n
Herr, Luci en, 5 5
Hobbes, Thomas, 1 50, 2 1 5-2 1 6
Hofman, Stanley, 68n
Hol leaux, Mauri ce, 28
Hubert, Henri , 24 1 , 244
Hughes, H. Stuart, 73n, 228n
James, William, 1 1 1
Janet, Paul, 76
Janet, Pi erre, 27
Jaures, Jean, 27, 5 2, 5 5
Kant, Immanuel , 6, 7 , 1 5 , 28, 36,
4 1 , 44, 6 1 , 90, 1 03, 1 3 5n, 2 1 2,
226, 269
Karady, Victor, 66n
Kristeva, Julia, vi i , 266
Kroeber, A. L. , 34
Labriola, Antonio, 52
Lacan, Jacc1ues, vi i , 283
LaCapra, Domi ni ck, vi i n, 23n, 1 77n,
1 78n, 23 l n, 232n, 274n, 278n,
279n
Lachelier, Jul es, 38, 44
Lacombe, Roger, 1 44, 1 74n
Laing, R. D. , 232n
Lamarck, Jean Baptiste de, 1 93
Lang, Andrew, 245
Lanson, Gustave, 27
Lao-T se, 1 09
La pi e, Paul, 37-40
Leach, Edmund, 263, 278n
Leni n, Vladimir, 9 1
Leon, Xavier, 26
Leroux, Pierre, 7 6
Levasseur, Emi le, 1 23
Levi-Strauss, Claude, vii, 1 0, 22n, 84,
97-98, 1 02, 1 07- 1 08 , 1 3 5n, 1 8 6,
233n, 262, 274n-275n, 277n,
278n, 282, Elementary Stuctures
ofKimhip, 1 04-1 05 ; The Savage
Mind, 1 02- 1 05 , 259-262; T
temism, 1 05- 1 06
Levy-Bruhl , Lucien, 77, 82, 1 08 ,
259, 278n
I 289
Liard, Loui s, 29-30, 37-40, 5 0
Lichthei m, George, 54- 55
Lienhardt, R. Godfrey, 275n
Lowie, Robert, 235
Luckmann, Thomas, 275n
Luhman, Niklas, 1 0
Lukes, Steven, 22n-23n
Lyotard, Jean-Franoi s, vi i
Maistre, Joseph de, 1 5 , 46
Malebranche, Ni colas, 98
Mannhei m, Karl, 1 7, 1 46, 276n
Marett, R. R. , 34
Mari on, Henri, 44, 57
Marx, Karl, 1 8 - 1 9, 23n, 24n, 5 2, 54-
55, 87, 9 1 , 1 1 7,
1 22, 1 25 , 1 46,
1 5 1 , 1 8 1 , 1 84, 2 1 7, 253,
262, 282-283; Capital, 1 8 1 ; Eigh
teenth Brumaire, 1 9 ; German
Ideolog, 5 1
Massi s, Henri , 50
Maurras, Charles, 1 5, 46, 208
Mauss, t1arcel, vi i , 1 , 1 0, 2 1 , 30, 35 ,
5 2, 5 5 , 66, 67n, 76-77, 90, 95,
97, 1 07, 1 20, 1 3 3n, 1 57, 233n,
24 1 , 247, 25 6, 274n, 278n, 282;
The Gi, 1 0, 98- 1 02; "Sacrifce:
Its Nature and Functi on, " 244
Mazzi ni , Giuseppe, 2 1 0
Merton, Robert K. , 23n, 1 76n- 1 77n
Mi ll, John Stuart, 1 1 3, 1 96
Montesqui eu, Charles Loui s de, 27,
76, 94, 208, 230n-23 1 n
Muller, Max, 245
Muntzer, Thomas, 9 1
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 79, 1 66, 1 77n,
1 78n
Ni zan, Paul, 5 0
Parain, Brice, 6 2
Pareto, Vi l fredo, 1 26
Parsons , Tal cott, 7, 22n, 75 , 235- 236,
273n, 28 1
Pascal, Blaise, 1 8 5
Pecaut, Felix, 36, 38 , 40
Peguy, Charles, 48, 62
Plato, 250, 259, 272
Pope Leo XI I I , 47
Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. , 8 1 , 278n-
279n
Reinach, Salomon, 27
Renouvier, Charles, 6, 38, 41
Ri chard, Gaston, 1 38 , 1 74n
Ri chter, l1el vi n, 60
Ross, Kristi n, 68n
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 1 5 , 28, 6 1 ,
76, 84- 85, 1 03, 1 1 3 , 1 8 6, 2 1 2 ,
230n-23 1 n
Sai nt-Si mon, Claude Henri de, 32,
52, 1 07, 1 1 2, 1 8 1 - 1 86 , 1 9 1 , 1 93-
1 95, 2 1 7, 2 1 9, 2 3 1 n
Salvemini, Gaetano, 1 90
Sangnier, fare, 47
Saussure, Ferdinand de, 84
SchaefAe, Albert, 29, 52, 1 27
Schmi tt, Carl, 208
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1 7 1
Scott, Joan, 279n
Seignobos, Charles, 1 92
Sewell, William, 73n
Si mmel , Georg, 1 89
Smi th, Adam, 77
Smi th, Robertson , 62
Socrates, 89, 9 1 , 1 9 1
Sorel, Georges, 54, 208
Spencer, Si r Baldwin, 246
Spencer, Herbert, 4, 6 1 , 97, 1 1 0- 1 1 1 ,
1 1 3 , 1 1 8- 1 1 9, 1 2 1 , 1 89, 2 1 6
Spinoza, Baruch, 26, 40
Spuler, Eugene, 30
Steeg, Jules, 36, 38
Steinmetz, Sebald-Rudolf, 94
Sutherland, Edwin Hardi n, 90
Tarde, Alfred de, 50
Tarde, Gabriel, 44-45, 50, 71 n, 9 1 ,
1 26, 1 49, 2 1 6, 254
Thibaudet, Albert, 37- 38
Thiers, Adolphe, 33
Thomson, David, 32, 48
Tiryakian, Edward, 23n-24n
Tocc1ueville, Alexis de, vi i i , 33, 5 3,
1 1 1 , 230n, 23 1 n
Tonni es, Ferdinand, 79, 1 1 5- 1 1 6,
1 1 9
Treitschke, Hei nri ch von, 63, 74n
Turner, Victor, 80, 1 08- 1 1 0
Tylor, E. B. , 34, 245
Weber, 1ax, 23n-24n, 78-79, 1 1 7,
1 44, 1 49, 1 65 - 1 70, 1 92, 2 1 5,
240, 263, 275n
Wundt, Wilhelm, 29
White, Hayden, 279n
Wolff, Robert Paul , 276n
Zizek, Slavoj, 276n

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