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Hegel's

Ethical Thought
ALLEN W. WOOD
The right of the
University of Camri!ge
to "rint an! sell
all manner of oo#s
$as grante! y
Henry %lli &n '()*.
The Unifersity has "rinte!
an! "ulishe! continuously
since '(+*.
CA,-.&D/E UN&%E.0&T1 2.E00
CA,-.&D/E
NEW 1O.3 2O.T CHE0TE. ,EL-OU.NE 01DNE1
2ulishe! y the 2ress 0yn!icate of the University of Camri!ge
The 2itt -uil!ing4 Trum"ington 0treet4 Camri!ge C-5 &.2
*6 West 56th 0treet4 Ne$ 1or#4 N1 &OO&&4 U0A
'6 0tamfor! .oa!4 Oa#leigh4 ,elourne )'774 Australia
8 Camri!ge University 2ress '996
:irst "ulishe! '996
2rinte! in the Unite! 0tates of America
Lirary of Congress Cataloging;in;2ulication Data
Woo!4 Allen W.
Hegel's ethical thought < Allen W. Woo!.
". cm.
&nclu!es iliogra"hical references.
&0-N 6;(5';)=*)5;*. ; &0-N 6;(5';)==+5;> ?"#.@
'. Hegel4 /eorg Wilhelm :rie!rich4 '==6;'+)' ; Ethics. 5. Ethics4
,o!ern ; '+th century. ). Ethics4 ,o!ern ; '9th century. *. Ethics
/erman. &. Title.
-59*9.E+W77 '996
'=6'.95 ; !c5o +9;==*77
-ritish Lirary Cataloguing in 2ulication Data
Woo!4 Allen W.
Hegel's ethical thought.
'. Ethics. Theories of Hegel4 /eorg Wilhelm :rie!rich4
'==6;'+)'
&. Title
'=6.95
&0-N 6;(5';)=*)5;* har!ac#
&0-N 6;(5';)==+5;> "a"erac#
To :orrest4
Henry4 an! 0te"hen
Contents
2reface
Areviations
&ntro!uction
i. Heget as s"eculative "hiloso"her
5. Dialectical logic
). 0"eculative logic is !ea!A ut Hegel's thought is
*. 0"eculative "hiloso"hy an! mo!ern society
(. Does Hegel have an ethicsB
7. .ationality an! actuality
=. Hegel's "ractical "hiloso"hy
2art &C Hegelian ethical theory
' 0elf;actualiDation
'. Ethical theory an! self;a$areness
5. 0"irit
). ,o!ern self;un!erstan!ing
*. Astract right
(. ,orality
7. ,o!ern ethical life
=. The mo!ern state
+. A self;actualiDation theory
9. HistoriciDe! naturalism
5 :ree!om
'. Hegel an! free!om
5. :ree!om as "ossiility an! free!om as actuality
). :ree!om an! autonomy
*. :ree!om as a goo!
(. Does "ositive free!om lea! to totalitarianismB
7. Asolute self;activity
=. 0elf;activity an! otherness
+. E-eing $ith oneselfE
9. :ree!om in my !eterminations
'6. A system of oFective free!om .
''. Hegelian free!om an! or!inary free!om
vii
CONTENT0
) Ha""iness ()
'. Ha""inessC ancient an! mo!ern ()
5. The issue of oFectivity ()
). The issue of egoism (7
*. The natural $ill4 resolve4 an! choice (+
(. 3ant's i!ea of ha""iness 76
7. The in!eterminacy of ha""iness 7)
=. Why !o $e care aout ha""inessB 77
+. The "riority of free!om over ha""iness 79
9. .ight in general ='
'6. Hegel's institutionalism =)
2art &&C Astract right
* .ecognition ==
'. The right to astract free!om ==
5. :ichte's theory of recognition ==
). EA human eing ecomes human only among othersE =9
*. The relation of right +'
(. The !esire for self;certainty +*
7. The struggle for recognition +(
=. ,aster an! servant +7
+. Universal self;consciousness ++
9. Hegel's !ialectic of recognition 96
'6. The reality of o""ression 95
( 2ersons4 "ro"erty4 la$ 9*
'. 2ersons an! their astract right to thingsA 9*
5. 2ro"erty as the fun!amental right 97
). 0elf;a""ro"riation an! slavery 9=
*. The right to "ersonality itself 99
(. The limits of astract right '6'
7. Astract right an! "ositive la$ '6)
=. 2rivate "ro"erty '67
7 2unishment '6+
'. .etriutivism '6+
5. 2unishment as the restoration of right no
). The nullity of the criminal $ill ''5
*. Consenting to e "unishe! ''*
(. The incom"leteness of Hegel's theory ''(
7. %iolations of right an! violations of la$ ''+
=. The measure of "unishment ''9
+. The !eath "enalty '5'
9. 0houl! $e e>"ect an ethical FustiGcation of "unishmentB '55
viii
CONTENT0
2art &&&C ,orality
= The conce"t of morality '5=
'. Develo"ment of the conce"t of moralityC Tuigen an!
-ern ?'=9);'=97@ '5=
5. -eyon! moralityC :ran#furt ?'=97;'+66@ '5+
). ,orality versus ethical lifeC Hena ?'+6';'+67@ ')'
*. The 2henomenology of 0"irit ?'+6=@ '))
(. 0uFectivity ')*
7. The moral ought an! oFectivity ')(
.=. 0uFectivity an! action ')=
+ The moral $ill '*6
'. &m"utaility '*6
5. ,oral luc# an! negligence '*5
). The goo! '**
*. 3ant on the goo! $ill '*7
(. Hegel on the goo! $ill '*+
7. ,oral $orth an! "sychological causality '(6
=. Hegel's critiIue of 3ant '(5
9 The em"tiness of the moral la$ '(*4
'. The em"tiness charge '(*
5. 3ant's formula of universal la$ '((
). Contra!ictions ari! conJicting volitions '(7
*. The universal la$ test '(+
(. 0ome unsolve! "rolems '76
7. 3ant's !e!uction of the moral la$ '7'
=. The failure of 3ant's !e!uction '7)
+. Universal a""licaility an! collective rationality '7(
9. The em"tiness of the moral $ill '7=
'6. En!s an! em"irical motivation '79
''. Em"tiness an! Hegelian morality '=5
'6 Conscience '=*
i. The role of conscience in Hegelian ethics '=*
5. :ichte's moral e"istemology '=7
). :ries an! the ethics of conviction '=+
*. A "rolem aout moral error an! lame '+6
(. 0ome solutions to the "rolem '+'
7. ,ista#en criticisms of :ries '+)
=. The em"tiness of an ethics of conviction '+(
+. The hy"ocrisy of conscience '+=
9. The right of insight '+9
'6. &nsight an! res"onsiility '9'
&K
CONTENT0
2art &%C Ethical life
&& Ethical oFectivity '9(
'. What is Eethical lifeEB '9(
5. The t$o si!es of ethical life '97
). Ethical life as s"irit '9+
*. The ethical or!er '99
(. Ethical in!ivi!uality 566
7. .omantic "luralism 565
=. Hegel's universalism 56)
+. &n!ivi!uality as an ethical "rinci"le 56(
9. The ethical as a universal stan!ar! 567
'5 Ethical suFectivity 569
'. The ethical !is"osition 569
5. Ethical !uty 569
). Duties of relationshi"s 5''
*. .elational !uties an! universal reJection 5'5
(. Ethical virtue 5'*
7. %irtue an! rectitu!e 5'(
=. Ethical life an! suFective reJection 5'=
') The limits of ethics 5'9
'. The transitoriness of the ethical 5'9
5. The ethical life;cycle 55'
). History's su"reme right 55)
*. History an! relativism 55(
(. Worl! historical in!ivi!uals 557
7. -eyon! the ethical 55+
=. E>ercising the right to !o $rong 5)6
+. Historical self;o"acity 5)5
9. Hegel's amoralism 5)*
'* 2rolems of mo!ern ethical life 5)=
'. The "rinci"le of the mo!ern state 5)=
5. .ationality an! suFectivity 5)+
). Civil societyC suFective free!om an! cor"orate s"irit 5)9
*. Hegel's !ilemmaC suFective free!om or ethical goals 5*'
(. 0ustantiality an! reJection 5*)
7. ,an an! $oman 5**
=. 2overty in civil society 5*=
+. Does Hegel have an ans$erB 5*+
9. The rale mentality 5(6
'6. The class $ith neitherrights nor !uties 5()
''. Ethical self;!estruction 5(*
>
CONTENT0
Conclusion 5(7
'. Ethics an! society 5(7
5. Hegel as lieral 5(=
). Hegel versus lieralism 5(+
*. The free society 5(9
Notes 57'
&n!e> 5+(
K&
2reface
Hegel's social an! "olitical thought has een stu!ie! y "hiloso"hers4 even
more y "olitical theorists an! historians of i!eas. Treatments of it have usually
neglecte! the "hiloso"hical foun!ations of Hegel's theory of society an!
"olitics. -y E"hiloso"hical foun!ationsE & !o not mean Hegel's s"eculative
meta"hysics. & sus"ect that one of the reasons $hy Hegel's ethical theory has
een neglecte! is that it has een su""ose! that this is $hat E"hiloso"hical
foun!ationsE has to mean in his case. &f you !eci!e to e>amine those foun!ations
more closely4 you #no$ efore long that you are in for a !iLcult an!
generally unre$ar!ing time of it4 at least from the stan!"oint of social an!
"olitical theory. &f you are sensile4 you $ill try to avoi! that. &f you are not
so sensile4 you $ill humug yourself into thin#ing that there is some esoteric
truth in Hegelian !ialectical logic $hich "rovi!es a hi!!en #ey to his
social thought.
What & mean y E"hiloso"hical foun!ationsE is the ethical theory on $hich
Hegel rests his critical reJections on mo!ern social an! "olitical life. This
suFect has een neglecte! "artly ecause some elieve it to e none>istent.
& ho"e to sho$ that such eliefs are seriously in error. Hegel's "hiloso"hical
orientation !oes ten! to oscure his ethical theory4 an! that ethical theory
!oes not fall into the familiar "atterns of conseIuentialism an! !eontologism4
ut involves a critiIue of them. Nevertheless4 there is such a thing as Hegelian
ethical theory4 an! it is a "o$erful an! im"ortant theory4 $hich shoul!
e ta#en seriously y moral "hiloso"hers as $ell as y those $ho are intereste!
in Hegel's social an! "olitical thought.
&n the late t$entieth century4 everyo!y #no$s that Hegel is an im"ortant
thin#er $ho cannot e ignore! or easily !ismisse!. -ut the roa! outlines of
Hegel's thought are much oftener !iscusse! $ith so"histication than his $ritings
are rea! $ith com"rehension. English;s"ea#ing "hiloso"hers still often
have very sim"listic an! !istorte! images of Hegel4 suggeste! y the
thoughts that Hegel $as a Ggure of the .omantic "erio!4 a /erman i!ealist
$ith a gnostical meta"hysics of oscurely religious intent4 a "ro"onent of
communitarian ethical thought4 an! a critic of 3ant an! Enlightenment lieralism.
Hegel is all these things4 of course. -ut the associations they set oM
in the min!s of English;s"ea#ing "hiloso"hers4 se"arate! from Hegel's milieu
y nearly t$o centuries an! ?more im"ortantly@ y the "ro"agan!a of
t$o $orl! $ars an! a col! $ar4 are often nothing ut mislea!ing stereoty"es.
They reinforce the very i!eologies that the stu!y of Hegel might hel" us to
unlearn.
>iii
2.E:ACE
Hegel's era $as the era of /erman .omanticism4 ut Hegel himself $as an
o""onent of the .omantic movement. He $as al$ays much more favoraly
!is"ose! to 3ant an! the Enlightenment than to the li#es of 0chlegel an!
Novalis. Hegel's critiIue of lieral in!ivi!ualism is not a reactionary or irrationalist
re"u!iation of its concern for in!ivi!ual rights an! civil lierty ;
$hich mattere! as much to the ourgeois Hegel as they !o to lierals.
&nstea!4 it $as a reFection of the formalistic an! ahistorical conce"tions of
human nature4 society4 an! reason in terms of $hich the Enlightenment conceive!
an! attem"te! to !efen! these values. ,uch of Hegel's critiIue of the
lieral tra!ition is still vali! to!ay4 ut Hegel's thought eIually serves as
asis for criticiDing various forms of irrationalist an! relativist thought in
ehalf of $hich Hegel's o$n name is often ignorantly invo#e!.
The infamous oscurity of Hegel's $ritings ma#es common misun!erstan!ings
all the more !iLcult to correct. Even the most acute an! $ellintentione!
may lac# the leisure an! the "atience to "enetrate Hegel's "retentious
style an! astract Fargon. 2artly for this reason4 Hegel's inJuence ten!s
to "er"etuate itself through familiar ?an! often malicious@ caricatures an!
o$!leriDations. Even the most grossly inaccurate of them are often !iLcult
to e>"ose unless one "uts forth more eMort than can e lightly aMor!e! y
those $ith only a casual or mo!erate interest in Hegel's thought.
Unfortunately4 there is no ra!ical reme!y for the "rolem4 no royal roa!
through the Hegelian ramles. The currency of Hegel's thought has "ro!uce!
some hel"ful scholarshi" on his "hiloso"hy. ,ore roa!ly4 scholarshi"
even in English is eginning to she! much nee!e! light on the most
im"ortant "erio! of "hiloso"hical activity in mo!ern times4 the movement
of /erman "hiloso"hy et$een '=+' an! '+56. To un!erstan! this "erio!
etter is to get a etter gras" on the issues that still most troule an! ren!
Western cultureA t$entieth;century "hiloso"hy4 at least English;s"ea#ing
"hiloso"hy4 has suMere! greatly from its failure to realiDe this. The "resent
oo# is my attem"t to contriute to that un!erstan!ing.
,uch light has een she! on Hegel's ethical an! "olitical thought y the
recent "ulication of his lecture transcri"tions over a "erio! of years ?'+'=;
'+)'@. & have #e"t in min! the !istinction et$een these te>ts an! Hegel's
"ulishe! $ritings4 ut & have not hesitate! in the least to use the lecture
materials. As Hegel himself sa$ it4 lecturing $as "roaly the most im"ortant
"art of his "hiloso"hical activity. All his maFor $ritings after '+'= $ere
merely outlines to e lecture! u"on. E!uar! /ans a""reciate! this "oint
$hen he !evote! a siDale "ro"ortion of the Grst e!ition of Hegel's collecte!
$ritings to Hegel's lecture transcri"tions on history4 art4 religion4 an! "hiloso"hy.
E!itors of suseIuent e!itions have correctly follo$e! him in this.
There are a numer of to"ics4 inclu!ing those !ealt $ith in Cha"ter ') an!
Cha"ter '*4 NN =;''4 $hich are !ealt $ith in much greater !etail in lecture
transcri"tions than in the $ritings Hegel "ulishe!. These !iscussions re"resent
some of Hegel's ol!est an! most interesting forays as a thin#er4 an! it
is "erha"s un!erstan!ale that he might have un!erta#en them in lectures
rather than in "ulishe! $ritings. To !e"rive ourselves of them on narro$
>iv
2.E:ACE
"hilological groun!s $oul! e to im"overish our a""reciation of Hegel's ethical
thought.
This oo# has ta#en me a long time to $rite. & Grst taught Hegel's 2hiloso"hy
of .ight at the University of ,ichigan in '9=)4 an! recall $ith "ri!e that
-ernar! Cullen an! Charles -eitD $ere among my stu!ents then. DiMerent
emryonic versions of some of my thoughts aout Hegel's ethical theory $ere
"resente! at the &nter;University Centre in Durovni# in '9=( an! at the
University of Helsin#i4 :inlan! in '9+'. & egan to $or# seriously on the
oo# only in '9+);'9+* in -erlin4 su""orte! y a fello$shi" from the Hohn
0imon /uggenheim :oun!ation. :acilities for my research at the &nstitut
fur 2hiloso"hie4 :reie Universitat4 -erlin in '9+);'9+* $ere "rovi!e!
through the generous assistance of 2rofessor Ernst Tugen!hat. Consi!erale
momentum $as given to my $or# on it y my association $ith stimulating
colleagues an! stu!ents at the University of California at 0an Diego in '9+7.
,y stu!ents4 oth there an! at Cornell University4 enriche! my stu!y of
Hegel. 2ortions of the oo# have een "resente! to an! !iscusse! $ith
grou"s of "hiloso"hers from many !iMerent institutions4 inclu!ing the four
to $hich & feel closestC Cornell University4 the :reie Universitat in -erlin4
the University of California at 0an Diego4 an! .ee! College. The relevant
cha"ters $ere invarialy im"rove! as a result of these !iscussions.
,any in!ivi!uals have hel"e! me to $rite this oo# through !iscussions or
corres"on!ence4 or y giving me comments4 oral or $ritten4 on !rafts of
various "arts of it. & list ?in al"haetical or!er@ those to $hom & feel es"ecially
olige! for information4 suggestions4 or criticismsC Henry Allison4
Emil Angehrn4 Anthony A""iah4 Le$is White -ec#4 Hohn /. -ennett4 :elmon
Davis4 Alan Donagan4 An!reas Eshete4 .ichar! :arr4 .ichar! :el!man4
Carl /inet4 2aul /uyer4 Hean Ham"ton4 ,ichael Har!imon4 Harol!
Ho!es4 Terence &r$in4 Chris 3ern4 Haral! 3!htB Christine 3orsgaar!4 Anton
Leist4 Davi! Lyons4 Hulie ,ayee4 Hohn ,cCumer4 /eorge ,yro4 3ai
Nielsen4 William 2ec#4 .oert 2i""in4 Thomas 2ogge4 Allen .osen4 Hohn
.ussell4 /ottfrie! 0eeass4 Hohn 0immons4 0y!ney 0hoema#er4 .oert 0talna#er4
2eter 0teinerger4 Nicholas 0turgeon4 ,ichael Theunissen4 Neil
Thomason4 Ernst Tugen!hat4 ,ilton Wachserg4 Christo"her Wagner4
.oert Wallace4 An!reas Wil!t4 Ursula Wolf4 an! .ega Woo!.
>v
Areviations
All translations from the $or#s liste! elo$ are my o$n. 0tan!ar! English
translations $ill normally e cite! along $ith the original4 $ith English "agination
follo$ing /erman "agination4 se"arate! y a slash ?<@.
Writings of /. W. :. Hegel ?'==6;'+)'@
Wer#e HegelC Wer#eC Theorie Wer#ausgae. :ran#furtC 0uhr#am" %erlag4
'9=6. Cite! y volume.
- Hegels -riefe4 e!ite! y Hohannes HoMmeister an! :rie!helm Nicolin.
HamurgC :eli> ,einer %erlag4 '9+'. Cite! y volume an! "age
numer.
HegelC The Letters4 translate! y Clar# -utler an! Christiane 0eiler.
-loomingtonC &n!iana University 2ress4 '9+*. Cite! y "age numer.
D DiMerenD !es :ichte'schen un! 0chelling'schen 0ystems !er 2hiloso"hic
?'+6'@4 Wer#e 5.
The DiMerence -et$een :ichte's an! 0chelling's 0ystem of 2hiloso"hy4
translate! y H. 0. Harris ari! Walter Cerf. AlanyC 0UN1 2ress4 '9==.
D% Die %etfassung Deutschlan!s4 Wer#e '.
EThe /erman Constitution4E in Hegel's 2olitical Writings4 translate! y
T. ,. 3no>. O>for!C the Claren!on 2ress4 '97*.
EL EnDy#lo"!!ie !er "hiloso"hischen Wissenschaften & ?'+'=4 rev. '+5=4
'+)6@4 Wer#e +.
Hegel's Logic4 translate! y William Wallace. O>for!C O>for! University
2ress4 '9=(4 Cite! y "aragra"h ?N@ numer. A!!itions are in!icate! y
an EAE.
EN EnDy#lo"!!ie !er "hiloso"hischen Wissenschaften && ?'+'=4 rev. '+5=4
'+)6@4 Wer#e ".
Hegel's 2hiloso"hy of Nature4 translate! y ,ichael H. 2etry. Ne$ 1or#A
Humanities 2ress4 '9=6. Cite! y "aragra"h ?N@ numer.
E/ EnDy#lo"!!ie !er "hiloso"hischen Wissenschaften &&& ?'+'=4 rev. '+5=4
'+)6@4 Wer#e '6.
Hegel's 2hiloso"hy of ,in!4 translate! y William Wallace an! A. %.
,iller. O>for!C O>for! University 2ress4 '9='. Cite! y "aragra"h ?N@
numer. A!!itions are in!icate! y an EAE.
>vii
A--.E%&AT&ON0
EH EnDy#lo"a!ie !er 2hiloso"hischen Wissenschaften ?'+'= Hei!elerg ver
sion@. Hegels 0amtliche Wer#e4 *. AuJage !er Huilaumsausgae4 e!ite!
y Hermann /loc#ner. 0tuttgartC :rie!rich :rommann %erlag4 '97+4
%olume 7. Cite! y "aragra"h ?N@ numer.
/W /lauen un! Wissen ?'+65@4 Wer#e 5.
:aith an! 3no$le!ge4 translate! y Walter Cerf an! H. 0. Harris. AlanyC
0UN1 2ress4 '9==.
H. Henaer .eal"hiloso"hie ?'+6(;'+67@ ?"revious titleC Henenser .eal"hilo;
so"hie &&@4 e!ite! y H. HoMmeister. HamurgC :eli> ,einer %erlag4
'979.
Hegel an! the Human 0"irit4 translate! y Leo .auch. DetroitC Wayne
0tate University 2ress4 '9+). Cite! y "age numer.
H. ' Henenser .eal"hiloso"hie & ?'+6);'+6*@4 e!ite! y H. HoMmeister. Ham
urgC :eli> ,einer %erlag4 '9)6. Cite! y "age numer.
0ystem of Ethical Life an! :irst. 2hiloso"hy of 0"irit4 translate! y H. 0.
Harris. AlanyC 0UN1 2ress4 '9=9. Cite! y "age numer.
N2 Nurnerger 2ro"a!euti# ?'+6+;'+''@4 Wer#e *.
N. Uer !ie $issenschaftliche -ehan!lungsarten !es Naturrechts ?'+65@4
Wer#e 5.
Natural La$4 translate! y T. ,. 3no>. 2hila!el"hiaC University of
2ennsylvania 2ress4 '9=(. Cite! y "age numer.
2h/ 2hanomenologie !es /eistes ?'+6=@4 Wer#e ).
2henomenology of 0"irit4 translate! y A. %. ,iller. O>for!A O>for!
University 2ress4 '9==. Cite! y "aragra"h ?f@ numer.
2. 2hiloso"hie !es .echts ?'+5'@4 Wer#e =.
Hegel's 2hiloso"hy of .ight4 translate! y H. -. Niset4 e!ite! y Allen
W. Woo!. Camri!geC Camri!ge University 2ress4 forthcoming in
'995. Cite! y "aragra"h ?N@ numer. .emar#s are in!icate! y an E.4E
a!!itions y an EA.E 2reface an! sometimes longer "aragra"hs cite! y
"age numer in /erman e!ition only.
(( 0ystem !er 0ittlich#eit ?'+65@4 e!ite! y /. Lasson. HamurgC :eli>
,einer %erlag4 '97=.
0ystem of Ethical Life an! :irst 2hiloso"hy of 0"irit4 translate! y H. 0.
Harris. AlanyC 0UN1 2ress4 '9=9. Cite! y "age numer.
TH Theologische Hugen!schriften ?'=9);'+66@4 Wer#e '.
TE HegelC Three Essays4 '=9);'=9(O translate! y 2eter :uss an! Hohn Do
ins. Notre DameC University of Notre Dame 2ress4 '9+*.
ETW Early Theological Writings4 translate! y T. ,. 3no>. 2hila!el"hiaC
University of 2ennsylvania 2ress4 '9='. Cite! y "age numer.
%A %orlesungen uer Astheti#4 Wer#e ');'7.
The 2hiloso"hy of :ine Art4 translate! y :. 2. -. Osmaston. Ne$ 1or#C
Hac#er4 '9=(. Cite! y volume an! "age numer.
%/ Die %ernunft in !er /eschichte4 e!ite! y H. HoMmeister. HamurgC :e
li> ,einer %erlag '9((.
>viii
A--.E%&AT&ON0
Lectures on the 2hiloso"hy of Worl! HistoryC &ntro!uction4 translate! y
H. -. Niset. Camri!geC Camri!ge University 2ress4 '9=(. Cite! y
"age numer.
%/2 %orlesungen iier !ie /eschichte !er 2hiloso"hie4 -!. ';). Wer#e '+;56.
Lectures on the History of 2hiloso"hy4 translate! y EliDaeth Hal!ane.
Ne$ 1or#C Humanities 2ress4 '97+. Cite! y volume an! "age.
%2/ %orlesungen iier !ie /eschichte !er 2hiloso"hie4 Wer#e '5.
The 2hiloso"hy of History4 translate! y H. 0iree. Ne$ 1or#C Dover4
'9(7. Cite! y "age numer.
%2. %orlesungen iier .echts"hiloso"hie4 e!ite! y 3.;H. &lting. 0tuttgartC
:rommann %erlag4 '9=*. &nclu!ing notes an! transcri"tions from Hegel's
lectures of '+'+;'+'9 ?transcri"tion y C. /. Homeyer@4 '+5';
'+554 '+55;'+5) ?transcri"tion y H. /. Hotho@4 '+5*;'+5( ?transcri"tion
y 3. /. von /riesheim@4 '+)' ?transcri"tion y D. :. 0trauss@.
Cite! y volume an! "age numer.
%2.iy Die 2hiloso"hie !es .echtsC Die ,itschriften Wannenmann ?Hei!elerg
'+'=;'+'+@ un! Homeyer ?-erlin &+&+&&P@Q e!ite! y von 3.;H. &lting.
0tuttgartC 3iett;Cotta %erlag4 '9+). Cite! y "age numer.
%2.ig 2hiloso"hie !es .echtsC Die %orlesung von '+ig ''+564 anonymous tran
scri"tion or transcri"tions e!ite! y Dieter Henrich. :ran#furtC 0uhr#am"
%erlag4 '9+). Cite! y "age numer.
%. %orlesungen iier !ie 2hiloso"hie !er .eligion4 Wer#e '7;'=.
Lectures on the 2hiloso"hy of .eligion4 translate! y E. -. 0"eirs an!
H. -. 0an!erson. Lon!onC .outle!ge R 3egah 2aul4 '+9(. ) vols. Cite!
y volume an! "age numer.
WL Wissenschaft !er Logi# ?'+'5;'+'7@4 Wer#e (;7. Cite! y volume an!
"age numer.
Hegel's 0cience of Logic4 translate! y A. %. ,iller. Lon!onC /eorge
Allen R Un$in4 '979. Cite! y "age numer.
&n $ritings cite! y "aragra"h ?N@4 a comma use! efore E.E or EAE means Ean!.E
ThusC E2. N ))4AE meansC E2. N )) an! the a!!ition to N ))EA E2. N 5=o4.4A.N
meansC E2. N 5=6 an! the remar# to N 5=6 an! the a!!ition to N 5=6.E
Writings of &mmanuel 3ant ?'=5*;'+6*@
/0 3ants /esammelte 0chriften. -erlinC Ausgae !er #Gniglich "reussischen
A#a!emie !er Wissenschaften4 '9'6;. Cite! y volume an! "age
numer.
A&- 3riti# !er reinen %emunft ?'=+'<'=+=@4 e!ite! y .aymun! 0chmi!t.
HamurgC ,einer4 '9(7.
&mmanuel 3ant's CritiIue of 2ure .eason4 translate! y Norman 3em"
0mith. Ne$ 1or#C 0t. ,artin's4 '97). Cite! y Grst e!ition ?A@ an!
secon! e!ition ?-@ "age numers.
K&K
A--.E%&AT&ON0
-0E -eoachtungen uer !as /efuhl !es 0chonen un! Erhaenen f '=7*@4 /0
5.
Oservations on the -eautiful an! 0ulime4 translate! y H. /ol!th$ait.
-er#eleyC University of California 2ress4 '9+'.
/ /run!legung !er ,eta"hysi# !er 0itten ?'=+(@4 /0 *.
:oun!ations of the ,eta"hysics of ,orals4 translate! y Le$is White
-ec#. &n!iana"olisC -os;,errill4 '9(9. Cite! y "age numer.
&/ &!ee Du einer allgemeinen /eschichte in $elturgeriicher Asicht ?'=+*@4
/0+.
E&!ea for a Universal History $ith a Cosmo"olitan 2ur"ose4E translate!
y H. -. Niset4 in 3ant's 2olitical Writings4 e!ite! y H. .eiss. Camri!geC
Camri!ge University 2ress4 '9=6.
3"% 3riti# !er"ra#tischen %ernunft ?'=++@4 /0 (.
CritiIue of 2ractical .eason4 translate! y Le$is White -ec#. &n!iana"olisC
-os;,errill4 '9(7. Cite! y "age numer.
. .eligion innerhal !er /renDen !er lossen %ernunft ?'=9);'=9*@4 /0 7.
.eligion Within the Limits of .eason Alone4 translate! y Theo!ore ,.
/reene an! Hoyt H. Hu!son. Ne$ 1or#C Har"er R .o$4 i976. Cite!
y "age numer. O
.L ,eta"hysi# !er 0itten ?'=9=@C .echtslehre4 /0 7.
,eta"hysical Elements of Hustice4 translate! y Hohn La!!. &n!iana"olisC
-os;,errill4 '97(. Cite! y "age numer4 occasionally y section
?N@ numer.
TL ,eta"hysi# !er 0itten ?'=9=@C Tugen!lehre4 /0 7.
The Doctrine of %irtue4 translate! y ,ary H. /regor. Ne$ 1or#C Har"er
R .o$4 '97*. Cite! y "age numer.
T2 Uer !en /emeins"ruchC Das mag in !er Theorie richtig sein4 taugt aer
nicht fur !ie 2ra>is ?'=9)@4 /0+.
EOn the Common 0ayingC This ,ay -e True in Theory4 -ut &t Does
Not A""ly in 2ractice4E translate! y H. -. Niset4 in 3ant's 2olitical
Writings.
%E Eine %oriesung uer Ethi# ?'=+6@4 e!ite! y 2aul ,enDer. -erlinC .olf
Heise4 '95*. .e"rinte! in /0 5+.'.
Lectures on Ethics4 translate! y Louis &nGel!. Ne$ 1or#C Har"er4
'97). Cite! y "age numer.
Writings of H. /. :ichte ?'=75;'+'*@
:W :ichtes Wer#e4 e!ite! y &. H. :ichte. -erlinC W. !e /ruyter4 '9='.
/N. /run!lage !es Naturrechts ?'=97@4 :W F .
0cience of .ights4 translate! y A. E. 3roeger. Lon!onC Truener4
'++9. Cite! y "age numer4 occasionally also y section ?N@ numer.
KK
A--.E%&AT&ON0
0L 0ystem !er 0ittenlehre ?'=9+@4 :W*.
The 0cience of Ethics4 translate! y A. S. 3roeger. Lon!onC 3egan
2aul4 Trench4 Truener4 '+9=.
W Wissenschaftslehre ?'=9*@4 inclu!ing the t$o &ntro!uctions ?'=9=@'
:Wi.
The 0cience of 3no$le!ge4 translate! y 2eter Heath an! Hohn Lachs.
Camri!geC Camri!ge University 2ress4 '9+). Cite! y "age numer.
Writings of H. :. :ries ?'==);'+*)@
/DH Uer !ie /efahr!ung !es Wohlstan!es un! Chara#ters !er Deutschen
!utch !ie Hu!en. TEOn the Danger to the /erman Weil;-eing an!
Character 2ose! y the He$s.EU Hei!elergC ,ohr un! Winter4 '+'7.
Cite! y "age numer.
H22 Han!uch !er "ra#tischen 2hiloso"hie4 '. TeilC Ethi#. TE,anual of
2ractical 2hiloso"hy. 2art OneC Ethics.EU Hei!elergC ,ohr un!
Winter4 '+'+. Cite! y "age numer.
HE Hulius un! Evagoras4 o!erC 0chonheit !er 0eele. Ein "hiloso"hischer
.oman. TEHulius an! Evagoras4 orC -eauty of 0oul. A 2hiloso"hical
Novel.EU Hei!elergC Christian :rie!rich Winter4 '+55. ?.evise! an!
e>"an!e! from Grst e!ition of '+').@
Dialogues on ,orality an! .eligion4 translate! y Davi! Walfor!.
Toto$a4 NHC -arnes an! Nole4 '9+5. Cite! y "age numer.
N3% Neue 3riti# !er %emunft. TENe$ CritiIue of .eason.EU Hei!elergC
,ohr un! Vimmer4 '+6=. ?Ne$ e!ition of '+)+ un!er the titleC
Anthro"ohgische 3riti# !er %emunft. TEAnthro"ological CritiIue of
.eason.EU@ Cite! y volume an! "age numer.
>>i
&ntro!uction
i. Hegel as s"eculative "hiloso"her
Hegel hol!s that "hiloso"hy is a $holly uniIue !isci"line4 $hich !eals $ith
uniIue oFects an! em"loys a uniIue metho! WEL NN ';*@. 2hiloso"hy is
!istinguishe! oth from every!ay common sense an! from the em"irical sciences
y the $ay it astracts from their concerns4 an! gras"s in their "urity
the E!eterminations of thoughtE $hich4 unnotice!4 "rovi!e every!ay life an!
inIuiry $ith their genuine content WEL N (A WL(C )+<*(@. &n Hegel's vie$4
the foun!ation of all "hiloso"hy is the self;evolving system of these astract
thought;!eterminations4 "resente! in the "urely "hiloso"hical !isci"line of
s"eculative logic.
Hegel sees tra!itional Aristotelian logic as an em"ty4 formal !isci"lineA he
inten!s s"eculative logic to transform it into a science $ith "rofoun! meta"hysical
content WEL N 5*@. 0"eculative logic $ill therey "rovi!e a meta"hysical
#ey to the a "riori com"rehension of all reality4 enaling "hiloso"hy
to encom"ass an! systematiDe the results of em"irical science an! give to
them an a "riori character WEL N '5@. &n so !oing4 it $ill overcome the alien4
acci!ental4 an! oFective form ta#en y these facts in the mo!ern em"irical
sciences WEL N =@4 e>hiiting the inner essence of the oFective $orl! as at
one $ith our o$n free!om as thin#ers WEL N 5)@.' Hegel thus regar!s his o$n
"hiloso"hical achievement as fun!amentally a contriution to meta"hysics or
EGrst "hiloso"hy.E
Hegel is the most metho!ologically self;conscious of all "hiloso"hers in
the Western tra!ition. There is no mo!ern "hiloso"her4 not even e>ce"ting
Descartes4 3ant4 an! Husserl4 $ho !is"lays greater originality in laying the
metho!ological foun!ations of a "hiloso"hical system. This is Hegel's main
"roFect !uring his Hena "erio!4 culminating in the 2henomenology of 0"irit
of '+6=. &t is a si!e of Hegel sel!om a""reciate!4 ecause Hegel's metho!ological
reJections are a res"onse to the "rolems of ancient 2yrrhonistic
s#e"ticism4 rather than to the s#e"tical $orries of the "ost;Cartesian tra!ition4
$hich Hegel al$ays esteeme! less highly than he !i! the ancient s#e"tical
tra!ition.5
5. Dialectical logic
The lifeloo! of Hegel's system of s"eculative logic is the famous Hegelian
!ialectic. Hegel's !ialectic may e vie$e! as a highly novel theory of "hilo;
'
&NT.ODUCT&ON
so"hical "ara!o>esC $here an! $hy "hiloso"hical thought runs into them4
$hat they mean4 ho$ to !eal $ith them. 3ant argues that $hen human reason
attem"ts to e>ten! its cognition eyon! the oun!s of "ossile e>"erience4
it not only is tem"te! to ma#e un$arrante! claims to #no$le!ge4 ut
also is in !anger of falling into contra!ictions ?antinomies@A the only $ay to
avoi! them is y carefully oserving the "ro"er limits of its cognitive "o$ers.
The "art of this account Hegel retains is the i!ea that our thin#ing has an
inherent ten!ency to go eyon! every limit4 an! thus to un!ermine or overthro$
itself. He associates this i!ea $ith the human self's ten!ency to change4
!evelo"4 an! "rogress through a "rocess involving a stage of self;conJict follo$e!
y its resolution.)
Hegel hol!s that a thought !etermination is $hat it is ecause it is !etermine!
?or limite!@ in a !eGnite $ay. -ut each such thought has an inherent
ten!ency to "ush eyon! its limit an! turn into its o""osite4 resulting in a
contra!iction. This E!ialecticE of thought !eterminations4 as Hegel calls it4
is a cause of consternation to the Eun!erstan!ingE ; that analytical !is"osition
of thought $hich tries to gras" thought !eterminations in their !eterminacy4
#ee"ing them clearly an! !istinctly se"arate! from one another. :or the un!erstan!ing4
!ialectic is a source of scan!al an! "ara!o>4 something to avoi!
at all costs. -ut the un!erstan!ing's eMorts are to no avail4 ecause thought
itself is !ynamic4 self;transcen!ing4 fun!amentally !ialectical. 3ant realiDe!
that thoughts oey the un!erstan!ing's rules only so long as they remain
$ithin their "ro"er oun!s. Hegel hastens to a!! that they have an inherent
ten!ency not to remain conGne!4 a ten!ency that is as much a "art of their
nature as the neat analytical !eGnitions $ithin $hich the un!erstan!ing
$ants to conGne them. Dialectical "ara!o>es cannot e avoi!e!4 !one a$ay
$ith4 or treate! as mere illusions4 as the un!erstan!ing $oul! $ish. They
are real4 unavoi!ale4 virtually omni"resent.
Hegel argues that the "ro"er $ay to resolve !ialectical "ara!o>es is not to
su""ress them4 ut to systematiDe them. &f you ecome master of them4 they
can !o "ositive "hiloso"hical $or# for you. Hust as thought inevitaly gives
rise to contra!ictions4 so it also inevitaly reconciles them in a higher unity4
as a human self that gro$s through self;conJict "roves its gro$th y emerging
from the conJict into a higher self;harmony. :or e>am"le4 3ant's 0econ!
Antinomy o""oses the inGnite !ivisiility of the real in s"ace to the in!ivisiility
of its smallest "arts ?A*)*<-*75@. Hegel thin#s the antinomy can e
resolve! y recogniDing that the conce"t of Iuantity contains $ithin itself
oth of the o""ose! !eterminations4 !iscreteness an! continuity ?WL (C 5'7;
55=<'96;'99A cf. EL N '66@. 3ant resolves the antinomy y saying that as a
mere a""earance4 matter is neither inGnitely !ivisile nor com"ose! of sim"les
?A(65;(6=<-()6;() 7@A Hegel resolves it y saying that matter is oth
at once. &t can e oth ecause our thought may legitimately em"loy oth
conce"tions involving !iscreteness an! conce"tions involving continuity in
its theoriDing aout matter.
&n eMect4 Hegel resolves "hiloso"hical "ara!o>es such as the 0econ! Antinomy
y relying on an i!ealist or constructivist "icture of the relation of
5
&NT.ODUCT&ON
theory to reality. &f reality is constitute! y our thought aout it4 an! that
thought systematically involves contrasting ?even contra!ictory@ as"ects or
moments4 then reality itself must emo!y the same contra!ictions. Contra!ictory
thin#ing aout reality is tolerale if $e are ca"ale ?via the un!erstan!ing@
of !istinguishing clearly et$een the contra!ictory as"ects of our
thought4 an! also ?via s"eculative reason@ of reconciling the contra!ictions
in a higher theoretical conce"tion.
We might com"are Hegel's treatment of "hiloso"hical "ara!o>es $ith the
later Wittgenstein's. Wittgenstein hel! that contra!ictions or "ara!o>es !o
not Ema#e our language less usaleE ecause4 once $e E#no$ our $ay aoutE
an! ecome clear aout e>actly $here an! $hy they arise4 $e can Eseal them
oMEA $e nee! not vie$ a contra!iction as Ethe local sym"tom of a sic#ness
of the $hole o!y.E* :or Wittgenstein contra!ictions can e tolerate! ecause
they are marginal an! $e can #ee" them seIuestere! from the rest of
our thin#ingA for Hegel4 they arise systematically in the course of "hiloso"hical
thought4 ut they !o no harm so long as a system of s"eculative logic can
#ee" them in their "ro"er "lace4 refusing them a!mittance to those conte>ts
in $hich they $oul! !o harm. Thus Hegel claims that the ol!;fashione! logic
of the un!erstan!ing is Fust a limiting case of s"eculative logic4 $hich $e
otain sim"ly y omitting the !ialectical element in thought ?EL N +5@.
The guarantee that contra!ictions nee! not ultimately !isru"t thin#ing is
"rovi!e! y the higher unity4 in $hich the o""osites are reconcile! an! the
"ro"er "lace of each is simultaneously !etermine!. :or e>am"le4 the o""osition
et$een continuous Iuantity an! !iscrete Iuantity lea!s to a contra!iction
$hen $e !on't realiDe that the conce"t of Iuantity contains oth ?WL
(C 559<566@. Their !iMerence is overcome in the conce"t of a !eterminate
Iuantity or a Iuantum. This conce"t sets limits to sim"le continuity4 an!
hence su"erse!es ?auJiet@ the o""osition et$een continuous an! !iscrete
Iuantity ?WL (C 5)6<56'@.
Hegel has a roa!er an! a narro$er conce"tion of !ialectic. 0ometimes he
inclu!es the E"ositive reasonE that Egras"s o""osites in their unityE $ithin
E!ialecticE ?WL(C (5<(7@4 ut sometimes he calls this stage Es"eculationE or
E"ositive reason4E in contrast to E!ialecticE or Enegative reasonE ?EL N +5@.
Negative reason is the activity of reason that !rives thought !eterminations
eyon! themselves an! engen!ers the contra!ictions that so "lague the un!erstan!ingA
s"eculation or "ositive reason reconciles contra!ictions in a
higher unity4 enaling them to e inclu!e! in a rational system. &n the system
of s"eculative logic4 each thought !etermination lea!s to another that
o""oses it4 an! that o""osition lea!s in turn to a ne$ !etermination in $hich
the o""osition is overcome.
?The regrettale tra!ition of e>"oun!ing this theme in the Hegelian !ialectic
through the grotesIue Fargon of Ethesis4E Eantithesis4E an! EsynthesisE
egan in '+)= $ith Heinrich ,oritD Chalyaus4 a o$!leriDer of /erman
i!ealist "hiloso"hy4 $hose ri!iculous e>"ository !evices shoul! have een
forgotten along $ith his name.( This tria! of terms is use! y oth :ichte
an! 0chelling4 though never to e>"ress the Hegelian i!eas $e have Fust een
)
&NT.ODUCT&ON
e>aminingA to my #no$le!ge4 it is never use! y Hegel4 not even once4 for
this "ur"ose or for any other. The use of Chalyaus's terminology to e>"oun!
the Hegelian !ialectic is nearly al$ays an un$itting confession that
the e>"ositor has little or no Grsthan! #no$le!ge of Hegel.@
Hegel's s"eculative logic attem"ts to run through all asic !eterminations
of thought in a systematic $ay4 assigning each its "ro"er "lace $ithin the
!evelo"ment. At the "innacle of the system is the E&!eaE ; thought's ten!ency
to actualiDe itself y going outsi!e itself. Hegel associates the &!ea $ith
the ontological "roof for /o!'s e>istence4 since the &!ea e>hiits the ca"acity
of the highest thought !irectly to !emonstrate its o$n e>istence ?EL N 7*@.
-ut the &!ea also re"resents4 in religious terms4 /o!'s creation of the $orl!.
The &!ea is thought's "rocee!ing eyon! itself to give itself imme!iate reality
in Gnite4 sensuous nature ?EL N 5**@. Hegel's system4 com"rising the "hiloso"hy
of nature an! "hiloso"hy of s"irit4 attem"ts to !evelo" the structure of
the $orl! of nature an! the $orl! of the human min!4 using the categories
an! movement of the system of s"eculative logic as its #ey. Nature is thought
going outsi!e itselfA min! or s"irit is its return to itself. As a natural eing4
the human eing4 through its a$areness of itself as thought4 transcen!s the
merely natural to the level of the s"iritual. E0"iritE emraces not only EsuFective
s"iritE ?or in!ivi!ual "sychology@4 ut also EoFective s"iritE ?society
or culture4 culminating in the "olitical state@4 an! Gnally Easolute s"irit4E
the realms of art4 religion4 an! "hiloso"hy ; those forms of higher human
culture in $hich s"irit ecomes a$are of itself as asolute4 or the ultimate
reality.
). 0"eculative logic is !ea!A ut Hegel's thought is
not
We must a!mire the ol!ness of Hegel's metho!ological conce"tion in the
2henomenology4 ut $e must also a!mit that Hegel's ho"elessly amitious
"roFect "roves utterly unconvincing in its e>ecution. Even Hegel himself "erha"s
tacitly aan!one! the 2henomenology as the foun!ation of his system
in the Hei!elerg Encyclo"e!ia ?'+'=@4 $here he relegate! the contents of
2h/ Cha"ters ';( to a suor!inate "art of the "hiloso"hy of s"irit. The
-erlin Encyclo"e!ia ?'+5=4 '+)6@ inclu!es a ne$ intro!uction to the system
?EL NN ';+)@. This intro!uction e>"resses reservations aout the 2henomenology's
"roce!ure as a starting "oint4 at the same time can!i!ly confessing
itself encumere! $ith the i!entical !efects to an even greater e>tent ?EL N
)(.@.
%ie$e! from a late t$entieth;century "ers"ective4 it is evi!ent that Hegel
totally faile! in his attem"t to canoniDe s"eculative logic as the only "ro"er
form of "hiloso"hical thin#ing. ,any of the "hiloso"hical "ara!o>es Hegel
nee!s in or!er to ma#e his system $or# are ase! on shallo$ so"histriesA the
resolution to "ara!o>es su""lie! y his system is often artiGcial an! unilluminating.
When the theory of logic actually $as revolutioniDe! in the late nineteenth
an! early t$entieth centuries4 the ne$ theory $as uilt u"on "recisely
*
&NT.ODUCT&ON
those features of tra!itional logic that Hegel thought most !is"ensale. &n
light of it4 "hiloso"hical sanity no$ usually Fu!ges that the most "romising
$ay to !eal $ith the "ara!o>es that "lague "hiloso"hy is the un!erstan!ing's
$ay. Hegel's system of !ialectical logic has never $on acce"tance outsi!e an
isolate! an! !$in!ling tra!ition of incorrigile enthusiasts.
Of course4 the history of "hiloso"hy is a history of s"ectacular failures.
Descartes faile! to "ut the sciences on an asolutely in!uitale asis in his
Grst "hiloso"hy. 3ant also faile! to estalish meta"hysics as the forever
close! an! Gnishe! science of the transcen!ental forms of em"irical #no$le!ge.
1et Hegel's failure $as essentially more Gnal an! unre!eemale than
theirs4 since even the "rolems of Hegel's logic remain alien an! artiGcial to
us in $ays that the "rolems of Cartesian an! 3antian "hiloso"hy !o not.
As one recent scholar of Hegel's metho! confesses4 the short ans$er to the
Iuestion EWhat is living in the logic of HegelBE isC ENothing.E7
-ecause Hegel regar!s s"eculative logic as the foun!ation of his system4
$e might conclu!e from its failure that nothing in his "hiloso"hy coul! any
longer e !eserving of our interest. -ut that $oul! e Iuite $rong. The fact
is rather that Hegel's great "ositive achievements as a "hiloso"her !o not lie
$here he thought they !i!4 in his system of s"eculative logic4 ut in Iuite a
!iMerent realm4 in his reJections on the social an! s"iritual "re!icament of
mo!ern Western Euro"ean culture. Li#e no one efore4 an! "erha"s no one
since4 Hegel's thought e>"lores the self;conce"tion of mo!ern human eings4
the amivalent relation of mo!ern Euro"ean culture to its Heraic;Hellenic
heritage4 its Iuest in the mo!ern $orl! for a ne$ image of nature an! society4
its ho"es an! self;!outs4 its nee!s an! as"irations.
0oon after his !eath4 the inJuence of Hegel's "hiloso"hy egan to !ecline
ra"i!ly. Hegel $as hel! in Iuite lo$ esteem !uring the latter half of the
nineteenth century an! the Grst fe$ !eca!es of the "resent one. Hegel's contriution
to the Ehuman sciencesE ?/eistes$issenschaften@ $as al$ays ac#no$le!ge!
even !uring those "erio!s4 ho$ever4 at least in the /erman tra!ition.
= &t $as also this si!e of Hegel's thought that since the '9)6s has le!
to a remar#ale resurgence of interest in his "hiloso"hy. The situation $as
alrea!y Iuite clear to Ernst Cassirer nearly a half century agoC
THegel'sU logic an! meta"hysics $ere at Grst regar!e! as the strongest ul$ar#s of
his systemA yet it $as "recisely from this si!e that the system $as o"en to the most
violent an! !angerous attac#s. An! after a short struggle they seeme! to have een
successful. 1et Hegelianism has ha! a reirth not in the Gel! of logical or meta"hysical
thought4 ut in the Gel! of "olitical thought. There has har!ly een a single great
"olitical system that has resiste! its inJuence. All our mo!ern "olitical i!eologies
sho$ us the strength4 the !uraility an! "ermanence of the "rinci"les that $ere Grst
intro!uce! an! !efen!e! in Hegel's "hiloso"hy of right an! his "hiloso"hy of history.
+
The living tra!itions that !erive from Hegel's thought ; the tra!itions of
,ar>ist social theory an! e>istential "hiloso"hy ; are !istinctly antimeta"hysical
in their orientation. The Hegel $ho still lives an! s"ea#s to us is
not a s"eculative logician an! i!ealist meta"hysician ut a "hiloso"hical his;
(
&NT.ODUCT&ON
torian4 a "olitical an! social theorist4 a "hiloso"her of our ethical concerns
an! cultural i!entity crises.
*. 0"eculative "hiloso"hy an! mo!ern society
This is not necessarily to contra!ict the assertion that $e cannot un!erstan!
Hegel's social an! "olitical concerns $ithout reference to his s"eculative
meta"hysics.9 -ut $e are li#ely to miss the connection et$een the t$o if
?$ith Hegel@ $e su""ose that Hegelian social thought is groun!e! in Hegelian
meta"hysics4 an! conclu!e that s"eculative logic is a "ro"ae!eutic to
Hegel's theory of mo!ern society. &n fact4 the relation et$een the t$o may
e very nearly the reverse of thisA often Hegel's treatment of meta"hysical
issues is est vie$e! as an attem"t to inter"ret these issues as an e>"ression
of cultural an! e>istential concerns. The most inJuential recent inter"retation
of Hegel's "hiloso"hy4 that of Charles Taylor's Hegel ?'9=(@4 un!erstan!s
Hegel's meta"hysics essentially as an Ee>"ressivistE vision of human
agency an! its "ro!ucts4 vie$ing Hegel's entire "hiloso"hy as a res"onse to
the cultural "re!icament of the "ost;Enlightenment.'6 &f Hegel un!erstoo!
his "hiloso"hy as the activity of "ure thought;thin#ing itself4 its legacy has
rather een that of enaling us to un!erstan! ho$ all human thought e>"resses
its concrete social an! cultural conte>t.
Even Hegel's o$n conce"tion of his tas# s"ea#s in favor of regar!ing his
"hiloso"hy as fun!amentally occu"ie! $ith cultural self;un!erstan!ing an!
"ractical self;concern. &n '+6'4 Hegel o"ens his Grst "iece of "ulishe! $riting
$ith a me!itation on Ethe nee! of "hiloso"hyE in the "resent age. He
sees this nee! as arising at a time $hen the unreJective harmony of human
in!ivi!uals $ith themselves an! their $orl! has een rent y a culture ase!
on reJectionA an! he assigns "hiloso"hy the tas# of reestalishing this harmony
at a higher level through reason ?D 56;5'<+9;9'@. &n his last "ulishe!
$or#4 the 2hiloso"hy of .ight ?'+5'@4 Hegel assigns to "hiloso"hy essentially
the same functionC reconciling reJective in!ivi!uals $ith the $orl!4 an!
aove all $ith the social $orl!4 through a s"eculative cognition of the actual
in its rationality ?2. 2reface 5=@.n &f an un!erstan!ing of Hegel's thin#ing
aout human selfhoo! an! society refers us to his meta"hysics4 it is ecause
the "rinci"al aim of Hegel's meta"hysics is to a!!ress the "re!icament of
mo!ern humanity in mo!ern society.
/eorg Lu#acs ac#no$le!ges this "oint $hen he saysC EThe entire Hegelian
"hiloso"hy is essentially oriente! to the #no$le!ge of society an! history.
Hence its categories are y their very nature a!a"te! to this s"here of eing.E
'5 -ut once again it is not as though Hegel's social "hiloso"hy !rives us
constantly ac# to the categories of his meta"hysics as to some source of
esoteric $is!om. The "oint is rather that Hegel sees his meta"hysics as the
foun!ation of a "hiloso"hy that !eals $ith the mo!ern "re!icament ecause
his o$n !ee"est res"onse to the mo!ern "re!icament is a res"onse on the
level of meta"hysics or s"eculative "hiloso"hy. Hegel's res"onse to the alienation
of mo!ern life is not ?li#e 0chiller's or 0chelling's@ aesthetic4 nor ?li#e
7
&NT.ODUCT&ON
0chleiermacher's@ religious. 0till less !oes Hegel res"on! ?li#e 3ant an!
:ichte@ y turning the struggle in$ar! to the in!ivi!ual's moral life4 nor ?li#e
,ar>@ !oes he turn it out$ar! to social revolution. Hegel see#s to overcome
alienation y rationally reconciling us to the $orl!4 com"rehen!ing a !ivine
reason4 a#in to our o$n4 immanent in it.
Hegel ma#es many e>travagant claims for his "hiloso"hy4 even to the "oint
of arrogating the terms E"hiloso"hyE an! EscienceE as nic#names for his o$n
system. -ut in vie$ of the fact that Hegel's language an! i!eas often stri#e
us as e$il!eringly novel an! unfamiliar4 it is es"ecially note$orthy that one
!istinction he never claims for it is originality. Hegel sees himself rather as
a synthetic4 encyclo"e!ic thin#er $hose tas# is to reconcile the $is!om of
ancient /ree# meta"hysics $ith the faith of the Christian religion4 reinter"reting
oth in terms of the mo!ern claims of free suFectivity an! EnlightX
enment reason. Thus in The 0cience of Logic Hegel conceives his tas# not as
that of Euil!ing a ne$ city in a $astelan!E ut rather as Eremo!eling an
ancient city4 soli!ly uilt4 an! maintaine! in continuous "ossession an! occu"ationE
?WL 7C 5*)<(=(@. Hegel !oes not see himself as the architect of a ne$
system or metho! li#e Descartes4 still less as the !estroyer of a tra!ition li#e
NietDsche or Hei!egger. He is rather the restorer of an ancient uil!ing in
nee! of re"airA his original contriution4 such as it is4 consists in uttressing
it through the use of recently acIuire! materials an! engineering techniIues4
so that it may once again e a soun! structure in $hich to live.
&t is this mo!est an! ingenuous self;conce"tion that lea!s Hegel to s"ea#
of his o$n system sim"ly as EscienceE or E"hiloso"hy.E He is as far as "ossile
in this regar! from his .omantic contem"oraries $ho thought of oth "hiloso"hy
an! art as "ro!ucts of in!ivi!ual genius4 monuments to the i!iosyncrasy
of their self;celerating creators. :or Hegel4 a soun! "hiloso"hical system
is not anyone's "ersonal creation at all. &n his vie$4 the content of his
system is merely the Western "hiloso"hical tra!ition4 a""ro"riate! y the
reJective s"irit of mo!ernity. The aim of "hiloso"hy is to vin!icate !ie 0ache
selst4 an! it can !o this only if it o$es as little as "ossile to the uniIue
"ersonality of the in!ivi!ual $ho ha""ens to formulate it.
&n contrast $ith his misestimate of himself as "rimarily a meta"hysician
an! s"eculative logician4 Hegel's self;un!erstan!ing on this "oint seems to
me to contain a goo! !eal of truth4 es"ecially regar!ing ethical to"ics. &n the
area of moral "hiloso"hy4 Hegel's thought re"resents an attem"t4 in many
$ays stri#ingly successful4 to remo!el classical ethical theory4 e>hiiting its
fun!amental soun!ness y investing it $ith the style4 an! a!a"ting it to the
content4 of a mo!ern self;un!erstan!ing. Li#e /oethe's "oetry4 Hegel's ethical
thought is an attem"t to marry the classical i!eal $ith the mo!ern4 to
unite the harmony of /ree# culture $ith the reJective s"irit of the Enlightenment4
so as to conceive the mo!ern social or!er as one in $hich :austian
as"irations can reach fulGllment $ithout violating the reIuirements of classical
form.
Hegel's achievement lies in his sensitivity to the !iverse as"irations of mo!ern
humanity4 his aility to relate these as"irations to their historical roots
=
&NT.ODUCT&ON
an! their focus in social institutions4 an! his success in integrating these as"irations
into a single conce"tion of the mo!ern s"irit. Hegel's 2hiloso"hy of
.ight articulates our !ee"est human nee!s an! is sensitive to their !iversity
an! the !estructive "ossiilities that such !iversity "resents. &t "oints the
$ay to a society in $hich reJective4 rational4 an! self;integrate! in!ivi!uals
can satisfy all of their nee!s simultaneously4 $ithout the regret of lost alternatives
or tragic choices et$een incom"atile an! incommensurale goo!s.
:or Hegel4 of course4 its chief signiGcance is "hiloso"hical or s"eculativeC
to e>hiit the social $orl! an! one's role in it as rationally satisfying ecause
it is the actualiDation of reason4 the $or# of !ivine "rovi!ence4 manifest to
the "hiloso"her even in the most $orl!ly as"ects of life. :e$ of Hegel's rea!ers
to!ay Gn! it natural to a!o"t rational theo!icy as their fun!amental relation
to their cultural "re!icament. Accor!ingly4 they shoul! e more $illing
than he $as to consi!er Hegel's conce"tion of the vocation of mo!ern in!ivi!uals
an! its fulGllment in the mo!ern state in their "ractical meaning ; as
a "roFect in rational ethics. To rea! Hegel in this $ay is4 a!mitte!ly4 to rea*
him in some measure against his o$n self;un!erstan!ingA it is nevertheless
the only $ay in $hich most of us4 if $e are honest $ith ourselves4 can rea!
him seriously at all. 0uch a rea!ing reIuires that $e Grst loo# closely at
Hegel's o$n conce"tion of his "hiloso"hical "roFect4 so that $e may see
clearly $here it leaves room for the "ossiility of a Hegelian ethical theory.
(. Does Hegel have an ethicsB
&t is sometimes sai!4 y Hegel's sym"athiDers as $ell as his !etractors4 that
Hegel's system contains no EethicsE at all4 that for Hegel moral "hiloso"hy
is E!issolve! in sociologyE or Easore! in "olitical "hiloso"hyE. ) 0uch remar#s
are mislea!ing e>aggerations4 ut there is some truth in them if they
are un!erstoo! in the right $ay.
Hegel's "hiloso"hy is fun!amentally a s"eculative meta"hysics $hose aim
is to overcome4 through "hiloso"hical insight4 the alienation of the mo!ern
min! from itself4 nature4 an! society. -ecause of this4 in Hegel's mature
system even E"ractical "hiloso"hyE is treate! from a contem"lative "ers"ective
; as a stage in s"irit's self;#no$le!ge ?E/ NN *79;((5@. Thus Hegel
treats Ethe $ill'' not from the "ers"ective of the volitional agent engaging in
"ractical !elieration4 ut from the "ers"ective of the s"eculative "hiloso"her
contem"lating the $ill an! its mo!e of actualiDation. Li#e$ise4 the
avo$e! aim of the 2hiloso"hy of .ight is not to tell the state ho$ it ought to
e4 ut rather to "rovi!e us $ith a rational theo!icy of mo!ern social life4
y e>hiiting the actuality of !ivine reason an! the rationality of the social
$orl! it has create! ?2. 2reface 5*;5+@.
MTis sim"ly false to say that Hegel's "hiloso"hy aims at Fustifying the social'
ana "olitical status Iuo. On the contrary4 Hegel insists that every e>isting
state4 stan!ing as it !oes in the s"here of trans#oriness an! contingency4 is
!isGgure! to some e>tent y error an! $ic#e!ness44 an! fails to e $holly
rational4 ecause it fails to e $holly actual ?2. N 5(+A@. The 2hiloso"hy of
+
&NT.ODUCT&ON
.ight clearly leaves room for rational criticism of $hat e>ists4 an! also for
"ractical eMorts to im"rove the e>isting state y actualiDingC it4 ringing it
more into harmony $ith its o$n rational essence or conce"tY
Hegel !oes !eny4 ho$ever4 that such criticism elongs among the tas#s of
"hiloso"hyC
:or $ho is not clever enough to see much in his environment that is not in fact as
it ought to eB -ut this cleverness is $rong to imagine that such oFects an! their
EoughtE have any "lace $ithin the interests of "hiloso"hical science. :or science has
to !o only $ith the &!ea4 $hich is not so im"otent that it only ought to e $ithout
actually eingA hence "hiloso"hy has to !o $ith an actuality of $hich those oFects4
institutions4 con!itions4 etc. are only the su"erGcial outsi!e. ?EL N 7A cf. 2. 2reface
5(@
The rhetorical Iuestion that intro!uces this "assage is in eMect a !eclaration
that no one ?least of all Hegel@ is so stu"i! as to claim that the status
Iuo is al$ays as it ought to e. 1et the "assage contains t$o other controversial
i!eas $hich4 though they !o not !eny that much in the $orl! is not as
it ought to e4 nevertheless ten! to !enigrate the im"ortance often attache!
to this ovious truth y "artisans of the Eun!erstan!ing.E The Grst is an i!ea
aout the sco"e an! aim of "hiloso"hy. Hegel claims that although it may
often e correct to say that social institutions an! con!itions are not as they
shoul! e4 it is al$ays $rong to regar! such assertions ?even $here they are
correct@ as of interest to E"hiloso"hical science.E :or the tas# of "hiloso"hy
?conceive! here in '+)6 very much as it $as in the DiMerenDschrift of '+6'@
is to heal the !ivision or ifurcation ?EntD$eiung@ $hich the mo!ern "rinci"le
of reJection has o"ene! et$een our min!s an! the $orl!A it eMects this
healing y e>hiiting to our reason the $orl!'s o$n !ee" inner rationality.
We might ta#e Hegel to e agreeing $ith Aristotle that the highest en! of
reason is "hiloso"hical contem"lation an! not the en!s of "ractice in the
narro$er sense ?%/2 5C '7=<'('@. -ut Hegel o""oses s"eculative cognition
oth to theory an! to "ractice4 treating it as a higher unity in $hich oth are
containe!. The asolute &!ea lies eyon! oth the &!ea of cognition an! the
&!ea of the goo! ?EL N 5)7@4 Fust as the realm of asolute s"irit transcen!s
oth theoretical an! "ractical s"irit ?E/ N (()Y. Hegel's vie$ seems to e
that s"eculative $is!om elongs eIually in contem"lation of the reason that
sho$s itself in the $orl!4 an! in "ractice that actualiDes reason in the $orl! ;
Fust as art4 religion4 an! "hiloso"hy nourish the human s"irit eIually in its
cognition an! its action.
This conce"tion of "hiloso"hy rests on a secon! controversial i!eaC that
although there is much in the contingent4 transitory $orl! of e>istence an!
a""earance that is not as it ought to e4 nevertheless the inner essence of
things4 vie$e! y s"eculative reason in its necessity4 is inevitaly seen to e
fully rational an! hence s"iritually satisfying. -ecause of this there can e a
genuine EscienceE of s"eculative logic4 $hich !eals entirely $ith the Ethought
!eterminationsE that constitute the conce"tual essence of the $orl!4 an! !is"lay
themselves in e>ternal reality. This science is "hiloso"hy "ro"er4 an!
its oFect is solely the E&!eaE ; the self;realiDing rational conce"t4 or the Ea;
9
&NT.ODUCT&ON
solute unity of the conce"t an! oFectivityE ?EL N 5')@. &n the ErealE "art of
"hiloso"hical science4 the out$ar! forms ta#en y thought in the $orl!s of
nature an! human society can e rea""ro"riate! y the human s"irit through
our cognition of them. Hegel is convince! that once $e have taste! of this
"urely "hiloso"hical science an! its truth4 $e $ill $ant to !istinguish it from
all other stan!"oints on the $orl!4 inclu!ing the "ractical one4 an! to treat
them all as essentially inferior.
7. .ationality an! actuality
This is the "oint of Hegers saying4 EThe rational is actual4 an! the actual is
rational.E &n his o$n e>egesis of the saying4 Hegel is at "ains to !istinguish
$hat is EactualE from $hat merely Ee>ists<' The Eactual4E he says4 inclu!es
only those e>istents that fully e>"ress an! corres"on! to their essence ?EL
NN74 '*5@. 0uch an e>istent Hegel calls an Ea""earanceE or E"henomenonE
?Erscheinung@ ?EL N ')'@. The transitory e>istents that $e encounter in every!ay
life ?inclu!ing societies an! states@ often fail to e Eactual4E fail to e
Ea""earancesE of their Eessence.E &n them the outer e>"ression is ina!eIuate
to the inner essenceA an! an e>istent that is im"erfect in this $ay Hegel calls
EillusionE or Esho$E ?0chein@ ?WL7C '=<)9*A EL N ')' A@. ?Hegel's use of
the term 0chein is li#ely to mislea!4 since EillusionsE in this sense Z e.g.4 evil
or sic# human eings4 a!ly organiDe! or unFust states ; certainly ;e>ist every
it as much as EactualitiesE !o.@
What is actual is rational. -ut one must #no$4 !istinguish4 $hat is in fact actual.
&n common life all is actual4 ut Tin "hiloso"hyU there is a !istinction et$een the
$orl! of a""earance an! actuality. The actual has also an e>ternal e>istence4 $hich
!is"lays aritrariness an! contingency. . . . ,en $ill al$ays e $ic#e! an! !e"rave!4
ut this is not the &!ea. On the surface "assions $restle every$here4 ut that is not
the actuality of sustance. The tem"oral an! transitory certainly e>ists4 an! may
cause us enough !istressA ut in s"ite of that it4 along $ith the "articularity of the
suFect an! its $ishes an! inclinations4 is no true actuality. ?%/2 5C ''6;'''<9(;97@
Hegel !istinguishes et$een the rational Eessence4E $hose a!eIuate a""earance
is the Eactual4E an! the Etransitory4 contingent4 su"erGcial e>terior4E
$hich this essence $ears in the s"here of Gnitu!e. &n eMect4 this is
Hegel's $ay of !ra$ing the !istinction et$een /o! an! creationA /o! is
the Erational essenceE of things4 $hereas creation is their Esu"erGcial e>teriorE
?WL (A **<(6@. -ecause E"hiloso"hy is the true theo!icyE ?%/2FC *((<
(*7A %2/ 5+<'(@4 the only true suFect matter of "hiloso"hy is /o!4 an!
"hiloso"hy "ro"er occu"ies itself $ith the Gnite $orl! only to the e>tent that
the !ivine "resence is immanent in it ; that is4 only to the e>tent that the
Gnite is Eactual.E The !efects of Gnitu!e e>ist4 ut they are su"erGcial contingencies4
FustiGe! y the fact that contingency itself is a necessary factor
in /o!'s self;manifestation ?WL7C '+6<(*5;(()A EL N '*( A@.'*
Hegel's "hiloso"hy of the state FustiGes not the status Iuo4 ut /o!A it
hallo$s not the "olitical or!er ut the !ivine revealing itself in the s"iritual
realm of the state4 Fust as it !oes in the lo$er realm of nature ?2. 2reface
'6
&NT.ODUCT&ON
'(@. The tas# of "hiloso"hy is to contem"late the !ivine or EaLrmativeE
factor that necessarily reveals itself to s"eculative reason in even the most
!efective state4 Fust as the rational essence of humanity !is"lays itself even
in the ugliest4 most !eforme! or most corru"t human eings ?2. N 5(+A@.
2hiloso"hy can neither Fustify nor con!emn any e>isting state4 since it is not
the tas# of "hiloso"hy to "ass Fu!gment on ho$ $ell or a!ly any given state
has actualiDe! its rational essence.
This restriction on the sco"e of E"hiloso"hyE or E"hiloso"hical scienceE
!oes a""ear to entail that for Hegel E"hiloso"hy4E ta#ing the $or! in the
strict sense4 cannot contain an ethicsA in other $or!s4 in the strict sense of the
$or! there can e no such thing as a E"ractical "hiloso"hy.E :or "hiloso"hy
concerns itself $ith $hat e>ists only to the e>tent that it manifests the !ivineA
an! in res"ect of e>istents that !o4 there can e no !istinction et$een $hat
they are an! $hat they ought to e.
1et Hegel's "osition clearly commits him to hol! ?an! he often e>"licitly
aLrms@ that reason is "ractical. .eason constantly $or#s changes in the
$orl! through human actions4 actualiDing itself in $hat e>ists. The only
groun! Hegel has for e>clu!ing the "ractical use of reason from E"hiloso"hyE
is a Fealous reservation of the term to s"eculative contem"lation4 the su"reme
activity of thought !ivinely thin#ing only itself. Aan!oning these strictures4
ho$ever4 Hegel occasionally regar!s his "hiloso"hy of oFective s"irit ?es"ecially
in the 2hiloso"hy of .ight@ as a E"ractical "hiloso"hyE ?2. N *A@.
Hegel's amivalence on this "oint is reJecte! in the amiguity of the term
EoFective s"iritE itself. &t refers oth to the oFective $orl! $hich s"irit has
ma!e for itself in the form of the rational social or!er4 an! to the oFective
vali!ity of the !uties4 la$s4 an! institutions constituting the $orl!. &t is EoFectiveE
in the sense that it stan!s over against the suFect as an e>isting
$orl!4 an! also in the very !iMerent ?even o""osite@ sense that it lays claim
on the suFect's $ill through its o$n conce"t an! vocation ?2. N 57@. The
-erlin Encyclo"e!ia thus !eGnes EoFective s"iritE as a $orl! not only
Erought forthE y s"irit ut also Eto e rought forthE y it ?E/ N )+(@.
Accor!ingly4 the 2hiloso"hy of .ight must e loo#e! at simultaneously in
t$o $aysC ?'@ as E"hiloso"hical scienceE in the strict sense of EL N 74 an
e>ercise in s"eculative theo!icyA an! ?5@ as E"ractical "hiloso"hy4E an ethical
an! "olitical theory on the asis of $hich conclusions can e !ra$n aout
ho$ the $orl! shoul! e4 inclu!ing ho$ social institutions an! con!itions
shoul! e change!. 0ome things Hegel says in the 2hiloso"hy of .ight are no
!out inten!e! as E"hiloso"hical scienceE in the strict senseA ut many4
many others ma#e sense only as "ieces of "ractical ethics or "olitical theory4
an! cannot e comfortaly Gt into Hegel's oLcial "roFect of s"eculative theo!icy.
=. Hegel's "ractical "hiloso"hy
Hegel's thesis that the actual is rational not only leaves room for "ractical
"hiloso"hyA it also hel"s to !eGne the metho! of Hegel's "ractical "hiloso;
''
&NT.ODUCT&ON
"hy. &t im"lies that $e are mista#en if $e thin# the right $ay to go aout
"ractical "hiloso"hy is Grst to formulate Ei!ealsE an! then to loo# aroun! for
some $ay in $hich the errant $orl! might e rought into conformity $ith
them. .eason's actuality in the $orl! consists in the e>ercise of the ca"acities
of e>isting things4 the fulGllment of essential ten!encies in them. 0uch ten!encies
to$ar! rationality !o not inevitaly "revail in a $orl! of transitoriness
an! contingency4 ut $e can learn aout them through the actual ehavior
of things4 an! $hat $e learn in this $ay is in!is"ensale to ethical #no$le!ge.
This means that "ractical reason is not autonomous in the sense that
it is cut oM from the $orl! to $hich it is to e a""lie!. .ather4 it consists in
$or#ing $ith the essential ten!encies in the e>istent to actualiDe the rationality
that is there. Hegel's ethical thought thus turns out to re"resent a rather
Aristotelian variety of ethical naturalism.
&t is in this light that $e shoul! inter"ret Hegel's freIuent4 em"hatic4 yet
cry"tic an! sometimes "ara!o>ical remar#s !is"araging Ethe oughtE ?2h/ NN
5*94 *5(4 7'9A WL7C (**<+56A EL NN 74 5)*@ an! criticiDing those $ho $ant
to Eteach the $orl! ho$ it ought to eE ?2. 2reface 5=@. EThe true i!eal4E
says Hegel4 Eis not $hat ought to e actual ut $hat is actual4 an! the only
actuality. &f an i!eal is hel! to e too goo! to e>ist4 there must e some fault
in the i!eal itself4 since actuality is too goo! for itE ?%/2 5C ''6<9(@. An i!eal
is !efective if it is not foun!e! on the rational essence of that to $hich it is
a""lie!. Where "ractical recommen!ations !o have such a asis4 there $ill
e an essential ten!ency in the e>istence to actualiDe it. -ut an i!eal to $hich
no such ten!ency corres"on!s is an i!eal alien to the -estimmung ; the nature4
!estiny4 or vocation4 of those to $hom it is a!!resse!. -ecause of this4
it $ill forever remain an EoughtE $ithout actuality4 an! for their sa#e it is
Fust as $ell that it remain so.
Hegel's "olemics against the EoughtE are criticisms of the vie$4 "resent
in 3ant an! e>aggerate! y :ichte4 that "ractical reason has "rimacy over
theoretical reason4 an! that this entails that the only truly rational or!er is
an i!eal one4 entirely in!e"en!ent of $hat is4 eternally confronting it as its
Eought;to;e.E :rom the Aristotelian "ers"ective Hegel a!o"ts4 it ma#es
goo! sense to reFect such i!eals.
Largely on the asis of the 2reface to the 2hiloso"hy of .ight4 Hegel acIuire!
a re"utation among his lieral critics as the E2russian 0tate "hiloso"her4E
a "hiloso"hical a"ologist for the 2russian restoration. There can e
little !out that in '+56 Hegel inten!e! the 2reface to e un!erstoo! as a
"le!ge of allegiance y the 2russian authorities $ho em"loye! him. 1et it is
note$orthy that in the same "aragra"h $here Hegel insists that the tas# of
"hiloso"hy is to Ea""rehen! the "resent an! the actual4 not to erect a eyon!4E
he goes on imme!iately to argue that 2lato's .e"ulic re"resents "olitical
"hiloso"hy in the truest sense ecause it Egras"e! nothing ut the nature
of /ree# ethical lifeE ?2. 2reface 5*@. Together $ith a long tra!ition of
Hegel's !etractors4 the 2russian censors seem to have een too !ull to !ra$
the "lain inference that as far as Hegel's "rotestations in its 2reface are concerne!4
the 2hiloso"hy of .ight might Fust as easily e the same sort of a"ol;
'5
&NT.ODUCT&ON
ogy for 2russian asolutism as 2lato's .e"ulic $as for Athenian !emocracy.
The rational state !escrie! in the 2hiloso"hy of .ight !oes closely resemle
2russiaA not as it ever $as4 ut 2russia as it $as to have ecome un!er
the reform ministry le! y Chancellor 3arl August von Har!energ4 $ith
the a!vice of &nterior ,inister Wilhelm von Humol!t ?$ho ha! estalishe!
the "rofessorshi" Hegel occu"ie!@ an! ,inister of E!ucation 3arl von Altenstein
?$ho ha! arrange! for Hegel's a""ointment to it@. &n ,ay of '+'(4
3ing :rie!rich Wilhelm &&& ha! issue! a "roclamation "romising that 2russia
$oul! e given a $ritten constitution "rovi!ing for the regular convening
of an estates assemly ?or "arliament@. Early in '+'94 Har!energ an! Humol!t
oth !rafte! "lans for such a constitution. The rational state !escrie!
in the 2hiloso"hy of .ight ears a stri#ing resemlance to these "lans. They
$oul! have converte! 2russia from an asolute monarchy into a constitutional
monarchy ?2. N 5=)4 .@ an! $oul! have estalishe! a icameral estates
assemly4 $ith an u""er house !ra$n from the here!itary noility4 an! a
lo$er house com"rise! of re"resentatives !ra$n from munici"al an! "rofessional
cor"orations ?2. NN )66;)'7@.'7
&n some of his early lectures on the 2hiloso"hy of .ight4 "rior to its "ulication
in '+564 $e get a very !iMerent "icture of the "olitical im"lications of
his "hiloso"hy from the one given in the 2reface.' :or instance4 in '+'94
Hegel "uts his famous thesis in a slightly !iMerent $ayC EWhat is actual ecomes
rational4 an! the rational ecomes actualE ?%2.'9'('@. Here the relation
et$een rationality an! actuality is a !ynamic one4 asserting not the
rationality of the status Iuo ut rather the rationality of social change. This
harmoniDes $ell $ith Hegel's sym"athy $ith the .eform Era4 e>"ressing
Hegel's conG!ence that the 2russian state $as evolving to$ar! rationality4
ecoming more an! more li#e the EactualE or ErationalE constitutional monarchy
of the 2hiloso"hy of .ight. This same o"timism is also e>"resse! in a
statement of Hegel's thesis aout the rationality of the actual from his Hei!elerg
lectures of '+'=;'+'+C EWhat is rational must ha""en4 since on the
$hole the constitution is only its !evelo"mentE W%2.iyC '(=@.
The .eform Era $as rought to a su!!en en! y events of the summer of
'+'9. &nternal foes of reform4 such as :urst Wittgenstein4 an! its e>ternal
foes4 such as ,etternich4 "revaile! over Chancellor Har!energA Humol!t
$as force! to resign from the ministry4 an! thus en!e! the "ros"ects for
constitutional reform in 2russia. &n or!er to reconcile Hegel's statements in
the 2reface $ith the actual contents of the oo#4 one $oul! have to argue
that4 o$ing to human error4 $ic#e!ness4 an! other unfortunate contingencies4
the 2russian state in its e>istence never achieve! full actuality4 ut al$ays
remaine! !efective in relation to the &!ea of the mo!ern state. We have
seen that Hegel's conce"tions of actuality4 e>istence4 an! contingency !o
allo$ for this "ossiility.
Critics of Hegel such as 06ren 3ier#egaar! have often charge! that he
masIuera!es as a Christian a"ologist $hile actually !efen!ing a "hiloso"hy
of rationalist humanism $hich is $holly at o!!s $ith the s"irit of Christian
faith. &n vie$ of Hegel's "enetrating critiIue of the other$orl!ly Eunha""y
')
&NT.ODUCT&ON
consciousnessE an! his rationalistic reinter"retation of such Christian !octrines
as the &ncarnation an! the Trinity4 there is evi!ently some truth in
these charges. The same com"laint might e rought $ith eIual Fustice
against Hegel's attem"t ?in the 2reface to the 2hiloso"hy of .ight@ to a""ease
the censors y "ortraying himself as a !efen!er of the 2russian state against
its enemies. The reactionary 3ing :rie!rich Wilhelm &%4 $ho came to the
throne in '+*64 certainly regar!e! Hegelian "hiloso"hy in all its forms as
either a false frien! or an o"en enemy. +
Hegel's thesis that Ethe rational is actual4 an! the actual is rationalE has
oth a s"eculative meaning an! a "ractical one. The s"eculative meaning is
that "hiloso"hical $is!om consists in contem"lating the inner rational essence
of things rather than !$elling on their contingent a""earances. The
"ractical meaning is that rational action "rocee!s not from i!eals or "rinci"les
set u" in in!e"en!ence of $hat is4 ut rather from a rational com"rehension
of $hat is. The thesis in its s"eculative meaning gives some su""ort to
the thesis in its "ractical meaning4 y "rovi!ing a meta"hysical rationale for
the Aristotelian assum"tions of an ethical theory of self;actualiDation. -ut it
is "ossile to acce"t the thesis in its "ractical meaning $hile re"u!iating it
in its s"eculative meaning4 if $e are "re"are! to give a conce"tion of human
self;actualiDation some other asis ?e.g.4 an em"irical4 historical analysis of
the nature of human eings in mo!ern Western culture@. &n neither meaning
!oes the thesis !eny that there may e !efects in $hat e>ists. &n its s"eculative
meaning it !oes im"ly that the usiness of "hiloso"hical science involves
a "rinci"le! !irection of one's attention a$ay from these !efects4 in or!er to
otain a "urer insight into /o!'s immanence in the $orl!. &n its "ractical
meaning the thesis is controversial4 since it involves a variety of ethical naturalism
an! an Aristotelian self;actualiDation theory of the human goo!. -ut
it has no more ten!ency to sanctify $hatever ha""ens to e>ist than most
other versions of Aristotelian naturalism.
H
&
Hegelian ethical theory
&
0elf;actualiDation
i. Ethical theory an! self;a$areness
&f there is any ho"e for ethics as a ranch of rational inIuiry4 it lies in sho$ing
ho$ ethical conce"tions an! a theory of the human goo! can e groun!e!
in human self ;un!erstan!ing.' Ethics must e groun!e! in a #no$le!ge of
human eings that enales us to say that some mo!es of life are suite! to our
nature4 $hereas others are not. &n that sense4 ethical theories generally may
e regar!e! as theories of human self;actualiDation. 2lato groun!s his ethics
in "sychology4 an! Aristotle i!entiGes the human goo! $ith a life actualiDing
the human essence in accor!ance $ith its "ro"er e>cellences. Even the ethical
theories of mo!ern times rest on some i!entiGale conce"tion of human eings4
3antian theories conceiving human nature as Gnite rational $ill4 an!
utilitarian theories i!entifying human eings $ith un!les of !esires4 "references4
or aMective states.
The common "itfall of ethical theories in this res"ect is that their conce"tions
of human nature are too thin4 one;si!e!4 an! astract4 or else too much
!ictate! y the nee!s of some convenient theoretical "rogram. Hegel's ethical
theory is ase! on a com"le> conce"tion of human nature4 $hich systematiDes
a numer of !iMerent human self;images. Hegel groun!s this conce"tion
in his theory of history4 $hich attem"ts to sho$ ho$ the !iMerent elements
arose through a "rocess of cultural !evelo"ment. Hegel's ethical
theory is therefore culturally an! historically s"eciGc in $ays that most ethical
theories are not. At the same time4 it tries to avoi! cultural relativism y
!efen!ing its conce"tion of human nature as the outcome of a "rocess in
$hich human eings have acIuire! a measure of genuine human self;#no$le!ge.
Hegel's account of the historical "rocess through $hich this self;#no$le!ge
has een acIuire! is groun!e! in a theory of human selfhoo! an! self;a$areness.
This theory o$es much to the thought of his t$o "rinci"al "re!ecessors4
3ant an! :ichte. 3ant treate! theoretical self;a$areness not as the
a$areness of a soul;thing un!erlying our "sychic states ?in the Cartesian tra!ition@4
or even the "assive "erce"tion of relations of continuity an! causal
connecte!ness et$een these states ?in the Loc#ean an! Humean tra!ition@
ut rather as the a$areness of the activity of synthesiDing or comining them
?- ')';'))@. 0elf;a$areness is therefore essentially "racticalA it is not so
much an a$areness of our various urges an! !esires as it is the a$areness of
a system of ai!ing concerns an! "roFects $ith $hich $e actively i!entify.
H=
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
/eneral self;concerns mo!ify or inhiit our !esires4 give rise to ne$ !esires4
an! serve as a asis for rational Fu!gments aout $hat is for our o$n goo!
or aout $hat $e have est reason to !o on the $hole.
Thus 3ant i!entiGes the $ill ?the "ractical self@ $ith "ractical reason ?/
*'5<59@. Concernful a$areness of oneself is in!is"ensale for a sense of one's
i!entity4 in t$o relate! sensesC that $hich ties together all one's mental states
as the states of a single "erson4 an! that $hich !etermines the content of
one's self;interest an! self;$orth. Li#e Dere# 2arGt4 3ant an! his i!ealist
follo$ers regar! the i!entity of a "erson as a rational construct. Contrary to
2arGt4 ho$ever4 they thin# .this enhances rather than !iminishes the im"ortance
of in!ivi!ual selfhoo!. :or it ma#es us our o$n $or# an! our o$n
tas#A our fun!amental vocation is to ma#e ourselves into $hat $e are.5
:ichte's $ay of e>"ressing this i!ea is to say that the self E"osits itselfE ?W
9+<99@4 an! that the self is Enot a eing ut a !oingE ?W *9(<77@. The self is
the oFect of an a$areness4 ut this a$areness is not a !etache! contem"lation.
:ichte inter"rets self;a$areness as an activity of reJection on another
activity alrea!y givenA this is "ractical activity or $ill ?W 57*<5)5;5))4 /N.
56<)7@. 0elf;a$areness reJects on $ill4 intuits its o$n i!entity $ith that $ill4
an! at the same time forms a conce"t of it ?W *7);*7*<)+;)9@. Thus selfa$areness
is al$ays self;concern4 involving issues of self;interest an! self$orth.
&t is self;a$areness4 in fact4 that turns given !esires into concerns for
self;interest an! self;$orth. To e a self is al$ays simultaneously to e a$are
of something an! to !o something. &t is to E"ositE $hat one is y !eci!ing or
"ositing $hat one is to e. A self;conce"tion involves simultaneously $hat
one is an! $hat one is striving to ecome.
These :ichtean i!eas are ta#en u" into Hegel's theory of self;a$areness4
through the thesis that the $ill's Ein!ivi!ualityE results from its o$n activity
of self;!etermination4 "rocee!ing from EuniversalityE through E"articularityE
?2. NN (;=@. One can s"ea# of a self at all only in relation to an actively
$ille! system of "ractical concerns4 ut these concerns have a !imension that
goes eyon! my E"articularityE ; the traits4 !esires4 an! other Iualities that
!istinguish me from other "eo"le. &t is not merely a result of the "hiloso"her's
"eculiar craving for generality that ethical theories focus on the human
goo! rather than on the goo! of this or that in!ivi!ual.
:ichte's $ay of e>"ressing this is y !evelo"ing a theory not of the selfa$areness
of this or that in!ivi!ual ut a theory of !as &ch4 of the & or the
self The :ichtean E&E is not some meta"hysical entity !istinct from your self
an! mine4 ut a transcen!ental structure or ty"e necessarily e>em"liGe! y
any "articular self. Hegel ma#es the same "oint y insisting that one EmomentE
of the $ill4 that $hich enales me to a""ly the $or! E&E to myself at
all4 is the moment of Euniversality4E in $hich & i!entify myself $ith $hat is
common to all eings ca"ale of calling themselves E&E ?2. N (A E/ N )+' A@.
-ut self;concern for Hegel is al$ays socially an! culturally situate!. An in!ivi!ual
self is an e>"ression of its culture's historically !evelo"e! un!erstan!ing
of human nature an! its "ractical "ossiilities. 0elf;concern is universal
concern4 ut it is a socially an! historically situate! concern4 e>"ressing a
'+
0EL:;ACTUAL&VAT&ON
collective "ractical "roFect of fashioning a human $orl! ?%/ (*;(7<*=;*+@.
The "ractical "roFect of eing a self !oes not leave either the self or its
self;#no$le!ge unaltere!. &n carrying out the "ractical "roFect through $hich
they !eGne themselves an! their humanity4 "eo"le acIuire a !ee"er #no$le!ge
of themselves an! so !evelo" the human nature $hich it is their "roFect
to actualiDe. &n this $ay4 "eo"le alter not only their conce"tion of themselves
ut also the goals involve! in this conce"tion. -ecause this alteration comes
aout through an alteration of their striving itself4 $e may even say that
"eo"le sha"e or create their o$n goals an! as"irations. -ecause of this constant
inter"lay of self;un!erstan!ing4 self;actualiDation4 an! self;alteration4
Hegel refers to the "rocess of creative self;!evelo"ment as a E!ialecticalE "rocess4
to $hich he gives the name Ee>"erienceE ?2h/ 3 +7@.
The !ialectical "roFect of self;un!erstan!ing an! self;actualiDation is one
in $hich in!ivi!ual human eings "artici"ate through the forms sha"e! y
a cultural tra!ition. Any in!ivi!ual's "roFect of self;actualiDation must e un!erstoo!
in its social an! historical meaning. Hegel thin#s that the strivings
of in!ivi!uals can themselves e un!erstoo! as cumulative an! collective4 as
as"ects of a collective striving of humanity itself for an un!erstan!ing of its
essence an! for the "ro"er oFective sha"e in $hich that essence may e
actualiDe!.
5. 0"irit
Hegel's a!venturous claim is that the various strivings of in!ivi!ual human
selves may e gathere! together an! un!erstoo! as e>"ressions of a single
historical ten!ency or movement $ith an intelligiility of its OWHL He calls
the collective suFect of this striving Emin!E or Es"iritE ?/etst@. [The $hole
of humanity constitutes such a collective suFect4 an! so !o the "eo"les or
Enational s"iritsE of "articular cultures.
The Hegelian conce"t of s"irit is Often ri!icule! as a elief in Egrou"
min!s.E This is easiest to !o $hen one thin#s of a min! in the Cartesian
$ay4 as a nons"atiat interior "lace $here immaterial items ?calle! y such
names as Ethoughts4E Ei!eas4E or Ere"resentationsE@ enact a microcosmic
!rama efore an au!ience that4 as a matter of logical necessity4 is limite! to
a single s"ectator. Hegel4 ho$ever4 has a more Aristotelian conce"tion of
mentality. :or him4 min! is a #in! of form or organiDation e>hiite! y a
o!y in its structure an! ehavior. This enales us to hy"othesiDe that the
collective ehavior of human eings might !is"lay an organiDation analogous
to the mentality e>hiite! y the ehavior of human in!ivi!uals; When it is
not foun!e! on metho!ological !ogmatism4 our resistance to Hegel's tal# of
national s"irits an! the $orl! s"irit "roaly !erives from a sense that such
tal# grossly e>aggerates the e>tent of the organiDation an! functional inter!e"en!ence
!is"laye! y the thoughts an! activities of nations ?an! of humanity
as a $hole@. That nee! not "revent us from treating Hegel's conce"tion
of s"irit as something to $hich the reality of society an! history may a""ro>imate4
even if there really is no such entity as the E$orl! s"irit.E
'9
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
:or Hegel4 s"irit's self;a$areness or Eself;relationE is $hat Hegel calls
EsuFective s"iritE ?E/ N )+(@. &n other $or!s4 it is nothing over an! aove
the consciousness that in!ivi!uals have of s"irit's activity. &nsofar as human
eings give s"irit's strivings after self;actualiDation the e>ternal4 sustantial
sha"e of a functioning social or!er4 Hegel calls this social or!er EoFective
s"iritE ?E/ NN )+(4 *+)A cf. 2. N 5=@. -ut the !ee!s of s"irit are also nothing
over an! aove the !ee!s that in!ivi!uals !o in s"irit's ehalf. &t is only in
in!ivi!uals that the "o$ers of s"irit ecome conscious an! actual ?2. N '*(@.
Hegel's "ractical "hiloso"hy in the 2hiloso"hy of .ight "resents a system
of oFective s"irit for mo!ern culture4 the latest an! the !ee"est form in
$hich s"irit has attaine! to #no$le!ge of its essence an! e>"resse! that essence
in a social $orl!. Li#e the classical ethical theories of 2lato4 Aristotle4
an! the 0toics4 Hegel's "ractical "hiloso"hy is ase! on a conce"tion of an
encom"assing human goo! $hich is oFective in the sense that it is not re!ucile
to the contingent !esires an! "references of "articular human eings.
Those !esires an! "references are in a general $ay !irecte! to$ar! the goo!4
ut they can e ase! on false eliefs aout $hat it is.
The life that actualiDes me4 of course4 may not e the same as $hat actualiDes
youA the goo! of one "erson !iMers from the goo! of another. -ut these
!iMerences themselves are not merely acci!ental. They can e un!erstoo! at
least "artly in terms of the nee!s an! values "ertaining to the in!ivi!uals'
!iMering social an! historical circumstances. The goo! of a "articular in!ivi!ual
is a !eterminate form of the goo! of s"irit4 an! it can e un!erstoo!
in terms of the goo! of s"irit.
&n the classical tra!ition4 the Gnal human goo! is calle! Eha""inessE ?eu!aemonia@.
&t is conceive! as the "erfection or self;actualiDation of human
nature4 $hich $as i!entiGe! $ith the rational element or ca"acity of the human
soul. We $ill see in N 9 of this cha"ter that Hegel's ethical theory !iMers
signiGcantly in form from these classical theories4 at least if they are inter"rete!
as teleological theories4 foun!e! on a Gnal human en! or "ur"ose. Hegel's
theory is ase! instea! on a conce"tion of human nature Z on $hat Hegel
calls the E!eterminationE ?-estimmung@ or Efun!amental !eterminationE
?/run!estimmung@ of s"irit ; $here -estimmung signiGes simultaneously
the nature of s"irit an! its vocation4 Fust as human self;a$areness itself is
simultaneously an a$areness of $hat & am an! of $hat & strive to !o an! to
e.
&t also !iMers signiGcantly from them in content. :or Hegel4 as for the
classical theorists4 the human essence or vocation is relate! closely to the
e>ercise of our rational "o$ers4 oth theoretical an! "ractical. Hegel's name
for the human !etermination4 ho$ever4 is not Eha""inessE ut Efree!omE
?2. N *A %/ (*<*=A %2. *C '6'A E/ N )+5@. &n Cha"ter 54 $e $ill ta#e a
closer loo# at $hat Hegel means y Efree!om.E &n Cha"ter )4 $e $ill investigate
his reasons for regar!ing free!om rather than ha""iness as the Gnal human
goo!. &n the remain!er of the "resent cha"ter4 $e $ill try to see ho$
Hegel articulates the self;un!erstan!ing of human eings in mo!ern society4
5 6
0EL:;ACTUAL&VAT&ON
an! ho$ he attem"ts to use this self;un!erstan!ing to !evelo" a !istinctive
ethical theory.
). ,o!ern self;un!erstan!ing
We often hear that Hegel's ethical thought is oriente! more to$ar! society
than to$ar! the in!ivi!ual. There is a foun!ation in reality for saying this.
Hegel's 2hiloso"hy of .ight elongs to EoFectiveE rather than EsuFectiveE
s"iritC Hegel's ethical system is a theory of rational social life rather than a
theory of in!ivi!ual con!uct. -ut "roaly its chief foun!ation is Hegel's
elief that rational in!ivi!uals actualiDe their free!om most fully $hen they
"artici"ate in a state ?2. N 5(+@. Li#e utilitarianism4 Hegel's ethical theory
tells in!ivi!uals to !evote themselves to the goo! of society4 not solely to
their o$n "rivate goo!. -ut utilitarianism treats the social goo! as a sim"le
sum of in!ivi!ual goo!sA Hegel thin#s of it in terms of a certain institutional
structure that is a Euniversal en!4E valuale in itself an! not merely as a
means to the goo! of in!ivi!uals. That is !outless one reason $hy Hegel's
ethical theory culminates in the !escri"tion of a rational social or!er4 an! not
in an account of the goo! life for an in!ivi!ual or a !octrine of !uties for the
regulation of our "rivate lives.
Nevertheless4 the !evelo"mental structure of the theory "resente! in the
2hiloso"hy of .ight is !ictate! not y collective en!s ut y a certain conce"tion
of the mo!ern human in!ivi!ual ; or4 more accurately4 a system or !evelo"ing
series of such conce"tions. &t is this system of self;images4 together
$ith the necessary forms of activity corres"on!ing to it4 that foun!s the com"le>
system of social institutions constituting the Hegelian rational state. The
rational state is an en! in itself only ecause the highest stage of in!ivi!ual
self;actualiDation consists in "artici"ating in the state an! recogniDing it as
such an en!. This means that Hegel's ethical theory is after all foun!e! on
a conce"tion of in!ivi!ual human eings an! their self;actualiDation. Even
the state's rationality is groun!e! on the fact that the in!ivi!ual $ill is actualiDe!
through "artici"ating in it an! contriuting to it as a universal en!.
&n that sense4 Hegel's ethical thought is oriente! to the in!ivi!ual4 not the
collective.
We can see this in Hegel's "roce!ure in the 2hiloso"hy of .ight. This oo#
is a fuller version of the science of EoFective s"irit4E "art of the thir! volume
of Hegel's Encyclo"e!ia of 2hiloso"hical 0ciences ?E/ NN *+);((5@. As in
the Encyclo"e!ia4 the &ntro!uction to the 2hiloso"hy of .ight "resents a "hiloso"hical
"ro"ae!eutic to oFective s"irit ?2. N 5@ !ra$n from Hegel's treatment
of the $ill or E"ractical s"iritE ?E/ NN *79;*+5@4 $hich is the Gnal
stage in the !evelo"ment of EsuFective s"irit4E of in!ivi!ual "sychology ?E/
NN )+=4 **6@. Hegel's !iscussion of Ethe free $illE in the &ntro!uction !eals
$ith the human in!ivi!ual as a rational agent $hose free!om is to e actualiDe!.
Hegel tells us that of the three "rinci"al "arts of the 2hiloso"hy of .ight
5'
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
?Astract .ight4 ,orality4 Ethical Life@4 only the thir! !eals $ith human
eings in their concretenessA Astract .ight an! ,orality are Eastract momentsE
?2. N ))@. Their images of the in!ivi!ual are onesi!e!4 an! the
truth containe! in these images is est a""reciate! $hen $e see ho$ they are
actualiDe! in social institutions elonging to ethical life ?2. N '*'.A cf. 2.
NN 56=4 569@. -ut oth images are very im"ortant4 ecause they are characteristically
mo!ern4 re"resenting a !ee"er human self;a$areness than $as
availale to any "remo!ern culture. The follo$ing sections ?NN *;=@ of this
cha"ter $ill rieJy e>amine the system of human self;images that elong to
this mo!ern self;un!erstan!ing4 an! so constitute the elements of Hegel's
ethical theory.
*. Astract right
Astract right is ase! on a !istinctive human self;imageC the "erson4 a eing
Eca"ale of aritrary free choice ?2. N )(4.@ an! !eman!ing res"ect for this
ca"acity in the form of an e>ternal s"here $ithin $hich to e>ercise it ?2. N
*'@. This ma#es a "erson a "ro"erty o$ner4 a suFect of !ominion over "art
of the e>ternal $orl! ?2. N **@. 2ro"erty in this sense of course "rominently
inclu!es the right of "ossession over e>ternal things4 ut even more asically
it inclu!es the "ossession of one's o$n o!y an! life ?2. N.N *=;*+@. Hegel's
vie$ on this "oint is antici"ate! y Loc#e4 for $hom the right of E"ro"ertyE
inclu!es not only the right over one's Eestate4E ut also ; an! more fun!amentally
; the rights to life an! lierty.) A "erson is therefore a suFect of
rights ?2. N )7@ ; the sort of rights that the tra!ition4 calls Enatural rightsE
an! to!ay usually go y the name of Ehuman rights.EU
?HFegel thin#s that the conce"t of a "erson in this seEnse Grst came to e>ercise
an im"ortant social inJuence at the time ofFm"erial .ome ?2. N )(=A cf.
2h/ '' *==;*+)A %2/ )+6;)+(<)'*;)'+@UUTlie earlier ethical life of /reece4
$hich "rece!e! the !evelo"ment of "ersonality in this sense4 consiste! in a
eautiful imme!iate harmony. This $as a harmony et$een humanity an!
nature an! also a social harmony. &t $as a harmony et$een in!ivi!uals4 an!
$ithin each in!ivi!ual it $as a harmony et$een the in!ivi!ual's EuniversalityE
an! E"articularity4E et$een an in!ivi!ual's "ro"er selfhoo! an! her social
role. &n!ivi!uals sim"ly i!entiGe! their self;interest an! self;$orth $ith
theFr e>cellences as memers of the communityA
?.eJection inevitaly !istinguishe! these t$o si!es of the in!ivi!ual's life
from each other4 an! this le! to the !issolution of the eautiful harmony
of classical /ree# life<Jn!ivi!uals came to see themselves as nee!ing social
"rotection against others an! against the $hole. Hegel inter"rets .oman culture4
$ith its em"hasis on the legal rights an! "rivileges of in!ivi!uals4 as
the heir to this socially alienate! an! self;"rotective attitu!e. Contrary to
most lieral theory4 Hegel thin#s that such a culture fosters "olitical autocracy4
ecause the universal that $as'once share! y in!ivi!uals ten!s to ta#e
u" resi!ence in a single seat of "olitical "o$er4 the im"erial lor!U@
Hust as $hen a "hysical o!y is corru"te!4 each "oint $ins a life of its o$n for
55
0EL:;ACTUAL&VAT&ON
itself4 $hich ho$ever is only the $retche! life of $orms4 so here the state organism
is !issolve! into the atoms of "rivate "ersons. 0uch a con!ition is the life of .omeC
on the one si!e fate an! the astract universality of Tim"erialU lor!shi"4 on the other
the in!ivi!ual astraction4 the "erson4 $hich contains the !etermination that the in!ivi!ual
is something in itself not through its life4 or its fulGlle! in!ivi!uality4 ut as
an astract in!ivi!ual. ?%2/ )+*<)'=@
& &n "agan .ome4 some ha! the right of "ersonality4 ut some $ere e>clu!e!
froGi it y their status as slaves. Hegel thin#s it $as Christianity that Grst
lai! a foun!ation for the i!ea every in!ivi!ual is a "erson4 an! it is only in
the mo!ern $orl! that this Christian i!ea ha! foun! its $ay systematically
into social reality=E&t is over a millennium an! a half since the free!om of
the "erson has egun through Christianity to lossom an! ecome a universal
"rinci"le among a small "art of the human raceE ?2. N 75.@. "Ohe Orientals
#ne$ only that one is free4 the /ree# an! .oman $orl! that some are free.
Only the /ermanic nations in Christianity have come to the consciousness
that the human eing as human is freeE ?%/ 75;7)<(*@. This "rocess of self#no$le!ge
$as associate! $ith the rise of another im"ortant mo!ern selGmageC
the moral suFectUY
(. ,orality
The suFect is the EreJection of the TfreeU $ill into itself an! its i!entity for
itself over against eing in itself an! imme!iacyE ?2. N '6(@ HAs a s u F e c t &
atten! to my o$n $illing an! the $ay in $hich my e>ternal actions can e
Fu!ge! as e>"ressions of it. Thus morality is concerne! not only $ith my
assertion of my right to act freely $ithin a "ro"er s"here4 ut also $ith the
$orth of my Lions as measure! y the goo!ness or a!ness of my $ill ?2.
NN i)i;i))@&Xoral $ill is essentially a striving to overcome the ga" et$een
the oFective an! the suFective4 an! to give itself a real e>"ression in the
oFective $orl! ?2. NN +;94 '69@. Thus morality is inevitaly concerne! $ith
the scoge of my moral res"onsiility for $hat ha""ens in the $orl! ?2. NN
''(;'56=( &t is res"ect for "eo"le as suFects that ma#es us "lace value on
$hat H0gel calls EsuFective free!om4E action from reasons that the agents
a""rove on the asis of their o$n conscience an! their in!ivi!ual thin#ing
?2. NN ')54 ')7;')+4 55+.4 5=*@.
Hegel is #no$n as a critic of the moral stan!"oint4 es"ecially as it is re"resente!
in the ethical thought of 3ant an! :ichte. -ut at least after his Hena
"erio!4 suFective free!om an! morality "lay an im"ortant role in Hegel's
o$n ethical thoughtC
The sustance of s"irit is free!om. &ts en! in the historical "rocess is given along
$ith thisC it is the free!om of the suFect to have its o$n conscience an! morality4 to
have its o$n universal en!s for itself an! to ma#e them vali!A the suFect must have
inGnite value an! also come to consciousness of this e>tremity. What is sustantial in
the $orl! s"irit's en! is reache! through the free!om of each in!ivi!ual. ?%/ 7*<((@
[Hegel thin#s that morality4 the conce"tion of the self as a suFect4 is the
5)
HE/EL&AN ETH&CALXTHEO.1
most !istinctive feature of ChristianiDe! mo!ernity. The !issolution of ancient
ethical life un!er the .oman em"ire le! to a culture in $hich in!ivi!uals
$ere alienate! from their common social life. Their o$n social essence
assume! the form of the em"eror4 a su"reme "erson $ith all the legal "erson's
tyrannical aritrariness ?2h/ ''*+'A %2/ )+6;)+(<)'*;)'+@. The s"iritual
life of in!ivi!uals4 alienate! from the real social $orl!4 turne! in$ar!
?2. N ')+.@. Their self;loss ecame the suMering an! unha""iness of the
self;alienate! in!ivi!ual ?2h/ &Jf 56=;5'64 *+);*+*4 =(';=(5A %2/ )++<
)56@. &n this crisis the ancient $orl! naturally turne! to a religion of Heraic
origin ecause Here$ religious culture4 $ith its s"irit of sumission to the
la$ of a single Fealous /o!4 alien to oth nature an! humanity4 ha! long
een a veritale school of self;alienation ?2. N )(+A cf. %2/ 5*';5*(<'9(;
'9+A TH 5=*;59=<ETW '+5;56(@. Christianity egan as an e>"ression of selfalienation4
in the "ractical forms of self;chastisement ?Vucht@ an! culture
?-il!ung@ ?%2/t )++<)56@. -ut its vocation $as eIually to overcome alienation4
at least on the "lane of religious thougGtFF E0"irit thrust ac# into itself
in the e>treme of its asolute negativity gras"s the turning "oint in an! for
itself4 the inGnite "ositivity of this4 its in$ar!ness4 the "rinci"le of the unity
of !ivine an! human nature4 reconciliationE ?2. N )(+@.
?Hegel thin#s that the most signiGcant im"act of Christian !isci"line an!
reconciliation $as not their rece"tion y the culture! "eo"les of classical antiIuity.
&nstea!4 it $as their inJuence on the Euro"ean ararians $hose
cultural history $asto contriute to the creation of a ne$ $orl! or!er on the
asis of ChristianityX These E/ermanicE "eo"les ?germanische %ol#er@ ?a
term Hegel uses in a very roa! sense4 encom"assing all the ChristianiDe!
nations of Euro"e@* ha! as their most note$orthy characteristic Ethe sensation
of natural totality4E to $hich Hegel gives the name /emiit or /emutlich#eit.
These are !iLcult $or!s to translateC The meaning of gemutlich inclu!es
frien!ly4 goo!;nature!4 cosy4 hearty4 Fovial4 convivial4 easy;going. &n
one "lace4 /emiit is eIuate! $ith EheartE ?HerD@ ?%2/ *5*<)()@. Hegel !escries
?/emiit@ as Ethis enclose!4 in!eterminate totality of s"irit4 in $hich
a human eing has Fust as universal an! in!eterminate a satisfaction in himselfE
?%2/ *5)<)(6@. /emiit is o""ose! to Echaracter4E $hich asserts itself
through a !eterminate form of the $ill an! in ehalf of a !eterminate interest4
such as $ealth or honor. /emiit has no !eterminate en!4 no "articular
content. &t is Eformal $illE or EsuFective free!om as $illfulness ?Eigensinn@E
?%g/ *5)<)(6;)('@.
[HHLegel relates the /emiit of the /ermanic ararians to the s"irit of in!ivi!ual
free!om an! "ersonal in!e"en!ence that sho$e! itself in their social
institutions. EThis element of free!om4 $hen it is carrie! over into a social
relation4 can "osit nothing ut "o"ular communities4 so that these communities
com"rise the $hole an! every memer of the community4 as such is a
free man. ,ur!er can e atone! for y a monetary "ayment4 ecause the
free man is vali! an! remains so4 $hatever he might have !oneE ?%2/ *5(<
)()@. Among /ermanic "eo"les4 social on!s $ere forme! not through la$s
or "rinci"les of right4 nor even through a collective aim to e achieve!4 ut
5*
0EL:;ACTUAL&VAT&ON
rather on the asis of "ersonal EG!elityE ?Treue@C E&n!ivi!uals attache!
themselves to other in!ivi!uals through free choice or aritrariness ?mit
freier Will#ur@ an! their associations $ere confe!erations of "rivate com"acts
anFXaritrary "rivate rightsE ?%2/ *5(;*57<)();)(*@==
?S6 this /ermanic s"irit Christianity rought t$o things. :irst4 it gave
!e"th to the /ermanic self y su""lying it $ith an oFect of concern a!eIuate
to engage its $hole selfhoo!C E/emiit has no "articular contentA ut
Christianity !eals "recisely $ith the Thing ?0ache@4 $ith the content as
oFect. = ' . The in!eterminate as sustance4 oFectively4 is the $holly universal
;E/o!A ut the other moment in Christianity is concrete unity4 that
the in!ivi!ual $ill is ta#en u" y /o! in grace. . . . The suFect must no$
also $in oFective form4 i.e.4 unfol! itself as oFectE ?%2/ *5)<)('@.T0econ!4
Christianity infecte! the /ermanic "eo"les $ith self;alienation4 the se"aration
of sacre! an! secy#FXan! the self;loss of the in!ivi!ual self in the forsa#en
$orl! of actuality ' Out of this4 the Ehar!nessE of the /ermanic EheartE
$as Ero#en an! mello$e! y the frightful chastisement of the mi!!le agesE
?%2/ *+=<*6=@. The human o!y $as "ut in on!age y feu!al serf!om4
an! the soul $as in servitu!e to the church. /ermanic self;$ill ecame something
evil4 !eserving of this chastisement4 $hile at the sarIRtime the in!ivi!u
al self $as i!entiGe! $ith the asolute oFect4 $ith /o!.H
?The result of this "rocess $as a !ivision $ithin the selMan internaliDation
of the out$ar! servitu!e4 an! the emergence of a ne$ #in! of self4 one that
regar!s itself as free only $hen it sees itself as its o$n master. To this self4
lieration consists in ringing the "articular self;$ill into conformity $ith
the universal. Hegel has a s"ecial name for this tas# of lieration through a
self;!isci"lineC He calls it -il!ung ; Eculture4E Ee!ucation4E or ?self;@formation.
&t is out of the !isci"line of -il!ung that there emerges the true volitional
EsuFectE or moral self ?2h/ 'f'f *++;*+9A %/ 7(;77<(7;(=@=Y
u n morality4 the "rimitive /ermanic res"ect for the integrity oftne in!ivi!ual
self is "reserve!4 yet the self is no$ i!entiGe! not $ith its "assing
fancy or aritrary self;$illF ut $ith the Euniversal $illE or E$ill in itselfE
$hich it is the tas# of the suFect to actualiDe ?L FF '674 .@A &n!ivi!ual
free!om is value! ecause it is reIuire! for this tasEHan! not merely out of
"rimitive /ermanic stuornness. This is the moral$ay of thin#ing4 $hich
has come to e an im"ortant "art of mo!ern culture an! common sense4 an!
!istinguishes mo!ernity !ecisively from earlier stages of the human s"irit.
,ore than anything else4 it is $hat gives mo!ern Euro"ean culture a !ee"er
un!erstan!ing of human nature than non;Euro"ean cultures4 an! !ee"er
than earlier stages of itself ?%/ (7<*+4 7';7)<(*;((@.
7. ,o!ern ethical life
The "erson an! the suFect are astractions4 incom"lete or one;si!e! images
of the in!ivi!ual human self4 $hich are overcome only $hen in!ivi!uals are
consi!ere! in relation to Eethical lifeE ?0ittlich#eit@. Hegel i!entiGes ethical
life $ith Ethe oFective ethical or!erE ?2. N '**@4 the Eethical sustance4E to
5(
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
$hich "articular in!ivi!uals relate as Eacci!entsE ?2. N '*(@. &t is aove all
in his conce"tion of ethical life that Hegel seems to assert the "rimacy of the
social over the in!ivi!ual. -ut $e have Fust seen that free suFectivity itself
is the !istinctive "rinci"le of mo!ern ethical life. Ethical life is more concrete
than astract right an! morality not ecause it em"hasiDes the collective over
the in!ivi!ual4 ut ecause the ethical image of the in!ivi!ual is a more concrete
one. &t a!!resses every si!e of the in!ivi!ual self4 an! situates the self
in a living social or!er.
What is most asic or "rimitive to a self4 its Grst nee!4 is love4 Es"irit's
feeling of its o$n unity.E &t Gn!s its ethical "lace in the family4 $here one
has Ethe self;consciousness of Tone'sU in!ivi!uality in this unity as an essentiality
in an! for itself4 so that in it one is not a "erson for oneself ut a
memerE ?2. N '(+@. Hegel thin#s that family life satisGes a fun!amental
human nee! for love or unity $ith others at the level of feeling. He accor!s
such im"ortance to the family that he elieves that half the human race ?the
female se>@ must restrict its s"here of activity to family life ?2. N '77A see
Cha"ter '*4 NN (;7@. -ut Hegel reFects the vie$ of some of his .omantic
contem"oraries4 $ho sa$ the familial "rinci"le as the asis of social life generally.
On the contrary4 in the mo!ern $orl!4 $here in!ivi!uals are free
"ersons4 Hegel thin#s that this "rinci"le must e #e"t carefully circumscrie!.
&n mo!ern society4 for instance4 the family can mean only a nuclear
familyA an e>ten!e! family or clan ?0tamm@ has no status in mo!ern society
ecause it $oul! com"romise the free "ersonality of the clan's a!ult memers
?2. NN '=54 '==4 '+6.@.
Hegel restricts the sco"e of the family as a form of economic organiDation
in or!er to ma#e room for the !istinctively mo!ern social institutionC Ecivil
societyE ?iirgerliche /esellschaft@. Civil society is the system of social relationshi"s
in $hich in!ivi!uals "artici"ate $hen they interact economically as
free4 in!e"en!ent "ersons. One of Hegel's most original contriutions to social
theory is his conce"tion of the mo!ern mar#et economy as a social institution
!istinct from oth the family an! the "olitical state.( Hegel ac#no$le!ges
his !et to the "olitical economists4 $ho stu!ie! the mar#et system
an! its la$s ?2. N '+9.@A ut his original contriution is to see civil society
not merely as the natural result of the interaction of "rivate "ersons ; a conce"tion
Hegel ri!icules4 calling it the Es"iritual animal #ing!omE ?2h/ ,&
)9=;*'+@ ; ut as a social institution4 a !istinctively mo!ern form of human
community4 in!is"ensale for the self;actualiDation of the mo!ern self ?see
Cha"ter '*4 NN ';5@.
Civil society is a social institution4 a form of ethical life4 groun!e! on the
self;image of mo!ern in!ivi!uals4 on a far richer an! more com"le> image
of the in!ivi!ual self than that $hich groun!s the family. &t is only $ithin
civil society that the self as "erson gains concreteness4 through the economic
relation of "rivate "ro"erty o$ners ?2. N '+5@ recogniDe! y the system of
legal Fustice ?2. NN 569;559@. &t is also chieJy in the contingent interactions
of "rivate "ersons aMor!e! y civil society that moral suFectivity Gn!s free
sco"e for its activity ?2. NN 56=4 5*5@. The human self;images of "erson an!
57
0EL:;ACTUAL&VAT&ON
suFect ecome concrete only in one's self;image as a EurgherE ?-urger@4 a
memer of civil society ?urgerliche /esellschaft@. T&n this conte>t4 Hegel
insists that -urger !oes not mean EcitiDenE ?:renchC citoyen@4 a memer of
the "olitical state4 ut is eIuivalent to the :rench ourgeois ?2. N '96.A cf.
%2.i=C '6+@.U
&t is in his e>"osition of civil society that Hegel ma#es most e>"licit the
fact that it is a series of self;images of the in!ivi!ual human eing that structures
his theory of oFective s"iritC E&n TastractU right4 the oFect is the
"erson4 in the moral stan!"oint it is the suFect4 an! in the family it is the
family memer4 in civil society in general it is the urgher ?as ourgeois@A here
at the stan!"oint of nee! it is the concretum forme! y conce"tion $hich $e
call a human eing ?,ensch@E ?2. N '96.@. We un!erstan! ourselves as Ehuman
eingsE $hen $e thin# of ourselves as eings $ith Enee!sE ; oth animal
nee!s an! nee!s engen!ere! y social life ?2. N '96@. Thus Hegel characteriDes
a Ehuman eingE as Ea concrete $hole of many "o$ersE $hose Een!E is
its o$n E"articular suFectivityE ?%2.'=C '69;''6@. We might say that our
conce"tion of ourselves as Ehuman eingsE is our conce"tion of ourselves
sim"ly as consumers of $hat civil society "ro!uces. As Ehuman eingsE $e
are concerne! $ith "ur o$n $elfare ?cf. 2. 4NN '96.4 '5)@4 an! $e are in!uce!
to "artici"ate in civil society sim"ly in or!er to satisfy our nee!s an!
a!vance our $elfare ?2. N '97@.
&t is not true4 ho$ever4 to say that Ecivil society4 for Hegel4 is essentially
the mar#et an! its legal frame$or#.E7 The ourgeois is not sim"ly the selGntereste!
homo oeconomicus. Once human eings are !ra$n into the life an!
laor of civil society4 Hegel thin#s that they receive through it oth a theoretical
an! "ractical e!ucation ?-il!ung@ ?2. N '9=@. &n!ivi!uals "artici"ate in
civil society as "art of a "articular EestateE ?0tan!@4 $hich gives them a !eGnite
social Estan!ingE or E"ositionE ?0tan!@ in civil society ?2. N 56'@. Their
image of themselves comes to e oun! u" $ith the honor or !ignity of their
estate ?0tan!esehre@4 through $hich they gain recognition oth in their o$n
eyes an! in the eyes of others ?2. N 56=@. At the same time they acIuire ethical
!is"ositions4 values4 an! interests in common $ith others in their estate4 an!
this lea!s to a sense of soli!arity $ith these others4 institutionaliDe! in cor"oration
memershi" ?2. N 5('A see Cha"ter '*4 NN );*@. A urgher thus ecmes
a Eman $ith a tra!e or "rofessionE ?/e$ersmann@4 $hose sense of !ignity an!
self;$orth is oun! u" $ith the s#ill an! ethical rectitu!e ?.echtschaFfenheit@
$hich he !is"lays in his $or# ?2. N 5().@. :inally4 the urgher's concerns as
a "rofessional man an! a cor"oration memer "rominently inclu!e concerns
aout the $elfare of others an! aout the common goo! of civil society as a
$hole. &n this $ay4 the in!ivi!ual's "artici"ation in civil society "asses over
naturally into the universal life of the state ?2. N 5(7@.
=. The mo!ern state
Hegel regar!s the state as the highest actualiDation of the in!ivi!ual's free!om
?2. N 5(=@. &n relation to the state4 the in!ivi!ual is a citiDen ?2. NN
5=
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
57'.4 57(A@4 a -urger als citoyen ?%2.'= C 9*@. As such4 ho$ever4 in!ivi!uals
are also memers of the state ?2. NN 5(+.4 57'.@4 "arts of a $hole as
memers of a family are. &n this res"ect4 the state is unli#e civil society4
$here the !iMerentiation or se"aration of in!ivi!uals is the fun!amental !eterminant
of their relationshi" to one another ?2. NN '+'4 '+*4 '+74 57).@.
,emershi" in the state is also fun!amentally !iMerent from memershi"
in the familyC EThe family is also ethical4 only the en! is not a conscious one
. . . ut Tin the stateU the groun!4 the Gnal truth4 is s"irit4 $hich is Tthe
state'sU universal en! an! conscious oFectE ?2. N 57)A@. &n the family4 the
social $hole is not a conscious en!A the in!ivi!ual's commitment to this institution
is al$ays e>"erience! as an imme!iate feeling of love for other "articular
in!ivi!uals. -ut citiDens !evote themselves to the state as an institution4
$ith an e>"licit "olitical constitution. Their "artici"ation in the state ta#es
the form not of imme!iate feeling ut of rational thought ?2. N 5(=.@.
The state is an Een! in itselfE ?2. N 5(=@C EUniGcation as such is itself the
Tstate'sU true content an! en!4 an! the in!ivi!ual's vocation is to lea! a universal
lifeE ?2. N 5(=.@. Hegel has often een criticiDe! for hol!ing that
"artici"ation in the state gives to in!ivi!uals a universal en!4 over an! aove
the "articular $ell;eing of its in!ivi!ual memers. He certainly !oes hol!
this. -ut it is a serious !istortion of Hegel's meaning to thin# that the goo!
of in!ivi!uals is su""ose! to e s$allo$e! u" in4 or sacriGce! to4 some Iuite
!iMerent en!. Hegel maintains that the mo!ern state $or#s only ecause the
universal life of the state "rovi!es for the suFective free!om an! "articular
ha""iness of its memers. The ErationalityE of the mo!ern state consists in
the Ethoroughgoing unity of universality an! in!ivi!ualityE ?2. N 5(=.@.
EThe "rinci"le of mo!ern states has this tremen!ous strength an! !e"th4
that it lets the "rinci"le of suFectivity com"lete itself in the in!e"en!ent
e>treme of "ersonal "articularity4 an! simultaneously rings it ac# to sustantial
unityE ?2. N 576@.
Hegel reFects the common vie$ that "atriotism is the rea!iness to ma#e
sacriGces for the sa#e of one's country. He insists that it is rather Ethe !is"osition
that haitually #no$s the community as the sustantial foun!ation an!
en! in the usual con!itions an! relationshi"s of lifeE ?2. N 57+.@. :ar from
eing a !is"osition to sacriGce oneself for the state4 "atriotism is closely allie!
to Etrust4E the sense that one's o$n "articular self;interest is Econtaine! an!
"reserve! in another'sC $herey this other is imme!iately no other for me4
an! in this consciousness & am freeE ?2. N 57+@.
Hegel !oes hol! that all "articular interests must give $ay to the universal
interest of the state in time of $ar ?2. NN )5);)5(@. -ut he !oes so "recisely
ecause he ta#es $ar to e the e>treme case in $hich the universal interest
can ?for once@ e clearly !istinguishe! from the "articular. The state has
EstailityE only insofar as the universal en! is Ei!enticalE $ith "articular en!s
?2. N 57( A@A $ar strengthens the state only in the sense that it "oses a threat
to its staility4 an! a healthy state gro$s stronger for overcoming the threat.
Hegel as#s e>"licitly $hether the state e>ists for the sa#e of its citiDens4 or
$hether the state is an en! an! they are its instruments. He re"lies y !eny;
5+
0EL:;ACTUAL&VAT&ON
ing oth alternatives4 ecause the state is an organic unity in $hich no memer
is en! an! none is means ?%/ ''5<9(@4 Else$here he insists that Ethe en!
of the state is the ha""iness of the citiDensE ?2. N 57(A@. Hegel's vie$ at
this "oint is not4 after all4 so very !iMerent from that of Hohn 0tuart ,ill4
$ho hol!s that an in!ivi!ual's life has meaning only $hen !evote! to a social
or collective goo!4 a Egoo! to the aggregate of all "ersons4E $hich is "ursue!
in concert $ith others.= :or the content of this en!4 neither ,ill nor Hegel
can conceive of anything e>ce"t the $ell;eing of in!ivi!uals $ho com"rise
the collective.
-ut there is an im"ortant !iMerence in the $ay in $hich the t$o "hiloso"hers
thin# of in!ivi!ual $ell;eing4 an! so of the collective human en!.
-ecause an in!ivi!ual for Hegel is al$ays a "ro!uct of a !eterminate social
or!er4 he conceives of the human goo! not astractly4 as the ma>imiDing of
"leasures4 ut as an ethical life "rovi!ing for the in!ivi!ual's self;actualiDation
as "erson4 suFect4 family memer4 urgher4 an! citiDen. This structure
reaches its highest "oint in the "olitical state4 ecause there the structure of
social life is consciously #no$n an! $ille! for the sa#e of its rationality.
The state is an institution in $hich human eings ma#e rational collective
!ecisions aout the;form of their life together. &n the family4 such !ecisions
are very limite!4 not only in sco"e ut also through the fact that the family
is hel! together y feelings of love rather than y rational thought. &n civil
society4 the common mo!e of life is the result of rational choices4 ut of
isolate! in!ivi!ual choices4an! not collective ones. :or this reason4 civil society
can e a""rehen!e! as a rational form of social life only from the higher
stan!"oint of the state4 an! Hegel !escries the rationality of civil society as
an illusion or Esho$E ?0chein@ ?2. N '+9@. &n the state4 Hegel thin#s that
social life ase! on rational choice is ho longer a mere a""earance ut a living
institutional reality.
The term EstateE for Hegel has a roa!er an! a narro$er meaningC E0tateE
refers to the $hole organiDe! e>istence of a "eo"le4 inclu!ing its family life
an! its civil societyA ut it also refers4 more narro$ly to a set of "olitical
institutions ?2. N 57=A %/ ''*;''(<97;9=@. The t$o meanings are connecte!4
ecause it is only in the "olitical state that the form of social life
ecomes an oFect of rational human choiceC Only there is it true that Ethe
state #no$s $hat it $ills4 an! #no$s it in its universality4 as something
thoughtE ?2. N 5=6@.
Hegel has other reasons for regar!ing the "olitical state as the highest actualiDation
of free!om ?2. N 5(=@. He regar!s the state as the only social institution
that can claim genuine in!e"en!ence. ,o!ern family life is economically
!e"en!ent on the life of civil societyA oth the family an! civil society
!e"en! on the "olitical state an! are suor!inate to it. The state4 ho$ever4
is sovereign4 !e"en!ent on nothing larger. Unli#e EhumanityE at large or the
3antian Erealm of en!sE com"ose! i!eally of all rational eings4 it is not a
mere mental construct or a creation of the cosmo"olitan moralist's $ishful
imagination. The state has an institutional realityA it is in fact the su"reme
human "o$er on earth.
59
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
The state is an actual reality only ecause it is has Ein!ivi!uality4 as e>clusive
eing for itself4 T$hichU a""ears as a relation to other statesE ?2. N )55@.
Hegel thin#s that human eings unite for the accom"lishment of great en!s
?even en!s of universal or cosmo"olitan $orth@ only $hen they form a !eterminate
social unity4 !istinct from ; at least im"licitly in o""osition to ; others.
Hegel elieves that states are the unities that ma#e history4 Fust as ,ar>
later thought classes $ere.+
0tates are therefore the EmaterialE of $orl! history4 the concrete agents of
$orl!;historical !evelo"ment ?%/ ''';''5<9);9*@. Thus it is through my
relation to my state that & as an in!ivi!ual acIuire a genuine an! "ositive
relation to the "rocess of $orl! history ?2. N )*+@. Hegers insistence that
each in!ivi!ual's su"reme !uty is to e a memer of the state ?2. N 5(+@ is
therefore not a reFection of the i!ea that the in!ivi!ual shoul! as"ire to "lXy
a role in the universal life of the human race. On the contrary4 Hegel thin#s
that it is only through "artici"ation in the state that in!ivi!uals can realistically
ho"e that their actions $ill gain such a universal signiGcance.
HegelX "icture of the state has lost a goo! !eal of its cre!iility in our
century. The "olitical states $e #no$ have long een !ivi!e! into great $orl!
em"iresA the "olitical "rocesses of even the most "o$erful states are at the
mercy of multinational cor"orations an! other geo"olitical social an! economic
inJuences. 0tate sovereignty is sometimes a Fust !eman!4 sometimes
an unconvincing "loy ?sometimes oth at once@4 sometimes an a""ro>imation4
sel!om a full reality. &f the most "o$erful states may still claim to e
the greatest "o$ers on earth4 even they have cre!ile com"etitors in the form
of international "olitical or religious movements4 as $ell as !rug cartels an!
other multinational cor"orations.
:or these reasons4 it is only too evi!ent to us that the "olitical state cannot
"lay the role4 $hether in the life of the in!ivi!ual or in the collective life of
the human race4 $hich Hegel trie! to assign it. -ut it !oesn't follo$ that $e
as rational eings !on't have the nee!s that the Hegelian state $as su""ose!
to fulGll. Hegel's theory of the state may still teach us a great !eal aout
ourselves an! our as"irations4 even if the lesson cannot have the Foyful eMect
on us Hegel inten!e! it to have ?2. 2reface 5=@.
+. A self;actualiDation theory
&n NN *;= of this cha"ter4 $e have ta#en a rief loo# at the human self;images
that form the elements of Hegel's ethical theory. This has le! us to the social
institutions $ithin $hich Hegel thin#s the mo!ern self can e actualiDe!.
No$ it is time to as# ourselves $hat sort of an ethical theory this might e.
The t$o commonest mo!els for ethical theory are the !eontological an!
the teleological. Deontological theories are ase! on a la$ or "rinci"le that
tells us $hat to !o an! $hat not to !o4 an ultimate im"erative or set of im"eratives
that $e are su""ose! to oey. This theory selects the actions to e
"erforme! y their conformity to the relevant set of comman!ments. -ilical
)6
0EL:;ACTUAL&VAT&ON
ethics is !eontological4 as is 3antian ethics. Teleological theories are ase!
on a conce"tion of some en! or set of en!s that is to e realiDe! in action.
They select actions as instruments to the en!. Utilitarianism is a teleological
theory4 as are the various forms of egoistic eu!aemonism foun! in classical
/ree# ethics.
Hegel's ethical theory !oes not Gt either mo!el very comfortaly. Li#e
3antian ethics4 it is ase! on the value of free!om or rational selfhoo!. -ut
Hegel esche$s the term EautonomyE an! the image of moral self;legislation4
ecause he $ants to avoi! the i!ea of the rational self as one in $hich one
"art of the self constrains or coerces another "art. Hegelian ethics incor"orates
one im"erative4 the Ecomman!ment of rightEC E-e a "erson an! res"ect
others as "ersonsE ?2. N )7@. This im"erative elongs only to the most astract
ranch of Hegel's theoryA it is essentially incom"lete4 an! its $hole
content is negative ?2. NN )=Z)+@.
&t might seem more a""ro"riate to treat Hegel's theory as teleological. The
theory !oes have a role for an i!ea of the goo! ; Efree!om realiDe!4 the asolutely
Gnal en! of the $orl!E ?2. N '59@. -ut this goo! is not intro!uce!
until 2art T$o4 0ection Three of the 2hiloso"hy of .ight4 an! even then it is
not given $hat Hegel regar!s as a satisfactory content ?2. NN ')*;')(@.
0urely in a teleological theory4 the Grst or!er of usiness is to s"ecify the
goo!4 so as to e in a "osition to select the actions most con!ucive to achieving
it. Hegel4 on the contrary4 has s"eciGe! some of the main categories of
actions that actualiDe free!om ?those regar!ing rights4 those "ursuing the
moral goo!@ efore !eGning their en!s in any satisfactory $ay. &n Hegel's
theory4 the goo! is given !eterminate content along $ith a more !eterminate
account of the actions that actualiDe it.
Hegel's self;actualiDation theory re"resents a !istinctive ty"e of ethical
theory4 !iMerent from oth !eontological an! teleological theories.9 &t egins
neither $ith an im"erative4 la$4 or "rinci"le to e follo$e! nor $ith the i!ea
of an en! to e achieve!. &ts starting "oint is the conce"tion of a certain self
or i!entity to e e>ercise! or actualiDe!4 to e emo!ie! an! e>"resse! in
action. The theory selects the actions to e "erforme! an! the en!s to e
"ursue! ecause they are the actions an! en!s of that #in! of self. &n such a
theory4 la$s an! comman!ments o$e their force to the fact that they turn
out to e "rinci"les $hich the right sort of self $oul! follo$. En!s o$e their
!esiraility to the fact that they turn out to e the en!s $hich that sort of
self $oul! "ursue.
&n such a theory4 it is mislea!ing to consi!er Eself;actualiDationE as the en!
or goal of the self. &f the self is successful4 it !oes actualiDe itself in !oing
the right things an! "ursuing the right en!sA ut the content of this EselfactualiDationE
cannot e s"eciGe! in!e"en!ently of those actions an! en!s.
&n a theory li#e Hegel's4 Eself;actualiDationE is not to egin $ith an en! $ith
a s"eciGale content to $hich such a self !irects its eMorts. :rom one "oint
of vie$4 self;actualiDation is sim"ly a y;"ro!uct of acting in certain $ays4
follo$ing certain "rinci"les an! successfully "ursuing other en!s. -ut it has
)'
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
the a""earance of an en! ecause for a self;actualiDation theory4 these en!s
have their value an! these "rinci"les their force ecause they are the en!s
an! "rinci"les of a certain sort of self.'6
The starting "oint of a self;actualiDation theory is a certain conce"t of $hat
human eings are ; a conce"t that cannot ultimately e !ivorce! from the
"ractical self;concern that elongs necessarily to eing a self. Hegel sees this
as the "oint of the classical inFunction /nothi seauton ?E3no$ thyselfE@ ?E/
N )==@O '\ see#ing the #no$le!ge !eman!e! y this inFunction4 it is oun!
to e ina""ro"riate to try to !ra$ any ultimate !istinction et$een EfactsE
an! Evalues4E or et$een theoretical an! "ractical rationality. As#ing $ith
self;concern $hat it is to e human is the same thing as as#ing $hat sort of
human eing one is to eA it is as#ing aout $hat Hegel calls one's -estimmung
; aout one's nature an! simultaneously aout one's vocation.
This is the reason Hegel's o$n account of EsuFective s"iritE ?of the human
in!ivi!ual@ in the Encyclo"e!ia moves from a !iscussion of emo!iment ?E/
NN )++;*'5@ through consciousness an! reason ?E/ NN *');*)9@ to theoretical
s"irit ?E/ NN **6;*7+@ an! en!s $ith "ractical s"irit ?E/ NN *79;*+6@
!eGning itself as free s"irit ?E/ NN *+';*+5@. Hegel tells us that $hat have
tra!itionally een thought of as the self's !iMerent EfacultiesE are not so much
!iverse ca"acities or activities4 as !iMerent ?an! more or less a!eIuate@ conce"tions
of min! or s"irit itself an! as a $hole4 or stages in its !evelo"ment
to$ar! self;#no$le!ge ?E/ NN )=94A4 )+6@. The E"ractical s"iritE or E$illE
therefore inclu!es the theoretical4 ecause the asis of theoretical concern is
"ractical concern4 concern $ith $hat & am an! am to e ?2. N *A@. An! the
outcome of this concern is the a$areness that $hat & am is free!om4 that is4
a eing $hose vocation is to #no$ itself an! actualiDe its #no$le!ge of itself
?S/N* + i @ .
&t is the !evelo"ment of this simultaneously theoretical an! "ractical selfconce"t
of the human in!ivi!ual in the 2hiloso"hy of .ight $hich $e have
s#etche! in NN (;+ of this cha"ter. We have seen that the scaMol!ing of the
2hiloso"hy of .ight is the !evelo"ing image of the free $ill or self;#no$ing
an! self;concerne! human agent4 conceiving of itself successively4 ever more
concretely an! a!eIuately4 Grst as a E"ersonE "ossessing astract rights4 then
as a EsuFectE $ith a moral vocation4 then in the concrete s"heres of ethical
life as a family memer4 then a urgher4 an! Gnally as a citiDen.
To each of these self;images there corres"on! !eterminate activities4 "rinci"les
to e follo$e!4 an! en!s to e "ursue! an! achieve!4 either in!ivi!ually
?as in the EastractE s"heres of astract right an! morality@ or together
$ith others in the conte>t of !eterminate social institutions ?as in the s"here
of ethical life4 in the family4 civil society4 an! the state@. The "rinci"les an!
en!s4 ho$ever4 are seen as in!ing an! valuale ecause they are $ays in
$hich the free $ill actualiDes the various as"ects or moments of its self#no$le!ge
or i!entity. That is $hat Hegel means $hen he calls the system
of ErightE a system in $hich Efree!om is its o$n oFectE an! !escries &!ea
or self;actualiDe! free $ill as Ethe free $ill that $ills the free $illE ?2. N 5=@.
Cha"ter 5 $ill ta#e u" the conce"t of free!om that Ggures in these claims.
)5
0EL:;ACTUAL&VAT&ON
9. HistoriciDe! naturalism
As a normative ethical theory4 $e have characteriDe! Hegel's theory as a selfactualiDation
theory. On the metaethical level4 it is a variety of ethical realism
or naturalism. Hegel's ethical theory is foun!e! on a conce"tion of human
nature that has im"lications for $hat human eings nee!4 $hat is goo! for
them4 $hat fulGlls or actualiDes them. &n this res"ect4 it may e com"are!
$ith the classical naturalism foun! in the ethical theories of 2lato an! Aristotle.
2lato's theory says that the human soul actualiDes itself $hen each "art
fulGlls its "ro"er function. Aristotle's ethical theory hol!s that the human
goo! consists in the actualiDation of rational ca"acities4 es"ecially the ca"acities
for "ractical reason an! "hiloso"hical contem"lation4 an! it "rovi!es a
theory aout the other things ?such as e>ternal goo!s an! frien!s@ that "eo"le
nee! in or!er to lea! the goo! life. The asis for classical naturalism is a
"sychological theory4 aout the functions of the soul4 the relation among its
!iMerent "arts or faculties4 an! its nee!s4 !esires4 an! natural en!s.
Hegel's theory4 in contrast4 might e calle! a !ialectical or historiciDe!
naturalism. &t vie$s the human nature to e actualiDe! as a historical "ro!uct4
the result of a !ialectical "rocess of e>"erience involving the acIuisition
of self;#no$le!ge4 the struggle to actualiDe the self4 an! an interaction et$een
these activities4 $hich mo!iGes the self that is #no$n an! actualiDe!.
HistoriciDe! naturalism "rovi!es for a variale an! malleale notion of the
human goo! in a $ay that classical naturalism !oes not. The element of truth
in the mislea!ing claim that ,ar>'s social critiIue is not ase! on any i!ea
of Ehuman natureE is that ,ar>'s conce"tion of the human goo!4 li#e its
Hegelian "re!ecessor4 is ase! on a historiciDe! rather than a classical version
of ethical naturalism.
-oth classical an! historiciDe! naturalism are an emarrassment to some
contem"orary ethical naturalists4 ecause they are so unashame!ly "art of a
"hiloso"hical tra!ition of gran! theoriDing aout human nature an! history.
Easily emarrasse! naturalists $oul! rather start $ith "eo"le's conscious !esires
an! "references4 yiel!ing a theory that loo#s more li#e em"irical social
science than ol! fashione! "hiloso"hy. -ut conscious !esires an! "references
are sometimes the result of misinformation4 "athology4 i!eology4 an! other
!istorting "rocesses4 $hose eMects it is one of the tas#s of a theory of the
goo! to e>"ose an! correct. Thus ethical naturalists such as .ichar! -ran!t
an! 2eter .ailton "refer $hat $e might call i!ealiDe! "reference naturalismC
A "erson's goo! is to e i!entiGe! not $ith $hat that "erson in fact !esires
or "refers4 ut $ith $hat the "erson $oul! !esire or "refer if fully informe!
aout an! luci!ly a$are of all the relevant facts.'' Although they !escrie
themselves as Estar# raving moral realists4E i!ealiDe! "reference naturalists
seem to regar! even hy"othetical suFective "references as more real than
or!inary oFective goo!ness an! a!ness.
&!ealiDe! "reference naturalism !e"en!s on a set of rather s"eculative
counterfactual claims. &t is !outful that4 at least in the interesting an! controversial
cases4 they are any easier to Fustify than the central claims of gran!
))
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
theory naturalism ?$hether classical or historiciDe!@. 2erha"s they $oul!
even eneGt from a gran! theory to ac# them u". &!ealiDe! "reference naturalism
suMers from a further !efect $hen $e come to issues aout ho$ chil!ren
are to e raise! an! e!ucate!.'5 &t ma#es no sense to inIuire aout
a ne$orn infant's i!ealiDe! "references unless $e mean to as# aout the
"references it might have as an a!ult4 after it has fully forme! ca"acities to
asor information an! !elierate on the asis of it. The $ay $e raise an
infant4 ho$ever4 $ill "artly !etermine its fully informe! an! luci! "references
as an a!ult. An im"ortant Iuestion aout raising chil!ren is4 Ho$ shall
$e inJuence these "referencesB &!ealiDe! "reference naturalism has no theory
of the ne$orn chil!'s goo! that is in!e"en!ent of $hat its i!ealiDe!
"references $ill e once it is mature enough to have i!ealiDe! "references.
&t seems that i!ealiDe! "reference naturalism has nothing to say to uR aout
ho$ to form the "eo"le $hose i!ealiDe! "references are to e the sole in!icators
of their goo!. -y e>tension4 i!ealiDe! "reference naturalism $ill also
have troule !etermining the goo! of "eo"le elonging to future generations.
Classical naturalism4 on the other han!4 has a general conce"tion of the
human goo!4 an! it can choose the chil!rearing "ractices that $ill ma>imiDe
that. HistoriciDe! naturalism has no general conce"tion of the human goo!4
ut for any infant it $ill e orn into a !eterminate social an! historical
situation4 inheriting from its culture a !eterminate human self;un!erstan!ing.
HistoriciDe! naturalism tells us to choose the chil!rearing "ractices that
$ill actualiDe the self of the ne$orn chil! on that un!erstan!ing.
HistoriciDe! naturalism !oes face a "rolem of in!eterminacy $hen it
comes to the goo! of future generations4 $hich classical naturalism !oes not.
0ome things aout "eo"le's nee!R an! the con!itions of their self;actualiDation
$ill4 no !out4 remain the sameA an! some changes might even e "re!ictale.
1et if human self;un!erstan!ing is al$ays gro$ing4 an! if the action
ase! on it is al$ays mo!ifying an! !ee"ening the nature of human eings4
then the historiciDe! naturalist must confess that our "resent self;conce"tion
is ina!eIuate4 in $ays $e can never ho"e to re"air4 for !eci!ing the goo! of
future human eings.
Hegel is clearly a$are of this limitation4 an! resigne! to it. That is $hy
he tells us that every in!ivi!ual is a chil! of his o$n time4 $hich he can no
more overlea" than he can Fum" over .ho!esA that the O$l of ,inerva egins
its Jight only at !us# ?2. 2reface 5(;57@. The same is true of ,ar>.
:or he insists that communists have no reci"es for the coo#sho"s of the future4
an! no i!eals to realiDe eyon! setting free the ne$ society through
"artici"ating in a historical "rocess that $ill Etransform oth circumstances
an! men.E &t is easier to live $ith these limitations than $ith those that
i!ealiDe! "reference naturalism $oul! im"ose on us. We may comfortaly
lfcave some issues aout the goo! of future human eings to e settle! y
them. -ut $e cannot ignore issues aout our o$n chil!ren's goo! to the
e>tent that it !e"en!s on our chil!rearing "ractices. Those issues have to e
settle! y us if they are going to e settle! y anyo!y.
&t might e oFecte! that historiciDe! naturalism4 ecause it is ase! on a
)*
0EL:;ACTUAL&VAT&ON
culturally inherite! conce"tion of human nature4 has an inherently conservative
iasO &f this charge means that historiciDe! naturalism has to e socially
conservative in its results4 then it is easy to see that this is not so. A historiciDe!
naturalist might very $ell conclu!e that the goo! of human eings4 as
they no$ un!erstan! themselves an! as they have ma!e themselves through
history4 can e actualiDe! only in a ra!ically ne$ form of society. ?This is
e>actly $hat ,ar>'s historiciDe! naturalism !oes conclu!e.@ On the other
han!4 the oFection may e that $hatever its results4 the "rocess of ethical
reasoning accor!ing to historiciDe! naturalism has an inherent ias to$ar!
conservatism sim"ly ecause its conce"tion of human nature is a historical
"ro!uct. .This oFection only remin!s us of the unavoi!ale limits on our
#no$le!ge aout the goo! of future human eings mentione! in the "revious
"aragra"h. &t shoul! egin to $orry historiciDe! naturalists only $hen someone
rings for$ar! a #no$le!ge of human nature that is not suFect to those
limits.
)(
5
:ree!om
i. Hegel an! free!om
&n Hegel's self;actualiDation theory4 the essence of the self to e actualiDe!
goes y the name of Efree!om.E What !oes Hegel mean y Efree!omEB
&n the lieral tra!ition4 Efree!omE usually refers to a s"here of "rivacy in
$hich in!ivi!uals may !o as they "lease4 immune from the interference of
others ; es"ecially of the state. :or lierals4 to value Efree!omE means to
insist that there are !eGnite limits to legitimate interference $ith in!ivi!ualsA
the main issues aout free!om have to !o $ith $here these limits are to e
set. Hegel also elieves that the state's "o$er over in!ivi!uals shoul! e limite!4
an! ta#es the e>istence of such limits to e a !istinctive feature of mo!ern
ethical life W2. NN *'4 '+(.4 5o74.4 575A4 599.@. He criticiDes :ichte for
a!vocating too much state regulation of "eo"le's lives ; he is "articularly outrage!
y :ichte's suggestion that citiDens shoul! e reIuire! to carry aroun!
i!entiGcation "assoo#s $ith their "ictures in them ?%2.*C 7'=A 2. 2reface
5(A %2.iyC ')9A cf. /N. 59';)6)<)=*;)+=@. Hegel insists that the "olice
shoul! not e "ermitte! to enter "rivate resi!ences $ithout a s"ecial or!er4 an!
he says of the -ritish use of E"olice s"iesE to !etect an! "revent crime that this
"ractice o"ens the $ay to Ethe greatest ayss of corru"tionE ?%2.iyC ')9@.
Nevertheless4 Hegel !oes not see issues aout free!om as lierals see them4
an! his agen!a regar!ing free!om is not the lieral one. He is not averse to state
"aternalism to$ar! those $hose im"rovi!ence rings economic ruin u"on
themselves an! their families W2. N 5*6@. He thin#s that the normal limits of
state interference $ith in!ivi!ual lierty !o not a""ly in times of $ar or other
national emergency4 $hen the state's very survival is at sta#e ?2. N )5)A %2.
F C 79*@. Even more sym"tomatic of Hegel's !istance from the lieral tra!ition
is the fact that though he hol!s that there are limits on the state's legitimate
regulation of in!ivi!ual con!uct4 he refuses to s"ecify these limits "recisely4 on
the groun! that this sim"ly cannot e !one ?2. NN 5)*4 A4 )'9.@. Hegel !oes
not share the lieral's fear that the state $ill inevitaly encroach on our "rivate
s"here unless $e guar! it $ith vigilance an! Deal. As $e sa$ in Cha"ter '4 N *4
he thin#s that a society Tsuch as ancient .ome4 or :ichte's "olice state ?N. ('=;
('9<'55;'5*@U that is too "reoccu"ie! $ith "ersonal rights is li#ely to !estroy
the very ethical values that "reserve in!ivi!ual free!om. &n Hegel's vie$4 the
$hole strength of the mo!ern state lies in the fact that its unity !e"en!s on its
"reservation of suFective free!om ?2. N 576@. Why shoul! $e fear that the
state $ill $ant to un!ermine its o$n foun!ationB
)7
:.EEDO,
Though Hegel's theory is ostensily foun!e! on Efree!om4E lierals are
often outrage! to Gn! that Hegel !oes not mean y this $or! $hat most
"eo"le mean y it. ENo !out Hegel "rofesse! ?as $ho !oes notB@ an! even
"ersua!e! himself ?as $ho cannotB@ that he $as an a!mirer of free!om. An!
he manage! this y giving the $or! a "eculiar meaning of his o$n.E' This
is Iuite rightA in!ee!4 it is something Hegel himself asserts em"hatically an!
re"eate!ly ?2. NN '(.4 55.4 '*9A4 567.4 )'9.A EL N '*(AA E/ N *+5A %/2
'C *(<57@. Of course it !oes hot follo$ that Hegel !oes not a!mire free!om in
the or!inary senseA it follo$s only that the free!om $hich groun!s his ethical
theory is something !iMerent.
5. :ree!om as "ossiility an! free!om as actuality
&n or!inary s"eech4 EfreeE often means "retty much the same as E$ithout.E5
A foo!stuM is free of a!!itives $hen it has none4 a freestan!ing uil!ing is
one $ithout su""orts or attachments4 an! a free lunch is a lunch $ith no
charge. The free!om of "eo"le or their actions usually refers to a more s"eciGc
lac#C the lac# of ostacles or hin!rances to their !oing something.) -y
e>tension4 the free!om to act sometimes refers to the "ositive "resence of
ca"acities4 enaling con!itions or entitlements to act. :ree!om of s"eech is
not only the asence of hin!rances or threats4 ut also the "resence of "ositive
guarantees an! "rotections. E:ree!om of the $illE is a ca"acity4 such asthe
aility to cause your actions4 or the aility to !o either one thing or another
as you choose. &n any case4 free!om of "eo"le or actions in the or!inary
sense al$ays refers to "ossiilities. We !o not call "eo"le EfreeE on account
of the s"eciGc use they ma#e of their "ossiilities4 ut sim"ly on account of
the fact that they have them.
Hegel uses the term Eformal free!omE to refer to one #in! of free!om as
"ossiility. The free!om that is EformallyE the essence of s"irit consists in
the fact that a s"iritual eing Ecan astract from everything e>ternal an!
from its o$n e>ternality4 even from its e>istence itselfA it can en!ure the
negation of its in!ivi!ual imme!iacy4 or inGnite "ainA i.e.4 it can "reserve
itself in this negativity an! e for itself i!enticalE ?E/ N )+5@. E:ormal free!omE
is the ca"acity to EastractE from our !esires. Hegel hol!s that every
s"iritual eing is formally free. 0uch a eing4 he thin#s4 is al$ays ale to
!etach itself from all its !esires4 !rives4 $ishes4 an! so forth4 an! act contrary
to them ?2. N (4.@.* His vie$ is that though our !esires may !etermine $hat
$e in fact !o4 they in no $ay limit $hat $e can !o. That is $hy he Jatly
!enies that the free $ill can e coerce! at all. When $e s"ea# of the coercion
of a free $ill4 Hegel thin#s4 $e must e tal#ing aout a case in $hich the
$ill itself has een i!entiGe! y its o$n choice $ith something e>ternal to
the $ill itself4 such as the o!y of the "erson $hose $ill it is4 or some oFect
$hich the $ill has ma!e its "ro"erty. What $e call the EcoercionE of the free
$ill consists in a $rongful violation of the $ill's right over that e>ternal oFect
?2. N 9'A cf. N. **=;**9<+9;95@.
:or Hegel4 formal free!om is the Efoun!ationE ?/run!lage@ of the free!om
)=
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
of s"iritE ?E/ N )+5A@4 ut it is not s"irit's free!om itself. The free!om on
$hich Hegel ases his ethical theory is instea! calle! Easolute free!omE ?2.
NN 5';5*@. Hegel e>"licitly contrasts asolute free!om $ith the mere Eca"acity
for free!om4E $hich ?he says@ is $hat most "eo"le mean y the $or!
Efree!omE ?2. N 55.@. Closely relate! to Easolute free!omE in Hegel's vocaulary
are the terms Esustantive free!omE ?2. NN '*(A4 '*94 5(=@4 Econcrete
free!omE ?2. NN =A4 576@4 Efree!om for itselfE ?2. N '6A@4 an! E"ositiveE
or EaLrmativeE free!om ?%/ (=<(6A 2. '*9A@. To these various
as"ects of Easolute free!om4E Hegel sets u" a series of contrastsC EsustantiveE
$ith Eformal free!omE ?2. NN '5)4 '+=@4 EconcreteE $ith Eastract free!omE
?2. NN =A4 '5)4 i*94A@4 an! Efree!om for itselfE $ith Efree!om in
itselfE ?2. N '6A@. With the single e>ce"tion of Eformal free!om4E the latter
term of each contrast refers not to a "ossiility ut to a $ay of acting that
falls short of Easolute free!omE ecause it is immature4 aritrary4 the result
of acci!ental inclinations4 or other$ise lac#ing in full rationality.
&saiah -erlin coins the term Enegative free!omE to !esignate free!om as
the asence of e>ternal interferences to acting as $e "lease.( Hegel uses the
same term to mean something very !iMerent. :or him negative free!om is a
"articular ?misgui!e!@ sort of action. &t is the "ractice of those $ho regar! all
forms of E"articularityE ?such as !eterminate !esires4 traits4 or social roles@ as
alien to their true selfhoo!4 an! $ho therefore EJee from every content as a
restriction.E Hegel "erceives such an irrational Jight in the religious $orl!4
$here Oriental mystics see# lieration y em"tying their min!s of all content
an! activity. He sees it also in the social $orl!4 $here :rench revolutionaries
faile! ecause they i!entiGe! free!om $ith the !estruction of every E"articulariDation
of organiDations an! in!ivi!ualsE ?2. N (.@.
Hegel also occasionally uses the terms E"ersonalE free!om ?%2. *C (9)@4
an! EcivilE or EourgeoisE ?urgerliche@ free!om ?%2.iyC '*6@ to refer to
the asence of e>ternal interference ?e.g.4 state interference@ in the lives of
in!ivi!uals. The former term allu!es to the fact that such free!oms elong
to the astract right of a "ersonA the latter in!icates that their "ro"er home
is the s"here of civil society4 $here in!ivi!ual urghers act as in!e"en!ent
economic agents. Hegel thus !istinguishes the Ecivil free!omE guarantee!
through the a!ministration of the legal system4 from E"olitical free!om4E or
E"ulic free!om4E $hich "ertains to the in!ivi!ual as a "artici"ant ?!irectly
or through re"resentatives@ in the "olitical state ?%2.iyC '*6A 2. N )6'.@.
The #in! of free!om Hegel !iscusses most often in the 2hiloso"hy of .ight
is EsuFective free!om.E This term allu!es in!irectly to noninterference4 ut
$hat it !irectly refers to is a #in! of action4 one that is reJective4 conscious4
e>"licitly chosen y the agent4 as o""ose! to actions "erforme! unthin#ingly4
haitually4 or from coercion ?2. NN '+(.4 55+.4 5(+.4 5=6.4 5=).4 5=*4
)6'4 )'7A cf. 2. NN ')54 ')+4 '*6.@. 0uFective free!om also inclu!es actions
that satisfy the agent's "articular nee!s or interests4 es"ecially the
agent's reJective interest in seeing our chosen "lans an! "roFects carrie! successfully
to com"letion ?2. NN '5'4 i+s.4A4 5(+.4 599.@.
0ometimes EsuFective free!omE is eIuate! $ith the less rational forms of
)+
:.EEDO,
action4 such as EaritrarinessE ?2. NN '+(.4 567.4 575A4 599A@4 an! contraste!
$ith asolute free!om. &t $oul! e a serious mista#e to thin# that
Hegel is o""ose! to suFective free!om even in these cases4 since at other
times Hegel ma#es it clear that he regar!s EsuFective free!omE ; even the
element of aritrariness it involves ; as one si!e of asolute free!om. &n fact4
Hegel argues that "ersonal or civil free!oms are essential to the mo!ern state
Fust ecause they are necessaryXfor suFective free!om ?2. NN '+(.4 567.4
576@.
). :ree!om an! autonomy
Hegelian Easolute free!omE oviously means something li#e 3antian Eautonomy4E
&t refers to a $ay of acting in $hich our $ill is !etermine! through
itself alone4 an! is not at all !etermine! y alien inJuences. :or 3ant4 $e act
autonomously only $hen our $ill is !etermine! solely through "ure reason or
res"ect for the moral la$. Hust for this reason4 3ant !oes not thin# that
free!om an! autonomy are Iuite the same thing. .ather4 free!om is relate!
to autonomy as "otency to act. 3ant !eGnes Efree!omE as 'Othat "ro"erty of
Tthe $ill'sU causality y $hich it can e eMective in!e"en!ently of foreign
causesE ?/ **7<7*4 em"hasis a!!e!@44 or again as Ethe "o$er ?%ermogen@ of
"ure reason to e of itself "racticalE ?TL 5');'5*<'6@. :or 3ant4 $e are free
$henever $e have the ca"acity to e autonomous4 $hether or not $e e>ercise
our free!om y acting autonomously. Thus 3ant "reserves the i!ea that free!om
consists in "ossiilities or ca"acities rather than in any4"articular $ay
in $hich they may e e>ercise! or actualiDe!.7
A similar !istinction is !ra$n y :ichte. He gives the name Eformal free!omE
to the "o$er to act in!e"en!ently of natural !etermination an! to e
eMective on the oFective $orl! ?0L ')(<'*'4 5=7<595@. :ichte !istinguishes
formal free!omE from Ematerial free!omE or Easolute free!om4E in $hich
the self uses its formal free!om to !etermine itself solely through itself4 acting
Esolely for the sa#e of free!omE ?0L ')9<'*(4 '*9<'(=@. Whereas 3ant
consistently "reserves the or!inary sense of free!om as "ossiility4 :ichte
!e"arts !ecisively from or!inary usage an! treats autonomy itself as a #in!
of free!om4 even the highest or truest #in!.
Hegel follo$s :ichte rather than 3ant. :or him4 too4 asolute free!om is
not a "ossiility or ca"acity ut a !eterminate $ay of acting. Thus in an
a!!ition to the -erlin Encyclo"e!ia4 Hegel sutly turns ostensile "raise for
3ant's conce"t of free!om into "raise for the :ichtean;Hegelian conce"t of
free!om as actualityC
3ant e>"ressly recogniDe! the "ositive inGnity of "ractical reason $hen he ascrie!
to the $ill the ca"acity to !etermine itself in a universal $ay4 i.e. thin#ingly. Of course
the $ill !oes "ossess this ca"acity4 an! it is of great im"ortance to #no$ that the
human eing is free only insofar as he "ossesses it an! avails himself of it in action4
?El N (*AA Gnal italics a!!e!@
The main "uDDles concerning Hegel's conce"t of free!om can e formu;
)9
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
late! in terms of this revision of the meaning of the $or!. Why !oes Hegel
"ermit himself so ra!ical an alteration in the meaning of the $or! Efree!om';
an alteration as ra!ical as the !iMerence et$een "otentiality.an! actualityB
What connection is there et$een Efree!omE in the or!inary sense an! Efree!omE
in Hegel's senseB Does Hegel's insistence that Efree!omE in the or!inary
sense is not true free!om entail that Hegel is in!iMerent or hostile to
free!om in the or!inary senseB
*. :ree!om as a goo!
One i!ea ehin! Hegel's revision of the i!ea of free!om is that "ro"erly
s"ea#ing4 free!om must e something goo!. The reasoning is sim"le. Hegel
thin#s that the "rimary human goo! consists in an actuality4 more s"eciGcally4
in asolute free!om. :ree!om as "ossiility is goo! chieJy or even
solely ecause it is a necessary con!ition for asolute free!om. &f free!om is
a goo!4 then naturally the name Efree!omE elongs more "ro"erly to $hat is
goo! in itself than it !oes to something $hose goo!ness consists in eing a
necessary con!ition for $hat is goo! in itself.
The i!ea that free!om must e something goo! usually elongs among the
connotations of EfreeE in the or!inary sense of the $or!4 even $hen it is not
use! in connection $ith human agency. & say that my asement is free of
ro!ents an! mil!e$ ecause $e all un!erstan! that ro!ents an! mil!e$ are
no>iousA & $on't !escrie it as Efree of storage s"aceE unless & thin# storage
s"ace is un!esirale4 an! & $on't say that it is Efree of heatE if that means
the $ater "i"es might urst in the $inter. When you !escrie a foo!stuM as
free of a!!itives4 you im"ly that a!!itives are something it $oul! e etter
for foo! to e $ithoutA it $oul! e !iLcult to ma#e sense4 e>ce"t as irony4
of the remar# that a certain foo! is Efree of nutrientsE or Efree of Javor.E
Analogously4 it is arguale that $e use the $or! Efree!omE to !escrie the
asence of hin!rances to action only ecause $e thin# of such hin!rances as
a! an! the asence of them as goo!. Usually this is true.
There are e>ce"tional cases4 though. O!ysseus ha! his sailors lash him to
the mast of his shi" so that he $oul! not e se!uce! to his !eath y the
sirens' song. We choose to surroun! ourselves in every!ay life $ith gentler
hin!rances $hose "ur"ose is analogousC alarm cloc#s4 guar!rails on stee"
"aths4 automatic "ayroll savings "lans4 strings tie! aroun! the little Gnger.
We are reluctant to !escrie their asence as increasing our free!om4 ecause
$e regar! them as !esirale. We may even see them as increasing our free!om4
to the e>tent that they enale us to !o certain things ?listen to the
sirens4 clim the "ath in safety4 get to $or# on time4 save money@.
The i!ea that free!om is necessarily something goo! "lays an im"rtant
role in the thin#ing of many mo!ern "hiloso"hers4 inclu!ing some $hose
stan!ing in the lieral tra!ition is unim"eachale. They !istinguish et$een
EliertyE an! Elicense4E inclu!ing in the latter category those "ossiilities for
action that $oul! !estroy our ha""iness or violate the rights of others. Hohn
Loc#e saysC
*6
:.EEDO,
:ree!om then is not $hat 0ir .oert :ilmer tells us4 Ea lierty for everyone to !o
$hat he lists4 to live as he "leases4 an! not to e tie! to any la$sEA ut free!om of
men un!er government is to have a stan!ing rule to live y4 . . . a lierty to follo$
my o$n $ill in all things $here the rule "rescries not.=
Loc#e's "oint is en!orse! y ,ontesIuieu4 3ant4 an! the '=+9 Declaration
of the .ights of ,an an! CitiDen.+ &t is the only i!ea e>"resse! in .ousseau's
notorious ?ecause notoriously misun!erstoo!@ remar# that $hen $e are
com"elle! to. oey the general $ill $e are only eing Eforce! to e free4E9
Hohn 0tuart ,ill suscries to the same i!ea $hen he says that ]?the only
free!om $hich !eserves the name4 is that of "ursuing our o$n goo! in our
o$n $ay4 so long as $e !o not attem"t to !e"rive others of theirs4 or im"e!e
their eMorts to otain it.E'6 All these "hiloso"hers agree that $e are not !e"rive!
of free!om y la$s that restrain us from !oing harm or inFustice to
others4 ecause free!om must e something goo!4 an! the aility to !o harm
or inFustice is not goo!.
The contrary vie$ is asserte! y &saiah -erlin4 follo$ing Heremy -entham
?an! 0ir .oert :ilmer@.'' -entham saysC EA la$ y $hich noo!y is oun!4
a la$ y $hich noo!y is coerce!4 a la$ y $hich noo!y's lierty is curtaile!4
all these "hrases $hich come to the same thing $oul! e so many
contra!ictions in terms.E'5 -entham an! -erlin might have a "oint if they
mean that the aility to !o evil can sometimes e something goo!. -ut they
are mista#en if they thin# that or!inary usage su""orts the false i!ea that
Efree!omE refers to the asence of any an! every hin!rance to action4
$hether goo! or a!. Worse yet4 they "rocee! inconsistently if they inten!
Grst to say that Efree!omE inclu!es any an! every "ossiility of action4 an!
then later to invo#e the "resu""osition of or!inary s"eech that all free!om
is something goo! in su""ort of the erroneous vie$ that any an! every asence
of hin!rances is ?consi!ere! in itself@ something goo! an! every legal
hin!rance to action constitutes some ?"erha"s necessary@ evil. /enerally
s"ea#ing4 hin!rances are a! an! their asence is goo!A ut there are e>ce"tions4
$hich no "hiloso"hical theory ?or lac# of one@ can get ri! of.
(. Does "ositive free!om lea! to totalitarianismB
&t shoul! e self;evi!ent that an ethical theory ase! on the i!ea of "ositive
free!om or autonomy must give high "riority to securing a consi!erale !egree
of free!om in the or!inary sense ?Hegel's E"ersonalE or EcivilE free!om@.
To e autonomous4 you must act not only rationally4 ut also accor!ing to
your o$n reasonA in Hegel's terms4 you have to e EsuFectivelyE free. 1ou
can't have "ositive free!om unless you have enough choices o"en to you that
it ma#es a signiGcant !iMerence $hether your choices are rational or not.
Thus a Hegelian has reasons for valuing "ersonal or civil free!om that some
others ?2latonists4 Hoesian egoists4 he!onistic utilitarians@ !o not have.
Against this4 &saiah -erlin has famously argue! that the i!ea of E"ositive
free!omE lea!s naturally !o$n the "rimrose "ath to totalitarianism. -erlin
may not have inten!e! this s"eciGcally as a criticism of Hegel4 ut anyone
*'
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
$ho Gn!s -erlin's arguments convincing "roaly thin#s that Hegel's vie$s
on free!om are seriously !amage! y them. -erlin clearly realiDes that it
$oul! e "ara!o>ical if a "olitical theory ase! on the i!ea of free!om ?in
any sense@ $ere therey !is"ose! to !efen! aA "olitical system that is hostile
to in!ivi!ual lierty. He a!mits.that the ste"s from an ethics of "ositive free!om
to totalitarian conclusions may not e Elogically vali!4E ut insists that
they are nevertheless E"sychologically an! historically intelligile.E')
&n his attem"t to ma#e them so4 -erlin Gn!s it necessary to ascrie to
his totalitarians several eliefs Iuite in!e"en!ent of their ethics of "ositive
free!omC They are convince! that there is only one ans$er to any "ractical
Iuestion that a rational "erson coul! even entertainA they thin# that on every
Iuestion they are infallily in "ossession of the right ans$erA an! they are
sure that no one else $ill ever arrive at the right ans$er unless le! to it
through their o$n enlightene! an! enevolent coercion.'* &t $oul! e !isastrous
if "olitical "o$er fell into the han!s of "eo"le $ith these eliefs4 no
matter $hat their other convictions might e.
&f "eo"le $ith these eliefs also ha""ene! to es"ouse an ethics of "ositive
free!om4 that $oul! at least "rovi!e them $ith a countervailing reason for
$anting "eo"le to ta#e the rational course y their o$n rational choice rather
than eing coerce! into it. Hence -erlin has to ma#e His "ositive free!om
fanatics e>tremely asent min!e! as $ell as "aranoi!C They see no a!vantage
in e!ucation over coercion e>ce"t that e!ucation is an easier $ay of controlling
"eo"le.4s -erlin's "ositive free!om totalitarians have to t so !istrait that
they forget their fun!amental aim $ith every ste" they ta#e to achieve it.
2erha"s -erlin's only "oint is that any i!ea ?ho$ever true an! nole@ may
e "erverte! into its virtual o""osite if it falls into the han!s of "eo"le $ho
are suLciently !erange!4 self;!eceiving4 or o""ortunistic. The fact that even
an ethics of "ositive free!om might conceivaly e use! to rationaliDe a totalitarian
system is a rather e>treme illustration of this Iuite general "oint. We
com"letely miss the "oint if $e see this as a !efect in the i!ea of "ositive
free!om.
The general "oint is one $e $oul! all !o $ell to hee!. During our lifetime4
the lieral in!ivi!ualism -erlin a!vocates has een use! regularly in Englishs"ea#ing
countries to Fustify su""ressing "olitical !issent an! limiting in!ivi!ual
free!om ; all in the name of "rotecting the Efree $orl!E against its
EtotalitarianE enemies. &t is that ause of the i!ea of free!!m4 n7t -erlin's
iDarre tale of totalitarianism ase! on "ositive free!om4 $hich shoul! have
for us the greatest E"sychological an! historical intelligiility.E
7. Asolute self;activity
Hegel's i!entiGcation of free!om $ith rational choice can e motivate! y
the i!ea that free!om is a goo!. There is another line of thin#ing4 even more
intimately connecte! $ith Hegel's "hiloso"hical roots4 $hich lea!s to the
same conclusion. &t starts $ith 0"inoDa's i!ea that you are free $hen the
source of your actions is in you4 an! unfree $hen the source is outsi!e you.'7
*5
:.EEDO,
Accor!ingly4 any e>ternal cause of an action may e regar!e! as a hin!rance
; not ?of course@ to the "articular action that it causes4 ut to the
in!e"en!ence of the agent. 2erfect free!om is the con!ition in $hich your
actions are cause! only internally4 not at all e>ternally.
This i!ea is "resent in 3ant's conce"tion of the autonomous $ill4 $hich
acts solely from res"ect for a self;given la$ rather than from natural inclinations4
$hich 3ant ta#es to lie outsi!e the rational agent's real self. The "hiloso"her
in $hom this thought is most "rominent4 e>"licit4 an! fully !evelo"e!
is :ichte. &t is no e>aggeration to say that :ichte's entire "hiloso"hy is
nothing ut the attem"t to $or# out com"letely the i!ea of a self that strives
to e entirely its o$n $or#. :or :ichte4 the essence of selfhoo! is a !rive
to$ar! free!om4 a ten!ency $hich he variously calls the Eten!ency to asolute
self;activityE ?0L )9<**@4 or to Eself;suLciencyE ?0elst!n!ig#eit@ ?0L
(=<7'@ ; or Fust Ethe asolute ten!ency to the asoluteE ?0L 5+<))@.
The same i!ea is "resent in Hegel's conce"tion of s"irit's free!omC
Thus s"irit is;"urely $ith itself an! hence free. :or free!om is Fust thisC to e $ith
oneself in the other4 to !e"en! on oneself4 to e self;!etermining. ?EL N 5*A@
0"irit is eing $ith itself4 an! this is free!om. :or if & am !e"en!ent4 then & am
relate! to an other $hich & am not4 an! & cannot e $ithout this other. & am free
$hen & am $ith myself. ?%/ ((<*+@
The &ntro!uction of the 2hiloso"hy of .ight egins y !evelo"ing the conce"tO
of a free $ill $hose vocation is to achieve asolute free!om4 $hose asoluteness
consists in the fact that it Erefers to nothing other than its o$n self4 so
that every relation of !e"en!ence on something other falls a$ayE ?2. N 5)@.
Hegel un!erstan!s the i!ea of com"lete self;suLciency to mean that the
$ill must have nothing outsi!e itself4 not even as an oFect or en!. ETThe
free $illU has universality4 itself as the inGnite form4 for its content4 oFect
an! en!E ?2. N 5'@. EThe $ill in an! for itself is truly inGnite ecause its
oFect is itself4 an! so not an other or a limitE ?2. N 55@. Hust as :ichte's
Eten!ency to asolute self;activityE elongs to a $ill that $ills Efree!om
solely for the sa#e of free!omE ?0L ')9<'*(@4 so Hegel's asolutely free $ill
is Ethe free $ill that $ills the free $illE ?2. N 5=@. EThe $ill is free only
insofar as it $ills nothing other4 e>ternal4 alien4 for then it $oul! e !e"en!ent4
ut $ills only itself ; $ills the $ill. The asolute $ill is thisC $illing
to e freeE ?%2/ (5*<**5@.
This conce"tion of free!om surely must stri#e many of us as ho"elessly
e>travagant an! meta"hysical. -ut in the age of /erman i!ealism4 its social
an! "olitical signiGcance $as vivi! an! imme!iate. &t $as a "hiloso"hical
e>"ression of the ourgeoisie's struggle against feu!al economic an! "olitical
forms4 an! the Enlightenment's !eman! that $e shoul! thin# for ourselves4
in !eGance of the E"ositivityE of tra!itional morality an! religious authority.
The mo!ern s"irit4 accor!ing to Hegel4 is one that claims Ean asolute title
for suFective self;consciousness to #no$ $ithin itselfan! from itself $hat
!uty an! right is4 an! to recogniDe nothing e>ce"t $hat it #no$s as the goo!E
?2. N ')=.@.
*)
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
The i!ea of asolute activity $as su""ose! to soun! e>tremeC &t gave e>"ression
to the s"irit of a revolutionary age4 for $hich there can ultimately
e no com"romise et$een the as"iration to free!om an! the forces of unfree!om.
'= ,ar> still a""eals to the revolutionary connotations of the term
Eself;activityE $hen he uses it "rominently to characteriDe the emanci"ation
an! actualiDation of the human self in "ostca"italist society.'+ The fact that
the i!ea of "ositive free!om still has the ca"acity to terrify "eo"le in!icates
that it has retaine! some of its original force. &t e>"resses the sense that $e
are still in nee! of a ra!ical lieration $hose content cannot ecome clear to
us until $e have een lierate!A at the same time4 it suggests a ra!ically o"en
future $hich frightens those $ho imagine the $ays in $hich the uncom"romising
!eman! for free!om may go !isastrously astray.
Critics of the mo!ern revolutionary im"ulse have often charge! that it is
!oome! to failure ecause its goals are meta"hysical rather than "ractical4 or
even that they are misconceive!4 im"ossile in "rinci"le to actualiDeA the
only "ossile eMect of "ursuing them is the vengeance $rought against the
real $orl! y misegotten ho"es $hen they encounter their inevitale frustration.
'9 Hegel $as "erha"s the Grst to formulate this critiIue of ra!ical
revolution ?2h/ 'f'f )7=;)+64 (+5;(9(@. That ma#es him simultaneously a
"ro"onent an! a critic of the ra!ical :ichtean i!ea of free!om as Easolute
self;activity.E Hegel's notion of asolute free!om may e vie$e! as an attem"t
to reconce"tualiDe an! !era!icaliDe this i!ea so that it can e seen
as something more than a "rete>t for .omantic yearning an! the terror of
!estruction. Hegel $ants to convince us that asolute free!om is something
$e can have here an! no$4 through rationally com"rehen!ing ho$ the reason
in the oFective $orl! !oes not limit ut actualiDes the reason in ourselves.
=. 0elf;activity an! otherness
Whether it is "ossile to attain asolute self;activity of course !e"en!s on
$hat counts as oneself an! $hat counts as other. :ichte i!entiGes the self
$ith reason4 so free!om is acting from one's o$n reason rather than accor!ing
to the authority of someone else ?0L '=(;'==<'+(;'+=@. :ollo$ing 3ant4
he i!entiGes the self more "ro"erly $ith "ure reason4 so mere nature is also
other4 inclu!ing one's em"irical !esires an! natural inclinations. To e asolutely
self;active is to act solely from !uty or res"ect for the moral la$ given
y "ure reason. -ritish i!ealist ethics ?es"ecially -ra!ley an! -osanIuet@
carrie! on the :ichtean tra!ition4 i!entifying free!om $ith the trium"h of
the active or rational self over the su"ine4 em"irical4 or irrational self. -ecause
the -ritish i!ealists are su""ose! to e EHegelians4E Hegel's name has
sometimes een associate! $ith such vie$s in English;s"ea#ing "hiloso"hy.
&n fact4 Hegel reFects this entire conce"tion of autonomy along $ith the conce"tion
of self an! other on $hich it rests.
Hegel thin#s the 3antian;:ichtean vie$ involves an e>actly $rong $ay of
!ealing $ith otherness4 a strategy of esca"e or self;$ith!ra$al4 a#in to $hat
-erlin calls the Eretreat to the inner cita!el.E56 &t resemles the 0toic i!ea4
**
:.EEDO,
"o"ulariDe! y E"ictetus4 of in!e"en!ence through self;$ith!ra$al an! ceasing
to care aout $hat lies outsi!e oneself.5' 3ant an! :ichte !on't tell us
not to care aout $hat is other than the self4 ut they !o !ra$ a shar" !istinction
et$een the rational self an! everything em"irical4 an! they regar! the
free!om of the self as com"romise! y any motive reJecting the self's relation
to em"irical otherness.
Hegel follo$s :ichte in hol!ing that a self is its o$n self;"ositing activity.
-ut he regar!s the self as the outcome of this activityA its i!entity is !etermine!
!ialectically through e>"erience4 through the interaction of self;a$areness4
self;actualiDation4 an! self;alteration. -ecause self;i!entity is not G>e!
ut self;ma!e4 the same is true of the self's relation to otherness. :or a self4
otherness is al$ays relative4 an! it can e overcome. &t follo$s that $e !o
not achieve true self;suLciency in relation to an other y esca"ing it or se"arating
ourselves from it ; as y 0toical aloofness from our e>ternal con!ition4
or 3antian !etachment from em"irical motives. 0uch a strategy is self;!efeating4
li#e the strategy of the neurotic "ersonality that avoi!s the trauma
of failure y "reclu!ing from the outset any "ossiility of success. True in!e"en!ence
in relation to an other is achieve! rather y struggling $ith otherness4
overcoming it4 an! ma#ing it our o$n. EThe free!om of s"irit is an
in!e"en!ence from the other that is $on not merely outsi!e the other ut in
the other. &t comes to actuality not y Jeeing efore the other ut y overcoming
itE ?E/ N *+5AA cf. EL N )+A@.
+. E-eing $ith oneselfE
Aout the time he egins lecturing on the "hiloso"hy of right in -erlin4
Hegel coins his o$n s"ecial technical term for asolute free!om or asolute
self;activity. To e free in this s"ecial $ay4 he says4 is to e ei sich selst4
E$ith oneselfE ?2. N 5)@.55 &n or!inary /erman4 et sich has t$o "rinci"al
meanings $hen a""lie! to human "ersonsC &t means to e a$a#e or conscious4
an! it means to e in control of oneself. :ree!om as -eisichselstsein
refers to the human ca"acities for self;a$areness an! self;mastery4 ut its
meaning is still richer. The "rimary sense of the /erman "re"osition et is
to e>"ress s"atial "ro>imity4 contact4 or elonging. This suggests that aself
E$ith itselfE is uniGe!4 coherent4 $ell integrate!A its "arts4 elements4 or as"ects
elong to an! Gt $ell into one another. The s"atial meta"hor also suggests
that the free self has Earrive! atE itself4 that it has actualiDe! or "erfecte!
itself4 ma!e itself its en! an! then attaine! this en! ; $hich is nothing
e>ternal to itself.
-eisichselstsein !oes not refer merely to a state of myself. E-eing $ith
myselfE is al$ays a relation et$een me an! an EoFectE or EotherE $hose
!iMerence or otherness has4 ho$ever4 een overcome. :ree!om is al$ays -eisichselstsein
in einem An!ern4 Eeing $ith oneself in an other.E This is the
$ay Eeing $ith oneselfE gives e>"ression to Hegel's ne$ conce"tion of the
relation et$een self an! other4 an! so to his reconce"tualiDation of asolute
self;activity. &t also entails that asolute free!om is not merely a state of
*(
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
the self or its action4 ut also involves a relation et$een the self an! its
circumstances.
Hegel's Grst authentic use of the conce"t ei sich . . . in einem An!ern
em"hasiDes the i!ea that Eeing $ith oneselfE is a conce"tion of free!om as
self;activityC EThe free $ill $ills only itself4 $ills nothing ut to e freeA it
receives only its free!om as intuition. The $ill !etermines itself4 it "uts itself
into an oFectA ut this oFect is the $ill itself4 the $ill is $ith itself in its
oFectE ?%2.iy C 5'7A italics a!!e!@. The very same em"hasis is "resent in
one of Hegel's last e>"ressions of the same i!ea in the 2hiloso"hy of History
lectures of '+)6C E0"irit is eing $ith itself4 an! this is free!om. :or if & am
!e"en!ent4 then & am relate! to an other $hich & am not4 an! & cannot e
$ithout this other. & am free $hen & am $ith myselfE ?%/ ((<*+@.
Hegel uses a numer of a!!itional e>"ressions to ca"ture the relation E$ith
oneself in4E $hich otains et$een the free self an! its other. 0ome of these
e>"ressions convey the i!ea that the oFect is something over $hich & ha%e
"o$er4 !ominion4 or controlC He s"ea#s of the oFect as EmineE or as E"osite!
y meE ?%2. *C '6(4 '*7@. Other e>"ressions suggest that the oFect manifests
my agency an! mirrors my nature ac# to meC & am E"resentE ?"rasent@
in it ?%2. *C '5*@A still others em"hasiDe the overcoming of self;alienationC
& am also sai! to e Eat homeE ?Du Hause@ in my oFect ?%2. *C '65@4 an!
to stan! in a relation to it similar to A!am's relation to Eve $hen he sai!C
EThou art Jesh of my Jesh an! one of my oneE ?2. N *A@.
E-eing $ith oneself in an otherE is a "ara!o>. &t s"ea#s of something that
is !iMerent from or other than myself an! yet at the same time not !iMerent
or other at all4 ecause & am E$ith myselfE in it. The central "ara!o>es in
Hegel's "hiloso"hy nee! not scan!aliDe us once their "oint is "ro"erly un!erstoo!
?an! $e !o not nee! a ne$ system of E!ialectical logicE in or!er to
un!erstan! them@. The "ara!o> of Eeing $ith oneself in an otherE shoul!
not sur"rise us4 since free!om is the essence of s"irit4 an! the "ara!o> of
free!om as Eeing $ith oneself in an otherE is also the central "ara!o> in
Hegel's conce"t of s"irit. 0"irit is Eself;restoring samenessE ?2h/ '' '+@4 Fust
as s"irit's self;consciousness is Econsciousness of itself in its othernessE ?2h/
&& '7*@. :or Hegel4 to e a s"iritual self or a suFect is a Emovement of "ositing
oneself4 or the me!iation of ecoming other to oneself $ith itselfE ?2h/
'' '+@.
Hegel's s"irit is a mo!el of human agency. Accor!ing to it4 the agent creates
or E"ositsE an e>ternal EoFect.E This oFect is not merely the e>ternal
sha!o$ of an internal intention that $as fully actual an! self;com"lete $ithin
itself4 ut something through $hich & !iscover myself.5) A s"iritual eing
actualiDes itself only through the "rocess of "ro!ucing or E"ositingE such
oFects an! then Eme!iatingE this otherness $ith the self that "osite! it. &
learn $hat & am through the inter"retation4 y myself an! y others4 of $hat
& have !one. As a s"iritual eing4 & !o not e>ist fully an! actually e>ce"t
through these contrary an! com"lementary movements of Eecoming otherE
an! Eme!iating otherness4E that is4 through the activities of self;e>"ression
an! self;inter"retation.5*
*7
:.EEDO,
:ree!om for Hegel is a relational "ro"erty. &t involves a self4 an oFect ?in
the $i!est sense of that term@4 an! a rational "roFect of the self. Any oFect4
sim"ly as oFect4 is an EotherE to the self $hose oFect it is. -ut ecause a
self is actual y i!entifying itself $ith a set of rational "roFects involving
oFects4 the otherness of an oFect can e overcome $hen the oFect is integrate!
into the self's rational "roFects. A self is $ith itself or free in an oFect
$ith res"ect to a rational "roFect if that oFect elongs to that "roFect4 ecoming
a "art of that self.
9. :ree!om in my !eterminations
&n his Grst systematic a""lication of the conce"t of free!om as Eeing $ith
oneself in another4'' Hegel seems to a!! to the "ara!o> inherent in that formula
the further "ara!o> that the EotherE in $hich & am free is my o$n
E!eterminationsE ; a term that a""ears to cover all my mental states an!
characteristics4 ut es"ecially my !rives4 !esires4 an! inclinations ?2. N ^ (;
5)@. Hegel not only $ants us to thin# that $e can e E$ith ourselves inE
oFects e>ternal to us4 ut also that $e can treat our o$n mental states as
something EotherE $ith $hich $e must someho$ reconcile ourselves if $e
are to e free.
The i!entity of a human "erson is usually focuse! on the "erson's o!y
an! "sychic states. -ut "ersonal i!entity can $ithout meta"hor or hy"erole
e either e>ten!e! eyon! that or contracte! $ithin it. This is es"ecially true
if $e acce"t :ichte's i!ea that & am not a eing ut a !oing4 an! that $hat
fun!amentally constitutes the unity of my "erson is ut the activity that uniGes
a system of "lans an! "roFects. On this vie$4 $hat enales me to i!entify
myself $ith a "hysical o!y or a set of mental states is the fact that this o!y
is the Ee>ternal s"hereE in $hich my agency is e>"resse!4 an! that these
mental states are uniGe! y the "roFects $hich i!entify me ?/N. (7;7'<+=;
9*@. The limits of my self are the limits of my activity4 an!4 conversely4 &
e>ten! as far as the activity e>ten!s. ,y free!om is limite! only y $hat
resists or interru"ts the activity $ith $hich & i!entify myselfA $hatever resists
is Eother.E
Even my o$n !esires are sometimes e>"erience! as alien or !iMerent or
other4 not a "art.of me4 $hen they interfere $ith my activity. .ecalcitrant
!esires are !iMerent from or other than myself4 an! hin!er my free!om or
self;activity4 ecause they are in !isharmony $ith the "ractical system $ith
$hich & actively i!entify.5( This is $hat enales 3ant an!. :ichte to treat
their inclinations an! em"irical !esires as something coming to them from
outsi!e4 threatening to interfere $ith their free!om of self;activity. -ecause
they i!entify selectivity solely $ith the activity of the "ure rational legislative
self4 they regar! all contents "resent in them through em"irical inclinations
as alien to their self;activity or free!om.
The limits of my self;activity can e regar!e! as the limits of my i!entity4
an! this ma#es it "ossile for me to "lay $ith these limits4 at least in imagination.
&t is even "ossile4 at least in a #in! of fantasy4 to $ith!ra$ myself
*=
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
from everything that & am or have een an! to treat that as something $ith
$hich & !o not choose to i!entify myself. :ichte inter"rets the act of selfreJection
as one that originates in the E$averingE or EJoatingE ?sch$een@
of the imagination et$een o""ose! "ossiilities4 an! that en!s $ith the EG>ingE
or EstailiDingE ?G>ieren@ of a !eterminate oun!ary et$een the ego
an! the real $orl! o""osing it ?W 557Z55=<5654 5)5;5))<567;56=@. The
:ichtean E"ure egoE is Ethat $hich remains over after all oFects have een
eliminate! y the asolute "o$er of astractionE ?W 5**<5'7@. Hegel is thin#ing
of this e>"erience of imaginative self;$ith!ra$al from all my !eterminations
$hen he !escries the ca"acity of Eformal free!omE $hich $e encountere!
in N 5 of this cha"ter. Hegel also calls this the EuniversalE moment
of the $ill4 Ethe "ure thin#ing of oneself4E $hich is Ethe element of "ure
in!eterminacy or "ure reJection of the & into itselfE $here Eevery limitation
an! every content... is !issolve!E ?2. N (@. He thin#s that & can oFectify
any of my nee!s4 !esires4 or !rives4 treating it as alien or other. He inter"rets
this as the free agent's ca"acity to act contrary to any of her !esires4 or even
all of them at onceC E& am the asolute "ossiility of eing ale to astract
from every !eterminationE ?2. N (.@4 E& can !o anything4 omit anythingE
?%2.FC i n A %2. *C ''5@. Hegel thin#s it is an illusion to i!entify the ego
$ith this "o$er of astraction4 as :ichte seems to. :or this may lea! us
"erversely to eIuate asolute free!om $ith Ethe Jight from every content as
from a restrictionE ?2. N (.@. This is the misgui!e! conce"tion to $hich
Hegel gives the name Enegative free!om.E
True free!om consists instea! in choosing one's !eterminacies4 actively
i!entifying oneself $ith them. This4 Hegel says4 is Eself;!etermination of the
&4 "ositing oneself in a negative of oneself4 that is4 "ositing oneself as !etermine!4
limite!4 an! remaining $ith oneself ?ei sich@E ?2. N =A cf. E/ N
*79@. E-eing $ith oneself in one's !eterminaciesE is a reinter"retation of the
3antian conce"tion of autonomy. &n this ne$ version4 my self inclu!es em"irical
!esires an! inclinations if & have i!entiGe! myself $ith them an! &
am E$ith myselfE in them. 0elf;activity !oes not e>clu!e activity motivate!
y such inclinations4 as it !oes $ith 3ant an! :ichte.
,ore is reIuire! for me to e E$ith myselfE in a !esire than merely some
choice on my "art to Ei!entifyE $ith it. This is the "oint of Hegel's !enial
that free!om consists in EaritrarinessE ?Will#iir@. -y Earitrariness4E Hegel
means a choice that4 o"erating y Efree reJection4 astracting from everything4E
seiDes on some contingent content Egiven internally or e>ternallyE
?2. N '(@. An aritrary choice is ma!e $ith the consciousness of my aility
to ta#e any of several o"tions "resente! to me4 ut $ithout concern for the
$ay in $hich this choice might relate to my other values4 goals4 or "roFects.
& may thin# of such a choice as free ecause it is at the mercy of my momentary
$him an! not constraine! y anything else. -ut4 Hegel argues4 aritrariness
involves a !e"en!ency & have overloo#e!. E&t is containe! in aritrariness
that the content is !etermine! as mine not through the nature of my
$ill4 ut through contingency. Thus & am !e"en!ent on this content4 an!
this is the contra!iction that lies in aritrarinessE ?2. N '(A@.
*+
:.EEDO,
:ollo$ing the 3antian tra!ition in $hich Hegel stan!s4 to e X<<;a$are is
to e a$are of an activity that uniGes a content !istinct from it. &f the limits
of the self4 or at least of its "ositive free!om4 are the limits of this activity4
then the self's free content is $hatever its self;activity successfully unites.
The oFect of an aritrary choice has not een "ro"erly ma!e a "art of the
self that chooses it4 since4 it ears only a contingent relation to the self's nee!s4
!esires4 an! other choices. &n this res"ect4 the content of such a choice is not
something in $hich & am E$ith myself4E an! so an aritrary choice is Eunfree.E
&t !oes not manifest only the self;activity of the self that ma#es it4 ut
inclu!es an a!!itional content $hich is alien to this self ecause it is relate!
only acci!entally to its other contents. EThe or!inary man elieves he is free
$hen he is "ermitte! to act aritrarily4 ut in this very aritrariness lies the
fact that he is unfreeE ?2. N '(A@. A choice is asolutely free only $hen &
am E$ith myselfE in it. This reIuires that it e s"eciGcally characteristic of
me4 integrate! reJectively into my other choices4 an! stan!ing in a rational
relation to my !esires4 traits4 "roFects4 an! my total situation. & am free or
E$ith myselfE in my EcontentsE or E!eterminationsE ; my !esires an! my
choices ; $hen they harmoniDe $ith the "ractical system constituting my
self;i!entity as an agent ; $ith the Erational system of volitional !eterminationE
$hich & am ?2. N '9@.
io. A system of oFective free!om
Hegel's conce"t of s"irit is ase! on the i!ea that & can e free or E$ith
myselfE in something e>ternal4 $hich can count as a manifestation of my
free!om or self;activity. There is room for the relation E$ith myself inE
$herever there is a self engage! in some rational "roFect an! there is an oFect
that "lays some "ositive role in that "roFect4 either as a "ro!uct or an inten!e!
result4 or else as a means or an enaling con!ition.
Hegel vie$s the $hole of the 2hiloso"hy of .ight as a Esystem of oFective
free!omE ; a system of oFects in $hich the $ill is E$ith itselfE ?2. N 5+@4
or the E&!eaE of the $ill as Ethe free $ill that $ills the free $illE ?2. N 5=@.
&n cha"ter '4 $e loo#e! at the structure of the 2hiloso"hy of .ight as a !evelo"ing
system of self;images4 all of $hich elong to the self;un!erstan!ing of
mo!ern humanity. To loo# at the 2hiloso"hy of .ight in this $ay is to loo#
at it EsuFectively4E from the si!e of the suFect $hose free!om is in Iuestion.
-ut $e might eIually $ell loo# at the same system EoFectively4E from the
si!e of the oFects in $hich the free $ill actualiDes itself4 or4 as $e have no$
learne! to e>"ress it4 the #in!s of oFects EinE $hich the free $ill is E$ith
itself.E
&n the course of the 2hiloso"hy of .ight4 Hegel consi!ers four asic ty"es
of entities in $hich the self or free $ill can e E$ith itselfEC
'. The $ill's o$n !eterminations
5. E>ternal oFects or EthingsE ?0acheri@
). The $ill's e>ternal actions an! !oings4 inclu!ing their conseIuences
*9
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
*. The social institutions that !eGne the $ill's situation '
&n eMect4 this also re"ro!uces the structure of Hegel's system of oFective
s"iritA ?'@ is treate! in the 2.4 &ntro!uctionA ?5@ is Astract .ightA ?)@ is
,oralityA an! ?*@ is Ethical Life.
&n Astract .ight4 Hegel ta#es u" oFective free!om in the form of the
e>ternal oFects or things that are the "ro"erty of the "erson4 an! hence in
$hich & as "erson am E$ith myselfEC EAs free $ill & am oFect to myself in
$hat & "ossess4 an! only thus am & an actual $ill. This si!e constitutes $hat
is true an! rightful4 the !etermination of "ro"ertyE ?2. N *(@. ,orality !eals
$ith the free!om of the suFect4 the $ill's eing $ith itself in its o$n $illing4
in its actions an! their en!s ?2. N '69@4 an! in the results it rings aout in
the oFective $orl!4 for $hich it regar!s itself as morally res"onsile ?2. N
''=A E/ N (6)@. &n Ethical Life the $ill comes to e free or E$ith itselfE in
the social institutions of the rational state. The state's interests an! mine are
not in reality o""ose!4 an! to the e>tent that & ecome conscious of this fact
EFust this Tother4 i.e.4 the stateU is imme!iately not an other for me4 an! in
this consciousness & am freeE ?2. N 57+@.
Hegel's most stri#ing claim in this regar! is that my !uties as a memer
of the rational social or!er !o not really constrain me4 ut instea! lierate
me ?2. N '*9@. This claim may seem to go a ste" eyon! "ara!o>4 "assing
over into !oulethin#. -ut it ma#es "erfectly goo! sense4 if $e #ee" in min!
$hat Hegel's conce"t of free!om is4 an! if $e grant the strong claims he
ma#es on ehalf of the institutions of the mo!ern ethical or!er. These institutions
mar# out for me a certain role4 or a set of roles4 in society ; as a
family memer4 as a "rofessional in civil society4 as a citiDen of a state ?2.
N '(=@. Hegel claims that our social roles in the mo!ern state are in!is"ensale
to the fulGllment or actualiDation of ourselves as rational eings. &t follo$s
that ethical !uties lierate us ecause only y fulGlling them can $e
actualiDe ourselves as "art of this rational system of coo"eration. Without
them4 my $ill $oul! contain only natural im"ulses an! striving after vaguely
!eGne! moral goals. & coul! have neither a concrete self;image4 nor a !eterminate
"lan of action4 nor any conG!ence that $hat & thin# ought to ha""en
actually $ill ha""en. When & fulGll my role in a rational social or!er4 on the
other han!4 & !eGne myself through my action4 an! my action is "art of a
larger social "rocess that systematically achieves the goo!. Duties count as
enaling con!itions for us4 an! $hen $e see this4 $e come to e E$ith ourselvesE
or free in "erforming them.
T&n ethical lifeU the in!ivi!ual is not limite! ut rather free!. What the in!ivi!ual
is4 his essential $ill4 is not an other to$ar! $hich he relates himself. He Gn!s himself
conGne!4 o""resse! only insofar as he stan!s in his "articularity4 only insofar as he
has a "articular EoughtE an! Emay eEA $hat "resses on him is only his o$n suFectivity.
&nsofar as he relates to himself as something ethical4 he lierates himself. The
ethical living together of human eings is their lierationA in it they come to an intuition
of themselves. ?%2.igC '5(@
&t is my o$n oFectivity4 in the true sense4 $hich & fulGll in !oing my !utyC in
cloing my !uty4 & aim $ith myself an! free. ?2.N '))A@
0O
:.EEDO,
Of course4 Hegel !oes not thin# that $e are free only in !oing our !uties.
Unli#e :ichte4 he !oes not maintain fanatically that even our o!ily survival
shoul!' have Eno other "ur"ose than to live an! to e an eMective tool for the
"romotion of the en! of reasonE ?0L 57+<5+*@. He insists that suFective
free!om an! "articular self;satisfaction are the foun!ation of morality4 an!
that ethical !uties lierate us only ecause $e fulGll our "articularity through
them ?2. NN '5';'5*4 '(5;'(*4 '754.4 '+(;'+94 576A cf. 5B/N *=(@. -y the
same to#en4 it is clearly not Hegel's vie$ that $e coul! e Elierate!E y
eing com"elle! to "erform our !uties ?$hether through "olice "o$er or4
more sutly4 through social "ressure@. We are $ith ourselves in our !uties
only if $e.have rational #no$le!ge of or insight into the $orth of $hat $e
!o ?2. N i)54.@A the chief avo$e! "ur"ose of the 2hiloso"hy of .ight is to
"rovi!e this #no$le!ge ?2. 2reface ')@.
:inally4 !uty !oes not lierate us unless it is true that $e actualiDe ourselves
through fulGlling our !uties. Duty is lieration only ecause fulGllingC
!uty is a Ecoming to the essence4 to the truth of the $illE ?%2.FC *96A cf.
2. NN 5*4 '*9A@. Our est reason for resisting Hegel's assertion that E!uty
lieratesE is a healthy s#e"ticism concerning Hegel's vie$ that the fulGllment
of our !uties in a mo!ern social or!er really contriutes to a concretely free
an! rational life. We may even come to ta#e for grante! that to thin# in!e"en!ently
an! critically is necessarily to ta#e a conscientiously !etache! vie$ of
society an! one's "lace in it $hich "reclu!es eing E$ith oneselfE in one's!uties.
57 Even if this is right4 Hegel may still e correct in thin#ing that $e
have a fun!amental nee! for rational4 reJective i!entiGcation $ith a social
role4 an! that mo!ern in!ivi!uals cannot e truly free until they create a
social or!er in $hich this is "ossile. 0urely the most $retche! unfree!om
of all $oul! e to lose the aility even to conceive of $hat it $oul! e li#e
to have the free!om $e lac#4 an! so !ismiss even the as"iration to free!om
as something $ic#e!4 an! !angerous.
''. Hegelian free!om an! or!inary free!om
Hegel's conce"t of asolute free!om is not the or!inary one4 ut $e are no$
in a "osition to see ho$ a Hegelian ethical theory ase! on asolute free!om
$ill "rovi!e for free!om in the or!inary sense. To e free $e must e $ith
ourselves in our actions. As mo!ern in!ivi!uals4 our self;image "rominently
inclu!es the conce"tion of ourselves as suFects4 !irecting our lives through
our o$n choices an! Gn!ing satisfaction in our !ee!s as e>"ressions of our
suFectivity ?2. N '5'@. &n other $or!s4 $e cannot e $ith ourselves in our
actions unless $e achieve suFective free!om. We cannot e suFectively free
unless $e have "ersonal free!om an! civil free!om. As "ersons $e reIuire
an e>ternal s"here in $hich to e>ercise our free choice ?2. N *'@. We cannot
fulGll ourselves as suFects unless;$e elong to civil society4 an! enFoy the
free!om from state interference necessary to uil! our lives an! livelihoo!s
on our o$n $or# ?2. N '+9@. We cannot actualiDe suFective free!om as
citiDens of the state unless $e can "artici"ate in the formation of "ulic o"in;
('
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
ion through the give an! ta#e of free !iscussion ?2. N )'9@. Thus in Hegel's
ethical theory4 free!om in the or!inary sense turns out to e reIuire! as a
necessary con!ition for suFective free!om4 $hich is one as"ect of asolute
free!om. The value of free!om in the or!inary sense is suor!inate to an!
con!itional on other values4 ut it is im"ortant Fust the same.
&saiah -erlin4 along $ith many other $riters in the lieral tra!ition4 $arns
us against i!entifying free!om ?in the or!inary sense@ $ith some other goo!4
such as self;actualiDation. To !o this4 they thin#4 is to run the ris# of losing
sight of the s"ecial value of free!om4 "erha"s sacriGcing it in our "ursuit of
other goals. One Hegelian res"onse to this is that unless $e vie$ free!om in
the or!inary sense as suor!inate to other goals4 $e cannot "ro"erly estimate
its value4 or have full insight into its im"ortance4 since that is est.a""reciate!
$hen it is seen in light of the larger human goo! it serves. :or Hegel4
as for Hohn 0tuart ,ill4 free!om in the or!inary sense is a very im"ortant
goo!4 ut its value is con!itional on the s"eciGc con!itions of human selfactualiDation
in mo!ern society. We $ill not !o a etter Fo of "rotecting
free!om y "reten!ing it has a more e>alte! "lace in the scheme of things
than it really has.
The other Hegelian re"ly to such lieral arguments is that they eg the
Iuestion in su""osing that free!om4 "ro"erly s"ea#ing4 is a !iMerent goo!
from self;actualiDation. Hegel's theory i!entiGes free!om as the -estimmung
of human eings4 the essence of the self to e actualiDe!. We have alrea!y
seen that Hegel has a theoretical asis for claiming that human self;actualiDation
is free!om4 an! free!om is not really the aility to !o as you "lease4 ut
asolute self;activity4 or eing $ith yourself.
This may seem li#e a mere !is"ute aout the meaning of a $or!4 ut in
some cases $or!s matter a lot. &n mo!ern society4 the !eman! for lieration4
emanci"ation4 free!om4 occu"ies a very im"ortant "lace. &f Hegel is right4
then this !eman! may not mean $hat lierals thin# it !oes. &f you thin# that
free!om is nothing eyon! the aility to !o as you "lease4 then you $ill say
that if a society "rovi!es lavishly for that aility4 it must e a free society. &f
critics claim that it is still not a free society4 ecause "eo"le cannot rationally
i!entify $ith their roles in that society4 or ecause there is no meaning in
any of the choices it "rovi!es "eo"le4 then you $ill !ismiss such claims as
confuse!4 or reinter"ret them as !eman!s for something other than free!om.
Of course4 it $oul! e nice to have those other things4 you thin#4 an! maye
some!ay $e $ill Gn! a $ay to get themA in the meantime $e shoul! at least
e gla! that $e are living in a free society. -ut you might e all $rongA the
critics may e saying e>actly $hat they mean4 an! you may sim"ly e failing
to un!erstan! them.
(5
)
Ha""iness
i. Ha""inessC ancient an! mo!ern
The classical /ree# tra!ition in ethics from 0ocrates to the 0toics is concerne!
$ith one very sim"le an! fun!amental IuestionC What sort of life
shoul! one liveB This inIuiry is focuse! on the "ursuit of eu!aemonia4 or
Eha""iness.E Ha""iness consists in that sort of life in $hich a human eing
!oes an! has $hat is most Gtting to human nature. The ha""y life is the life
of human self;actualiDation.
Hegel shares $ith classical ethics the i!ea that "ractical "hiloso"hy is focuse!
on a single encom"assing human goo!4 consisting in the self;actualiDation
of human eings as rational agents. His theory !iMers from classical
theories in t$o main $ays. :irst4 as $e sa$ in Cha"ter '4 N +4 it is mislea!ing
in Hegel's theory to thin# of this goo! as an en!4 ecause it is a self;actualiDaC
tion theory rather than a teleological theory. 0econ!4 Hegel's name for the
Gnal human goo! is not Eha""inessE ut Efree!om.E To a""reciate the signiGcance
of this secon! !iMerence $e nee! to ta#e a loo# at the $ay classical
ethics thought aout ha""iness4 an! then at the $ay the conce"t has change!
in mo!ern ethics.
Aristotle re"orts that some thin# ha""iness consists in "leasure4 or $ealth4
or honor4 $hereas others hol! that it consists in virtue4 or the e>ercise of
virtue4 or "hiloso"hical #no$le!ge.' Aristotle a""arently thin#s that everyone
in his society $oul! agree that ha""iness is the com"rehensive goo!4 the
goo! inclu!ing all other goo!s $orth having. &n 2lato4 too4 the Iuestion
EHo$ shoul! & liveBE $as a""arently ta#en to e eIuivalent to the Iuestion
EHo$ can & achieve ha""inessBE5
'
Classical ethics therey ta#es t$o other things for grante! as $ellC Grst4
the oFectivity of ha""inessA secon!4 the egoistic orientation of ethics. -oth
have een rought into Iuestion y mo!ern ethical thought.
5. The issue of oFectivity
&t is agree! y 0ocrates4 2lato4 Aristotle4 an! the 0toics that the constitution
of an in!ivi!ual's ha""iness is an oFective matter4 not !e"en!ent on $hat
the in!ivi!ual thin#s or elieves aout it. &f a certain sort of life constitutes
my ha""iness4 then that is an oFective fact aout me4 in!e"en!ent of my
actual !esires4 "references4 or eliefs aout $hat my ha""iness consists in.
0u""ose & elieve that ha""iness consists in o!ily "leasures4 an!4 follo$ing
()
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
this elief4 & succee! in enFoying a life of o!ily "leasure. & have a life that
contents me4 an! & elieve it to e a ha""y life. Nevertheless4 classical ethical
theorists ?even the E"icureans@ !eny that ha""iness for any human eing
consists in a life of o!ily "leasures. On this groun!4 they !eny not only that
& #no$ $hat my goo! is4 ut also that & am really ha""y. &n the classical
vie$4 if "eo"le's values an! "riorities are suLciently at o!!s $ith the oFectively
correct ones4 they can e $retche! $ithout #no$ing itA their thoughts
an! feelings to the contrary count for nothing.
&t is characteristic of mo!ern ethical thought to regar! ha""iness as a much
more suFective matter than this. ,any mo!ern thin#ers regar! ha""iness
as consisting sim"ly of "leasure an! the asence of "ain4 $hereas most others
maintain that $hether & am ha""y !e"en!s on $hether & satisfy the !esires
& actually have. This change a""ears to have egun $ith Hoes. Descartes4
for e>am"le4 still es"ouses the 0toic vie$4 i!entifying ha""iness $ith virtue.)
Hoes4 ho$ever4 consi!ers ha""iness to e not a state of the "erson4 ut a
transition from !esire unsatisGe! to !esire satisGe!C
& "ut for a general inclination of all man#in! a "er"etual an! restless !esire of
"o$er after "o$er that ceases only in !eath. . . . The felicity of.this life4 consisteth
not in the re"ose of a min! satisGe!. :or there is no such Gnus ultimus4 utmost aim4
nor summum onum4 greatest goo!4 as is s"o#en of in the oo#s of the ol! moral
"hiloso"hers. Nor can a man any more live4 $hose !esires are at an en!4 than he4
$hose senses an! imagination are at a stan!. :elicity is continual "rogress of the
!esire4 from one oFect to anotherA the attaining of the former4 eing still ut the $ay
to the latter.*
-y the late seventeenth century4 it $as common to i!entify ha""iness not
merely $ith the satisfaction of !esire4 ut $ith a !eterminate suFective stateC
"leasure. ,aleranche an! Arnaul!4 for e>am"le4 argue over $hether ha""iness
is "leasure in general or "leasures of the intellect onlyA ut they agree
that ha""iness consists in "leasure ?a "osition that ha! een roun!ly reFecte!
y 0t. Thomas AIuinas an! most other 0cholastics@.(
Hohn Loc#e agrees $ith Arnaul! an! ,aleranche aout this4 an! ta#es
t$o further ste"s to$ar! suFectiviDing the i!ea of ha""iness.7 :irst4 Loc#e
recogniDes that $hat may give "leasure to one "erson may not give it to another4
an! conclu!es that ha""iness is suFective not only in the sense that
it consist in a suFective state4 ut also in the further sense that the ha""y life
varies from "erson to "erson.= ?Thus it is a ste" ac#$ar!4 in the !irection of
ancient oFectivism aout ha""iness4 $hen 0haftesury claims ; an! $hen
,ill later re"eats the claim ; that mental "leasures are more con!ucive to
ha""iness than o!ily ones on the groun! that those $ho #no$ oth "leasures
systematically "refer the former.@+ 0econ!4 Loc#e ma#es the interesting
claim that $e are move! to !esire an! "ursue $hat $e consi!er goo!
only insofar as $e regar! that goo! un!er the guise of our ha""inessC
1et all goo!4 even seen4 an! confesse! to e so4 !oes not necessarily move every
"articular man's !esireA ut only that "art4 or so much of it4 as is consi!erX4 an!
ta#en to ma#e a necessary "art of his ha""iness. All other goo! ho$ever great in
(*
HA22&NE00
reality4 or a""earance4 e>cites not a man's !esires4 $ho loo#s not on it to ma#e a "art
of that ha""iness.9
As it stan!s44 of course4 this Jies in the face of the familiar fact that "eo"le
sometimes !esire an! "ursue something ?such as another "erson's aMection@
$hile realiDing that such striving $ill e !estructive of their ha""iness. -ut
Loc#e's claim is interesting ecause it gives s"ecial em"hasis to the role
"laye! y an in!ivi!ual's conce"tion of ha""iness in that in!ivi!ual's !esires
an! choices. As $e shall see44 the same thought is central to 3ant's an! Hegel's
reJections on the i!ea of ha""iness4 even though ?unli#e Loc#e@ they
!o not i!entify ha""iness $ith "leasure an! they recogniDe that "eo"le may
!esire things not inclu!e! in their notion of $hat $ill ma#e them ha""y.
There are three Iuite !iMerent senses in $hich Loc#e's conce"tion of ha""iness
is more EsuFectiveE than the classical conce"tions of 2lato4 Aristotle4
an! the 0toicsC
0C 0uFectivity of contentC Ha""iness consists in a suFective state of min!4
such as "leasure or satisfaction4 not in e>tramental states or achievements
?such as having a Fust soul4 or acting virtuously@.
0% 0uFective variailityC The content of ha""iness may !iMer from "erson
to "ersonA $hat ma#es me ha""y may e Iuite !iMerent from $hat ma#es
you ha""y.
0D 0uFective !eterminationC The content of a "erson's ha""iness is at least
in "art u" to that "ersonA at least to some e>tent4 $hat counts as my
ha""iness !e"en!s on $hat & thin# $ill count as my ha""iness.
Of the three4 0D is y far the greatest !e"arture from classical ethics. &t
is arguale that 0% is alrea!y "art of classical ethics itself4 since 2lato seems
to hol! that a ha""y life for a memer of one class in the i!eal state $ill !iMer
in content from a ha""y life for a memer of another classA an! at least on
some inter"retations4 Aristotle recogniDes that some "eo"le can e ha""y y
!evoting their lives to "olitical activity4 $hereas others are ha""y y !evoting
their lives to "hiloso"hical contem"lation. Aristotle reFects 0C4 ut re"orts
it as a common o"inion in his !ay4 an! 0C $as hel! y some ancient "hiloso"hers4
such as E"icurus an! Eu!o>us.'6 -ut all ancient ethical theories4 even
the most he!onistic of.them4 seem to hol! that $hat my ha""iness consists
in is a matter of fact entirely in!e"en!ent of my eliefs aout it. &n contrast4
Loc#e an! later mo!ern thin#ers such as 3ant an! Hegel hol! that my conce"tion
of ha""iness has an irre!ucile role to "lay in !etermining the actual
content of my ha""iness.
-ecause the mo!ern conce"tion of ha""iness !iMers so much from the
ancient one4 it is sometimes allege! that Eha""inessE is not a correct translation
of eu!aemonia. &n mo!ern languages4 ho$ever4 there is no other $or!
that is more suitale4 an! the alternative translations of eu!aemonia that
have een "ro"ose! ?such as EJourishingE@ have a !istinctly artiGcial ring to
them. The "rolem is not one of le>icogra"hy or translation. -oth eu!aemonia
an! Eha""inessE can "erfectly $ell e use! to refer to an in!ivi!ual's
total goo!4 to the unrestricte! $hole of $hat is in that in!ivi!ual's interests4
((
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
eneGts that in!ivi!ual4 or ma#es that in!ivi!ual $ell oM. &f eu!aemonia in
classical ethics is use! !iMerently from Eha""inessE an! its mo!ern eIuivalents4
the most natural e>"lanation is that there is a systematic an! sustantive
!isagreement et$een classical an! mo!ern ethical thought concerning
$hat an in!ivi!ual's goo! is4 an! es"ecially over the e>tent to $hich my conscious
!esires an! my eliefs aout my goo! !etermine the content of my
goo!.
.ichar! 3raut has suggeste! that our mo!ern conce"tion of ha""iness is
less EoFectiveE an! more EsuFectiveE than the ancient one ecause the ancients
$ere more conG!ent than $e are that they #ne$ $hat the human goo!
consists in.'' He may e right that $e are less conG!ent aout this than
Aristotle $as4 ut Aristotle's o$n re"ort of common o"inion in!icates that
there $as consi!erale !isagreement among the ancients4 an! that suggests
that there might have een a goo! !eal of uncertainty as $ell. -ut even if $e
are less conG!ent than the ancients that $e #no$ the content of the human
goo!4 that still !oes not e>"lain $hy $e relate an in!ivi!ual's ha""iness more
closely than they !i! to that in!ivi!ual's eliefs4 !esires4 an! "references. &f
one "hysician feels less conG!ent than her colleagues that she #no$s the real
nature of a certain !isease4 that $oul! not e>"lain her conclu!ing that the
nature of the !isease varies from "atient to "atientA still less $oul! it account
for her a!o"ting the iDarre theory that for each in!ivi!ual "atient the nature
of the !isease is $hatever that "atient ha""ens to thin# it is. The mo!ern
ten!ency to suFectiviDe ha""iness or the goo! cannot e e>"laine! y anyone's
!egree of conG!ence in their #no$le!ge aout $hat ha""iness consists
in. What nee!s e>"lanation is the fact that $e mo!erns are so conG!ent that
a "erson's goo! !e"en!s on the satisfaction of that "erson's actual !esires an!
conce"tion of the goo!.
). The issue of egoism
A "erson's ha""iness is the sum of that "erson's goo!4 that "erson's selGntereste!
goo!. -y "osing the Iuestion as it !oes4 the classical ethical tra!ition
ta#es for grante! that the ans$er to Iuestions aout ho$ one shoul! live
must ultimately e egoistic ans$ers. Of course it is true that ancient ethical
thought often stresses the role of non;self;intereste! "ursuits in the ha""y
life. 0ometimes ancient moral "hiloso"hers even insist that such "ursuits are
in!is"ensale to ha""iness4 as $hen 2lato ma#es ha""iness consist in Fustice4
an! Aristotle treats frien!shi" as an in!is"ensale con!ition for ha""iness.
Classical ethical theories all hol! that one cannot e ha""y unless one "ossesses
certain virtues the "ractice of $hich involves non;self;intereste! ehavior
to$ar! others. -ut in classical ethics the ultimate rationale for my
having non;self;intereste! concerns is that having them is reIuire! for my
o$n ha""iness4 necessary to my o$n goo!.
Hegel realiDes that $e totally miss the "oint of ancient egoism if $e thin#
it reJects the attitu!e $e mo!erns call EselGshness.E Accor!ing to Hegel's
inter"retation of classical ethics4 ancient /ree# culture $as originally one in
(7
HA22&NE00
$hich in!ivi!ual self;interest $as asically in harmony $ith the interests of
the community4 in $hich "eo"le e>"erience! no serious !ivision et$een
their o$n $elfare an! the !eman!s of social life. There $as no sense in $hich
self;interest $as "erceive! as conJicting $ith any other im"ortant values.
,y goo! is sim"ly my share in the goo!. Until the rise of the suversive
i!ea of suFective free!om in Gfth;century Athens4 the !istinction et$een
!iMerent interests4 as something that might e mutually o""ose!4 $as not a
natural one to !ra$ for "eo"le living in the naive harmony of /ree# culture.
Hegel thin#s that the a$areness of social conJict ; that the claims of the
family an! the state might conJict4 or that in!ivi!ual self;interest might !iverge
from4 the common goo! ; $as e>tremely traumatic for the /ree#s4 an!
so ecame the main focus of their trage!ies ?cf. 2h/ '''' *7*;*=7@.
&f $e thin# ancient egoism re"resents EselGshness4E then $e shoul! e
sur"rise! that the classical egoism $as not imme!iately calle! into Iuestion
y Christian "hiloso"hy. Christianity "laces very strong em"hasis on aga"e4
self;!enial an! service to othersA ut such thin#ers as 0t. Augustine an! 0t.
Thomas AIuinas continue to "ose the Iuestions of ethics from an egoistic
stan!"oint. They mo!ify the classical "osition only y i!entifying our Gnal
ha""iness $ith an after$orl!ly eatiGc vision of /o!. 0in is vie$e! as the
assertion of in!ivi!ual self;$i<<4 ut not of in!ivi!ual self;interestA this al$ays
consists in conforming our $ill to /o!'s. &n Christian ethics4 classical oFectivism
an! egoism oth remain unIuestione!. This continuity et$een "agan
an! Christian ethics ecomes intelligile if $e realiDe that classical ethics
is egoistic sim"ly ecause the ancients !i! not yet clearly !iMerentiate clearly
et$een the goo! of the in!ivi!ual self an! the goo! of the social or cosmic
$hole to $hich the self elongs. The "antheism of 0toic ethics $as a natural
transition from "agan to Christian ethical thought4 retaining the egoistic "resu""ositions
of classical ethics.
Hegel thin#s that mo!ern ethics has aan!one! ancient egoism only ecause
$e mo!erns have come to see ourselves as in!ivi!ual suFects4 $ith
self;!etermine! lives to lea! !istinct from the life of the state4 the or!er of
nature4 an! the life of /o!. Thus $e come to regar! our suFective selfsatisfaction
as a goo! !istinct from4 an! "ossily in conJict $ith4 the "rivate
goo! of others44 the "ulic goo! of the community4 an! the !ivine or!er of
the universe. This mo!ern s"irit for Hegel gives rise to the !ee"est corru"tion4
ut at the same time to the i!ea of asolute free!om ; the mo!ern
s"irit's fun!amental vocation ?2. NN ')+;')9@. The reconciliation of universal
an! "articular goo! in the mo!ern state is thus a reconciliation of genuine
o""osites4 a true return out of otherness ?2. N 576@.
&t is not until 3ant that mo!ern ethics !ecisively challenges classical egoism.
3ant !emotes ha""iness to secon! "lace among goo!s4 ma#ing the rational
value of ha""iness !e"en!ent on the "ossession of moral virtue4 the con!ition
even of the $orthiness to e ha""y ?/ )9)<9@. A Hegelian e>"lanation
of this is that $ith the rise of mo!ern suFective self;consciousness4 the conce"t
of in!ivi!ual goo! ha! to e suFectiviDe!A conseIuently4 in!ivi!ual
ha""iness no longer necessarily shares in the universal goo!4 or in its asolute
(=
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
claims u"on us. &f in!ivi!ual goo! arises through in!ivi!ual !esire an! "reference4
it can fun!amentally o""ose the goo! of others4 the common goo!
of society4 the moral la$ of /o!. Therefore4 ethics must !e"ose ha""iness
from its "osition as the Grst "rinci"le of "ractical "hiloso"hy.
*. The natural $ill4 resolve4 an! choice
On oth issues4 oFectivity an! egoism4 Hegel si!es $ith the mo!erns. Hegel
is no he!onist4 so he reFects 0CA ut his conce"t of ha""iness is suFectivistic
in res"ect of oth 0% an! 0D. Hegel i!entiGes my ha""iness $ith the satisfaction
of my !esires ; in fact4 $ith the attainment of a goo! $hose content
is suFectively !etermine! y me. Hegel thin#s of ha""iness4 my suFective
or self;intereste! goo!4 as only one "art of the larger goo! for $hich & have
goo! reason to strive in actualiDing my free!om. As $e shall see in the ne>t
section4 Hegel's conce"tion of ha""iness is very close to 3ant's. Although
Hegel's ethical theory ta#es a more favorale attitu!e to$ar! the "ursuit of
ha""iness than 3ant's !oes4 it still treats ha""iness as a con!itione! goo!4
not as the Gnal aim of all action.
The &ntro!uction to the 2hiloso"hy of .ight !erives the Conce"t of ha""iness4
in the course of !evelo"ing the conce"t of the free $ill. &t also argues
that asolute free!om rather than ha""iness is the Gnal goo! of the free $ill.
Hegel's aim is not to sho$ that free!om as such must e "eo"le's conscious
en!. -ecause his ethical theory is a self;actualiDation theory rather than a
teleological theory4 he egins not $ith an i!entiGcation of the conscious goal
of action4 ut $ith a conce"tion of the agent to e actualiDe!4 an! he !erives
free!om as the oFective content of the goals that such a $ill sets for itself.
&n other $or!s4 he tries to sho$ that the characteristic $ays of reasoning an!
!eci!ing "oint to a tacit ac#no$le!gment of the evaluative "riority of free!om
over ha""iness4 even y "eo"le $ho !o not e>"licitly recogniDe the value
of free!om.
Hegel "rocee!s y consi!ering some characteristic $ays in $hich "eo"le
ma#e !ecisions aout $hat they $ant an! em"loy their reason in ma#ing
such !ecisions. He thin#s that insofar as these $ays of !eci!ing are carrie!
out $ith full self;a$areness4 they involve ; or at least a""ro>imate to ; an
e>"licit recognition of free!om as the Gnal human goo!. The argument involves
three gra!es or levels of the free $ill4 a hierarchy of !iMerent $ays of
e>ercising agency. &t egins $ith the Eimme!iate or natural $illE ?2. N ''@.
This is4 so to s"ea#4 the $ill sim"ly as it comes from nature4 the $ill consi!ere!
"rior to ?that is4 in astraction from@ any e>ercise of free agency. The
EcontentE of this $ill is a Eme!ley an! manifol! of !rives ?Triee@E each of
$hich is Esomething universal an! in!eterminate4 having many mo!es an!
oFects of satisfactionE ?2. N '5@. Hegel a""ears to inclu!e among such
!rives not only sensuous !rives4 such as hunger an! thirst4 ut also !rives of
a Es"iritual nature4E such as Esym"athyE an! the !rives for EhonorE an!
EfameE ?%2. 5C ')(@. Hegel's theory hol!s Grst4 that these !rives are Fust
foun! in us4 or imme!iately EgivenEA secon!4 that there are an in!eterminate
(+
HA22&NE00
multi"licity of themA an! thir!4 that each is a !rive for a general #in! of
thing4 an! not a !esire for a s"eciGc oFect.
The Grst tas# of the free $ill consists in EresolvingE ?-eschliesseri@4 Ecanceling
the in!eterminacyE of these natural !rives. To resolve is to convert
one's general an! in!eGnite !rives into !esires for more or less !eGnite oFects.
This is $hat & !o4 for instance4 $hen & feel hungry an! !eci!e that
$hat & $ant to eat is enchila!as rather than lam curry4 or stea#4 or scam"i.
Of course4 it is not often that $e Grst feel hungry in general an! then suseIuently4
after a conscious "rocess of Eresolving4E !eci!e $hat foo! $e are
hungry for. Usually our hunger "resents itself to us !irectly as a !esire for a
s"eciGc foo!. -ut it is o"en to Hegel to claim that there can e resolving
even in cases $here no e>"licit mental "rocess of this sort ta#es "lace. His
theory of our volition treats our asic or imme!iate !esires as in!eterminate
!rives4 an! assigns to our $ill the function of converting these !rives into
!esires for !eterminate oFects. .esolving is sometimes an e>"licit an! conscious
"rocess of !eci!ing4 ut sometimes it is "erforme! tacitly or unconsciously.
Hence the theory can a""eal to the fact that sometimes resolving is
an e>"licit an! conscious "rocess of !eci!ing $hat $e !esire4 ut it is not
refute! y the fact that this !oes not al$ays occur.
Once the $ill has Eresolve!4E its !esires ta#e the form of $ants !irecte! at
!eterminate oFects. Then it is in a "osition to move on to its secon! tas#4
$hich Hegel calls E!ioosingE ?W!hlen@. When $e Echoose4E $e select $hich
of our !eterminate !esires $e $ill count as most "ro"erly our o$n. &n Cha"ter
54 $e sa$ that there is a sense in $hich it is not a trivial truth that all the
!esires & Gn! in myself are mine4 or a "art of me. There are im"ortant !iMerences
et$een my !esires in res"ect of the e>tent to $hich & regar! them
as truly mine4 or e>"ressive of myself. As some recent "hiloso"hers have
em"hasiDe!4 most of us have secon!;or!er !esires4 !esires concerne! $ith
other !esires. Aout some of my !esires & form the secon!;or!er !esire that
& shoul! continue4 to have them4 $hereas aout others & !esire not to have
them at all. 0ome !esires are aLrme! through my choice4 or EchosenE ?in
Hegel's sense@ as "art of me. & i!entify $ith these !esires4 & regar! them as
"art of meA the !esires that & !esire not to have remain4 y contrast4 Ee>ternalE
to me4 they fall outsi!e $hat & regar! as my real self.
Choosing is a function of $hat Hegel calls the EreJective $illE ?E/ NN
*=7;*==A 2. N 56@4 ecause in choosing4 the $ill !etaches itself4 as it $ere4
from its "articular !esires so as to choose et$een them. As choice4 the content
of the $ill is Efor the reJection of the self into itself only a "ossile
TcontentU4 it may e mine or not4 an! the self is the "ossiility of !etermining
myself to this or that other4 of choosing among these !eterminations4 $hich
are e>ternal for the self on this si!eE ?2. N '*@. &f & am to e free or $ith
myself in my actions4 they must "rocee! from !esires that are truly mine4
!esires $ith $hich & have chosen to i!entify. When it ma#es such a choice4
Hegel says4 the reJective $ill Ecloses $ithE its !esire ?sich mit ihr Dusammenschliessi@
an! therey ma#es the !esire really Eits o$nE ?seinige@ ?E/ N *==@.
As in the case of resolving4 choosing is sometimes !one y an e>"licit4
(9
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
conscious "rocess4 sometimes not. & sometimes i!entify $ith a !esire through
a "rocess of e>"licitly !eci!ing to4 ut choosing can also occur through s"ontaneous
self;!irecte! attitu!es4 such as "ri!e or shame. The ritual act of consciously
!eci!ing to i!entify $ith a !esire $ill mean little if it is not ratiGe!
y these attitu!es. As efore4 Hegel's theory assigns the i!entiGcation $ith
a !esire not to our natural constitution ut to our free agency4 to the EreJective
$ill4E $hatever the !egree of consciousness $ith $hich the i!entiGcation
"rocess has een carrie! out.
As choosing4 the $ill is also calle! EaritrarinessE ?Will#iir@ ; or4 as $e
might also translate the term in this conte>t4 Eo"tion.E Choosing is a function
of the $ill that can e e>ercise! in!iMerently in either of t$o or more $ays.
:or e>am"le4 & might !esire great $ealth an! "o$er4 ut also !esire not to e
ur!ene! $ith the cares an! res"onsiilities that $ealth an! "o$er inevitaly
ring $ith them. &t is u" to me $hich of these conJicting !esires & i!entify
$ith an! count as most truly mine. Choosing !oes not have the "o$er to
create ne$ !esires4 or to !estroy !esires that are alrea!y there. -ut it ma#es
a great !eal of !iMerence $hether & thin# of my gree! an! amition as $ar"ing
my life4 or thin# of my chil!ish irres"onsiility as stan!ing in the $ay of
success. ,y self;!eGnition is at sta#e4 along $ith the content of my free!om.
The term Will#iir also suggests4 ho$ever4 that such choices can e aritrary4
acci!ental4 at the mercy of $hims an! ca"rices. As $e have seen4 Hegel !enies
that asolute free!om is "resent in aritrary choices. He consi!ers aritrariness
as one techniIue for overcoming the $ill's EGnitu!e4E the fact that its has some
!eterminate4 naturally given !esire as its content ?2. N 7@. Through its ca"acity
to i!entify aritrarily $ith one content an! reFect another4 the $ill see#s EinGnitu!eE
?2. N (@. Hegel sees such a Iuest among some of his .omantic contem"oraries4
such as :rie!rich 0chlegel4 $ho try to vin!icate their inGnite
free!om through an attitu!e of ironic !etachment to$ar! all Gnite as"ects of
life. Another illustration of it4 later ut "erha"s etter #no$n to us4 is foun! in
3ier#egaar!'s Eaesthetic manE in Either<Or.l We sa$ in Cha"ter 5 that Hegel
regar!s this .omantic Iuest for free!om as a !ece"tion. &nstea! of eing everything4
the aritrary $ill is nothing !eterminate at all4 hence Fust as one;si!e! as
the Gnite !eterminacy it is trying to avoi! ?2. N '7@. As 3ier#egaar! $as later
to "ut it4 this self falls into the E!es"air of inGnitu!e.E')
Aritrariness !oes not get the $ill eyon! the E!ialecticE of !iMerent !rives
an! inclinations4 getting in the $ay of one another an! "ulling the $ill in !iMerent
!irections ?2. N '=@. &n or!er to overcome this !ialectic4 the $ill must move
on to a thir! stage eyon! oth EresolveE an! Echoice.E &t reJects on its !rives
an! tries to harmoniDe them oth $ith one another an! $ith the "ractical means
of their satisfaction4 so that they form a consistent $hole4 a Esum of satisfaction.E
The i!ea of this $hole is $hat Hegel calls Eha""inessE ?2. N 56@.
(. 3ant's i!ea of ha""iness
This notion of ha""iness is Iuite close to the one !evelo"e! in 3ant's ethical
$ritings. 3ant i!entiGes ha""iness $ith the E$ell;eingE ?Wohl@ of a Gnite
76
HA22&NE00
rational eing ?/ )9(<''@4 its total an! lasting a!vantage ?/ *'76<))6@4 $hich
consists in the satisfaction of its natural !esires or inclinations. -ut ha""iness
is also an Ei!ea4E in $hich Eall inclinations are summe! u"E ?/ )99<'(@A to
"ursue ha""iness is to "ursue an Easolute $hole or ma>imum of $ell;eingE
?/ *'+<)(@. To e ha""y is to e in that state $here these inclinations are
ma>imally satisGe!4 so that ha""iness consists in a total Econtentment $ith
one's con!itionE ?/ )9)<9@.
Ha""iness is the ma>imal satisfaction of one's inclinations4 ut inclinations
are heterogeneous4 lac#ing any common measure in themselves ?2. N
'=@. There are no !esires $hose satisfaction counts as my satisfaction a"art
from my choice to Eclose $ithE a given !esire foun! in meA an! there are
not even any !esires for !eterminate oFects a"art from my act of EresolveE
$hich gives !eterminacy to an in!eterminate a natural !rive. Li#e$ise4
oth 3ant an! Hegel thin# that the notion of a EtotalE or Ema>imalE satisfaction
ma#es sense only in terms of an i!ea !evise! y the in!ivi!ual
$hose goo! it is su""ose! to e. ,y agency is involve! in !eci!ing $hich
comination of satisfactions $ill count as my EtotalE or Ema>imalEsatisfaction.
&n framing this i!ea of a greatest Esum of satisfaction4E & may consi!er not
only the relative strength of my !esires4 ut also the resources availale an!
conseIuences of a""lying these resources in various $ays ?2. N 5'@. As
Hegel "uts itC
The result4 the i!eal of this s"here is ha""iness4 satisfaction of !rives. -ut !rives
contra!ict each other4 their means an! conseIuences com"licate an! contra!ict each
other. Through reJection4 conce"tion ?%orstellung@ ma#es a $hole out of this un!le4
a universal satisfaction of !rives4 ut in such a $ay that they !o not contra!ict
each other4 they are "osite! in harmony an! suor!inate! to one another. ?%2. *C
')(@
& am satisGe! ?or content@ at a given time if $hatever !esires & ha""en to
have at that time are satisGe!. -ut that is not suLcient for ha""iness. & can
e calle! ha""y only y means of a conce"tion of ha""iness that & have
frame! for myself4 an i!ea of a life in $hich all my inclinations $ill achieve
ma>imal an! alance! satisfaction. The content of my ha""iness !e"en!s in
"art on my !ecision aout $hat my ha""iness is going to consist in. 3ant
"uts this "oint most e>"licitly in a fragment from his Nachlass ?!ate! aout
'==(@C EHa""iness is not something sense! ut something thought. Nor is
it a thought that can e ta#en from e>"erience ut a thought that only ma#es
its e>"erience "ossile. T&t isU not as if one ha! to #no$ ha""iness in all its
elements4 ut the a "riori con!ition y $hich alone one can e ca"ale of
ha""iness.E'*
Ha""iness for 3ant reIuires not only em"irical !esires an! their satisfaction4
ut also an inter"retation of these !esires in terms of a conce"tion of
myself ; a com"rehensive set of aims4 an! a "lan in terms of $hich & imagine
these aims fulGlle!. Only a conce"tion of the sort of life & regar! as ma#ing
me ha""y Ema#es the e>"erience of ha""iness "ossile.E To e ha""y ?as
7'
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
o""ose! to eing merely "lease! or contente! at the moment@ reIuires reJection
on oneself an! one's life. &t also reIuires $hat Hegel has calle! a EchoiceE
of one's !esires4 an! it means that this choice has een ma!e in a systematic
$ay4 so that the "ursuit an! satisfaction of the !esires chosen constitute a
coherent $hole.
No one has a Econce"tion of ha""inessE in the sense of a $ell $or#e! out
"icture4 com"lete an! consistent !o$n to the last !etail4 of ho$ life is su""ose!
to go. What "eo"le have at any given time is a set of goals4 !esires4
an! "references4 "erha"s to some e>tent inchoate or inconsistent4 an! a "icture4
more or less vague4 of ho$ they $oul! li#e various issues in their life
to turn out. ,oreover4 the stan!ar! against $hich & measure my life may
alter as it goes along. & may thin# that ha""iness for me consists in ecoming
a la$yer4 ut $hen & fail at that or ecome !issatisGe! $ith the "ractice of
la$4 & might !eci!e that $hat & really $ant is to e a novelist. &n oth these
$ays4 3ant's conce"tion of ha""iness is an i!ealiDation $hen it s"ea#s of our
having an Ei!eaE of ha""iness. The same i!ealiDation is involve! in tal#ing
aout our having Estan!ar!sE for our life. -ut these are i!ealiDations of something
real. When $e Fu!ge ourselves ha""y or unha""y4 $e !o not merely
e>"ress "leassure or !is"leasure $ith our momentary stateA $e are "lease!
or !is"lease! $ith our life4 ecause it measures u" to our stan!ar!s for a
ha""y life. _
,ost "eo"le's conce"tion of ha""iness $ill "resumaly inclu!e the normal
satisfaction of their "hysical nee!s an! !esiresA for many4 ha""iness also reIuires
such things as suLcient $ealth4 "rofessional success4 social status4 a
goo! marriage4 an! a satisfactory family life. Each in!ivi!ual's i!ea of ha""iness
$ill "roaly also inclu!e goals characteristic of that in!ivi!ual4 ase!
on that in!ivi!ual's "articular circumstances4 talents4 o""ortunities4 an! as"irations.
Ha""iness is suFective in the sense of 0%4 "artly Fust ecause it
is suFective in the sense of 0D. What my ha""iness consists in $ill !iMer
from $hat yours consists in not only ecause you an! & are !iMerent4 ut
also ecause $e have chosen to i!entify our ha""iness $ith !iMerent things.
3ant's conce"tion of ha""iness4 ho$ever4 un!enialy contains oFectivist
elements as $ell. To e ha""y4 & must oFectively succee! in getting $hat &
thin# $ill ma#e me ha""y. &f & i!entify my ha""iness $ith ma#ing a million
!ollars or $inning a 2ulitDer 2riDe4 then in or!er for me to have a ha""y life4
& must actually have ma!e a million !ollars4 or actually have $on a 2ulitDer
2riDe. These achievements are not suFective states of my min!.
&t is not "lausile to argue that & $oul! e eIually ha""y if & ha! not
actually ma!e a million !ollars ut only mista#enly elieve! & ha!4 since the
suFective satisfaction !erive! $oul! e the same either $ay. This $oul! e
all right if $e $ere $or#ing $ith a he!onistic conce"tion of ha""iness that
is suFective in the sense of 0C. -ut a he!onist must hol! that my ha""iness
consists in suFective "leasure or satisfaction even if & elieve that it consists
instea! in oFective accom"lishments. Hence a he!onistic conce"tion of ha""iness
necessarily etrays suFectivism in the more im"ortant sense of 0D.
:rom the stan!"oint of 0D4 if you feel goo! aout your life only ecause
75
HA22&NE00
you falsely elieve that you have a million !ollars4 then you aren't really
ha""y4 ut only thin# you are. One coul! of course say that in such a case
the "erson feels ha""y4 ut one coul! eIually say that the "erson feels rich.
On a conce"tion of ha""iness4 li#e 3ant's4 $hich is suFectivist in the sense
of 0D4 "erha"s the !istinction et$een feeling an! eing ha""y is very similar
to the !istinction et$een feeling an! eing rich.
There is still a vali! "oint to e ma!e y insisting on the role of felt satisfaction
in ha""iness4 for a ha""y "erson must not only have a life that oFectively
meets self;!evise! stan!ar!s for ha""iness4 ut also feel satisfaction in
life $hen it oFectively meets those stan!ar!s. This entails4 for one thing4
that in or!er to e ha""y4 the "erson $ho has met self;!evise! stan!ar!s
must also #no$ ?or at least elieve truly@ that the stan!ar!s have een met.
&t also means that the "erson must actually feel satisfaction in that life ;
$hich4 as $e #no$4 all too freIuently !oes not ha""en. This "oints to the
suFectivity of ha""iness in the sense of 0C4 ut also it sho$s ho$ the suFectivity
of ha""iness in the sense of 0D must e IualiGe!. &t al$ays remains
an oFective fact4 not u" to me4 $hether & $ill feel satisGe! $ith my life once
it has met my self;!evise! stan!ar!s.
7. The in!eterminacy of ha""iness
3ant an! Hegel agree on the conce"tion of ha""iness $e have een e>amining.
They also agree that ha""iness4 so conceive!4 is not the Gnal human en!
or chief human goo!. T$o !istinct lines of argument for this a""ear in their
$ritings. The Grst4 "resent in ,egel ut more e>"licit in 3ant4 is $hat & $ill
call Ethe in!eterminacy argument.E The secon!4 clear enough in Hegel ut
not to e foun! at all in 3ant4 & $ill call Ethe "riority argument.E This section
$ill e !evote! to the in!eterminacy argumentA NN =;+ $ill focus on the
"riority argument.
Hegel contrasts the !esire for ha""iness $ith s"eciGc em"irical !esires y
saying that the i!ea of ha""iness gives the form of EuniversalityE to E"articularE
!esires ?%2. *C ')=@. -ut this Euniversality4E Hegel tells us4 is Eastract4E
an! so there is no Econtra!ictionE in it et$een EformE an! EcontentE
?2. N 5'A %2. F C '*(A %2. *C ')=;')+@. &n "utting the "oint this Way4
Hegel is trying to see it as an instance of one of the "rinci"les of his s"eculative
logic. &n The 0cience of Logic4 Hegel reFects the conce"tion of a universal
conce"t as Ca"turing merely something Ecommon4E a EsimilarityE et$een
"articulars4 $hich are thought of as the sustrata in $hich the common feature
inheres. This4 he says4 is the merely Eastract universalE or the universal
as it is gras"e! y the Eun!erstan!ingE ?WL7C 5(=;5(+<(+=@. The true universal
is rather Es!f;!eterminingE or Eself;s"ecifyingEC &t is the ultimately
real4 the groun! of its in!ivi!ual instances4 an! it is at home $ith itself in
them ?WL7'576<(+9A EL N '7)4A@. Hegel is an e>treme realist aout universalC
The truly real an! self;susistent is the universalA "articular instances
are merely a !erivative "hase of the universalX e>istence4 the me!ium
through $hich it actualiDes itself.
7)
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
&n these terms4 ha""iness corres"on!s to the universal as conceive! y the
un!erstan!ing. The i!ea of ha""iness is !efective ecause it is a universal
en! that merely harmoniDes an! organiDes em"irical en!s given e>ternal to
it4 not a universal en! that generates from $ithin itself the "articulars it systematiDes.
The true en! of reason must e a true universal4 self;susistent
an! self;!eterminingC
Ha""iness has t$o moments4 Tuniversality an! "articularityU. No$ $e have the
Grst moment in ha""iness4 ut the secon! is only in the !rives. These !rives ought
to e suor!inate! to each other4 an! their !eterminacy is therefore a contingency.
Hence a universality is !eman!e! $hich has !eterminacy in itself4 TsinceU the !eterminacy
of !rives !oes not corres"on! to universality. What is thus !eman!e! is a
universality4 an! $hat is containe! ut not realiDe! in it is a !etermining that corres"on!s
to it4 an! hence a free universal !etermining4 a real !etermining. ?%2.*C ')9@
&n this "assage4 Hegel "resents not only the oFection ase! on his s"eculative
critiIue of astract universality4 ut also Z ent$ine! $ith it ; another
i!ea that !oes not !e"en! on s"eculative logic or Hegelian realism aout
universals. He claims that the !eterminacy of the em"irical !rives E!oes not
corres"on! to universality.E That is4 so long as the en! of action is concocte!
on the asis of em"irical !rives4 it cannot have the E!eterminacyE reIuire!
for a genuinely Euniversal en!.E
Ha""iness is an en! of action in $hich rational agents re"resent to themselves
the ma>imum attainale satisfaction of their em"irical !esires. The
"oint of framing such an en! for oneself is to "rovi!e rational gui!ance to
action4 to "rovi!e !eterminate "rinci"les of action. The ur!en of Hegel's
oFection is that no i!eal of ha""iness can !o an a!eIuate Fo of "rovi!ing
such "rinci"les4 ecause in the i!eal of ha""iness4 the !iMerent !rives are
relate! to one another only contingently or aritrarily. There is no stan!ar!
or measure $ith $hich to com"are them4 an! so the only "ractical "rinci"les
that can e given using the i!ea of ha""iness $ill e vague an! "latitu!inousC
EWe aren't hel"e! y a suor!ination of !rives4 such as the un!erstan!ing
usually comes to4 ecause no measure for the or!ering is to e foun! here4
an! thus the !eman! usually en!s u" $ith oring generaliDationsE ?2. N '=@.
Hegel seems to !erive this conclusion merely from the fact that the com"onents
of ha""iness are em"irical in nature ?E/ N *=9A %2. )C '*(@. -ut it is
not imme!iately clear $hy an en! fashione! from em"irical !rives must e
in!eterminate4 inca"ale of yiel!ing "rinci"les of action. On this "oint 3ant
is more informative. He claims that the i!ea of ha""iness can never give us
vali! hy"othetical im"eratives of the sort that can generally e given in the
case of more !eterminate en!s ?/ *'+<)(;)7@. A vali! im"erative is one that
might rationally constrain the $ill of every rational eing ?/ *')<)6@. &n the
case of a technical im"erative4 $hat the im"erative says is that any rational
eing $ho $ills a given en! ought to ta#e a certain action. :or e>am"le4 such
an im"erative might say that if & see# to construct a circle of ra!ius r4 &
shoul! rotate a straight line of length r aroun! one of its en!"ointsA li#e$ise4
if & $ant to heal a certain !isease4 & shoul! a!minister such an! such me!ication
in a s"eciGe! amount ?/ *'(<)5@. Though not all rational agents may
7*
HA22&NE00
ha""en to have the en! mentione! in these im"eratives4 they are universal
ecause it is true universally that any agent $ho !oes have that en! ought
rationally to act as the im"eratives !irect.
3ant calls an im"erative not Ehy"otheticalE ut EassertoricE if it "resu""oses
an en! that any rational agent necessarily has. 3ant hol!s that ha""iness
is the one em"irical en! that every rational eing necessarily has. Nevertheless4
he !enies that there are any vali! assertoric im"eratives4 ecause
such im"eratives !e"en! oh a !eGnition of the en! ?ha""iness@4 an! Eit is a
misfortune that the conce"t of ha""iness is so in!eterminate that although
every "erson $ishes to attain it4 he can never !eterminately an! self;consistently
state $hat it is he really $ishes an! $illsE ?/ *'+<)(@. EThe reason for
this4E 3ant says ; agreeing $ith Hegel ; Eis that all elements $hich elong
to the conce"t of ha""iness are em"irical4 . . . $hile for the i!ea of ha""iness
an asolute $hole4 a ma>imum4 of $ell;eing is nee!e! in my "resent an!
in every future con!itionE ?/ *'+<)(@.
Unli#e Hegel4 3ant elaorates on this reason. The elements of ha""iness
are em"irical !esires4 $hose oFects are !esirale to us solely ecause of the
"leasure or satisfaction $e e>"ect to e>"erience $hen $e have gotten them.
-ut4 3ant conten!s4 human nature is such that $e can never e sure that
the oFects $e !esire $ill fulGll their "romise of satisfaction. 0ome may !isa""oint
us4 $hereas others may have si!e eMects that altogether cancel out
the satisfaction $e e>"ecte!. We !esire $ealth4 for instance4 ut the life of
the $ealthy often loo#s more attractive from a !istance than it !oes u" close4
an! riches often ring $ith them a host of cares4 an>ieties4 an! com"lications4
$hich !e"rive the $ealthy of the contentment they ho"e! for. &f $e
$ant #no$lege an! vision4 they may only sho$ us evils of $hich $e might
other$ise have remaine! lissfully ignorant. Even long life4 $hich almost all
"eo"le !esire4 may turn out to e only long misery ?/ *'<)(;)7@.
This systematic ga" et$een em"irical !esire an! satisfaction has t$o "otentially
!evastating eMects on our attem"t to form a !eterminate i!ea of our
ha""iness. :irst4 our inaility to envision all the no>ious y;"ro!ucts of $hat
$e !esire ma#es it im"ossile for us to $eigh $ith accuracy the costs an!
eneGts of "ursuing !iMerent oFects. This in turn ma#es it im"ossile for
us to give !eterminate sha"e to the i!ea of a harmonious $hole of satisfaction.
0econ!4 in e>treme cases it might even ma#e it im"ossile for us to
frame any self;consistent i!ea of ha""iness at all. 0u""ose & have a !esire
?e.g.4 a "assionate !esire to e unite! $ith EherE@ that is so urgent an! inera!icale
that & $ill necessarily e unha""y unless it is satisGe!A at the same
time4 it turns out that the satisfaction of this !esire $ill leave me itterly
!isa""ointe! an! miserale ?our characters are so ill;suite! that $e can only
ma#e a hell of each other's lives@. &n such a case4 & can never state E!eterminately
an! self;consistentlyE $hat $oul! ma#e me ha""y4 ecause no selfconsistent
conce"tion of ha""iness is "ossile for me. No matter $hat ha""ens
to me4 & am !oome! to e unha""y.
This is not the 0cho"enhauriari thesis that all !esire is inherently insatiale
an! !elusive4 so that ha""iness is al$ays a tantaliDing illusion. 3ant !oes not
7(
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1 A
thin# that everyone is in a ho"eless con!ition4 only that some "eo"le may e.
His "oint is that $e can never e so certain of $here our satisfaction $ill lie as
to formulate universally vali! im"eratives that s"ecify the means to ha""iness
unfailingly ?as 3ant thin#s $e can for many im"eratives of geometrical construction4
an! some im"eratives of me!ical art@. EThe tas# of !etermining
infallily an! universally $hat action $ill "romote the ha""iness of a rational
eing is com"letely unsolvaleE ?/ *'+<)7@.
What $e !o have to gui!e us in "ursuing ha""iness4 3ant thin#s4 are rules
of "ru!ence ?Eof !iet4 economy4 courtesy4 restraint4 etc.E@. These rules are
not true im"eratives4 comman!ing actions that are "ractically necessary to
the given en!A they are only EcounselsE in!icating con!uct that is Esho$n y
e>"erience est to "romote $elfare on the averageE ?/ *'+<)7@. Thus most
"eo"le cannot attain ha""iness if they ecome a!!icte! to alcohol or cocaine4
if they systematically s"en! more money than they ma#e4 or if they haitually
treat those aroun! them $ith arrogance an! ingratitu!e. -ut these rules are
never $ithout e>ce"tions. 0u"erstars of screen or "laying Gel! are often
love! an! a!mire! for con!uct that $oul! ring enmity an! ostracism on
you an! meA the most $anton "roJigacy !oes not !estroy ha""iness for
Charles 0urface in 0heri!an's "lay4 or for U.0. /overnment;insure! Gnanciers
in real lifeA an!4 if $e can ta#e the $or! of Charles -u#o$s#i ?or of
.osin the -o$ in the ol! &rish fol# song@4 there are even some "eo"le for
$hom ha""iness consists in a life of alcohol a!!iction.
=. Why !o $e care aout ha""inessB
The in!eterminacy argument !e"en!s on contingent ?"erha"s !is"utale@A
claims aout the actual constitution of human !esires an! $hat $ill "ro!uce
satisfaction in human eings. :urther4 its conclusion is restricte! to claiming
that ha""iness is !efective as the Gnal human goo! ecause it cannot "rovi!e
us $ith !eterminate universal "rinci"les. This conclusion4 even if true4 "rovi!es
us $ith no rationale for the claim that free!om ?or anything else@ is a
etter can!i!ate for the Gnal human goo! than ha""iness is. The in!eterminacy
argument4 even if soun!4 leaves us free to conclu!e either that there is
no Gnal goo!4 or else that ha""iness is the Gnal goo! ut there are no !eterminate
universal "rinci"les of "ractical reason.
The same limitations !o not attach to another line of thin#ing4 "resente!
y Hegel. The est $ay to a""roach this argument is to as#4 Why !o $e
"ursue ha""inessB -ut "erha"s this isn't Iuite the right Iuestion. :or it is
sometimes argue! that many "eo"le !on't actually "ursue ha""iness as an
en!4 an! that those $ho !o are less li#ely to e ha""y than those $ho !on't.
-ut even those $ho !on't actually ma#e their ha""iness their en! usually
!esire it4 care aout it4 treat it as a measure of their life. 0o let us as#4 more
generally4 Why !oes it matter to us $hether $e are ha""yB The ans$er to
such Iuestions is not at all ovious. Hegel thin#s that the est ans$er "oints
to$ar! free!om rather than ha""iness as the Gnal goo!.
3ant insists that all of us necessarily have a !esire for our o$n ha""iness.
77
HA22&NE00
Ha""iness is not an aritrary or merely "ossile en!4 ut an en! that $e
Ecan assume a "riori for everyoneE ecause it Eelongs to our natureE ?/
*'(;*'7<))@. EAH human eings have the strongest an! !ee"est inclination
to ha""iness4 ecause in this i!ea all inclinations are summe! u"E ?/ )99<
'(@. This account is not satisfactory. The mere fact that the i!ea of ha""iness
is the i!ea of a sum of satisfactions !oes not entail that $e necessarily !esire
ha""iness. &t is one thing to have a !esire4 an! another thing to have the
!esire that this Grst !esire e fulGlle!. ?:or instance4 & may have a !esire to
go to e! $ith my neighor's s"ouse4 ut !esire even more strongly not to
satisfy this Grst !esire4 ecause & can foresee the inevitale com"lications.@
The !esire for ha""iness essentially inclu!es a secon!;or!er !esire for the
fulGllment of the !esires $hose oFects are inclu!e! in our i!ea of a sum of
satisfaction. The fact that & have the Grst;or!er !esires of $hich ha""iness
is com"ose! !oes not entail that & have the secon!;or!er !esire to satisfy the
$hole $hich they constitute. &f all of us !o in fact have a !esire for a Esum
of satisfactionsE either in general or as s"eciGe! accor!ing to some "articular
i!ea of $hat my ha""iness consists in4 then this fact nee!s an e>"lanation.
2erha"s our !esire for ha""iness can e treate! sim"ly as a "rimitive !esire4
li#e the !esires for foo!4 se>4 or a comfortale surroun!ing tem"erature.
'( This suggestion seems im"lausile4 ho$ever. The !esire for ha""iness
essentially involves a secon!;or!er !esire to satisfy other !esires $hose
nature is variale an! "artly at the mercy of our choicesA it is unli#ely that a
!esire of this #in! shoul! e "resent in us as a natural instinct. :or that
matter4 3ant may even e $rong in saying that everyone has a !esire for
ha""iness. Hegel suggests that the i!ea of ha""iness is the "ro!uct of a certain
#in! of culture4 reIuiring a certain !egree of reJectiveness an! naturally
mil! mores4 so that it coul! not have arisen in a culture less cultivate! than
that of /ree# ethical life ?2. N '5).A %2. )C '*(@. Any i!ea of ha""iness
essentially arises through reJective !elieration4 an! it seems li#ely that the
!esire for ha""iness is also ase! on reasoning. What $e nee! to ma#e e>"licit
is the rationale ehin! our !esire for ha""iness.
The nee! for such a rationale is further in!icate! y the fact that "ursuing
ha""iness sometimes reIuires us to forego the satisfaction of our imme!iate
!esires4 $hich ?Hegel says@ Ecome to e sacriGce! "artly to each other on
ehalf of Tha""inessU4 an! "artly to Tha""inessU itself !irectlyE ?E/ N *=9@.
This fact ma#es it even "lainer than efore that the i!ea of ha""iness must
have some a""eal to us over an! aove the satisfaction of the "articular !esires
that com"rise it. &t $on't !o to say that & !esire ha""iness for the sa#e
of my "articular !esires4 a!!ing that the !esire for ha""iness is merely the
!esire that the "ursuit of one !esire shoul! not unnecessarily hin!er the "ursuit
of others. To achieve this unity among !esires4 & $oul! not nee! the
i!ea of a E$hole of satisfactionE consisting in the satisfaction of many mutually
limiting !esires. & coul! accom"lish it much more sim"ly y $hat $e
might call a "olicy of Emonomania4E concentrating all my energy on satisfying
Fust one of my !esires4 an! sacriGcing all my other !esires to that one. Of
course4 & !o not ta#e the o"tion of monomania seriously in "ractice4 ecause &
7=
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
ta#e it for grante! that & $ant to satisfy a variety of !iMerent !esires4 an! so
& reIuire some "lan of mutual limitation. -ut $hy !o & $ant to satisfy a
variety of !esiresB
One inJuential ans$er to this Iuestion is to say that & $ant to ma>imiDe
my satisfaction4 so & !esire a $hole com"ose! of !iMerent !esires ecause
this strategy lea!s to greater total satisfaction than any "olicy of monomania
coul! !o. There is4 so the fairytale goes4 a !eclining marginal utility in the
satisfaction of any single !esire4 an! so the ma>imum total utility $ill e
achieve! through a strategy of eIualiDing the marginal utility to e gotten
from each se"arate satisfaction. Hegel uncom"romisingly reFects this ans$er4
an! his theory of the $ill gives him very goo! reasons for !oing so. As $e
have seen4 Hegel !enies that any "articular !rive contains a EmeasureE y
$hich it coul! e com"are! to other4 Iualitatively !iMerent !rives ?2. N
'=4A@. This is $hy Hegel thin#s that the $ill nee!s to Eresolve4E to convert
in!eterminate !rives into !esires for !eGnite oFects4 an! then EchooseE
among these !esires4 therey estalishing for the Grst time some !eGnite
or!er of "riority among them. There is4 of course4 a sense in $hich $e e>"erience
our !esires E"assively4E an! this "assivity may "lay some role in !eci!ing
$hat $e call their relative EstrengthEA ut our agency also "lays a role
large enough that it is Iuite artiGcial to re"resent the relative $eight $e give
to our satisfaction of !iMerent !esires as something $e coul! sim"ly recor!
as "assive oservers of our feelings.
Hegel nee! not !eny that for certain theoretical "ur"oses the "attern of a
"erson's "references might usefully e !escrie! y a!o"ting the Gction that
there is some Iuantity that the agent is trying to ma>imiDe. The !escri"tion
might even e more than a Gction if $e are tal#ing aout one of our "articular
!esires that aims at a ma>imum of something that is literally IuantiGale ;
for e>am"le4 our !esire for money. -ut if Hegel is right4 the e>istence of
anything li#e a Eutility function4E assigning !eterminate ?car!inal or or!inal@
values to the oFects of !iMerent !esires4 cannot e re"resente! as a sim"le
"sychic given. ,y utility function has to e the result of my resolving4 choosing4
an! forming an i!ea of ha""inessA to su""ose the e>istence of such a
function is sim"ly to "resu""ose that $e have chosen to or!er our !esires
an! to assign relative "riorities to them accor!ing to the i!ea of a sum of
satisfaction. The i!ea of ma>imiDing utility thus alrea!y ta#es for grante! the
activity of forming an i!ea of ha""iness4 an! "resu""oses that $e have a
!esire to ma>imiDe satisfaction in accor!ance $ith such an i!ea. Hence it
cannot e use! to e>"lain $hy $e $oul! troule ourselves to form an i!ea
of ha""iness an! to sacriGce the satisfaction of "articular !esires to it. Li#e
3ant4 utility theory ta#es for grante! the !esire for ha""iness as a sim"le
natural fact4 $hereas $e have seen that it is unli#ely to e anything of the
sort.'7
&t might e suggeste! that the reason $e gui!e our con!uct y an i!ea of
ha""iness rather than y follo$ing a "olicy of monomania is that it is sim"ly
a natural fact aout us that $e have many !esires that $e cannot get ri! of
or limit to the !egree that any "olicy of monomania $oul! reIuire. This
7+
HA22&NE00
e>"lanation may e true as far as it goes4 ut it is still ina!eIuate ecause it
!oes not account for the fact that $e often tolerate ?or even cultivate@ !is"ensale
!esires $hose "ursuit com"licates the "rolem of satisfying !esires
$e cannot get ri! of. An in!ivi!ual's i!ea of ha""iness very often inclu!es
the satisfaction ?even the e>"ansion of@ such !esires. 2eo"le of mo!est means
sometimes cultivate a taste in o"era an! Gne $ines4 even though the troule
an! e>"ense of see#ing out goo! vintages or traveling to see La 0cala or the
Wiener 0taatso"er ma#e it har!er for them to #ee" u" $ith the mortgage.
+. The "riority of free!om over ha""iness
What this suggests is that our !esire for ha""iness cannot e e>"laine!
merely in terms of con!uct instrumental to achieving the satisfactions of
$hich ha""iness consists. The fact that $e even count as "art of our ha""iness
the cultivation of !esires4 inclu!ing those that ma#e it har!er to satisfy
our !esires as a $hole4 strongly suggests that $e form the i!ea of ha""iness
not so much to facilitate the satisfaction of our !esires4 as to give our !esires
themselves a !eterminate sha"e an! content.
Hegel follo$s u" on this suggestion $hen he tells us Iuite e>"licitly $hy
he thin#s $e form an i!ea of ha""iness rather than a!o"ting a "olicy of
monomaniaC E&f & "lace myself merely in one Tof my !rivesU4 !isregar!ing
all others4 then & Gn! myself in a !estructive state of limite!ness4 for & have `
given u" my universality4 $hich is a system of all !rivesE ?2. N '=A@. Hegel
hol!s that $e est ma#e sense of our !esire for ha""iness y su""osing that
our Gnal goo! is the assertion of our EuniversalityE or selfhoo!4 $hich reIuires
us to e>"ress ourselves through a coherent system of !esires.
This same as"iration to selfhoo! can alrea!y e seen in the activities of
resolving an! choosing $hich $e loo#e! at earlier. Antici"ating Hei!egger4
Hegel notes that an eIuivalent e>"ression for EresolveE ?eschliessen@ is sich
entschliessen ; etymologically4 Eunclosing oneselfE ?2. N '5@.'= When & resolve4
converting my in!eterminate !rives into !esires for !eterminate oFects4
& am in eMect transforming general human nee!s into the !esires of
this in!ivi!ual "erson. & am e>"ressing4 or even !eGning4 my self. As Hegel
"uts itC EThrough resolving4 the $ill "osits itself as the $ill of a !eterminate
in!ivi!ualE ?2. N ')@. Li#e$ise4 in reJecting on an! choosing et$een my
!eterminate !esires4 the "oint is to !eGne myself y !eci!ing $hich !esires
& $ill i!entify as truly mine. Human !esires are not Fust rute givens for
consciousnessA they ecome my !esires y eing !eGne! through resolve an!
y eing "osite! as mine through choice. This is true ecause it is the function
of human !esires to e>"ress the self $hose !esires they are.
-ut this self4 Hegel insists4 is something EuniversalEA it is the function of
forming an i!ea of ha""iness to vin!icate this universality. This claim might
seem "ara!o>ical at Grst4 since it might seem that the "oint of !eGning my
self through resolve an! choice is to !o a$ay $ith $hat is universal aout
my aims4 vin!icating my "articularity. -ut the universal Hegel is thin#ing
of here is not merely $hat & have in common $ith all other selves or human
79
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
eings ?this conce"tion of universality4 $e shoul! recall4 is $hat Hegel attriutes
to the E!ea! un!erstan!ingE@. Hegel is thin#ing of the self as a true or
rational universal4 in relation to the various elements ?!esires4 traits4 acts4
states of consciousness@ that constitute it. A true Hegelian universal4 li#e a
2latonic or Aristotelian universal4 e>hiits itself in the !iMerent "articulars
that "artici"ate in it4 !etermining each of them in a s"eciGc $ay y its "resence.
A self for Hegel is a universal ecause it is something that manifests
itself in each of its !eterminate !esires an! acts y connecting them. A self
is !eGne! an! e>"resse! in its !esires $hen it relates to them as a universal
relates to its "articular instances ; that is4 $hen these !esires have to e the
!eterminate !esires they are4 an! $hen they have to e such ecause they
are the !esires of this !eterminate self. ,y self attains to this universality
$hen its !esires form a $hole that is coherent4 not only in the sense that it
involves fe$ conJicts4 ut even more in the sense that my various !esires
systematically su""ort4 e>"lain4 an! Fustify one another4 "erha"s analogously
to the conce"ts an! "ro"ositions of a $ell;constitute! theoretical system.
What lies ehin! the !esire for ha""iness4 then4 is the !esire to manifest
my Euniversality4 as a system of all !rivesE ?2. N '=A@. We form the i!ea of
ha""iness not so much in or!er to get the satisfactions that constitute it as
in or!er to ring it aout that "ur !esires are a!eIuate e>"ressions of our
universal self. :or this reason4 Hegel says that the true function of the i!ea
of ha""iness is one of Ee!ucatingE an! E"urifyingE our !rives4 Efreeing them
from their form as imme!iate natural !eterminatenesses4 an! from the suFectivity
an! contingency of their content4E transforming them into Ethe rational
system of volitional !eterminationE ?!asvernunftige 0ystem !er Willensestimmung@
?2. N '9@.
EThe rational system of volitional !eterminationE is nothing ut asolute
free!omC eing $ith myself in my !esires or !eterminations. Thus Hegel
says that the EtruthE of ha""iness is free!om of the $ill4 Ethe free $ill that
$ills the free $illE ?E/ N *+6A 2. N 5=@. He further insists that it is only
free!om4 an! not ha""iness or $ell;eing4 that !eserves to e calle! the human
goo! ?2. N '5)A@. &f Eeu!aemonismE is the vie$ that our o$n ha""iness
is the goo! ?%2. *C ')(;')7@4 then Hegel is arguing that eu!aemonism4
$hen re!uce! to its asis4 is self;refuting4 ecause the est rationale for gui!ing
one's con!uct y the i!ea of ha""iness is one that im"licitly recogniDes
the "riority of free!om over ha""iness as a human goo!.
&n contrast to 3ant4 Hegel sees ha""iness an! free!om as intimately connecte!.
3antian autonomy consists in the $ill's suFecting itself to an a "riori
su"ernatural legislation4 an! limiting its natural or em"irical !esires in accor!ance
$ith the la$. Hegel attac#s 3ant for seeing !ichotomies in the self
et$een free!om an! nature4 reason an! sense4 $here he ought to have seen
free!om as actualiDing nature an! reason as fulGlling itself through sense.
Asolute free!om inclu!es the !esire for ha""iness4 since the i!ea of ha""iness
is the i!ea of a rational system of !esires in $hich the $ill is $ith itself
or freeA in!ee!4 free!om even inclu!es achieving ha""iness or satisfaction4
=6
HA22&NE00
since in achieving ha""iness the $ill actualiDes itself in the e>ternal $orl!4
comes to e $ith itself in relation to that $orl!.
&t still ma#es sense to !istinguish ha""iness from of free!om4 an! to treat
free!om as the "rior goo!4 ecause the !esire for ha""iness is only one si!e
of free!om. Ha""iness or in!ivi!ual $ell;eing is the $hole of satisfaction
relating to only some of our !esiresC those arising from our imme!iate natural
!rives an! elonging to the $ill's E"articularityE ?2. NN r55;i5a@. The2Ai;
Xtoso"hy of .ight !escries a $hole system of rational volition. ,uch of this
system involves %olitions that !o not have my o$n natural nee!s as their
source an! !o not aim at my "articular satisfaction. These inclu!e non;selGntereste!
!esires4 arising from the claims of astract right4 morality4 an!
ethical !uties arising Within the family4 civil society4 an! the state. ,y ha""iness
is a self;intereste! goo!4 an! it forms one in!is"ensale "art of my selfactualiDation
as a rational agent. -ecause the s"here of astract right astracts
from the "articularity of the agent; ?2. N )=@4 there is no concern $ith ha""iness
in that s"here. -ut my o$n ha""iness is 0ystematically integrate! into
the s"heres of oth morality ?2. NN '5);'5(4 a )7@C ari! ethical life ?2. NN
'7)A4 '+);'+=4 5*';5*54 5()4.4 5764 57);57*4 57+<.@. Even so4 the rights
an! $elfare of others an! the goo! of the community are goo!s not re!ucile
to my ha""iness or self;interest. They lay claim to'me not ecause & !esire
ha""iness4 ut ecause my Gnal goo! is free!om.
Hegel even suggests that insofar as & am a self;consciously free in!ivi!ual44
my !esire for my o$n ha""iness shoul! not e seen as an instance of EselGshnessE
?0elstsucht@4 $hich Hegel !eGnes as E"referring the "articular to the
oFective contentE 7f an action ?E/ N *=(A@. 0elGshness consists in "ursuing
our aims4 even those that elong to a$fully rational or autonomous system of
!esires4 solely for the sa#e of "articular satisfactions ?EL N (*A@. &f ;& am
a eu!aemonist4 someone $ho "ursues my o$n ha""iness as the Gnal an!
encom"assing en! of my action4 then & see# my o$n ha""iness for the sa#e
of the "articular satisfactions of $hich it consistsA that ma#es me a selGsh
"erson. -ut not all !esire for my ha""iness nee! e selGsh. &f i am asolutely
free4 then & $ill'$ant to e ha""y ecause niy ha""iness is one oFect of a
free an! rational system of !esires that inclu!es the rights an! $elfare of
others an! the goo!of the community. &n that case4 & cannot e calle! selGsh
even in the "ursuit of my o$n ha""iness.
9. .ight in general
The aim 7i the 2hiloso"hy of .ight is to !evelo" the &!ea of right4 that is4 to
e>"oun! the conce"t of right an! "resent its full actualiDation ?2. N'@. &n
Hegel's vocaulary4 ErightE is a technical term4 $hose roa!est meaning is
e>"laine! as follo$sC ''.ight isC that e>istence $hich is in'any $ay an e>istence
of the free $iHE<?2. N 59@. EE>istenceEb?Dasein@'here means something
!Fective4 something Eimme!iately e>ternalE to the $ill ?2. N 57@. Thus in
'Hegel's technical usage ErightE refers to a thing or oFect4 something that
='
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
counts as other than the $ill. -ut it is an other in $hich the free $ill is $ith
itself. A right is a thing in $hich the free $ill has successfully actualiDe!
itself or accom"lishe! its en!s. E.ightE means Efree!om oFectiGe!4E or ?as
Hegel also "uts it@ Efree!om as &!eaE ?2. N 59@.
The system of right is the system of oFects in $hich the $ill is free or
$ith itself. The Grst form of right Hegel ta#es u" is astract right4 the right
$e have in the form of e>ternal oFects4 our "ro"erty4 inclu!ing our o$n
o!y an! life. These are4 accor!ing to Hegel's technical usage of the term4
ErightsE in the most straightfor$ar! sense4 since they are e>ternal oFects in
$hich our free $ill has imme!iate e>istence ?2. NN ))4 *6@. Later on4 Hegel
$ill e>ten! the term ErightE to other4 less imme!iate #in!s of oFects. The
free $ill receives moral e>istence in the form of a suFective $ill an! its acts
in the $orl! in $hich it e>"resses itself4 an! it has ethical e>istence in the
form of the institutions of a rational society ?2. N ))@.
Oviously4 this is a highly unusual $ay to use the term Eright.E Normally4
$e !o not refer to a thing $e o$n as a right4 ut say instea! that $e have a
right to it4 meaning at least that $e !o nothing contrary to oligation in using
it as $e see Gt4 an! "erha"s also that $e have vali! claims against others $ith
regar! to its use. We s"ea# of right action4 ut if $e say of an action itself
that it is a right4 this $oul! e an elli"tical $ay of saying something Iuite
!iMerent from $hat Hegel means4 namely that $e have a right to "erform it.
We might thin# of social institutions as eing right ?or Fust@ Q ut $e $oul!n't
s"ea# of a Fust institution itself as a right.
.echt has an eIuivalent in other Euro"ean languages4 ut not in English
?Latin ius4 :rench !roit4 &talian !iritto4 0"anish !erecho4 HungarianX4 2olish
"ra$o4 etc.@. &t means ErightE or EFustice4E an! also refers to the $hole
o!y an! foun!ation of the la$4 as !istinct from s"eciGc legal statutes4 to
$hich a !iMerent $or! is a""lie! ?/esetD4 le>4 hi4 legge4 etc.@. ,ost of the
time4 Hegel uses .echt in $ays that a""arently conform more to this common
usage than to his technical one as e>"oun!e! in 2. N 59. We may etter
un!erstan! oth Hegel's theory of right an! his general "hiloso"hical "roce!ures
if $e see ho$ this a""arent ga" et$een technical an! or!inary usage
might e ri!ge!.
Hegel ma#es it "lain that for "hiloso"hical "ur"oses4 the technical meaning
shoul! al$ays e "rimary. Hegel ta#es himself to e engaging in the
uniIuely "hiloso"hical tas# of !e!ucing or !evelo"ing categories or thought!eterminations
out of one another. He elieves that the system of "hiloso"hical
categories is in fact Estore! in language4E an! hence ?"erha"s to our astonishment@
Hegel !enies that "hiloso"hy nee!s any s"ecial terminology
?WL (C 56<)';)5@. At the same time4 he realiDes that or!inary language reJects
or!inary thin#ing4 $hich is often confuse!4 shallo$4 an! erroneous4
in nee! of "hiloso"hical correction. A""eals to or!inary usage are therefore
entirely out of "lace in "hiloso"hy. E.ather the main thing in "hiloso"hical
cognition is the necessity of the conce"t4 an! the "rocess of having come to
e as a result TisU its "roof an! !e!uction. 0ince the content is necessary for
=5
HA22&NE00
itself4 the secon! thing is to loo# aroun! for $hat corres"on!s to it in Tor!inaryU
conce"tions an! languageE ?2. N 5.@.
.echt seems to Hegel the est $or! in or!inary language to ca"ture the
conce"t of an e>istence that is the e>istence of the free $ill. -oth the la$
an! the rights of "ersons are regar!e! as something sacre!4 !eserving of our
veneration an! res"ect. Hegel's ethical theory attem"ts to account for this y
sho$ing 3o$ they are e>istences of the free $ill4 since free!om of the $ill is
sho$n y Hegel's theory to e the Gnal human goo! ?2. N )6@. &n or!er to
!o this4 Hegel nee!s to connect his technical meaning of ErightE more closely
$ith the or!inary one?s@. He attem"ts the connection in his lecturesC E.ight
in general e>"resses a relation4 constitute! y the free!om of the $ill an! its
realiDation ?.ealisation@. Duty is such a relation insofar as it is essentially
vali! for me4 insofar as & have to recogniDe or res"ect or "ro!uce itE ?%2.'=C
*6A cf. 2. N 576.4 %2. 'C 5*9@.
Hegel's technical !eGnition of ErightE in 2. N 59 says that right is an Ee>istenceE
of the free $ill4 an! this is "resumaly eIuivalent to some oFect in
$hich my free!om is ErealiDe!4E in $hich it ta#es the form of a thing or
oFect. -ut here Hegel says that right is a relation et$een the free $ill an!
such an oFect. ,ore s"eciGcally4 it is the relation that & ear to something
in $hich the free!om of my $ill e>ists4 insofar as that thing ErealiDesE my
free!om. Let us give these t$o Hegelian uses of ErightE t$o !iMerent names4
calling right as the e>istence itself e>istent right4 an! right as the relation &
ear to this e>istence relative right.
'6. Hegel's institutionalism
2rominent among e>istent rights are the institutions of a rational society.
Hegel also says that Ethe true an! "ro"er groun! in $hich free!om is e>istent
TisU the relation of $ill to $illE ?2. N ='@. 2ro"erty rights ecome actual
an! recogniDe! only $ithin legal institutions $here they can e s"eciGe! an!
enforce! ?2. N 5'=@. Even the moral rights of the suFective $ill4 such as its
right to e Fu!ge! accor!ing to its #no$le!ge an! conviction of the conseIuences
an! $orth of its acts ?2. NN ''=4 '564 ')5.@ are actual rights only
$ithin a community that recogniDes such rights an! treats suFects accor!ingly.
An e>istent right for Hegel seems al$ays to involve ?e>"licitly or im"licitly@
a social institution4 $hose e>ternal functioning realiDes my free!om.
As $e have seen4 Hegel hol!s that only the institutions of ethical life "rovi!e
a concrete foun!ation for the rights foun! in the s"heres of astract right
an! morality. :or Hegel4 e>istent rights of other #in!s seem to have their
foun!ation in social institutions that are the fun!amental or concrete e>istent
rights.
Accor!ingly4 $e may vie$ a relative right as my relation to an institution
that is an e>istent right ?i.e.4 that realiDes my free!om@. As Hegel in!icates4
relative rights are very closely relate! to !uties. :or a !uty is also my relation
to an e>istent right4 to an institution that realiDes free!om. -ut the relation
=)
HE/EL&AN ETH&CAL THEO.1
is a !iMerent oneC &t is the relation of having to recogniDe4 res"ect4 or "ro!uce
the e>istent right in Iuestion. Thus $hen & have a right4 the claims that &
have over against others are sim"ly their !uties in relation to the same e>istent
right that realiDes my free!om.
0ome are !isture! y the central role of social institutions in Hegel's theory
of right. :or Hegel4 in!ivi!uals have claims on one another4 ut solely
y virtue of institutions foun!e! in the ethical life in $hich they "artici"ate.
They have no claims on others4 or on these institutions4 ase! on anything
e>ce"t the institutions. Dieter Henrich Gn!s it es"ecially !isIuieting that
in!ivi!uals have no rights against institutions themselves4 a feature of Hegel's
theory $hich he calls Estrong institutionalism.E'+
What e>actly is su""ose! to e missing in Hegel's theoryB What sort of
rights ought & to e ale to claim $hich Hegel's theory $ill not let me claimB
& may !eman! that others ehave accor!ing to their !uties un!er the actual
institutions. & may also !eman! of the institutions themselves that they o"erate
accor!ing to their o$n rational nature4 since this is $hat ma#es these
institutions e>istent rights in the Grst "lace. Thus there certainly is room in
Hegel's theory for a""ealing eyon! the contingent an! "ossily $ic#e! $ills
of the in!ivi!uals $ho a!minister social institutions4 an! $hose aritrariness
might turn their rationality to unreason4 their free!om to o""ression. We
$oul! !o this "recisely in a""ealing to the actuality of the institution4 as
!istinct from its contingent e>istenceA in such a""eals $e have E$hat is universally
recogniDe! an! vali!E on our si!e ?2. 2reface '(@. :inally4 Hegel
thin#s that living un!er rational institutions ?an actual ethical or!er@ is also
the right of in!ivi!uals4 since such institutions give e>istence to their free
$illC EThe right of in!ivi!uals to their suFective !etermination to free!om
has its fulGllment $hen they elong to ethical actualityE ?2. N '()@.
The only thing Hegel $ill not give us is a certain moralistic "icture of $hat
it is to !eman! one's right against social institutions. He reFects the i!ea that
in ma#ing such !eman!s $e might e a""ealing to something eyon! the
actual essence of the institutions themselves ; to a set of suFective moral
sentiments $ith no asis in the actual ethical or!er4 or to a !ivine "rovi!ence
$hich so utterly transcen!s human history as to leave it utterly go!forsa#en.
The only rights Hegel's theory !enies us are rights $e coul! never e>ercise
any$ay4 an! shoul!n't e>ercise even if $e coul!.
=*
&&
Astract right
*
.ecognition
i. The right to astract free!om
&n Hegel's ethical theory4 the Gnal goo! is not ha""iness ut free!om. One
conseIuence of this is the im"ortance of the right of "ersons in Hegel's theory.
2ersonal rights set limits to $hat may e !one to a "erson in the name
of interests4 $hether that "erson's o$n interests or the interests of others. &f
rights are there in or!er to overri!e eu!aemonistic consi!erations generally4
then $e might e>"ect them to e ascrie! to "ersons in!e"en!ently of those
consi!erations. Hegel's theory meets this e>"ectation4 since EastractE right
is so calle! "recisely ecause it astracts from all consi!erations of $ell;eing
or ha""inessC &n astract right Eit is not a matter of "articular interests4 my
utility or my $ell;eingE ?2. N )=@. &nstea!4 it is a matter of securing the
astract free!om of a E"erson.E
As $e sa$ in Cha"ter 54 N 54 Hegel hol!s that every human eing has
Eformal free!om4E the ca"acity to astract from all "articular !eterminations4
!esires4 an! interests. This ca"acity is $hat ma#es someone a "erson4 Ea
self;consciousness of itself as a "erfectly astract &4 in $hich all concrete
limite!ness an! vali!ity is negate! an! invali!E ?2. N )(.@. As "ersons4 all
human eings are eIual ?%2.igC 7=;7+@. Even though the e>ercise of this
ca"acity to astract ?as in negative free!om or aritrariness@ is not free!om
in its most "ro"er sense4 Hegel hol!s Fust the same that it is essential to
guarantee in!ivi!uals in the mo!ern state a!eIuate room for the e>ercise of
aritrariness ?Cha"ter 54 NN 54 (4 an! ''@. This is the "oint of astract right.
EA "erson must give its free!om an e>ternal s"here in or!er to e>ist as
&!eaE ?2. N *'@. E&!eaE for Hegel refers to a rational conce"t $hen it e>"resses
or emo!ies itself in something real ?WL7C *75;*79<=((;=76A EL NN
5');5'(A 2. N '@A a s"iritual eing Ee>ists as &!eaE $hen it actualiDes itself
a""ro"riately in the oFective $orl!. & Ee>ist as &!eaE $hen my "ersonality4
my ca"acity to ma#e astract choices4 is given a!eIuate sco"e to actualiDe
itself4 an! in Hegel's vie$ this ha""ens $hen & have a suLcient Ee>ternal
s"hereE suFect to my aritrary choice.
5. :ichte's theory of recognition
To Fustify the claim that human eings have astract rights4 $hat Hegel must
sho$ us is $hy formally free agents ought to guarantee one another e>clusive
s"heres of aritrary activity. Hegel's argument on this "oint is !evelo"e! in
==
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
his Hena "erio! lectures an! sho$s u" again in the Encyclo"e!ia ?'+'=4 Gnal
version '+)6@ ?E/ NN *)6;*)7@. ,uch of it is merely "resu""ose! in the
2hiloso"hy of .ight4 since that $or# !eals $ith oFective s"irit4 $hereas the
argument in Iuestion elongs to the Encyclo"e!ia ys !iscussion of suFective
s"irit. Hegel's argument is ase! on the conce"t of ErecognitionE ?Aner#ennung@4
or mutual a$areness. The gist of Hegel's "osition is that & can have
an a!eIuate consciousness of myself only if & am recogniDe! y others4 an!
recognition can e a!eIuate only if it is fully mutual. ,uch in Hegel's !iscussion
of recognition is novel an! "rovocative4 ut oth the conce"t of recognition
an! its use as the asis of a theory of natural right are !erive! from
:ichte's :oun!ations of Natural .ight ?/N.@ ?'=97@. &t $ill enhance our
un!erstan!ing of Hegel's theory of recognition an! the rights of "ersons if
$e are a$are of the :ichtean theory he a!o"ts an! mo!iGes.
:ichte's entire "hiloso"hy is transcen!entally !e!uce! from the "ossiility
of self;consciousness4 the consciousness of an oFect that is i!entical to the
suFect of the same consciousness. :or :ichte4 the self !eGnes itself through
its o$n activityA ut it is nevertheless limite! or Gnite4 !istinguishale from
other oFects. This means that the self's activity must e limite! y a notself4
an oFective $orl! !iMerent from an! o""ose! to the self. :rom this
:ichte infers that the activity of $hich $e are a$are in self;a$areness must
e "ractical activity or volition4 concerne! $ith altering an outsi!e $orl!
?/N. '=;56<)';))@. Hence our a$areness of this activity as limite! must e
the a$areness of an e>ternal oFect that chec#s or resists it ?/N. 5);5*<*6@.
A self's "ractical activity is relate! to some "ossile change in the oFective
$orl!4 through $hich the self rings aout a state of the $orl! contrasting
$ith a "revious state. &n this $ay4 self;a$areness involves the a$areness of
time ?/N. 59<*+@. The e>ternal oFect that chec#s the self's activity must e
re"resente! as alrea!y e>isting for the self at a moment in time "rior to that
of the self;a$areness $e are setting out to e>"lain ?/N. 5+<*=@.
:ichte argues that this threatens us $ith a vicious regress ?or4 alternatively4
a vicious circularity@. At every moment $e "resu""ose the "revious consciousness
of an oFect for the self4 an! along $ith it the very self;consciousness
that $as to e accounte! for ?/N. )'<*9@. :ichte "ro"oses to avoi! the
regress ?or circularity@ y thin#ing of the self as relate! not only to an e>ternal
$orl!4 ut at the same time also to a !iMerent sort of oFectC one in
$hich an activity of the self is alrea!y comine! $ith a limitation of this same
activity4 all $ithin a single tem"oral moment ?/N. )5<('@. The conce"t that
ans$ers to this !escri"tion4 :ichte says4 is that of a EreIuirementE or E!eman!E
?AuMor!erung@ that the suFect shoul! manifest its free activity4 ut
in a !eterminate $ay ?/N. )5;))<(5@.
,ore "recisely4 :ichte argues4 self;consciousness "resu""oses the consciousness
of an oFect that is the groun! of such a !eman!4 or ; as he also
"uts it ; an oFect that Ea!!resses a !eman!E to the suFect ?/N. )7<(=@.
This must e an oFect of a very s"ecial #in!4 one $hose inJuence on the
suFect is to cause the suFect not only to act in a !eterminate $ay4 ut also
to set itself an en!4 $hich means that this suFect must ring aout in itself
=+
.ECO/N&T&ON
a cognition of the oFect it inten!s to "ro!uce ?/N. )=<(+@. :ichte no$
argues that an oFect $hose essential inJuence on us is to "ro!uce such a
cognition in us must itself e a conscious eing4 one that "ossesses the conce"tions
oth of free activity an! of the ca"acity to manifest it accor!ing to
a conce"t ?/N. )=;)+<(+;(9@C
The rational eing cannot "osit itself as such4 $ithout its ha""ening that there is
a reIuirement that it act freely. -ut if such a reIuirement to act ha""ens to it4 then
it must necessarily "osit a rational eing outsi!e it as the cause of the reIuirement4
an! so in general it must "osit a rational eing outsi!e itself. ?/N. )9<76@
:ichte un!erstan!s this to "resu""ose that a self;conscious eing must actually
have een aMecte! y another self;conscious eingC E&t has een sho$n
that if a rational eing is to come to self;consciousness4 then necessarily another
must have ha! an eMect on it4 as on one ca"ale of reasonE ?/N.
+=<'59@. &n fact4 :ichte claims4 the t$o must stan! in a relation of Efree
reci"rocal eMectE of each on the other Ethrough conce"ts an! accor!ing to
conce"tsE ?/N. )9<7'@. This mutual relation4 $hich :ichte regar!s as the
E"ro"er characteristic of humanity4E is ErecognitionE ?Aner#ennung@.
). EA human eing ecomes human only among
othersE
:ichte's transcen!ental argument is ri!!le! $ith !iLculties. 0u""ose $e
grant that a$areness of a !eterminate self "resu""oses a$areness of alrea!y
e>isting e>ternal oFects that con!ition an! resist one's activity. &t is far from
clear that there is any vicious circularity or regress in this. There $oul! e
if the "resu""osition raise! "recisely the same "rolem that it $as invo#e!
to solve4 ut this is far from evi!ent. &f there is a "rolem involve! in "resu""osing
that every moment of self;a$areness is con!itione! y a "reviously
e>isting moment4 that is only the familiar "rolem of 3ant's :irst Antinomy.
&t is aritrary to invo#e the notion of a E!eman!E to solve that "rolemA an!
ho"eless esi!es. .:or if there $ere a "rolem aout an en!less regressive
series of oFective a$arenesses4 ho$ $oul! it e a solution to intro!uce a
!iMerent sort of oFect that !oes not raise the "rolemB &t might !o so if
$e $ere going to re"lace the "resu""osition of an e>ternal $orl! $ith the
"resu""osition of a !eman!4 ut that is evi!ently not :ichte's intention.
:ichte imme!iately follo$s this unsuccessful argument $ith a EcorollaryE
!efen!ing the same conclusion less transcen!entally ut more "ersuasively.
EA human eing4E he claims4 Eecomes human only among othersE ?/N.
)9<76@.l To e a rational selfO you have to e Ee!ucate!EA the !eman! y one
human eing that another manifest free activity is the original meaning of
Ee!ucationE ?ErDiehung@ ?/N. )9<7'@. 0elf;a$areness4 accor!ing to :ichte4
has genetic as $ell as transcen!ental con!itions. ,y a$areness of the !eman!s
of others on my con!uct is one of these genetic con!itions.
To e self;a$are as a rational agent4 it is not enough to !istinguish myself
from e>ternal oFectsA & must also e ale to a!!ress reIuirements to myself
=9
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
ase! on my conce"tion of myself. That is4 & must e ale to !istinguish4
$ithin the "ractical o"tions o"en to me4 et$een those that manifest my
"ro"er selfhoo! an! those that !o not. & must have the ca"acity to act not
only on imme!iate !esires or im"ulses4 ut also on relatively stale "rinci"les
e>"ressing $ho & am. ,y i!entity as an agent consists not only of momentary
mental states4 ut also of en!uring "roFects an! "ractical commitments. ,y
selfhoo! $oul! e im"overishe! if & lac#e! these features4 an! my self;a$areness
$oul! e im"overishe! if & lac#e! the ca"acity to ecome a$are of them.
Develo"mental "sychologists tell us that chil!ren acIuire these ca"acities
only y internaliDing !eman!s that others ?chieJy their "arents@ have ma!e
on them.5 :ichte antici"ates the same "oint $hen he insists that & ecome a
self only y eing Ee!ucate!E through the !eman!s of others. ,y a$areness
of e>ternal !eman!s is a genetic con!ition for my full selfhoo! as a rational
agent. :ichte conclu!es that a human self;consciousness is "ossile only on
the assum"tion of a "lurality of human eingsA the conce"t of humanity is
not the conce"t of a single in!ivi!ual4 ut instea! the conce"t of a s"ecies or
#in! ?/attung@ ?/N. )9<7'@.cThe most asic relation et$een human eings
is recognition4 the ma#ing of !eman!s on others an! un!erstan!ing their
!eman!s on youF .ecognition in this sense is in!is"ensale to eing human.
When they recogniDe others4 free eings !istinguish themselves from the
others. They !o this4 accor!ing to :ichte4 through each one's assigning to
itself a limite! Ee>ternal s"hereE in $hich to e>ercise its free activity an!
recogniDing a similar s"here for every other. Originally a "erson's e>ternal
s"here is to e i!entiGe! $ith that "erson's o!y ?/N. (9<9'@4 ut it is
eventually su""ose! to encom"ass the entire e>ternal realm $hich is suFect
to a rational eing's free choices. &n :ichte's theory4 it is the function of a
certain sort of social contract ?the E"ro"erty contractE@ to give "ulic recognition
to these !eterminate e>ternal s"heres ?/N. '9(<5')A cf. '9=<5'(@.
Thus far $e have consi!ere! only :ichte's argument that self;a$areness
reIuires the a$areness of another's !eman! on me to manifest my free activity
in a !eterminate $ay. -ut he also thin#s that these !eman!s have a !eterminale
content. When free eings recogniDe each other4 the fun!amental
!eman! that they a!!ress to each other is the !eman! to res"ect each other's
e>ternal s"heres. The !eterminate action & !eman! is that you not encroach
on my e>ternal s"here ?/N. *)<77@. 2resumaly :ichte thin#s that this is
so ecause self;a$areness is fun!amentally an a$areness of the $ill to act
freely in the e>ternal $orl!. As soon as & ecome a$are of other free eings4
this volition naturally lea!s to a !esire that others shoul! not "revent me
from !oing $hat & fun!amentally $ill to !o4 hence it e>"resses itself as the
!eman! that others shoul! res"ect my e>ternal s"here of free!om. Naturally4
the !eman! is reci"rocal4 a!!resse! y each rational eing to every other.
When & ma#e such a !eman!4 & am also reci"rocally recogniDing the other's
!eman! u"on me.
:ichte insists that these mutual !eman!s must not remain mere e>"ressions
of $illA they must also manifest themselves in action. ENo Tfree eingU
can recogniDe another unless oth reci"rocally recogniDe each otherA an! nei;
+6
.ECO/N&T&ON
ther can treat the other as a free eing unless oth so treat each other reci"rocallyE
?/N. **<7=@. To treat another as a free rational eing is to grant to
the other an e>ternal s"here4 an! also to claim such a s"here for oneself. This
relation of mutual self;restriction constitutes the Erelation of rightE ?.echtsverhaltnis@
?/N. *'<7)@.
*. The relation of right
:ichte claims that to recogniDe another is to stan! in a Erelation of rightE to
that other. &t is to stan! $ith the other un!er the E"rinci"le of rightEC E0o
limit your free!om that others esi!es you can also e freeE ?/N. +9<')'A
cf. (5<=+@. &n!ivi!uals $ho stan! in a relation of right !eman! of one another
that they com"ly $ith this "rinci"le4 an! they recogniDe a li#e !eman! on
the "art of others. E.ecogniDingE the !eman! involves more than the a$areness
that it has een ma!eA it involves also a EconfessionE ?/estan!niss@ or
E!eclarationE ?Declaration@ that & $ill for the future res"ect the other's
s"here ?/N. *=<=54 ')6<'+5@.
:ichte un!erstan!s these !eman!s $e ma#e on one another not to e moral
im"eratives4 ut something much more "rimitive an! fun!amental than that.
To egin $ith4 the !eman!s involve! in the relation of right have to !o only
$ith e>ternal actions4 not $ith the internal intentions that are ?for :ichte4 as
for 3ant@ the essential thing in morality. ,ore im"ortantly4 :ichte insists
that it is not in the name of morality4 ut merely in the name of consistency
?ConDeIuenD@4 that & !eman! the other to res"ect my rights ?/N. *9;(6<
=(@.) Whether inconsistency in this matter involves an act of moral $rong!oing
is for :ichte entirely irrelevant to the theory of right. He thin#s right can
e foun!e!4 in!e"en!ently of morality4 merely on a logical "rinci"le ?/N.
')<5)4 (o<=74 (*<+6@.
Of course4 it is one thing to say that & contra!ict myself y inva!ing the
other's e>ternal s"here4 an! Iuite another thing to say that & have a reason
not to inva!e it. &f & stan! to eneGt from contra!icting myself4 then so
much the etter for self;contra!iction. 0o $e might argue that unless :ichte's
theory a""eals to morality ?or some other consi!eration eyon! logical consistency@4
it gives no one any reason for res"ecting the rights of others4 an!
hence it can "rovi!e no guarantee that anyone's rights $ill e res"ecte!.
:ichte acce"ts this argument in full. Accor!ing to him4 the relation of
right is a "resu""osition of self;consciousness4 ut a reason to res"ect others'
Erights is not. That is $hy :ichte goes on to !iscuss the Ela$ of com"ulsionE
through $hich the relation of right may e enforce!A the aim of this !iscussion
is to "rovi!e a transcen!ental !e!uction of the social arrangements
necessary to enforce it. He argues that free "ersons must un!erta#e y
mutual agreement to guarantee that each of them $ill have reason to ehave
consistently an! res"ect the rights of others ?/N. '*(;'*7<566@4 an!
this in turn $ill reIuire the estalishment of a community or state ?/N.
'(6<56(@.
A more serious "rolem for :ichte's theory is that there seems to e a
+'
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
fallacy in the argument that recogniDing another reIuires me to treat that
other as a "erson $ith rights4 in the sense of granting the other a s"here of
free activity $ith $hich & refrain from interference. To recogniDe another as
a free eing may very $ell involve ac#no$le!ging that this other is ca"ale
of ma#ing free choicesA this may even commit me to the a!mission that there
is in fact some s"here of e>ternal reality !etermine! y the other's choices.
-ut it is har! to see ho$ it involves anything li#e a !eclaration on my "art
that & $ill sustain this s"here y restricting my o$n actions. 0u""ose $e
grant :ichte that in recogniDing an! eing recogniDe! y another4 & have
a!!resse! to the other a !eman! to res"ect my e>ternal s"here of free!om4
an! & have ecome a$are of a li#e !eman! on the "art of the other. Even so4
no reason has yet een given for me to com"ly $ith the other's !eman!4 or
even for me to agree or !eclare4 in actions4 $or!s4 or even in thoughts4 that
& $ill com"ly $ith it. &f that is right4 then & am involve! in no inconsistency
$hen & infringe on the other's s"here of activity.
We might try to re"ly to this oFection on the asis of the fact that :ichte's
theory of self;a$areness involves the attriution to everyone of a !esire to
e>ercise a causal inJuence freely over the e>ternal $orl!. :rom this $e coul!
argue in :ichte's ehalf that since & $ant the other to com"ly $ith my !eman!
to res"ect my e>ternal s"here of free!om4 & might e $illing to res"ect
the other's s"here in return. This coul! e the asis for a mutual !eclaration
that $e $ill res"ect each other's e>ternal s"heres. 0uch an argument $oul!
treat our reci"rocal !eclarations as the result of a mutually a!vantageous contract
or agreement. -ut the argument is surely Fust as ho"eless as the agreement
$oul! e "ointless4 for there is su""ose! to e no reason to com"ly
$ith the other's !eman!s4 an! hence no guarantee that either of us $ill have
a reason to com"ly $ith them. 0o $hat "oint coul! there e in !eclaring that
$e $ill com"ly4 or in in!ucing the other to ma#e such a !eclarationB 0ince
it $ill e a!vantageous to contra!ict such !eclarations $henever $e feel li#e
it4 an! since oth of us #no$ this4 no one has anything to gain from ma#ing
them or getting others to ma#e them.
:ichte's o$n argument on the "oint has nothing in common $ith this contractarian
one. He treats mutual recognition an! the relation of right as the
asis of contracts or agreements4 not as a result of any contract or agreement.
:ichte asserts that $hen you an! & recogniDe each other4 $e em"loy a conce"t
of human in!ivi!uality that is a Ereci"rocal conce"t4 $hich can e thought
only in reference to another's thought4 . . . a common conce"t4 in $hich t$o
consciousnesses are unite! into oneE ?/.N *=;*+<=5@. What :ichte $ants to
claim is that my a$areness of myself as rational eing involves a conce"tion
of a free rational in!ivi!ual4 $hich & must ascrie to others as $ell as to
myself. &n laying claim to a s"here of free!om for myself4 & lay claim simultaneously
on the other's ehalf to a s"here of free!om for the other. -ecause
& am a$are of oth myself an! the other as rational eings4 & am recogniDing
the other's right to a li#e s"here of e>ternal free!om in the very act of !eman!ing
of the other a s"here of free!om for myself.
+5
.ECO/N&T&ON
&n light of this4 it is more "romising to inter"ret :ichte's theory of recognition
as an account of an i!eal socialiDation "rocess for in!ivi!uals in a culture
in $hich values such as in!ivi!ual free!om an! autonomy hol! an im"ortant
"lace. &n teaching "eo"le to thin# of themselves as rational eings4 $e teach
them to thin# of themselves as having the right to an e>ternal s"here for free
action4 an! $e teach them to em"loy the same conce"tion in thin#ing of
other rational eings. :ichte himself suggests this rea!ing not only in his
references to the e!ucation of human eings ut also $hen he stresses that
the self;consciousness of rational agents is something that can !evelo" only
through its social cultivation ?/N. =9;+6<''+;''9@. &f in!ivi!uals $ere socialiDe!
in some such $ay4 that $oul! e>"lain oth $hy they $ant to ma#e
the !eman!s involve! in relations of right4 an! $hy they are "re"are! to
recogniDe the reci"rocal !eman!s of others. -ut they still might not e motivate!
to ehave consistently $ith this recognitionA thus it !oes not oviate
:ichte's argument that a la$ of com"ulsion is also necessary.
On this rea!ing4 the "rolem $ith :ichte's theory is that he has not !efen!e!
the claim that this sort of socialiDation is etter suite! to the conce"t
of rational nature than various others might e. Human selves may !esire
e>ternal free!om4 ut it !oes not follo$ that they must e!ucate one another
to !eman! a !eterminate s"here of e>ternal free!om an! to res"ect a li#e
!eman! on the "art of every other. &n!ivi!uals $hose fun!amental !esire is
to e>ercise causality freely over the e>ternal $orl! might !eci!e to e!ucate
one another in accor!ance $ith :ichte's theory. -ut they might also e socialiDe!
to thin# of one another as see#ing to a""ro"riate the entire e>ternal
$orl!4 #illing or enslaving as many of their com"etitors as they can. &t is not
enough for :ichte's "ur"oses to sho$ that it $oul! e a!vantageous if "eo"le
thought of themselves an! others as having rights to e>ternal s"heres of actionA
the theory reIuires that such thin#ing shoul! e correct4 that the conce"tion
of a suFect of rights shoul! e someho$ connecte! to the conce"t
of a rational eing as such.
We may see Hegel as attem"ting to su""ly this !eGciency in :ichte's theory.
Hegel !oes not treat recognition as a transcen!ental con!ition for the
O "ossiility of self;consciousness. He un!erstan!s it instea! as a E"rocess4E
eginning $ith a Estruggle to the !eath4E an! "assing through an asymmetrical
Emaster;servantE relation in $hich one self is recogniDe! y the other
$ithout having to recogniDe the other in turn. &n the course of this "rocess4
the selves acIuire a !ee"er conce"tion of $hat it is to e a free self4 an! the
rational outcome of the "rocess is the mutual a$areness of free self;conscious
;eings as "ersons $ith astract rights. Hegel's mo!el involves a "hiloso"hical
argument4 ut it also has historical a""lications. &t attem"ts to say something
aout the !iMerence et$een ?mo!ern@ societies4 $hich recogniDe every human
eing as a "erson $ith astract rights4 an! ?"remo!ern@ societies4 $hich
!o not. Hegel tries to sho$ that "eo"le have a !ee"er #no$le!ge of their
human nature in societies that res"ect the right of "ersons than in societies
that !o not.
+)
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
(. The !esire for self;certainty
Earlier $e sa$ that Hegel locates the origin of the conce"t of a "erson in
ancient .ome. He cre!its Christianity $ith e>ten!ing this status in "rinci"le
to all4 an! he Gn!s the $orl!ly a""lication of this Christian vie$ only in the
mo!ern state. -ut Hegel's !iscussion of recognition4 in oth his Hena "erio!
an! his later "hiloso"hy of s"irit4 is not so much an historical account as a
rational reconstruction of the "rocess through $hich the mutual recognition
of "ersons might have !evelo"e! out of sim"ler forms of self;consciousness.(
We might thin# of social contract theories of the state as one analogy for
Hegel's "roce!ure4 since they4 too4 are rational reconstructions of the $ay in
$hich an e>isting institution might have come aout. We $oul! !o etter4
ho$ever4 to thin# of the "eculiar form of social contract theory foun! in
.ousseau's Discourse on the Origin of &neIuality. Hegel's reconstruction4 li#e
.ousseau's4 !oes not try to sho$ ho$ in!ivi!uals might construct a social
institution in or!er to satisfy given en!s using given resources. &nstea!4 it
attem"ts to un!erstan! ho$ the mutual interaction of in!ivi!uals fun!amentally
alters their #no$le!ge of themselves4 therey changing their en!s4 resources4
an! their human nature itself.
&n the -erlin Encyclo"e!ia4 Hegel !ivi!es the !evelo"ment of Eself;consciousnessE
into three !istinct stagesC ?'@ !esire ?E/ NN *57;*59@4 ?5@ recognition
?E/ NN *)6;*)(@4 an! ?)@ universal self;consciousness or reason ?E/
NN *)7;*)9@. Hegel's mo!el egins $ith human in!ivi!uals conceive! sim"ly
as living things "ossessing Eself;consciousnessE or E$illE ?2h/ 3 '7(A H. '9*<
99A E/ N *57@. Hegel follo$s :ichte in regar!ing the human self as fun!amentally
a striving of the E&E against the Enot;&4E of self against otherness4 an im"ulse
to overcome all otherness ?W 575<5)'@. Hegel e>"resses this y saying
that self;consciousness is E!esire.E ,ore s"eciGcally4 it is a !esire to achieve
Eself;certaintyE through overcoming an oFect or Eother.E 0elf;consciousness
see#s to !estroy the in!e"en!ence or Eself;suLciencyE ?0elstan!ig#eit@ of the
oFect4 in or!er to estalish its o$n self;stan!ing in!e"en!ence.
Certain of the nothingness of this other4 it "osits this nothingness for itself as the
truth of the otherA it negates the in!e"en!ent oFect an! therey gives itself selfcertainty4
as true certainty as such4 $hich has ecome so for it in an oFective $ay.
?2h/ '' '=*@
&t is in this EnothingnessE of the oFect or other that the !esire of self;consciousness
Gn!s its EsatisfactionE ?2h/ 3 '=(@.
:or Hegel4 the EoFectE of a !esire is never merely a suFective mental
state4 such as "leasure or the asence of "ain. Hegel inter"rets !esire as a
function of self;conscious4 s"iritual eing ; an emo!ie! eing situate! in a
$orl! of e>ternal oFects to$ar! $hich its !esires are !irecte!. :urther4
Hegel inter"rets this !esire in accor!ance $ith his theory of s"irit as selfactualiDation
through the overcoming of otherness. The fun!amental !esire
that Hegel attriutes to self;consciousness is a !esire for self;$orth or Eselfcertainty.E
As s"irit4 the self engages in an activity of "ositing an oFect an!
then inter"reting itself in terms of it. 0elf;certainty is gaine! only through
+*
.ECO/N&T&ON
something e>ternal4 $hich is rought into harmony $ith the self4 an oFectivity
$hose in!e"en!ence is !one a$ay $ith or Enegate!.E This negation of
the oFect refers to my using it u" or consuming it ?as $hen & literally eat it
u"@4 ut also inclu!es my sha"ing or forming it. Even more roa!ly4 it covers
any sort of integration of it into my "lans an! "roFects. &n the most astract
form4 it occurs $hen & assert my !ominion over the oFect in the social forms
suitale to "ro"erty o$nershi" ?2. NN (*;=6@.
The attem"t to achieve self;certainty through the a""ro"riation of things
"roves ina!eIuate. 0atisfaction ta#en in e>ternal oFects merely lea!s to a
ne$ !esire for a ne$ oFect. This result only "oints to the fact that the !esiring
self;consciousness is al$ays !e"en!ent on a ne$ oFect4 $hereas its aim
$as rather to estalish its o$n in!e"en!ence4 an! the nothingness of the
oFect ?E/ N *5+@. What self;consciousness nee!s is an oFect that rings
aout this negation $ithin itself $ithout ceasing to e an oFect. -ut only a
self;consciousness is ale to en!ure the Econtra!ictionE of negating itself or
eing its o$n other ?2h/ '''75@. &n other $or!s4 Eself;consciousness reaches
its satisfaction only in another self;consciousnessE ?2h/ ' '=(@.
:rom the stan!"oint of self;certainty4 the fun!amental "rolem $ith nonhuman
oFects of !esire is that they can contriute to my self;$orth only
secon!arily or in!irectly4 y conGrming an image of myself that & alrea!y
have in!e"en!ently of them. Even animals4 $hich are living an! conscious
oFects4 cannot "rovi!e me !irectly $ith a sense of my self;$orth4 since they
"ossess no conce"tion of a free self4 an! so & can never Gn! in them a conGrming
"ers"ective on myself. The only EotherE that can form a conce"tion
of me as a free self is another free self. 0elf;consciousness can Gn! satisfaction
for its !esire for self;certainty only $hen it comes Eoutsi!e itself4E so that its
oFect ecomes Eanother selfE ?2h/ 3 '=9A E/ N *594A@. E0elf;consciousness
has an e>istence only through eing recogniDe! y another self;consciousnessE
?N2 =+@A E0elf;consciousness is in an! for itself insofar an! through
the fact that it is in an! for itself for another4 i.e.4 it is only as something
recogniDe!E ?2h/ 'f '=+@.
When & see my free selfhoo! reJecte! ac# to me out of another self4 &
actualiDe my self;consciousness in the form of Es"irit4E as a Eself;restoring
sameness.E &t is only in relation to another free self that & can e truly free4
E$ith myself in anotherE as regar!s my self;certainty. Thus the full actualiDation
of s"irit is "ossile only through the relation et$een selves that recogniDe
each other. This is $hy Hegel even goes so far as to say that the essence
of s"irit itself lies in recognition4 in a community of selves4 Ethe & that is a
$e an! the $e that is an &E ?2h/ ' '==A cf. E/ N *)7@.
7. The struggle for recognition
The Grst stage in the !evelo"ment of self;consciousness is !esire in general.
The secon! stage comes $hen !esire ecomes a !esire for recognition ?E/ N
*)6A@. EEach $ills to e vali! for the otherA it is the en! of each to loo#
u"on itself in the otherE ?Hf. 5'6<''7@.
+(
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
& am ErecogniDe!E y another $hen the other self;conscious eing has an
image of me as a eing self;conscious li#e itself4 an! & am a$are of it as
having this image. Hence to e recogniDe!4 & must also recogniDe the other.
At this "oint4 $e might see a certain mutuality4 eIuality4 even an i!entity of
my !esire an! interest $ith that of the other. Hegel suggests this y saying
?oth hy"erolically an! "ara!o>ically@ that the other of $hich & am a$are
is myself ; myself as other ?2h/ H i+oAH. 56*<''6A E/ N *)6@. The "oint
of the hy"erole is that at this stage $e are astracting from all our "articular
"ro"erties4 an! so sim"ly as free self;consciousnesses $e are e>actly ali#e.
There is nothing to !istinguish one of us from another e>ce"t my a$areness
of you ?an! your a$areness of me@ as other.
This sort of eIuality or i!entity4 instea! of creating a common interest
et$een us4 lea!s imme!iately to a struggle4 for our characteristic con!uct as
!esiring eings confronte! $ith an other is sim"ly to EnegateE or E!o a$ay
$ithE the other. Each of us $ants recognition from the other4 ut sees no
reason to recogniDe the other. ,y recognition $oul! only attest to the other's
in!e"en!ent e>istence ?or Eimme!iacyE@4 an! that $oul! e a threat to my
self;certainty. Each of us therefore tries to !o a$ay $ith ?auJieen@ the other's
imme!iacy4 that is4 $ith its o!ily life ?E/ N *)'@. The struggle for
recognition ecomes a struggle to the !eath.
Hegel suggests another reason for regar!ing the struggle as a attle of life
an! !eath. 0ince each is a E"ure astraction of self;consciousnessE attem"ting
to vin!icate its free!om or in!e"en!ence4 its self;certainty consists in Esho$ing
that it is connecte! to no !eterminate e>istence4 not at all to the universal
in!ivi!ually of e>istence4 that it is not connecte! to lifeE ?2h/ 3 '+=@. The
!ee"er meaning of the struggle for recognition is not the nee! to see# the
other's !eath4 ut the nee! to ris# my o$n life. ETo him as consciousness it
a""ears that it is a Iuestion of the !eath of the otherA ut it is really a Iuestion
of his o$nE ?H. 5''<''=@.
Whether the life an! !eath struggle en!s in your !eath or mine4 neither of
us can get out of it $hat $e !esire. The one $ho !ies is no longer there to
e recogniDe!4 an! the one $ho lives no longer has an other to "rovi!e recognition.
Thus self;certainty through recognition is unattainale un!er these
con!itions. &f it is ever going to e attainale4 something in our aims an!
!esires $ill have to change. 0"eciGcally4 $hat seems to e nee!e! is a form
of self;consciousness that $ill recogniDe $ithout !eman!ing recognition in
return. At this "oint4 self;certainty a""ears attainale only through eing
recogniDe! y such a self;consciousness.
=. ,aster an! servant
Hegel imagines this form of self;consciousness arising out of the struggle4 $hen
one comatant4 face! $ith !eath at the han!s of the other4 chooses to live at the
cost of renouncing its claim on the other's recognition. EOne of those involve!
in the struggle "refers life4 "reserves himself as a single self;consciousness4 ut
gives u" eing recogniDe!4 $hile the other hol!s TfastU to its reference to itself
+7
.ECO/N&T&ON
an! is recogniDe! y the Grst4 $ho is his suFect ?Unter$orfenen@C the relation
of master an! servantE ?E/ N *))@. The master;consciousness a""arently gets
"recisely $hat it $ants. &t is recogniDe! y its other4 ut !oes not have to
recogniDe the other. Conversely4 the servant;consciousness is utterly nonself;
suLcient ?unselstan!ig@C E&ts essence is life or eing for anotherE ?2h/
3'+9@. The servant also ta#es over the !e"en!ent si!e of the master's relation
to e>ternal things4 laoring on them $ithout satisfaction4 $hereas the master
gets the enFoyment $ithout laoring ?2h/ '' '96@.
As Hegel !escries it4 the master;servant relation has much in common
$ith Hoes's account of E!es"otical !ominionEC
Dominion acIuire! y conIuest or victory in $ar is that $hich some $riters call
DE02OT&CAL from !es"otes4 $hich signiGes a lor! or master; an! is the !ominion
of the master over his servant. An! this !ominion is then acIuire! to the victor $hen
the vanIuishe!4 to avoi! the "resent stro#e of !eath4 covenants . . . that4 so long as
his life an! the lierty of his o!y is allo$e! him4 the victor shall have the use of it
at his "leasure.7
Hegel's servant4 li#e Hoes's4 is "ut in on!age through the !esire to save
his lifeA an! he is "ut in on!age not y mere force4 ut y his o$n consent
to the arrangementC ENor is he olige! ecause he is conIuere! ; that is to
say4 eaten an! ta#en4 or "ut to Jight ; ut ecause he comes in an! sumits
to the victor.E=
There are t$o signiGcant !iMerences et$een Hoes's account an! Hegel's4
oth conseIuences of the fact that the Hegelian master;servant relation
arises in the course of the struggle for recognition4 as "art of the !rive for
self;certainty. :irst4 for Hoes the servant is nothing ut a tool to satisfy the
master's other !esiresA the humanity of the servant is at est a circumstantial
a!vantage ; a human servant might e ale to "erform tas#s to $hich a machine
or an animal $oul! e uneIual. :or Hegel's master4 ho$ever4 the servant
is essentially a self;conscious eing4 since he is "rimarily a means to the
master's self;certainty. This also means that for the master4 the relation is to
e Fu!ge! "rimarily y ho$ $ell it "rocures self;certainty.
0econ!4 $hen Hoes's servant saves his life at all costs4 he merely ehaves
consistently $ith his fun!amental !rive4 self;"reservationA ut Hegel's
servant aan!ons ; or at least mo!iGes ; his fun!amental !esire4 the !esire
for self;suLcient self;certainty. The servant claims no vali!ity for his "articular
self4 an! not even over against the $orl! of e>ternal oFects. The servant's
life is !evote! entirely to the transient "rocess of EnegatingE e>ternal
things for the master's sa#e4 $hile the servant's o$n enFoyment of the oFect
is in!eGnitely "ost"one!. Thus Hegel !escries the servant's laor as E!esire
restraine!4 !isa""earance !elaye!E ?2h/ '' '9(@. &n other $or!s4 the servant's
laor is Elaor accor!ing to an alien $illE ?N2 +5@.
:or the master4 the earlier im"asse in the struggle for recognition has a""arently
een overcome. He gets the one;si!e! recognition that self;consciousness
has een $anting. Hegel argues4 ho$ever4 that the master's a""arent
success is an illusion4 that the master's con!ition is in fact the very
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
o""osite of $hat he $as trying to achieveC EThis oFect !oes not corres"on!
to its conce"tA rather4 that in $hich the master has fulGlle! himself has ecome
something $holly other than a self;suLcient consciousnessE ?2h/ ''
'95@. &t is through the servant's recognition that the master achieves the status
he !igniGes y the name of self;suLciencyA the servant's activity rather
than the master's is the one sha"ing an! !ominating e>ternal things.
Hegel even goes so far as to say that it is the servant's consciousness rather
than the master's that has achieve! self;suLciencyC EThe truth of the selfsuLcient
consciousness is the servant's consciousnessE ?2h/ 3 '9)@A it is the
servant's consciousness4 not the master's4 that suLces to itself an! !oes not
!e"en! on another. The fear of !eath4 $hich ma!e the servant $illing to
laor for an alien $ill4 has also set the servant;consciousness on the "ath to
a more com"lete self;suLciency than any that self;consciousness has #no$n4
or even imagine!. Hegel Iuotes ironically the -ilical "roverC EThe fear of
the lor! is the eginning of $is!omE ?2h/ 3 '9(A cf. 2rovers 'C =A 9 C '6@.
Hegel !oes not mean that the servant;consciousness as such is a self;suLcient
self;consciousness. E-ut Fust as !omination sho$e! that its essence is
the inversion of $hat it $ants to e4 so servitu!e $ill in its com"letion ecome
the o""osite of $hat it imme!iately isA as a re"resse! consciousness it
$ill go into itself an! convert itself into true self;suLciencyE ?2h/ 3 '9)@.
True self;suLciency or Efree!omE is reache! $hen the servant;consciousness
ecomes conscious of $hat servitu!e has $on for it ?2h/ 3 '9=@.
Hegel sees the servant's suFection to an alien $ill as a "re"aration for the
self;!isci"line of a rational life an! memershi" in a community of free "ersons.
The servant's self;consciousness Elaors oM its "articular $ill an! its
self;$ill4 su"erse!es ?het . . . auf@ the inner imme!iacy of !esire4 an!4 in
this alienation an! fear of the lor! ; the eginning of $is!om ; it ma#es the
transition to universal self;consciousnessE ?E/ N *)(A cf. 2h/ '' '97@. 0ervitu!e
to an alien $ill ma#es "ossile the !isci"lining of "articular $hims an!
!esires4 so that they may e rought un!er the s$ay of one's o$n rational or
universal $ill. EThis suFection of the servant's selGshness forms the eginning
of true human free!om4 . . . a necessary moment in the formative e!ucation
?-il!ung@ of every human eingE ?E/ N *)(A@.
+. Universal self;consciousness
&n this last "oint4 there seem to e t$o !istinct i!eas at $or#. One is nothing
ut a !outful "latitu!e of authoritarian "e!agogyC 1ou learn to comman!
y learning to oey4 an! acIuire self;!isci"line y having your $ill forcily
ro#en y another's $ill. The other i!ea is more 3antianC /enuine free!om
an! self;$orth are availale only to those $ho are ca"ale of !etaching themselves
from their "articular !esires an! a!o"ting a universal or rational stan!"oint
that res"ects eIually the free!om of others. &t is through the secon!
i!ea that $e may "ass from the secon! stage of self;consciousness ?recognition@
to the thir! an! Gnal stage ?universal self;consciousness@.
What matters aout the e!ucation of servitu!e is not the rea#ing of self;
++
.ECO/N&T&ON
$ill4 ut the !a$ning conviction that $hat is im"ortant for self;$orth is not
the gratiGcation of !esire ut the !ignity of formally free agency. Thus eing
recogniDe! consists not in the !omination of another self;consciousness4 ut
in the mutual relation of !iMerent self;consciousnesses $ho i!entify their !ignity
$ith the free!om they have in common.
Universal self;consciousness is the aLrmative #no$ing of oneself in another self4
so that each self has asolute self;suLciency as free in!ivi!ualityA . . . each is thus
universal Tself;consciousnessU an! oFective4 an! has real universality as reci"rocity4
in such a $ay that it #no$s itself as recogniDe! in the free other4 an! #no$s this other
insofar as it recogniDes it an! #no$s it as free. ?E/ N *)7@
& $in free!om for myself not y suFugating others ut y lierating them4
granting thern the same free status & claim for myself. EThe master stan!ing
over against the servant $as still not truly free4 for he still !i! not thoroughly
loo# on himself in the other. ConseIuently4 it is only through the lieration
of the servant that the master4 too4 ecomes "erfectly freeE ?E/ N *)7A@.
Hegel's "oint might e vie$e! as an instance of the general truth that if &
$ant to acIuire $orth in my o$n eyes on the asis of another's esteem4 & can
!o it only to the e>tent that & esteem the other as a Fu!ge of my $orth. An
author $ill a!! nothing to her self;esteem y rea!ing favorale critical notices
of her $or# if she !es"ises the o"inion of all the critics. Only a free
eing has the ca"acity to recogniDe another as free. Hence if & $ant selfcertainty
as a free eing through recognition4 then & can get it only from a
eing & regar! as free. The master's attem"t to achieve recognition through
!ominion over another is necessarily a failure4 ecause it !eman!s the im"ossileC
that the other e free an! in!e"en!ent4 an! yet !o a$ay $ith this very
free!om an! in!e"en!ence in the act of giving recognition. To "rovi!e selfcertainty
for self;consciousness4 recognition must e reci"rocal.
The !ee"er source of the master's failure is that he has an ina!eIuate conce"t
of self. He is trying to claim self;suLciency for the merely "articular
self4 !istinguishe! from others y its selGsh !esires an! s"ecial traits. The
attem"t to $in self;certainty through recognition for that self lea!s to the $
strategy of !omination4 $hich necessarily fails for the reasons $e have Fust
seen. The recognition & nee! from others reIuires a !iMerent self;image4 that
of an astractly free "erson "artici"ating eIually $ith others in a Euniversal
self;consciousness.E -y "rovi!ing an argument that Euniversal self;consciousnessE
is the only solution to the "rolem of self;certainty4 Hegel succee!s in
vin!icating :ichte's claim that the correct conce"t of a rational nature must
e a Ereci"rocal conce"tE or a Ecommon conce"t4E $hich & can a""ly to myself
only y a""lying it in the same $ay to others4 an! granting to others the
same rights & claim for myself.
EUniversal self;consciousnessE means more for Hegel than the mutual relation
of "ersons having astract rights. He insists that Eit forms the sustance
of ethical lifeE generally4 an! is Ethe form of consciousness of the sustance
of every essential s"irituality4 $hether of family4 fatherlan!4 state4 or of all
virtues ; love4 frien!shi"4 courage4 honor4 fameE ?E/ N *)74A@. That is $hy
+9
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
Hegel says that the master;servant relation "ertains to Ethe transition from
the natural state of humanity to a truly ethical con!itionE ?2. N (=A@. -eyon!
this4 universal self;consciousness is for Hegel the foun!ation of reason
generally4 regar!e! as the human min!'s highest ca"acity ?E/ N *)=A N2 +5;
+(@. :or Hegel4 rational thought in general is "ossile for a human min!
only as "art of a community of min!s that mutually recogniDe each other's
rationality.
Nevertheless4 the most imme!iate a""lication of universal self;consciousness
is to the astract right of "ersons. &n the Hena lectures4 Hegel states
Iuite !irectly the connection et$een "ersonal right an! the universal selfconsciousness
arising from genuine recognition.
The #no$ing $ill is no$ universal. &t is recognition. 2ut o""osite itself in the form
of universality it is eing4 actuality in general4 an! the in!ivi!ual4 the suFect4 is the
"erson. The $ill of in!ivi!uals is the universal an! the universal is in!ivi!ualA it is
ethical life in general4 ut imme!iately it is right. ?Ff. 5'5<''+@
&n the 2henomenology of 0"irit the connection is in!icate! less !irectly4 ut
still Iuite clearly. Hegel i!entiGes 0toicism as the form of self;consciousness
that emerges from servitu!e4 an! in!icates that a society foun!e! on "ersons
an! their rights is one that corres"on!s to 0toical self;consciousness ?2h/ f
*=9@. The !e"en!ence of astract right on the !ialectic of recognition is
state! Iuite !irectly in the 2hiloso"hy of .ightC EContract "resu""oses that
those $ho enter into it recogniDe each other as "ersons an! "ro"erty o$nersA
since it is a relation of oFective s"irit4 the moment of recognition is alrea!y
containe! an! "resu""ose! in itE ?2. N ='A cf. %2.'=C (7;(=@.
9. Hegel's !ialectic of recognition
Hegel's account of the self's !evelo"ment through recognition an! the master;
servant !ialectic may loo# more li#e an astract fale than a "hiloso"hical
argument. &t may hel" us to see the "oint of the account if $e consi!er things
!iMerently4 y focusing on Gve main theses $hich groun! Hegel's !efense of
the conce"t of a "erson an! the ethical s"here of astract right.
'. 0elfhoo! involves the !esire for self;certainty. Hegel's argument egins
$ith his vie$ of human eings as s"iritual eings4 $hose fun!amental
!esires inclu!e the !esire to estalish their self;$orth through self;"ositing
an! self;inter"retation.
5. 0elf;certainty reIuires recognition. 0elf;"ositing through nonhuman oFects
is ina!eIuate for a human eing's sense of self;$orth. What & nee!
is an oFect ca"ale of reJecting ac# to me my conce"tion of myself as a
free self4 an! that oFect can e only another free self. 0elf;$orth reIuires
recognition y others.
). One;si!e! recognition cannot succee!. &f & $ant self;certainty only for my
"articular self4 then & $ill $ant recognition through !ominating the other4
Fust as & might !ominate nonhuman oFects. -ut this form of recognition
$ill not give me $hat & nee!4 ecause it !enies to the other the free!om
96
.ECO/N&T&ON
it must have if its recognition is to conGrm my self;$orth. ConseIuently4
if recognition is to "rovi!e us $ith self;certainty4 it must e mutual..
*. ,utual recognition reIuires universal self consciousness. ,utual recognition
is "ossile only if & !ee"en my conce"tion of myself. & must vie$
myself as a rational eing4 ca"ale of in!e"en!ence in relation to my "articular
!esires4 an! ca"ale of acting on "rinci"les that are universally
vali! for all selves.
(. .ecognition through universal self;consciousness reIuires a community of
"ersons4 stan!ing in mutual relations of astract right. Universal self;consciousness
arises only un!er certain social con!itions. &n!ivi!uals must
elong to a community in $hich they are socialiDe! mutually to claim an!
grant to each other the right to e>ercise their free!om $ithin a limite!
e>ternal s"here. .
Hegel's conclusion is virtually i!entical to :ichte's4 ut his route to the
conclusion is very !iMerent. &t is not a transcen!ental argument from the
con!itions for self;consciousness4 ut an argument aout the con!itions un!er
$hich human eings can gain a sense of free!om an! self;$orth through
their relations $ith others. &t rests not on the con!itions for self;a$areness
in general4 ut on the assum"tion that $e have a fun!amental !esire to vin!icate
our self;$orth4 an! on a theory aout the con!itions un!er $hich it is
"ossile for us to satisfy that !esire.
Hegel's argument reme!ies the most im"ortant !efect $e foun! in
:ichte's. &t ma#es e>"licit our reasons not only for a!!ressing to others the
!eman! for a s"here of free!om4 ut also for recogniDing an! acce"ting a
li#e !eman! on the "art of others. &t FustiGes the self;conce"tion of ourselves
as rational eings $hich might e ma!e the asis of a socialiDation of "eo"le
as free an! eIual memers of a community that res"ects the rights of every
rational eing.
The argument might e com"are! to Hoes's argument for the Ela$s of
natureE $hich i! us to see# "eace4 to ma#e an! #ee" covenants $ith others4
an! in general to accommo!ate ourselves to a social con!ition.+ -oth arguments
aim to sho$ that recogniDing the rights of others is the only $ay in
$hich $e can achieve something $e ourselves !ee"ly nee! an! $ant. An
im"ortant !iMerence is that Hegel's argument is not an egoistic argument in
the $ay that Hoes's is. The !esire for survival on $hich Hoes's argument
rests is an oviously egoistic !esire4 ut the !esire for self;certainty is
not necessarily egoisticFSin fact4 $e might !escrie Hegel's argument as
sho$ing that the !esire for self;suLciency an! self;$orth cannot e a!eIuately
satisGe! as long as it is treate! as a "urely egoistic !esire ; a !esire
for $ants ase! on my "articularity4 as !istinct from $ants that e>"ress my
universal rationality. The conclusion of Hegel's argument is that the !esire
to vin!icate my self;$orth can e satisGe! only if & locate my fun!amental
$orth in something & share $ith other free eings an! res"ect in them as
$ell.@
Hegel is arguing for a certain conce"tion of the self as universal self;con;
9i
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
sciousness. His argument is "ractical in the sense that it !efen!s this conce"tion
y saying that the self can satisfy its asic !esire for self;certainty only
if it has this conce"tion. -ut the conclusion nonetheless is su""ose! to e a
"iece of self;#no$le!ge. We might say that the argument "resu""oses that if
a certain self;conce"tion enales the self to achieve its asic !esires4 that is a
sign that this self;conce"tion is correct. -ut since having a certain self;conce"tion
is "art of $hat ma#es a self $hat it is4 it might e more accurate to
"ut it another $ayC A self actualiDes itself $hen it ma#es itself into $hat it
nee!s to e in or!er to satisfy its !esire for self;certainty. &t turns out that
in or!er to !o this4 a self must ecome a free "erson4 through "artici"ating
in a community of recognition or universal self;consciousness4 an! ecoming
a$are of itself as a free "erson. When it has !one this4 its conce"tion of itself
as a free "erson $ill e correct4 an! constitute #no$le!ge of itself.
'6. The reality of o""ression
&t $ill also clarify Hegel's argument to mention t$o im"ortant limitations on
$hat it "roves.
:irst4 Hegel's argument !oes not sho$ ?it !oes not even claim@ that there
cannot e goo! reasons for $anting to !ominate others4 e>"loit them4 re!uce
them to a con!ition of servitu!e. Dominion "romotes the master's free!om
?in the or!inary sense@4 since it a!!s to his ca"acities an! removes ostacles
to satisfying his !esires. Hegel's argument sho$s only that !ominating others
s is not the $ay to achieve self;certainty as a free eing. Hegel's argument gives
me no reason for res"ecting the rights of others if & ha""en to "refer free!om
in the or!inary sense to self;certainty or asolute free!om in the Hegelian
sense. Dominion may even "rovi!e me $ith a semlance of self;certainty if
my conce"tion of free selfhoo! is suLciently un!evelo"e! that & still confuse
the !ominion over others $ith self;certainty aMor!e! me through recognition
y others. Hegel cannot say aout me $hat Hoes coul! say aout those
$ho fail to see# "eace ; that they !o not #no$ the right $ay to get $hat they
most $ant.
What Hegel can say instea! is that $hat & $ant in this case4 or at least the
"riority among my $ants4 is ase! on an ina!eIuate conce"tion of myself as
a human eing. Hegel thin#s that such an ina!eIuate self;conce"tion $as
characteristic of "re;Christian an! "remo!ern societies4 $here social institutions
such as slavery still "revaile!. He seems convince! that normal mature
in!ivi!uals in mo!ern society !o im"licitly recogniDe others as "ersons $ith
rights. As $e shall see in Cha"ter 74 this conviction "lays a crucial role in
his theory of "unishment.
&t is easy to reconcile Hegel's argument $ith the ovious fact that many
"eo"le "refer !ominion over others to living on eIual terms $ith them. &t is
es"ecially easy to see ho$ one might have this "reference in a social or!er
$here the recognition of at least some is only formal4 nominal4 or a mere
sham ?see Cha"ter '*4 NN +;'6@. &f there is in fact a !ivision et$een o""ressors
an! o""resse!4 our most natural !esire is to "revent ourselves from fall;
95
.ECO/N&T&ON
ing into the latter category4 "roaly y securing our "osition as est $e can
in the former one. Hegel's argument hel"s to e>"lain the fact that in mo!ern
societies "eo"le "refer to conceal from themselves their !ominion over others4
y seIuestering the others in !iMerent "arts of to$n or in !istant lan!s4
or y re"resenting the others as formally free an! eIual to themselves. &n
these $ays4 "eo"le enFoy simultaneously the ?real@ a!vantages of o""ressing
others an! the ?at least "reten!e!@ self;certainty that only a society of free
an! eIual "ersons can oMer.
Hegel's argument is suFect to a secon! limitation4 $hich "oints in the
same !irection. Hegel's argument sho$s that & cannot achieve self;certainty
e>ce"t as a memer of a community of free "ersons $ho mutually recogniDe
one another's rights. Hegel claims that in mo!ern ?"ost;Christian@ society
$e regar! all human eings as "ersons $ith rights4 ut his !ialectic of recognition
!oes not estalish that self;certainty reIuires me to recogniDe everyone
as a "erson. Consistently $ith Hegel's argument4 & might Gn! self;certainty
in the "arochial society constitute! y a "rivilege! race4 caste4 or class4 $hose
memers mutually recogniDe one another as "ersons ut treat outsi!ers as
non"ersons. Hegel's argument "roves that & coul! not achieve self;certainty
through my relations $ith these non"ersonsA ut if & have alrea!y achieve!
it through memershi" in my "rivilege! grou"4 & $ill have nothing to lose
an! "erha"s much to gain from ignoring the su""ose! rights of those $ho
!o not elong to it.
Of course4 such a !istincti"n et$een "ersons an! non"ersons coul! not
e !ra$n aritrarily. &f memers of the outgrou" have the same ca"acity to
"artici"ate in universal consciousness as memers of the ingrou"4 then Hegel's
argument reIuires that oth e recogniDe! ali#e. &n "ractice4 ho$ever4
this "resents little !iLculty ecause "eo"le "rove to e very ingenious in
E!iscovering ?or inventing@ !iMerences on $hich to ase the e>clusion of others
from rights $hich they recogniDe for themselves an! their o$n #in!.
0ome of Hegel's o$n remar#s ; aout $omen ?2. N '77A@4 or African "eo"les
?%2/ '56;'59<9';'65@4 or societies not organiDe! as Euro"ean nationstates
are ?2. N ))'.@ ; coul!4 $ithout a force! inter"retation4 e use! in
"recisely this $ay. 0ome reuttal to the common rationales for restricting
human rights in "ractice is necessary if $e are to "rovi!e a thoroughgoing
Hegelian !efense of the i!ea that all human eings are free an! eIual "ersons.
9)
(
2ersons4 "ro"erty4 la$
i. 2ersons an! their astract right to things
English;s"ea#ing "hiloso"hy recogniDes a !istinction et$een ElegalE an!
EmoralE rights4 the former estalishe! y "ositive la$4 the latter $ith a foun!ation
in morality. Along $ith other /erman "hiloso"hers of the same "erio!4
Hegel ma"s the ethical lan!sca"e !iMerently. :or him4 the fun!amental
!istinction is et$een right ?.echt@ an! ethics or morality ?0itte4 ,oral4
Ethi#@. As $e sa$ in Cha"ter )4 N 94 .echt ?the $hole o!y of la$4 constitutional4
criminal or civil4 or the rational foun!ation of la$ an! the state@ contrasts
$ith /esetD ?"articular "ositive legal statutes@. .ight ?.echt@ is ca"ale
of co!iGcation in "ositive la$4 ut it has a rational foun!ation in!e"en!ent
of "ositive la$. .ight is also in!e"en!ent of morality ; of virtue4 goo!ness
of $ill4 an! the "ro"er en!s of con!uct.
Hegel also has a technical sense of .echt that is even roa!er than thisC
E.ightE refers to any e>istent that is the e>istence of the free $ill4 any oFect
in $hich the free $ill is $ith itself ?2. N 59@. &n this sense4 ErightE refers to
the $hole realm of oFective free!om4 inclu!ing morality an! ethical life4
an! the $hole of mo!ern social organiDation. Hegel also uses ErightE in the
tra!itional sense4 contrasting it $ith ethics or morality an! referring to the
s"here of "eo"le's rights that are suFect to "rotection y coercive "ositive
la$s. :or this "ur"ose he uses the term Eastract right.E
Astract right has to !o $ith the "ro"er safeguar!ing of a s"here of aritrary
choices. ,orality is concerne! $ith $hich actions $e ought to "erformA
astract right !eals only $ith $hat is "ossile or "ermissile for us in the
s"ecial Furi!ical ?rechtlich@ sense. E.ight is only a "ossiility4 an! hence only
a "ermission ?Erlaunis@ or $arrant ?-efugnis@E ?2. N )+@.
The t$o terms !o not mean Iuite the same thingC E '2ermitte!' means
"ossile accor!ing to rightE ?%2.'=C *(@A Ethat is "ermitte! $hich !oes not
violate my free $illA a $arrant is that others have to recogniDe thisE ?%2. 'C
5((@. & have the right to "lant a tree in my ac#yar!. This right involves a
"ermissionC in "lanting the tree4 & !o nothing contrary to right4 nothing that
violates the e>ternal s"here of any free $ill. &t also involves a $arrantC Others
are reIuire! to recogniDe my rightA they must not interfere $ith my "lanting
activities or harm the tree & have "lante!.'
EThe comman!ment of right isC '-e a "erson an! res"ect others as "ersons'
E ?2. N )7@. We res"ect others as "ersons $hen $e refrain from infringing
on their s"here of astract or aritrary free!om. Thus Hegel also states
9*
2E.0ON04 2.O2E.T14 LAW
the comman!ment of right asC E.es"ect the astract free!om of othersE
?%2.igC 7+@. Hegel also thin#s that $e have a "ositive !uty to assert our
o$n "ersonality4 to e>ercise our o$n free!om $ithin its "ro"er s"here. We
!o this through "ro"erty o$nershi"A an! this is $hat is meant y the im"erative
E-e a "ersonEC E&t is a !uty to "ossess things as "ro"erty4 i.e.4 to e as
a "ersonE ?E/ N *+7@. To recogniDe a "erson is al$ays to recogniDe the "erson
as free in relation to a EthingE ?0ache@4 $hich counts as the E.e"rasentant
or emo!iment of Tthe "erson'sU free!omE ?%2.*C '('@.
:ichte says that the right of "ro"erty inclu!es the Ee>ternal s"hereE for
each "erson's e>ercise of free!om ?/N. *iM<7)M@4 an! that the e>tent of
one's right to "ro"erty is !etermine! y the e>tent of this s"here ?/N.
5'6<5+9;596@. &n Hegel's theory4 too4 the rationale for "ro"erty right is that
a "erson Ee>ists as &!eaE $hen "ersonality is given a suLcient Ee>ternal
s"hereE in $hich to e>ercise its astract or aritrary free!om ?2. N *'@. A
"erson's E"ro"ertyE thus consists in that "art of the e>ternal $orl! that falls
$ithin that "erson's s"here of aritrary choice.
A "iece of "ro"erty is a Ething.E A thing is Eimme!iately !iMerent from
free s"irit4 something e>ternal in general. . . unfree4 un"ersonal an! $ithout
rightE ?2. N *5@. Hegel thin#s that natural things have no en! or !estination
e>ce"t to serve the $ill of rational eingsC
As a "erson4 & have the right of "utting my $ill into every thing4 $hich therey
ecomes mine4 an! giving it its sustantial en!A for it has no such en! in itself4 ut
receives through my $ill its !estination ?-estimmung@ an! soul ; the asolute right
of a""ro"riation human eings have over all things. ?2. N **@
,y a""ro"riation of a thing is actualiDe! $hen & use the thing ?2. N (9.@A
$hen a thing is consume! y its "ossessor4 Eits nature as 'selJess' is reveale!4
an! thus its !estination is fulGlle!E ?2. N (9@.
EThingE refers "rimarily to natural oFects given imme!iately through the
senses. EThe !eci!ing an! imme!iate in!ivi!uality of the "erson is relate!
to a nature confronting it4E $hich the "ersonality see#s to claim as Eits o$nE
?2. N )9@. -ut $hat is Enot at Grst imme!iateE can Eecome so through the
me!iation of s"irit4 $hich re!uces $hat is inner to imme!iacy an! e>ternalityE
?2. N *).@. &t is in this $ay that not only e>ternal4 sensile things4 ut
even such things as a "erson's mental an! s"iritual s#ills4 #no$le!ge4 an!
arts can e treate! as Ethings4E can e ought an! sol! or ma!e the oFect
of contractual agreements4 Fust as if they $ere e>ternal an! !irectly sensile
things. Hegel !oes insist that the category of EthingsE cannot inclu!e "ersons
themselves4 an! he re"eate!ly castigates .oman la$ for treating chil!ren as
the "ro"erty of their "arents ?2. NN ).4 *).4 '=(4.@. -ut eyon! this4 there
are a""arently no limits at all to $hat might in "rinci"le e regar!e! as a
EthingE an! ma!e the suFect of "ro"erty right.
Loc#e ases "ro"erty right on laor.5 Hegel ases it on something more
astractC on $ill. The act of $ill that ma#es something our "ro"erty is calle!
Eta#ing "ossessionE ?-esitDnahme@ ?2. N (*@A it can consist in a !irect4
o!ily gras"ing of the thing ?2. N ((@4 or ?more astractly@ in laoring on
9(
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
the thing an! forming it ?2. N (7@4 or ?most astractly of all@ in mar#ing the
thing as ours ?2. N (+@. To a""ro"riate something is to E"ut one's $ill into
itE in one of these three $ays. O$nershi" also gives me three !istinguishale
rights over the thingC ?'@ the right to use the thing ?2. N (9@4 ?5@ the right
to alienate it ; to transfer o$nershi" to another ?2. N 7(@4 an! ?)@ the right
to ma#e it the oFect of a contract $ith others y sti"ulating $ill $hich the
"arties share as their common $ill ?2. N =(@.
When the oFect is regar!e! un!er the as"ect of its use4 it can e com"are!
$ith other oFects that satisfy a similar nee!4 an! eIuate! $ith other oFectsA
therey it is assigne! a EvalueE ?2. N 7)@. & can thus e regar!e! as the
o$ner not merely of the "articular oFect4 ut also of its value4 $hich can e
recovere! in case of reache! contracts or other infringements on my right
?2. N ==@. Through the "rocess of astraction4 the right of "ro"erty thus
goes far eyon! the "hysical "ossession of e>ternal oFects4 an! involves a
com"le> set of claims that & may have on others4 an! that they may have on
me.)
5. 2ro"erty as the fun!amental right
Hegel treats all astract right as a right of "ro"erty4 even the right to our
o$n life an! o!y4 the right over our inner life an! conscience4 an! the right
to a social status as free "ersons. EOnly "ersonality gives a right to things4
an! hence "ersonal right is essentially a right to things ; things in the universal
sense as $hat is e>ternal to free!om4 an! even my life an! o!y elong
to thisE ?2. N *6.@. Hegel's theory involves $hat /. A. Cohen a"tly calls
Eself;o$nershi"EA it conceives of all one's "ersonal rights as conseIuences of
self;o$nershi".*
We might thin# that such a theory $oul! inevitaly overvalue our right to
e>ternal an! alienale things an! un!erestimate the human rights $e care
most aout. Hegel !isagrees. &n his Nuremerg lectures4 he !istinguishes
three !egrees in $hich violence can e !one to me as a "erson. The Grst an!
most serious is the Eroery of my free!om through im"risonment or slaveryE4
the secon! !egree consists in inFuries to my o!y an! lifeA an! the
thir!4 an! least serious4 consists in the theft of my e>ternal "ro"erty ?N2
5*);5**@. At this "oint4 Hegel is close to Loc#e4 $ho treats Elife4 lierty4
an! estateE as three !iMerent forms that my E"ro"ertyE can ta#e.(
& have a right to my life an! o!y only ecause they are "ara!igmatically
my "ro"erty4 things e>ternal to my free!om4 $hich & "ossess y "utting my
$ill into themC EAs a "erson4 & have my life an! o!y4 li#e other things4 only
insofar as it is my $illE ?2. N *=@. Hegel even argues that "eo"le !o not have
"ersonality or right until they actually ta#e "ossession of their "ersonality
through $illing it ?2. N (=4.@. E&n!ivi!uals an! "eo"les still have no "ersonality
insofar as they have not yet come to this "ure thin#ing an! #no$ing of
themselves Tas thin#ing raise! into sim"le inGnityUE ?2. N )(.@.
2eo"le ta#e "ossession of themselves through Ee!ucationE ?-il!ung@ ?2.
N *).4 (=4 .@. -il!ung is acIuisition of the ca"acity to suor!inate the "ar;
97
2E.0ON04 2.O2E.T14 LAW
ticular to the universal ?2h/ 3 *++A 2. N 56@4 or4 in other $or!s4 the ca"acity
nee!e! in or!er to enter into mutual recognition of others as "ersons ?E/ N
*)7@. We have ta#en "ossession of ourselves $hen $e have acIuire! the ca"acity
to thin# of ourselves as "ersons y regar!ing ourselves as memers of
a community of "ersons4 a Euniversal self;consciousness.E Hegel's !ialectic
of recognition thus s"eciGes the circumstances un!er $hich in!ivi!uals have
ta#en "ossession of themselves as "ersons.
Whatever his $or!s occasionally seem to im"ly4 Hegel !oes not hol! that
& acIuire the status of a "erson only after some contingent act of Eself;a""ro"riationE
on my "art. He insists that if & am a human eing4 then there is a
"resum"tion from the stan!"oint of others that & am a "erson4 even if & have
not yet actually e!ucate! myself to the stan!"oint $here & have ma!e myself
my o$n "ro"erty. E:or others & am essentially a free eing in my o!y4 Fust
as & "ossess it imme!iatelyE ?2.[ *+@. Hegel's vie$ is a""arently that in a
society that recogniDes human eings as "ersons4 $e ought to recogniDe the
right of chil!ren4 mental incom"etents4 an! others $ho have not actually
ta#en "ossession of their o!ies4 lives4 an! free status y e!ucation or
through !eterminate acts of self;a""ro"riation. 0trictly s"ea#ing4 it $oul!
seem4 such in!ivi!uals are not "ersons on Hegel's theoryA ut they shoul!
nevertheless e treate! as if they $ere.
Hegel faces a "rolem here4 $hich is common to all theories that ase
human rights on the "ossession of !eterminate human faculties that some
memers of the human s"ecies may either tem"orarily or "ermanently lac#.
3ant4 for instance4 regar!s human eings as en!s in themselves4 "ossessing
!ignity an! entitle! to res"ect4 only insofar as they are rational agents4 ca"ale
of setting en!s through reason an! thus of regar!ing their en!s as oFectively
goo! ?/ *5+;*59<*7;*=@.7 Hohn .a$ls treats as Emoral "ersonsE only
those $ho have a conce"tion of their o$n goo! an! a sense of Fustice.= No
more than Hegel's can such theories regar! all human eings literally as "ersons
$ith rights. Without some su""lement4 they cannot Fustify ascriing
the status of en!s in themselves to small chil!ren or the severely mentally
inca"acitate! ?or to fetuses@. Hegel's strategy in !efen!ing the rights of the
"rolematic in!ivi!uals seems to e to argue that $e have goo! an! "o$erful
reasons for treating certain in!ivi!uals as if they $ere "ersons $ith rights
even though strictly s"ea#ing they are not. &t is har! to see ho$ there coul!
e an alternative for any theory that ases human rights on em"irically oservale
"ro"erties of in!ivi!uals4 since all the natural can!i!ates for such
"ro"erties are such that some human eings !o not actually have them. :e$4
ho$ever4 seem $illing to face u" to the conseIuence that some human eings
!o not literally have rights4 an! that it reIuires some s"ecial argument to
sho$ that $e shoul! treat them as if they !i!.
). 0elf;a""ro"riation an! slavery
Hegel's theory is not su""ose! to have the conseIuence that $e are to grant
more rights to mature4 intelligent4 or e!ucate! in!ivi!uals than to others.
9= d
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
-ut Hegel !oes seem $illing to !istinguish et$een !iMerent cultures an!
e"ochs insofar as astract right is concerne!. As long as an entire culture
lac#s a$areness of human eings as "ersons4 there is a sense in $hich its
memers !o not yet have the right of "ersons. We have seen that even ancient
/ree# an! .oman culture lac#e! the a$areness that all are "ersons ?%/ 7';
75<(*@. :or Hegel4 there is a sense in $hich slavery4 $hich $e recogniDe to
e a fun!amental inFustice at all times an! "laces4 $as nevertheless Evali!E
in those cultures. To e sure4 for Hegel the struggle against slavery is al$ays
a struggle to Eachieve recognition of eternal human rightsE ?E/ N *))A@.
0laves al$ays have the Easolute rightE to free themselves ?2. N 77A@. -ut
some cultures are so far from having a !evelo"e! conce"tion of humanity
that even the slaves acce"t slavery as their natural con!ition. Where this is
so4 human eings still have not ta#en "ossession of themselves as "ersons4
an! $e Gn! ourselves Ein a $orl! $here an inFustice is still right. Here the
inFustice is vali! an! so Gn!s itself necessarily in "laceE ?2. N (=A@.'
0lavery ought not to e4 since accor!ing to the conce"t of the thing it is unFust in
an! for itself. This ought e>"resses something suFective4 $hich as such is not historical.
What is lac#ing to the ought is the sustantial ethical life of a state. 0lavery is
not "resent in rational states4 ut efore there are such states4 the true i!ea is "resent
in some as"ects only as an ought4 an! there slavery is still necessaryC it is a moment
of the transition to a higher stage. ?%/ 557<'+*@
Hegel's em"hasis on 0ittlich#eit ?Ecustomary moralityE@ as the asis of all
s"eciGc ethical !uties has sometimes le! his rea!ers to inter"ret him as a
cultural relativist aout morality ?see Cha"ter ''4 N 7@. The vie$s Fust cite!
aout slavery might e un!erstoo! in a similar veinA an! $e might rea! the
"assage Fust Iuote! as !enying that slavery $as al$ays $rong.+ That $oul!
e a serious misun!erstan!ing. We have alrea!y seen that Hegel grants slaves
an Easolute rightE to free themselves4 an! regar!s their struggle against slavery
as a struggle for Eeternal human rightsE ?2. N 77AA E/ N *))A@.
&n 2. N (=. Hegel tries to resolve the EantinomyE et$een this argument
that slavery is not $rong $here it is not contrary to custom4 an! the contrary
argument that slavery is al$ays unFust sim"ly ecause the human eing is
s"irit an! hence Ein itself free.E Though he grants that the latter vie$ is
su"erior in having a more correct starting "oint4 he still regar!s oth arguments
as Eone;si!e!.E The "roslavery argument ignores $hat human eings
essentially are4 ut the antislavery argument ignores the fact that in some
cultures4 the human essence is still not actual. 2eo"le come into their right
as free "ersons only in a rational state that recogniDes an! guarantees these
rights "ulicly. Where such a state !oes not yet e>ist4 Hegel says that the
oligation not to hol! slaves is a mere Eought.E Even $hen human eings
!o not un!erstan! themselves as "ersons4 there is still a moral ?moralisch@
im"erative not to treat them as slaves4 ut there is no oligation of astract
rightC ETo ma#e no one into a slave is not a !eman! of right ut a moral
!eman!. The claim of right refers only to free!om4 $here the latter sho$s
itself in e>istence4 an! so falls a$ay $here free!om !oes not sho$ itself in
9+
2E.0ON04 2.O2E.T14 LAW
e>istence. ; Only in the state is the recognition of free!om com"leteE
?%2.igC =*@. Even $here the institutions of the state !o not recogniDe all as
free "ersons4 morally insightful an! $ell;!is"ose! in!ivi!uals $ill treat them
as "ersons.
*. The right to "ersonality itself
Hegel regar!s "art of our right ; the right over our o$n o!y4 the right to
inner life an! conscience4 the right to free status an! "ro"erty o$nershi" ;
as s"ecial4 ecause it is the right over our o$n "ersonality itself ?2. NN *6.4
774 =6@. Hegel regar!s this right as oth EinalienaleE ?$e cannot give or
arter it a$ay@ an! Eim"rescri"tileE ?$e cannot lose it through !isuse or
the "assage of time@ ?2. N 77@. Hegel's "osition is that this is a "ro"erty right
conseIuent in some $ay on our having ta#en "ossession of our o$n "ersonality
through an act of #no$le!ge an! $ill. -ut $hen he comes to s"ea# of the
inalienaility an! im"rescri"tiility of the right to "ersonality itself4 he a""ears
to give Iuite a !iMerent account.
&n general4 astract right for Hegel is a claim $e have over something
Eimme!iately e>ternalE to our free volition4 or $hich can at least e treate!
as e>ternal4 as our "ro"erty. -ut of my status as a free "erson4 my rationality4
an! my moral an! religious feelings4 Hegel says that these are not e>ternal
to my free!om4 ut are rather Esustantial !eterminationsE that Econstitute
my o$nmost "erson an! the universal essence of my self;consciousnessEA
conseIuently4 the right to them is not a right over e>ternals ut over Ethe
act y $hich & ta#e "ossession of my "ersonalityE ?2. N 77@. The alienation
of such a right ?as in slavery4 su"erstition4 an! limits on "ro"erty o$nershi"@
is "ossile only through ignorance of the real nature of human "ersonality
?2. N 77.@. &n reality4 a right is inalienale an! im"rescri"tile ecause it
is im"ossile for me to alienate my "ersonality4 or to have it se"arate! from
me y the "assage of time or y anything else. There is a Econtra!ictionE in
su""ose!ly having given into the "ossession of others Emy ca"acity for right4
my ethical life4 my religiosity4 $hat & myself !i! not "ossess an! $hat4 as
soon as & "ossess it4 e>ists essentially only as mine an! not as something
e>ternalE ?2. N 77.@.
This is not a goo! argument. 0urely it is Iuite "ossile to conceive $ithout
contra!iction that & have artere! a$ay my "ersonality4 even artere! a$ay
my ca"acity to arter any more. This $oul! e the last transaction & $oul!
have ma!e ?at least until my "ersonality ha! someho$ een restore!@ ut
that !oes not sho$ that there is any contra!iction in su""osing that & have
ma!e itA the same is true of artering or giving a$ay my o$n o!y or conscience.
&n this argument Hegel seems to confuse $hat ?logically or naturally@
cannot e violate! $ith $hat ?y right@ must not e violate!.
&n a !iMerent conte>t4 Hegel argues that Ethe moral si!e an! moral comman!s4
$hich have to !o $ith the $ill in its o$nmost suFectivity an! "articularity4
cannot e the oFect of "ositive la$;givingE ?2. N 5')@. This might
e inter"rete! either of t$o $aysC
99
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
i. ,orality shoul! not e legislate!4 ecause it is $rong or ina""ro"riate for
"ositive la$s to tres"ass on $hat is suFective an! "articular.
5. ,orality cannot e legislate!4 ecause $hat is moral elongs to an as"ect
of the human "ersonality that is inaccessile to legal coercion.
&nter"rete! as ?5@4 the claim seems to e notoriously false4 an! in any case
gives the state no reason at all for refraining from the attem"t to legislate
morality ?as far as it is ale to@A it asserts only that the state's ca"acityO to
coerce "eo"le has certain ?"erha"s regrettale@ limitations. To e relevant to
!etermining the "ro"er limits of legislation4 $hat $e nee! to argue for is ?'@
rather than ?5@.-ut then the argument is incom"lete4 for $e nee! to e tol!
more aout $hich matters are too suFective an! "articular to e the oFect
of "ositive legislation4 an! also $hy it is $rong to legislate in matters that
are suFective an! "articular.
The same "rolem aMects Hegel's attem"t to argue for the inalienaility
of rights to "ersonality in 2. N 77. &f these rights are inalienale in the sense
that they literally cannot e alienate!4 then the claim that they are inalienale
sets no limits at all on $hat "eo"le may rightfully !o to !e"rive others of their
free status4 inner lierty4 an! o!ily integrity. &f some rights are su""ose! to
e inalienale in the sense that "eo"le must not !e"rive others of these rights
?even $hen they are ale to !o so@4 then $e nee! a further argument to sho$
$hy they must not.
Hegel $oul! have !one etter sim"ly to hol! consistently to his Eself;o$nershi"E
theory4 treating "ersonal right as a case ?even a "ara!igmatic case@
of the right of "ro"erty in e>ternals. What $e $ant "rotecte! y such rights
is al$ays our access to some e>ternal thing ?since this inclu!es our o$n
o!y@4 or our free!om from e>ternal interference $ith our o!ily movement
or "rivate thought "rocesses. Our right to free status is a right to !o things
an! to o$n thingsA our right to our o$n moral or religious conscience is a
right to form our thoughts an! feelings an! e>"ress them through $or!s an!
actions $ithout harassment or fear of re"risal. &t is in these e>ternals that
our rights over "ersonality can e violate!4 an! it is "recisely there that they
nee! "rotection. The inalienaility an! im"rescri"tiility of rights to "ersonality
can e !efen!e! y treating a "erson's life4 o!y4 conscience4 an! free
status as "ieces of "ro"erty so central an! essential to the e>ternal s"here
$hich !eGnes the "erson that treating rights to them as something alienale
or "rescri"tile $oul! amount to a failure to recogniDe the in!ivi!ual in Iuestion
as a "erson at all.
&n "assages other than 2. N 774 Hegel follo$s the line & have Fust recommen!e!.
He unhesitatingly reFects the Eso"histryE ?"ut for$ar! y August
von .eherg4 $hose criticisms of the :rench .evolution $ere the oFect of
:ichte's attac#s@ that one cannot violate a "erson's inner soul or free $ill y
attac#ing the o!y ?2. N *+.@.9 Later4 Hegel ases the invali!ity of contracts
!is"osing of inalienale goo!s on the .oman legal "rinci"le of laesio enormis
?e>cessive !amage@4 $hich Hegel seems to inter"ret as saying that a contract
is voi!ale if the values e>change! are so uneIual that one "arty $ill e
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2E.0ON04 2.O2E.T14 LAW
e>cessively harme! y the e>change. Hegel insists that to alienate "ersonality
itself is to incur a !amage that is not merely e>cessive4 ut inGnite ?2. N
==.@. This account is not merely !iMerent from 2. N 77 ut inconsistent
$ith itA N 77 says that no contract at all can e formulate! concerning inalienales4
$hereas N == says that ut for the "rinci"le of laesio enormis4 "eo"le
$ho arter a$ay their conscience or free status $oul! have succee!e! in
alienating their "ersonality.
&f the "ro"erty rights over our o$n "erson an! free status are regar!e! as
inalienale an! im"rescri"tile in this $ay4 then $e nee! have no fear that
these rights $ill e misconstrue! or un!ervalue! if $e treat them as a s"ecies
of "ro"erty right. &f it still stri#es us as someho$ ina""ro"riate to treat the
lives an! o!ies of human eings sim"ly as "ieces of "ro"erty ?even their
o$n "ro"erty@4 then that ought sim"ly to un!erscore the inherent limitations
of the s"here of astract right itself.
(. The limits of astract right
Hegel's theory moves from EastractE to Econcrete.E Astract right an! morality
are foun!e! on astract images of the human eing4 as E"ersonE an! as
moral EsuFect.E These images contain im"ortant truths aout human nature
$hich have een fully a""reciate! in "ractice only in the mo!ern state4 ut
they remain astractions4 $hich are integrate! into the concrete life of human
eings only in the s"here of ethical life4 $here they can e emo!ie! in
social institutions. Within ethical life4 too4 Hegel's theory moves from the
astract to$ar! the concrete4 from the more incom"lete an! !e"en!ent social
institutions of the family an! civil society to the state4 $hich is their foun!ation
an! also their en! ?2. NN '(=4 57'@.
Astract right an! morality reach concreteness y eing emo!ie! in s"eciGc
social institutions ; in oth cases4 in the s"here of civil society. The
"erson $ith astract right ecomes concrete li#e the self;intereste! economic
agent ?2. N '+5@ $hose right is !etermine! an! guarantee! through the system
of legal Fustice ?2. N 569@A morality Gn!s its "lace in the reJection of
in!ivi!uals on the !uties of their tra!e or "rofession4 an! the relation of their
mo!e of life an! their choices in it to their o$n ha""iness an! that of others
?2. N 56=@.
One conclusion $hich Hegel !ra$s from this structural feature of his theory
is that $hat is more EconcreteE has a #in! of "riority over $hat is more
Eastract.E &n a numer of conte>ts4 Hegel "uts for$ar! the thesis that something
that is more concrete has a Ehigher rightE than something that is more
astract4 $ith the eMect that the claims of the more astract s"here are to e
overri!en y the claims of the more concrete one. Es"ecially cons"icuous are
Hegel's assertions that the right of the state is EasoluteE in relation to all the
lo$er s"heres ?<QiBONN 5(+4 57';5754 )5)@ an! that the $orl! s"irit o"erating
in history ta#es "rece!ence even over the right of states4 so that its right is
Esu"remeE ?2. NN))4 )*6@.
0ince astract right is the Elo$estE an! most EastractE oFect of Hegel's
'6'
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
theory4 its claims ought therefore to e the most limite! an! the most ea'sily
overri!!en. -ut this seems to yiel! a "ara!o> if $e thin# that it is "recisely
the function of rights to serve as Etrum"sE that "rotect "ersons y overri!ing
claims of other #in!s4 es"ecially those !erive! from the "ulic goo! an! the
interests of the state.'6 :or then Hegel's thesis that the right of the state is
EhigherE than the astract rights of "ersons4 even EasoluteE in relation to
them4 a""ears to re!uce "eo"le's rights to a sham.
What !oes Hegel mean $hen he claims that the state's right ?for instance@
is EhigherE than astract rightB &n "art4 & thin#4 Hegel's "oint is an antire!uctionist
oneC EHigherE s"heres of right4 such as the family an! the state4 are
not to e analyDe! into lo$er ones4 such as "ro"erty an! contract4 as ha""ens
in 3ant's theory of the marriage relation ?.L N 5*4 2. N =( .@4 in the asolutist
notion that the state is the monarch's "ro"erty ?2. N 5(+.@4 or in contract
theories of the state ?2. NN =(.4 '66.4 5(+.@. Hoes4 for e>am"le4 $ants
to re!uce most social oligations to contractual ones4 an! to foun! all oligations
$hatever on a fe$ fun!amental Ela$s of natureE !ictating to each of us
the con!uct that is most a!vantageous.'' The claim that the right of the state
is EhigherE than astract right is in "art a !enial that it can e a!eIuately
accounte! for y a theory of that ty"e.
-ut !oesn't Hegel's claim commit him to say that the state's right overri!es
that of the lo$er s"heresB The general ans$er isC No.
:or Hegel4 the Ehigher rightE of the state ?or of other s"heres@ in com"arison
$ith astract right !oes not consist in the state's ?or any other s"here's@
having the "rerogative of ignoring "eo"le's astract right.' .ather4 it consists
in certain !eterminate $ays in $hich consi!erations of astract right
nee! to e a!Fuste! to consi!erations arising from those higher s"heres. Astract
right is4 for instance4 limite! y morality4 $hose "rimary en!4 Hegel
maintains4 is the "articular $elfare or ha""iness of in!ivi!uals. -ecause astract
right is su""ose! to astract from all "articular nee!s an! $ants4 there
is no astract right to the means of susistenceA the astract right to life is
no astract right to the means of susistenceA the astract right to life consists
only in the right not to e $rongfully !e"rive! of life through force ?2. N
*9.@. Hegel argues4 ho$ever4 that $hen $hat is at sta#e is a "erson's "articular
interests as a $hole4 in the form of "ersonal e>istence or life4 that life
!eserves to "revail against the "ro"erty rights of someone else.
&f4 for instance4 TlifeU can e "rolonge! through stealing a loaf of rea!4 then the
"ro"erty of a human eing is therey violate!4 ut it $oul! e unFust to consi!er this
action as a common theft. ?2. N '5=.@
There are moral "oints of vie$ that limit astract right4 e.g.4 if a !etor $oul! e
ruine! y "aying4 then the strict right of the cre!itor is limite! from this stan!"ointA
the manual laorer must e left his toolsA thus astract right recogniDes morality4 an!
strict4 formal right is not treate! as holy. To this e>tent4 moral right is more concrete
than astract strict right. ?%2.<=C *'@
:or such cases Hegel uses the tra!itional term Eright of necessityE ?Notrecht4
ius necessitatis@ ?2. N '5=@.
Hegel also hol!s that astract right is limite! an! mo!iGe! y the state.
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2E.0ON04 2.O2E.T14 LAW
Hegel elieves that strictly s"ea#ing4 all "ro"erty shoul! e "rivate "ro"ertyA
it shoul! elong to in!ivi!ual "ersons4 or at least to families4 since a family
constitutes a single Furi!ical "erson ?2. NN '79;'='@. -ut Ethe organism of
the stateE can reIuire that collectives ; "artnershi"s or limite! liaility cor"orations
; e treate! as "ersons an! "ro"erty o$ners ?2. N *7.4A@. We
sa$ in Cha"ter '4 N =4 that in time of $ar the state has the right to !eman!
that its memers ris# or sacriGce their "ro"erty an! even their lives for its
sa#e ?2. N )5*@. Hegel's statements on this "oint are ?an! are inten!e! to
e@ har! sayingsC
This is the Tstate'sU highest o$nmost moment ; its actual inGnity as the i!eality of
everything Gnite in it ; the si!e in $hich sustance4 as the asolute "o$er against
everything in!ivi!ual an! "articular4 against life4 "ro"erty an! their rights4 as against
the further circles4 rings their nullity to e>istence an! consciousness. ?2. N )5)@
This "o$er elongs to the state only in the most e>treme circumstances4
$hen its survival is at sta#e. Of course4 $e Americans are all too familiar
$ith the $ay Enational securityE is use! to Fustify en!less im"erial e>"ansion4
as $ell as $ith cases in $hich rulers a""eal to their Eemergency "o$ersE as
a "rete>t for any violation of their citiDens' rights $hich they !eem e>"e!ient.
-ut if $e rea! Hegel as countenancing such frau! an! ause4 then $e misinter"ret
his !octrine in a $ay that "recisely "arallels the inFustice "ractice! in
the auses themselves.
7. Astract right an! "ositive la$
vH2erha"s Hegel "rovi!es theclearest e>"lanation"f his claim4that the right of
tnXFstlggX n!X$XXhXrXmar#s that the state Ehas
Xmu>OGXX an! so "rivate rXTH2nXifXHty is
XXXXonsmuiion)l la$FTXX Tee actuaTcrteht
ofthe rX3TclXXonsTias to e !etermine! in relation to the entire legal
an! "olitical structure of the state. The content of those rights cannot e
!etermine! in astraction from a concrete social or!er4 ut must e conceive!
so as to harmoniDe $ith the ethical life of a "eo"le an! the constitution
of a state. This is a controversial "osition to the e>tent that it im"lies that
the content of in!ivi!ual right shoul! e a function of the state's "olitical
constitution. ,any $oul! surely $ant to insist that the constitution of a state
must a!Fust itself to the human rights of its citiDens4 rather than the other
$ay roun!.
-ut to see matters in this $ay is to "ut oneself in a vicious circle Hegel
$ants to avoi!. &t forces us to !eGne the structure of the state in terms of
rights $hose "recise content can e s"eciGe! ?Hegel thin#s@ only in light of
the state's structure. &t is true that a constitution that ignores the astract
right of "ersons is not the constitution of a mo!ern stateA ut it is eIually
true that a"art from a concrete social conte>t as !eGne! y a rational system
of la$4 it is not "ossile to say !eterminately $hat it means to res"ect the
right of "ersons. &n Hegel's vie$4 those $ho give la$s an! co!ify them have
'6)
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
the vocation of s"ecifying the content of right "recisely. Through "ositive
legislation4 right ?.echt@ is "osite! ?gesetDt@ as la$ ?/esetD@ ?2. N 5''@. The
la$ regulates "eo"le's ehavior. -ut its more im"ortant function is to give
an e>"licitly rational form to $hat is right. Only through "ositive la$ !o
"eo"le come to #no$ in concrete terms $hat their astract rights are. EOnly
$hen it ecomes la$ !oes $hat is right Grst receive not only the form of
its universality ut also its true !eterminacyEA the most im"ortant as"ect of
legislation is not the laying !o$n of rules ut the Ecognition of TtheirU content
in its !eterminate universality4E that is4 as rational an! right ?2. N 5' i.@..
Hegel's high o"inion of the calling of legal co!iGcation "uts him at o!!s
$ith his great -erlin colleague 3arl :rie!rich von 0avigny4 foun!er of the
historical school of /erman Furis"ru!ence. The historical school4 reacting
against the legal rationalism of the Enlightenment4 em"hasiDe! the value of
historical tra!ition in la$4 an! criticiDe! the attem"t to "rovi!e systematiDation
an! co!iGcation to legal tra!itions4 $hich they thought $oul! !istort the
tra!itional meaning of la$s y forcing them into the frame$or# of mo!ern4
artiGcial i!eas. Their vie$s e>hiit a lau!ale res"ect for the em"irical history
of la$4 ut also a .omantic reaction against ail attem"ts to "lace reason
ahea! of tra!ition in the or!ering of social an! "olitical life. The historical
school's hostility to legal co!iGcation $as also an e>"ression of /erman nationalist
sentiments. The "rinci"al mo!el of co!iGe! la$ $as of course the
Na"oleonic Co!eA many /ermans in Hegel's !ay ?inclu!ing those $ho $ere
at o""osite "oles of the "olitical s"ectrum on most other issues@ resente! the
im"osition of :rench institutions on their "olitical life4 an! the historical
Furists vie$e! attem"ts to co!ify /erman la$ in that light.
Hegel's attitu!e to$ar! legal co!iGcation is very !iMerentC
To !eny to an e!ucate! nation or its "rofessional Furists the ca"acity to frame a
legal co!e $oul! e the greatest insult that coul! e oMere! to a nation or to that
"rofession. :or it cannot e a matter of ma#ing a system of ne$ la$s as regar!s
their content4 ut rather of cogniDing the "resent content of la$s in its !eterminate
universality4 i.e.4 gras"ing it thin#inglyy $ith a vie$ to its a""lication to the "articular.
?2JN5&l.@
Hegel !oes not !es"ise national tra!itions4 ut he !oes suor!inate their
claims to those of universal reason. He sees a legal co!e as the o""ortunity
to ring national tra!ition into harmony $ith reason. &ts essence lies in e>"licating
the rational core in the "ro!ucts of a nation's history4 an! at the same
time ringing tra!ition efore the ar of reason an! ma#ing it "rove its
$orth.
&f it is the function of "ositive la$ to give !eterminate content to astract
right4 Hegel also sees the authority of such la$s as resting on their successful
"erformance of their function. &n general4 Hegel conceives of Enatural rightE
?$hat is Ein itself rightE@ not as something to e contraste! $ith "ositive la$4
ut rather something to e ma!e !eterminate y it ?2. N ).@. &t can ha""en
that $hat is "osite! as the la$ can !iMer from $hat is Eright in itselfEA in
such a case4 the la$ lac#s in!ingness or oligatoriness ?%erin!lich#eit@. E&n
'6*
2E.0ON04 2.O2E.T14 LAW
the i!entity of eing in itself an! eing "osite! ?/esetDtseins@4 only $hat is
la$ ?/esetD@ has oligatoriness as rightE ?2. N 5'5@. Hegel hol!s that to e
Eoligatory as right4E a comman! or "rece"t must e oth E"osite!E an!
Eright in itself.E Thus $hat is right in itself is not oligatory as right unless
it has een lai! !o$n in "ositive la$A eIually4 a "ositive la$ is not in!ing
as right unless it is also right in itself. Hegel em"hasiDes that "ositive la$s
are sometimes at serious variance $ith $hat is right in itself ?2. NN ).4
'+6A4 5'5@. Those la$s are not in!ing on us as right.
&t seems to e commonly thought that Hegel4 $ith his haitual reverence
for the state an! the la$4 must naturally ta#e a very har! line concerning our
oligation to oey the la$. As one recent $riter "uts it4 Hegel %vie$s Eseem
tolea! in the uncongenial !irection4 of asolute ohc!icaoGF Asf$e have Fust
seenTT0o$everX Hege2s "osltionin fact has much in common $ith that stran!
of the natural la$ tra!ition $hich says that Ean unFust la$ is no la$.E &t is
true that Hegel never actually a!vocates that $e !isoey unFust la$s. As far
as & #no$4 hg is com"letely silent on the Iuestion of $hat $e shoul! !o $hen
$e are confronte) $ith an unFust la$$hich the authorities e>"ect us to oey.
&t $oul! e consistent $ith his vie$s to a!o"t a "olicy of asoluX oe!ience
ev-fX'TnXusrilWsA'on the groun! fnat y an!Targe the state an! theQ legal
sy0tent'merattonal an! N6 $e shoul! avoi! !omX
to uXErnyne ttiem. ?Of course4 this argument ten!s to lose its force in "ro;F
"ortion to the numer an! gravity of the inFustices $ith $hich $e are !eal;'
ing.@ 0uch a "olicy4 ho$ever4 is neither articulate! y Hegel nor reIuire!
y any of his vie$s. On the other han!4 it is "ositively inconsistent $ith
Hegel's e>"licit account of legal oligation to maintain that $e are oligate!
y right to oey unFust la$s. &n this res"ect4 Hegel's vie$ re"resents a signiGcant
!e"arture from tra!itional Lutheran !octrines of asolute oe!ience to
the "o$ers that e4 $hich $ere staunchly !efen!e! y 3ant ?.L )'+;)5)<
+*;++@.
At this "oint4 $e may still $on!er $hether Hegel has avoi!e! the vicious
circle after all. Ho$ can Hegel thin# that there might e a !iMerence et$een
"ositive la$ an! $hat is Ein itself rightE if he also thin#s that astract right
acIuires a !eterminate content only through "ositive la$B 2art of the ans$er
is that he $oul! regar! "ositive la$s as contrary to right if they sanctione!
"lain violations of astract right4 if they fora!e in!ivi!uals to hol! "ro"erty4
or reIuire! in!ivi!uals to "artici"ate in religious oservances contrary to
their conscience4 or regulate! a system of slavehol!ing4 $hich is fun!amentally
contrary to $hat is right in itself ?%2. *C *(+@. ,ore generally4 Hegel%
"osition seems to e that the conce"tion of in!ivi!uals as "ersons "rovi!es
mo!ern society $ith an ethical s"irit4 $ith $hich the letter of "ositive la$
can either harmoniDe or clash ?%2.'9C '=(@. Oviously $hat some "eo"le
$ant at this "oint is something more than an Eethical s"iritE $ith $hich to
com"are the letter of the la$A they $ant a rational !ecision "roce!ure that
settles !is"utes aout $hich la$s are Fust an! unFust4 an! "rovi!es us $ith
a systematic FustiGcation for Fu!gments aout this in "articular cases. &t
seems to e Hegel's "osition4 ho$ever4 that they $on't get $hat they $antA
'6(
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
Iuestions of this #in! must e consi!ere! in their "articular historical an!
social conte>t4 an! it is com"etent legislators an! Furists $ho are most li#ely
to give $ise an! reasone! ans$ers to them. 0uch ans$ers can al$ays e suFecte!
to rational scrutiny4 an! sometimes $e can see them to e the $rong
ans$ersA ut no general theory $ill hel" us to !o any etter.
=. 2rivate "ro"erty
H:or HegelXFheFX lfei0SE
FngntToT"ersons is "rivate "ro"erty. The fun!amental comman!ment of astractE
right ; E7e a "ersonE ; im"oses on us an oligation to o$n "ro"erty
?E/ N *+7@. -ut a "erson4 Hegel tells us4 is an in!ivi!ual $ill4 an! this ma#es
"rivate "ro"erty the fun!amental form of o$nershi" ?2. N *7@. EThe i!ea
of the 2latonic state4E he says4 Econtains as a universal "rinci"le the inFustice
against "ersons that they are ineligile for "rivate "ro"ertyE ?2. N *7.@.'*
Hegel himself intro!uces one signiGcant restriction on "rivate "ro"erty
$ith his !octrine that the "artners in a marriage are not in!ivi!ual "ersons
ut together constitute a single "erson ?2. NN4 '(+4 '7+@. He thin#s that the
resources of a nuclear family are hel! y its memers in common. ENo memer
of a family has "articular "ro"erty4 ut each has a right in $hat is commonE
?2. N '='@. The normal a!ministrator of this common "ro"erty is the
husan! an! father4 ut accor!ing to Hegel he is no more a "rivate "ro"rietor
in his o$n right than anyone else in the family ?2. N '=' @.'( One conseIuence
Hegel !ra$s from this is that there are limits on a father's right to
!is"ose of the family "ro"erty at his !eath. Thus Hegel o""oses oth "rimogeniture
an! the e>clusion of !aughters from inheritance ?2. N '+6.@A he
hol!s that the father has no right to eIueath "ro"erty outsi!e the nuclear
family ?2. N '=9.@.
We $ill see later ?Cha"ter '*4 N =@ that Hegel is sensitive to the $ays in
$hich a mar#et economy foun!e! on the right of "rivate "ro"erty may sometimes
lea! to irrational an! inhuman results ?2. NN 5*';5**A H<B < C )5'<5*=@.
He regar!s the ga"s et$een rich an! "oor4 e!ucate! an! une!ucate!4 not
merely as misfortunes4 ut as $rongs ?2. NN 5*'4 5**A@. Hegel charges the
state $ith the res"onsiility of !ealing $ith these "rolems ?2. N 5*5@4 ut
he is !o$nright "essimistic aout the "ros"ects of a solution to them ?2. N
5*(..@.
Hegel treats these issues in the conte>t of his i!ea that astract right must
accommo!ate itself to the higher right of more concrete s"heres4 such as civil
society an! the state. He sees it as a "rolem of a!Fusting the astract strict
right of "rivate "ro"erty to more concrete consi!erations arising out of "eo"le's
"articular nee!s4 from $hich $e must astract $hen $e ta#e the stan!"oint
of "ro"erty rights. :rom the stan!"oint of right itself4 he thin#s4 the
formal eIuality of "ersons has no im"lications for the !iMerent amounts of
"ro"erty that in!ivi!ual "ersons may o$n ?2. N *9.@.
-ecause he thin#s $e can resort to consi!erations arising out of the s"heres
of morality an! ethical life to !eal $ith such "rolems4 Hegel recogniDes
'67
2E.0ON04 2.O2E.T14 LAW
nothing li#e the so;calle! Loc#ean "roviso that one "erson can a""ro"riate
things from the common stoc# of nature only as long as Ethere is enough an!
as goo! left in common for others.E'7 Wealth an! "overty are one thing4 the
rights of "ersons are another. Puestions aout the !istriution of "ro"erty
are relevant in the conte>t of morality an! civil society4 ut irrelevant in
the s"here of astract right. EThat all human eings shoul! have enough
susistence for their nee!s is "artly a moral. . . $ish4 ut "artly4 susistence
is something other than "ossession4 an! elongs to another s"here4 that of
civil societyE ?2. N *9.@.
&t is not clear that Hegel can remain consistent in hol!ing to the centrality of
"rivate "ro"erty $ithin his o$n conce"tion of astract rights4 $hile ignoring
?or at any rate astracting from@ the actual eMects of the institution of "rivate
"ro"erty. The fun!amental i!ea in astract right is that every "erson4 as an
astractly free $ill4 has a claim on an e>ternal s"here in $hich to e>ercise an!
actualiDe this astract free!om ?2. N *'@. 2rivate "ro"erty is su""ose! to "rovi!e
this s"here4 an! conseIuent to this thought4 Hegel !oes ma#e one !istriutive
"roviso concerning "rivate "ro"ertyC The eIuality of "ersons !oes reIuire
that each of them shoul! o$n some "ro"erty ?2. N *9A@.
-ut it is !iLcult to see ho$ Hegel's theory coul! "rovi!e any reason for
insisting that each "erson must o$n some "ro"erty4 that is not also a reason
for insisting that each "erson o$n enough "ro"erty ?an! the right sort of
"ro"erty@ to guarantee an e>ternal s"here of free!om suLcient to fulGll the
in!ivi!ual's free "ersonality. &t seems arguale that & have not een "rovi!e!
$ith such a s"here if & o$n no more ?for instance@ than a fe$ items of clothing
an! the su""ly of foo! that & must consume each !ay if & am to stay
alive. This is es"ecially true if others' o$nershi" over lan! an! other means
of "ro!uction "uts me in a "osition $here & must virtually enslave myself to
them if & am to acIuire even the miserale share of "ro"erty & have. To
!efen! the centrality of the institution of "rivate "ro"erty in actualiDing the
astract rights of "ersons4 Hegel nee!s to sho$ that in its actual conseIuences
this institution is com"atile $ith a social or!er in $hich the status
of a free "erson is not a mere sham for many memers of society.
Hegel $oul! have a har! time sho$ing this. The social history of mo!ern
ca"italism4 $ith its systematic im"overishment4 e>"loitation4 an! !ehumaniDation
of $or#ing classes an! "oorer nations4 strongly suggests that the institution
of "rivate "ro"erty4 far from "rovi!ing for the actualiDation of the
"ersonality of all4 is fun!amentally incom"atile $ith a social or!er in $hich
all in!ivi!uals recogniDe each other as free "ersons. ,oreover4 Hegel himself
seems at certain "oints to e a$are of this ?see Cha"ter '*4 NN 9;'6@. &f in
its actual social conseIuences the institution of "rivate "ro"erty !estroys the
s"here of "ersonal free!om for some as it "rovi!es that s"here for others4
then this "oses the "rolem of !evising alternative social arrangements that
!o guarantee to all in!ivi!uals an a!eIuate e>ternal s"here for the e>ercise
of astract free!om or aritrary choice. What is fun!amental to Hegel's conce"tion
of astract right is the insistence that social arrangements shoul!
ma#e am"le "rovision for this si!e of human self;actualiDation.
'6=
7
2unishment
i. .etriutivism
2unishment is the social "ractice of inJicting evil ?"ain or harm@ as a res"onse
to $rong!oing. To e "unishe! is to have an evil inJicte! on you y
a !uly constitute! authority sim"ly ecause it is an evil an! ecause that
authority ostensily elieves you have !one something $rong. &t is still "unishment
; unFust "unishment ; if the authority's elief is false4 or even
shamme!. &t is not "unishment at all to inJict evil on a "erson $ho is not
even allege! to have !one $rong. Nor !o you "unish a "erson $hen your
reason for inJicting the evil is that it is a means to or a y;"ro!uct of some
goo! ?as in a "ainful me!ical treatment or annoying e!ucational "rocess@.
1ou have to choose it as an evil4 an! your reason for inJicting it has to e
that the "erson has su""ose!ly !one something $rong.
&n that sense4 the very conce"tion of "unishment is retriutive. -orro$ing
.a$ls's terminology4 $e coul! say that it is essential to "unishment as an
institution that "articular acts of "unishment shoul! e FustiGe! y reference
to the general "ractice of "unishmentA an! the general "ractice is conceive!
in an essentially retriutive $ay.'
&t is an altogether !iMerent issue ho$ the "ractice itself is to e FustiGe!.
Here "eo"le often a""eal to goo! conseIuences of various #in!sC to the su""ose!ly
eneGcial eMects of "unishment on $rong!oers themselves4 or its
!eterrent eMect on "eo"le generally4 or to the "art "unishment might "lay in
moral e!ucation4 or to the $ay in $hich "unishing $rong!oers gives satisfaction
to the "ulic's vengeful feelings to$ar! them. Those $ho oMer such
conseIuentialist FustiGcations for the "ractice of "unishment shoul! not e
calle! Eretriutivists4E even if they ac#no$le!ge that "unishment itself is an
inherently retriutive "ractice in the sense !escrie! in the last t$o "aragra"hs.
5 True retriutivists are those $ho hol! a !istinctive vie$ aout ho$
the "ractice of "unishment is to e FustiGe!. They thin# that the "ractice
is suLciently FustiGe! merely y the fact that Fustice !eman!s that some
"ro"ortionate evil shoul! e visite! on a "erson guilty of $rong!oing. .etriutivists
!o not necessarily !eny that "unishment has goo! conseIuences4 ut
they !o !eny that $e nee! to a""eal to them in Fustifying the "ractice of
"unishment. .ather4 they say that the essential "oint in the FustiGcation of
"unishment is that it is inherently Fust to inJict some evil on those $ho have
!one $rong.
'6+
2UN&0H,ENT
Hegel is a genuine retriutivist. He reFects as Esu"erGcialE all theories that
try to Fustify "unishment y the Egoo!E $hich is su""ose! to come of it. To
him4 $hat matters is Ethat crime is to e cancele!4 not as the "ro!uction
of an evil4 ut as the violation of the right as rightEA "unishment4 as the
EcancellationE ?Aufheung@ or EannulmentE ?%ernichtung@ of crime is FustiGe!
merely ecause it is Ein an! for itself FustE ?2. N 99.@.) This "osition
agrees $ith 3ant4 $hose commitment to retriutivism is clear4 ut $hose
!efense of it remains at est emryonic ?.L ))';))=<99;'6=@. EIually4 it is
a res"onse to :ichte's scornful reFection of retriutivism as a nonsensical theory
ase! on an Einscrutale categorical im"erativeE ?/N. 5+)<)=5@.*
XHege2s theory of "unishment elongs to the s"here of astract right ecause
"unishment is a res"onse to crime as a E$rongE or EinFusticeE ?Unrecht@4
$hich is a violation of astract right ?2. N +'@. A crime is an act of
EcoercionEA it violates the free $ill in its e>ternal e>istence4 as in the o!y or
"ro"erty of a "erson ?2. N 95@. :urther4 crime violates the free $ill #no$ingly
an! intentionallyA it Eviolates the right as rightE ?2. N 9(@. 0uch a
violation4 Hegel !eclares4 has a E"ositive4 e>ternal e>istence4 ut $ithin itself
it is null ?nichtig@. The manifestation of its nullity is the annulment of that
violation4 $hich also ste"s into e>istence ; the actuality of rightE ?2. N 9=@.
Crime4 Enull $ithin itself4E thus calls forth its o$n EannulmentE in the form
of EFusticeE ?/erechtig#eit@4 an e>ternal act of EretriutionE $hich Eviolates
the violationE ?2. N '6'@.
When an act of Fust retriution is carrie! out y a "rivate "erson4 it is an
act of Erevenge.E .evenge is EFust in its content4E ut Ein formE only a ne$
violation of right ?2. N '65@. :rom the stan!"oint of the $rong!oer $ho
suMers the Fust revenge4 the "rivate act of vengeance is Fust. -ut if the
avenger is only a "rivate "erson4 from the avenger's stan!"oint the act of
vengeance is merely a ne$ crime4 $hich calls for its o$n annulment. Hence
Hegel argues that revenge lea!s naturally to an en!less series of $rongs4 "er"etuating
itself from generation to generation ?2. N '65@. :inal Fustice can
e !one only $hen crime is annulle! not y a "rivate $ill ut y the universal
$ill4 the "ulic authority of the state4 in the form of the court of Fustice ?2.
NN 5'9;556@. Only this authoritative annulment of crime is E"unishmentE
strictly so;calle! ?2. N '6)@.
The retriutivist intent of Hege2s theory is clear enough4 ut its central
claims arI shrou!e! in oscure meta"hors. What !oes it mean to say that a
crime is Enull $ithin itselfEB Ho$ !oes this EnullityE call for "unishment as
its "ro"er EmanifestationEB
Even efore $e try to ans$er these Iuestions4 ho$ever4 $e can a""reciate
one !istinctive feature of Hege2s theory of "unishment. Hust as Hegel conceives
of crime as the intentional violation of the right4 so he conceives of
"unishment ?or the EannulmentE of crime@ as Ethe violation of a violation.E
The "unishment of a criminal ta#es the form of inJicting a !istinctive #in!
of evil. To "unish a criminal is to !o something that $oul! normally count
as the violation of the criminal's o$n right ; ty"ically4 the right to "ro"erty4
'69
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
or lierty4 or life. To Fustify "unishment is to sho$ ho$ the state can e
FustiGe! in !oing things to criminals $hich4 ut for their commission of
crimes4 no one coul! ever have the right to !o to them.
5. 2unishment as the restoration of right
One inter"retation of Hegel's theory egins $ith Hegel's assertion that crime
must e "unishe! ecause other$ise the crime $oul! e Evali!EA hence "unishment
Erestores the rightE ?2. N 99@< This theme in Hegel's !efense of
"unishment is clearly relate! to the i!ea ?!efen!e! y Hoel :einerg@ that
one im"ortant function of "unishment is sim"ly to e>"ress society's strong
con!emnation of criminal acts.7 -y violating the right of another4 the criminal
is in eMect asserting that this right has no vali!ity. -y "unishing the
criminal4 the state eMectively contra!icts this assertion4 !emonstrating in
"ractical terms that "eo"le !o have rights4 that their rights count for something.
Hegel Gn!s in this theme some aLnity to his o$n meta"hysics4 in $hich
something !is"lays true actuality $hen it is ca"ale of en!uring otherness
an! contra!iction4 an! returning to itself even from its o$n o""osite. &f
crime4 $rong!oing4 or inFustice ?Unrecht@ is the negation of right ?.echt@4
"unishment is the actuality of rightA it is ?as the "artici"ial form of the noun
might suggest@ E$rong righte!4E or EFusticeE ?/erechtig#eit@. 2unishment is
Ethe negation of the negation. Actual right is the canceling of the violation
Tof rightU4 $hich thus sho$s its vali!ity an! "reserves itself as a necessary4
me!iate! e>istenceE ?2. N 9=A@. 2unishment asserts the actuality of the right
even in the face of $rong or inFusticeA li#e s"irit itself4 right "roves its actuality
y vin!icating itself even in its o$n o""osite.
We run into some "rolems if $e try to use this theme in inter"reting
Hegel's theory of "unishment. One is that it is not clear ho$ such an inter"retation
$ill save the retriutivist intent of the theory. The righting of
$rong an! the !oing of Fustice4 of course4 !o loo# li#e "ara!igmatically retriutivist
reasons for "unishing. -ut the state's intention to reassert the vali!ity
of right in the face of $rong loo#s li#e an intention not to !o Fustice as such4
ut to "romote a goo! en!4 namely the "ulic recognition of the vali!ity of
right. &f there is room for !out aout this4 that is largely ecause the "recise
nature of the en! is rather mysterious. Why is it im"ortant for the state to
assert the vali!ity of right4 to e>"ress its !isa""roval of crimeB &s there any
reason for it to !o this a"art from its !evotion to such conseIuentialist en!s
as "reventing future crimes an! reassuring "eo"le that their rights are eing
"rotecte!B
A !ee"er "rolem $ith Hegel's theory on this inter"retation is that it
seems to "resu""ose a FustiGcation of "unishment rather than to su""ly one.
Whatever the state's reasons for e>"ressing its !isa""roval of crime4 it still
remains to e sho$n $hy the state is FustiGe! in ma#ing such assertions in
the $ay "unishment !oes4 at the e>"ense of the "erson "unishe!.
no
2UN&0H,ENT
Davi! Coo"er attem"ts to Gll these ga"s y attriuting to Hegel the follo$ing
Econce"tual thesisEC
CTC &t is a conce"tual truth that the violation of a "erson's right calls forth
"unishment as its "ro"er res"onse.
& !o not actually have rights4 Coo"er argues4 unless society is "re"are! to
"unish the violation of my rightsA hence Ethe FustiGcation of "unishment is
the same as the FustiGcation of the rights the crimes violate.E= He thin#s the
criminal act involves the assertion that the victim of the crime has no rights.
This assertion is EnullE in the sense that it is false4 since the victim !oes have
rights4 an! this gets manifeste! $hen the criminal is "unishe!.+
On Coo"er's inter"retation4 Hegel's FustiGcation of "unishment turns on
CT. Unfortunately4 $e loo# in vain for any e>"licit statements of CT in
Hegel's $ritings. Even $orse4 on its o$n CT is far from com"elling. &t may
e true ?even tautologous@ that the e>istence of ?socially guarantee!@ rights
reIuires that society e "re"are! to "rotect them in some $ay. -ut $hy must
this "rotection ta#e the s"eciGc form of "unishing their violationB 0u""ose
there $ere a society in $hich the authorities have !evise! fairly eMective $ays
of "rotecting ?$hat $e $oul! other$ise call@ "eo"le's rights4 ut $ithout the
use of "unishment ; as y ma#ing it !iLcult to violate rights4 or y e!ucating
"eo"le so that violations of right $ill not e common. 0u""ose that !es"ite
these "recautions "eo"le's rights are sometimes violate! in this society
?though less often4 let us say4 than "eo"le's rights are violate! in our society@A
still4 their violation is never "unishe!. Coo"er must claim4 "urely on conce"tual
groun!s4 that the "eo"le in that society have no rights at all4 that if $e
s"ea# of rights in that society4 $e must e using some ne$ or o!! conce"t
of right. & Gn! such claims e>tremely !uious.
Even if CT $ere correct4 ho$ever4 that $oul! not "rovi!e any FustiGcation
for the "ractice of "unishment. &t $oul! instea! "lace the ur!en of argument
on sustantiating the claim that "eo"le have ?or ought to have@ rights
?in the sense in $hich "eo"le's having rights reIuires that the violation of
their rights $ill e "unishe!@. To ma#e goo! that claim4 $e $oul! have to
Fustify the institution of "unishment ; from scratch. &t is one thing to say
that "eo"le are entitle! to free!om of s"eech or "ro"rietorshi" over "arts of
the Sarth4 even that they are entitle! to having their free!om or "ro"erty
"rotecte! y the state. &t is another thing to say that they are entitle! to have
these things "rotecte! in a certain $ay4 y the state's inJicting evil on those
$ho interfere $ith free!om or "ro"erty. &f Coo"er's inter"retation is correct4
Hegel's theory of astract right ought to concentrate on !efen!ing this last
claim.
Hegel "rocee!s in no such $ay. &n the theory of astract right !evelo"e!
in 2. NN )*;+64 he regar!s astract right as conferring on "ersons oth a
"ermission an! a $arrant to e>ercise aritrary choice $ithin a limite! s"here
?2. NN )+4 *'@. Only later !oes he focus attention on the claim that others
shoul! res"ect this s"here ?cf. 2. N *9.@4 an! no$here efore 2. N +' !oes
i n
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
he intimate $hat might ha""en if they !o not res"ect it. Hegel's "roce!ure
strongly suggests that either his !efense of "unishment rests on a fun!amental
confusion or else CT "lays no role in his thin#ing aout "unishment.
Even if an argument coul! e given for CT4 there is no reason to thin#
that the resulting FustiGcation for "unishment $oul! e retriutivist. Once
$e as# $hy CT's conce"t of right ought to e instantiate!4 it is o"en to
conseIuentialists to cite the eneGts to e gaine! y granting "eo"le such
rights an! "unishing their violation. &f Hegel is correctly inter"rete! as resting
his FustiGcation of "unishment on CT4 then he is confuse! if he thin#s
this len!s any su""ort to his "reference for retriutivism. &n the asence of
any e>"licit te>tual $arrant for it4 $e shoul! not ascrie to Hegel such a
confuse! an! un!erargue! "osition.
). The nullity of the criminal $ill
Central to Hegel's theory of "unishment is the afing claim that the criminal
act is Enull $ithin itself.E Hegel's hints at the meaning of this claim "oint
in a !isturing variety of !irections.
'. As $e have Fust seen4 Coo"er says that the nullity of the criminal $ill
consists in the falsity of its im"lie! assertion that the victim has no rights.
Hegel no$here !irectly su""orts this inter"retationA ut he !oes suggest
that the criminal $ill is EnullE ecause it attem"ts to !o $hat cannot e
!one. 0ome te>ts say that the criminal $ill is null ecause it tries to coerce
the free $ill4 $hich4 Iua free4 cannot e coerce! ?%2.iFC 79C cf. 2. N
9'@. Others say that it is null ecause it tries to violate the universal $ill
?the E$ill in itselfE@ $hich4 having no e>ternal e>istence as such4 is4 in
"rinci"le4 inviolale ?2. N 99@. These suggestions are oth un"romising.
Even grante! ?$hat is far from evi!ent@ that these things are im"ossile
an! that the criminal $ill tries to !o them4 the main Iuestion still remainsC
Why shoul! anyone e "unishe! for attem"ting the im"ossileB
5. Hegel sometimes im"lies that the criminal act is EnullE ecause it is inherently
self;!estructive. Thus Hegel says that coercion is Ein its very conce"tion
!irectly self;!estructive ecause it is an e>"ression of a $ill that
annuls the e>"ression of !eterminate e>istence of a $illE ?2. N 95@. This
is nothing ut an im"u!ent so"histry. When & coerce you or violate your
right4 my $ill annuls the e>"ression or !eterminate e>istence of your $illA
there is nothing self;!estructive in that.
). ENullityE is also associate! $ith Hegel's notion that inFustice or $rong is
a #in! of Esho$E ?0chein@4 not in the usual sense of an illusion ?something
that only seems to e>ist@ ut in the technical Hegelian sense of an act
$hose outer e>istence is someho$ at o!!s $ith its inner nature or conce"t.
9 2unishment manifests the nullity of the criminal act y reasserting
the right4 thus revealing the truth of this sho$ ?2. N +5@. 0uch an account
raises many more Iuestions than it ans$ers. 2erha"s a crime is in some
sense a free act $hose outer e>istence is at o!!s $ith its essence. -ut ho$
''5
2UN&0H,ENT
is the ina!eIuacy of the act manifeste! y the state's inJicting evil on the
agentB Even if it !oes "rovi!e such a manifestation4 ho$ !oes that fact
Fustify the inJicting of evilB
*. 0ometimes Hegel s"ea#s of the EnullityE not of the criminal act4 ut of
the criminal's $ill &t4 too4 is calle! Eself;!estructiveE or even Eself;contra!ictoryE
?2. N 95@. EThe right of free!om in res"ect of coercion is that4
as the contra!ictory of itself4 it !estroys itself. The manifestation of this
is that coercion is cancele! through coercionE ?%2.igC +(@. These remar#s
!o at last suggest a $ay in $hich the EnullityE of the criminal $ill might
call forth "unishment as its Emanifestation.E &f the criminal's $ill can e
seen as someho$ $illing its o$n frustration4 then "unishment might e
seen as the carrying out of this volition4 an! thus manifesting the latent
self;contra!iction. &n that case4 the criminal's $ill is EnullE in the sense
that4 $hen it $ills the violation of the victim's right4 it also $ills the violation
of its o$n right4 an! this violation is carrie! out $hen the criminal is
"unishe!.
&f this is $hat Hegel means y the EnullityE of crime4 then it !ovetails
$ith another line of thin#ing aout the criminal act on $hich Hegel lays
consi!erale stress. Hegel insists that $hen & have committe! a crime4 "unishment
is my Eright4E ecause it is something that & myself have $ille!. Not
only is "unishment Ein itself Fust4E he says4 ut Eit is also a right "osite! in
the criminal himself4 in his e>isting $ill4 in his action. :or it lies in his action4
as rational4 that something universal is set u"4 a la$ that he has recogniDe!
for himself an! un!er $hich he thus may e susume! as un!er his o$n
rightE ?2. N '66@.
,ore s"eciGcally4 Hegel claims that my act of violating another's right sets
u" the la$4 $hich is vali! for meQ that my o$n right may e violate!C EThe
criminal has set u" a universal la$C '&t is right to violate free!om' E ?%2.iyC
=6A cf. %2.FC )'7@. ,oreover4 the s"eciGc la$ estalishe! y the criminal
corres"on!s to the s"eciGc crime committe!4 the s"eciGc right violate!C
When he #ills4 he !eclares as a universal la$ that #illing is allo$e!. ?%2.iy. =6@
As a mur!erer he sets u" the la$ that life is not to e res"ecte!A he e>"resses this
universal in his !ee!A ut therey he "ronounces his o$n !eath sentence. ?%2.Ft
)l+&Qn sofar as the agent is a rational eing4 it lies in his action that it is something
universal. [&f you steal from another4 then you steal from yourselfc &f you #ill someone4
then you #ill everyo!y4 an! even yourselfc The action is a la$ that you set u" an!
that through your action you have recogniDe! in an! for yourself. ?g<O 5**@'6
When & commit a crime4 !o & therey $ill that the same crime shoul! e
committe! against meB Clearly mur!erers !o not ty"ically !esire to e #ille!4
nor thieves to e stolen from. 0ometimes4 ho$ever4 $e ascrie volition to
"eo"le not on the asis of $hat they !esire4 ut on the asis of their e>"ressions
of intent ?in $or! or action@. The clearest case is "roaly a contractual
agreement. 0u""ose & agree to shovel your $al# ne>t $inter if you mo$ my
la$n this summer. When $inter comes an! & am !ue to "erform my "art of
'')
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
the argain4 it can e sai! on the asis of this agreement that & shovel your
$al# in accor!ance $ith my o$n $ill. This is true even if the shoveling is
something & !o not $ant to !o4 even if it is something & hate !oing an! $ish
that & ha! never agree! to !o.
Hegel e>"licitly reFects Cesare -eccaria's contractarian theory of "unishment
?2. N '66.@. -ut he !oes acce"t -eccaria's claim that "unishment is
ase! on the criminal's consent to e "unishe!C EWhat -eccaria !eman!s4
that a man must give his consent to e "unishe!4 is Iuite rightA ut the
criminal alrea!y gives his consent through his !ee!. &t is the nature of the
crime an! the criminal's o$n $ill that the violation "rocee!ing from him
shoul! e cancele!E ?2. N '66A@. Hegel even insists that the criminal's consent
to e "unishe! is e>"licit rather than tacit ?%2. *C 59'@.
*. Consenting to e "unishe!
-eccaria hol!s that $hen & consent to the social contract4 & con!itionally
alienate the rights an! lierties that the la$ ta#es from me $hen & am "unishe!.
'' &n eMect4 & consent in a!vance to e "unishe! in the event that &
shoul! commit a crime.'5 Hegel's theory is !iMerent4 ut analogous. He says
that $hen & commit a crime4 & set u" a la$ ma#ing it "ermissile for others
to violate my right to the same e>tent that my crime violates the right of its
victim. EThe same right that is violate! in another through a crime is lost to
the criminal. . . . His !ee! ecomes universal4 an! the right that he has cancele!
is also cancelle! for himE ?TH )++;))9<V0=W 55(;557@. 2unishment is
FustiGe! ecause the right infringe! y the state in "unishing me is one that
& have e>"licitly renounce!.
Why !oes Hegel thin# that my commission of a crime involves my consent
to e "unishe! for itB 2erha"s his theory of recognition an! astract right
"uts him in a "osition to !efen! such a thought. To elong to the ethical life
of mo!ern society is to "artici"ate in its Euniversal self;consciousness4E to see
oneself as a "erson among "ersons4 each of us entitle! to an e>ternal s"here
for the e>ercise of our free!om. To un!erstan! oneself as a "erson is to claim
this free status for oneself4 an! since mo!ern recognition is inherently reci"rocal
in character4 it is simultaneously to claim the same status for all other
"ersons. When & commit a crime4 my act revo#es my o$n claim on the right
that & violate. &f a right is the enFoyment of a !eterminate s"here of free!om
in connection $ith a "erson's o!y or "ro"erty4 then y inva!ing another's
s"here of free!om & !eclare y my action that & no longer recogniDe that
right as inviolale. ,y !eclaration a""lies most !irectly not to the other's
right ?since the other has not Foine! in the !eclaration@4 ut rather to my
o$n right. &n eMect4 my crime is an act of consent to someone else's invasion
of my o$n s"here of free!om to the same e>tent that & have inva!e! the
s"here of my victim. This consent is the source of $hat Hegel calls the Ela$E
that & lay !o$n4 !eclaring that it is allo$e! to !o to me $hat & have !one to
the other.') Of course4 neither my victim nor anyone else has renounce! the
right & violate. Hence my renunciation of right a""lies ; ironically ; only to
''*
2UN&0H,ENT
meC The la$ e>"resse! in the criminal's act4 Hegel says4 is ErecogniDe! for
himselfE ?2. N ioo@A it is Ea "rinci"le vali! only for himE ?E/ N (66@. EThe
criminal's la$ is a universal4 ut only he has recogniDe! itE ?%2.'=C =6@A
hence it is Evali! only for the agent4 ecause only he through his action has
recogniDe! it4 not the othersE ?N2 5**@.
This la$ is sim"ly carrie! out on me $hen & am "unishe!4 an! my o$n
$ill is therey fulGlle!. That is $hy Hegel insists that in eing "unishe!4 &
am not eing treate! as a mere means to someone else's en!s4 or as a !angerous
animal that must e ren!ere! harmlessA & am eing Ehonore! as a rational
eingE ?2. N '66.@. 0ince Eright4E in Hegel's technical sense4 refers to any
e>istence that is the e>istence of a free $ill ?2. N 59@4 my "unishment can
also e calle! my ErightE ; for it gives e>istence to the rational volition e>"resse!
in my criminal act ?2. N '66@.
The criminal's consent to "unishment enales us to inter"ret Hegel's insistence
on the EnullityE of the criminal $ill in the sense of its self;!estructiveO
ness. ,y criminal act is self;!estructive in the sense that the right it actually
revo#es is not my victim's4 ut only my o$n. 2unishment manifests this
nullity4 since it ta#es from me ?y my o$n consent@ the very right that &
have trie! to ta#e from another.
(. The incom"leteness of Hegel's theory
As $e shoul! e>"ect from a retriutivist4 Hegel's theory of "unishment tries
to sho$ that "unishment is FustiGe! ecause it is inherently Fust. &n eMect4
Hegel's theory of the annulment of crime is a theory of the forfeiture of
rights. The theory says that $hen & commit a crime4 & forfeit the same right
that is threatene! y my criminal actA the mechanism of this forfeiture is a
renunciation of the right4 containe! in my criminal act. This is a $ell;conceive!
theory of the forfeiture of rights4 foun!e! on the theory of astract
right $hich "rocee!s from Hegel's theory of recognition an! rational "ersonality.
-ut the theory is also suFect to several serious limitations. &n the remain!er
of this cha"ter4 & inten! to e>"lore them.
:irst4 Hegel's theory has one im"ortant assum"tion that may seriously
limit its ca"acity to Fustify the institution of legal "unishment as it actually
e>ists. Hegel usually ta#es for grante! that those $ho are to e "unishe! !o
in fact regar! themselves as "ersons $ith astract rights4 an! also recogniDe
their victims as "ersons eIual to themselves. Without that assum"tion4 it
cannot e inferre! that my criminal act lays !o$n a universal la$ that & may
e treate! as & treat my victim. Occasionally4 ho$ever4 Hegel oserves that
social con!itions in mo!ern civil society ten! to "ro!uce a $hole class of
"eo"le ?the "oor or Ethe raleE@ $ho have neither rights nor !uties4 an!
ten! to e altogether lac#ing in a sense of right ?2. N 5**A see Cha"ter '*4
NN 9;'6@. &f there are "eo"le $ho fail to share the conce"tion of themselves
as "ersons4 as "art of a system of mutual recognition4 then $e cannot attriute
to their actions a universal la$ foun!e! on a universal self;consciousness
that recogniDes everyone as a "erson. Hegel's theory "rovi!es no gui!ance
E(
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
on the treatment of such "eo"le $hen they violate the rights of others. Hegel
is troule! y the e>istence of an un!erclass that is eMectively e>clu!e! from
the ethical life of mo!ern civil society. The inaility of his theory of "unishment
to !eal $ith such "eo"le is one goo! reason4 among others4 $hy he
shoul! e troule!.
Hegel's theory suMers from a secon! serious limitation4 regar!e! as a !efense
of retriutivism. We might as# t$o !iMerent Iuestions aout the FustiGcation
of "unishment. :irst4 $e might as# y $hat right the state "unishes
the criminal. This is the Iuestion on $hich a retriutivist theory of "unishment
ten!s to focus. 0econ!4 $e might as# for a "ositive reason $hy the
state shoul! actually inJict "unishment. That is4 granting that "unishment
!oes no inFustice4 $e might still as# if there is any goo! reason for the state
to "unish.
Hegel's theory ans$ers the Grst Iuestion y sho$ing ho$ criminals have
renounce! or forfeite! the rights they violate. Hegel a""ears to $ant to ans$er
the secon! Iuestion in the same $ay4 y a""ealing to the i!ea that
"unishment is the criminal's right4 the fulGllment of the criminal's rational
$ill. -ut it is not clear that the secon! Iuestion can e satisfactorily ans$ere!
in this $ay. &f & renounce my right to something4 then it follo$s that you
are not oligate! or reIuire! to give it to meA if you choose not to give it to
me4 you cite my renunciation in su""ort of the claim that your refusal to give
it to me is in accor!ance $ith my $ill. -ut it !oes not follo$ from this that
you must not give it to me4 or that you are !oing anything $rong if you go
ahea! an! give it to me any$ay. &f & have contracte! to shovel your $al# in
the $inter4 then you have the right to that service4 an! & have an oligation
to "erform it. -ut our contractual arrangement gives you no "ositive reason
to insist that & "erform the service for youA an! you !o no $rong if you
choose not to e>act the service.
&f criminals $ill their o$n "unishment4 as Hegel's theory says4 then it
follo$s that the state violates no right of theirs y "unishing themA they
are "unishe! in accor!ance $ith their o$n rational $ill. &t !oes not follo$4
ho$ever4 that the state has acIuire! any "ositive reason to "unish them. &n
"articular4 it !oes not follo$ that the state in any sense fails to honor a criminal's
rational $ill if it chooses not to "unish the criminal.
2erha"s Hegel's thought is that since criminals $ill the actual violation of
the other's right4 they are committe! to $illing the actual violation of their
o$n right. That thought is mista#en4 or at least $ithout foun!ation in Hegel's
theory. Criminals !o not ty"ically !esire the violation of the other's
right for its o$n sa#eA often they regar! it only as a regrettale means to
their en!. Even $here criminals !o !esire the violation of right for its o$n
sa#e4 it is not clear that Hegel's theory of astract right entitles us to say that
the criminal act commits the criminal to "ositively $illing that anyone else's
rights shoul! e violate!. Astract right4 accor!ing to Hegel4 !eals entirely
$ith "ermissions. &t groun!s "ositive actions only $hen they can e inter"rete!
as cases of stan!ing asi!e an! allo$ing "ersons to e>ercise free!om $ithin
their "ro"er e>ternal s"here ?2. N )+@. &t seems inconsistent $ith the s"irit
''7
2UN&0H,ENT
of Hegel's theory to su""ose that the criminal act has the eMect of going
eytfn! the granting of a "ermission. Hegel's o$n language reJects this4
$hen he !escries the criminal as EconsentingE to "unishment4 as having
!eclare! that Eit is right to violate free!omE an! that it is Eallo$e!E to violate
the right he is violating ?%2.'=C =6@. To say that & consent to or allo$ something
is to say that & "ermit it4 ut not that & "ositively !eman! it.
Occasionally4 it is true4 criminals !o "ositively !esire to e "unishe!4 an!'
!o not feel "ro"erly reconcile! $ith themselves until they have un!ergone
"unishment. Hegel4 li#e Dostoyevs#y4 might Gn! such sentiments a""ro"riate
an! $ant to encourage them. There is nothing in Hegel's theory4 ho$ever4
that e>"lains the !esire of $rong!oers to e "unishe! or len!s any
su""ort to it. &f criminals $ant to e "unishe!4 that might "rovi!e the state
$ith a reason for "unishing themA ut it $oul! e a conseIuentialist4 not a
retriutivist reason..
Of course4 there are a numer of other reasons often given for the state's
actually !oing $hat Hegel's theory says it has the right to !o. A criminal's
incarceration or !eath "rotects society against that criminal4 tem"orarily or
"ermanentlyA the general #no$le!ge that crimes are "unishe! !eters other
"otential criminals4 e>"resses social !isa""roval of their acts4 an! satisGes
society's vengeful feelingsA a""ro"riate "unishments might e!ucate or reform
criminalsA an! so forth. None of these reasons is retriutivist in character.
All are reasons to $hich the retriutivist Hegel "rou!ly an! consistently refuses
to a""eal ?2. NN 99;'66@.
Hegel's theory that criminals $ill their o$n "unishment thus "rovi!es no
"ositive reason at all for "unishing them. &t stan!s in nee! of su""lement y
a!!itional4 nonretriutivist consi!erations if it is to "rovi!e a com"lete rational
FustiGcation for the "ractice of "unishment. Hegel might try to otain a
retriutivist FustiGcation for "unishing from his other claim4 that "unishment
is reIuire! ecause it is Ein itself FustE o$ing to the. fact that the criminal act
is Enull $ithin itself.E -ut & have confesse! !efeat in the attem"t to ren!er
that claim !efensile ?or even fully intelligile@. ,y conclusion must e that
nothing !efensile in Hegel's theory of "unishment is ca"ale of "rovi!ing
a retriutivist reason $hy criminals shoul! actually e "unishe!.
This y no means entails that Hegel's theory is a total failure. &t ans$ers
the asic Iuestion it sets out to ans$erC Why is it Fust to "unish criminalsB
&t sho$s ho$ theX"ractice of "unishment might e ren!ere! consistent4 e>clusively
on retriutivist groun!s4 $ith the astract right of "ersons. :urther4
the theory "rovi!es a rationale for !eci!ing $hat it is "ermissile for
the state to !o in res"onse to crime. &t says that the state may !e"rive the
criminal of the same right $hich the criminal act $as attem"ting to violate4
an! it im"lies that the state may not !o more than this in its attem"ts to
"rotect the "ulic4 or a""ease its feelings4 or to a!vance its "roFects of e!ucating
or reforming the criminals themselves. &f Hegel's retriutivist theory
stan!s in nee! of su""lement y conseIuentialist consi!erations4 it nevertheless
"rovi!es a frame$or#4 in!e"en!ent of such consi!erations4 for !eci!ing
Iuestions aout the Fustice of "unishment. &t is !outful that any conseIuen;
''=
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
tialist theory of "unishment is ca"ale of ans$ering these Iuestions satisfactorily.
7. %iolations of right an! violations of la$
Hegel's theory of crime an! its annulment elongs to the s"here of astract
right. This theory conceives of crime sim"ly as EcoercionE ; the violation of
the astract right of one or more in!ivi!ual "ersons. Crime is "erha"s more
conventionally thought of in another $ayC as the violation of criminal la$.
Hegel attem"ts to reconceive crime as the violation of la$ later in the 2hiloso"hy
of .ight $hen he comes to his treatment of "unishment "ro"er4 the annulment
of crime y the state through the courts ?2. NN 5'9;55+@. 2unishment4
he says4 is EoFectively regar!e!4 the reconciliation of the self;restoring
an! hence actually vali! la$ $ith itself through the annulment of crimeE ?2.
N 556@. &n eMect4 Hegel sim"ly transfers to the la$ the attriutes of selfrestoration
an! actual vali!ity $hich he earlier ascrie! to astract right in
its annulment of crime. 2erha"s he feels entitle! to !o this ecause his "hiloso"hy
of la$ ta#es the asic function of "ositive criminal la$ itself to e that
of ma#ing astract right !eterminate an! hence enforceale y the state.
&t is not true4 ho$ever4 that the only function of criminal la$ is to !etermine
an! enforce the astract right of "ersons. Along $ith acts that are inherently
$rong ?so;calle! mala in se@4 the la$ also Gn!s it e>"e!ient to fori!
acts that are not inherently $rong4 an! that violate no in!ivi!ual's rights.
0uch acts ?so;calle! mala "rohiita@ inclu!e counterfeiting4 smuggling4
!rug;!ealing4 insi!er stoc#;tra!ing4 !riving on the $rong si!e of the roa!4
etc. ; acts not $rong in themselves $hose "rohiition nevertheless serves
some legitimate legislative en!. The la$ also fori!s some acts that are usually
consi!ere! $rong in themselves4 not ecause they violate the right of a
"erson ut ecause they !irectly attac# the stateC for e>am"le4 reellion an!
treason. As $ith mala "rohiita4 on Hegel's theory4 it is not clear ho$ the
state can e $arrante! in "unishing such acts.
Hegel "lainly inten!s all violations of criminal la$ to count as crimes un!er
his theory. 2rominent among the crimes he mentions are e>am"les of
crimes against the state or the Fu!icial "rocess ?E"erFury4 treasonE@ an! e>am"les
of mala "rohiita ?Eforgery4 coiningE@ ?2. N 9(.@. -ut it is not clear
ho$ his theory is going to Fustify the "unishment of either class of crimes.
That theory argues that the state is entitle! to ta#e the criminal's lierty4
"ro"erty4 or life ecause the criminal has renounce! or forfeite! the right to
$hat is ta#en through the attem"t to !e"rive some other "erson of the same
right. Unless an act that violates the la$ also counts as an attem"t to !e"rive
a "erson of an astract right4 the theory "rovi!es no account of ho$ such a
renunciation or forfeiture can ta#e "lace4 an! hence "rovi!es no FustiGcation
for the state's act of "unishing the la$rea#er. Hegel the reno$ne! statist
seems to have no FustiGcation for "unishing crimes against the state.
Hegel might try to ring such acts un!er his theory either y arguing from
the inci!ental harm that such la$less acts may !o to "ersons4 or else y a";
''+
2UN&0H,ENT
"ealing someho$ to the ?"erha"s in!irect@ $ay in $hich the la$s that "rohiit
them serve the asic "ur"ose of la$4 "rotecting the rights of "ersons.
Hegel sho$s no sign of em"loying such strategies4 an! they !o not loo# very
"romising. Even if they $or#4 there might still e a "rolem aout some
violations of right themselves. There are sometimes rights ; even rights recogniDe!
un!er the la$ ; for $hich the la$ "rovi!es no mechanism of enforcement
?e.g.4 certain civil rights in the Unite! 0tates efore the Civil .ights
Act of '97*@.&* Hegel may inten! to a!!ress this "oint $hen he claims that
astract right ecomes ErecogniDe!E an! E!eterminateE only through "ositive
la$ ?2. N 5'=@. -ut that claim !oes a much etter Fo of e>"laining the
rationale for la$s against violating the right of "ersons than of e>"laining
$hy the violation of the right of "ersons is "unishale only $hen it ta#es the
form of violating the la$.
&n his Hena "erio!4 Hegel a!umrates an alternative theory of "unishment
focusing on crime as the violation of the universal $ill of the community.
Here crime is !escrie! as Ethe in!ivi!ual $ill to "o$er4 to vali!ity4 to eing
recogniDe!. TThe criminalU $ills to e something . . . to carry out his $ill in
s"ite of the universal $illE ?Hf. 55*<')6;')'@. &n res"onse the universal $ill
ecomes active4 Ecanceling the in!ivi!ual. 2unishment is this reversal. &t is
retaliation as the universal $ill. &ts essence !oes not rest on any contract4 or
on the !eterrence of others4 or on the etterment of the criminal. .ather its
essence4 its conce"t4 is this transition4 this reversal of the inFure! universal
recognitionE ?H. 55*<')'@.4
These remar#s ma#e clear the retriutivist intent of Hegel's theory4 ut
leave virtually everything else in ho"eless oscurity. They "rovi!e iio FustiGcation
for "unishment4 ecause they !o not tell us $hy or un!er $hat circumstances
the EuniversalE has a right to EcancelE the Ein!ivi!ual.E Hegel
a!mits that Eeven the state may not !o $hat is not right in itself ?fur sic#@E
?%2.iyC =6;=' @[ &t is the greatest strength of his mature theory of "unishment
that it a!!resses itself to the "rolem of sho$ing ho$ the state may
"unish a criminal $ithout violating the criminal's right. Hegel sim"ly has no
theory that solves this "rolem an! also FustiGes the "unishment of everything
he regar!s as a crime.
=. The measure of "unishment
.etriutivist theories of "unishment usually hol! that "unishment shoul!
EeIualE the crime. This feature of retriutivism often gives rise to !iLcult
Iuestions aout ho$ "unishments are to e mete! out. ConseIuentialist theories
tell us to choose those "unishments that have the est results4 ut retriutivist
theories a""ear to man!ate "unishments com"letely irres"ective of
the results. They threaten to reIuire "unishments $e regar! as too severe4
or too lenient4 or counter"ro!uctive to the social goo!.'( 0ometimes the reIuirement
that "unishment shoul! EeIualE the crime has seeme! to oFectors
too meta"horical to yiel! any !eterminate "olicy at all.
Hegel's theory seems to involve some fairly "recise conclusions aout the
''9
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
measure of "unishment. &t says that the criminal has violate! or attem"te!
to violate a !eterminate right an! in so !oing he has renounce! or forfeite!
trie very same rightA conseIuently4 it seems to im"ly that his "unishment
shoul! consist in the violation of the very same right. Ta#en literally that
seems to mean that if & rea# into your house an! steal Hioo4'7 then the state
shoul! rea# into my house an! steal a'66 from meA if & assault you an!
rea# your arm4 then & shoul! e assaulte! an! have my arm ro#enA if &
steal your car an! $rec# it4 then & shoul! have my o$n car stolen an!
$rec#e!. Clearly this is not al$ays going to yiel! a $or#ale measure of
"unishment. The "unishments sometimes a""ear to e too lenient4 sometimes
cruel. What4 for instance4 is to e !one to me in the last case if & !o
not ha""en to o$n a carB Hegel himself $on!ers ho$ the -ilical inFunction
Ean eye for an eye an! a tooth for a toothE ?E>o!us 5'C 5*@ is su""ose! to
a""ly to a criminal $ho has only one eye or no teeth ?2. N '6'.@.
Hegel's res"onse to these !iLculties is to say that $hen & commit a crime4
$hat & forfeit is not the very same right & violate4 ut only an eIuivalent
right. On this groun!4 he even !enies that "unishment shoul! e conceive!
as a talion ?%2.iyC =5@. Crime an! "unishment shoul! e regar!e! as eIuivalent
in a more astract sense4 in their EvalueE ?2. N '6'@. 2erha"s $hen $e
regar! crimes in terms of their value4 $e can treat a monetary Gne as eIuivalent
to an assault4 an! a "erio! of incarceration as eIuivalent to a theft. Hegel
insists that such eIuivalences must e "ossile4 since they are em"loye! in
civil la$C ,oney is a$ar!e!4 for instance4 for !amages that may not have
ta#en the form of a "ecuniary loss ?%2.iyC =5@. Hegel argues that the violation
of right can have a value in this sense sim"ly ecause astract right
concerns a free $ill that has entere! into something e>ternal4 Einto the s"here
of Iuantitative e>tent an! Iualitative !eterminationE ?2. N 97@. To !etermine
the value of a crime4 it is necessary to consi!er the violation of rights
in relation to "eo"le's nee!s an! e>"ectations4 $hich vary from "lace to "lace
an! time to time. :or this reason4 Hegel regar!s criminal co!es as a matter
for changing "ositive legislation4 not for astract "hiloso"hical reJectionC
EHo$ each crime is to e "unishe! cannot e !eci!e! y thoughts. 2ositive
la$s are necessaryE ?2iB N 97A@A Ea criminal co!e elongs chieJy to its time4
an! to the con!itions of civil society in its timeE ?2. N 5'+@.
We may $on!er ho$ far this account remains faithful to Hegel's "urely
retriutivist intentions. When legislators get their han!s on a "enal co!e4
$hat guarantee is there that they $ill not e inJuence! y conseIuentialist
as $ell as retriutivist consi!erations unless our retriutivist theory "uts
them un!er fairly "recise constraintsB Of course4 if our argument in N ( $as
correct4 then the only function of a retriutivist theory $ith res"ect to the
measure of "unishment is to set u"$ar! limits to the state's right to "unish.
That leaves room for "enal legislators to e conseIuentialists $ithin those
limits4 ut it is also a signiGcant mo!iGcation of retriutivism.
We may also Iuestion $hether the notion of EvalueE is a""ro"riate for
measuring violations of right. Hegel un!erstan!s EvalueE as a function of the
nee!s satisGe! y a thing4 an! "eo"le's !is"ositions to sustitute !iMerent
'56
2UN&0H,ENT
nee! satisfactions for one another ?2. N N 7)4A4 ==A cf. %2.'9C '75@. &n a
civil suit4 monetary !amages are a""ro"riate ecause the inFure! "arty is
see#ing com"ensation for something measurale y mar#et stan!ar!s. -ut
crime is an invasion of my "ersonality. &t $oul! e !emeaning to regar! any
mar#et "rice as an acce"tale eIuivalent for that. 2erha"s there is such a
thing as an eIuality et$een crimes an! "unishments4 in the form of the
forfeiture of an eIuivalent though !iMerent right. The fun!amentally economic
notion of Evalue4E ho$ever4 !oes not seem to ca"ture it.
+. The !eath "enalty
Cesare -eccaria argues against the !eath "enalty on the asis of social contract
theory. He conten!s that the state's right over the in!ivi!ual consists
only in $hat in!ivi!uals have grante! to the state for the "ur"ose of "rotecting
their o$n interests. &n!ivi!uals cannot e su""ose! un!er any circumstances
to grant others the right to #ill them4 since life is the greatest of all
the goo!s to e "rotecte!. ConseIuently4 there can e no right of the state
to em"loy the "unishment of !eath.'=
Hegel reFects oth the argument an! its conclusion. He s"urns the contract
theory of the state4 insisting that the state is an en! in itself4 an! a higher
en! than the "rivate goo! of its in!ivi!ual memers ?2. N '66.@. Hegel
a""roves of the fact that the !eath "enalty is im"ose! less often than it use!
to e4 an! he thin#s there are very fe$ oMenses to $hich it is a""ro"riate
?2. N '66A@. -ut he regar!s !eath as a legitimate "unishment in some cases4
an! he thin#s that it is the only Fust "unishment for the crime of mur!er ?2.
N &O&A@.
As $e have seen4 Hegel's theory of "unishment has in common $ith -eccaria's
the feature that it "ro"oses to Fustify "unishment on the asis of the
criminal's consent4 Hegel's theory of "unishment is a theory of the forfeiture
of rights4 an! the mechanism of forfeiture is the criminal's renunciation of a
right through the giving of consent to renounce it. A Hegelian !efense of the
!eath "enalty therefore reIuires us to maintain that mur!erers have4 through
their ca"ital oMense4 !iveste! themselves of the right not to e #ille!.
&t is Iuestionale $hether Hegel can consistently hol! that "eo"le may. !o
this. &f & forfeit a right only through consenting to its violation4 then it follo$s
that & can forfeit only those rights that it is in my "o$er to alienate
through my consent. :ollo$ing Hegel's theory4 then4 an inalienale right
$oul! e immune to forfeiture. &t is "erha"s note$orthy that Hegel never
e>"licitly inclu!es the right not to e #ille! among inalienale rights. -ut he
!oes say that a right is inalienale an! im"rescri"tile if it is a right constituting
"ersonality itself ?2. N 77@4 an! he !enies that & have a right to #ill myself
on the groun! that my life is not e>ternal to my "ersonality ?2. N =6@. This
seems to commit him to regar!ing the right not to e #ille! as inalienale.
Hegel insists that & have not only the right ut even the !uty to sacriGce my
life for the state in time of $ar ?2. N =6@. -ut it certainly seems inconsistent
$ith his vie$ to su""ose that & might vali!ly contract to "ermit someone else
'5'
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
to #ill me outright.'+ ConseIuently4 Hegel's vie$s a""ear to commit him to
the "osition that & cannot forfeit my right not to e #ille!.
2erha"s Hegel thin#s that the !eath "enalty is the only Fust "unishment
for mur!er ecause he thin#s that the act of ta#ing another's life involves the
violation of a right that is at once very sacre! an! highly s"eciGc4 so that
the eIuivalent "unishment is eIually e>treme an! eIually "recise. 1et an
analogous line of reasoning in the case of other inalienale rights $oul! e
unconvincing4 to say the least. No !ecent "erson $oul! regar! it as a""ro"riate
to "unish ra"ists y ra"ing them4 or to "unish those $ho enslave others
y ma#ing them into slaves. &f an inIuisitor forces others to $orshi"
against their religious conscience4 it $oul! not e a Gt "unishment to force
him to $orshi" go!s in $hich he !oes not elieve. O""onents of the !eath
"enalty are often motivate! y the i!ea that ca"ital "unishment is a araric
an! !egra!ing "ractice4 as $rong an! !emeaning as are the crimes to $hich
"eo"le $ant to a""ly it.'9 &t is interesting that Hegel's retriutivist theory of
"unishment ten!s ?even against Hegel's intentions@ to su""ort this o"inion.
,ost "eo"le $ho elieve that mur!er shoul! not e "unishe! y !eath
elieve that it is at least "ermissile to "unish it $ith life im"risonment ?this
is -eccaria's vie$4 for instance@.56 Hegel also seems to regar! life im"risonment
as "ermissile in cases of mur!er $here the !eath "enalty is ina""ro"riate
?%2. *C 5+(@. On the other han!4 if the !eath "enalty is illegitimate
ecause the right not to e #ille! is immune to forfeiture4 then $e ought also
to as# $hether & can alienate or forfeit my lierty for the $hole of my life.
:ree status is e>"licitly inclu!e! among inalienale rights ?2. N 77@. Hegel
regar!s the alienation of one's free activity for the $hole future as im"ermissile4
since it is eIuivalent to the alienation of one's free status ?2. N 7=@.
:rom this it follo$s that life im"risonment is Fust as illegitimate a "unishment
as !eath. Hegel himself a""ears to en!orse this argument at least in his
lecturesC
& cannot give over to another $hat is in$ar! to me4 ut & can give over to someone
only my services as limite! y time an! "articularity. &n the same $ay4 & cannot give
over my ca"acity to hol! "ro"erty along $ith my "ro"erty. A criminal $ho comes
into the "enitentiary can lose his free!om only for a !eterminate time4 a limite! time.
?%2.i=C(7@
9. 0houl! $e e>"ect an ethical FustiGcation of
"unishmentB
2eo"le sometimes !o such monstrous things to one another that $e cannot
!ecently !o anything to them that might "lausily e regar!e! as EeIualE to
$hat they have !one. Torture4 ra"e4 an! enslavement are e>am"les of such
egregious actsA some thin# that mur!er is as $ell. .etriutivism may have a
a! name "artly ecause it seems to im"ly that $e are morally reIuire! to
reIuite every evil $ith an eIual evil4 even in such cases. -ut the most !istinctive
feature of retriutivism is its concern $ith the criminal's right. As He;
'55
2UN&0H,ENT
gel's theory illustrates4 a retriutivist theory sets limits to $hat it is "ermissile
to !o to criminals in $ays that no conseIuentialist theory can.
Egregious crimes "ose a "rolem for retriutivism ecause they threaten
a conJict et$een this si!e of retriutivist theories an! the retriutivist i!ea
that "unishment is Fust only if it is eIual to the crime. &f ?on this conce"tion
of Fustice@ $e res"on! EFustlyE to egregious crimes4 then $e cease to ehave
$ith minimal moral !ecencyA $e violate rights that must not e violate! un!er
any circumstances. 2erha"s in these cases no Fust res"onse to crime is
o"en to us.
A !iMerent4 ut in some $ays analogous "rolem is face! y conseIuentialist
theories that vie$ "revention of crime as the aim of "unishment. The
state threatens to "unish crimes4 an! it tries ; $ith im"erfect success ; to
carry out the threat. No !out there are fe$er crimes than there $oul! e if
the state trie! less har!4 ut if $e are rational conseIuentialists4 then $e
shoul! eOintereste! not only in reaching our en!s4 ut also in reaching them
in a cost;eMective $ay. As a metho! of "reventing crime in mo!ern society4
"unishment is e>tremely e>"ensive in "ro"ortion to its results. Not only is
the criminal Fustice system very costly to o"erate4 ut it is "lainly counter"ro!uctive
in many cases4 since "unishment ty"ically ren!ers criminals more
rather than less li#ely to commit future crimes. ?&t is false to the "oint of
oscenity to suggest that $hat society actually !oes to criminals un!er the
name of "unishment can e FustiGe! on the groun! that it eneGts them y.
"rovi!ing them $ith moral e!ucation.@5' 0ocial an! economic measures to
re!uce the incentives to commit crimes $oul! oviously $or# much etter at
much lo$er social cost4 ut they are reFecte! for moral an! "olitical reasons.
2roaly nothing $e coul! !o $oul! come any$here near to eliminating
crime in mo!ern society as it is "resently organiDe!. Hegel is a$are that
ethical corru"tion is one of the si!e eMects of the suFective free!om fostere!
y mo!ern civil society4 an! he realiDes that the $or#ings of its mar#et system
ten! to "ro!uce a class of "eo"le $ho are es"ecially "rone to commit
crimes ?2. N 5**4 see Cha"ter '*4 N 9@. &f the "rolem for retriutivism is
that sometimes no Fust res"onse to crime is availale to us4 the "rolem for
conseIuentialists concerne! $ith "reventing crime is that as a means of "rotecting
"eo"le's rightFs in mo!ern society "unishment is so hi!eously e>"ensive
an! so utterly ineMective as to e ho"elessly irrational.
2hiloso"hers $ho try to Fustify "unishment are sometimes ta#en to tas#
for giving the im"ression that this is !iLcult to !o4 that it is even har! to
ma#e rational sense of the institution of "unishment.55 There are4 ho$ever4
goo! reasons for thin#ing that the "hiloso"hers may not e to lame. /enerally
s"ea#ing4 "eo"le are not at their est $hen they have suMere! $rong
an! are un!er attac#. Whether you measure their con!uct y stan!ar!s of
morality or those of rational self;interest4 they ten! to ehave very a!ly.
,oreover4 there seems to e no reason to e>"ect their collective ehavior
to e essentially etter than their in!ivi!ual ehavior in this regar!. &f the
institution of "unishment4 as it actually e>ists4 re"resents "eo"le's collective
'5)
A-0T.ACT .&/HT
res"onse to attac#s on their rights4 then $e shoul! not e too sur"rise! to
Gn! it less than rational an! less than a!mirale. Hence $e might e>"ect to
e unale to ma#e rational sense of "unishment or to "rovi!e a satisfactory
ethical FustiGcation for it. 2erha"s the most $e shoul! e>"ect "hiloso"hical
theories to "rove is that society's ehavior to$ar! criminals isnot as senseless
an! outrageous as criminals' ehavior to$ar! their victims. &f $e egin to
$on!er $hether that is enough4 maye "hiloso"hy is Fust !oing its Fo.
'5*
& l l
,orality
=
The conce"t of morality
i. Develo"ment of the conce"t of moralityC
Tuigen an! -ern ?i=9);'=97@
2erha"s the most $ell;#no$n feature of Hegel's ethical thought is his !istinction
et$een EmoralityE ?,oralitat@ an! Eethical lifeE ?0ittlich#eit@. -ut is
the !istinction $ell un!erstoo!B One common inter"retation is the follo$ingC
E,oralityE for Hegel means 3ant's moral "hiloso"hyA it re"resents $hat
is reJective4 critical4 an! in!ivi!ualistic in the moral life. Hegel i!entiGes
Eethical lifeE $ith ancient /ree# societyA it stan!s for an attitu!e of unthin#ing4
"ious !evotion to the tra!itional la$s an! customs of one's "eo"le. Hegel
is a "artisan of ethical life an! an o""onent of morality. He favors social
conformism an! moral tra!itionalism4 an! is an o""onent of in!ivi!ualism
an! critical moral thin#ing.
There is some truth in each of the elements of this "icture4 ut in every
case that truth is seriously oversim"liGe!. The "icture as a $hole ?summe!
u" in the last t$o sentences of the "revious "aragra"h@ is a ho"eless !istortion.
The "icture comes closest to !escriing Hegel's vie$s !uring his Hena
"erio! ?'+6';'+67@. -ut Hegel's vie$s aout morality an! ethical life un!er$ent
Iuite ra!ical changes in the course of his "hiloso"hical !evelo"ment4
an! !uring the Hena "erio! itself Hegel's conce"tion of morality "resents us
$ith a moving target. The est $ay to egin a !iscussion of this conce"tion
is $ith a rief accgunt of its evolution.
Hegel's earliest manuscri"ts4 com"ose! $hile he $as a stu!ent in Tuigen
?'=9)@ an! a "rivate tutor in -ern ?'=9*;'=97@4 are ostensily concerne!
$ith religion an! its history. .ecent scholarshi" argues that they are Hegel's
attem"t to s#etch an amitious "rogram of religious an! social reform for
the age.' Hegel's manuscri"ts e>hiit the "o$erful inJuence of .ant's moral
"hiloso"hy4 an! es"ecially of his ne$ly "ulishe! .eligion Within the -oun!s
of Unai!e! .eason ?'=9);'=9*@. Li#e 3ant4 Hegel hol!s that Ethe essence
of all true religion4 inclu!ing our TChristianU religion4 is human moralityE
?TH '6(<HETW7+@. Along $ith 3ant4 he is intereste! in the com"le> relation
of the "ure moral religion of reason an! free!om to the historical tra!itions
of Estatutory faithE ?or E"ositiveE religion@4 $hich serves as the necessary
vehicle of "ure moral religion4 ut against $hose su"erstition an! s"iritual
on!age "ure religion has also $age! a continual struggle.
&n the $ritings of the young Hegel4 the comat et$een rational religion
an! "ositive religion is given a historical !ramatis "ersonae. The main "ro;
'5=
,O.AL&T1
tagonists are the eautiful an! loving "agan Efol# religionE of ancient /reece4
the slavish "ositive religion of Here$ monotheism4 an! Hesus' attem"t to
revolutioniDe the latter through the intro!uction of a "ure moral religion.
Hegel vie$s /ree# an! Here$ religion as e>"ressive of ra!ically !iMerent
social or!ers. The naive s"iritual self;harmony of the /ree#s gives rise to
"olitical free!om an! to a religion that is sim"le in its tenets4 ut "o$erful
in its sensuous imagery an! in its "ulic cult4 a!miraly suite! to instill in
the human heart an enthusiasm for moral virtue. -y contrast4 the authoritarianism
an! self;alienation of Here$ culture sho$ themselves in an utterly
"ositive religion4 a cult of servile !evotion to a single !ivine tyrant e>ternal
to oth nature an! the human $orl!.
&n such a milieu4 the religious reform attem"te! y Hesus coul! not e the
creation of a genuine fol# religion in $hich the in!ivi!ual an! the social4 the
rational an! the sensuous4 are ha""ily unite!. &nstea!4 the religion of Hesus
is a "rivate4 other;$orl!ly moral religion suite! to the nee!s of isolate! in!ivi!uals
$ho have no conce"tion of a free earthly social or!er. EA fol# religion4
$hich "ro!uces an! nourishes great !is"ositions4 goes han! in han!
$ith free!om. -ut our TChristianU religion $ants to e!ucate human eings
to e citiDens of heaven4 their gaDe al$ays !irecte! u"$ar!4 $here human
feelings ecome alien to themE ?TH *'Z*5<==B (7@.
Hegel is ostensily $riting aout the !istant historical "ast4 ut it is not
!iLcult to recogniDe4 ehin! their historical mas#s4 the real actors in Hegel's
o$n $orl! $hose struggle is his actual concernC the "ositive4 alienate! society
of the ancien regime4 the moral in!ivi!ualism of Enlightenment ?es"ecially
3antian@ "hiloso"hy4 an! the ne$ society of the young Hegel's ho"es4
free an! uniGe!4 mo!ele! on his image of a lost Hellenic greatness.
5. -eyon! moralityC :ran#furt ?'=97;'+66@
&n '=974 Hegel move! to a ne$ tutoring "osition in :ran#furt. At aout
the same time4 his thought aout morality too# a ne$ turn. EThe 0"irit of
Christianity an! &ts :ateE ?'=9+;'=99@ egins $ith a "olemic against the
"ositivity an! self;alienation of Here$ religion4 ut then !irects the same
criticisms against 3antian morality. -et$een the victim of "ositive religion
an! the 3antian moralist4 he says4 Ethe !iMerence is not that the former
ma#es himself into a servant $hile the latter is freeA instea! it is that the
former carries his master outsi!e himself4 $hile the latter carries his master
$ithin himself an! is in on!age to himselfE ?== )55<ETW 5''@.
&n 3antian morality4 the self is never "resent in its $holeness. &ts la$ is
never the la$ of the $hole self4 hence never a real autonomy of the $ill.
3antian morality overcomes the "ositivity of an e>ternal la$4 ut internaliDes
on!age rather than aolishing it. The em"irical self is su""ose! to res"ect
the la$ given y reason4 ut this la$ is not its o$n la$. &t is the a "riori la$
of a su"ernatural self4 !$elling in a su"ersensile eyon!. ConseIuently4
3antian morality contains $ithin it an Ein!estructile "ositivityE $hich EGlls
us $ith in!ignationE ecause it "reten!s to e self;legislation ut is really a
'5+
THE CONCE2T O: ,O.AL&T1
legislation alien to the em"irical self $hich is e>"ecte! to oey it ?TH )5)<
E=W5&&;5&5@.
:or the :ran#furt Hegel4 Hesus' teaching is no longer a version of 3antian
morality. No$ it is an antinomian religion of love that goes eyon! morality.
Hesus "reaches not oe!ience to the moral la$ ut EfulGllmentE ?"ler!ma@ of
the la$ ?TH )694 )57<S=W5i*@4 a fulGllment that Eaolishes Tthe moral la$U
as la$E an! Eta#es from the la$s their la$fulness4 their form of la$E ?TH )5*<
ETW 5'5@. The s"irit of Hesus is Ethe e>tinguishing of la$ an! !uty in loveE
?TH ))*<ETW 55)@.
&n Tuigen an! -ern4 Hegel still agrees $ith 3ant that Ethe sole moral
incentive is res"ect for the moral la$E ?TH liglETW '**@. He regar!s love
as a sensuous "rinci"le4 hence in itself !evoi! of moral $orth ?TH 56&TE *7@.
Love is instrumental to morality only ecause it inhiits evil inclinations an!
hel"s to ring our sensuous nature into harmony $ith the moral la$ ?TH '5;
'*&TE )5;)*A TH 56<TE *=@. &n :ran#furt4 ho$ever4 love is no longer a harmony
et$een the la$ an! inclination4 ut a state of the soul that transcen!s
an! even aolishes their o""osition. Love is no$ Ethe relation Tof la$ an!
inclinationU as in!iMerents to one another. . . . 0uFect an! oFect have lost
their o""osition4 la$ loses its universality an! the suFect its "articularityE
so that Eall !uties fall a$ayE ?TH )5(;)5=<0=W 5');5'(@. Love no longer
serves moralityA it is Ea s"irit elevate! aove moralityE ?TH 55.*&ETW 5'5@.
EThe 0"irit of ChristianityE in!icates a hierarchy of s"iritual levels. &n
each $e ecome cogniDant of the limits of the "revious one4 an! therey
EcancelE or Esu"erse!eE ?aufheen@ it ?TH )654 )6=;)6+@. The four stages
areC
'. 2ositivity
5. ,orality
). Love
*. .eligion
The lo$est level is the E"ositivityE of statutory or ceremonial religion. 3antian
morality re"laces this unreJective suFection of the min! to something
e>ternal $ith the suFection of the senses to the rational comman! of !uty.
Love EfulGllsE morality through the i!entity ?or Ein!iMerenceE@ of reason's
la$ an! the !esire f sense. Love is Ea !ivine s"irit4E ut it is also limite!
ecause it is merely suFective feeling4 $hich reIuires to e unite! $ith the
EoFective.E Love is therefore EfulGlle!E y the Gnal stageC Ereligion . . .the
su"reme nee! of the s"iritE ?TH *67&ETW 5+9@. E.eligionE in the :ran#furt
"erio! antici"ates Hegel's later conce"tion of s"eculative thought4 $hose
function is similarly to "rovi!e a su"reme reconciliation of suFective an!
oFective4 sense an! intellect.
&n EThe 0"irit of ChristianityE Hegel Grst articulates some of his most
characteristic criticisms of moralityC
'. He charges4 as $e have seen4 that morality involves an alienate! relation
of reason to sense4 an! in conseIuence an internaliDe! E"ositivity4E an
unfree!om ?TH 55)&ETW5''@.
'59
,O.AL&T1
5. This lea!s !irectly to a secon! contention4 that morality is im"otent to
accom"lish the goo! it inten!s. .eally to !o the goo!4 Hegel says4 the
$hole self must e involve!4 not only astract reason ut also !eterminate
sensuous !rives. -ut morality comman!s us to act only from res"ect for
the la$A for morality4 the goo! $ill is "resent Eonly in the i!ea4 in re"resentationEA
the !eterminate $ill to !o goo! Eis not actual in the "assive
manEA conseIuently4 Ethe i!ea of their $illing is the o""osite of the $illA
its en! is not to $illE ?== )66@. :rom this Hegel conclu!es that morality
cannot act4 cannot accom"lish its en!sC &t can only Fu!ge an! con!emn
?== 5)*<S=W 555;55)@. ,orality tells us only $hat Eought to e4E
$hereas love is a EeingO ?== )5*<ETW 5'5@4 a unity of sense an! reason
that actually achieves the goo!.
). Hegel rings a thir! charge against moralityC He says that it has an inherent
ten!ency to hy"ocrisy. The goo! is truly achieve! only through the
s"irit of loveA ut love !oes the goo! freely4 s"ontaneously4 $ithout reJection
or com"ulsion. 3antian morality i!entiGes the moral $orth of acts
$ith the motive of !uty4 $ith a reJection on the act $hich re"resents it
as something that is !one un!er constraint. -ut if the "ure s"irit is the
s"irit of love4 then 3antian morality "uts action in a "ers"ective that necessarily
ren!ers it im"ure4 an! that gives cre!it for !oing the goo! not to
the s"ontaneous loving !is"osition ut to the suseIuent reJection on the
action as a E!uty.E &nstea! of thin#ing s"ontaneously of the goo! to e
!one4 morality ma#es us thin# aout our o$n !oings. &t concentrates our
attention on the reJective a""rehension of $hat $e !o as something Eto
e !one from !uty.E The s"irit of morality is therefore the hy"ocritical
s"irit4 the s"irit of 2harisaism ?== ))5;)))<50TW556;55'@. As Hegel $as
to "ut the "oint several years later in HenaC E%irtue4 in transforming itself
into morality4 ecomes necessarily the #no$le!ge of one's o$n virtue4 or
in other $or!s4 it ecomes 2harisaismE ?/W *57<'+*@.
*. :inally4 Hegel also criticiDes morality for ignoring4 or even su""ressing4
in favor of this suFective reJection4 the healthy relations an! social forms
$ithin $hich goo! actions are !one freely an! haitually. &n "lace of the
rich emotional faric of social life4 $ith the manifol! claims of loyalty an!
aMection they ma#e on us4 morality "uts a single formal "rinci"le4 to
$hich $e are to e oun! y the single astract motive of !utyC
On account of its form of universality4 T!utyU ma#es the har!est "retentions for
its one;si!e!ness. Woe to those human relations that are not foun! !irectly in the
conce"t of !utyc :or ecause it is not merely the em"ty thought of universality
ut must !is"lay itself in action4 this conce"t e>clu!es or !ominates all other relations.
?== )5)<S=W 5'5@
(. Cons"icuously asent from the early $ritings is any e>"licit statement of
$hat is "erha"s Hegel's est #no$n criticism of 3antian moralityC the
charge that it is an Eem"ty formalismE inca"ale of "rovi!ing any Eimmanent
!octrine of !uties.E ,orality's "rinci"le has no contentA it is inca"ale
of "rovi!ing any criterion at all for $hat is morally right an! $rong4
')6
THE CONCE2T O: ,O.AL&T1
an! even the most !es"icale con!uct is ca"ale of eing reconcile! $ith
it. These accusation "lainly have an aLnity $ith some of the charges
Hegel !oes ma#e ; for instance4 $ith the charge that morality is hy"ocritical
an! the charge that morality is ';"ositiveE ecause the motive of !uty
is se"arate! oth from sensuousness an! from healthy social relations ?=X
)5)<FETW 5'5@. -ut the Eem"tiness chargeE ?as & shall call it@ is not actually
articulate! until Hegel's Hena $ritings ?'+6';'+65@. We $ill leave
asi!e the em"tiness charge for no$4 since Cha"ter 9 $ill e !evote! entirely
to it.
). ,orality versus ethical lifeC Hena ?'+6';'+67@
&n '=994 :ichte $as !ismisse! from his "rofessorshi" at Hena on the groun!s
of Eatheism.E Hegel's frien! 0chelling ?$hose religious vie$s $ere4 if anything4
even less ortho!o> than :ichte's@ $as a""ointe! to re"lace him4 at the
astonishingly early age of 5*. The follo$ing year4 0chelling hel"e! Hegel
?then age )6@ to gain a "ost at Hena as 2rivat!oDent. &n a letter to 0chelling
of Novemer 54 '+664 Hegel !escries ho$ his intellectual !evelo"ment has
move! a$ay from Ethe more suor!inate nee!s of menE an! to$ar! s"eculative
meta"hysicsC E& $as !riven inevitaly to$ar! science4 an! the i!eal of
youth ha! to ta#e the form of reJection an! so too of a systemE ?-'C (9<7*@.
Along $ith his construction of a s"eculative system4 Hegtel's vie$s on morality
continue! to !evelo"4 chieJy in reaction to the ethical $ritings :ichte
"ro!uce! !uring his o$n Hena "erio! ?'=9*;'=99@.
Hegel's Grst "ulishe! essay $as The DiMerence -et$een :ichte's an!
0chelling's 0ystem of 2hiloso"hy ?'+6'@. &n it he ma#es :ichte the oFect of
his continuing attac#s on morality. Here he Grst articulates the em"tiness
charge. &ts target is :ichte's version of 3antian autonomy. ET:or :ichteU 'We
oey ourselves' means uur natural inclination oeys our ethical la$' EA Hegel
regar!s this conce"tion of autonomy as E!eforme!4 an>ious4 o""resse!4
uglyE ?SQ 95;9)<'();'(*@. To the E"olarity of nature an! free!om4E an! the
Eunnatural self;su""ressionE of :ichtean morality4 Hegel no$ o""oses not
EloveE ut Ean i!entity as characterE ; $hich4 he says4 is to e foun! in Ethe
eauty of the soul an! of the TartU $or#E as $ell as in Ethe com"lete an! living
community of in!ivi!uals in a congregation ?/emein!e@E ?D ++;96<'(6;'('@.
&n :aith an! 3no$le!ge ?'+65@4 Hegel coins a ne$ term for this Ei!entity
as character4E or ; as he "uts it there ; the Etrue i!entity of universal an!
"articular4 of matter an! form.E The term is Eethical lifeE ?0ittlich#eit@ ?/W
*57<'+)@.5 :or the rest of the Hena "erio!4 Hegel's ethical thought focuses on
the contrast et$een morality an! ethical life. The latter conce"t is further
!evelo"e! in the essay On the Ways of Treating Natural .ight 0cientiGcally
?'+65@4 in the un"ulishe! fragment 0ystem of Ethical Life ?'+65;'+6)@4 an!
in Hegel's lectures of the "erio! ?'+6);'+6*4 '+6(;'+67@. At the same time4
Hegel also reGnes his conce"t of morality. He comes to recogniDe morality
as a form of consciousness characteristic of mo!ern social life4 est articulate!
in the moral "hiloso"hy of 3ant an! :ichte.
')'
,O.AL&T1
Ethical life is the Eliving sha"e of organic totalityE of a community ?N.
*99<'6+@A at the same time4 it is the Eessence of the in!ivi!ualEA conseIuently4
Ethe nature of asolute ethical lifeE inclu!es Ethe relation of the
in!ivi!ual's ethical life to real asolute ethical lifeE ?N. (6*<''5@. ?These
t$o si!es of ethical life $ill e !iscusse!4 res"ectively4 in Cha"ters '' an!
'5@. Consi!ere! as the ethical life of a society4 it is a totality of social relationshi"s
et$een the occu"ants of !iMerent social an! economic roles4 forming
an inter!e"en!ent $hole.
E,oralityE ?,oralitat@ is !eGne! as Ethe formal "ositing4 in mutual in!iMerence4
of the s"eciGc terms of the relationE ?N. (67<''*@. The moral stan!"oint
consi!ers an in!ivi!ual's role in ethical life in astraction from the
$hole of $hich it is a "art. ,oral theories Ema#e eing;for;self an! in!ivi!uality
into a "rinci"leE ?N. (6*<''5@A they consi!er everything from the
stan!"oint of the astracte! in!ivi!ual. Though this stan!"oint shoul! not
sim"ly e !enie!4 Hegel insists that it is EinferiorE an! Eone;si!e!4E an! cannot
e Ethe asolute stan!"ointE ?N. *(+;*(9<=*;=(4 (6*<''5@.
Hegel locates the moral stan!"oint $ithin the ethical life of mo!ern society.
He regar!s it as Ethe ethical life of the ourgeois or "rivate in!ivi!ual
for $hom the !iMerence of relations is G>e! an! $ho !e"en!s on them an!
is in themE ?N. (67<''*@. :or Hegel in '+654 the mo!ern ourgeoisie "artici"ates
in a Euniversal "rivate life.E &ts ethical life is not EfreeE ecause it is
limite! to "rivate self;see#ing ?N. *95;*9)<'65;'6)@. &n contrast4 Hegel regar!s
the noility as the free estate ecause its "olitical "osition relieves it
from the nee! to "rovi!e for its o$n nee!s4 an! gives it the vocation for
"ulic service as military oLcers an! high government oLcials. &ts ethical
life is therefore Ea universal life oun! u" $ith the "ulic interestE ?N. *96<
'66@.
The EscienceE of morality ?in 3antian an! :ichtean moral theory@ is a
science of ethical life4 vie$e! from the stan!"oint of "rivate in!ivi!uals. &t
fails to a""reciate the s"eciGcity of the social relationshi"s ecause "rivate
in!ivi!uals see these relationshi"s only as a natural e>"ression of their contingent4
"articular volition. ,oral theory involves an a$areness of s"eciGc ethical
relations4 ut it !oes not un!erstan! them as organic "arts of a social
$hole. &nstea!4 it treats them as something asolute4 !e"en!ing only on the
isolate! in!ivi!ual. Duties an! virtues that elong to !eterminate ourgeois
social roles are EG>e!E ?a later ,ar>ist Fargon $oul! say EreiGe!E@ an!
treate! as universally in!ing.
Hegel hol!s that the real on! of moral !uty !e"en!s on the $ay in $hich
!uties ear on "eo"le's social roles an! relationshi"s in the ethical life of a
rational social or!er. The stan!"oint of morality4 ho$ever4 consi!ers these
!uties in astraction from such a system of relationshi"s. ConseIuently4 it is
tem"te! to see them as merely Econtingent4E yet it must also try to give them
the form of EasolutenessE a""ro"riate to a moral !eman!. This it !oes y
associating them $ith the formal "rinci"le of the asolute self ?N. (6=<''*@.
This is the light in $hich Hegel inter"rets the moral fanaticism of :ichte's
ethical theory. &t is also his !iagnosis of the harsh4 mechanistic character of
')5
THE CONCE2T O: ,O.AL&T1
:ichte's conce"tion of the state. Where the vision of a Jui!4 organic ethical
life has een lost4 there is nothing left for "olitical "hiloso"hy e>ce"t the
astract o""osition of "rivate an! "ulic4 lea!ing to a ElifelessE ?or4 as $e
might no$ "ut it4 a totalitarian@ conce"tion of the state ; to a E"olice stateE
?N. ('=;('+<'5*A cf. :ichte /N. 59';)6)<)=*;)+=@.)
&n the Natural .ight essay4 Hegel's nascent conce"tion of ethical life is
mo!ele! on the classical "olitical theories of 2lato an! Aristotle. The EfreeE
estate corres"on!s to the "ulic classes in those theories4 to 2lato's guar!ians
an! Aristotle's free ruling citiDenryA the mo!ern ourgeoisie*s seen in light
of the unfree class of artisans or "ro!ucers $ho "lay no role in the "olitical
!elierations of the community ?N. *+9;*9*<99;'6*@. There is as yet little
sign that Hegel sees anything in the ourgeoisie's Euniversal "rivate lifeE e>ce"t
a necessary evil4 little evi!ence that he a""reciates the "ositive historical
signiGcance of ourgeois suFectivity ?cf. N. *95<'6)@.
*. The 2henomenology of 0"irit ?'+6=@
Things have change! again y the en! of Hegel's Hena "erio!. Cha"ter 7 of
the 2henomenology of 0"irit4 $hich attem"ts to !e"ict a history of s"irit's
!evelo"ment from ancient /ree# culture to Hegel's o$n time4 is structure!
aroun! the o""osition et$een ethical life an! morality4 eginning .$ith the
Eethical sustanceE of /ree# society an! en!ing $ith the Emoral $orl!vie$.E
Here EmoralityE is no longer merely a false or one;si!e! theory of
ethical life4 nor even an e>"erience of ethical life from a limite! ?an! unfree@
social4"ers"ective $ithin it. Hegel no$ sees morality as a stan!"oint that is
characteristic of the mo!ern s"irit4 in contrast $ith the nole naivete of ancient
ethical life. ,ore s"eciGcally4 Hegel !escries morality as a s"irit that
has overcome the self;alienation of the $orl! of Christian faith an! un!ergone
the EcultureE ?-il!ung@ of the early mo!ern "erio!4 achieving an a$areness
of the in!ivi!ual self as i!entical $ith the universal la$ of reason.
T,orality isU asolute me!iation4 li#e the consciousnesses of culture an! faithA for
it is essentially the movement of the self to su"erse!e the astraction of imme!iate
e>istence an! to ecome universal for itself ;ut neither through a "ure alienation
an! !isru"tion of itself an! actuality nor through a Jight. &nstea! it is "resent to itself
imme!iately in its sustance4 for this sustance is its #no$le!ge4 it is the intuite!
"ure certainty of itself. ?2h/ H (9=@
&n the 2henomenology4 Hegel "lainly sees mo!ern morality as an a!vance
on ancient ethical lifeA ut he has still not aan!one! his earlier vie$ that
morality is at the same time a one;si!e! vie$ of ethical life. This leaves an
unresolve! tension in Hege2s ethical thoughtC the systematic su"eriority of
ethical life versus the historical su"eriority of morality. &nstea! of resolving
the tension4 Hegel "rovi!es a critiIue of the moral stan!"oint4 e>hiiting the
limitations of Gnite s"irit as a $hole an! "ointing to the a$areness of asolute
s"irit in religious consciousness. &t is not until Hegel's return to university
teaching a !eca!e later that he attem"ts to "resent a "icture of mo!ern ethical
life $ith $hich moral consciousness has een fully an! "ositively reconcile!.
'))
,O.AL&T1
(. 0uFectivity
Hegel's Hena $ritings tell us that morality is a stan!"oint characteristic of the
mo!ern $orl!. The moral stan!"oint is limite!4 ut not false. These $ritings
ma#e no real attem"t4 ho$ever4 to sho$ ho$ morality is X"ositive ?if limite!@
as"ect of ethical life. Nor !o they "rovi!e an account of a s"eciGcally mo!ern
ethical life in $hich morality is su""ose! to "lay a !ecisive role. -oth these
tas#s are left to Hegel's mature ethical $ritings4 eginning $ith the Hei!elerg
Encyclo"e!ia an! culminating in the 2hiloso"hy of .ight.
&t is no acci!ent that Hegel egins to "rovi!e a more "ositive account of
morality e>actly $hen he starts to "rovi!e a theory of civil society. Alrea!y
in the Natural .ight essay4 Hegel i!entiGe! morality as the ethical life of the
ourgeois. What is ne$ in the ethical $ritings after '+'7 is Hegel's a$areness
that the ourgeois moral attitu!e re"resents something uniIue to mo!ern
ethical life that constitutes the essential su"eriority of mo!ern Euro"ean culture
?the E/ermanic $orl!E@. &n Hegel's mature $ritings4 there are still recogniDaly
3antian an! :ichtean elements in the "resentation of morality4
ut they are re$or#e! to give an account of a moral stan!"oint $hich4 $ithin
its "ro"er s"here4 Hegel is "re"are! fully to en!orse.
The !istinguishing characteristic of mo!ern social life is EsuFectivityEA
the moral stan!"oint is the stan!"oint of the EsuFect.E This stan!"oint may
e !iLcult for us to gras" in its s"eciGcity4 ecause it may e har! for us to
see ho$ there coul! e any real alternatives to it. 0uFectivity is sim"ly the
stan!"oint of any in!ivi!ual agent. The $ill of the suFect4 as Hegel says4 is
Fust Ethe form of all $illingE ?2. N '6+@. 1et Hegel thin#s that consciousness
of myself as a suFect is something !istinctive4 culturally s"eciGc4 an! historically
recent. Li#e the a$areness of myself as a "erson4 it reIuires astraction.
To ta#e the moral stan!"oint seriously4 as Hegel thin#s $e !o in the mo!ern
$orl!4 $e must regar! our suFectivity as vitally im"ortant to our i!entity.
0uFectivity is astract4 ut less so than "ersonality. 2ersonality4 $hich
inclu!es only my formal or astract free!om4 e>clu!es those very features
that ma#e u" the content of my self;consciousness as this !eterminate rational
agent. &n contrast4 suFectivity is Ethe reJection of the $ill into itself an!
its i!entity for itselfE ?2. N '6(@. To e a suFect is to e a$are of oneself
as the "articular4 contingent in!ivi!ual that one is4 ut at the same time to
relate all the "articular things one ha""ens to e to one's ca"acities as a free
an! rational eing4 an! to regar! one's e>ercise of these ca"acities as the core
or foun!ation of one's i!entity as a self.
Hegel ma#es this "oint y !escriing suFectivity as a reJective i!entity
of universality an! "articularity. ,ore "recisely4 suFectivity is the EmovementE
y $hich these universal an! "articular si!es of the self are ma!e
i!entical<e>"erience! as harmonious as"ects of the same self. 0uFectivity is
the tas# of E$or#ing this groun! of free!om4E transforming EastractE suFectivity
into EconcreteE suFectivity y ma#ing it EoFectiveE an! EeIual to
its conce"tE ?2. N '67.@. As a suFect4 & am4 on the one si!e4 a free agent in
the astract4 $hose $ill falls un!er the universally vali! stan!ar!s of "ractical
')*
THE CONCE2T O: ,O.AL&T1
rationality. On the other si!eX& arG this "articular in!ivi!ual4 $ith nee!s an!
!esires "eculiarly my o$n<TactualiDe myself as a suFect $hen & ring these
t$o si!es together y ma#ing my "articular volitions rational an! y giving
my astract rationality a !eterminate in!ivi!ual content y turning its universal
"rinci"les into my "articular en!s an! actions<
^:he tas# of suFectivity is thus the ?3antian@ "roFect of ringing my $illing
into conformity $ith a universal rational "rinci"le4 so that it Eaccor!X
)'th the $ill in itselfE or has Ethe oFectivity of the conce"tE ?2. N m @ O 4
HThe universal si!e of suFectivity thus ta#es the form of an EoughtE ?2. Na
'6+4 '')@4 legislating to the "articular si!e. :or all $e have seen thus far4
ho$ever4 this EoughtE might consist only in the regulation of my $ill y
rational self;interestF 2rinci"les of "ru!ence are EuniversalE an! EoFectiveE
in the sense that they are in!ing on any an! every suFect $hose self;interest
is in IuestionC They have $hat $e may call a universality of a""licaility.
There is nothing EuniversalE aout the sco"e of the interests such "rinci"les
"romoteC These interests are solely mine. They !o not involve $hat $e
might call a universality of concern.hi the universal EoughtE elonging to
suFectivity is to e a recogniDaly moral ought4 then it must e sta$n to
have universality of concern4 not merely universality of a""licailityXU
7. The moral ought an! oFectivity
Hegel moves from universality of a""licaility to universality of concern
.Through the i!ea that the suFective $ill see#s to ma#e itself EoFective4E see#ing
to ring aout e>ternal states of aMairs. Li#e all stages in the !evelo"ment
of right4 morality involves the $ill's giving Ee>istenceE to itself or Eeing $ith
itself in an otherTFWhere the "erson's e>istence;in;otherness is e>istence in
an e>ternal thing4 Hegel ?a""arently "iling "ara!o> on "ara!o>@ !escries
the moral $ill as one;that Eis to have itself for its e>istenceE ?%2.igC 9'@. &n
other $or!s4 the EotherE in $hich the $ill is to e E$ith itselfE is su""ose!
to e Fust its o$n inner $illing.
?Willing itself4 Hegel insists4 is a "rocess of Etranslating the suFective en!
into oFectivityE ?2. N +@. The self as suFect is not Fust a un!le of !esires4
or even a clearinghouse for selecting actions to satisfy !esires. The tas# of
the suFect is to ring aout oFective results that manifest its suFectivity4
an! therey conGrm its o$n free!om or eing $ith itself. The en!s of the
suFect are never merely EsuFectiveEA they al$ays reach out into the oFective
$orl!. Although $e Fu!ge our actions morally as e>"ressions of our suFectivity4
our suFectivity itself e>ists only y sho$ing itself in actions $ith
e>ternal results ?2. NN & O + ; & & O @ H
This "oint lea!s us from suFectivity to universality of concern. To emo!y
my suFectivity in an e>ternal oFect is to Esu"erse!e the imme!iacy of
this suFectivity4 along $ith its character as my in!ivi!ual suFectivityEA it is
therefore to "osit at the same time Ean e>ternal suFectivity $hich is i!entical
$ith me4E or4 in other $or!s4 Ethe $ill of others. . . . The carrying out of
my en! thus has in itself the i!entity of my $ill an! another's $ill ; it has a
')(
,O.AL&T1
"ositive reference to the $ill of othersE ?2. N ''5@. EThe e>ternal e>istence
of the suFect is essentially the $ill of anotherE ?%2. 5C )9=@.
Hegel's argument here is terse an! oscure. &t may even seem so"histical4
a mere "lay on $or!s ; as if Emy suFective $ill e>ternaliDe!E ?i.e.4 e>"resse!
in something e>ternal@ meant the same as Ean e>ternal suFective $illE ?the
suFective $ill of another@.?She sustantial i!ea ehin! it is that since my
en! as a suFect is not merely suFective satisfaction ut an e>ternal result4
it follo$s that my rational concern as a suFect is essentially aout e>ternal
or "ulic oFects. 0uch oFects are there for others as $ell as for myself.
These others are suFects4 too4 $ith !esires an! interests of their o$n. -ecause
my suFectivity is actualiDe! only in $hat is "resent for these others4
the universality ?or rationality@ of $hat & !o must ta#e account of the interests
of others as $ell as my interests. Their stan!"oint on the rationality of
$hat & !o is eIual to my stan!"oint. Hence the universal conce"t of suFectivity
$hich serves as an ought Fmist inclu!e a universality of concern as $ell
as a universality of a""licailityX<
Hegel !istinguishes three relate! senses in $hich the moral suFect see#s
EoFectivity.E He ma#es this threefol! !istinction e>"licitly4 an! at some
length ?2. NN ''6;''54 ''5.4 '')@.T:irst4 the suFect see#s an Ee>ternal
e>istenceE in $hich its suFective en! ecomes a real oFect. 0econ!4 it see#s
oFectivity in the sense of that $hich is universally in!ing or a!eIuate to
the universal conce"t of the suFect ?$hat & have calle! Euniversality of a""licailityE@.
Thir!4 it see#s oFectivity or universality in the sense of something
that involves the $ill of others4 of all suFects ?Euniversality of concernE@.
Hegel goes on to infer that the moral goo!4 $hose content is the satisfaction
of "articularity or E$ell;eingE ?Wohl@4 must not e consi!ere! only as the
suFect's o$n $ell;eing4 ut it must e thought of ?Ethough Iuite em"tilyE@'
as Ethe $ell;eing of allE ?2. N '5(@ or Euniversal $ell;eingE ?2. N ')6@='
None of this settles any Iuestions aout ho$ far rational universality fR
Iuires me to $eigh the interests of others against my o$n interests. &t tells
us nothing aout the !egree to $hich one moral suFect ought to contriute
to the $ell;eing of others4 an! is minimally consistent $ith the su""osition'
that4 all things consi!ere!4 each suFect ought to "rovi!e e>clusively for her
o$n $ell;eing an! ta#e no thought for that of the others. Hegel's argument
"rovi!es for a universality of concern only in the minimal sense that it removes
the "resum"tion that suFectivity concerns solely the suFect's o$n
$ell;eing. -eyon! that4 Hegel thin#s that morality leaves in!eterminate
ho$ $e are to $eigh the interests of !iMerent suFects against one another.
This limite! conclusion of Hegel's argument accor!s "erfectly $ith his
intentions. &t is Hegel's "osition that the moral stan!"oint "rovi!es us $ith
no !eterminate criteria of action4 no !eterminate conce"t of the moral goo!.
These are su""lie! only y the more concrete social relationshi"s of ethical
life. &t is Hegel's hait to a""ly the term EmoralE to those cases of otherconcern
$hich are not !eterminately structure! y the relations of ethical
life ; for e>am"le4 contingent acts of "rivate charity to$ar! the nee!y ?cf.
2. NN 56=4 5*5@. :rom the stan!"oint of morality4 the only im"ortant thing
')7
THE CONCE2T O: ,O.AL&T1
is that the "ossiility of concern for others' $ell;eing shoul! e recogniDe!
as integral to the "roFect of actualiDing the moral suFect's free!om.
=. 0uFectivity an! action
EThe i!entity of inner an! outerE is one of the "rinci"les of Hegelian s"eculative
logic ?WL7C '=9;'+(<(5);(5+A EL N ')+@. As a""lie! to morality4 Hegel
inter"rets this "rinci"le as saying that the in$ar!ness of $illing must e
Fu!ge! y outer actionsC
What a human eing is e>ternally4 i.e. in his actions . . .4 he is in$ar!ly4 an! if he
is virtuous4 moral4 etc. only in$ar!ly4 i.e. only in his intentions or !is"ositions an!
his e>ternality is not i!entical $ith this4 then the one is as hollo$ an! em"ty as the
other. ?EL N '*6@
What the suFect is4 is the series of his actions. &f these are a series of $orthless
"ro!uctions4 then the suFectivity of his $illing is Fust as $orthless. -ut if the series
of his !ee!s is of a sustantial nature4 then so it is also $ith the $ill of the in!ivi!ual.
?2. N '5*@
Hegel !oes not !eny that "eo"le can conceal their intentions ?%/ 77<(=@4 or
that in "articular cases they may fail to achieve $hat they inten!4 o$ing to
unfavorale circumstances ?EL N '*6A@. This means only that $e shoul!
Fu!ge an in!ivi!ual's inner $illing y the overall "attern of out$ar! !ee!s4
Fust as these !ee!s are al$ays to e inter"rete! as the e>"ression of a !eterminate
inner volitionC EWhat a man !oes is to e consi!ere! not in its imme!iacy
ut only as me!iate! through his in$ar!ness an! as a manifestation of
his in$ar!ness. Only here $e must not overloo# the fact that the essence an!
the in$ar!ness conGrm themselves only y ste""ing for$ar! as a""earanceE
?SLN ''5A@.
2art of $hat Hegel has in min! in these "assages is e>"resse! y 3ant
$hen he says that the goo! $ill is Enot a mere $ish4 ut the summoning of
every means in our "o$erE ?/ )9*<'6@. 2eo"le get no moral cre!it for mere
$ishes4 an! & nee! not troule to congratulate myself on the Egoo! intentionsE
that & Gn! in myself ut have never gotten aroun! to acting on. -ut
Hegel's "osition goes further than 3ant's in the same !irection4 an! is at
o!!s $ith it in im"ortant $ays.
3ant famously hol!s that the eneGcial conseIuences of the goo! $ill4 li#e
the setting of a Fe$el4 serve only to !is"lay it more favoraly. They a!!
nothing to its inner $orth4 $hich $oul! not suMer at all if the goo! $ill faile!
com"letely to achieve the goo! results at $hich it aims ?/ )9*<'6@. 3ant
!istinguishes et$een the satisfaction $e may ta#e in the achievement of our
"ur"oses an! the contentment $e feel in ourselves $hen $e are a$are of
having a goo! $ill ; $hether or not $e succee! in accom"lishing the goo!
that $e $ill ?TL )+7;)+=<*7;*=@.
&n this !istinction Hegel sees the moralist's ten!ency to hy"ocrisy. The
goo! $ill is su""ose! to consist in a concernful striving to$ar! a goo! en!.
-ut if & fail to achieve the en!4 the moralist says4 & may still feel "erfectly
content $ith myself4 sim"ly on account of my goo! $ill. Hegel $on!ers ho$
')=
,O.AL&T1
far it can e consistent for me to feel such contentment $hen & have faile!
to achieve the en! to $hich & $as su""ose!ly so !evote!. To him it a""ears
as if the moralist's struggle to actualiDe the goo! is really a sham;Gght4 $hich
$e !are not ta#e seriously for fear of e>"osing our inner virtue to the assaults
of evil W2h/ h )+(@.
The natural 3antian re"ly to Hegel at this "oint is to say that $e can
surely !istinguish et$een my stan!"oint as an agent concerne! to realiDe
the goo! an! my stan!"oint as Fu!ge of my actions an! their inherent $orth.
Li#e$ise4 $e can !istinguish et$een the "ossession of a goo! $ill4 $hich is
u" to me an! my res"onsiility4 an! the success or failure of my eMorts to
actualiDe the goo!4 $hich may not e my fault. As moralist & may feel !isa""ointment
an! regret at not having accom"lishe! my nole en!s4 ut & may
nevertheless e a$are that my failure $as not my fault4 an! so & may e
content $ith myself as a virtuous moral suFect4 even if & am not satisGe!
$ith the $ic#e! course of the $orl! $hich has frustrate! me.
Hegel's "oint4 ho$ever4 is that there are limits on ho$ far $e can "ress
these t$o !istinctions4 es"ecially $hen $e ta#e them in tan!em. A!mitte!ly
a ty"e of striving that generally lea!s to the goo! may4 through no fault of
the agent4 fail to achieve it in a "articular case. &n Cha"ter +4 $e $ill see that
Hegel thin#s & am not al$ays to lame for the conseIuences of my actions4
es"ecially $hen & !i! not #no$ they $oul! occur. -ut Hegel hol!s that & am
res"onsile for $hatever elongs to my action y its very nature4 an! the
nature of my action often involves the com"le> e>ternal circumstances in
$hich & act. &f the nature of my actions is such that they !o not "ro!uce
goo! results4 then & cannot save the goo!ness of my $ill y hi!ing ehin!
the "rofession of my goo! intentions.
Consi!er the follo$ing scenarioC* 0ome moralists are sincerely concerne!
aout the nee!y an! o""resse! of the $orl!. They ma#e great eMorts an!
sacriGces to relieve their suMerings an! ring them free!om an! !ignity. -ut
su""ose the system of o""ression antici"ates their charitale $or#4 an!
#no$s ho$ to e>"loit their eMorts to its a!vantage. &t has its o$n !evices for
e>tracting all the fruits4 leaving the inten!e! eneGciaries $ith none. 0u""ose4
further4 that receiving charity humiliates an! !emoraliDes the "oor4 so
that they are even easier "rey to their o""ressors. As a result4 the moralists
have accom"lishe! nothing of their arms. They have enriche! the e>"loiters4
$hile the "eo"le they inten!e! to hel" are even $orse oM than efore4
A""ealing to the 3antian !istinction et$een the goo! $ill an! its results4
these moralists lay the lame for their failure entirely on the system that
"erverte! their $ell;intentione! eMorts4 an! the evil $ills of those $ho have
successfully th$arte! their aims. &f our motives are "ure4 they tell themselves4
then4 our consciences may e clearA the sa! results of our eMorts nee!
not !iminish our inner self;contentment.
Hegel's Fu!gment is less consoling. &f Ethe truth of the intention is Fust the
!ee! itselfE ?2h/ h '(9@4 then $e must regar! the suFectivity of these moralists
as im"licate! in the results of their actions. The moral signiGcance of
their intentions must e inter"rete! in light of the natural conseIuences of
')+
THE CONCE2T O: ,O.AL&T1
the actions $hich manifest them. &f our intentions issue in actions that naturally
"ro!uce a! results4 then $e have a! intentions. The moralists are
guilty of hy"ocrisy $hen they sIuan!er all their regret on the e>ternal $orl!4
leaving none for their o$n suFectivity.
3ant says that the goo! $ill $ithout any goo! results Eshines li#e a Fe$el4
having its full value in itselfE ?/ )9*<'6@. &n "lace of this4 Hegel "utsC EThe
laurels of mere $illing are !ry leaves that never have een greenE ?2. N
'5*A@. He reFects the vie$ that E"resu""oses a ga" ?-ruch@ et$een $hat is
oFective in the action an! $hat is inner4 suFective in its motivesE in favor
of Ethe higher moral stan!"oint $hich Gn!s satisfaction in the action itselfE
?2. N '5' A@. &f & $ill to achieve some en!4 then & can e truly content $ith
my $illing only if the en! is accom"lishe!. There is no such thing as a "urely
inner volitional state4 immune to the $orl! of actions an! conseIuences. The
self;contentment foun! in such states is nothing ut ty"ical moralistic hy"ocrisy.
')9
+
The moral $ill
i. &m"utaility
,orality is concerne! $ith the suFective4 ut suFectivity is actual only insofar
as it ma#es itself oFective. The conseIuences of $hat & !o are not a""en!e!
acci!entally to my moral suFectivity. They are its actuality4 an! it
is from them that & must learn the meaning of $hat & am as a moral suFect.
&t is eIually true that from a moral stan!"oint & am intereste! in my actions
an! their conseIuences only insofar as they e>"ress my suFectivity. Hence
from the moral stan!"oint it is im"ortant to !eci!e for $hich e>ternal events
my suFective $ill can e hel! accountale.
Anything & !o changes the $orl! in some $ay4 or at least contriutes to
such changes. Hegel says that & Eam res"onsile forE ?0chul! in an@ any
event in $hich my !oing ?Tun@ is causally involve! ?2. N ''(@A ut not
everything for $hich & am res"onsile ?in this causal sense@ may e Eim"ute!E
?Dugerechnet4 im"utiert@ to me4 treate! as an e>"ression of my suFective
$ill. Hegel !istinguishes my E!ee!E ?Tat@ from my EactionE ?Han!lung@.
Action consists only of that "art or as"ect of $hat & eMect that lies in
my conscious #no$le!ge. This "art or as"ect of my !ee! Hegel calls my
E"ur"oseE ?%orsatD@ ?2. N ''=@. The e>tent of the conseIuences of my action
lying $ithin my "ur"ose !e"en!s on my Ere"resentationE ?%orstellung@ of
the circumstances an! of the li#ely results of $hat & !i!. &f factors eyon!
my #en !rive my action on to further conseIuences4 then Hegel says & have
the right to re"u!iate all conseIuences e>ce"t the Grst one4 since it alone lay
in my "ur"ose ?2. N ''+@. -ecause my "ur"ose !e"en!s in this $ay on
my #no$le!ge ?Wissen@4 Hegel also !escries the right to re"u!iate alien
conseIuences as the Eright of #no$le!geE ?.echt !es Wissens@ ?2. N ''=@.
Hegel contrasts the mo!ern4 suFective vie$ of the sco"e of moral res"onsiility
?recogniDing the right of #no$le!ge@ $ith the Enole sim"licityE ?/e!iegenheit@
of the ancient /ree#s4 $ho ha! not yet attaine! the moral stan!"oint
?%/ ='<75@. The /ree#s thus acce"te! res"onsiility for the full
com"ass of their !ee!s4 even for things they !i! in ignorance or ma!ness ?as
in the case of tragic heroes such as Oe!i"us an! AFa>@ ?2. NN ''=A4 ''+.A
N2 55);55*A 2h/ ,l *7+;*=6@.
Hegel clearly uses E"ur"oseE ?%orsatD@ in a highly technical sense. The
E"ur"oseE of my action inclu!es not only those conseIuences at $hich & e>"ressly
aim4 ut also those $hose occurrence & foresee in acting4 even if & !o
not !esire them at all. &f & use my re! Jag to alter the "ath of a charging ull
'*6
THE ,O.AL W&LL
so that instea! of goring your chil! it tram"les your "etunias4 Hegel counts
as "art of my E"ur"oseE not only the "reservation of your chil!'s life4 ut
also the !estruction of your "etunias.
:urther4 Hegel counts as "art of my "ur"ose even conseIuences that &
may not have #no$n aout4 if they elong to Ethe nature of the action itselfE
?2. N ''+.@. &n general4 the EnatureE of a thing for Hegel is $hat $e gras"
from rational reJection u"on it an! its connection $ith other things ?EL N
5)@. &n the case of an actionA these connections are conseIuences ?%2.igC
9*A 2. N ''+@. The nature of an action thus consists in those conseIuences
of it that $oul! e #no$n y rational reJectionC E&n general it is im"ortant
to thin# aout the conseIuences of an action ecause in this $ay one !oes
not sto" $ith the imme!iate stan!"oint ut goes eyon! it. Through a manysi!e!
consi!eration of the action4 one $ill e le! to the nature of the actionE
?N2 5)6@.
Hegel a""arently inten!s this to !eal $ith cases li#e that of an arsonist
$ho sets Gre only to one house ?or to one stic# of furniture@4 ut en!s u"
urning u" a $hole neighorhoo! ?2. N ''9A@. Hegel insists that the fully
!evelo"e! conseIuences of the act elong to the arsonist's "ur"ose4 ecause
it elongs to the nature of an act of arson that the Gre may s"rea! out of
controlC EThe !olus !irectus or !irect "ur"ose is4 for e>am"le4 setting Gre
to the Grst "iece of $oo!4 an! the !olus in!irectus contains all the further
conseIuences. These elong to the nature of the action itself4 $hich "osits
their "ossiility along $ith it. The man must #no$ thisE ?%2. *C )57A cf.
E/ N (6(@;'
An agent's E"ur"oseE tells us $hich events are im"utale to that agent4
ut it !oes not tell us everything $e nee! in or!er to Fu!ge the agent's suFectivity.
&t tells us that oth the saving of your chil! an! the tram"ling of
your "etunias elong to my "ur"ose. -ut the t$o results are relate! to my
suFectivity in very !iMerent $aysC One is the !esire! en! of my action4 the
other a regrettale conseIuence & incur reluctantly for the sa#e of that en!.
This !iMerence is im"ortant for un!erstan!ing the t$o results as e>"ressions
of my suFectivity.
As a suFect4 Hegel says4 & am a thin#er4 an! so & ring my actions un!er
a Euniversal4E $hich Hegel calls the action's EintentionE ?Asicht@. -y Eunir
versalE Hegel !oes not mean merely some general !escri"tion un!er $hich
my action may e rought ?Eurning4E E#illingE@4 ut the $hole com"le> of
conseIuences that an act sets in motion4 organiDe! in a certain $ay y
thought ?2. N ''9A E/ N (6(@. Hegel "oints out that etymologically the
$or! Asicht ?Eloo#ing a$ayE@ im"lies the astraction of a "articular si!e of a
concrete !ee! ?2. N ''9.@. The moral he !ra$s from this is that the agent's
intention is the as"ect of the action that constitutes its EsuFective essenceE
an! e>"lains $hy the suFect !i! it ?2. N '5' A@.
To "ut the "oint in non;Hegelian Fargon4 the EintentionE of an action is
its E!esiraility characteriDationE or the E!escri"tion un!er $hichE the agent
!esires to "erform it. Or again4 $e coul! say that the Hegelian intention is
the Einternal reasonE for the action4 the reason that e>"lains $hy the suFect
'*'
,O.AL&T1
!i! it.5 :or instance4 my intention in $aving the Jag at the ull $as to save
your chil!4 not to !estroy your "etunias. Hegel thin#s that as moral suFects
$e have the right that our actions e Fu!ge! un!er the a""ro"riate intentional
!escri"tions.
This Eright of intention4E as Hegel calls it4 has t$o "artsC :irst4 an act
can e im"ute! to me un!er a certain !escri"tion only if & un!erstan! that
!escri"tion. A chil! too young to have any conce"t of "ro"erty or immo!esty
cannot e guilty of theft or in!ecent e>"osure. The right of intention Ecarries
$ith it a total4 or a lesser4 ca"acity on the "art of chil!ren4 imeciles4 the
insane4 etc. to have their actions im"ute! to themE ?2. N '56.@. 0econ!4 &
have the right that my actions e consi!ere! in light of my intention in "erforming
it. Destroying your "etunias elonge! to my E"ur"oseE ut not to
my Eintention4E $hich is to save your chil!. &t is my right of suFectivity to
have my action evaluate! morally in that light.
As in the case of an act's "ur"ose4 ho$ever4 $hen $e Fu!ge an act's intention
$e must ta#e into account that a res"onsile agent is a thin#er $ho must
un!erstan! the nature of the action. Hence the right of intention is not a
right to acce"t res"onsiility for an action only in terms of some "referre!
!escri"tion. & must also acce"t res"onsiility for $hat & !o un!er those !escri"tions
that4 as a rational agent4 & ought to have #no$n. ConseIuently4
Hegel says that the right of intention corres"on!s to Ethe right of oFectivity
of the action4 as it might e calle!4 to assert itself as #no$n an! $ille! y
the suFect as a thin#ing eingE ?2. N '56@. This means that if an act of mine
violates a la$ or an ethical !uty4 or harms another in!ivi!ual4 & am res"onsile
for it un!er that !escri"tion as $ell as un!er the !escri"tion that su""lies
the reason for my !oing it. Hegel cannot mean that these are all !escri"tions
un!er $hich & !esire! the action. We must consi!er all the !escri"tions un!er
$hich & #ne$ ?or shoul! have #no$n@ the action to fall in their s"eciGc
relation to my en!s an! !esires. &n a sense4 then4 the universal Etram"ling
the "etuniasE is also "art of my intention4 ut not in the same $ay as Esaving
the chil!.E
5. ,oral luc# an! negligence
One vie$ of moral res"onsiility ma#es the agent res"onsile originally or
fun!amentally not for oFective ha""enings in the $orl!4 ut for the agent's
o$n suFective states of $illing or trying4 $hether or not they have any e>ternal
conseIuences at all. &t treats moral res"onsiility as a function of $hat
morality may !eman! of us. We are res"onsile for !oing only $hat lies
$ithin our control4 an! strictly s"ea#ing only our inner volitions are $ithin
our control. On this vie$ it is not a sim"le matter to ma#e sense of assertions
to the eMect that & am res"onsile for something that ha""ens in the $orl!
?e.g.4 an acci!ental !eath4 the "revention of a $ar@ as !istinct from $hat
ha""ens in my voluntary mental life ?e.g.4 my trying or not trying to "revent
an acci!ent4 my eMorts to "revent the $ar@. On such vie$s4 my res"onsiility
for e>ternal events has to e in!irect. These events are treate! only as conse;
'*5
THE ,O.AL W&LL
Iuences of inner volitional !oings or omittings4 un!er the close su"ervision
of some Eought im"lies canE "rinci"le.
Hegel's theory of res"onsiility4 y contrast4 ma#es the agent !irectly an!
originally res"onsile for e>ternal occurrences. This theory i!entiGes my
$illing $ith the suFective si!e of an oFective occurrence. ,y suFective
$illing is #no$n through the inter"retation of $hat it accom"lishes4 an! has
no actual e>istence in astraction from that. ,orality is intereste! in the
suFective $illA in!ee!4 it is intereste! in nothing else. -ut Hegel thin#s that
the suFective $ill !oes not e>ist at all in se"aration from e>ternal !ee!s.
,ere strivings or inten!ings4 in astraction from the actions that e>"ress
them4 are too inchoate an! amiguous to e oFects of moral assessment.
The signiGcance of an intention can e gras"e! only $hen it is the intention
of this act4 $ith these conseIuences. An intention $ith no conseIuences at
all has4 in any case4 only marginal signiGcance. De"rive! of its setting4
3ant's Fe$el turns to glass.
Hegel's theory of res"onsiility "lainly allo$s for a !egree of Emoral luc#.E
&t conce!es that our inner moral $orth is vulnerale to the haDar!s efalling
our out$ar! actions.) &n Hegel's vie$4 this is sim"ly a conseIuence of the
fact that our intentions have actuality only as emo!ie! in the e>ternal $orl!4
$here contingency is inevitale ?WL7C (**<+56@. EAn ol! "rover rightly
says4 'A stone once thro$n is the !evil's.' When & act4 & allo$ for a! luc#A
so it has a right over me an! is an e>istence of my o$n $illingE ?2. N ''9A@.
The only $ay to #ee" your inner intentions free from the vagaries of goo!
or a! fortune is to avoi! acting on them at allA that is not moral "urity4 only
hy"ocrisy ?cf. 2h/ ,& 7(+;776@. ,oral agents $ho un!erstan! the nature of
suFectivity !o not attem"t to Jee from contingencyA they acce"t it as a con!ition
of the "ossiility of e>"ressing their suFectivity.
3arl;HeinD &lting claims that Hegel's theory of res"onsiility ma#es no
"rovision for a !istinction et$een the foreseeale an! unforeseeale conseIuences
of actions4 an! cannot han!le cases of res"onsiility !ue to negligence.
* This Fu!gment atten!s too one;si!e!ly to Hegel's insistence on the
im"ortance of the agent's #no$le!ge an! intention4 $ithout noticing his com"lementary
remar#s to the eMect that $e may im"ute to the agent $hatever
elongs to the nature of the action. &f & am res"onsile for the nature of $hat
& !o4 an! if that inclu!es the conseIuences that $oul! e #no$n y rational
consi!eration of the action4 then this entails that & am res"onsile for foreseeale
conseIuences ?ut not unforeseeale ones@. &t also ma#es me res"onsile
for conseIuences & shoul! have foreseen an! for my actions un!er !escri"tions
that & shoul! have #no$n ?ut in fact !i! not #no$@ to e true of them.
&n short4 Hegel's theory ma#es me res"onsile not only for $hat & !i! $hile
?in the usual sense@ "ur"osing or inten!ing it4 ut also for $hat & #ne$ $oul!
occur as a result of $hat & !i!4 an! even for $hat & !i! not #no$ $oul! occur
if its occurrence $oul! have een antici"ate! y a thoughtful or rational
consi!eration of the action in light of the circumstances. That surely ta#es
in everything $e usually mean y cul"ale negligence.
&lting may still have a "oint4 though. Hegel's theory might e faulte! for
>*)
,O.AL&T1
incom"leteness regar!ing these !istinctions. &t !istinguishes et$een $hat
falls $ithin the agent's E"ur"oseE an! $hat !oes notA an! $ithin that "ur"ose4
it enales us to say $hat elongs to the agent's Eintention.E This allo$s
us to Fu!ge !iMerently an agent $ho causes a !eath intentionally an! one $ho
causes a !eath #no$ingly ut $ithout !esiring the !eath for its o$n sa#e.
-ut !oes it account for the !iMerence et$een the moral lame $e $oul!
!irect to the latter agent an! the lame $e $oul! !irect to an agent $ho
causes a !eath unintentionally an! $ithout #no$le!ge4 ut $ith cul"ale
negligenceB
Hegel remar#s that someone $ho Gres a gun into the $oo!s4 meaning to
hit an animal ut #illing a human eing4 is guilty of manslaughter rather than
mur!er ?%2. 5C *5)4 F C )(+4 cf. %2. iyC =+@. -ut it is unclear ho$ his theory
$ill !ra$ such !istinctions. The only Iuestions on $hich it focuses are
$hether the !eath shoul! fall $ithin the agent's E"ur"oseE an! $hat the
agent's EintentionE $as in acting. &ssues of negligence an! cul"ale ignorance
usually also !e"en! on the ans$ers to other4 Iuite !iMerent Iuestions. Ho$
carefully !i! the hunter e>amine the thic#et efore Gring into itB Whatever
his #no$le!ge an! intention4 $hy $as he so rec#less as to Gre at something
he coul!n't see clearlyB
2erha"s one reason Hegel ten!s to ignore these Iuestions is that he !oes
not al$ays succee! in !istinguishing issues of moral res"onsiility4 Fu!gment4
an! lame from issues of legal cul"aility. One sign of this is that
Hegel's most imme!iate a""lication of the "rover EA stone once thro$n is
the !evil'sE is to "rovi!e a rationale for a charge of felony mur!er in a case
$here an arsonist unintentionally causes someone's !eath ?2. N ''9.@. Another
sign of it is that Hegel san!$iches et$een E"ur"oseE an! EintentionE
a !iscussion of my EliailityE ?Haftung@ for harm or !amage cause! to others
or their "ro"erty y things4 animals4 or chil!ren $ho are in my charge ?2.
N ''7A %2. iyC ==;=+A %2.FC )(74 *C )'*@. Hegel himself notes that there
is an im"ortant !iMerence et$een legal an! moral im"utaility ?2. N '').@4
ut he cannot e cre!ite! $ith e>"laining the !istinction4 or even $ith any
great care in atten!ing to it.
These are "rolems not so much $ith Hegel's theory of im"utaility itself
as $ith its formulation an! a""lication. Hegel's theory hol!s us res"onsile
for an occurrence if it gives out$ar! e>istence to our suFective $ill. -ecause
?as Hegel em"hasiDes@ $e are thin#ing eings4 certain !efects in our un!erstan!ing
have to e regar!e! as !efects of our suFectivity. This "lainly
allo$s for the "ossiility of im"uting negligent actions to "eo"le not only
ecause they $ere not suLciently motivate! to acIuire the #no$le!ge they
shoul! have ha!4 ut also sim"ly ecause they !i!n't #no$ $hat a thin#ing
suFect shoul! have #no$n un!er the circumstances.
). The goo!
The en! of morality is the goo!4 Efree!om realiDe!4 the asolute Gnal en! of
the $orl!E ?2. N '59@. Hegel locates the goo! $ithin the moral s"here e;
'**
THE ,O.AL W&LL
cause there the actuality an! self;!etermination of the free $ill are foun! in
their "articulariDation ?WL7C (*)<+'9@. &t is in the moral suFect that the
universal is unite! $ith the "articular4 achieving in!ivi!uality ?2. N =@. &n
other $or!s4 Hegel thin#s that the self;actualiDation of reason in the $orl!
occurs only in an! through the acts of self;conscious in!ivi!ual human suFects
?cf. %/ =+;''6<7+;9)@. To e sure4 Hegel hol!s that & most fully actualiDe
myself $hen & am !evote! to higher en!s than my o$n "articular satisfactionA
an! the highest such en! is the state ?2. N 5(+@. Nevertheless4 these
higher en!s elong to the goo!4 Ethe Gnal en! of the $orl!4E only ecause
they are set as rational en!s y free moral suFects $ho actualiDe themselves
in "ursuing the goo!. ,oreover4 the sustance of these higher en!s consists
in the right an! the $ell;eing of in!ivi!uals ?2. N 57(AA see Cha"ter '4 N
)@. We shoul! #ee" these "oints in min! $hen "eo"le tell us that Hegel's
"hiloso"hy sumerges the human in!ivi!ual in social collectives or astract
s"eculative universals.
The suFect's actualiDation ta#es "lace $hen its universal rationality receives
fulGllment through the satisfaction of its "articularity. To this satisfaction
Hegel gives the name of E$ell;eingE ?!as Wohl@ or ha""iness ?2. N
'5).A cf. Cha"ter )4 N (@. Well;eing inclu!es not only the satisfaction of
our "articular !esires as natural eings4 ut also the Eself;satisfactionE accom"anying
the success of "roFects in $hich $e ta#e an interest4 even $hen the
"roFects themselves are entirely unselGsh ?2. N '5)@. :or Hegel as for 3ant4
the content of the goo! consists in rational agents' successful accom"lishment
of their en!s4 inclu!ing the satisfaction of their natural nee!s ?/ *')<)6@.(
:or oth "hiloso"hers4 $ell;eing is a goo! only con!itionally. 3ant hol!s
that the con!ition of its goo!ness is virtue or goo!ness of $ill. That is4 & am
$orthy of $ell;eing or ha""iness $hen & am virtuous enough ?/ )9)<7'A
3"% ''6<''(A TL *+'<'((@. 3ant ta#es this "osition ecause he regar!s the
moral agent as suFect to an a "riori la$ telling us $hich ma>ims to a!o"t
"rior to any en!. The moral en! ?the goo!@ is sim"ly the en!s !etermine!
y these morally reIuire! ma>ims. /oo!ness of $ill is the su"reme or uncon!itione!
en! involve! in morally legislative ma>imsA the $ell;eing of rational
agents is the con!itione! en!.
&t is not o"en to Hegel to follo$ 3ant's conce"tion of the goo! at this
"oint4 even if he $ante! to. As $e shall see "resently4 Hegel conceives of the
goo! $ill as the $ill $hose insight an! intention accor! $ith the goo! ?2.
N ')'@. /iven that conce"tion of the goo! $ill4 the 3antian conce"tion of
the goo! $oul! involve him in a vicious circularity4 ecause $e $oul! nee!
a conce"tion of the goo! in or!er to give content to the uncon!itione! com"onent
of the goo!. &nstea! of saying that goo! $ill or virtue is the con!ition
for the $orth of $ell;eing4 Hegel hol!s that $ell;eing is goo! $henever it
is consistent $ith astract right ?2. N '57A %2.iyC +)@4 $hich ?as $e have
seen@ is in!e"en!ent of $ell;eing.
:or Hegel4 then4 right an! $ell;eing are le>ically or!ere!.7 Human ha""iness
is something goo!4 ut only on the con!ition that no right is violate!
in acIuiring it. The le>ical or!ering of the right an! $ell;eing is mitigate!
H(
,O.AL&T1
y the Eright of necessityE ?see Cha"ter (4 N (@ an! in another $ay alsoC
EWell;eing is not something goo! $ithout the right. Li#e$ise4 the right is
not the goo! $ithout $ell;eingA Gat Fustitia TDo FusticeU shoul! not have
"ereat mun!us Tthough the $orl! "erishU as its conseIuenceE ?2. N ')6@.
Well;eing is suor!inate! to right4 ut the goo! reIuires that it e there
Fust the same. A $orl! of unha""y "eo"le $ho "unctiliously res"ect one
another's rights is not a goo! $orl!.
*. 3ant on the goo! $ill
&t is illuminating to com"are Hegel's conce"tion of the goo! $ill $ith 3ant's
more famous one. This section !iscusses 3ant's conce"tion of the goo! $ill4
in or!er to facilitate the com"arison4 $hich $ill occu"y us for the rest of this
cha"ter.
3ant !istinguishes actions that are merely Eaccor!ing to !utyE ?"Jichtmassig@
from actions that are !one Efrom !utyE ?aus 2Jicht@. Only the latter have
moral $orth an! e>hiit a goo! $ill4 the only thing in the $orl! or eyon!
it that is goo! $ithout IualiGcation ?/ )9=;)99<');'7A 3"% +'<+*A TL )+9<
(6@. To !o an action from !uty is to !o it out of res"ect for the moral la$4
rather than from any inclination or from any li#ing for the actual4 e>"ecte!4
or inten!e! conseIuences of the action ?/ )99;*6'<'7;'=@. 0ome actions
accor! $ith !uty ut are !one from feelings of love an! sym"athy. They are
Gne ?schon@ an! amiale ?lieens$iir!ig@4 !eserving of "raise an! encouragement4
ut !evoi! of moral $orth4 an! not !eserving of esteem ?HochschatDung@
?3"% +5<+(A cfi / )9=b)99<&)b&7@.
We may e misle! y 3ant's claim that there is Eno moral $orthE in actions
that accor! $ith !uty ut are not !one from !uty. 3ant clearly !oes not
acce"t :ichte's more e>treme vie$ that all acts ?even those comman!e! y
the moral la$@ are morally $rong unless they are !one from the motive of
!uty ?0L '(*<'75;'7)4 )'6<)574 )'(;)'7<))6@. 3ant asserts that these acts
are Gne4 !eserving of "raise4 an! that they shoul! e encourage!. These are
"lainly moral Fu!gments aout these acts4 an! they attriute $orth to the
acts. Ho$ever4 3ant $ants to !istinguish from this general moral a""roval
a s"ecial sort of moral esteem elonging only to acts !one from !uty.
0ometimes oth !uty an! inclination s"ea# in favor of the same course of
action. Here it ma#es an im"ortant moral !iMerence to 3ant $hether $e act
from !uty or from inclination. We nee! not forego the satisfaction of our
inclinations. We may even have this as "art of our en!. -ut in our motivation4
$e ought to Eastract ?ason!ern@ ourselves from all incentives of inclination4
so as to act solely from !uty4 an! not from inclination ?T2 5=+;5=9<
7*;7(@. The motive of !uty is $holly !istinctive for 3ant ecause only in
actions !one from !uty !o $e e>ercise our free!om ; our ca"acity to act
autonomously as eings in!e"en!ent of an! su"erior to the natural or sensile
$orl! ?3"% +7;+=<+9;96@.
3ant's vie$s here are stri#ing4 in some $ays e>treme. -ut it is easy ?almost
tra!itional@ for 3ant's rea!ers to e>aggerate their austerity. 3ant !oes not
'*7
THE ,O.AL W&LL
thin# that it is !esirale4 or even "ossile4 that every act shoul! e !one from
!uty4 since he !oes not thin# that every action is even a can!i!ate for moral
$orth. An action is a can!i!ate for moral $orth only if !uty reIuires it ?or
if $e loo# at its "erformance as a case of refraining from some other s"eciGc
action that is contrary to !uty@A $hen $e have a choice et$een t$o or more
morally "ermissile actions4 $e inevitaly ma#e it on groun!s other than
!uty. To $ant every one of our actions to have moral $orth $oul! e to
$ant ?in 3ant's $or!s@ to Estre$ all our ste"s $ith !uties4E a $ish $hose
fulGllment4 accor!ing to 3ant4 $oul! turn the E!ominionE ?Herrschaft@ of
virtue into a EtyrannyE ?TL *69<=' @.=
Even in cases $here !uty i!s us !o something4 3ant !oes not thin# that
$e are reIuire! to act solely from !uty. He thin#s it is our !uty to strive to
ma#e the thought of !uty our sole an! suLcient motiveA ut he hol!s that
$e may fulGll this !uty even if our striving is not "erfectly successful.+ 3ant
!oes hol! that "erfect virtue4 after $hich $e !o have a !uty to strive4 consists
in "erforming morally la$ful actions solely or "urely from the motive of
!uty4 $ithout the nee! of any coo"erating inclinations ?TL )9';)95<(5;()A
3"% +*;+(<+=;++A . )6<5(@. Thus those actions that accor! $ith !uty ut
are not !one "urely from !uty ; an! $hich therefore !eserve oth "raise an!
encouragement ; are nevertheless vie$e! y 3ant as e>hiiting the Eim"urityE
of the human $ill4 the secon! of the three !egrees of ra!ical evil in
human nature ?. 59;)6<5(@.
:or 3ant4 my $ill is E"ure4E only $here Eno incentives of inclinations are
the !etermining groun!s inJuencing an action !one as a !utyE ?3"% '76<
'7(@. The "ure $ill !oes not necessarily lac# nonmoral incentives4 ut it
succee!s in astracting itself from them in its motivation. &n the "ure $ill4
the moral motive is not only strong enough to account for the agent's "erformance
of the act in those "articular circumstances4 ut also strong enough
that the agent $oul! still "erform the !utiful action even if every conceivale
nonmoral incentive stoo! o""ose! to !oing it.
3ant invites us to imagine an honest man as#e! y a $ic#e! sovereign to
give false testimony against an innocent "erson ?3ant's e>am"le is Anne -oleyn4
falsely accuse! y 3ing Henry %&&&@ ?3"% '((<'(9@. :irst the honest
man is oMere! ries an! in!ucements to Foin in the unFust calumny. When
he !eclines them4 he is threatene! $ith the loss of the aMection of his frien!s
an! family4 $ith the !e"rivation of his every ha""iness4 even $ith the loss
of his free!om an! his life itself4 if he refuses. True "urity of $ill is to e
foun! only in those $ho !o their !uty in such a $ay that they $oul! still !o
it even in such an e>treme situation ?3"% '((;'(7<'(9;'76@. :or 3ant4 $e
can have a goo! $ill $ithout actually having a "ure $ill in this senseA ut to
have a goo! $ill $e must strive to the est of our aility after such "urity of
$ill in every act $here !uty is at sta#e ?even in situations $here no threats
or enticements are "resent@.
3ant famously !enies a goo! $ill to the sho"#ee"er $ho serves customers
honestly ecause he Gn!s that honesty is goo! usiness. He !oes not mean
that merely having the incentive of self;interest is suLcient to !isIualify the
H=
,O.AL&T1
sho"#ee"er from having a goo! $ill an! "erforming acts of moral $orth.
The sho"#ee"er's action $oul! have ha! moral $orth if in the "articular case
he ha! acte! from !uty rather than from self;interest ?i.e.4 if he ha! astracte!
himself from consi!erations of self;interest4 an! striven for "urity of
$ill@. A goo! $ill reIuires only that the agent shoul! so astract from nonmoral
motives as to ma#e the motive of !uty "re!ominant over them in the
"erformance of this "articular action.9
3ant's conce"tion of the goo! $ill seems to e foun!e! on the i!ea that
genuine moral $orth4 the #in! of $orth that alone truly !eserves esteem4
coul! never !e"en! on anything e>ce"t our o$n use of our free!om. Thus
3ant !escries moral $orth of character as the $orth $e give ourselves4 as
!istinct from the various #in!s of $orth4 such as talents of min! an! Iualities
of tem"erament4 $hich $e might e given y nature or fortune ?/ )9)<94
)9+<'(@. 3ant argues that true moral $orth elongs only to actions !one
from !uty on the groun! that the la$fulness of actions !one out of inclination
is merely Econtingent an! s"urious4 for though the nonmoral groun! may
in!ee! no$ an! then "ro!uce la$ful actions4 more often it rings aout unla$ful
onesE ?/ )96<7@.
This argument rests on a very !uious "remise if it !enies that "eo"le
coul! ever e so ha""ily constitute! y nature or e!ucation that their inclinations
relialy incline them to$ar! la$ful actions an! a$ay from unla$ful
ones. -ut 3ant might mean that actions !one from inclinations are only
EcontingentlyE la$ful in a !iMerent sense. He might mean that their la$fulness
?ho$ever reliale@ is !ue only to goo! fortune an! not to $hat & have
ma!e of myself through my o$n $or# alone. The true inner $orth of a "erson4
ho$ever4 cannot e the result of goo! or a! fortuneA it cannot vary
$ith favorale or unfavorale natural en!o$ment or circumstances. &t must
e u" to each of us alone to give it to ourselvesA an! in res"ect of it4 nature
an! fortune must "lace us all in e>actly eIual circumstances.
This concern to e>clu!e the "ossiility of Emoral luc#E also e>"lains $hy
3ant insists that the goo! $ill consists of striving for "urity of volition rather
than in attaining itA for some "eo"le may e more ha""ily constitute! than
others in this regar!4 an! may have less $or# to !o to achieve a given !egree
of "urity. -ut the !uty to strive to one's utmost for "urity leaves everyone
in the same situation. Li#e$ise4 it e>"lains $hy 3ant insists that even in
comfortale circumstances $e must strive to ma#e the motive of !uty so
"o$erful in ourselves that it coul! $ithstan! even the tyrant's threats an!
"romises. After all4 it is only goo! luc# that se"arates us at any time from
that unenviale "ositionC EHo$ many "eo"le $ho have live! long an! guiltless
lives may not e merely fortunate enough to have esca"e! many tem"tationsBE
?TL )95<(5@.
(. Hegel on the goo! $ill
Hegel !escries the goo! $ill as one $hose Einsight an! intention accor!
$ith the goo!E ?2. N ')'@. ,y EinsightE accor!s $ith the goo! if & have
'*+
THE ,O.AL W&LL
reasonale an! correct eliefs aout $hat is goo! an! aout $hich actions
further the goo!. ,y EintentionE accor!s $ith the goo! if & elieve that the
!escri"tion Efurthers the goo!E a""lies to my action4 an! if my action's satisfaction
of this !escri"tion gives me a suLcient ?internal@ reason to act as &
!o.
:rom the moral stan!"oint4 Hegel says4 an action that accor!s $ith the
goo! can e re"resente! astractly as a E!uty.E Hence a goo! $ill must have
an intention that accor!s $ith !uty. :or this reason4 Hegel agrees $ith 3ant
that a goo! $ill must !o its !uty for>luty's sa#e ?2. N '))@. Hegel !oes not
say ?an! !oes not elieve@ that a goo! $ill must !o its !uty only for !uty's
sa#e. He !oes not even thin# that a goo! $ill must strive for this. Hegel
scorns the attitu!e of the moralist $ho criticiDes the sustantively goo! acts
of great men on the groun! that they inten!e! an! achieve! ha""iness4 fame4
honor4 or self;satisfaction for themselves. He Gn!s no moral !efect in those
$ho !o nole !ee!s for the sa#e of these satisfactions4 so long as their intention
an! insight accor! $ith the goo!. &t is in this conte>t that Hegel Iuotes
the "rover ENo man is a hero to his valetE ; a!!ingC Enot ecause the man
is not a hero4 ut ecause the valet is only a valetE ?2h/ 3 77(A cf. 2. N
'5*.4 %/ '6*<+=;++@.
Let us turn to the humler case of 3ant's honest sho"#ee"er. Hegel $oul!
of course !eny a goo! $ill to the sho"#ee"er $ho Gn!s nothing attractive at
all aout moral goo!ness or !utifulness. A sho"#ee"er $ho cannot e relie!
u"on to con!uct usiness honestly $oul! e a a! man no matter $hat his
motives or intentions4 sim"ly ecause he $oul! e !eGcient in the fun!amental
ethical virtue of Eu"rightnessE ?.echtschaMenheit@ ?2. N '(6@. &n Hegel's
vie$4 ho$ever4 the sho"#ee"er counts as having a goo! $ill if the goo!ness
or !utifulness of honest con!uct is one feature ?among others@ that attracts
him to such con!uct4 an! if it is Ethe Gnal groun!E of the action ?%2. *C
)(*@;
This means that the goo!ness or !utifulness of $hat he !oes must not only
attract the sho"#ee"er4 ut also attract him enough ?in this case@ to e a
suLcient ?internal@ .eason to !o it. &f he $ere mil!ly attracte! y !utifulness4
ut this $ere not enough to in!uce him to !o his !uty4 then Hegel
$oul! not regar! him as having a goo! $ill. To act for !uty's sa#e is to have
a Emoral !is"osition ?/esinnung@E ?%2.iy +)4 5*7A cf. 2. N ')=@A it is to
"erform the action Eecause it is goo! ?$eil sie !as /ute ist@ TorU ecause it
is rightE ?%2. *C )(*@. This EecauseE refers to the agent's intention4 to
the !escri"tion or !escri"tions that s"ecify the agent's ?internal@ reasons for
"erforming that act on that occasion. Hegel hol!s that the agent has a goo!
$ill if the moral goo!ness or !utifulness of the act elongs among those !escri"tions.
&t nee! not e.the only such !escri"tion4 ho$ever. Nor !oes it
nee! to have4 in general4 the highest "riority among such !escri"tions. The
agent nee! not try to im"rove its relative ran#ing4 either.
Com"aring Hegel's theory of the goo! $ill $ith 3ant's4 $e see that Hegel's
theory ma#es it har!er in one $ay4 ut easier in another4 to have a goo! $ill
an! to !o actions $ith moral $orth. Hegel reIuires that our Einsight accor!
'*9
,O.AL&T1
$ith the goo!4E that is4 that $e act from oFectively correct moral eliefs ?2.
N '*6.A see also Cha"ter '64 this volume@A 3ant4 ho$ever4 reIuires only
that $e sincerely follo$ our conscience ?TL *6'<7'@. On the other han!4
Hegel's theory !oes not reIuire that the moral goo!ness or !utifulness of
one's act shoul! "re!ominate over other motives4 nor is it necessary to the
moral $orth of an action that it shoul! e !one solely or mainly from !uty.
Where the goo!ness or !utifulness of $hat & !o attracts me enough to account
for my "erformance of my !uty4 the relative strength for me of moral
an! nonmoral incentives is irrelevant to the moral $orth of my act an! the
goo!ness of my $ill.
7. ,oral $orth an! "sychological causality
:or 3ant4 $hether or not one acts from !uty is morally crucial ecause the
autonomy or heteronomy of one's actions !e"en!s on ho$ they are "sychologically
cause!. 3ant's strenuous !enial that our free acts cannot e the
result of natural o> "henomenal causality shoul! not lin! us to the fact that
his theory of action is a !eterministic one in the sense that every act is seen
as arising from a ?su"ersensuous4 noumenal@ cause that rings aout the act
accor!ing to a la$ selecte! y the "o$er of choice ?. )(<)6@. Autonomy is4
in 3ant's $or!s4 Ethe causality of reasonE ?3"% +6<+)@. Thus the moral
$orth of an act !e"en!s accor!ingly u"on the causal strength of the motive
of !uty4 as com"are! $ith the agent's other motives4 in the act's "ro!uction.
/oo!ness of $ill !e"en!s on the agent's !is"osition to acts $hose sole or
!ominant cause is the motive of !uty ?. 5+;)6<5);57@. 3ant hol!s that $e
cannot Fu!ge the moral $orth of our actions $ith certainty ecause he thin#s
that the causal mechanisms that "ro!uce them elong to the intelligile
$orl!4 an! are therefore un#no$ale y us. Accor!ingly4 3ant !enies that
e>"erience enales us to cite even a single sure e>am"le of the !is"osition to
act from !uty4 on the groun!s that $e can never e asolutely certain that
some Esecret im"ulse of self;love4 "reten!ing to e the i!ea Tof !utyU4 $as
not the genuine !etermining cause of the $illE ?/ *6=<5)@.
:rom one "oint of vie$4 Hegel's reFection of 3ant's theory of moral $orth
can e un!erstoo! as a reFection of its "sychological !eterminism ?i.e.4 of the
crucial role "laye! in it y causes4 "henomenal or noumenal@. :or Hegel4
the $ill has from nature a set of !rives or original inclinations ?2. N ''@4 ut
in relation to them it is also a E"ure in!eterminacyE $hich !erives its contents
not from nature ut from an act of self;!etermination ?2. NN (;=@. His vie$4
$e may recall4 is that $e are Eformally freeE in the sense that our !esires !o
not limit $hat $e can !o. 0ince causes necessitate their eMects4 Hegel !enies
that the $ill stan!s in any causal relation to its motives or to the other circumstances
that !etermine it ?N2 555A cf. EL N '9(4A@.
The i!ea that the $ill is free in relation to its !esires an! so is not causally
!etermine! y them ma#es Hegel loo# very much li#e an incom"atiilistin!eterminist
on the issue of free $ill. &t is often sai!4 ho$ever4 that Hegel
is a com"atiilist or soft !eterminist.'6 This inter"retation is sometimes
'(6
THE ,O.AL W&LL
ase! on a misrea!ing of "assages in $hich Hegel asserts that necessity is
i!entical $ith free!om ?WL7C 5)9;5*6<(=6;(='A EL NN '(=;'(9@. &t is a
misrea!ing4 ecause in such "assages the EnecessityE inten!e! is not causal
necessitation ut organic interconnecte!ness or teleological inevitaility ?cf.
2. NN 57=A4 579A4 5=6A@. That free!om is com"atile $ith this sort of
necessity !oes not entail that it is com"atile $ith causal necessity.
There is nevertheless some truth in the com"atiilist inter"retation of
Hegel if it is un!erstoo! in another $ay. 2recisely ecause Hegel reFects
"sychological !eterminism ?a causal account of the $ill@4 his theory of human
agency is conceive! entirely in noncausal terms. ConseIuently4 his theory of
moral res"onsiility $oul! e entirely com"atile $ith any form of "hysical
!eterminism that allo$e! ?as com"atiilists usually try to !o@ that ?in some
a""ro"riate sense of EcanE@ $e al$ays can act against our !rives4 !esires4
motives4 an! so forth. Also stri#ingly com"atiilist in character is Hegel's
theory of moral res"onsiility. Although Hegel elieves that & al$ays can !o
other$ise than & !o4 this elief "lays no role at all in his theory of res"onsiility.
:or Hegel4 & am res"onsile for !oing a certain !ee! un!er a certain
!escri"tion if & in fact !i! the !ee!4 #ne$ & $as !oing it un!er that !escri"tion4
an! inten!e! to !o it un!er that !escri"tion. &n "rinci"le4 these con!itions
coul! all e satisGe! even if there $ere no "ossiility that & coul! have
!one other$ise.
Hegel's theory of moral action concerns itself $ith $hat & !i!4 $hether &
#ne$ & $as !oing it4 an! the as"ect or as"ects of it that & inten!e!. The t$o
main factors are $hat actually occurre! $hen & acte!4 an! my $ay of conceiving
of those occurrences. &t is stri#ing that motivation "ro"er "lays virtually
no role in Hegel's theory of action4 ecause Hegel's theory of action in eMect
re"laces motives $ith intentions or ?internal@ reasons. &nstea! of as#ing $hat
"sychic factors motivate! me4 Hegel's theory as#s for an e>"lanation of my
action in terms of the act;!escri"tions that su""ly the reasons & ha! for !oing
$hat & !i!. On Hegel's theory4 to say that & acte! Efrom !utyE or Efor !uty's
sa#eE means only that the !utifulness of my action elongs to my intention4
that it counts as one !escri"tion un!er $hich $e might ring my action in
e>"laining $hy & !i! it.
The "ulishe! te>t of the 2hiloso"hy of .ight contains no account at all of
motivation. To get such an account4 $e must refer to t$o A!!itions !ra$n
from Hotho's transcri"tion of Hegel's '+55;'+5) lectures ?2. NN '67A4
'5'AA cf. %2.FC ))6;))'4 )=);)=*@. -oth A!!itions em"hasiDe that it is
e>clusively from the stan!"oint of morality that motives of an action are of
interest. 2. N '67A a""ears to i!entify the EincitementE ?Triefe!er@ of an
action $ith its intention ?Asicht@ or its E"rinci"leE ?/run!satD@. 2. N '5'A
is more s"eciGc4 !escriing the EmotiveE ?-e$eggrun!@ of an action as Ethe
universal in the "ur"ose an! the "articular of the intention.E The "hrase
Euniversal of the "ur"oseE is "recisely Hegel's formula for the intention ?2.
N ''9@4 so the im"ort oi2. N '5'A is that the motive of an action is a certain
as"ect or si!e of the intention4 namely its E"articularE si!e.
Hegel is evi!ently i!entifying the EmotiveE of an action $ith $hat he there
'('
,O.AL&T1
calls the action's E"articular contentE or Emoment of "articularity4E through
$hich the action has EsuFective value4 interest for meE ?2. N '55@. An action's
Emotive4E then4 is sim"ly the agent's interest in it. As $e have seen4
Hegel thin#s that EinterestE in this sense is "resent even in the most unselGsh
actions4 since it !erives from my a$areness of the conGrmation of my agency
in a successful action4 $hether the action itself is oriente! to my o$n goo!
or not ?E/ N *=(@. -ut EinterestE still al$ays elongs to the agent's $elleing
or ha""iness4 along $ith the satisfaction of the agent's nee!s4 inclinations4
an! "assions ?2. N '5)@.
Hegel's vie$ is that reason can e "ractical only $hen it relinIuishes its
"urity an! e>"resses itself through em"irical !esires. Universal en!s get carrie!
out only through the "articular interests agents ta#e in carrying them
out. EThe astract universal en!4 insofar as it is !one4 since it ste"s into
actuality4 ecomes a !eterminate en!. ,y interest is in my !oing in !iMerent
$ays. . . . That my $ell;eing is my intention constitutes the sco"e of
"articularity. . . . This right lies imme!iately in "articularity an! is not for
itself to e regar!e! as something a!E ?%2.igC 97;9+@. As if to !rive the
"oint home against 3ant4 Hegel i!entiGes the EmotiveE of an action $ith
"recisely that E"articularE si!e of it that is necessary for setting an! "ursuing
an en!4 an! that in 3ant's vie$ is to e contraste! $ith the Euniversal4E $ith
the "ure thought of !uty or res"ect for the moral la$.
=. Hegel's critiIue of 3ant
This also means that Hegel's reFection of 3ant's "sychological !eterminism
is not his asic reason for reFecting 3ant's theory of the goo! $ill. /iven
Hegel's account of the goo! $ill4 even if our actions are involve! in a "hysical
or "sychological !eterminism4 their causes are irrelevant to their moral
$orth4 since that rests entirely on the nature of the act4 the agent's #no$le!ge4
an! the agent's intention ?the features of the act that ma#e it !esirale
enough for the agent to !o@. The crucial "oint is not that Hegel reFects 3ant's
"sychological !eterminism4 ut that he regar!s the causal antece!ents of acts
as irrelevant to their moral $orth an! to the goo!ness or a!ness of the $ill
that "erforms them.
When 3ant's sho"#ee"er !eals honestly $ith his ine>"erience! customer4
there are at least t$o features of his action that recommen! it to himC
'. Honest !ealing hel"s to "rotect my re"utationA it is goo! usiness.
5. Honest !ealing accor!s $ith the goo!A it is my !uty.
Let us su""ose that he is oth morally !is"ose! enough an! concerne!
enough for his re"utation that ?un!er the circumstances@ either of these incentives
$oul! e reason enough for him to !eal honestly. A$are of an!
attracte! y oth these features of honest !ealing4 the sho"#ee"er in fact
chooses to !eal honestly $ith the customer ; though as a formally free agent4
he coul! have acte! against all these reasons an! cheate! the customer. That4
as Hegel sees it4 is an e>haustive re"ort of the morally relevant facts of the
THE ,O.AL W&LL
case. They are suLcient for the sho"#ee"er to have a goo! $ill an! his act
to have moral $orth.
3ant's conce"tion of the goo! $ill reIuires us to "roe much !ee"er into
the sho"#ee"er's inner life. 3ant $ants the sho"#ee"er to as# $hich of the
t$o motives cause! him to act accor!ing to !uty. He $ants him to $orry
aout the relative strength of the motives. He thin#s it is im"ortant for !etermining
the moral $orth of this act $hat the sho"#ee"er $oul! !o if Henry
%&&& threatene! him $ith torture an! !eath if he !oes not cheat the customer.
Hegel reFects these Iuestions as having no ans$ers4 or at least no
morally relevant ans$ers. 3ant himself agrees that the ans$ers are all un#no$ale4
since they inIuire after information aout causality in the intelligile
$orl!. Hegel merely !ra$s the reasonale conclusion that if such matters
are necessarily nothing to us4 $e have no usiness uil!ing our conce"t of
moral $orth u"on them.
3ant em"hasiDes that $e are Gnite eings. 3ier#egaar! an! others $ho
follo$ 3ant in em"hasiDing the in$ar!ness of the moral life have often accuse!
Hegel of forgetting our Gnitu!e. -ut on the "oint $e are no$ !iscussing4
the truth is e>actly the reverse. The 3antian an! 3ier#egaar!ian morality
of in$ar!ness see#s a free!om in!e"en!ent of everything that is other
than free!om4 in!e"en!ent of oth nature an! fortune. &t is Hegel4 ho$ever4
$ho soerly faces u" to the fact that the human con!ition is one of Gnite
eings in a transitory $orl!. Hegel ma#es no attem"t to !eny that4 as the
e>istentialists "ut it4 $e are Ethro$nE eings4 con!itione! y our natural
en!o$ments an! the contingency of our situationA $e ourselves an! all our
real concerns4 inclu!ing our innermost self;$orth4 are al$ays to some !egree
!elivere! over to chance an! asur!ity.
3ant falsiGes the Gnitu!e of the human con!ition $hen he attem"ts to
"lace the goo! $ill eyon! the reach of nature an! fortune. This moral E!is"lacement4E
or E"retenseE ?%erstellung@ ?as Hegel calls itA 2h/ 33 7'7;7)'@4
is neither innocent nor $ithout cost. Every hi!!en value $e ho"e to "ossess
in the eyon! must e "ai! for out of the real $orth $e enFoy in the here
an! no$. When $e !is"lace morality to a eyon!4 locating it on the struggle
of motives in an intelligile $orl!4 $e alienate our "ractical reason from our
self;satisfaction. UXhen $e locate our moral $orth in a noumenal self that is
hi!!en from us4 $e !evalue the only self;$orth $e can actually "ossess. Our
nolest actions an! highest accom"lishments ecome for us
much $orl!ly s"len!or4 the !aDDling costume that cloa#s a
long run4 the lie serves the en!s only of envy an! hy"ocrisy.
nothing ut so
a! $ill &n the
'()
9
The em"tiness of the moral la$
i. The em"tiness charge
&n Cha"ter = $e revie$e! some of Hegel's com"laints against the moral
stan!"oint from his :ran#furt $ritingsC its alienation of reason from sense4
its ten!ency to hy"ocrisy4 its astraction from the relationshi"s of social life4
its commitment to an EoughtE $hich can never ecome an Eis.E Hegel's est
#no$n criticism of morality4 Grst a""earing in the Hena $ritings4 is the em"tiness
charge. &t says that morality is !oome! to e an Eem"ty formalism4E
that from the moral stan!"oint there is no criterion at all of moral right an!
$rong ?2. N ')(.@.
The em"tiness charge is sometimes "resente! s"eciGcally as a criticism of
3antian ethics4 es"ecially of the Grst formulation of the moral la$ in 3ant's
:oun!ations4 the so;calle! formula of universal la$U:UL@C
:ULC E0o act that you can $ill the ma>im of your action to e a universal
la$E ?/ *5'<)9@.
The charge is that the test "ro"ose! y the :UL !ra$s no real !istinction
et$een ma>ims. :rom one "oint of vie$ all ma>ims "ass it4 $hereas from
another any ma>im fails it.
The em"tiness charge is also "resente! as a more general in!ictment
against the moral stan!"oint as a $hole. &n this version it claims that no
Eimmanent !octrine of !utiesE can e formulate! from the moral stan!"oint
at all4 ecause this stan!"oint "rovi!es nothing ut an Eem"ty "rinci"le of
suFectivityE ?2. N '*+.@. ,orality is the stan!"oint of the in!ivi!ual moral
suFect $ho Fu!ges actions y a stan!ar! of the goo!4 $hose content is !ra$n
from oth right an! $ell;eing4 ta#ing into account not only the agent's $elleing
ut also the $ell;eing of others. Thus Hegel might seem to e ma#ing
the highly im"lausile claim that no "rinci"le formulate! in terms of human
rights an! $elfare coul! ever !ra$ any !istinction at all et$een goo! an!
evil or rule out any action $hatever as immoral.
One $ay to ma#e sense of Hegel's "osition here might e to !istinguish
also et$een a $ea#er an! a stronger form of the em"tiness charge. To say
that the :UL4 or 3antian moral "hiloso"hy4 or the moral stan!"oint generally4
cannot give us a com"letely satisfactory account of our !uties is clearly
$ea#er than saying that they can ma#e no !istinction -et$een goo! an! evil
an! are unale to e>clu!e any action $hatever as morally $rong. Even if the
:UL sho$s some actions or ma>ims to e $rong4 it may still fall short of
'(*
THE E,2T&NE00 O: THE ,O.AL LAW
"rovi!ing a fully a!eIuate account of !uties if there are some cases that it
fails to cover or in $hich it yiel!s the $rong results. A similar.$ea#ness
might elong to every "rinci"le a!o"te! from the moral stan!"oint if this
stan!"oint astracts from im"ortant factors in human life that any a!eIuate
theory of !uties must ta#e into account. Hegel !i! not vigorously "ursue any
argument in favor of this roa!er ut $ea#er form of the em"tiness charge.
?We $ill have a little more to say aout it4 though4 in N '' of this cha"ter.@
&t is "lain that at least in his Hena "erio!4 Hegel regar!s 3antian moral
"hiloso"hy as "rovi!ing the moral stan!"oint $ithes most "erfect theoretical
e>"ression. Using that as a starting "oint4 $e coul! !evelo" a secon!
inter"retation cM Hegel's em"tiness charge ?though it is not inconsistent $ith
the Grst one@. Other "hiloso"hers may formulate moral "rinci"les em"loying
the notions of right an! universal $ell;eing4 an! such "rinci"les may succee!
in eing more than em"ty formalisms. -ut if 3antian morality is the
only a!eIuate e>"ression of the moral stan!"oint4 then none of these other
"rinci"les is securely ase! in the moral stan!"oint itself. &f 3ant's "rinci"le
is em"to4 then that $oul! sho$ that the moral stan!"oint as a $hole is
em"ty. fThus Hegel might see the em"tiness of 3ant's "rinci"le as a uniIue
strength in 3ant's moral "hiloso"hy from the stan!"oint of "hiloso"hical
un!erstan!ing4 even if it is a fatal $ea#ness in it from the stan!"oint of "ractical
ethics. & n N 7 $e $ill see that this rea!ing of Hegel's em"tiness charge
has at least tnis much conGrmationC The em"tiness charge is not only a criticism
of the :UL4 ut also says that no contentful moral "rinci"le is availale
from 3ant's "hiloso"hical stan!"oint.
5. 3ant's formula of universal la$
Hegel's em"tiness charge against the :UL is also e>"resse! y later "hiloso"hers4
such as ,illC
When T3antU egins to !e!uce from Tthe formula of universal la$U any of the actual
!uties of morality4 he fails4 almost grotesIuely4 to sho$ that there $oul! e any
contra!iction4 any logical ?not to say "hysical@ im"ossiility4 in the a!o"tion y all
rational eings of the most outrageously immoral rules of con!uct. All he sho$s is
that the conseIuences of their universal a!o"tion $oul! e such as ho one $oul!
choose to incur.'
The charge $as not original $ith Hegel either. &n one of the very Grst critical
!iscussions of 3ant's :oun!ations4 /ottlo August Tittel maintaine! that
3ant's "rinci"le has no content unless inter"rete! in a utilitarian sense. The
immorality ?for e>am"le@ of orro$ing money $ith no intent to re"ay it can
e !erive! from the "rinci"le only if 3ant's argument is that the universaliDation
of the agent's ma>im $oul! un!ermine the generally eneGcial "ractice
of money len!ing.5
0imilar vie$s $ere en!orse! y :ichte4 $ho insists that 3ant's :UL must
e treate! as Emerely heuristic4E an! Ey no means constitutiveE of morality.
TThe :ULU is not a "rinci"le ut only a conseIuence of the true "rinci"le4 the
H((
,O.AL&T1
comman! of the asolute self;!e"en!ence of reason. The relation is not that ecause
something can e a "rinci"le of universal legislation4 therefore it shoul! e the ma>im
of my $illA on the contrary4 it is Fust the o""osite4 that ecause something ought to
e a ma>im of my $ill4 therefore it can also e a "rinci"le of universal legislation.
?0L 5)*<5*7@
:ichte's o$n fun!amental "rinci"le of morality is unashame!ly formalisticC
EAl$ays act accor!ing to the est conviction of your !uty4 orC Act accor!ing
to your conscienceE ?0L '(7<'7*4 '7)<'=)@. :ichte hol!s that the content of
!uty must e arrive! at in!e"en!ently of the fun!amental "rinci"le4 through
a "rocess of conscientious theoretical inIuiry ?0L '7);'==<'=);'+=A see elo$4
Cha"ter '64 N 5@.
The :UL is 3ant's Grst formulation of the "rinci"le of morality in the
:oun!ations. He gives it the most e>tensive !e!uction4 an! !evelo"s its casuistical
im"lications in greatest !etail. Even so4 it is a mista#e for Hegel an!
other critics to fasten e>clusively on the :UL in their attem"ts to "rove that
3antian ethics is em"ty of content. The :UL is also casuistically the least
amitious of 3ant's three formulations in tl[e :oun!ations. As Hegel himself
seems at times to a""reciate ?2h/ f *59@4 the :UL !oes no more than "rovi!e
us $ith a "ermissiility test for isolate! in!ivi!ual ma>ims. &f a ma>im
can e $ille! as universal la$4 it is "ermissile to act on itA ut if it cannot
e so $ille!4 then it is im"ermissile. Though 3ant's illustrations of the
formula are organiDe! accor!ing to a ta>onomy of "ositive !uties4 the :UL
cannot tell us $hat any of our "ositive !uties are. 3ant's four arguments from
the :UL4 if successful4 sho$ that one may not follo$ the s"eciGc ma>ims
concerning suici!e4 false "romising4 an! so on4 $hich he mentions. They
cannot sho$ that it is al$ays contrary to !uty to commit suici!e or ma#e
false "romises4 since those acts might also e !one from Iuite !iMerent ma>ims
$hich ?for all these arguments sho$@ may "ass the :UL test.
-y contrast4 3ant's secon! "rinci"le4 the Eformula of humanity4E fori!s
all con!uct that treats rational nature as a means only an! not at the same
time as an en!. &t lays on us the "ositive ?though $i!e an! im"erfect@ !uty
of furthering the "ur"oses of rational eings ?/ *5+;*)'<*7;*9@. The thir!
"rinci"le or Eformula of autonomy4E though su"erGcially similar to the :UL4
!oes not merely fori! us to act on ma>ims that cannot e $ille! as universal
la$4 ut also enFoins us to act on any ma>im elonging to a system of ma>ims
suitale for universal legislation ?/ *)5<(64 *)7<((@. Thus the formulas of
humanity an! autonomy oth "rovi!e for "ositive !uties in a $ay that the
:UL cannot. Hegel an! other critics $ill not have sho$n 3antian ethics to
e em"ty of content until they have !emonstrate! the em"tiness of these
other formulas along $ith that of the :UL.
Even against the :UL4 ho$ever4 Hegel's arguments $ill e seen to fail.
). Contra!ictions an! conJicting volitions
&n the CritiIue of 2ractical .eason4 3ant a""lies the :UL to a case in $hich
a man4 no$ !ecease!4 has left a siDale !e"osit in my care $ithout leaving
'(7
THE E,2T&NE00 O: THE ,O.AL LAW
any recor! of it. 3ant argues that & cannot universaliDe the ma>im of !enying
the !e"osit an! a""ro"riating the money4 since then Ethe "rinci"al $oul!
annihilate itself4 ecause the result $oul! e that no one $oul! ma#e a !e"ositE
?3"% 5=<5=@. Hegel re"liesC
-ut that there are no !e"osits ; $here is the contra!iction in thisB That there are
no !e"osits $oul! contra!ict other necessary !eterminacies4 Fust as that a !e"osit is
"ossile Gts together $ith other necessary !eterminacies an! therey ecomes necessary.
-ut other en!s an! material groun!s are not to e calle! u"on. ?N. *75<==@
Hegel insists that the test "rovi!e! y the :UL is nothing eyon! the "rinci"le
of contra!iction4 an! that this is a test that any ma>im can "ass ?EL N
(*A 2. N ')(.@. 3ant !oes s"ea# of a ma>im's Econtra!ictingE or EannihilatingE
itself $hen consi!ere! as a universal la$4 an! he !oes say that there
$oul! e a Econtra!ictionE in a system of nature in $hich some ma>ims $ere
universal la$sO?/ *55<*6@. 1et Hegel is surely $rong to say that this is a test
that any ma>im can "ass. There !eGnitely are "rinci"les that one "erson can
follo$4 ut that it $oul! e contra!ictory to su""ose that all follo$C :or
e>am"le4 E& $ill never $or#4 ut al$ays live y e>"loiting the laor of others.E
&f everyone follo$e! the "rinci"le4 there $oul! e no laorers left to
e>"loit4 an! so it $oul! e im"ossile for anyone to live y e>"loiting the
laor of others. One "rolem for 3ant4 ho$ever4 is that some ma>ims of
$hich this seems to e true are morally innocuousC :or e>am"le4 E& $ill
occasionally accom"any others through a !oor$ay4 an! on those occasions &
$ill al$ays go through the !oor last.E 3ant's test seems to yiel! false negatives
in the case of ma>ims li#e this one. This is a "rolem that an a!eIuate
!efense of the :UL $oul! have to solve.
Hegel misun!erstan!s the :UL's test for ma>ims4 at least as it a""lies to
the case of the !e"osit. 3ant neither nee!s to sho$ nor tries to sho$ that
the ma>im $oul! literally result in a self;contra!iction if universally follo$e!.
His argument is rather that if my ma>im of gaining money through
the a""ro"riation of the !e"osit $ere universaliDe!4 then "eo"le $oul! not
trust others $ith !e"osits. ConseIuently4 it $oul! e im"ossile for me to
gain money y follo$ing my ma>im4 ecause & $oul! never have een given
the !e"osit in the Grst "lace.* This argument em"loys some em"irical claims
?aout ho$ "eo"le $oul! ehave if my ma>im $ere a universal la$ of nature@4
ut it a""eals to no Eother en!s or material groun!s4E that is4 none
other than those containe! in my ma>im itself. The4 argument sho$s that &
$ill an im"ossile or self;contra!ictory $orl! in the sense that & $ill oth
?'@ that & "roGt y a""ro"riating the !e"osit an! ?5@ that circumstances e
such that & coul! never gain money in this $ay.
We might $on!er $hether there is any real im"ossiility in my $illing
here. &t seems "erfectly "ossile for me to $ill t$o incom"atile states of
aMairs ?such as having my ca#e an! eating it4 too@4 so $hy can't & $ill oth
that my ma>im shoul! e a universal la$ an! that & shoul! successfully act
on it in this caseB The ans$er !e"en!s on a more "recise un!erstan!ing of
3ant's use of the ver Eto $illE ?$ollen@. 3ant !istinguishes E$illingE from
O(=
,O.AL&T1
merely E$ishing.E EWillingE a state of aMairs is not the same as $anting or
!esiring it. To $ill something4 & must em"loy means to ring it aout4 or at
least e "re"are! to em"loy some means ?/ )9*<'6@. To $ill oth that & have
my ca#e an! that & eat it4 & must simultaneously try to eat the ca#e an! try
to #ee" myself from eating it. ConJicting volitions4 unli#e conJicting $ants
or $ishes4 are mutually incom"atile.
Hegel's theory of ethical life !erives our ethical !uties from social relationshi"s
an! institutions. 0ometimes Hegel misun!erstan!s the :UL ecause
he im"oses on it the assum"tions of his o$n theory. Thus he inter"rets the
e>am"le of the !e"osit as if it turne! on the vali!ity of the institution of
"rivate "ro"erty. He a""ears to thin# that the :UL is a""licale to cases li#e
the !e"osit4 only if it can e sho$n that the asence of this institution $oul!
result in a contra!iction ?N. *75;*7*<==;=9A cf. 2h/ ,&*)6;*))4 2. N
')(.4 %/2FC )7+;)79<*76;*7'@. This misconstrues the moral issue at sta#e
in the e>am"le4 $hich is the sanctity not of "rivate "ro"erty ut of "ersonal
trust.( The Iuestion is $hether & can consistently $ill that & shoul! "roGt
y etraying someone's trust an! also $ill that all shoul! etray the trust of
another $hen they stan! to "roGt from it. This issue coul! certainly arise in
a society $here "ro"erty !i! not e>ist4 an! in that sense Hegel is Iuite $rong
to suggest that 3ant's argument aout the !e"osit !e"en!s on the institution
of "ro"erty.
*. The universal la$ test
&n the :oun!ations 3ant !istinguishes cases li#e this one4 $here the ma>im
as universal la$ involves an internal self;contra!iction4 from cases $here the
universaliDe! ma>im cannot e $ille! to e a universal la$ ecause such a
$ill $oul! necessarily conJict $ith itself on groun!s e>ternal to the ma>im.
:or e>am"le4 3ant argues that $e cannot $ill as universal la$ the col!hearte!
man's ma>im of refusing charitale hel" to those in nee!. The argument
is that if $e ourselves $ere in such nee!4 $e coul! not $ill that others
shoul! !eny us the hel" $e reIuire. Here 3ant "lainly !oes nee! to call u"on
Eother en!s an! material groun!sE eyon! $hat are given in the ma>im to
e teste!. He su""oses that all rational eings have en!s they cannot ho"e
to reach $ithout the hel" of others. He ta#es for grante! that $e $oul! not
choose to !eny ourselves that hel" if it $ere nee!e!. Li#e the assum"tion
aout ho$ "eo"le $oul! ehave if no one coul! e truste! $ith a !e"osit4
this is an em"irically foun!e! assum"tion aout ho$ rational eings $oul!
ehave un!er the envisione! counterfactual circumstances.
&t might e oFecte! that the assum"tion is normative rather than em"irical4
telling us not ho$ they $oul! ehave ut ho$ it $oul! e rational for
them to ehave. Even so4 it is still an assum"tion that !e"en!s on em"irical
facts aout $hat rational eings nee! an! !esire. &t might also e "ossile to
!escrie Gctional eings $hose nee!s an! !esires are such that it $oul! not
e irrational for them to forego all a""eal to the charitale ai! of others.7
'(+
THE E,2T&NE00 O: THE ,O.AL LAW
3ant's argument !e"en!s on the em"irical fact that $e humans are not such
eings. ,oreover4 if the assum"tion is normative4 it is not morally normative.
&t !eals $ith the rational "ursuit of self;interest4 not $ith moral !uty.
-ut the result of the argument is moral4 not "ru!ential. 0ince it is a counterfactual
circumstance that the col!;hearte! man's ma>im hol!s as a la$ of
nature4 there is no sense in $hich 3ant's argument is ase! ?as 0cho"enhauer
falsely alleges@ on a covert an! corru"t a""eal to self;interest.= 3ant
!oes not reason that & shoul! hel" others ecause4 if & !o4 they $ill hel" me.
3ant's argument !oes rest on a su""osition aout the structure of our selGntereste!
!esires. &t says that no human eing coul! rationally $ill to sacriGce
all her en!s ?even survival@ $henever achievement of the en! reIuires
the eneGcent assistance of someone else. -ut nothing in 3ant's argument
involves an Ea""eal to material groun!sE in any sense that $oul! contra!ict
3ant's vie$ that the goo! $ill acts solely from !uty.
Tittel an! ,ill oth try to "ortray 3ant not as a covert egoist4 ut as a
covert conseIuentialist. 3aiit's arguments never !e"en! on the conseIuences
of a ma>im's actual a!o"tion4 though they !o involve claims aout the hy"othetical
conseIuences of its universal a!o"tion. This interest in conseIuences
seems "ro"erly conseIuentialist only if $e a!! the "remise ?as 3ant
never !oes@ that my follo$ing a ma>im $ill someho$ ma#e it more li#ely to
e universally follo$e!. ,oreover4 the :UL !oes hot reFect a ma>im sim"ly
on the groun!s that its universal a!o"tion $oul! e un!esirale ?as Tittel
an! ,ill oth claim in 3ant's ehalf@. &nstea!4 the ma>im is reFecte! ecause
of a conJict of volitions4 ecause $illing the ma>im as universal la$ conJicts
either $ith the ma>im itself or $ith something else that the agent $ills.
These t$o tests may often have similar results. The fact that & Gn! a certain
"ractice un!esirale often gives me a suLcient reason to refuse to "artici"ate
in it4 an! this $oul! e enough to "revent me from $illing $ithout
contra!iction that everyone "artici"ate in it. Conversely4 if & regar! everyone's
ehaving in a certain $ay as !esirale4 it a""ears as if & $oul! e ale
to $ill $ithout contra!iction that everyone ehave in that $ay. -ut neither
of these generaliDations hol!s universally4 an! therefore4 the universaliDaility
test for ma>ims is not the same as the conseIuentialist one. We can see
this from 3ant's o$n e>am"les. &n 3ant's argument aout the !e"osit4 the
issue is not $hether leaving !e"osits $ith others is a !esirale "ractice.
3ant's argument shoul! "rove to those $ho !isli#e this "ractice an! $ant it
aolishe! that they must nevertheless !eal honestly $ith any !e"osits left in
their charge. &n the other argument the issue is not ho$ !esirale it is for
"eo"le to give an! get charitale hel"4 ut $hether & can $ill that they not
hel" me $hen & nee! it. 3ant !escries a man $ho is ale for the most "art
to get along $ithout the hel" of others an! $ho thin#s that it $oul! e est
for everyone to e li#e himself in this res"ectA the argument is clearly su""ose!
to a""ly to this man4 sho$ing him that he cannot $ill as a universal
la$ the ma>im of refusing charitale hel" to others ?/ )9+<'*;'(@. 3ant's
"osition is that he may try to aolish the "ractice of charity y encouraging
'(9
,O.AL&T1
"eo"le to !evelo" self;reliance4 ut it is not "ermissile for him to "ursue
his en! ?as our rugge! in!ivi!ualists in "olitics usually !o@ sim"ly y refusing
hel" to those $ho nee! it.
Hegel claims that anything can "ass the test of the formula of universal
la$ if it is consi!ere! merely in itself4 as a Esim"le !eterminatenessEA ut he
also thin#s that nothing can "ass the test if resolve! into the !istinct an!
o""ose! moments that constitute it ?2h/ 'f'f *)6;*)'@. Thus he argues not
only that 3ant's "rinci"le "ermits immoral con!uct4 ut also that it may
fori! con!uct that is "raise$orthy.
Thus the !eterminacy of hel"ing the "oor e>"resses aolition of the !eterminacy
that is "overtyA the ma>im $hose content is that !eterminacy4 $hen teste! y eing
raise! to universal legislation4 $oul! "rove itself false4 for it $oul! annihilate itself.
&f it is thought that the "oor shoul! e hel"e! universally4 then either there $oul!
no longer e any "oor4 or there $oul! e only "oor an! then there $oul! e no one
$ho coul! hel" themA an! so in oth cases the hel" ceases. ?N. *7(;*77<+6@
This argument "ur"orts to sho$ that 3ant's "rinci"le fori!s us to follo$
the "rinci"le EHel" the "oorcE on the groun! that if everyone hel"e! the
"oor4 there $oul! no longer e any occasion for anyone to hel" the "oor4
an! so the ma>im of hel"ing the "oor ?li#e the ma>im of a""ro"riating the
!e"osit@ $oul!4 if universaliDe!4 annihilate itself.
We can see $hat is $rong $ith Hegel's argument as soon as $e !istinguish
t$o !iMerent meanings for the ma>im EHel" the "oorcE &f my ma>im is sim"ly
that of trying to aolish "overty as far as "ossile4 then there $ill e no
self;annihilation if everyone follo$s the ma>im an! "overty is aolishe!. On
the other han!4 my ma>im may e to engage in the activity of hel"ing the
"oor4 $here the "oint is not so much to im"rove their con!ition as to usy
myself $ith hel"ing them. That ma>im is threatene! $ith self;contra!iction
if everyone follo$s it. -ut that ma>im is morally sus"ect any$ayC &t is the
ma>im of those $ho hel" the "oor in or!er to in!ulge their feelings of "ity
or ecause they have some veste! interest in the institutions of "oor relief.+
(. 0ome unsolve! "rolems
& conclu!e that Hegel's criticism of the universal la$ test !oes not succee!.
Even so4 it might suggest a "rolem $ith the universal la$ testC Ho$ !o $e
!eci!e ho$ to formulate an agent's ma>im in a given caseB The "rolem is
r not that $e have to e ale to !istinguish et$een the intent of "eo"le $ho
hel" the "oor in or!er to aolish "overty an! those $ho hel" the "oor ecause
they have a veste! interest in charitiesA any moral theory must e intereste!
` in those !istinctions. The "rolem is that the intentions of an agent often
a!mit of !istinct ut eIually correct !escri"tions from !iMerent "oints of
vie$ or at !iMerent levels of generality.
0u""ose & invite you to !inner. & consi!er serving you granola an! yogurt
ecause4 although you hate them4 & enFoy them an! they $ill e goo! for
you. What is my ma>im in this caseB &s it4 E& $ill serve my guest foo!s &
li#eEB Or4 E& $ill fee! my guest foo!s that & #no$ are goo! for "eo"leEB Or4
'76
THE E,2T&NE00 O: THE ,O.AL LAW
E& $ill fee! my guest nourishing foo! that & li#e even though & #no$ the
guest $on't li#e itEB Or is the ma>im Fust E& $ill fee! my guest granola an!
yogurtEB All these ma>ims seem to e accurate e>"ressions of my intention4
ut some might e universaliDale $hereas others are not. Ho$ !o & !eci!e
$hich ma>im to use $hen & a""ly the universal la$ test to the action & "ro"oseB
&f $e ans$er that the ma>im ought to inclu!e all an! only those things
that are morally relevant4 then this !oes not solve the "rolem ut Fust restates
it. :or the "rolem is that the universal la$ test !oes not "rovi!e us
$ith any $ay of !eci!ing $hat is morally relevant.
0u""ose & $ant to ecome a "arent an! & ma#e it my ma>im to marry an!
im"regnate a $oman $ho $ants to have a chil! $ith me. This ma>im seems
Iuite innocent4 ut as state! it is oviously not universaliDale. &f everyone
?inclu!ing4 of course4 $omen@ follo$e! it4 then there $oul! e no $omen
left for me to marry or im"regnate4 since all the $omen $ho $ante! chil!ren
$oul! e usy trying to marry an! im"regnate other $omen.9 Here it loo#s
as if the "rolem is easy to solve y reformulating the ma>im in more general
terms using some such "hrase as Emarrying an! having a chil! $ith a "erson
of the o""osite se>. . . . E -ut ho$ can $e e sure that such reformulations
!o not re"resent an aritrary an! a! hoc a!Fustment of the e>am"le to our
moral "reFu!icesB Not every ma>im may "ass the universal la$ test4 ut the
test might turn out to e too vXgiiO an!4 Je>ile to "rovi!e !eterminate results
in many actual cases of moral reasoning.
There certainly are "rolems $ith 3ant's universal la$ testA some of them
might even turn out to e insolule. Nothing & have sai! in this cha"ter
shoul! e ta#en as an en!orsement of the :UL or as a !enial that it might
e sho$n to e em"ty of content. This is col! comfort to Hegel4 $ho seems
so far from a correct un!erstan!ing of the universal la$ test that he cannot
e cre!ite! $ith having i!entiGe! any of the real !iLculties $ith it. To ma#e
something of Hegel's criticisms of the :UL4 $e must use them as the occasion
for raising "rolems Hegel never thought of. Thus it is not sur"rising
that most scholars sim"ly !ismiss Hegel's criticisms of the :UL.'6
7. 3ant's !e!uction of the moral la$
Hegel's em"tiness charge a""ears at a !isa!vantage $hen it is regar!e! narro$ly
as an attac# on the :UL. To regar! it in this $ay is also "artly to
misun!erstan! it. Hegel thin#s that the :UL is em"ty4 ut he never means
to charge 3ant merely $ith having formulate! his "rinci"le a!ly4 so that it
turns out to e em"ty of content. &nstea!4 Hegel consistently treats this em"tiness
as a necessary feature of the stan!"oint from $hich 3ant thin#s aout
morality. Hegel !oes not egin $ith 3ant's :UL4 inter"reting ?or misinter"reting@
it as setting u" noncontra!iction as the sole moral criterion. On the
contrary4 he egins $ith the conce"tion of the moral stan!"oint as that of
the astract suFective ego4 foun!e! on the "ure conce"t of analytic unityA
an! then he infers from this that noncontra!iction is the only criterion morality
has at its !is"osal ?N. *(9<=(A 2h/ U3 *59;*)6@.
'7O
,O.AL&T1
Thus the -erlin Encyclo"e!ia !erives the em"tiness charge from the claim
that 3ant never successfully !istinguishes reason from un!erstan!ing4 since
3antian reason su""lies nothing ut a formal unity to an e>"erience $hose
content must come from outsi!e ?EL N (5@. :rom this Hegel infers that noncontra!iction
is the only moral criterion availale to 3antC E:or that $hich
"ractical thought ma#es its la$ . . . there is again nothing to han! e>ce"t the
same astract i!entity of the un!erstan!ing4 that there is no contra!iction in
the !eterminationE ?EL N (*4 em"hasis a!!e!@. The 2hiloso"hy of .ight criticiDes
3ant for remaining at the moral stan!"oint $ithout going on to the
stan!"oint of ethical life4 claiming that from this stan!"oint noncontra!iction
is the only criterion of !uty. Only then !oes Hegel allu!e to $hat he
calls Ethe further 3antian form4 the ca"acity of the action to e re"resente!
as a universal ma>im4E $hich ?Hegel says@ contains no "rinci"le eyon! the
asence of contra!iction ?2. N ')(.@. We have alrea!y seen that this last
claim is ase! on a misun!erstan!ing of 3ant's "rinci"leA ut Hegel's !ee"er
an! more interesting thesis is that 3ant is not entitle! to em"loy a "rinci"le
$ith any content eyon! the criterion of noncontra!ictoriness.
&f Hegel's em"tiness charge says that 3ant is unale to "rovi!e an a!eIuate
!e!uction for a "rinci"le $ith any content an! if the :UL is not
em"ty4 then $e might "ose Hegel's em"tiness charge as a challenge not to
the :UL ut to its !erivation. As $e shall see in the ne>t section4 this is
something that Hegel himself !oes at least once. &n or!er to evaluate the
challenge4 $e nee! to see ho$ 3ant "ro"oses to !erive the :UL.
3ant's !e!uction of the :UL4 in oth the :oun!ations an! the secon!
critiIue4 attem"ts to sho$ that the :UL is one that there is a s"ecial sort of
reason or groun! for follo$ingC an EoFectiveE groun!. An oFective groun!
is Evali! for every rational eing as suchE ?/ *')<)6A 3"% '9<'=@. -ut its
universal vali!ity cannot e merely a contingent matter of factA it must e
an a "riori necessary groun! for all rational eings. An! it must e Evali! Xn
the same form for all rational eingsE ; that is4 it must e Ee>actly the same
!etermining groun! for the $ill of all rational eings an! in all casesE ?3"%
5'<564 5(<5*@. Thus unanimity among rational eings as to $hat "leases or
"ains them coul! not constitute the sort of universal vali!ity necessary for
an oFective groun! or an oFectively groun!e! "rinci"le ?a "ractical la$@.
This unanimity $oul! e merely contingent4 an! although each rational eing
might have a reason for "romoting the universally "leasant4 each one's
reason $oul! e !iMerentC ,y groun! for "romoting the universally "leasant
is that it "leases meA your groun! is that it "leases you. A genuinely oFective
groun! for !oing something $oul! have to e something li#eC Eecause any
rational eing shoul! !o it4E or Eecause it is rational to !o it.E
3ant thin#s that if $e can sho$ that the :UL is oFectively groun!e!4
then that $ill sho$ that $e al$ays have a suLcient an! overri!ing reason to
follo$ it. This is ecause he thin#s that an oFective groun! is Esu"remeE
?oerste@ ; !eserving to "revail over any groun!s that !erive from EsuFective
!iMerences et$een human eingsE ?3"% )5<)5@. This4 in turn4 is ecause
he agrees $ith Hegel that $e act more rationally $hen $e act universally4
'75
THE E,2T&NE00 O: THE ,O.AL LAW
from groun!s !eriving from our essence as rational eings4 than $hen $e act
from "articular groun!s that $e have only contingently an! !o not share
$ith other rational eings.
3ant $ill have estalishe! that it is rational to follo$ the :UL if he can
sho$ that this formula e>"resses an oFectively groun!e! "rinci"le or "ractical
la$. This is e>actly $hat he tries to !o. His !e!uction of the :UL can
e !ivi!e! into t$o stages. :irst4 3ant argues that the :UL can e !erive!
from the very conce"t of an oFective groun!4 an! secon!4 he argues that
there !oes in fact e>ist an oFective groun!. The Grst stage of 3ant's argument
is carrie! out in 2art && of the :oun!ations an! in Theorem &&& of the
CritiIue of 2ractical .eason. 3ant intro!uces the conce"t of a categorical
im"erative or "ractical la$4 a "rinci"le involving Ean uncon!itional an! oFective4
an! hence universally vali! necessityE ?/ *'7<)*@A an! then he "rocee!s
to argue that Ethe mere conce"t of a categorical im"erative is suLcient
to "rovi!e the formula containing the "ro"osition that alone can e a categorical
im"erativeE ?/ *56<)+A cf. 3"% 57<57@. The argument "ur"orts to sho$
that the :UL is this formula.
&n 2art &&& of the :oun!ations4 3ant un!erta#es the secon! stage of his
argument4 claiming that free!om4 $hich can an! must e "resu""ose! as the
"ro"erty of every rational $ill4 can elong only to a $ill that is suFect to
oFective "rinci"les ?/ **=;**+<7(;77@. &n the secon! critiIue4 the secon!
stage of 3ant's argument ta#es a slightly !iMerent form4 for instea! of arguing
that there is an oFective "ractical la$ for rational eings ecause such
eings must thin# of themselves as free4 3ant insists that rational eings
must thin# of themselves as free only ecause they are a$are of eing suFect
to a "ractical la$4 $hich is given to them as a Efact of reasonE ?=XSQ% *=<*+@.
This !iMerence4 ho$ever4 aMects only the secon! stage of 3ant's argument.
The Grst stage4 eIually;necessary to oth versions of the argument4 is also
the same in oth. &t $ill e the target of Hegel's criticism.
=4 The failure of 3ant's !e!uction
3ant earns only "raise from Hegel for groun!ing the moral la$ on free!om4
Ethe "ositive inGnity of "ractical reason4E or Ethe T$ill'sU faculty of !etermining
itself in a universal $ay4 thin#inglyE ?EL N (*A@. Hegel grants that the
$ill is free4 an! that its free!om involves self;legislation accor!ing to oFective
groun!s. Thus Hegel agrees $ith the secon! stage of 3ant's !e!uction
of the :UL. He !enies4 ho$ever4 that any content to the moral la$ can e
arrive! at from this starting "ointC
Only $ith the recognition Tof the $ill's free!omU the Iuestion of the content of the
$ill or of "ractical reason is still not ans$ere!. When it is sai! that human eings
ought to ma#e the goo! the content of their $ills4 right a$ay there recurs the Iuestion
of the content4 i.e.4 the !eterminacy of this contentA an! $e get no$here either $ith
the mere "rinci"le of the agreement of the $ill $ith itself or $ith the !eman! to !o
!uty for !uty's sa#e. ?EL N (*A@
This "assage is not merely a re"etition of the claim that the :UL is em"ty
'7)
,O.AL&T1
of contentA it contains a !enial of the Grst stage of 3ant's !e!uction of the
:UL4 the stage that attem"ts to !e!uce the :UL from the conce"t of a
categorical im"erative4 oFective la$4 or oFective "ractical groun!. As $e
shall no$ see4 if Hegel's em"tiness charge is un!erstoo! in this $ay4 then it
turns out to e correct.
3ant claims that Ethe mere conce"t of a categorical im"erative . . . "rovi!es
the formula containing the "ro"osition $hich alone can e a categorical
im"erative.E His argument is thisC
&f & thin# of a categorical im"erative4 then & #no$ straight$ay $hat it contains.
:or since the im"erative contains4 esi!es the la$4 only the necessity that the ma>im
agree $ith this la$4 ut the la$ contains no con!ition $hich limits it4 there remains
nothing $ith $hich the ma>im shoul! agree e>ce"t the universality of la$ in general4
an! it is this agreement alone $hich the im"erative really re"resents. Hence the sole
categorical im"erative is thisC Act only accor!ing to that ma>im y $hich you can at
the same time $ill that it shoul! ecome a universal la$. ?/ *56;*5'<)+;)9A cf. /
*65<'+4 3"% 5=<5=@
3ant egins $ith the conce"t of an oFective groun! or oFectively groun!e!
"rinci"le ?a categorical im"erative@. He Grst "oints out that the only conceivale
groun! for follo$ing such a "rinci"le is the agreement of your ma>im
$ith the conce"t of la$fulness or universal vali!ityC 1ou follo$ it ecause it
is rational for any rational eing to follo$ it. :rom this he conclu!es that
this agreement4 an! hence the only "ossile oFective groun!4 consists in the
"ossiility of $illing that your ma>im e follo$e! y all rational eings. The
only "ossile oFective groun! is the conformity of your ma>im to the :UL.
3ant's argument may e "ara"hrase! as follo$sC A "ractical "rinci"le is
oFective4 or a "ractical la$4 only if there is a groun! for follo$ing it $hich
is necessarily vali! for every rational eing as such. -ut a groun! of this #in!
can consist in nothing ut the agreement of the agent's ma>im $ith the conce"t
of a "rinci"le that is oFectively vali!. This agreement4 ho$ever4 can
consist only in the "ossiility of $illing that the ma>im e universally follo$e!.
ConseIuently4 the only "ossile oFective "rinci"le isC Act accor!ing
to a ma>im that you can $ill to e universally follo$e!.
This argument is fallacious. An oFective groun! is universally vali!4 an!
li#e$ise an oFective "rinci"le is one that every rational eing has a reason
?the same reason@ for follo$ing. The universal vali!ity of an oFective "rinci"le
thus consists in $hat $e earlier calle! its Euniversality of a""licaility.E
-ut it !oes not consist4 as 3ant seems to infer4 in the rational !esiraility
?for someone4 "erha"s for anyone@ of the state of aMairs that $oul! result if
everyone follo$e! the "rinci"le. 3ant is arguing from the "remise that it is
rational for each "erson to follo$ a certain "rinci"le to the conclusion that it
is rational ?for someone4 or anyone@ to $ill that everyone follo$ the "rinci"le.
-ut that inference is not vali!. :rom the fact that it is rational for each of us
to !o something4 $e cannot !erive any conclusion aout the rational !esiraility
of the state of aMairs that $oul! result if $e all !i! that thing.
0u""ose & am an egoist4 $ho thin#s that one oFective "rinci"le is the
"rinci"le of self;loveC EAl$ays see# your o$n ha""iness.E &n the secon! cri;
'7*
THE E,2T&NE00 O: THE ,O.AL LAW
tiIue4 3ant claims that if everyone follo$e! this "rinci"le4 the result $oul!
e a conJict et$een "eo"le's en!s an! the !estruction of everyone's ha""iness.
Let us su""ose that 3ant is right an! that & ?the egoist@ agree $ith
him. & a!mit & cannot $ill that everyone shoul! follo$ the "rinci"le of selJove4
since this $oul! !estroy my o$n ha""iness ?along $ith everyone else's@.
-ut !oes this ten! in the least to sho$ that the "rinci"le of self;love is not
an oFective "rinci"leB No4 it !oes not. 3ant successfully refutes one argument
in favor of the "rinci"le of self;love4 an argument !ra$n from the universality
of the !esire for ha""iness. He "oints out that this !esire is only
contingently universal4 an! that it fails to "rovi!e a reason that is i!entical
for all rational eings ?3"% 57<5(@. -ut in my !efense of the claim that the
"rinci"le of self;love is an oFective "rinci"le4 & nee! not ma#e the mista#e
of relying on this argument. To refute one a! argument for a vie$ is not to
sho$ that the vie$ itself is mista#en.
1et if the Grst stage of 3ant's !e!uction of the :UL $ere vali!4 then &
coul! not even claim that the "rinci"le of self;love is an oFective "rinci"le
$ithout falling into self;contra!iction4 for 3ant's argument "ur"orts to sho$
that the only "rinci"le consistent $ith the conce"t of an oFective groun! is
the :UL. &f 3ant's argument $ere vali!4 it $oul! e im"ossile to maintain
$ithout contra!iction that a "rinci"le is oFectively groun!e! an! also that
one cannot $ill that that "rinci"le e universally follo$e!. -ut though it is
!outless false that the "rinci"le of self;love is an oFective "rinci"le4 the
su""osition that it is one lea!s to no contra!iction. Hence 3ant's argument
is not vali!.
+. Universal a""licaility an! collective rationality
&n framing his argument 3ant seems to have een misle! y the connotations
of his terms E"racticalla$E an! Euniversal la$.E When conscientious legislators
ma#e la$s for a community4 they normally have in min! that the la$s
shoul! have $hat $e earlier calle! Euniversality of a""licailityE ?Cha"ter =4
N (@C Everyone shoul! e eIually suFect to them. /oo! legislators are also
gui!e! y $hat life $ill e li#e for the community if the la$s are universally
follo$e!A they ma#e the la$s they !o ecause they thin# that everyone's follo$ing
those la$s $ill result in a system of collective ehavior that is rational
an! generally eneGcial. Let us call this secon! feature of a goo! la$ Ecollective
eneGt.E As $e note! earlier in this cha"ter ?N*@4 collective eneGt in
this sense is not i!entical $ith 3ant's :UL test4 $hich says that it must e
"ossile to $ill $ithout contra!iction that the la$ $ill e universally follo$e!.
Let us call this feature of a la$ Ecollective rationality.E :or our "resent
"ur"oses4 collective rationality is similar to collective eneGt4 since oth
have to !o $ith the relation of the rational agent's $ill to the hy"othetical
situation in $hich a ma>im is universally follo$e!.
No$ although 3ant's conce"tion of a "ractical la$ contains universality of
a""licaility4 it !oes not contain anything li#e collective eneGt or collective
rationality. The conce"t of a "ractical la$ involves the i!ea that ta#ing each
'7(
,O.AL&T1
rational eing in!ivi!ually4 it is rational for that eing to follo$ that la$A ut
this leaves entirely o"en the Iuestion $hether the result of everyone's follo$ing
the la$ $oul! e ?collectively@ !esirale4 or $hether it $oul! e something
that a rational agent coul! $ill $ithout contra!iction. A "riori $e have
no $ay of ruling out the "ossiility that a "rinci"le $ith universal a""licaility
might !ictate to each in!ivi!ual a course of action $hich she cannot $ill
that others shoul! follo$ too.
The mista#e is an easy one to ma#e ecause terms li#e Euniversally vali!E
an! Euniversally rationalE can e ta#en either in!ivi!ually or collectively. &f
& say that a "rinci"le is Euniversally vali!4E that might mean that for each
in!ivi!ual4 $ithout e>ce"tion4 it $oul! e rational for that in!ivi!ual to follo$
that "rinci"le. -ut it might also mean that any grou" of "eo"le all of
$hom follo$e! the "rinci"le $oul! ehave in a $ay that is collectively eneGcial
or collectively rational. The "hrase E$hat it is rational for everyone to
!oE contains a similar amiguity. Of course4 it might turn out that the referents
of the "hrase ta#en in the t$o senses are e>actly the sameC that the
course $hich it is rational for each in!ivi!ual to ta#e is i!entical $ith the
course $hich4 if universally follo$e!4 $oul! result in a collectively eneGcial
or collectively rational system of action. To the e>tent that $e can reasonaly
e>"ect others to ehave as $e ourselves !o4 $e have groun!s for thin#ing
that only collectively rational "rinci"les $ill turn out to have universal a""licaility.
:or if each of us can foresee that the conseIuences of follo$ing a
certain ma>im $ill e something $e cannot consistently $ill4 then that might
"rovi!e us $ith a reason not to follo$ the ma>im4 an! hence "reclu!e its
universal a""licaility. -ut it is only un!er certain contingent4 em"irical con!itions
that this $oul! ha""en. We cannot infer ?as 3ant !oes@ that a "rinci"le
$ith universality of a""licaility is eo i"so a "rinci"le $ith collective
rationality. 0uch an inference is sim"ly invali!.
0omeone might thin# that 3ant coul! e save! from these oFections y
insisting that the conce"t of an oFective groun! shoul! have een inter"rete!
all along as containing oth universality of a""licaility an! collective
rationality. Let us call this the EstrongerE conce"t of oFectivity4 in contrast
to the E$ea#erE conce"t that involves universality of a""licaility alone. &f
$e em"loy this ne$ conce"t of oFectivity4 then it $ill certainly e true that
only a "rinci"le that can e $ille! as universal la$ can e oFectively
groun!e!4 an! hence that the :UL $ill follo$ from the very conce"t of an
oFective groun!. This $oul!4 of course4 trivialiDe the Grst stage of 3ant's
!e!uction of the :UL4 ut "erha"s that is no reason to oFect to itC 3ant
himself seems to regar! the "oint he is ma#ing as a trivial oneC EA "ractical
la$ $hich & recogniDe as such must Iualify for universal legislationC this is
an i!entical "ro"osition an! therefore self;evi!entE ?3"% 5=<5=@.
This is not a satisfactory $ay out of 3ant's !iLculties4 ho$ever. The reason
is that the Grst stage of 3ant's !e!uction4 $hich !erives the :UL from
the conce"t of an oFective groun!4 nee!s to e comine! $ith the secon!
stage4 $hich sho$s that there are oFectively groun!e! "rinci"les. The !e!uction
as a $hole $ill not succee! if the stronger conce"t of oFective
'77
THE E,2T&NE00 O: THE ,O.AL LAW
groun! is use! in the Grst stage of the argument $hile the $ea#er conce"t is
use! in the secon! stage4 for it $ill still e an o"en Iuestion $hether the
$ea#ly oFective "rinci"les estalishe! in the secon! stage are strongly oFective
tooA in!ee!4 it $ill e an o"en Iuestion $hether there are any strongly
oFective "rinci"les at all.
3ant's arguments never attem"t to estalish the e>istence of strongly oFective
"rinci"les4 ut only the e>istence of $ea#ly oFective ones. The :oun!ations
claims that a free $ill is suFect to oFective "rinci"les ecause an
oFective groun! arises from the rational self rather than from inclinations
for e>ternal oFects ?/ **7;**=<7(4 *(=<=7@. 0uch an argument might sho$
that a free $ill is suFect to $ea#ly oFective "rinci"les ?"rinci"les having
universality of a""licaility@4 ut it cannot sho$ that the $ill is suFect to
strongly oFective "rinci"les ?having collective rationality as $ell@. Even.in
The CritiIue of 2ractical .eason4 $here 3ant treats the e>istence of oFective
"rinci"les as a Efact of reason4E he maintains that the "ractical la$ that is
such a fact is Ereci"rocally im"lie! yE free!om an! even Ei!enticalE $ith it
?3"% 59<594 *5<*)@. The la$ that is given as a fact of reason is therefore only
$ea#ly oFective. &f $e em"loy the stronger conce"t of oFectivity in the Grst
stage of 3ant's !e!uction of the :UL4 then $e save that stage y trivialiDing
it4 ut $e only !oom the !e!uction as a $hole to failure.
Hegel may e mista#en in thin#ing that the :UL is em"ty4 tut he is not
mista#en in thin#ing that 3ant's starting "oint ?in the i!ea of a free $ill an!
a categorical im"erative@ is "urely formal4 an! inca"ale of lea!ing to any
!eterminate moral "rinci"les. 3ant tries to !erive a sustantive moral "rinci"le
merely from the conce"ts of an oFective groun! for acting an! a "rinci"le
that is oFectively groun!e!. -ut $e'cannot tell4 given these conce"ts alone4
$hich ."rinci"les4 if any4 are oFectively groun!e!4 are categorical im"eratives.
&f 3ant's :UL is not em"ty4 that is ecause it !oes not follo$ from
his starting "ointA this starting "oint is em"ty.
9. The em"tiness of the moral $ill
A categorical im"erative or "ractical la$ is an oFectively groun!e! "rinci"le.
:ollo$ing such a "rinci"le ecause it is oFectively groun!e! or acting from.
an oFective groun! is the same as acting from res"ect for la$4 or acting from
!uty ?/ *66<'7@. Thus 3ant's attem"t to "rovi!e a !e!uction of the :UL
from the conce"t of a "ractical la$ or oFectively groun!e! "rinci"le is the
same as attem"ting to !e!uce the :UL from the i!ea of acting "urely from
!uty. This is the $ay the !e!uction is in fact Grst "resente! in the :oun!ations
?/ *65<'+@. &f Hegel's em"tiness charge may e inter"rete! as the !enial
that any contentful moral "rinci"les may e !erive!vfrom the mere conce"t
of a categorical im"erative or oFective groun!4 then it might also e
inter"rete! as the !enial that any contentful moral "rinci"les may e !erive!
from the i!ea of acting from !uty.
Hegel's $ritings contain such !enials. They go further4 ta#ing the "osition
that the $ill that acts from !uty is committe! to act on a "rinci"le that is
'7=
,O.AL&T1
"urely formal an! em"ty of content. &n Cha"ter + $e sa$ ho$ Hegel reFects
the 3antian conce"tion of the goo! $ill as the $ill that acts from !uty. No$
$e $ill see that at the root of the em"tiness charge4 as Hegel himself conceive!
it4 lies the i!ea that if you emrace the 3antian conce"tion of the
goo! $ill4 you are not merely unale to !e!uce contentful moral "rinci"les
from it4 ut are also !oome! only to em"ty "rinci"les. &n short4 the moral
la$ is em"ty ecause the moral $ill is em"ty.
&n Hegel's te>ts the em"tiness charge is usually associate! $ith an attac#
on the 3antian conce"tion of the goo! $ill. The 2hiloso"hy of .ight says that
3ant's a!herence to the moral stan!"oint $ithout a conce"tion of ethical life
re!uces his ethics of autonomy to Ean em"ty formalism an! the moral science
to a "rating aout !uty for !uty's sa#eE ?2. N ')(.@. &n the Lectures on the
History of 2hiloso"hy4 Hegel "uts it this $ayC EThis is the !efect of the 3antian;
:ichtean "rinci"le4 that it is sim"ly formal. Col! !uty is the last un!igeste!
lum" in the stomach4 the revelation given of reasonE ?%/2 F C )79<
*7'@. -ut in oth these "assages4 it is unclear Fust ho$ the em"tiness charge
an! the 3antian conce"tion of the goo! $ill are connecte!.
The em"tiness charge came to articulation in Hegel's $ritings !uring the
Grst years of his Hena "erio!. &t is Grst a!umrate! in The DiMerence -et$een
:ichte's an! 0chelling's 0ystem of 2hiloso"hy ?'+6'@ an! !evelo"e!
further in Hegel's critiIue of :ichte in :aith an! 3no$le!ge ?'+65@. Later
"resentations of the charge in the 2henomenology4 Encyclo"e!ia4 2hiloso"hy
of .ight4 an! the lectures are in fact only echoes an! summaries of Hegel's
most e>tensive e>"osition of the em"tiness charge in the Natural .ight
?'+65@. &t is in the early Hena $ritings that $e must loo# for Hegel's clearest
statements of the motivation ehin! the charge.
:aith an! 3no$le!ge is most e>"licit aout the connection et$een the
em"tiness charge an! his critiIue of the goo! $ill as the $ill that acts from
!uty. :rom the moral stan!"oint4 Hegel says that Ethe content of the conce"t
is some reality "osite! in an i!ea form as en! an! intention4 some em"irical
givenA only the em"ty form is the a "riori.E &n morality there is a se"aration
et$een the concrete action4 $hose content is contingent an! em"irical4 an!
the "ure form of !uty4 for $hose sa#e alone the action is su""ose! to e
!one.
-ecause the em"tiness of the "ure $ill an! the universal is the truly a "riori4 the
"articular is something asolutely em"irical. What right an! !uty are in an! for
themselves ; to give a !etermination of this $oul! e contra!ictory. :or the content
at once cancels the "ure $ill or !uty for !uty's sa#e4 an! ma#es !uty into something
material. The em"tiness of the "ure feeling of !uty an! the content continually cross
each other u". . . . 0o $e are free to elevate every moral contingency into the form
of the conce"t an! "rocure a FustiGcation an! a goo! conscience for $hat is unethical.
?/W *57;*5=<'+);'+*@
Hegel claims that if the "ure moral !is"osition consists in acting from the
"ure thought of !uty4 then any EcontentE $oul! !estroy the moral "urity of
the $ill. Or4 as Hegel more succinctly "uts the "oint later in the 2henomenology
of 0"iritC E0ince the !eterminate !uty is an en!4 it has a content4 its
'7+
THE E,2T&NE00 O: THE ,O.AL LAW
content is a "art of the en!4 an! so morality is not "ureE ?2h/ f 7)6@. 0u""ose4
for instance4 that & try to thin# of a certain #in! of action4 such as
#ee"ing a "romise or hel"ing another in nee!4 as my !uty. To !o this s"eciGc
!uty4 Hegel seems to e saying4 $oul! e to act not from !uty alone4 ut
also from a more "articular motive4 that of #ee"ing this "romise or hel"ing
this "erson. -ut this more "articular motive $oul! cancel $hat 3ant regar!s
as the "urity of my $ill. Hegel's contention is that to a""ly any !eterminate
criterion of !uty is to thin# of one's action as one's !uty ecause it has certain
!eterminate em"irical featuresA an! to "erform it ecause it is a fulGllment
of that !uty is to "erform it ecause it has those features.
The "oint coul! also e "ut y saying that if there are to e !eterminate
!uties4 then to act from !uty is to act from those "articular !uties un!er the
em"irical circumstances $here they ariseA ut that means to act from em"irical
motives4 an! not solely from the "ure motive of !uty. This entails that
3antians must not a""ly any sustantive criterion of !uty4 since to use such
a criterion is to !o the action not only from !uty ut also ecause it has
$hatever features satisfy the criterion. Hence the moral stan!"oint "reclu!es
any oFective criterion for moral actionA it is ca"ale of "rocuring a goo!
conscience for even the most unethical actions.
To this argument there seems a very natural 3antian re"ly. To act from
!uty is to "erform the action ecause it satisGes the categorical im"erative in
one or another of its formulations. &f "romise #ee"ing is entaile! y some
formulation of the categorical im"erative4 then to act from !uty entails #ee"ing
"romises. Thus in or!er to act from !uty it is not only "ossile ut even
necessary to "erform actions $ith the em"irical features that ma#e them acts
of "romise #ee"ing. These em"irical features shoul! not motivate the acts4
ut it is a corollary of acting from the categorical im"erative that one shoul!
"erform acts $ith those features.
This re"ly4 ho$ever4 misses the "oint of Hegel's criticism. Hegel thin#s
that in or!er to !o one's !uty as this "articular !uty4 even if one !erives the
em"irical features of that !uty from some moral "rinci"le4 one must act from
those em"irical features4 an! that to act from the em"irical features of the
act in this $ay is also to act from something that has the stam" of E"articularityE
on itA it is to act from em"irical inclinations4 interests4 !rives4 "assions.
Hegel's thesis is that to act from a contentful "rinci"le is al$ays to act from
em"irical motivesA therefore4 the only $ay to avoi! acting from em"irical
motives $oul! e either not to act at all or else to act in a !eterminate $ay
$hile astracting entirely from the em"irical content of $hat one is !oing ;
an! so any !eterminate $ay of acting $ill !o. &n other $or!s4 to act from
"ure !uty is to act from a "rinci"le $ith no content. The motive of "ure
!uty thus attaches Fust as easily to the unethical as to the right an! goo!.
ioi En!s an! em"irical motivation
Hegel's argument is "erha"s most e>"licitly state! in the 2henomenology.
Accor!ing to the moral $orl!;vie$C
'79
,O.AL&T1
& act morally insofar as & am conscious of "erforming !uty only4 an! not something
else4 an! this means in fact $hen & !o not act. When & actually act4 & am conscious of
an other4 an actuality'that is at han!4 an! of an actuality & $ill to "ro!uceA & have a
!eterminate en! an! fulGll a !eterminate !uty. There is something in it that iRother
than "ure !uty4 $hich alone ought to e inten!e!. ?2h/ h 7)=@
The crucial thesis here is that to act on a contentful "rinci"le is to "ursue an
en!4 an! that to "ursue4 an en! is necessarily to act from something other
than "ure !utyA it is to act from em"irical !esires. Hegel often ma#es this
"oint in a very astract $ay y insisting that the universal an! the "articular
are i!entical ?EL NN'7);'7*@4 or that the universal is actualiDe! only in the
"articular ?%/ +(<=5@. As a""lie! to morXl "sychology4 this means that !uty
or the moral la$ ?Ethe universalE@ can e carrie! out or actualiDe! only
through the me!ium of Ethe "articularE ; through the agent's em"irical !esires4
!rives4 an! inclinations ?2h/ H 755@.
The meaning of Hegel's thesis is amiguous. 0ometimes it seems to e a
"oint aout human nature4 the "oint that "eo"le are not !is"ose! to carry
out sustantial "roFects unless they are !riven to !o so y Einterest4E or Eselfsatisfaction4E
or move! at the level of their sensuous nature y elemental
!rives or "assionsC ENothing great4E he says4 Ehas ever een accom"lishe!
$ithout "assionE ?%/ +(<=)A E/ NN *=*;*=(A 2. N '5'@. 0uch statements
have an air of $orl!ly $is!om aout them4 an! they may even e true4 ut
they !o not "ose a serious Xchallenge to 3antian morality. They only conGrm
3ant's o$n sus"icions4 in his more cynical moo!s4 that "erha"s even the est
human $ill is im"ure in itsOmotivation4 so that maye none of our actions
"ossesses true moral $orth.
0ometimes4 ho$ever4 Hegel suggests something !iMerentC that all action
is me!iate! y inclination ecause every action has an en! an! the setting
an! "ursuing of any "articular en! necessarily involves acting from em"irical
!rives an! inclinations. .ecall the "assage Iuote! earlier from the 2henomenologyC
E0ince the !eterminate !uty is an en!4 it has a content4 its content is
a "art of the en!4 an! so morality is not "ureE ?2h/ H 7)6@. Or4 as he "uts
it much later in the -erlin Encyclo"e!iaC
An action is an en! of the suFect4 Fust as Tthe suFectU is its activity of carrying
out this en!. There is an action at all only through the fact that the suFect is in it4
i.e. through its interest4 even in the most unselGsh action. . . . TAccor!ing to some
"eo"leU !rives an! "assions are o""ose! as a $hole to !uty for !uty's sa#e4 to morality.
-ut !rive an!' "assion is nothing ut the vitality of the suFect4 through $hich
Tthe suFectU is in its en!s an! their e>ecution. ?E/ N *=(.@
Every action is itself one of the agent's en!s4 since in our actions$e see#;to
vin!icate our o$n agency through the accom"lishment of our other en!s.
-ut the vin!ication of my agency is al$ays an as"ect !f my "articular goo!4
my suFective interest or Eself;satisfaction.E :rom this Hegel;conclu!es that
the ethical $orth of an action is not in the least !iminishe! y the fact that
it is "erforme! from inclination or "assion4 since it is an inevitale fact aout
agency that this shoul! e so. &nstea!4 Ethe ethical has to !o $ith the content4
'=6
THE E,2T&NE00 O: THE ,O.AL LAW
$hich as a universal is something inactive4 an! has its activation in the suFect.
The fact that this content is immanent in the suFect is interest4 an!
$hen it lays claim to the $hole of the eMective suFectivity4 it is "assionE
?E/ N *=(.@.
3antians must ta#e this argument more seriously. 3ant himself hol!s that
every action has an en!4 acts !one from !uty every it as much as acts !one
from imme!iate im"ulse or "ru!ential calculation ?/ *)7<(*;((@. 3ant even
maintains that en!s that are !uties ?en!s that it is my !uty to have@ "lay the
chief role in !etermining our ethical !uties as !istinct from our !uties of
right ?TL )+'<)+@. 3ant agrees $ith Hegel that there can e no a""lication
of the moral la$4 no s"eciGcation of $hat our !uties are4 $ithout the s"eciGcation
of the !eterminate en!s of !utiful actions. 3ant also hol!s that an act
is !evoi! of moral $orth if its motive consists in the agent's !esire for the
en! of the actionA acts so motivate! are !one from $hat 3ant calls a Ematerial
"rinci"leEA such "rinci"les4 he says4 are $ithout e>ce"tion em"irical an! fall
un!er the "rinci"le of self;love or one's o$n ha""iness ?3"% 5';55<'9;56@.
An act $hose motive coinci!es $ith its en! is heteronomous4 !one from inclination
an! not from !uty. &f all acts $ere necessarily of this #in!4 then the
$hole of morality ?as 3ant un!erstan!s it@ $oul! e nothing ut a co$e
of the rain.
3ant thin#s it is a mista#e to su""ose that the motive of an action inevitaly
coinci!es $ith its en!. An act !one from !uty has an en!4 $hich sometimes
even inclu!es the satisfaction of the agent's inclinations or "articular
interests. 3ant never claims that the agent has to forego this self;satisfaction
in or!er for the action to have moral $orth. -ut this en!4 $hich 3ant calls
the EmatterE of the agent's ma>im4 is not the motive of an action !one from
!utyA rather4 the motive in this case is the Elegislative formE of the ma>im4
the fact that the ma>im can e $ille! as a universal la$ ?3"% 57;59<57;59@.u
One meaning of 3ant's thesis that free!om of the $ill means that "ure reason
can of itself e "ractical is that an action can e "erforme! !irectly y legislative
reason4 $ithout the assistance of inclinations ?3"% *';*5<*)@.
Cha"ter + e>"oun!e! Hegel's reasons for reFecting 3ant's vie$ on this
"oint. :or Hegel4 the relevant Iuestion of moral "sychology is not aout an
act's "sychic causes ut aout the intentional !escri"tions that "rovi!e the
agent $ith the ?internal@ reasons for !oing it. 0ince Hegel agrees $ith 3ant
that the act must e !one for !uty's sa#e4 the intention of an act !one y a
goo! $ill must inclu!e its "romotion of the goo!. 0ince every successful act
also a""eals to the agent ecause of the self;satisfaction it "rovi!es4 this selfsatisfaction
$ill also elong to the intention. 0o eIually might other em"irical
or self;intereste! motives $ithout ta#ing anything a$ay from the goo!ness
of the agent's $ill.
&n the conte>t of Hegel's moral "sychology4 to try to act solely from !uty
is to attem"t to ring your action un!er no intentional !escri"tion at all e>ce"t
that it is your !uty to !o it. This means astracting yourself from the
self;satisfaction necessary to every action. 0uch a vie$ of oneself is incom"atile
$ith acting accor!ing to any !eterminate or contentful "rinci"les4 since
'='
,O.AL&T1
such "rinci"les $ill al$ays su""ly further intentional !escri"tions ?E#ee"ing
that "romise4E Ehel"ing this "ersonE@ un!er $hich the act is sure to e
rought y an agent engage! in fulGlling a concrete !uty. E2ure !uty consists
in the em"ty astraction of "ure thin#ing4 an! has its reality an! content
only in a !eterminate actuality ; an actuality that is the actuality of consciousness
itself4 an! this not as a mere thought;entity ut as an in!ivi!ualE ?2h/
n 7)=@.
3antians may oFect that astracting from self;satisfaction $ith res"ect to
motivation is not the same thing as ignoring the e>istence of these !esires or
trying to e>tir"ate them ; a course to $hich 3ant is o""ose! every it as
much as Hegel ?. (=<(6@. The morally relevant Iuestion is only $hether our
action is motivate! y the !esire for that eneGt or y the thought of !uty.
&f Hegel is correct4 though4 then this is not a morally relevant Iuestion at
iUA it may not even e a meaningful Iuestion. &n "ractice4 3ant's criterion
of moral $orth estranges moral $orth from self;satisfaction. &t encourages
us to thin# that $e cannot esteem ourselves unless $e act from an outlan!ish
su"ernatural motive $hich no one ever really has.
i.O
i i . Em"tiness an! Hegelian morality
3antians might ta#e some comfort from a rief revie$ of the history of the
em"tiness charge4 ecause it reveals an ironic tension in Hegel's vie$s. Hegel
!evelo"e! the em"tiness charge in the Hena "erio!4 $hen EmoralityE $as
little more than a nic#name for an erroneous stan!"oint4 ty"iGe! y the
moral "hiloso"hies of 3ant an! :ichte4 an! Grmly committe! to the unhealthy
i!ea that the goo! $ill acts solely from !uty. The moral "sychology
that enales Hegel to !efen! the em"tiness charge $as ma!e e>"licit only in
the $ritings after '+'7 ; as "art of a revise! conce"tion of morality that
attem"ts to integrate it "ositively $ithin a mo!ern ethical life.
Hegel's mature conce"tion of morality seems to o"en u" the "ossiility of
a morality ase! on the goo! ?the right unite! $ith universal $ell;eing@
yiel!ing contentful "rinci"les from $hich a !octrine of !uties might e !erive!.
-ut even in his later thought Hegel continues to hol! that there can
e no !octrine of !uties from the moral stan!"oint4 that this stan!"oint
yiel!s no criterion e>ce"t noncontra!iction4 an! that a contentful theory of
!uties reIuires the stan!"oint of ethical life ?2. N '*+.@. This seems to e
the em"tiness charge in the $ea# form4 $lXi!XXlHriHv that morality cannot
"rovi!e an Ea!eIuate !octrine of !utiesT12. N , X < . At the same time4 it
$oul! e a very roa! form of the em"tmXshclTarge= since it a""lies even to
the stan!"oint of morality as Hegel acce"ts it.
Ho$ might Hegel try to Fustify the em"tiness charge in this formB &f the
moral stan!"oint is limite! to consi!ering nothing ut the rights an! $elfare
of in!ivi!uals4 then it might not e ale to !eal $ith the value $e accor! to
social institutions4 an! that might "revent it from giving an a!eIuate !octrine
of !uties. Hegel hol!s4 for e>am"le4 that the state is a higher en! than
in!ivi!ual $ell;eing as such ?2. N 5(+@4 an! that $e value the Elea!ing of
'=5
THE E,2T&NE00 O: THE ,O.AL LAW
a universal lifeE in the state for its o$n sa#e ?2. N 5(+.@. He might argue
that these "urely collective values have a role to "lay in !etermining the sustance
of our !uties. They might4 for instance4 im"ose on us !uties to sho$
res"ect for !ue "rocess of la$ ?2. N 55'@ or the "erson of the monarch4 $ho
re"resents the free "ersonality of the state ?2. N 5=9@4 even $hen these acts
of res"ect are not really necessary for the state's institutions to fulGll their
en! of securing the right an! $ell;eing of in!ivi!uals. 0uch !uties coul! e
com"rehen!e! from the stan!"oint of ethical life4 ut not from the stan!"oint
of morality4 even on Hegel's most sym"athetic un!erstan!ing of the
latter.
This may e a "romising line of thought4 ut no$here !oes Hegel !evote
himself to a sustaine! !efense of it. To ma#e his case4 Hegel $oul! have to
argue that the value of rational institutions is oth genuine an! irre!ucile
to in!ivi!ual right an! $ell;eing. He $oul! have to sho$ ho$ the higher
en! of the state an! other institutions actually !oes sha"e our !uties4 an! he
$oul! have to sho$ ho$ the stan!"oint of ethical life can give an a!eIuate
account of the matters for $hich the moral stan!"oint is insuLcient.'5 &t is
the em"tiness charge in this roa! ut $ea# form that "oses the most serious
threat to the moral stan!"oint. &n Cha"ters '' an! '5 $e $ill e>amine some
features of Hegelian ethical life $hich may len! further su""ort to the em"tiness
charge in this form ?see es"ecially Cha"ter '54 NN 5;)@.
'=)
' 6
Conscience
iO The role of conscience in Hegelian ethics
&n the 2hiloso"hy of .ight4 the em"tiness of morality lea!s to ethical life an!
its system of Xsustantive oligations. The 2henomenology of 0"irit suggests
an ans$er to em"tiness $ithin the moral stan!"oint. This is conscience4
$here the suFective $ill gives iself content through the imme!iate conviction
that a "articular act fulGlls its !uty. Conscience also has an im"ortant
role to "lay in Hegel's mature ethical thought.
The stan!"oint of conscience is $hat $e might no$ call a Esituation ethics.E
Here the suFect leaves ehin! general rules an! "rinci"les4 loo#s at the
concrete situation4 an! ta#es u"on herself the res"onsiility of choosing the
act $hich she thin#s that situation reIuires. Conscience selects an act ecause
it is goo! in some res"ect4 ut in other res"ects the act may a""ear to e a!
or even $rong. Hegel thin#s that $ithin the moral stan!"oint there is no $ay
to resolve such conJicts. ConseIuently4 conscience involves an unavoi!ale
element of aritrariness. Hegel em"hasiDes that there are no rules that in!
conscience asolutely. Even $hat loo#s to others li#e an act of theft or co$ar!ice
may e re"resente! y conscience as a !uty W2h/ 'f 7**@. This gives
a "ositive meaning to the em"tiness chargeC -ecause morality cannot "rovi!e
com"letely !eterminate !uties4 there are certain "oints in the moral life
$here the suFect's aritrariness must ste" in.
. Conscience is morally amiguous4 in "art o$ing to the com"le>ity of human
situations4 ut even more to the fact that the "articular suFect's insight
is the only authority com"etent to resolve moral "rolems. Conscience relies
on the in!ivi!ual's Emoral genius4 $hich #no$s the inner voice of its imme!iate
#no$le!ge to e a !ivine voiceE ?2h/ 'f 7((@. Hence conscience cannot
altogether avoi! an attitu!e of self;$orshi". Ta#en together $ith the "ossiilities
of !ece"tion an! hy"ocrisy that accom"any it4 this "uts conscience very
close to moral evil. Hegel li#es to "oint out that the suFective self;certainty
that ma#es conscience the su"reme stage of morality has much in common
$ith that self;centere!ness that is the essence of sin in the Christian tra!ition
?2h/ 'f 776A 2. N ')9A cf. 2h/ 'f ===@.
Hegel's treatment of conscience is corres"on!ingly amivalent. &t involves
a critiIue of "ost;3antian moral thin#ing4 follo$ing :ichte. The 2henomenology
account4 it seems4 aime! at the /erman .omantics4 es"ecially :rie!rich
0chlegel4 0chleiermacher4 an! Novalis4' $hereas the 2hiloso"hy of
.ight's lengthy treatment of conscience loo#s li#e a sustaine! attac# on the so;
'=*
CON0C&ENCE
calle! ethics of conviction ?UerDeugungsethi#@ !evelo"e! y Ha#o :rie!rich
:ries. ,ost of the "resent cha"ter $ill e !evote! to this theme. -ut Hegel
also regar!s conscience as a necessary element in morality4 $hich not even
the structures ethical life can !is"lace. This "ositive si!e of Hegel's theory
of conscience also !eserves em"hasis4 an! $e $ill !evote the rest of this section
to it.
&f the stan!"oint of conscience is "remise! on the asolute moral authority
of the in!ivi!ual suFect's insight4 then Hegel agrees $ith the "remiseC
The right of the suFective $ill is that $hatever it is to recogniDe as vali! must e
seen y its insight as goo!. ?2. N ')5@
T0uFectivityU is the Fu!ging "o$er for a content to !etermine from $ithin itself
only $hat goo! is. ?2. N ')+@
Conscience e>"resses the asolute FustiGcation of suFective self;consciousness4
namely that of #no$ing in itself'an! from itself $hat right an! !uty are4 an! of recogniDing
nothing as goo! e>ce"t $hat it #no$s to e soA an! simultaneously the assertion
that $hat it #no$s an! $ills in this $ay is in truth right an! !uty. ?2. N ')=.@
Even the institutions of ethical life have authority over a mo!ern suFect only
ecause they may e E!evelo"e! out of suFectivityE ?2. N ')+A@. Hegel
ac#no$le!ges that there are times in history $hen the ethos of social life has
ecome Efaithless to etter $illsEA he thin#s that it is in such times that the
$ise turn in$ar! to their o$n consciences4 see#ing to $in ac# in$ar!ly the
self;harmony that out$ar! actuality has lost ?2. N ')+.@.
Even in ha""ier times $hen suFectivity is fulGlle! y ethical life4 conscience
"lays an im"ortant role in in!ivi!ual morality. The oFective content
of my !uties is !etermine! y my social relationshi"s ?2. N '*+.@4 ut that
cannot "ossily !etermine every !etail of my con!uct. The !uties im"ose!
y !iMerent relationshi"s leave im"ortant ga"s4 an! occasionally come into
conJict $ith each other. Conscience has the tas# of !eci!ing et$een conJicting
ethical !uties ?2h/ '' 7)(A %2.'=C +=A %2.ig'C ''+A %2.5C *+(@. &t
can resolve these conJicts only ecause efore conscience no !uty is asoluteA
rather4 the only asolute is "ure !uty4 $hose content is #no$n y conscience
?2h/ '' 7*)@.
&n morality Hegel sees a ten!ency to$ar! casuistry4 an attem"t to ring
every !ecision un!er rules an! "rinci"les. The em"tiness of the moral stan!"oint
means that this attem"t is ultimately !oome! to failure. -ut Hegel
$oul! also have reservations aout moral casuistry even if it $ere successful.
He regar!s its rule;follo$ing mentality as !estructive of character4 $hich
sho$s itself est $here moral rules fail. EDecisive "articularity is $hat $e
usually call EcharacterEA a man can act only insofar as he is a "articular. The
!eman! for a casuistry involves e>"ressing the $ish that a man $ants to e
relieve! of the troule of having a characterE ?%2.igC ''9@.
ENaive44 sustantial action4E ethical action as the ancient $orl! "erforme!
an! "erceive! it ; Hegel thin#s ; EreIuires self;forgetfulness in regar! to
"articularityE ?%2.igC ''9@. ConseIuently4 there character ta#es the form
of an instinct for action of e>traor!inary ethical virtuosity or EvirtueE ?Tugen!@
?2. N '(6.@. ,o!ern self;consciousness4 y contrast4 !eman!s that
O=(
,O.AL&T1
"articularity shoul! ecome reJective. This is the meaning of the mo!ern
i!ea that moral genius ta#es the form of in!ivi!ual conscience. Li#e morality
itself4 conscience is not !is"lace! y ethical life4 ut remains an element
$ithin mo!ern ethical life.
5. :ichte's moral e"istemology
We sa$ in Cha"ter 9 that :ichte's moral "rinci"le is "urely formalC EAct
al$ays accor!ing to your est conviction of your !uty4 orC Act accor!ing to
your conscienceE ?0L '(7<'7*@4 leaving it to e !etermine! $hat our conscience
tells us to !o. :ichte's scientiGc system of ethics also inclu!es a
lengthy ta>onomy an! transcen!ental !e!uction of the EmaterialE of our !uties
?0L 567;)7(<5'=;)=+@. -ut he regar!s this as only transcen!ental "hiloso"hy4
$hich he !istinguishes from the $ay or!inary moral agents #no$ their
!uties ?0L '(<'94 56+<5'9@. The or!inary #no$le!ge of !uty is for him sim"ly
a s"ecial case of theoretical #no$le!ge4 $hose general criterion is coherence
$ith the entire system of the in!ivi!ual's theoretical convictions ?0L
'7);'7*<'=);'=*@.
:ichte sees a "rolem $ith this4 since it leaves o"en the "ossiility that my
$hole system of theoretical convictions may e in error. &n most theoretical
matters4 $e may resign ourselves to a certain !egree of s#e"ticism. -ut $here
our !uty is at sta#e4 :ichte thin#s that any !egree of !out at all is intolerale4
ecause it "resents us $ith the s"ecter of moral luc#. &f the content of
our !uty is in !out to us4 then to that e>tent $e are leaving the morality of
our actions an! characters to mere chance4 $hich no conscientious moral
agent can ever !o ?0L '7*<'=*@. 0ince conscientious action is fun!amental
to our moral vocation4 the "ossiility of the moral life !e"en!s on the e>istence
of an infallile criterion for the correctness of our moral convictions4
$hich must e eIually availale to all moral agents ?0L '7*;'7(<'=*;'=(@.
When & inIuire into any matter4 my theoretical faculties "resent me $ith
arguments an! evi!ence of various #in!s. While & consi!er the evi!ence4
my imagination hovers ?sch$et@ et$een elief an! !iselief regar!ing a
"ro"osition ?0L '7=<'==@. 0ometimes this results in a Fu!gment. A Fu!gment
is an actA it is "ractical in nature. Occasionally4 the evi!ence gives to a "articular
Fu!gment the !istinctive Iuality of certainty. This ha""ens $hen & am
move! to the Fu!gment y a feeling of certainty ?or truth@. This feeling is
the Gnal criterion of certainty in all matters. When the Fu!gment is aout our
!uty4 :ichte calls the feeling of certainty EconscienceE ?0L '=)<'+)@. :ichte
insists that the feeling of certainty must e "ossile in regar! to every Iuestion
of !uty. Other$ise $e coul! not e certain it is our !uty4 an! so it coul!
not e reIuire! of us ?0L '7+;'79<'=+;'=9@. :urther4 the feeling of "erfect
certainty must e unmista#aleA if $e coul! e sincerely mista#en in thin#ing
$e have it4 then this $oul! once again ma#e it a matter of chance $hether
$e have !one $hat !uty reIuires ?0L '=*<'+*@.
:ichte's e"istemology at this "oint has much in common $ith Descartes's.
:or oth "hiloso"hers4 $e arrive at convictions y theoretically contem"lat;
'=7
CON0C&ENCE
ing the evi!ence an! then Fu!ging through our "ractical faculty or $ill. When
the evi!ence is strong enough4 it "ro!uces in us a s"ecial state of "erfect
certainty $here elief is irresistile. Descartes calls this state Eclear an! !istinct
"erce"tion.E :ichte consi!ers it a feeling of the harmony of our "ure
an! em"irical ego4 in $hich my contingent Fu!gment e>"eriences a harmony
$ith the universal con!itions of selfhoo! $hich serve as the norm of rationality
?0L '77<'=7@. :ichte's o$n e>"licit com"arison4 ho$ever4 is $ith the
3antian theory of aesthetic Fu!gmentC The feeling of certainty claims oFective
vali!ity ut has an imme!iacy that "reclu!es any conce"tual or !iscursive
!emonstration ?0L '7=<'=7@. :ichte !oes not mean that !emonstrations
an! evi!ence are irrelevant to arriving at theoretical convictionsA his "oint is
rather that !iscursive arguments an! evi!ence "ro!uce conviction in us only
$hen they engage our "ractical faculty to come to a !ecision. Evi!ence can
lea! us to the trough4 ut $e are convince! only $hen the "ractical self
chooses to ta#e the "lunge. Dout an! uncertainty are states of the $ill4
accom"anie! y an>iety an! !issatisfaction4 $hereas conviction rings the
self into a state of harmony $ith itself4 $hich $e e>"erience as at once free
an! necessary4 giving us "eace an! satisfaction ?0L '7=<'==@. :ichte shares
$ith Descartes the vie$ that elief or conviction4 though occasione! y theoretical
evi!ence contem"late! y the intellect4 is actually a state of the $ill.
Conscience !oes not su""ly the content of our !uties ?the theoretical un!erstan!ing
!oes that@A it is rather the feeling that convinces us that something
is our !uty ?0L '=)<'+)@. :ichte hol!s that $e have a !uty al$ays to
hee! our conscienceA that is4 $e must al$ays inIuire into the content of our
!uty until $e arrive at the feeling of certainty4 an! then follo$ the conviction
accom"anie! y that feeling ?0L '=*<'+);'+*@. :ichte a!mits that $e are
sometimes uncertain $hether something is our !uty. 0ometimes $e Fu!ge
something to e our !uty $hen it is not4 an! sometimes $e elieve $e are
follo$ing our conscience $hen $e are not. He thin#s that such things can
occur only through the E!ar#eningE of our moral consciousness y cul"ale
self;!ece"tion ?0L '95;'97<565;567 @. The voice of conscience al$ays s"ea#s
to us an! its voice is infallileA ut sometimes $e choose either to "ervert its
message or not to listen to it at all. ,oral uncertainty an! moral error are
al$ays something for $hich $e are to lame.
-oth 3ant an! :ichte say there can e no such thing as an Eerring conscience4E
ut they mean !iMerent ?even incom"atile@ things y the saying.
3ant a!mits that $e are fallile in our oFective Fu!gment $hether something
is our !uty4 ut !enies that & can err as to $hether & have com"are!
my action $ith my "ractical reason4 an! i!entiGes conscience $ith the Fu!gment
that & have ma!e such a com"arison ?TL *6'<7'@. &f $e are fallile in
the $ay 3ant says4 then conscience in :ichte's sense can err. On the other
han!4 if $e can E!ar#enE our moral consciousness in the manner :ichte !escries4
then it is "ossile to Fu!ge falsely that $e have com"are! our action
$ith our conce"t of !uty4 an! that is an erring conscience in 3ant's sense.
3antian an! :ichtean theories asi!e4 it loo#s as if an erring conscience ?in
oth their senses@ is a fairly common fact of life.
'==
,O.AL&T1
:ichte argues that ecause the feeling of certainty is the Gnal e"istemic
court of a""eal4 it is im"ossile for a conviction accom"anie! y it ever to
e in error ?0L '=*<'+);'+*@. This argument is not fully "ersuasive. What
if $e acIuire a conviction ?accom"anie! y the feeling of certainty@ that an
earlier conviction of ours ?also so accom"anie!@ $as iaerrorB This4 or something
rather li#e it4 a""arently ha""ens in some cases $hen & change my
min! on a moral Iuestion. Though & earlier felt "erfectly certain of my "osition4
& no$ feel eIually certain that my earlier conviction $as $rong4 !es"ite
the certainty & use! to feel. &n such cases "eo"le !o not al$ays Fu!ge that
they $ere not really certain efore4 or that they have een !eceiving themselves.
They sometimes Fu!ge that they use! to feel "erfectly certain4 ut
no$ see that they must have een mista#en. :ichte no$here argues that this
coul! not ha""en4 an! he !oes not tell us ho$ to reconcile it $ith his claim
that conscience cannot err.
). :ries an! the ethics of conviction
Ha#o :rie!rich :ries ?'==);'+*)@ came to Hena as a 2rivat!oDent at the
same time as Hegel in '+6'. He $as "romote! to "rofessor at Hei!elerg in
'+6(A Hegel succee!e! him in '+'7 $hen :ries move! tP a "rofessorshi" at
Hena. The t$o men $ere "ersonal rivals as $ell as !isagreeing "hiloso"hically.
&n the summer of '+'94 one of :ries's stu!ents4 3arl Lu!$ig 0an!4
assassinate! the reactionary $riter August von 3otDeue. &t $as this event
that gave the Holy Alliance an! 2russian reactionaries the "rete>t they
nee!e! to "romulgate the Carlsa! Decrees4 instituting censorshi" of aca!emic
"ulications an! ta#ing other re"ressive measures against aca!emics
"erceive! as suversive E!emagogues.E :ries ha! given a $ell;#no$n s"eech4
Glle! $ith re"ulican an! /erman nationalist sentiments4 at the Warturg
:estival in '+'= ?see 2. 2reface '=X56@. Using this as an e>cuse4 the authorities
!ismisse! :ries from his "rofessorshi" at Hena in '+56 as. "art of the
so;calle! !emagogue "ersecutions ?the "rofessorshi" $as restore!.to him in
'+5*@.
:ries acce"ts :ichte's "rinci"le that the fun!amental moral !uty is to follo$
your conscience4 that is4 to act accor!ing to your moral convictionsC
EThe comman! of !uties of virtue comman!sC to act from res"ect for the
la$ accor!ing to one's conviction of $hat the4!uty of virtue reIuiresE ?:ries4
N3% y '+9@. The Eimme!iate comman! of virtueE isC E/ive allegianceto
your o$n conviction of !utyFE ?:ries4 H22 5*)A cf4 H22 '(+4 '7*@4
Unli#eO:ichte4 ho$ever4 :ries allo$s us no infallile faculty for the #no$le!ge
of our !uty. He thin#s4 that sincerely follo$ingrtheir conscience4 moral
agents sometimes !" $hat is oFectively i$roftg. Conscience4 he4 insists is Ee!ucaleE
?il!ungsfahig@ ?H22 5'*@. -ut li#e43ant an!':irchte efore him4
:ries also !efen!s theX claim that conscience is Einfallile4E once again giving
the claim his o$n inter"retation.
&t can easily a""ear that the !octrine of the infalliility of conscience stan!s against
this !octrine of the e!ucaility of conscience. The.follo$ing shoul!clear this u". :or
'=+
CON0C&ENCE
the man $ho has attaine! to "urity ?Lauter#eit@4 conscience is infallile accor!ing to
an i!entical "ro"ositionA for no more can e !eman!e! of any man than that he
faithfully follo$ his "ure conviction. No$ since conscience e>"resses this conviction4
it is al$ays right for every in!ivi!ual man in the moment. ?H22 5'*;5'(@
:or :ries4 the infalliility of conscience means that those $ho acton erroneous
moral convictions shoul! not e lame!A on the contrary4 they shoul!
e most highly esteeme!'4 since they sho$ true E"urity of soulE or res"ect for
the "ractical s"irit4 $hich is the highest moral goo! ?HE *9<56@.
:ries hol!s that $hen $e Fu!ge others4 $e ought to Fu!ge them only y
the stan!ar! of their moral convictions4 never y our o$nC
The Grst la$ of the "hiloso"hical theory of virtue is that of the goo! !is"osition of
characterC res"ect for the "ractical s"irit. Correctness of conviction in res"ect of the
comman! is y contrast only the secon! la$. Hence the Grst rule y $hich & shoul!
com"are the actions of others $ith the !uty of virtue must e !istinguishe! from the
rule that tells me $hat !uties are lai! on me. :or each can e Fu!ge! only accor!ing
to his o$n conviction4 an! $hat it $oul! e $rong to !o accor!ing to a correct conviction
can for the in!ivi!ual e "recisely $hat accor!s $ith !uty. ?N3%FC '96@
&t might a""ear that this still "ermits us to hol! in!ivi!uals lamale for
their $rong moral convictions4 since correctness of conviction is at least mentione!
as a Esecon! la$.E -ut :ries inten!s this secon! la$ for the "ur"ose
of Fu!ging actions only4 never agentsA his "rinci"le for the moral Fu!gment
of in!ivi!uals focuses e>clusively on their motivation or E!is"ositionE an!
not at all on the oFective lightness or $rongness of $hat they !oC EAll legal
estimation of in!ivi!ual actions as to their !utifulness or un!utifulness elongs
only to the theory of right4 an! has no "lace in a "ro"er theory of
virtue4 since this has to !o only $ith !is"ositionsE ?N3%FC '96@.
3ant says that the sho"#ee"er $ho !eals honestly $ith customers ecause
it is goo! usiness "erforms acts that have ElegalityE ut not EmoralityEA the
acts !eserve "raise an! encouragment4 ut they have no moral $orth an! !o
not !eserve the esteem that is reserve! for the goo! $ill ?3"%='<=*A TL 5'9<
H=_ / )9=bE)99<&)b&7@. :ries4 ho$ever4 thin#s that this notion of ElegalityE
elongs entirely to the theory of right4 an! has no "lace at all in morality.
He a""arently thin#s that 3ant's sho"#ee"er is no !iMerent morally from a
sho"#ee"er $ho cheats his customers ecause he elieves it to e goo! usiness4
since oth act from the same ?im"ure4 self;intereste!@ !is"osition or
motivation. On the other tian!4 :ries hol!s that if & am convince! that it is
my !uty to !o something an! !o it from a morally "ure !is"osition4 then &
shoul! e esteeme!'rather than lame! for !oing it4 even if oFectively it is
morally $rong.. Of course4 if my action violates some "ositive la$4 then it is
legally "unishale4 an! if it violates another's right4 then it may e con!emne!
from the stan!"oint of rightA ut :ries hol!s that morality or the
theory of virtue can have nothing to say against it.
:ries's stu!ent 3arl :ollen4 lea!er of the stu!ent -urschenschaft in Hena4
!re$ e>treme conseIuences from these teachings4 comining them $ith a
"olitical ra!icalism $hich :ries share! only to a lesser !egree. :ollenA es;
'=9
,O.AL&T1
"ouse! an e>treme ethical in!ivi!ualism4 $hich encourage! action on a "ersonal
moral co!e in!e"en!ent or even in !eGance of acce"te! moral stan!ar!s.
&n the "olitical realm4 he a!vocate! a Etheory of in!ivi!ual terrorE in
$hich even an act of "olitical mur!er elongs to Ea $ar of one in!ivi!ual
against other in!ivi!uals4E an! must e !eeme! a "raise$orthy act if motivate!
y conscience. EWherever there is a conviction $on through free $ill
an! one's o$n cognition4 for those so convince!4 every means is "ermissile4
even if it contra!icts the common moral co!e. The only essential thing for
the agent is to e res"onsile to one's o$n conviction.E5 3arl 0an! came
un!er :ollen's inJuence. He elieve! ?"roaly correctly@ that 3otDeue
$as a .ussian agent attem"ting to suvert the reform government in 2russia
in the interests of the Tsar. 0an!'s mur!er of 3otDeue $as a""arently motivate!
y the conviction that it $as his "atriotic !uty. ?With 0an!'s hel"4 of
course4 3otDeue serve! the interests of the reaction far more eMectively
!ea! than he ever coul! have !one alive.@
:ries "roaly !i! not share 0an!'s conviction that it $as his !uty to assassinate
3otDeue4 ut since he hol!s that $e must Fu!ge agents morally only
y their o$n convictions4 not y ours4 he must say that if 0an! sincerely
elieve! it $as his !uty to #ill 3otDeue an! acte! out of a "ure intention4
then 0an! is to e esteeme! rather than lame! for $hat he !i!.)
*. A "rolem aout moral error an! lame
:ichte's moral e"istemology an! :ries's ethics of conviction may e vie$e!
as t$o $ays of !ealing $ith a "rolem aout moral error an! res"onsiility.
2eo"le often !isagree $ith one another aout $hat is morally right an!
$rong. 0ome hol! that legaliDe! aortion countenances mass mur!er4
$hereas others maintain that la$s against aortion violate the asic human
right over one's o$n o!y. &f either of these eliefs is correct4 then successful
im"lementation of the incorrect elief ?$hichever it is@ involves very serious
$rong!oing.
Assume for a moment that aortion is mur!er of the innocent. Then "hysicians
$ho "erform aortions intentionally commit an act $hich4 Fu!ge! accor!ing
to correct moral "rinci"les4 is $rong. We $ill thin# such "hysicians
lamale if $e acce"t the follo$ing.
?'@ &t is lamale intentionally to !o $hat is morally $rongA that is4 if acts
falling un!er !escri"tion K1V are $rong4 then it is lamale to "erform
an act that is intentional un!er !escri"tion K1V.
To the e>tent that $e are initially !is"ose! to agree $ith ?'@4 then4 $e are4
$ith Hegel4 !is"ose! to reFect :ries's ethics of conviction.
No$ assume4 on the other han!4 that aortion is not mur!er4 ut rather
that a "hysician $ho "erforms an aortion only ai!s a $oman in the e>ercise
of a fun!amental human right. Even granting this4 $e ought to Gn! it !iLcult
to a""rove of "hysicians $ho elieve they are utchering innocent aies
$hen they "erform aortions ut $ho continue to "erform aortions $ithout
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Iualm ecause it "ays goo! money. We may thin# them lamale4 even
though a "hysician $ith !iMerent ?as $e are assuming4 correct@ moral eliefs
$oul! not e lamale. &n that case4 $e are !is"ose! to acce"tC
?5@ &t is lamale to !o something you elieve is morally $rong4 to act
against your o$n conscience4 even if $hat you are !oing is not really
morally $rong.
2erha"s the strongest "oint of the vie$s of :ichte an! :ries that $e have
een e>amining is their fun!amental commitment to ?5@.
Ta#en together4 ?'@ an! ?5@ threaten to conJict $ith another commonly
hel! elief4 $hich coul! e loosely state! as
?)@ We can e lamale only for $hat is u" to us.
0u""ose that 0an!4 !oing his est to !iscover moral truth4 comes to the false
conviction that it is his !uty to #ill 3otDeue. Then Ty ?'@U 0an! is lamale
if he intentionally #ills 3otDeue4 an! Ty ?5@U he is lamale if he !oes not.
-ut if 0an! has !one his est to Gn! moral truth4 then it $as not u" to him
to avoi! his error. ConseIuently4 if oth ?'@ an! ?5@ are true4 then 0an! is
lamale for something that is not u" to him. That contra!icts ?)@.
(. 0ome solutions to the "rolem
We coul! acce"t ?'@4 ?5@4 an! ?)@ all $ithout inconsistency4 if $e sai! that
it is after all u" to 0an! to avoi! incorrect moral eliefs. This seems to e
the "osition Aristotle ta#es $hen he argues that $e are res"onsile for the
$ay the goo! a""ears to us ecause the a""earance !e"en!s on our character4
an! our character is u" to us ecause it is forme! through our voluntary
actions4 $hich are u" to us.* This "osition is not very satisfactory4 though.
&t is !outful that our characters are $holly a "ro!uct of actions that are u"
to us. Even if they $ere4 it $oul! not necessarily follo$ that our character
itself is u" to us. When & a!! u" a long column of Ggures4 each stro#e of my
"encil is u" to me4 ut that !oesn't entail that it is al$ays u" to me to avoi!
ma#ing an error in the a!!ition. :urther4 Aristotle !oes not e>"lain ho$ $e
can e lame! for the earliest actions through $hich our characters $ere Grst
forme!. These must have een chosen accor!ing to an a""earance of the
goo! that $as not u" to us.
:ichte's solution is similar4 ut not vulnerale to the same oFections. He
hol!s that if $e inIuire conscientiously into the content of our !uty4 $e can
al$ays arrive at a conviction accom"anie! y the feeling of certaintyA such a
conviction is infallile4 an! only an action "erforme! in accor!ance $ith such
a conviction is "erforme! accor!ing to conscience. &f 0an! ha! inIuire! conscientiously4
he $oul! inevitaly have arrive! at the correct conviction. &f
he arrives at an incorrect conviction4 then he must e !ar#ening his moral
consciousness ?either he has arrive! at a correct conviction aout his !uty4
an! !eceives himself as to $hat his conscience tol! him to !o4 or he has
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faile! to convince himself fully concerning his !uty an! !eceives himself in
thin#ing that his conviction is accom"anie! y the feeling of certainty@.
The main "rolem $ith :ichte's solution is that it is not "lausile to thin#
either that every case of moral uncertainty has to result from cul"ale neglect
of our !uty to inIuire or that every moral error has to result from self;!ece"tion.
Honest inIuiry al$ays has uncertainty as one "ossile outcome ?s#e"tics
even argue that it is the only "ossile outcome of any inIuiry@. ,oral
issues are often more com"le> than Iuestions of mathematics4 "hysics4 or
even history. 0ometimes the only $ay to avoi! self;!ece"tion is to a!mit that
your moral convictions are not certain. When he insists that !ue consi!eration
of a moral issue has to result in a conviction accom"anie! y the feeling
of "erfect certainty4 :ichte commits himself to the "osition that $e have not
given !ue consi!eration to a moral issue until $e have converte! ourselves
into rigi! fanatics aout it.(
,any are attracte! to a less ra!ical version of :ichte's vie$. :ichte insists
that $e have a !uty to inIuire carefully into the content of our !uty ?0L
'7);'7*<'=);'=*@. Even if this inIuiry involves no ca"acities for infallile
#no$le!ge4 $e still might lame "eo"le $hose moral error results from a
failure to inIuire !iligently4 since that failure is u" to them. Along these
lines4 Alan Donagan thin#s that $e are res"onsile for moral error only $hen
the error is !ue to EnegligenceE or E$ant of !ue consi!eration.E7 -ut this
oMers no solution to our "resent "rolem. Unless $e emrace :ichte's e>treme
vie$4 the "rolem continues to arise $henever $e have inIuire! !iligently
enough to fulGll our !uty of inIuiry4 ut have nevertheless arrive! at
the $rong result. &t loo#s as though Donagan $ants either to a""ly some
notion of !iminishe! res"onsiility to such cases4 or else to treat moral error
as sim"ly irrelevant to the agent's moral $orth.
&n N 9 $e shall consi!er the vie$ that false moral convictions might e an
e>cusing con!ition. At Grst lush4 ho$ever4 the other alternative $oul! seem
"referale. When & act on a false moral conviction4 & am normally a fullJe!ge!
agent4 engaging all my faculties an! sentiments Fust as & $oul! if my
elief $ere correct. & may in fact have !one everything in my "o$er to !o
my !uty4 inclu!ing a !ue consi!eration of $hat my !uty is in this case.
.ather than regar!ing me as not res"onsile for my actions4 it might seem
more a""ro"riate to give me cre!it for !oing my est.
&n eMect4 that is :ries's "osition4 $hich "ro"oses to solve the "rolem
sim"ly y !enying ?'@. :ries thin#s that $e have a !uty to inIuire after the
correct ans$er to moral Iuestions4 ut our intellectual "o$ers are not infallile.
Correct moral elief is a sign of an e!ucate! un!erstan!ing4 not of a
"ure $ill. The true measure of a "erson is not the intellect ut the heart4 not
e>ternal acts an! their conseIuences ut inner "urity of !is"osition C
&f $e $ish to "ass Fu!gment u"on the true $orth of someone else's life4 $e must
rememer that virtue is not the la$. What is im"ortant is not the fact that an e>ternally
virtuous action has een."erforme! ut that virtue has een internally $ille!
an! "ractice!. . . . &f $e no$ as#4 EWhat then is the goo!BE only the e!ucate! un!erstan!ing
coul! give a correct re"ly. The !ecision is no longer a matter of the $ill ut
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CON0C&ENCE
of insight4 so that here even the "urest an! the est in earthly life coul! err an! e
mista#en. ?:ries4 HE *9<564 ((<5)@
7O ,ista#en criticisms of :ries
&f you act on a mista#en moral conviction4 some might lame you for the
action only4 $hereas others might lame you for the elief as $ell. Hegel's
attac# on !ie ethics of conviction has to !o $ith laming actions4 not eliefs.
&f Hegel thin#s that "eo"le are lamale sim"ly for hol!ing erroneous moral
convictions4 he never says so. -ut he !oes insist that if such convictions lea!
me to !o something $rong4 then & am to lame for it.
Hegel's e>ten!e! !iscussion of this "oint ?at 2. N '*6.@ "lainly has :ries's
ethics of conviction as its "rinci"al target.= 0o regar!e!4 ho$ever4 many of
Hegel's criticisms miss their mar#4 since they are ase! on "lain misun!erstan!ings
of :ries's "osition. &t is im"ortant to get a clear vie$ of $here some
of Hegel's criticisms go $rong if $e are to a""reciate $here :ries's "osition
is really vulnerale to Hegel's attac#s.
Hegel criticiDes a vie$ accor!ing to $hich EsuFective o"inion is e>"ressly
given out as the4 rule of right an! !uty4 since the conviction that hol!s something
to e right is to e that through $hich the ethical nature of the action
is !etermine!E ?2. N '*6.C 5=5@. He a""arently ta#es this vie$ to hol! that
$hatever moral eliefs the suFect hol!s are correct ?at least for that suFect@4
so that there is no such thing as an oFective or im"ersonal truth aout ethical
matters. Thus Hegel charges that E$ith Tthe ethics of convictionU ethical
oFectivity com"letely !isa""earsE ?2. N '*6.4 "". 5=5;5=)@.
Hegel "oints out that $hen this vie$ un!ermines the very "ossiility of
oFective truth an! error in ethics4 it also rules out many of its o$n claims.
:irst4 it can no longer mitigate crime an! evil y saying they are Eonly errorsE
since it !enies there is any such thing as moral error ?2. N '*6.4 ". 5=(@.
Ne>t4 the vie$ no longer "ermits me to Iuarrel $ith those $ho con!emn the
actions & "erform out of my convictions4 since their act of con!emnation also
accor!s $ith their conviction4 an! so it is entirely correct ?2. N '*6.4 ".
5=7@. :inally4 this vie$ no longer even gives us any reason to res"ect "eo"le's
convictions4 since the value of conviction is ase! on the fact that it is a
serious attem"t to "ossess the truth4 an! the vie$ !enies that there is any
truth in moral matters. Conviction is Eacci!ental an! trivial4 really something
Iuite e>ternal4 $hich coul! stri#e me this $ay or that $ayEA conseIuently4
Emy eing convince! is in fact the most triJing thing if & cannot #no$ the
truthE ?2. N '*6.4 ". 5=7@.
These criticisms $oul! e fatal against a moral relativist or antirealist $ho
claims that there is no oFective truth aout right4 $rong4 an! !uty an! then4
in a lieral s"irit4 tries to infer from this that the only a""ro"riate moral
measure is the conformity of an action to the agent's o$n moral convictions.
&f you !eny that there is any moral truth4 then you have no usiness trying
to correct "eo"le's erroneous moral Fu!gments. &f any conviction is as true
as any other4 then those $ho elieve in laming actions ecause they are
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"erforme! accor!ing to the agent's moral convictions Fu!ge Fust as truly as
those $ho elieve in esteeming those actions.
:ries is not a relativist or antirealist of this #in!. He !oes not !eny the
oFectivity of moral truth an! !oes not hol! that an act is right or !utiful
$henever the suFect is convince! it is. His "osition !e"en!s on !istinguishing
et$een t$o IuestionsC
?A@ &s this act ?oFectively@ right or $rongB
?-@ 0houl! & e esteeme! or lame! for "erforming itB
:ries thin#s that even $hen & have !one $hat is oFectively $rong4 & shoul!
e esteeme! rather than lame! if & follo$e! my conviction. He !oes not
thin# that my erroneous conviction therey acIuires any sort of truth.
:ar from !enying the "ossiility of erroneous moral convictions4 :ries's
vie$ actually !e"en!s on it4 since its central claims concern Fust those cases
in $hich someone's moral conviction is in error. 0ince :ries agrees that our
convictions aim at oFective truth4 he may also !eny that it is trivial or inci!ental
$hat & elieve. The inner "urity of my $ill !oes not !e"en! on
$hether my convictions are correct4 ut the oFective rightness of my actions
!oes. &f others4 follo$ing their o$n convictions4 lame me for my conscientious
actions4 then :ries is in!ee! committe! to saying that & shoul! not
lame them for !oing so. -ut he thin#s that their convictions are nevertheless
in error on this "oint4 an! he may try to convince them that their lame is
mis"lace!.
Accor!ing to Hegel4 the ethics of conviction !oes a$ay $ith the !istinction
et$een honesty an! hy"ocrisy $hich a""ears to matter so much to a vie$
em"hasiDing "urity of heartC EWhatever a human eing !oes can al$ays e
FustiGe! y the reJection on it of goo! intentions an! motives an! the conviction
that it is goo!E ?2. N '*6.4 ". 5=*@. As Hegel "resents it4 the ethics of
conviction consi!ers an action FustiGe! $henever the agent re"resents it as
goo! in any res"ect at all4 an!4 since no act $oul! e "erforme! unless the
agent foun! some goo! in it4 it follo$s that any act ?of lying4 or theft4 or
co$ar!ice4 or mur!er@ can e FustiGe! ?2. N '*6.4 ". 5=';5=5<9=A cf. 2h/
3 7**@. EThe evilE ?as Hegel "uts it@ Ecoul! e only $hat & am not convince!
ofE ?2. N '*6A@.
This is "lainly a gross caricature of :ries's "osition. :ries allo$s for cases
of hy"ocrisy4 since it allo$s the "ossiility that & may !eceive others ?or
myself@ aout $hether my action violates my o$n moral convictions. Clearly
& can re"resent an act as goo! in some res"ect $ithout re"resenting it as my
!uty4 so :ries nee! not a""rove of all agents $ho see some goo! as"ect in
$hat they !o.
:urther4 & can e of the o"inion that the act is my !uty $ithout eing ?in
:ries's sense@ convince! that it is my !uty. :ries !istinguishes EconvictionE
?UerDeugung@ from mere Eo"inionE ?,einung@. Conviction4 though fallile4
is forme! y a "rocess of moral e!ucation an! e>"erience4 yet Enot y learning
rules ut y the e>ercise of the moral sentimentE ?A<3%FC 567;56+A cf.
HE (*<5)@. :ries !oes not consi!er me lameless $hen & act on an erroneous
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CON0C&ENCE
moral o"inion that has een forme! carelessly4 $ithout the inJuence of a
!ecent moral e!ucation or the e>ercise of my i"oral sentiments. &n fact4 :ries
insists that my conviction must e E"ureE ?lauter@C E-y the virtue of "urity &
un!erstan! a man's truthfulness an! sincerity to$ar! himself an! in himselfE
?H22 )**@A self;!eceiving moral eliefs an! rationaliDations !o not count for
:ries as E"ure convictions.E
&f Hegel means to im"ly that on :ries's vie$ there coul! e no such thing
as acting lamaly4 then this is clearly mista#en. :or one thing4 :ries a""ears
to thin# that $e are lamale for acting on im"ure convictions4 even if they
are oFectively correct. Whether my convictions are oFectively correct or
not4 it is certainly "ossile for me to act against them4 an! :ries thin#s that
this violation of my o$n conscience is al$ays lamale.
:ries $as among the Grst of a long line of critics to charge that Hegel's
"hiloso"hy of the state $as sha"e! y "rofessional amition an! "ersonal
timi!ity. Hegel's theory4 he asserte!4 Ehas gro$n not in the gar!ens of science
ut on the !unghill of servility.E+ :ries may have ieen suggesting that
Hegel $as etraying his o$n "olitical convictions4 even violating his moral
conscience in the "rocess. &f that suggestion is correct4 then Hegel is guilty
of something rather more serious than a logical lun!er $hen he alleges that
:ries's ethics of conviction ma#es it im"ossile to act lamaly.
=. The em"tiness of an ethics of conviction
&n e>"oun!ing his ethics of conviction4 :ries usually consi!ers cases in $hich
a "erson acting on erroneous moral convictions is eing Fu!ge! y another
"erson $ho !oes not share them. This !is"lays the ethics of conviction to
est a!vantage4 y em"hasiDing the agents' common conscientiousness an!
leaving intact each one's moral commitments. Things loo# !iMerent if & a""ly
the ethics of conviction to my attitu!e to$ar! my o$n convictions.
&f & am truly conscientious4 & follo$ my convictions not ecause they are
mine4 ut ecause ?so & thin#@ they are correct. & !evote myself to a cause
ecause & elieve that this "articular cause is right4 an! that in!iMerence or
o""osition to it $oul! e $rong. :urther4 & am usually move! to such !evotion
not only ecause & a""rove the cause in the astract4 ut also ecause
my self;$orth is oun! u" $ith it. & esteem myself for serving it an! $oul!
feel ashame! of myself if & let it !o$n. The ethics of conviction ten!s to
un!ermine this element of self;concern involve! in our moral convictions.
The ethics of conviction allo$s it to ma#e a !iMerence $here moral truth
lies4 an! $hether & have foun! it. -ut it !oes not allo$ this to ma#e any
!iMerence to my moral self;$orth. The ethics of conviction tells me4 in eMect4
that & $oul! lose none of my moral $orth y Gghting on the other si!e
of the arrica!es4 "rovi!e! only that & fought $ith a !evote! s"irit an! ha!
een sincerely !u"e! y the enemy's lies. &n this $ay4 Hegel is not altogether
$rong $hen he charges that the ethics of conviction ma#es the hol!ing of
one conviction rather than another into something inci!ental an! trivial.
This !efect in the ethics of conviction seems es"ecially serious in the conte>t
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of an ethics $hich4 li#e :ichte's4 :ries's4 or Hegel's4 ma#es the agent's selfconcern
fun!amental to the moral life.
&t is as if the main "oint is to #ee" your soul usy at something or otherA
the struggle et$een goo! an! evil matters only ecause it "rovi!es you $ith
something to !o. :rom this "oint of vie$4 it ma#es no !iMerence $hich si!e
you are on4 so long as you are !evote! to some cause or other. &f $e ta#e this
attitu!e4 ho$ever4 it is not clear that $e can really e !evote! to any cause.
The ethics of conviction says in eMect that if you "ray fervently4 it !oes not
matter $hether you "ray to Ha$eh or to -aal. The "rolem is that the only
$ay you are going to "ray $ith any fervor to any !eity is to leave the ethics
of conviction ehin! you at the !oor of the tem"le.9
When Hegel claims that the a""eal to conscience can Fustify anything at
all ?2. N i*o.4AA 2h/ '' 7**@4 he associates the shortcomings of the ethics
of conviction $ith the em"tiness charge. 2rima facie the claim a""ears Iuite
mis!irecte!4 since there is nothing in the ethics of conviction itself that "reclu!es
the e>istence of contentful moral "rinci"les. -ut Hegel is onto an
im"ortant truth here as $ell. :or Hegel4 the goo! $ill is one $hose insight
an! intention accor! $ith the goo! ?2. N ')'@. The ethics of conviction
em"ties the goo! $ill of nearly all its content in the sense that it calls a
$ill goo! even $hen its insight an! intention are utterly o""ose! to $hat is
oFectively goo!. As Hegel !escries it4 the ethics of conviction hol!s that
Egoo!ness of $ill consists in $illing the goo!A this $illing of the astract goo!
is suLcient4 in!ee! the sole suLcient reIuirement for ma#ing an action
goo!E ?2. N '*6.4 ". 579@.
:ries allo$s that a "ure $ill can "erform an act that is a!4 if it emraces
a false conviction. -ut he thin#s that the $ill itself is goo! $henever it !oes
$hat it sincerely elieves is goo!. Hegel is Iuite right to $on!er $hether
this su""lies the goo! $ill $ith enough content to !istinguish it from a thoroughly
evil $ill. Divorce! from any s"eciGc conviction aout $hat is goo!4
the only constraints it "laces on the goo! $ill are those containe! in the
astract conce"t of Egoo!nessE itself. Thus Hegel uses the em"tiness of an
ethics of conviction to eMect a !ialectical reversal of the conce"t of moral
goo! into moral evil ?2. N ')9A 2h/ ''776@. &f $e follo$ the ethics of conviction4
Hegel alleges4 $e are committe! to a""rove even an evil $ill as goo!.
2erha"s the astract conce"t of Egoo!E "uts some limits on $hat can count
as a goo! $ill. 2hili""a :oot has argue! that the very conce"t of EmoralityE
e>clu!es certain eliefs4 "references4 evaluations4 an! so on from eing
Emoral.E'6 -ut such "urely conce"tual constraints are no$here close to suLcient.
They allo$ the goo! $ill to e sha"e! y moral convictions that are
tailore! to the interests of those $ho hol! them'' or y systems of moral
e!ucation $hose content may e as araric4 racialist4 or i!eological as you
"lease.
:ries himself is an e>am"le. &n an e!ict of ,arch '54 '+'54 Chancellor
Har!energ !ecree! that He$s $ere to enFoy full civil an! "olitical rights in
2russia. Hegel su""orte! the e!ict ?2. NN 5694 5=6.4 ". *5m@4 ut :ries
lent his su""ort to the movement that $ante! to overturn it or at least inhiit
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CON0C&ENCE
its enforcement. :ries's moral e!ucation an! fallile sentiments le! him to
the sincere conviction that He$s are an alien "eo"le $ho can never ecome
citiDens of a /erman state ?/DH )@4 an! that Ethe $hole He$ish caste shoul!
e e>tir"ate! root an! ranchE from /erman society ecause this E$orthless
caste of conniving secon!;han! "e!!lersE "oses Ethe gravest !anger to the
stateE ?/DH '+@.
We ought to $on!er ho$ much $orth there is in a Egoo! $illE if its Egoo!nessE
may e s"eciGe! through convictions such as these. We may !out that
there is any reason to e>ten! more moral cre!it to the sentiments an! intentions
that accom"any those $ho o""ress or "ersecute others on the asis of
such convictions than to those $ho violate the rights of others sim"ly from
self;interest. &f you are going to !o $rong4 it seems cleaner someho$ to !o
it o"enly ?either $ith a a! conscience or $ith none at all@ than to sanctify
your con!uct $ith a convenient set of moral convictions. &t is not only hy"ocrisy
that others us here. Doesn't our re"ugnance for $rong!oing actually
increase in "ro"ortion to the self;righteous sincerity $ith $hich the $rong!oers
Fustify their con!uctB 0houl!n't $e say of sincere elief in a a! cause
e>actly $hat 3ant ?/ )9*<'6@ says of resoluteness an! self;control4 that it
ma#es a villain not only more !angerous4 ut also more aominaleB
+. The hy"ocrisy of conscience
Hegel regar!s the a""eal to in!ivi!ual conscience as a feature of the /ermanic
$orl! an! its a""reciation of the right of suFectivity. He treats the
vali!ity of a""eals to conscience as connecte! $ith the social "ractice of !eclaring
!iem in language an! having one's !eclaration recogniDe! an! acce"te!
y others. Conscience is vali! only in a moral community that e>ten!s
moral cre!it to such !eclarations ?2h/ ,& 7*=;7()@. -ut the "ossiility that
& acce"t an a""eal to conscience as FustiGcation for your action goes han! in
han! $ith the "ossiility that & $ill treat this a""eal as a sham. To the e>tent
that you are free to Fustify any action y an a""eal to your suFective conscience4
& am eIually free to inter"ret your act as evil an! your !eclaration
of conscience as hy"ocrisy ?2h/ ,& 7(9;776@.
Hegel thin#s that this is "art of the moral amiguity that attaches inevitaly
to any suFective action. The amiguity is limite! to the e>tent that conscience
has een given a content in the form of !uties $hose oFective vali!ity
is recogniDe! y the entire moral community. Thus he !istinguishes Ethe
truthful conscienceE ?!as $ahrhafte /e$issen@4 $hich is Ethe !is"osition to
$ill $hat is goo! in an! for itselfE from the merely Eformal conscience4E
$hich is an a""eal to suFective conviction $ith no !eterminate content of
its o$n ?2. N ')=@. The truthful conscience relates to a system of oFective
"rinci"les an! !uties4 foun!e! in ethical life4 an! is nothing ut the a$areness
of them y the moral suFect. The formal conscience is nothing ut the
EinGnite formal self;certainty of this suFect.E &t may e either goo! or evilA
its !eclarations may e acce"te! or not.
The a""eal to formal conscience !e"en!s on a social frame$or# in $hich
'+=
,O.AL&T1
there is oFective #no$le!ge of the content of goo! an! !uty. :ormal conscience
o"erates at the fringes of the system4 $here ethical stan!ar!s are
in!eterminate4 conJicting4 or !is"utale. & acce"t your a""eal to conscience
as in!icative of a goo! $ill only insofar as & am assure! in a!vance that y
an! large you have a goo! $ill4 that your insight an! intention accor! $ith
the oFective goo!. These assurances rest on the conformity of your con!uct
to $hat is oFectively right in cases $here this is !eterminate. To the e>tent
that your conviction or intention !eviate from $hat & acce"t as oFectively
goo!4 the conscience to $hich you a""eal ecomes merely formalA your a""eals
to conscience lose their cre!it $ith me4 an! they !eserve to lose it.
Hy"ocrisy4 accor!ing to Hegel4 involves t$o thingsC #no$le!ge of the true
universal4 an! an attem"t to re"resent something conJicting $ith the universal
as something conforming to it ?the re"resentation may e either to others
or self;!ece"tively to oneself@ ?2. N '*6.4 "". 57=;57+@. &f this is the nature
of hy"ocrisy4 then there seems nothing inherently EuntruthfulE or hy"ocritical
aout formal conscience4 $hen use! to Fustify action on erroneous moral
convictions. Even formal conscience contains the agent's honestly hel! convictionsA
there seems nothing hy"ocritical in that.
0u""ose4 ho$ever4 that $e consi!er my a""eal to formal conscience on
the su""osition that & suscrie to the ethics of conviction. &f & ac#no$le!ge
that my convictions aout $hat is right may e erroneous4 then my a""eal
to conscience is an attem"t to "ass oM as oFectively right something that
may not e right at all. There is something inherently hy"ocritical in trying
to Fustify myself y a""ealing to the "rinci"le that & shoul! not e lame!
as long as & am follo$ing my o$n moral convictions. :or if & a""eal solely
to formal conscience in or!er to !o this ; as the ethics of conviction says &
may !o ; then & am re"resenting my fallile conviction as a stan!ar! of oFective
rightness ; something $hich it is not4 an! $hich < #no$ it is not. The
a""eal of conscience Esolely to itself is !irectly o""ose! to $hat it see#s to
e ; that is4 the rule for a rational an! universal mo!e of action that is vali!
in an! for itselfE ?2. N ')=.@. &f & am honest $ith myself an! others4 & $ill
not attem"t to !eny that to the e>tent that & act on moral convictions that
are oFectively $rong4 my $ill is im"licate! in the evil that & !o4 an! & am
lamale for it.
Those $ho ta#e oFective moral truth seriously are sometimes confronte!
$ith the rhetorical Iuestion4 -ut $ho is to say $hat the moral truth isB The
Iuestion is rhetorical ecause its real "ur"ose is to suggest that if you thin#
that oFective truth is im"ortant in morality4 then you must arrogantly su""ose
yourself to e in "ossession of it. -ut that is $rong. The "oint is rather
thisC To the e>tent that $e are uncertain $hose moral convictions are correct4
$e are also uncertain aout $ho has the goo! $ill an! $ho !eserves lame.
&f & hol! you to lame ecause you are acting on moral eliefs & thin# are
mista#en4 then & must conce!e at the same time that if your eliefs turn out
to e right an! mine to e $rong4 then it is & an! not you $ho !eserves
lame. &f $e ta#e moral truth seriously4 that shoul! not ma#e us more arro;
'++
CON0C&ENCE
gant aout asserting the truth of our moral convictions4 ut more mo!est
aout assuring ourselves an! others of our goo!ness of $ill.
3ant4 too4 thin#s that $e can never e sure $hether $e have a goo! $ill4
ecause $e are o"aIue to ourselves an! can never e sure of the inner "urity
of our motives. Hegelian morality "oints to a !iMerent #in! of uncertainty
aout the same thing4 a !iMerent self;o"acity coming not from insi!e ut
from outsi!e. The goo!ness of our $ill is uncertain not ecause $e cannot
fathom the !e"ths of our hearts4 ut ecause $e live in a com"le> $orl!
$here a goo! cause is sometimes !iLcult to !istinguish from an evil cause.'5
9. The right of insight
We note! earlier that :ries's ethics of conviction is not the only res"onse to
the "rolem aout moral error an! lame raise! in N *. Another o"tion $e
mentione! $as to regar! moral error as an e>cusing con!ition. We might say
that "eo"le $ho act on erroneous conviction are not to lame for the evil
they !o ecause they are not res"onsile for their acts. Hegel is a$are of this
o"tion4 an! !iscusses it se"arately from the ethics of conviction.
We might even $on!er $hether Hegel shoul!n't emrace this o"tion himself4
since he claims that the moral $ill has a Eright of insight into the goo!EC
The right of the suFective $ill is that $hatever it is to recogniDe as vali! must e
seen y its insight as goo!4 an! that an action4 as an en! ste""ing into e>ternal oFectivity4
shoul! e im"ute! to it as Fust or unFust4 goo! or evil4 legal or illegal4 accor!ing
to its cogniDance ?3enntnis@ of the value that it has in this oFectivity. ?2. N ')5@
This statement is carefully guar!e!. Hegel !oes not hol! that the $ill can
!iso$n a $rong action $henever it fails to have insight into its $rongness.
&nstea!4 he claims that the $ill can re"u!iate only those actions of $hose
$orth Ein e>ternal oFectivityE it has no EcogniDance.E
We are sometimes cogniDant of things $e !on't #no$ ?or even elieve@.
This ha""ens $hen $e have een a""rise! of them ut have not ta#en in or
acce"te! the information4 or $hen $e have suLcient groun!s to elieve
them ut have not !ra$n the right conclusions from these groun!s. Hegel
hol!s us res"onsile even for $hat $e are ignorant of4 so long as $e are
cogniDant of it. &n this sense4 he agrees $ith Aristotle that Eevery vicious
"erson is ignorant of the actions he must !o or avoi! an! this sort of error
ma#es "eo"le unFust4 an! in general a!E ?2. N '*6.4 footnote@')A ut only
$ith an im"ortant IualiGcationC &gnorance ma#es us a! only if $e are cogniDant
of $hat $e must !o an! avoi!. &t follo$s that ignorance in moral matters
e>cuses only if the agent ha! no $ay of #no$ing the "rinci"les involve!.'*
Hegel's commitment to this vie$ is in!icate! y several other things he
says. He cites the right of suFectivity as a reason for saying that a state is
unFust to its citiDens unless its legal co!e is "ulicly #no$n an! intelligile
to those $ho are e>"ecte! to ai!e y it ?2. N 54'(4.@. ,ore generally4 Hegel
maintains that the !uties an! institutions of ethical life must e Euniversal4E
'+9.
,O.AL&T1
so that the suFect can4un!erstan! their rationality an! in!ingnessC E&t is
through the "ulicity of la$s an! through universal ethics ?0itten@ that the
state ta#es a$ay the formality an! contingency $hich the right of insight has
for the suFect at Tthe moralU stan!"ointE ?2. N ')5.@. &t is a function of
moral e!ucation to "ut the suFect in "ossession of the EcogniDanceE of $hat
is oFectively right an! goo! ?2. NN ')5.4 '=*4 '+=.4. )'(@.
Hegel seems to "resume that the mo!ern state nearly al$ays ma#es its
memers cogniDant of the moral truths they nee! to #no$4 so that the right
of insight "rovi!es an e>cuse only for those ?Echil!ren4 imeciles4 lunaticsE@
$ho lac# the normal ca"acity to com"rehen! the rationality ehin! the la$s
an! the "revailing ethical norms ?2. N ')5.@. :or the rest4 Hegel regar!s
the right of insight as involving only a moral !uty im"ose! y suFects on
themselvesC E& can ma#e the !eman! on myself an! regar! it as a suFective
right that & have insight into an oligation from goo! groun!s an! a conviction
concerning it4 an! still more4 that & cogniDe it from its conce"t an! natureE
?2. N ')5.@.
This account is convincing if $e su""ose that there are social authorities
?"olitical4 ecclesiastical4 "e!agogical@ $hose $or! on moral matters is reasonaly
trust$orthy an! "rovi!es us $ith a consistent set of moral stan!ar!s.
0uch authorities might e ta#en to ma#e moral agents cogniDant of moral
truth. Hegel !oesn't su""ose that conscientious moral suFects $ill follo$
the authorities lin!lyA they $ill thin# for themselves aout moral Iuestions
an! Gn! their o$n reasons for emracing the correct convictions. As selfconscious
suFects it is even their !uty to !o so ?2. NN ')5.4 ')+@.
-ut $hat if the social authorities are !ivi!e! on moral IuestionsB Worse
yet4 $hat if the most "o$erful of them a!vance errors or self;serving lies an!
i!eology in the name of moral truthB &n that case4 the authorities !o not
ma#e moral suFects EcogniDantE of moral truth4 ut instea! misinform ?or
!isinform@ them. Or again4 su""ose the authorities are seriously !ivi!e!4 an!
a moral suFect4 after carefully $eighing4 all si!es4 en!s u" elieving the
$rong one. Does that count as eing EcogniDantE of the moral truth $hich
the suFect has reFecte!B Why is that suFect more lamale than those $ho
are not EcogniDantE of the reFecte! truth ecause they have hear! it only from
Iuite untrust$orthy sourcesB
&n mo!ern society as it actually e>ists4 these are not merely s"eculative
Iuestions. Ortho!o>y on many moral Iuestions ?if there is such a thing at
all@ is often reFecte! y !issenters re"resenting a variety of !iMerent alternatives.
Often these !issenters inclu!e some of the society's most sensitive4
so"histicate!4 an! articulate memers. On many vital suFects4 there is often
no reliale moral authority. Thin#ing for oneself may often involve a reFection
of moral ortho!o>y rather than ?as Hegel o"timistically assumes@ its
suFective conGrmation.'( &n this situation4 Hegel's Eright of insightE "rovi!es
us $ith no clear $ay of !eci!ing $hen "eo"le are EcogniDantE of moral
truth an! $hen they are to lame for acting on $rong eliefs.
There is a "art of the lieral tra!ition that is Iuite content $ith this amiguous
state of aMairs4 an! even celerates it as "art of an Eo"en society.E Those
'96
CON0C&ENCE
$ho thin# this $ay mistrust the very notion of a E"ulic moral truth.E They
say that the res"onsiility of society is not to set itself u" as a moral authority4
utA only to "olice the o"en mar#et"lace of moral i!eas4 in $hich in!ivi!uals
are to e free to a!o"t the convictions that most a""eal to them. This vie$
is threatene! $ith inconsistency if it is "resse! too far. &t must at least allo$
the rules of the mar#et"lace to "ass for "ulic moral truth4 even though these
rules are among the most "rominent oFects of controversy. -ut Hegel's oFections
go !ee"er than that.
Hegel hol!s that as moral agents $e nee! to live in a society that can give
a rational account of itself. :ree!om4 the harmony of our inner suFectivity
$ith our out$ar! life4 is "ossile only $here the reJection of the est min!s
on social norms an! institutions result in their rational conGrmation. Hegel
thin#s it is only in times of !ecay an! !isru"tion that the est $ills are !riven
to !issent fun!amentally from the acce"te! norms ?2. N ')+.@. :or this
reason4 Hegel is un!erstan!aly reluctant to a!mit that some moral convictions
su""orting the asic institutions of the mo!ern state coul!4 in the en!4
e fun!amentally "rolematic. He !oes occasionally a!mit it Fust the same
?2. N ')+A@4 though $ithout noticing the !ire conseIuences this $oul! have
for his conce"tion of the right of insight.
io. &nsight an! res"onsiility
What is Hegel's o$n res"onse to the "rolem raise! in N *B Even if $e have
een ma!e cogniDant of the oFective rightness or $rongness of an action4 it
still !oes not necessarily follo$ that it is u" to us $hether $e have insight
into its rightness or $rongness. Through mere mista#es of intellect $e may
fail to a""reciate the reasons $e have een given. We may form a conviction
!irectly o""ose! to the truth of $hich $e have een ma!e cogniDant. &f it is
not entirely u" to us to avoi! errors of this #in!4 then Hegel's "osition still
seems committe! to the vie$ that $e are lamale for something that is not
u" to us to avoi!.
Hegel's "osition that $e are lamale only if $e have een ma!e cogniDant
of the relevant moral truth clearly amounts to a IualiGcation ofC
?'@ &t is lamale intentionally to !o $hat is morally $rong.
&t !oes not e>cuse all action ase! on moral error4 even $here the agent has
given the matter !ue consi!eration an! not ehave! negligently in inIuiring
into moral truth. &t !oes e>cuse those agents $ho are not cogniDant of the
relevant moral truth. -ut Hegel's solution to the "rolem a""arently also
involves a straightfor$ar! reFection ofC
?)@ We can e lame! only for $hat is u" to us.
since it loo#s as though it may not al$ays e u" to us to avoi! moral error
even in cases $here $e have een ma!e cogniDant of the truth.
&t all !e"en!s on $hat $e mean y Eu" to us.E The #ey to Hegel's conce"tion
of moral res"onsiility is that our actions are im"utale to us ecause
they are e>"ressions of our suFectivity. Hegel em"hasiDes that a suFect is
'9'
,O.AL&T1
essentially a rational eing4 a thin#er ?2. NN '574 ')5.@. Hegel reFects the
!ivision of min! or s"irit into !istinct EfacultiesE ?E/ N **5@ an! es"ecially
the i!ea that theoretical min! is "assive $hereas only "ractical min! is active
?E/ N ***@. ,y insight4 as $ell as my volition4 constitutes my suFectivityA
that is $hy Hegel insists that my suFectivity is "resent as much in my insight
into $hat is goo! as in my intention to achieve the goo! ?2. N ')'@. We
actualiDe our suFectivity in goo! Fu!gment4 an! $e are guilty of moral failure
$hen our Fu!gment is a!.
Thus Hegel reFects ?)@ if it is ta#en to mean that $e are to lame for
something only if $e coul! have avoi!e! it merely y ma#ing a !iMerent
formally free choice. 0o un!erstoo!4 ?)@ $oul! also rule out many things
esi!es moral convictions as oFects of lameC !esires4 emotions4 attitu!es4
character traits. We often hol! "eo"le to lame for $anting the $rong things4
for eing stingy4 co$ar!ly4 ungrateful4 or thoughtless of others4 or for getting
angry or resenting things $hen they shoul!n't.'7 Thus if ?)@ is ta#en so that
Eu" to usE means only voluntary choice4 then it ra!ically contracts the sco"e
of moral res"onsiility in a numer of $ays that might e un$elcome even
to those $ho thin# $e are not res"onsile for moral errors.
,oral insight or error are Eu" to usE in the sense that they e>"ress $hat $e
are as rational suFects. &f $e acce"t ?)@ in that sense4 then it !oes not conJict
$ith ?'@ an! ?5@. We are to lame for violating our conscience ecause it elongs
essentially to our suFectivityA an! in going against it4 $e "erform actions
in $hich our integrity as a suFect is not "resent. We are also to lame for follo$ing
erroneous convictions4 ecause these convictions themselves are !efects
in us as suFects4 an! in acting on them $e manifest those !efects.
&n Hegel's vie$4 Oe!i"us $as not guilty of "arrici!e ecause he $as not
cogniDant of the fact that the ol! man at the crossroa!s $as his father4 an!
so his #illing him !i! not e>"ress his suFectivity in the $ay it $oul! have if
he ha! een cogniDant of that. 0an!4 ho$ever4 $as guilty of mur!er ecause
he $as cogniDant of the meaning of his act. His conviction that his act $as
not $rong re"resents a moral failure every it as serious as if he ha! #ille!
3otDeue in the conviction that he $as !oing $rong.
Not every failure to gras" $hat has een "lace! $ithin our cogniDance
re"resents so serious a !efect of suFectivity. As Hegel says4 our failure to
rememer $hether $e ha! 3ohl or 3raut for !inner yester!ay ?2. N '*6.4
". 5=7@ is a matter of little suFective signiGcance. He has no theory to !istinguish
errors that reJect on my suFectivity from those that !o not4 eyon!
the criterion that as rational eings $e are res"onsile for #no$ing the nature
of our action4 its regular connection $ith the com"le> of oFective circumstances
in $hich it is involve! ?2. N ''+.A see also Cha"ter +4 N '@. 2lainly
the nature of an action is ta#en y Hegel to inclu!e oth factual an! moral
eliefs aout the action ; not only4 for instance4 that my act of arson is
$rong4 ut also that the Gre & start may s"rea! farther than & inten! it to.
That also seems reasonale. The most vicious eliefs hel! y racists4 for
instance4 usually !o not concern matters of moral "rinci"le ut matters of
history4 sociology4 an! anthro"ology.
'95
&%
Ethical life
&&
Ethical oFectivity
i. What is Eethical lifeEB
&n or!inary /erman4 the $or! 0ittlich#eit means something li#e Ecustomary
moralityEA it calls attention to the close connection et$een ethical norms
an! social custom or usage ?0itte@. &n English4 these associations "roaly
come through most strongly in the connection et$een EmoralityE an! EmoresEA
ut EmoralityE also has overtones of fussy Emoralism4E an! this ?together
$ith the fact that it is a !irect cognate@ ma#es it the natural ren!ering
of ,oralitat. That means $e are more or less stuc# $ith the $or! EethicsE
to translate 0ittlich#eit4 even though its astract ?even theoretical@ connotations
are utterly ina""ro"riate. Ethisch has the same connotations in /erman4
hI$ever4 an! Hegel nevertheless occasionally uses it in "lace of sittlic#e4
allu!ing to the /ree# $or! ethos ?2. N '*+.A cf. %2. 5C ((=4 %2. 5C
(7(4 N. (6*<''5@.c &t hel"s a little to translate 0ittlich#eit as Eethical lifeE
in!icating that it refers to a $ay of living an! not to a theory.
Largely o$ing to the connotations of the $or!4 Hegel's conce"tion of ethical
life has often een inter"rete! as committing him to ethical relativism
an! tra!itionalism. Hegelian ethics is un!erstoo! to rest on the thesis that it
is al$ays right to follo$ the customs of one's community an! al$ays $rong
to violate them. We get the same im"ression from Hegel's association of ethical
life $ith an unreJective an! uncritical attitu!e to$ar! tra!itional mores.
He often Iuotes ?$ith a""arent a""roval@ Antigone's stuornly "ious attitu!e
to$ar! the sacre! la$ for $hich she $as $illing to !ieC
Not no$ an! yester!ay ut everlastingly
&t lives4 an! no one #no$s $hence it came.
?2h/ '' *)=A cf. 2. NN '**A4 '77.@5
To many4 Hegel's vie$ loo#s !istressingly li#e the reverent atavism $ith
$hich .omantic reactionaries $ante! to re"lace the Enlightenment's critical
rationalism. This is su""ose! to e Hegel's ans$er to the em"tiness of the
moral stan!"oint.
&t $oul! e a very "oor ans$er. 0ince customs an! tra!itions often re"resent
a culture's !ea! "ast ?$hat Hegel calls E"ositivityE@4 the ethical a!vice
it yiel!s $oul! often e $rong an! $ithout any rational foun!ation. &n the
cases $here $e most nee! ethical gui!ance4 moreover4 it $oul! often give us
no clear a!vice at all. :or in mo!ern society4 at any rate4 many ethical Iuestions
are controversial4 an! there is no !eterminate custom or social consensus
to gui!e us.
'9(
ETH&CAL L&:E
Hegel !oes hol! that oFective an! !eterminate moral stan!ar!s e>ist only
in the conte>t of a rational social or!er. Certainly he regar!s some Enlightenment
moral theories as shallo$ an! overly in!ivi!ualistic ecause they ignore
this fact. -ut $hen $e loo# at it more closely4 $e see that Hegel's conce"tion
of mo!ern ethical life is not "articularly conservative or tra!itionalist in its
orientation. At least in its mature form4 the conce"tion of ethical life is inten!e!
to inclu!e rather than e>clu!e in!ivi!ual moral reJection. 0ittlich#eit4
as Hegel means it4 is a s"ecial #in! of critical reJection on social life4
not a "rohiition against reJection.
5. The t$o si!es of ethical life
Hegel uses 0ittlich#eit to signify t$o a""arently Iuite !istinct thingsC :irst4
it refers to a certain #in! of social or!er4 one that is !iMerentiate! an! structure!
in a rational $ay. Thus Eethical lifeE is Hegel's name for an entire set
of institutions ; the ones anatomiDe! un!er that hea!ing in the 2hiloso"hy of
.ightC the family4 civil society4 an! the mo!ern "olitical state. 0econ!4 ho$ever4
the term also refers to a certain attitu!e or EsuFective !is"ositionE on
the "art of in!ivi!uals to$ar! their social life ?2. N '*'.@4 an attitu!e of
harmonious i!entiGcation $ith its institutions.
Hegel himself em"hasiDes this !oule use of the term. Ethical life4 he says4
is Ethe conce"t of free!om that has come to e a "resent $orl! an! the nature
of self;consciousnessE ?2. N '*54 em"hasis a!!e!@A it is oth a Erelation et$een
many in!ivi!ualsE an! the Eform of the concrete suFectE ?%2. 5C
(*9@. This !oes not mean that 0ittlich#eit is an amiguous term. &t is rather a
term referring to a single reality that has t$o com"lementary si!es or as"ects.
Ethical life has oth its EoFectiveE si!e4 in the form of a E"resent $orl!E or
social or!er ?2. NN '**;'*(@4 an! its EsuFectiveE si!e4 in the self;consciousness
of in!ivi!uals ?2. NN '*7;'*=@. The oFective si!e of ethical life is the
EsustanceE of the in!ivi!uals $ho elong to the ethical or!er ?2. N '**@4
$hereas the suFective si!e4 the self;consciousness of in!ivi!uals4 is at the
same time their consciousness of this sustance ?2. N '*7@.
The ethical is calle! a EsustanceE for several !iMerent reasons. Hegel
$ants to suggest that ethical life is something Grm an! unsha#aleC The in!ivi!ual
can rely on its $or#ings an! e sure of the vali!ity of its la$s ?2. NN
'*74 '*+@. He inten!s to contrast EsustanceE $ith suFectivity4 "ersonality4
or reJective thought ?WL7C '9(<()7;()=@4 in!icating that the ethical attitu!e
to$ar! la$s4 institutions4 an! relationshi"s is a natural4 haitual4 s"ontaneous4
an! unselfconscious one4 uncom"licate! y any reJective !outs or
y so"histicate! calculations of "ersonal a!vantage ?2. N '*7@. Hegel also
li#ens the relation et$een the social or!er an! the in!ivi!uals $ho elong
to it to the relation et$een a sustance an! its acci!ents. The roles an!
relationshi"s of a social or!er are something necessary an! ai!ing4 $hereas
the in!ivi!uals $ho occu"y them come an! go contingently ?2. N '*(A@.
&n!ivi!uals are Eacci!entsE in the sense that the ethical or!er !oes not !e"en!
on those "articular in!ivi!uals for its e>istence. The la$s of the ethical
'97
ETH&CAL O-HECT&%&T1
or!er4 Hegel says4 are E"o$ersE ; such as Emarriage4E E"iety4E an! EstateE
?%2. *C )9=@ ; $hich Egovern the life of in!ivi!uals4 in $hom they have
their actuality as acci!ents4 re"resentation4 an! form of a""earanceE ?2. N
>O(O@n; the other han!4 in Hegelian meta"hysics a sustance $oul! e nothing
actual $ithout the acci!ents that manifest it ?EL N '('@. ConseIuently4 a
social or!er is nothing actual e>ce"t through the action an! consciousness of
in!ivi!uals. &f s"irit is a Egrou" min!4E then it is one that has its consciousness
only in the consciousnesses of its in!ivi!ual memers4 $ho are a$are of
itC E&n Tthe life of in!ivi!ualsU4 its actual self;consciousness4 the TethicalU
sustance #no$s itself an! ecomes an oFect of #no$le!geE ?2. N '*7@. &n
tra!itional meta"hysics4 sustance is in!e"en!ent4 an! its acci!ents !e"en!
on it. :or Hegel4 the !e"en!ence of sustance an! acci!ents is reci"rocalA
Fust as in!ivi!uals $oul! lac# sustance $ithout their ethical life4 so ethical
life $oul! e nothing actual $ithout the thoughts an! actions of in!ivi!uals.
-y using the term 0ittlich#eit to refer oth to suFective attitu!es an! to
social institutions4 Hegel means to suggest that there is a close connection
et$een the t$o. &nstitutions may foster certain attitu!es on the "art of the
in!ivi!uals $ho live un!er them ; attitu!es to$ar! themselves an! other
in!ivi!uals4 an! attitu!es to$ar! the institutions. Conversely4 social institutions
!e"en! on the "revalence of certain !eterminate attitu!es on the "art
of in!ivi!uals. Without them the institutions coul! not arise4 function4 or
"er"etuate themselves. Hegel also means that the self;consciousness of in!ivi!uals
has4 at ottom4 something "rofoun!ly social for its content. ,y "ersonality
is constitute! through the socialiDation & have receive!4 an! my sense
of $ho & am is !ra$n from the social roles & am assigne!.
Hegel reFects those mo!ern ?lieral4 Enlightenment@ conce"tions of human
nature $hich i!entify the human self $ith a set of natural faculties4
nee!s4 an! !is"ositions4 an! regar! the institutions of human society sim"ly
as a set of !evices y $hich in!ivi!uals ma#e use of their relations $ith others
in or!er to satisfy their nee!s ?2h/ f (=9@. He en!orses the .omantic vie$
that Enlightenment lieralism "rocee!s from an astract conce"tion of human
eings $hich ignores or im"overishes the content of human in!ivi!uality4
$ith !isastrous results. Hegel's conce"tion of ethical life is ase! on the
i!ea that in!ivi!ual self;un!erstan!ing cannot e ha! a"art from an un!erstan!ing
of the social an! historical "rocess through $hich our social i!entities
have come to e.
Hegel says that the conce"ts of E"ersonE an! EsuFectE are astractions
from the concrete in!ivi!uals of ethical life ?2. N ))@. These conce"ts have
a "o$erful hol! on us4 an! Hegel !oes not $ant to rea# that hol!. We
!eman! our human rights ecause $e un!erstan! ourselves as "ersons4 an!
$e !eman! suFective free!om ecause $e un!erstan! ourselves as moral
suFects. -ut Hegel maintains that astract right an! morality are actual in
mo!ern society only to the e>tent that their astract conce"tions of the in!ivi!ual
are given real emo!iment through mo!ern social institutions. Conversely4
$e #no$ the full meaning of our i!entity as "ersons an! suFects
'9=
ETH&CAL L&:E
only $hen $e !iscover ho$ these i!entities are actualiDe! in the relations of
a $or#ing social or!er.
)O Ethical life as s"irit
EEthical lifeE is intimately relate! to Hegel's conce"t of s"irit. 0"irit is also
a unity of oFective an! suFective4 in $hich EsustanceE ecomes EsuFectE
?2h/ ' '+A 2. N '(5@. 0"irit is the self that ecomes oFective to itself
through its action an! then com"rehen!s itself as $hat it is y eing conscious
of its oFect as its o$n $or# ?2h/ ' )('@. Hegel thin#s that s"irit's
activity ta#es a self;suLcient form only in a "eo"le or nation ?2. N '(7@ that
uil!s a self;containe! $orl! an! achieves s"iritual self;a$areness in the
forms of asolute s"irit ; art4 religion4 an! "hiloso"hy ?E/ N ((*@.
:or Hegel4 the ethical is s"iritual also ecause it rises aove nature. &n the
ethical4 custom ?0itte@ ecomes ?in the $or!s of the "roverial saying@ a
Esecon! natureE ?2. N '('@. The ethical attitu!e imitates the imme!iate harmony
through $hich a natural thing is imme!iately one $ith itself an! its
"lace in the natural or!er. -ut it is a secon! nature ecause its imme!iacy is
essentially !iMerent from this. &n fact4 ethical life actualiDes free!om only
ecause it is not natural. The in!ivi!uals $ho "artici"ate in ethical life are
conscious of its la$s. Ethical life4 unli#e nature4 im"oses its la$s on itself4
an! is therefore free4 something s"iritual.
&nsofar as the ethical e>ists only unreJectively4 as hait or custom4ethical
life is s"irit's lo$est4 most imme!iate4 or least !evelo"e! form. Hegel says
that it is in the form of unreJective custom that Es"irit e>ists for the Grst time
as s"iritE ?2. N '('4 em"hasis a!!e!@. This im"lies that s"irit also e>ists in
other4 later4 more !evelo"e! forms. The "oint is misse! entirely y those
$ho inter"ret Hegel's theory of ethical life as a .omantic tra!itionalism that
is sim"ly hostile to in!ivi!uality or moral reJection. Ethical life is the asis
of moral suFectivity4 the con!ition of its "ossiility4 an! the true meaning
of moral suFectivity can e "ro"erly un!erstoo! only from the ethical stan!"oint.
&n that sense4 as Hegel "uts it4 morality al$ays falls short of ethical
lifeA it is the Enot yetE of ethical life ?2h/ ' )(7@. That is the meaning of
Hegel's assertion that in!ivi!ual self;$ill an! "rivate conscience have Evanishe!E
at the level of ethical life ?2. N '(5@.
EIuallyA ho$ever4 since ethical life "ro"er in!icates something imme!iate
an! unreJective4 Hegel insists that the stan!"oint of morality is Ea higher
form than the ethical sustanceE ?2h/ ' )(=@. The unreJective harmony of
ethical life is4 from the higher reJective stan!"oint of morality4 something
that has een left ehin!4 something that is Eno moreE ?2h/ ' )((@. Human
nature $oul! stagnate an! fail to !evelo" its "otentialities if left at the stan!"oint
of ethical imme!iacyA it $oul! e con!emne! to Es"iritual !eathE ?2.
N '(5A@. &n this res"ect4 Hegel regar!s ethical life as merely the starting
"oint for the !evelo"ment of morality as a higher form of s"irit. Hegel's
conce"tion of a !istinctively mo!ern ethical life4 as !evelo"e! in the 2hiloso"hy
of .ight4 is not an attem"t to sumerge or su""ress the suFective4 ut
'9+
ETH&CAL O-HECT&%&T1
rather to foun! it on the sustantive. &n N + $e $ill see that ethical life4
"ro"erly s"ea#ing4 e>ists only in a society $here in!ivi!uality an! suFective
free!om have come into their full right.
*O The ethical or!er
&n the 2hiloso"hy of .ight4 Hegel intro!uces ethical life y calling it Ethe &!ea
of free!om4 as the living goo!E ?2. N '*a@. 0ince the &!ea is the unity of a
conce"t $ith oFectivity ?WL7C *7'<=(*A EL N 5')@4 this means that ethical
life is the conce"t of free!om actualiDe! in an oFective $orl!. Ethical life is
living in the sense that it is self;movingC Unli#e morality4 it !erives neither
its content nor its motivation from something other than itself. &t is also
the self;moving goo!C &t "romotes the goo! through actions that are alrea!y
actualiDations of the goo!. Ethical life aims at the right an! the $ell;eing of
in!ivi!uals ?the goo!@4 an! achieves this aim through actions of in!ivi!uals
that are themselves right an! constitute "art of the $ell;eing of the agents
$ho "erform them.
Though.ethical life is !escrie! as living ?self;moving@4 it is also com"are!
to Aristotle's Grst or unmove! mover4 $hich moves things in the $ay that
an oFect of !esire or thought moves them. The ethical or!er is sustantial
or unmove! in the sense that its fun!amental "rinci"les are not at the mercy
of in!ivi!uals' $hims. &t moves in!ivi!uals ecause it is their en! ?2. NN
'*54 '(5A %/ 9'<==@. :or its memers4 the ethical or!er itself is the Gnal
en!4 an! a share! or collective en!. &t contains the right an! $elfare of in!ivi!uals
an! can for this reason e i!entiGe! $ith the moral goo!. -ut in the
ethical or!er the goo! ta#es a concrete form. &t is a rational institutional
structure4 $hose rationality ma#es it !esirale y in!ivi!uals as an en! in
itself4 an! not merely as a means to in!ivi!ual goo!.
The oFective ethical or!er is also ElivingE in that it is organiDe!. &n general4
rationality for Hegel consists in the E&!ea4E a self;actualiDing structure
organiDe! accor!ing to the conce"t .?EL N 5')@. The E"otenciesE of ethical
life are not EG>e!E ut mutually !e"en!ent an! mutually re"ro!ucing4 li#e
the organs of a living thing ?N. ('+<'55;'5)@. Ethical life is a structure that
sustains itself through the o"eration of its "arts4 Ethe movement through the
form of its momentsE ?2. N '(=@. &t ElivesE y securing the right an! "romoting
the $ell;eing of its in!ivi!ual memersA in this sense4 too4 it is the
Eliving goo!.E The right of in!ivi!uals as free eings is fulGlle! through
memershi" in an ethical or!er ?2. N '()@4 an! their "artici"ation in it also
guarantees their right to "articular satisfaction4 $ell;eing4 or ha""iness ?2.
N '(*@. Ethical life is mo!ele! on the'3antian Erealm of en!s4E in $hich the
en!s of all rational agents form a rational $hole or harmonious system ?/
`*)+<(=@C
The v<hote as $hole ecomes Tthe in!ivi!ual'sU $or#4 for. Which he sacriGces himself
an! therey receives himself ac# from the $holec ;Here there is nothing that
is nofc reci"rocal4 nothing m $hich the self;!e"en!ence of the in!ivi!ual !oes not4 in
'99
ETH&CAL L&:E
the !issolution of its eing for itself in the negation of itself4 give itself its "ositive
signiGcance as eing for itself. ?2h/ '' )('@
Only the realm of en!s is an astract i!eal that merely Eought to e4E $hereas
ethical life is an actuality.
An ethical or!er is Ea $orl! !istinguishe! $ithin itself4 articulate! ?geglie!eri@
into se"arate s"heres ?,assen@E ?2h/ 'f **(A cf. 2. N 579A@. On
one level4 the articulation of an ethical or!er refers to the fact that ethical
life is a system of human relationshi"s that oFectiGes free!om. Thus Hegel
i!entiGes ethical life $ith the free $ill itself4 the Esystem of rational !eterminations
of the $illE in $hich free!om consists ?2. N '9A %2.igC '55@. The
EarticulationE of ethical life consists in the fact that $ithin the ethical or!er
institutions are !iMerentiate!. Each institution4 li#e the organ of a living
thing4 serves a !istinct function. Hegel em"hasiDes the $ay in $hich !iMerent
institutions a!!ress !iMerent si!es of society's in!ivi!ual memers4 ans$ering
to !iMerent human self;images an! !iMerent human nee!s.
Oriental societies4 in Hegel's vie$4 $ere not truly ethical ecause they
lac#e! articulationA there $as in them no "ro"er !istinction et$een family
an! state4 or et$een religion an! government ?2. N )((@. True ethical life
egan $ith ancient /reece ecause there social life $as for the Grst time
articulate! in its !istinction et$een !ivine an! human la$4 se"arating the
family from the state an! the EnetherE $orl! of religion from the Eu""erE
$orl! of "olitical life ?2h/ 'f'f **7;*7)@.
(. Ethical in!ivi!uality
The EarticulationE of an ethical or!er also means that it allo$s systematically
for social !iversity4 enaling !iMerent in!ivi!uals to actualiDe !iMerent "ossiilities
containe! in the com"le> human self;image. This is es"ecially clear
in mo!ern ethical life4 $here the em"hasis on suFective free!om lea!s "eo"le
to !eman! that they choose their o$n $ay of life for themselves ?2. N
5674 .@ an! causes them to value !iversity in tastes an! life;style for its o$n
sa#e ?2. N i+s4.4A@.
Hegel's vie$s on this "oint have something in common $ith H. 0. ,ill's
insistence that Ein!ivi!ualityE is one of the elements of human $ell;eing.)
Unli#e ,ill4 ho$ever4 Hegel is concerne! to i!entify the !iversity of social
ty"es $ith the articulation of !eterminate socioeconomic roles4 "ositions4 or
estates ?0t!n!e@ $hich constitute the ethical or!er of civil society ?2. N 565@.
Hegel stresses the !iversity an! com"lementarity of the estates4 each $ith its
o$n ethical E!is"ositionE or Eoutloo#E ?/esinnung@ an! $ay of life.
The EsustantialE ?or agricultural@ estate is !is"ose! to tra!ition an! family
lifeA it values in!ivi!uality an! !iversity less than the uran estates ?2.
N 56)@. Within the EformalE or EusinessE estate4 Hegel !istinguishes the
estate involve! in manual craftsmanshi" from the estate that engages in manufacture4
an! oth from the estate that concerns itself $ith tra!e or commerce
?2. N 56*@. All three are mar#e! oM from the Euniversal estateE of
566
ETH&CAL O-HECT&%&T1
civil servants4 $hose life is !evote! to the universal interests of the $hole
community ?2. N 56(@. &t is !istinguishe! from the military estate4 $hich
has EvalorE ?Ta"fer#eit@ as its characteristic !is"osition ?2. N )5=@. Hegel
em"hasiDes the connection $ithin each estate et$een life;style an! values.
He !escries the $ays in $hich self;$orth for the memers of !iMerent estates
is sustaine! y Iuite !iMerent things ?Hf. 5();575<'7);'='@.
-ecause Hegel treats social !iversity as !eterminate an! socially organiDe!4
his conce"tion of the value of in!ivi!uality is less ra!ical than ,ill's4 less
e>"erimental in s"irit4 an! less o"en;en!e! in intent. This !iMerence also
reveals ho$ ,ill's notion of in!ivi!uality o$es more to the .omantic tra!ition
than Hegel's !oes. ,ill an! the .omantics associate in!ivi!uality $ith
ins"ire! eccentricityA in!ivi!uality for the .omantics is the vehicle through
$hich the oun!less inGnite intru!es into the Gnite $orl!4 !isturing an!
at the same time hallo$ing it. Hegel reFects the .omantic i!entiGcation of
in!ivi!uality $ith i!iosyncrasyA his "hiloso"hy aims4 moreover4 at reconciling
inGnitu!e $ith the Gnite4 actualiDing it y giving it resi!ence $ithin classical
form.* He li#es to com"are ethical action $ith the $or# of a classical
artist4 a $or# that is great ; an! !istinctive ; "recisely ecause it is EuniversalE
an! Evin!icates the thingE rather than e>"ressing the "ersonal "eculiarities
of the artistC
When great artists com"lete a master"iece4 $e may s"ea# of its inevitaility4 $hich
means that the artist's i!iosyncrasy has com"letely !isa""eare! an! no mannerisms
are !etectale in it. 2hei!ias has no mannerismsA his Ggures live an! !eclare themselves.
-ut the $orse an artist is4 the more $e see the artist in the $or#4 his singularity4
his aritrariness. ?2. N '(A@
Hegel's "oint is that & !on't Gn! my authentic self or true in!ivi!uality y
!etaching myself from my social i!entity4 or y a!!ing Iuir#s an! "eculiarities
to it. &n!ivi!uality is achieve! instea! y ta#ing over that i!entity
thoughtfully4 mastering it in the $ay that the great classical artists such as
2hei!ias have mastere! their craft.
To e an in!ivi!ual is therefore al$ays to e something !eterminate4 to
have a !eterminate 0tan!4 a "lace4 stan!ing4 or status in societyC
When $e say that a human eing must e something4 $e mean that he must elong
to a !eterminate estate ?0tan!@A for this EsomethingE means that he is something
sustantial. A human eing $ithout a status ?0tan!@ is a mere "rivate "erson4 not an
actualiDe! universality. ?2. N 56=A@
True human in!ivi!uality consists in fulGlling in one's o$n $ay a !eterminate
social function4 having a s"eciGc Fo or "rofession ?/e$ere@ ?2. N
5(5.@. Only in this $ay can an in!ivi!ual have a genuine social i!entity an!
a sense of honor or !ignity ?0tan!esehre@ associate! $ith it ?2. NN 56=4 5()@.
&n!ivi!uality !egenerates into alienation unless it is su""orte! socially y
soli!arity $ith a Ecor"orationE in $hich the in!ivi!ual's !ignity receives recognition
?2. N 5().A see Cha"ter '*4 N )@. Without that soli!arity4 society
!issolves into a hea" of atoms ?2. N 5(7.@4 astract "rivate "ersons $hose
56'
ETH&CAL L&:E
"ersonality has no ethical life. Where this occurs4 even the right of "ersonality
no longer confers any !ignity on "eo"le4 an! the E"ersonE ecomes an
oFect of contem"t ?2h/ &t *+6A 2iB N )(A@.
The thrust of Hegel's ethical thought is to value an in!ivi!uality $hose
actualiDation is not a mere acci!ent ecause it is socially situate!. A human
eing is truly an in!ivi!ual only if given a !eterminate social i!entity to fulGll.
On the other han!4 the i!ea of in!ivi!uality means so much to us in
mo!ern society ecause mo!ern society is more com"letely articulate!4 ecause
its system of social roles !eman!s an! re$ar!s !istinctiveness4 !iversity4
an! "articularity. &n this $ay4 the reJective in!ivi!uality of mo!ern
society also ma#es it $ore ethical ; more organiDe! an! articulate! ; than
*Qther social or!ers4 more ethical even than the social or!er of ancient /reece.
7. .omantic "luralism
Hegel "refers organism over mechanism as the meta"hor for a society. Li#e
Her!er efore him4 Hegel infers from this meta"hor that each culture is a
self;containe! $hole that must e un!erstoo! an! a""reciate! in terms of its
o$n internal la$s an! not measure! y a rigi! stan!ar! foreign to it. This
thought might easily lea! to the i!ea that !iMerent social or!ers an! their
corres"on!ing ethical stan!ar!s are also incommensuraleA the norms an!
values of each ethical or!er are in!ing on the memers of that or!er4 ut
there is no universal stan!ar! y $hich any of them coul! e criticiDe! or
regar!e! as su"erior one to another.
0uch a .omantic4 "luralistic ?even relativistic@ attitu!e to$ar! cultural
!iMerences in customs an! ethical values is alive an! $ell in our o$n !ay.
There is a recent tra!ition of EcommunitarianE thin#ing4 re"resente! y such
$riters as Alas!air ,aclntyre4 ,ichael 0an! el4 an! -ernar! Williams4 $hich
criticiDes the lieral tra!ition in ethical thought ecause it claims universal
vali!ity for some of its ethical stan!ar!s4 "articularly for tts conce"tions of
human rights an! of the moral stan!"oint.( These critics4 an! their lieral
o""onents4 haitually cite Hegel's notion of 0ittlich#eit as the intellectual
ancestor of "luralist4 communitarian criticisms of lieral universalismO
The connotations of the term 0ittlich#eit also ten! to suggest this rea!ing
of Hegel. When Hegel ases the content of an in!ivi!ual's !uties on the 0ittlich#eit
of the "eo"le of $hich the in!ivi!ual elongs4 it loo#s as though he
is suscriing to some form of ethical relativismC Ethical truth varies $ith
an! !e"en!s on "revailing customs an! moral eliefs. To un!erstan! the
term 0ittlich#eit in this $ay4 ho$ever4 you have to ta#e it to refer in!iMerently
to any community's system of customs4 usages4 an! moral eliefs. 1ou
have to su""ose that for Hegel every social or!er has an Eethical life4E an!
that the ethical lives of !iMerent cultures are self;containe! an! eIually vali!
or mutually incommensurale.
0ome of Hegel's statements4 es"ecially in the Hena "erio!4 might suggest
this. Accor!ing to the Natural .ight essay4 society has its o$n geogra"hy4
climate4 an! e"ochA each actualiDes its o$n i!ea in its o$n $ay4 an! so each
565
ETH&CAL O-HECT&%&T1
historical stage is FustiGe! ?N. (55;(5)<'57;'5=@. Even in the 2hiloso"hy of
.ight4 Hegel says that !iMerent "olitical constitutions are suite! to !iMerent
"eo"les4 even that Eevery "eo"le has the constitution a""ro"riate for an!
elonging to itE ?2. N 5=*.@.
Unli#e many .omantics of his time4 Hegel has no a!miration for feu!al
society4 $hich he regar!s as a confuse! ho!ge"o!ge of "rivate "rivileges
rather than as a rational organism ?2. NN 5=).4 5=+.4 5+7.@. -ut even feu!alism4
$ith its a""arent "ositivity an! its !enial of "ersonality through the
institution of serf!om4 may merely e>"ress the E$ea#ness of ethical lifeE an!
a historical stage in $hich "ersonality an! right have Elost all conviction of
truthEA $here this is so4 Ethe feu!al constitution ?Lehensverfassung@ an! servitu!e
have asolute truth4 an! this relation is the only "ossile form of ethical
life an! hence the necessary4 Fust an! ethical oneE ?N. (5*<'5+@. &f even
feu!alism can e an ethical or!er for Hegel4 then "erha"s anything can e
one.
-ut $e shoul! e cautions in rea!ing Hegel this $ay. Hegel !oes not claim
that feu!al institutions are al$ays FustiGe! an! ethical4 only that they may
e so4 that they are so un!er the con!ition that they have ecome EnecessaryEA
an! that very con!ition Hegel !escries as a E$ea#ness of ethical life.E
Even $hen he calls feu!alism Eethical4E he !oes so in a $ay that im"lies that
it is less ethical than other social or!ers. This suggests that the term EethicalE
for Hegel !oes not signify a!herence to a .omantic "luralism or relativism4
ut instea! is eing use! to articulate some sort of stan!ar! for ethical conce"tions
an! the social or!ers that emo!y them.
=. Hegel's universalism
There are a numer of !ee"er features of Hegel's theory that "oint in the
same !irection. Hegel's ethical theory is a self;actualiDation theory. The oFect
of self;actualiDation is "lural in the sense that the human s"irit forms
!iMerent conce"tions of itself at !iMerent times an! "laces. -ut Hegel vie$s
these conce"tions as stages of a single "rocess4 a series of attem"ts to gras"
an! actualiDe the nature of s"irit. The "rocess is "rogressiveA s"irit raises
itself from less a!eIuate conce"tions of itself to more a!eIuate ones. The
2hiloso"hy of .ight "ur"orts to e the highest an! most a!eIuate cognition
of oFective s"irit that has een attaine! so far. &t is su""ose! to e the
stan!ar! y $hich !iMerent human tra!itions4 an! earlier stages of the same
tra!ition4 are to e measure!. That is $hy Hegel ta#es such a universalistic
attitu!e to$ar! the conce"tions of mo!ern ethical life4 to$ar! the Eeternal
human rightE of "ersons4 an! to$ar! the asolute claims of the free suFect.
&t is also $hy he sho$s no "atience $ith the ethical relativism $hich he
?mista#enly@ elieves to e "art of :ries's ethics of conviction.
At no time !oes Hegel ever a""ly the term 0ittlich#eit to Fust any social
or!er that ha""ens to e>ist. As $e have alrea!y note!4 Hegel hol!s that Oriental
societies have not yet risen to the level of Etrue s"irit or the ethicalE
?2h/ 3 =66A cf. 2. N )((@. Hegel is $illing to a""ly the term EethicalE only
56)
ETH&CAL L&:E
to "eo"les an! societies that have attaine! to the level of culture re"resente!
y the ancient /ree#s4 or at least stan! in a tra!ition relate! to them. Hegel's
remar# that every "eo"le has the constitution a""ro"riate to it must e un!erstoo!
$ith this IualiGcation if it is to e consistent $ith his general "osition.
&n!ee!4 Hegel seems not to regar! "eo"les $ho fall outsi!e such tra!itions
as E"eo"les4E "ro"erly s"ea#ing4 at all. Even their claim on "olitical
sovereignty4 he maintains4 is at most merely EformalE ?2. NN ))i4.4A4
)*94.@. 0uch statements no !out reveal an unattractive Euro"ean ias4 even
an ominous im"erialist mentality. At the same time4 ho$ever4 they clearly
e>hiit Hegel's commitment to universal stan!ar!s of rationality an! right.
These stan!ar!s are not e>trasocial an! su"rahistorical4 ut locate! in a cultural
tra!ition. .eason locates this culture y vie$ing human history as a
!ialectical "rocess4 increasing self;a$areness. The culture nee! not e your
o$n4 though it must e intelligile to you. Hegel's universalism is committe!
to !iscovering4 com"rehen!ing4 an! !evelo"ing $hatever cultural tra!ition
has so far achieve! the !ee"est un!erstan!ing of the nature of reason an! the
human s"irit's vocation.
This a""roach4 $hich $e may call EhistoriciDe! universalism4E is inherently
EethnocentricE in the sense that it al$ays "rocee!s from a given tra!ition
an! acce"ts its o$n unavoi!ale cultural an! historical limitations. -ut
the general a""roach4 as !istinct from Hegel's historically limite! a""lications
of it4 has no "articular ten!ency to e culturally e>clusive or intolerant.
On the contrary4 it stan!s to reason that the most rational an! "rogressive
cultural tra!ition $oul! also e the one that is most sensitive to its o$n falliility
an! the most ca"ale of a""reciating $hat is valuale in other cultures.
Tolerance has to rest on "ositive convictions aout ho$ one culture shoul!
treat others4 aout $hen4 $hy4 an! to $hat e>tent $e shoul! allo$ others to
!o even $hat $e thin# is $rong. &f such convictions are to e rational4 they
must rest on "rinci"les that as"ire to universal a""licaility. &f these "rinci"les
are to e contentful an! eMective4 they must also rest on s"eciGc social
forms that re"resent a culture an! tra!ition of tolerance an! o"enness. Hegel's
historiciDe! universalism loo#s li#e the est $ay to achieve rational tolerance.
&n contrast4 alternative !octrines such as romantic "luralism an! cultural
relativism are not at all $ell suite! to !efen!ing a tolerant an! rece"tive attitu!e
to$ar! other cultures. .elativism !ogmatically claims that the values of
!iMerent cultures are all eIually vali!4 each for its o$n memers. :rom this
it follo$s !irectly that if you ha""en to elong to a narro$;min!e! an! intolerant
culture4 then you are "ositively reIuire! to e intolerant. .elativism
falls into this self;!efeating "osition ecause it !enies that there is a stan!"oint
aove an! outsi!e all cultures an! then ?self;contra!ictorily@ tries
straight$ay to occu"y such a stan!"oint.
Hegel sees that the only "ossile $ay of really esca"ing ethnocentrism is
gra!ually4 through the actual self;!evelo"ment of reason4 $hich is al$ays
roote! in a !eterminate cultural tra!ition. Of course4 on this "ath there is
al$ays the !anger that $hat the most "rogressive tra!ition calls rational may
56*
ETH&CAL O-HECT&%&T1
e a function of its o$n iases an! limitations. No !out its Fu!gment of
alien cultures an! tra!itions $ill al$ays e ase! to some e>tent on "artial
lin!ness an! ignorance ?as $e can no$ see that Hegel's o$n Fu!gments
aout non;Euro"ean cultures often $ere@. 1et a fallile4 culturally con!itione!4
an! historically limite! reason is the only reason $e have. &ts unavoi!ale
limitations !o not ta#e from it the right to com"rehen! an! Fu!ge
the $orl! as est it can4 $hile continuing to criticiDe an! !evelo" itself. No$here
$ill $e Gn! anything $ith a etter right.
+. &n!ivi!uality as an ethical "rinci"le
Hegel's conce"tion of the ethical is commonly un!erstoo! to e an en!orsement
of cultural "luralism an! relativism. -ut $e have seen that on closer
ins"ection it turns out to e Fust the o""ositeC a univeral stan!ar! for ran#ing
the rationality of !iMerent social or!ers. Hegel restricts the term EethicalE to
social or!ers that he ta#es to have attaine! a certain #in! of articulate! rationality.
&n the Natural .ight essay4 he calls a social or!er sittlich only $hen
it a!eIuately e>"resses a given historical stage of its "eo"le an! only to the
!egree that it "ossesses a living an! articulate! organic structure. &f Hegel
elieves that all or most ?mo!ern Western@ nation;states !o in fact e>em"lify
these features4 then that gives him a reason for thin#ing that all or most of
these states are to some e>tent ethical.
When Hegel says that every "eo"le has the constitution a""ro"riate to it4
he !oes not mean that all constitutions are eIually ethical4 rational4 or historically
"rogressive4 or that no change ever shoul! occur in constitutions. &f the
saying is to e consistent $ith his other !octrines4 it must e ta#en in the
sense that every "eo"le ten!s to have the constitution est suite! to its current
stage of !evelo"ment. .ecall his '+'= remar#C EThe rational must ha""en4
ecause on the $hole the constitution is only its !evelo"mentE W%2.'=C
'(=@;
&n the Hena "erio!4 Hegel ta#es the /ree# "olis to re"resent the most "erfect
ethical or!er. &n fact4 the 2henomenology of 0"irit a""ears to use the
terms 0ittlich#eit an! sittliche 0ustanD sim"ly as nic#names for ancient
/ree# society. Hegel !escries ancient .ome as the E!o$nfall ?Untergang@
of ethical sustance4E even the E!eath of ethical lifeE ?To! !es sittlichen Leens@
?2. 'f )(=@4 $here Ethe ethical sha"e of s"irit has !isa""eare! an!
another ste"s into its "laceE ?2h/ 3H *=(;*=7@. &n our time4 he says4 ethical
life has long since een Elost4E an! the tas# of consciousness is to go in search
of itA yet there is also the suggestion that ethical life has not een lost forever.
,o!ern morality itself arises out of a !istinctive #in! of ethical life un#no$n
to the /ree#s ?2h/ N )(=@. This im"lies that there must e such a thing as
a mo!ern ethical life to e foun! at the en! of the search4 a higher ethical
life than the ancient /ree# one.
The Hena lectures !istinguish three elements in mo!ern societyC ?'@ ethical
life4 $hich is the e>ternal social organiDationA ?5@ morality4 $hich is the suFective
E!is"ositionE ?/esinnung@ or self;consciousness of each in!ivi!ual as
56(
ETH&CAL L&:E
a memer of a social estateA an! ?)@ religion4 the consciousness that each
memer has of the social $hole4 or Es"irit #no$ing itself as asolute s"iritE
?Hf. 5()<'75@. This "arallels the 2henomenologyX "rogression from ethical
life through morality to religion. &t also means that mo!ern society4 li#e the
/ree# "olis4 has an ethical life4 even an ethical life that has een !ee"ene!
through the in!ivi!ual reJection that has given rise to the moral stan!"oint
?Hf. 5('<'76@.
&n his later $ritings4 Hegel continues to regar! ancient /reece as the "ara!igmatically
ethical society4 ut only if EethicalE is ta#en in the suFective
sense4 referring to the ethical !is"osition of in!ivi!uals. &n its oFective
sense4 referring to the social or!er4 Hegel regar!s the mo!ern state as more
ethical ecause it has greater structural articulation. This lea!s to a tension
in Hegel's conce"tion of the ethical4 ecause a more articulate! ethical or!er
is also one that "rovi!es for greater suFectivity an! in!ivi!uality. &n this
$ay4 the ethical turns out not to "reclu!e the !evelo"ment of in!ivi!uality4
ut actually reIuires it ?2. N )(7@.
Hegel !enies that there is ethical life in Oriental societies not only ecause
they are unarticulate!4 ut also ecause ; o$ing to this ; they !o not give
in!ivi!uality its !ue ?2. N )((@. ENo truly ethical e>istence is "ossile4E
he says4 until in!ivi!uals have gaine! a !istinct consciousness of theXethical
sustance or Eunmove! moverE that acts through them. E:or this force to
ecome eMective4 the suFect must have !evelo"e! to a con!ition of free in!ivi!uality4
in $hich it is fully conscious of the eternally unmove! mover4 an!
each in!ivi!ual suFect must e free in its o$n rightE ?%/ 9'<==@.
0ince an ethical or!er is one that lierates in!ivi!uality4 it follo$s that institutions
that su""ress in!ivi!uality are EunethicalE institutions4 even in the ancient
$orl!C E0lavery falls in the transition from the natural state of humanity
to a truly ethical con!itionE ?2. N (=A@. Li#e$ise4 the .oman "ractice of treating
chil!ren as their father's "ro"erty is Ean oMense against the ethicalE ?2. N
'=(.@ an! .oman la$s that "ut a family's "ro"erty un!er the father's aritrary
"o$er are li#e$ise EunethicalE ?2. N '+6@. &n fact4 Hegel argues that ecause a
society can e fully articulate! only $here the "rinci"le of in!ivi!uality is given
its fullest !evelo"ment4 "erfecte! ?oFective@ ethical life can e foun! only in
mo!ern society4 an! not in ancient societiesC
The "rinci"le of in!ivi!uality4 of suFective free!om4 has its origin Tin ancient
/reeceU4 although it is still eme!!e! in sustantial unity. . . . The ethical life of
/reece $ill therefore e an unstale one. . . . The aesthetic e>istence of /reece cannot
e eIuate! $ith true ethical life. ?%/ 5*9;5(6<565;56)@
&n ancient states4 . . . ethical life ha! not "rogresse! to Tthe mo!ern state'sU free
system of self;!e"en!ent !evelo"ment an! oFectivity. ?2. N '(6.@
9. The ethical as a universal stan!ar!
The term 0ittlich#eit is use! y Hegel to convey the i!ea that the customs
an! tra!itions of a "eo"le !eserve to have a !ee"er hol! on us than the astract4
cosmo"olitan i!eals of lieral Enlightenment moralists. -ut $e have
. 567
ETH&CAL O-HECT&%&T1
seen that Hegel is no .omantic "luralist or cultural relativist aout ethical
norms. &n 2. N ).4 he follo$s ,ontesIuieu's theory of the !iversity of la$s
a""ro"riate to !iverse national min!s or s"iritsA $hich is e>"licitly foun!e!
on the universal la$s of human reasonC
La$ in general is human reason4 inasmuch as. it governs all inhaitants of the earthC
the "olitical an! civil la$s of each nation ought to e only the "articular cases in
$hich human reason is a""lie!. They shoul! e a!a"te! in such a manner to the
"eo"le for $hom they are frame! that it shoul! e a great chance if those of one
nation shoul! suit another.=
&n fact4 Hegel leaves even less room for ethical !iversity than ,ontesIuieu
!oes. :or he thin#s that a thoughtful survey of the history of the human s"irit
reveals that the institutions of mo!ern Euro"ean society !is"lay a !ee"er
com"rehension of the human con!ition than those of other "eo"les. Though
!iMerent customs may e necessary ? an!4 in that sense4 Evali!E@ for other
times an! "laces4 it !oes not follo$ that they !eserve to e calle! ErightE or
EethicalE ?2. N (=.@.
&f $e loo# closely at Hegel's !etaile! !iscussion of mo!ern ethical life4 it
is stri#ing ho$ little he conce!es to ethnic !iversity4 ho$ little room he leaves
for the im"act of varying cultural tra!itions on the social an! "olitical structure
of mo!ern states. 0ome of Hegel's general "ronouncements soun! li#e
.omantic "rotests against the Enlightenment's ten!ency to mo!erniDe institutions4
leveling customs an! tra!itions4 recasting all constitutions accor!ing
to a single rationalistic mo!el. -ut he is a false frien! to .omanticism4 Fust
as he is to 2russian asolutism an! to Christian ortho!o>y. Hegel's o$n account
of mo!ern ethical life actually re"resents only a ne$4 historiciDe! version
of that same aggressive4 mo!erniDing rationalism.
The ethical life of a mo!ern social or!er reIuires the lieration of the ourgeois
nuclear family from the tra!itional institution of the feu!al e>ten!e!
family or clan ?2. NN '=54 '+6.@. &t nee!s an arena of civil society in $hich
in!ivi!uals "artici"ate in an o"en economic mar#et"lace. The legal regulation
of civil society must "rotect the "ersonhoo! of each human eing ?2.
N 569@4 an! the la$s shoul! e e>"licitly an! rationally co!iGe! THegel has
no use for the English system4 ase! on tra!ition an! Eun$rittenE la$ ?2.
N 5''.@U. The "olitical structure of a mo!ern state is !efective unless it is a
constitutional monarchy ?2. N 5=).@4 governe! y a "rofessional civil service
?2. N 59'@ un!er the $atchful eye of a re"resentative estates assemly
?2. N )65@.
Hegel never suggests that $e might a""eal to the !iversity of cultural tra!itions
to Fustify ?for e>am"le@ common la$ in Englan!4 theocratic asolutism
in .ussia4 re"ulicanism in America4 or the asence of re"resentative institutions
in Austria an! 2russia.+ &n '+6+4 Na"oleon attem"te! to im"ose on
0"ain the Constitution of -ayonne4 ase! on :rench .evolutionary "olitical
"rinci"les. &t "rovi!e! for a limite! monarchy4 strong re"resentative institutions4
an! the "olitical !isenfranchisement of the Church. The -ayonne
Constitution $as un"o"ular in 0"ain an! it !i! not last. Hegel's e>"lanation
56=
ETH&CAL L&:E
of its failure is revealing. He !oes not criticiDe Na"oleon for !oing violence
to 0"anish fol#$ays4 ut says only that.the -ayonne Constitution $as too
rational for the 0"anish4 $ho E$ere not yet e!ucate! u" to itE ?2. N 5=*A@.
&n "ractice4 Hegel arely even "ays li" service to the common"lace notion
that !iMerent "eo"les reIuire !iMerent la$s an! "olitical institutions. The
thrust of his theory of ethical life in the 2hiloso"hy of .ight is to !escrie the
social system that est actualiDes the self;conce"tion "ossesse! y in!ivi!uals
in mo!ern Euro"ean ?or E/ermanicE@ societies4 $here Hegel thin#s that the
human s"irit has reache! its most com"lete !evelo"ment so far.
Hegel is anticosmo"olitan in the sense that he stresses the sovereignty an!
self;containe!ness of the nation state ?2. N ))'@4 an! the in!is"ensale im"ortance
for in!ivi!ual self;actualiDation of the in!ivi!ual's !evotion to it ?2.
N 5(9@. -ut his celeration of a mo!ern4 universal conce"tion of human eings
an! mo!ern social institutions in!icates that he4 li#e the Enlightenment
cosmo"olitans4 is an a"ostle of a single mo!ern $orl! culture foun!e! on
universal "rinci"les of reason4 as o""ose! to the counter;Enlightenment vie$
$hich favore! a variety of "arochial cultures $ith foun!ations in religion or
some other tra!itional authority ?2. N 569.@.
Once $e a""reciate this4 $e can see ho$ great a !istance se"arates Hegel's
conce"tion of ethical life from all forms of .omantic;"luralistic communitarianism.
We can also see ho$ a misrea!ing of Hegel on this "oint a!ly misinter"rets
his critiIue of Enlightenment lieralism. Hegel reFects lieral theories
on the asis of their astract4 im"overishe!4 an! ahistorical vie$ of
human eings4 their "reference for a Gctional human nature in "lace of a
historically situate! self;un!erstan!ing. -ut he si!es $ith the Enlightenment
against .omantic "luralism4 an! its celeration of the !iverse Jourishing of
cultural unreason. The real signiGcance for us of Hegel's conce"tion of ethical
life is that it sho$s ho$ $e can acce"t a historiciDe! an! communitarian
critiIue of lieralism $ithout renouncing the Enlightenment's conG!ence in
universal stan!ar!s of reason.
56+
'5
Ethical suFectivity
i. The ethical !is"osition
The oFective si!e of ethical life is the ethical or!er4 a rationally articulate!
system of social institutions. The suFective si!e is the ethical !is"osition or
attitu!e ?/esinnung@.
The ethical attitu!e is the truest actualiDation of free!om ecause in it in!ivi!uals
are com"letely E$ith themselves.E Human in!ivi!uals are "ro!ucts of
their social or!er. The ethical la$s they oey are self;given ecause the ethical
or!er is fun!amentally i!entical $ith the essence of the in!ivi!ualC
TEthical la$s areU not something alien to the suFect4 rather the suFect ears a
$itness of s"irit to them as to its o$n essence4 in $hich it has its feeling of self an! it
lives in them as in an element not !istinguishe! from itself ; a relation more of i!entity
than of faith or trust. ?2. N '*=@
The original e>"erience of this i!entity is more fun!amental than rational
reJection4 even more fun!amental than any EfaithE or any aMective state. &t
is Ethe i!entity of living nature4 $hich !oes not a!mit of groun!s or reasons4
yet also !oesn't a""eal only to feelings4 ut rather to a $hole e>"erience4 the
$hole feeling of life4 unity of the la$s an! the in!ivi!ual's nature. This is
sim"le4 natural ethical lifeE ?%2.FC *+=;*++@.
The ethical !is"osition is Hegel's res"onse to the 3antian !uality of !uty
an! inclination. &n ethical life4 the EuniversalE as"ect of the self ?the as"ect
re"resente! y la$ an! !uty@ is in "erfect harmony $ith the E"articularE si!e
?the in!ivi!ual's !rives an! !esires@. &n his very Grst use of 0ittlich#eit in
contrast to ,oralitat4 Hegel !escries the ethical as Ea true i!entity of the
universal an! "articular4 of matter an! formE ?/W *57<'+)@. The ethical
attitu!e is heir to EloveE as Hegel use! it in the :ran#furt "erio!4 contrasting
$ith the self;alienate! $ill characteristic of 3antian morality. The ethical
attitu!e inclu!es love4 es"ecially in the conte>t of family relationshi"s ?2. N
'(+@4 ut it is su""ose! to e "resent $henever universal rationality is foun!
in harmony $ith an agent's "articular self;satisfaction un!er the aus"ices of
an institution elonging to an ethical $hole. Thus the ethical also inclu!es
"atriotism ?2. N 57+.@ an! 0tan!esehre ; the sense of honor that in!s us
to our "rofession an! those $ho share it $ith us ?2. NN 56=4 5()@.
5. Ethical !uty
Hegel !escries the moral stan!"oint as the stan!"oint of the EoughtE ?2h/
ff *5(4 7'*A 2. N i)(.AsS'/ N ('5@. 2art of $hat he means is that moral
569
ETH&CAL L&:E
!uties are e>"erience! as e>ternal limits on the suFect's "articular !esires4
"roFects4 an! mo!e of life. ,orality tells me $hich of my !esires it is "ermissile
to satisfy4 an! it remin!s me of the !ee!s an! en!s on $hich & must
e>"en! my tithe of nole eMort so that & may go aout my gruy "ersonal
usiness $ith a clear conscience. ,oral !uties4 as 3ant often em"hasiDes4
are e>"erience! as constraints on the $illA that is $hy 3ant says that love4
as a !esire or feeling4 cannot e a moral !uty ?3"% +)<+7@.
Ethical !uties4 on the other han!4 are not constraints on my lifeA on the
contrary4 they are the est "art of it4 Ethe sustance of my o$n eingE ?2.
N '*+@. Ethical !uties ta#e the form of !esires or E!rives T$hoseU content
elongs to my imme!iate $illE ?2. N '(6.@. Ethical !uties inclu!e my love
for my s"ouse4 my "arents4 an! my chil!ren4 an! the self;satisfaction & get
from engaging in my "rofession or vocation ?2. NN 56=4 5((@. The fulGllment
of ethical !uties involves having certain feelings an! !esires4 such as
the love for a certain "erson or the amition to achieve some goal. Ethical
!uties are not only things & EoughtE to !o4 they are usually things & s"ontaneously
$ant to !o.<Leaving them un!one !oes not so much oMen! my conscience
as em"ty my life of its meaningX ,orality ta#es4 as our "hiloso"hers
say4 Ethe moral "oint of vie$.E The "oint of vie$ of ethical life4 ho$ever4 is
nothing !istinct from the concrete in!ivi!ual's total4 uniGe! "ers"ective on
the $orl!.
Hegel !oes not reFect the i!ea of moral !uty as a constraint im"ose! y
the universal on the "articular $ill. -ecause morality is an as"ect or astract
moment of ethical life ?2. N ))4A@4 even ethical !uties sometimes ta#e a
moral form. Certain !uties ?e.g.4 those of enevolent !ee!s ren!ere! to
strangers in contingent circumstances@ are even moral in content4 ecause
they are ty"ically e>"erience! in their moral as"ect ?2. N 56=@. Hegel's "oint
is rather that moral !uty is not the only #in! of !uty4 not even the fun!amental
or ty"ical #in!. &n fact4 if the fulGllment of all !uty4 follo$ing the mo!el
of morality4 al$ays involve! a constraint y universal reason on the "articular
$ill4 then $e coul! not e>"ect !uty to e !one relialy enough to "ro!uce
the goo!. That is the sense in $hich the goo! for morality is forever an
Eought4E never an Eis4E $hereas ethical life is the living goo!4 the goo! that
has ecome self;moving an! self;achieving.
Hegelian ethical life involves a harmony et$een in!ivi!ual $ell;eing an!
the nee!s of a rational social or!er. An ethical or!er "rovi!es in!ivi!uals
$ith a generally satisfying mo!e of life4 so that they are sel!om calle! u"on
to ma#e great "ersonal sacriGces for others. We i!entify $ith ethical !uties
ecause they fulGll usA they alone give us a meaningful life. This is not the
same as saying that $e are attache! to them only ?or mainly@ y self;interest.
On the contrary4 ethical life involves concern for others an! the recognition
of claims that are more im"ortant to us than our o$n "articular goo!. 1ou
!o not e>"erience "rofessional or family life as a sacriGce of "ersonal ha""iness4
ut you #no$ that you coul! often !o etter for your o$n interests if
you !i!n't fulGll the !uties they im"ose. Ethical con!uct $oul! not fulGll
5 ' 6
ETH&CAL 0U-HECT&%&T1
you if it regularly cut too far into your ha""iness4 ut it sel!om ma>imiDes
your self;interest.
Ethical life involves $hat Amartya 0en calls EcommitmentE ; a !is"osition
to choose acts that forego your o$n $ell;eing to some !egree for the sa#e
of something you care aout more than that ?such as a love! one4 or your
"rofession or your country@. Commitment is not EselJessness4E thoughA it is
not a case $here self;interest is overri!!en y some universal moral "rinci"le
such as utility or the categorical im"erative. &f Hegel is correct in elieving
that most of social life !e"en!s on ethical !is"ositions4 then that means that
y an! large "eo"le's social ehavior cannot e e>"laine! y either egoistic
motives or a!herence to a universalistic morality ; the only t$o forms of
nt!tivation oLcially recogniDe! at all y many ethical theories an! most economic
theories.'
Accor!ing to Hegel4 morality tries in vain to "rovi!e an Eethical theory of
!uties4E ut a theory of this #in! can consist only in Ethe !evelo"ment of the
relationshi"s that are necessary through the i!ea of free!om4 an! hence in
their $hole range are actual only in the stateE ?2. N '*+.@. Our ethical
!uties are the !eman!s ma!e on us y other in!ivi!uals an! y institutions
through the relationshi"s in $hich $e stan! $ithin a rational society4 an
ethical or!er. The 2hiloso"hy of .ight !oes not really try to give us a !octrine
of !uties4 since it attem"ts no !etaile! e>"osition of these relationshi"s. -ut
it !oes furnish an outline of the institutions $ithin $hich these relationshi"s
are to e foun!4 an! so it might e seen as giving a s#etch of that structure
from $hich a !octrine of ethical !uties can e !erive!.
). Duties of relationshi"s
Ethical !uties are E!uties of relationshi"s ?2Jichten !er %erh!ltnisse@E ?2.
N '(6@. They arise from s"eciGc relationshi"s to other in!ivi!uals an! to
social institutions. Ethical !uties have a universal content ecause & am a$are
of them as. Faart;of aii ethical or!er4 ut & "erform these !uties on the asis
of fay "articular !esires an! !is"ositions of character4 not out of im"artial
enevolence or res"ect for a universal "rinci"le. :or instance4 & am !evote!
to the $elfare of these in!ivi!uals ecause they are my family an! & love
them4 not ecause my con!uct conforms to a system of universal legislation
or ma>imally satisGes the utility functions of all sentient creatures.
Ethical life allo$s for $hat Christina HoM 0ommers calls the E!iMerential
"ullE ?or D2@ of our !uties to others4 as !istinct from the most "revalent
moral theories4 $hich egin from a stan!"oint of im"artiality or EeIual "ullE
?E2@. & have s"ecial relations to such "eo"le as family memers4 frien!s4
"rofessional colleagues4 comra!es4 or com"atriots. -ecause of the ethical re; ]
lations that in! us4 & o$e them a concern & !o not o$e to humanity generally.
As 0ommers "uts the "ointC
Accor!ing to the D2 thesis4 the ethical "ull of a moral "atient $ill al$ays "artly
!e"en! on ho$ the moral "atient is relate! to the moral agent on $hom the "ull is
5''
ETH&CAL L&:E
e>erte!. ,oreover4 the Eho$E of relate!ness $ill e !etermine! in "art y social
"ractices an! institutions in $hich the agent an! "atient "lay their roles. . . . The
gravitational meta"hor may e suggestive. &n D2 morality the community of agents
an! "atients is analogous to a gravitational Gel! $here !istance counts an! forces vary
in accor!ance $ith local con!itions.5
Li#e 0ommers's version of D2 morality4 mo!ern ethical life follo$s the Enlightenment
tra!ition of "rovi!ing ?through the s"heres of astract right an!
morality@ for some ethical oligations that are universalistic or E2. As 0ommers
notes4 this version of D2 is to e !istinguishe! from anti;Enlightenment
versions of communitarian ethics ?such as that of Alas!air ,aclntyre@
$hich !elierately esche$ universalistic "rinci"les.)
&n a sense4 ho$ever4 even Hegel's commitment to D2 itself is foun!e! on
universalistic "rinci"les. Hegel's is not an E2 theory4 ecause it is not
foun!e!4 as 3antian an! utilitarian theories are4 on a universalism conceive!
as the EeIual "ullE or in!ivi!uals have on us as atoms of rational agency or
re"ositories of "leasure an! "ain. -ut Hegel's theory is still universalistic
ecause it a""eals to "rinci"les that claim universal vali!ity for all thin#ers.
As $e sa$ in Cha"ter ''4 the ethical is a universal4 oFective stan!ar! for
the rational assessment of social institutions. A relationshi" is EethicalE only
if it is ca"ale of !erivation from the universal conce"t of the free $ill.
Hegel !oes not agree $ith 0ommers $hen she says that it is a Emisconce"tion
of the Fo of ethicsE to thin# that it shoul! Iuestion the foun!ation of
the social institutions out of $hich D2 oligations arise.* On the contrary4
the 2hiloso"hy of .ight ta#es on the tas# of esto$ing the Eform of rationalityE
on the institutions of ethical life ?2. 2reface ')@. Hegel thin#s that it ma#es
a !iMerence $hether & sim"ly "erform my D2 !uties out of hait4 or also
reJect rationally on the institutional setting of these !uties an! $hether it
can e vin!icate! efore the ar of reason. He regar!s it as our Eright of
insight into the goo!E that $e shoul! Ehave insight into an oligation on goo!
groun!sE ?2. N ')5.@. Here4 too4 Hegel a""ears closer to Enlightenment
universalism than to the ran! of contem"orary communitarianism that e>alts
tra!ition an! ethos at the e>"ense of rational reJection.
*. .elational !uties an! universal reJection
2rima facie there is a "rolem reconciling D2 !uties $ith E2 ethical theories4
such as 3antianism an! utilitarianism4 $hich "ortray moral reasoning as
a!o"ting a !etache! an! im"artial stan!"oint. ,oral im"artiality seems to
alienate us even from the love an! commitment $hich even the theories
themselves4 from their im"artial stan!"oint4 tell us are goo! attitu!es for us
to have. Thus E2 theories are threatene! $ith self;!efeat.
0ome4 ho$ever4 !eny that there is any "rolem here at all. &f they are
right4 then 0ommers is mista#en in thin#ing that D2 oligations reIuire any
mo!iGcation in the stan!ar! moral theories4 an! Hegel is $rong to su""ose
that !uties of relation are com"rehensile only from the stan!"oint of ethical
life. Those $ho ta#e this vie$4 such as 2eter .ailton4 thin# there is no "ro;
5 ' 5
ETH&CAL 0U-HECT&%&T1
lem $ith an E2 moral theory that tells one to !evelo" !is"ositions to thin#
in terms of D2 oligations.( .ailton "oints out that there is a !istinction
et$een the truth con!itions of a theory an! its acce"tance or assertiility
con!itions. E2 theories may e true4 even if they ren!er themselves unacce"tale
or unassertile. He is untroule! y the oFection that a true ethical
theory must meet a "ulicity con!ition to the eMect that it must e "ossile
to elieve an! "ulicly assert it as true. EAny such con!ition4E he says4
E$oul! e Iuestion;egging against conseIuentialist theories4 since it $oul!
reIuire that one class of actions ; acts of a!o"ting or "romulgating an ethical
theory ; not e assesse! in terms of their conseIuences.E7
This re"ly !oes not cohere very $ell $ith the claim that an E2 rationale
can e given for D2 oligations4 for only if & actually elieve the conseIuentialist
theory ?an! am "re"are! to assert it@ can & actually give myself ?or
others@ conseIuentialist reasons for acting in the nonconseIuentialist $ays
that have goo! conseIuences. The re"ly $ill e unconvincing4 moreover4 to
those $ho thin# that there are in!e"en!ent reasons for im"osing the "ulicity
con!ition as a constraint on an ethical theory. There are such reasons4
since ethical theories achieve their en!s mainly y eing taught an! elieve!.
ConseIuentialists ought to e troule! if they are fori!!en y their theory
itself to elieve or "romulgate it. There is nothing Iuestion;egging in "ointing
out that conseIuentialism is in a in! if it !eman!s of us that $e a!o"t
eliefs on groun!s other than their ?evi!ent or a""arent@ truth. Any vie$.
that ma#es such !eman!s seriously conJicts $ith our fun!amental sense of
intellectual integrity. 2ointing this out !oesn't "resu""ose that conseIuentialism
is falseA it only "rovi!es a strong reason for thin#ing it must e.
A more reassuring re"ly from the E2 theorist $oul! e that the giving of
E2 reasons for acting in a D2 manner !oes not as a matter of fact involve us
in !iselieving our E2 theory or refusing to assert it. The "rolem $ith this
re"ly is that although it is "ossile that this thesis is correct for some E2
theories4 it is "roaly incorrect for many of them4 es"ecially ?as Henry 0i!g$ic#
famously a!mitte!@ for conseIuentialist ones.=
Hegel himself might in "rinci"le have similar "rolems reconciling ethical
!uties of relation ?many of $hich are D2 !uties@ $ith his o$n theory4
foun!e! on universal reasoning aout human free!om an! the con!itions of
its self;actualiDation. That he faces such challenges is4 in fact4 a goo! thing
for his theory. The "ossiility of eing alienate! from one's !is"ositions4
aMections4 an! s"ontaneous relationshi"s is inse"arale from all reason an!
reJection4 since $ithout it reason $oul! lac# the "o$er to correct4 or even
"ro"erly to conGrm such relations. &t $oul! e ho a!vantage to an ethical
theory ; on the contrary4 it $oul! e a serious !efect ; if it !i! not allo$
even the "ossiility of such alienation.j &t is reasonale to as# of an ethical
theory only that it shoul! in fact reconcile ethical reasoning $ith healthy an!
!esirale traits4 feelings4 an! ethical relations.
/enerally s"ea#ing4 a Hegelian self;actualiDation theory foun!e! on free!om
seems $ell suite! to meet these challenges. &t tells me to actualiDe a
certain self;image that is the outcome of the !ialectical "rocess of e>"erience.
5')
ETH&CAL L&:E
This turns out to e a self;image that involves "recisely those ethical relations
$ith $hich our ethical !uties are oun! u". There $oul! e a "rolem if
the self;image involve! the asence of self;a$areness or self;!etermination.9
Hegel's theory4 ho$ever4 "ro"oses that $e e self;consciously free ?or E$ith
ourselvesE@ in $hat $e !o. &ts $hole "oint is to achieve rational self;#no$le!ge
an! self;trans"arency in our ethical life. 0uch a theory gives us every
reason to avoi! a "rinci"le if the reJective attem"t to follo$ it lea!s to self!efeat
or self;alienation.
(. Ethical virtue
&n Cha"ter +4 $e loo#e! rieJy at a 3antian argument claiming that only
"ure res"ect for the moral la$ lea!s relialy to goo! actsC
&t is not enough that TactionU shoul! accor! $ith the la$A it must e !one for the
sa#e of the la$. Other$ise4 the accor!ance is merely contingent an! s"urious ecause4
though the unmoral groun! may in!ee! no$ an! then "ro!uce la$ful actions4 more
often it rings forth unla$ful ones. ?/ )96<7@
Hegel's vie$ is e>actly the o""osite of this. As $e sa$ in Cha"ter +4 he thin#s
that the "ure motive of !uty4 astracte! from our living !esires4 interests4
an! self;satisfaction4 can never relialy "ro!uce the goo!. .ather4 it is only
$hen the goo! is rought to life y reconciling it $ith our em"irical !esires
an! self;satisfaction4 that goo! actions ecome "art of our every!ay life4 an!
cease to e Econtingent an! s"urious.E When 3ant argues that Eunmoral
groun!sE cannot relialy "ro!uce goo! actions4 he seems to have in min!
cases li#e that in $hich im"ulsive sym"athy lea!s me to sIuan!er on the Grst
nee!y "erson & meet some scarce resources that & alrea!y o$e to someone
else ?-0E 5'7<(+@. To generaliDe from such cases is to su""ose that a "erson's
natural or em"irical !esires coul! never e so constitute! that they aim relialy
at the goo!.
That is sim"ly to su""ose the im"ossiility of virtue ; Ethe ethical insofar
as it is reJecte! in the in!ivi!ual character !etermine! through natureE ?2.
N '(6@. Hegel's conce"tion of ethical virtue is mo!ele! on Aristotle's conce"tion
of virtues of character ?2. N '(6.@. A virtue is a !is"osition ?/esinnung@4
trait ?he>is@4 or hait ?ethos@4 ut it is not only a !is"osition or tro"ism
to ehave in certain $ays. %irtues are intelligent !is"ositions4 !is"ositions to
act for certain reasons4 to e "lease! or "aine! at certain things4 to feel certain
emotions.'6
Hegel regar!s Aristotelian virtue as a !irect ans$er to the 3antian !uality
of reason an! inclination.
Aristotle !etermines the conce"t of virtue more "recisely y !istinguishing a rational
as"ect of the soul from an irrational oneA in the latter nous TreasonU is only !ynamei
T"otentiallyU ; sensations4 inclinations4 "assions4 emotions a""ly to it. &n the
rational si!e4 un!erstan!ing4 $is!om4 reJectiveness4 cogniDance all have their "lace.
-ut they !o not constitute virtue4 $hich consists only in the unity of the rational $ith
the irrational si!e. We call it virtue $hen the "assions ?inclinations@ are so relate! to
reason that they !o $hat reason comman!s. ?%/2 5C 555<56*@
QE*
ETH&CAL 0U-HECT&%&T1
This !oes not mean that the virtuous "erson sim"ly acts out of goo!hearte!
inclination. On the contrary4 Eif insight ?logos@ is a! or not "resent at all
ut "assion ?inclination4 the heart@ con!ucts itself $ell4 then goo!ness of
heart ?/utmutig#eit@ may e>ist4 ut not virtue4 ecause the groun! Wlogos4
reason@ or nous is lac#ing4 $hich is necessary to virtueE ?%/2 5C 555;55)<
56*;56(@.
There are t$o !istinct $ays of !oing the right thing $ithout e>hiiting
virtue. 3ant is Iuite correct $hen he !enies virtue to the "erson $ho !oes
goo! to others sim"ly ecause it ha""ens to "lease him to s"rea! Foy aroun!
?/ )9+<'*@. There is also no virtue4 ho$ever4 in one of 3ant's o$n e>am"les
of the goo! $ill4 the misanthro"e $ho th$arts his col!hearte! inclinations
an! ehaves #in!ly to$ar! others solely from !uty ?/ )9+;)99<'*;'(@. %irtuous
"eo"le #no$ an! $ill a""ro"riate actions for goo! reasons4 ut their
feelings an! inclinations accor! $ith reason4 an! so right actions also give
them suFective satisfaction. Even for such a "erson4 of course4 right action
can sometimes e "ainful4 as $hen !uty reIuires some "ersonal sacriGce.
-ut such cases $ill e !ue only to unfortunate e>ternal circumstances4 not
to !ee" conJicts et$een the !eman!s of !uty an! the agent's emotional
constitution. ,oreover4 in a rational system of ethical life4 such circumstances
shoul! e com"aratively rare4 since a rational social or!er is one that
is fun!amentally satisfying to the nee!s an! selfhoo! of its memers. &f they
are virtuous4 it $ill e unusual for them to Gn! themselves in situations
$here the !eman!s of !uty come into serious conJict $ith their suFective
nee!s an! !esires.
%irtues are Ethe ethical in a""lication to the "articular4E !is"ositions Gnely
tune! to "articular circumstances ?2. N '(6.A %2.ig '57@. %irtue is not4
as 3ant $oul! have it4 our "o$er of constraining ourselves to follo$ general
"rinci"les ?TL *6*;*67<77;7+@. &t is rather the ca"acity to Fu!ge4 feel4 an!
act as each uniIue situation reIuires4 to the !egree that the situation reIuires.
This is $hy oth Hegel an! Aristotle consi!er virtue to e a
Emean.E'' As the fun!amental ethical !is"osition4 virtue is "ossile ecause
it is the suFective con!ition of the "ossiility of an actual ethical or!er. Conversely4
virtue is ma!e "ossile y ethical institutions4 in $hich the "articular
satisfaction of each suFect is in harmony $ith the universal goo! ?2. N '(*@.
7. %irtue an! rectitu!e
0trictly s"ea#ing4 though4 virtue is not Hegel's i!eal for mo!ern ethical life.
Hegel associates virtue ?Tugen!@ $ith an earlier age4 $hen the social or!er
$as less fully organiDe!4 an! the ethical ha! to trium"h through Eethical
virtuosityE ?%irtuositat@ ; the s"ecial ethical genius of in!ivi!uals4 such as
Hera#les an! other heroes of ancient /reece ?2. N i(o.4AA %2. FC*9oA
%2.ig '5(@.'5 %irtue in this sense is com"atile $ith a goo! !eal of $hat $e
$oul! consi!er immoral or even ararous con!uct4 ecause in a heroic age4
the ethical is not yet estalishe! in a rational system4 an! is instea! the $or#
of the hero's aritrary $ill ?%A 'C 5*'<5(6@.
5'0
ETH&CAL L&:E
&n mo!ern society4 on the other han!4 the ethical life of in!ivi!uals is
articulate! into an organic $hole com"ose! of !eterminate roles4 "ositions4
or estates ?0t!n!e@. Each "osition has its o$n !eterminate !uties an! ethical
!is"osition.
Ethical !is"osition consists in everyone's having a "osition ?0tan!@C The human
eing must e!ucate ?il!en@ himself for a "osition. . . . An! he $ho has no "osition4
is nothing. -ut through this e>istence4 the human eing must ma#e himself actual4
an! "reserve himself in this "articularity. This is $hat is ethical in his "osition. . . .
The "osition is the real content of !uty. &t "rovi!es !eterminate !uties4 $hich each
can #no$. %irtue contains this4 that in!ivi!uality gives itself a character through its
o$n !eterminate vocation ?-estimmung@. ?%2.'= '5*@
Hegel has a "referre! term for this more mo!ern4 less s"ectacular #in! of
virtue. E&nsofar as TvirtueU sho$s nothing ut the sim"le conformity of the
in!ivi!ual to the !uties of relation that elong to him4 it is rectitu!e ?.echtschaMenheit@E
?2. N '(6@. Thus Hegel argues that $here ancient !rama focuses
on heroic !ee!s4 mo!ern !rama must !eal $ith the success or failure
of in!ivi!uals in their Iuest for "urely "ersonal an! suFective en!s ?%A 'C
5*9;5('<5(+;576@. He realiDes that $e may regret the asence of the o""ortunity
for heroism in the mo!ern $orl!. -ut he $ants us to a""reciate that
this is sim"ly the conseIuence of a more rational society an!4 at the same
time4 of a !ee"er self;un!erstan!ing4 $hich cannot hel" ut vie$ the ancient
i!eal of heroic virtue as something naive4 immature ; in the en!4 ri!iculous.
Hegel is unim"resse! $ith contem"orary .omantic attem"ts to revive the
heroic i!eal in a mo!ern conte>t ; as in 0chiller's The .oers. A truer insight
into its fate4 in his vie$4 $as "rovi!e! in the early seventeenth century
y Cervantes' Don Pui>ote ?%A 'C 5()<575@. Hegel's vie$ im"lies that a society
?li#e our o$n@ $hose "o"ular Gction an! !rama are !ominate! y i!eals
of heroism4 is seriously lac#ing a $ell;or!ere! an! reJective ethical life.
We sa$ in Cha"ter ''4 N (4 that Hegel is !istinctly hostile to .omantic
in!ivi!ualism. He is sensitive4 ho$ever4 to the rather 3antian thought that
Efrom the stan!"oint of morality Trectitu!eU a""ears as something suor!inate4
aove $hich other an! greater things must e !eman!e!A for TmoralityU
see#s to e something "articular4 an! is not satisGe! $ith eing the universal4
or $hat is in an! for itselfA it Gn!s the consciousness of authenticity
?Eigentumlich#eit@ only in $hat is e>ce"tionalE ?2. N '(6.@. Hegel's res"onse
to this $orry is to say that Fust as free!om !oes not lie in aritrariness4
so in a rational social or!er virtue !oes not lie in i!iosyncrasies4 through
$hich & might ho"e to !istinguish myself from others y some uniIue e>cellence
of character. &n a rational social or!er4 virtue consists rather in "erfecting
myself in my "articular vocation4 ringing my character into conformity
$ith the !eman!s of my s"ecial "osition in society. :or it is this that constitutes
my reaFF$ticularityC EThe in!ivi!ual gives himself actuality only insofar
as he ste"s into e>istence ?Dasein@4 hence into !eterminate "articularity4
an! hence limits himself e>clusively to one of the "articular s"heres Tof mo!ern
economic lifeUE ?2. N 56=@.
5'7
ETH&CAL 0U-HECT&%&T1
=. Ethical life an! suFective reJection
&n Cha"ter ''4 N +4 $e note! a certain tension in Hege2s vie$ of the ethical.
Hegel hol!s that the oFective ethical or!er reaches "erfection only in the
mo!ern state. The suFectively ethical4 ho$ever4 seems to e essentially unreJective.
&t is the attitu!e that follo$s ethical custom haitually an! unIuestioningly.
Thus it might a""ear that the suFectively ethical4 the ethical
attitu!e or !is"osition4 is essentially "remo!ern4 since it e>clu!es the suFectivity
foun! in the moral stan!"oint.
&n the Hena "erio!4 Hegel argues that the moral consciousness of !oing
!uty for !uty's sa#e is 2harisaical4 an! "oisons truly ethical con!uctA Ein a
true ethical life4 suFectivity is !one a$ay $ith ?aufgehoen@E ?/W *57<'+*@.
Even later4 after he has come to terms $ith morality in a "ositive $ay4 Hegel
continues to s"ea# of the ethical attitu!e as one that e>clu!es reJectionC EThe
ethical attitu!e ?/esinnung@ of the suFects is a se"aration from reJection4
$hich is al$ays "oise! for a lea" out of the universal sustance over Tan!U
into the "articularE ?%2.&HC 96@.
The ethical attitu!e !escrie! in such "assages a""ears to have much in
common $ith the secon! stage of moral consciousness in 2iaget's theory of
"ersonality !evelo"ment4 in $hich the chil! acce"ts rules as Esacre! an! untouchale4
emanating from a!ults an! lasting foreverEA') or again4 it might
remin! us of the EconventionalE stage of !evelo"ment in 3ohlerg's theory4
in $hich the chil! is oriente! to$ar! "ersonal relationshi"s4 or at most to$ar!
institutions4 ut still lac#s the ca"acity to formulate an! follo$ selfchosen
ethical "rinci"les.'* The ethical attitu!e seems "rimitive or immature
y com"arison $ith the reJective moral attitu!e $ith $hich Hegel often favoraly
contrasts it.
&n his mature $ritings4 ho$ever4 Hegel's usual "osition is that the ethical
attitu!e !oes not "reclu!e reJection after all. &n those "assages $here Hegel
still consi!ers the EethicalE to e>clu!e suFective reJection4 the term su!!enly
acIuires "eForative connotations. The arrange! marriage is more EethicalE
than a marriage in $hich the "artners have chosen each other4 ut it
clashes $ith Ethe suFective "rinci"le of the mo!ern $orl!E ?2. N '75.@.
The Eethical $ill4E together $ith the $ill of the chil!4 the slave4 an! the
su"erstitious "erson4 is a $ill Esun# in oFectivity4E E$ithout free!omE ?2.
N 57A %2.FC '7'A *C '*7@. ,oire often4 ho$ever4 Hegel conten!s that the
ethical attitu!e is the truest e>"ression of free!om "recisely ecause it is
com"atile $ith moral suFectivity.
T&n the ethicalU suFective self;consciousness remains suFective $ill4 ut loses its
one;si!e!ness4 for it is suFectivity that has its foun!ation in the oFective conce"t4
the goo!. . . . Of course $e can say that the ethical human eing is unconscious4 ut
consciousness is also there4 though only as a moment. ?%2. F C *+5;*+)@
Originally4 & oey the ethical norms of my society ecause & feel com"letely
i!entical or at home $ith them4 an! follo$ them haitually an! naturally.
This ethical attitu!e may still e "resent even if4 su"ervening on it4 there is
5'=
ETH&CAL L&:E
also a moral or "hiloso"hical attitu!e of conscientious in!ivi!ual reJection
or scientiGc criticism.
:aith an! trust elong to the eginning of reJection an! "resu""ose a re"resentation
an! a !iMerenceC as4 e.g.4 it is one thing to elieve in a "agan religion an! a
!iMerent thing to e a "agan. Every relation4 or rather this relationless i!entity4 in
$hich the ethical is the actual life of self;consciousness4 can "ass over into a relation
of elief an! conviction4 an! then through further reJection into an insight from
groun!s4 $hich originate either in some "articular en!s4 interests an! consi!erations4
or in fear an! ho"e4 or in historical "resu""ositions. -ut an a!eIuate cognition of
Tthese groun!sU elongs to the thin#ing conce"t. ?2. N '*=.@'(
The ethical attitu!e thus a!mits of a hierarchy of four levelsC
'. &mme!iate e>"erience of the in!ivi!ual i!entity $ith ethical norms
5. .eJective feelings of faith an! trust
). &nsight of the un!erstan!ing
*. .ational "hiloso"hical cognition of ethical norms as oFectively right
The ethical !is"osition is fun!amentally a living a$areness of the in!ivi!ual's
i!entity $ith the ethical or!er. This sense of i!entity can e $holly imme!iate4
ta#ing the form of custom an! hait4 or $e can reJect on it. -ut reJection
!oes not !estroy $hat is ethical in the !is"osition. On the contrary4
Hegel thin#s that the etter $e un!erstan! the ethical or!er4 the more "rofoun!
$ill e our a""reciation of its rationality. .eJective un!erstan!ing
an! reason are there to conGrm us in our haitual ehavior4 an! they acIuire
the status not only of hait ut also of moral conscience4 since the truthful
conscience is nothing ut the suFective !is"osition to $ill $hat is oFectively
goo! ?2. N ')=@. &n this $ay4 con!uct that is at ottom haitual4 arising out
of a concrete life e>"erience4 !oes not cease to e so $hen it is reJecte! onA
it retains its genuinely ethical character.
This "resu""oses that reason an! reJection conGrm the Tightness an! rationality
of ethical norms. Hegel has every right to this "resu""osition since
only an articulate! an! rationally organiDe! society is truly ethical. -esi!es4
the theory "resente! in the 2hiloso"hy of .ight consi!ers only the i!ea or
rational essence of mo!ern ethical life. &t treats e>isting social or!ers only to
the e>tent that they are actual an! rational. Hence it is reasonale to "resume
that the ethical attitu!e !iscusse! in this theory $ill relate to a society $hose
rationality $ill e conGrme! y suFective reJection.
&t ears re"eating4 ho$ever4 that Hegel !oes not thin# that rational reJection
inevitaly en!orses the e>isting social or!er. There are historical "erio!s
in $hich e>isting society is Efaithless to etter $illsEA those are times $hen4
in the manner of 0ocrates an! the 0toics4 moral reJection must turn in$ar!
an! see# there for $hat outer social reality has lost ?2. N ')+@. Hegel even
thin#s that reJection inevitaly e>"oses the limitations of every ethical or!er4
an! so ten!s4 in the long run4 to un!ermine oth the ethical attitu!e an! the
ethical or!er. &n the ne>t cha"ter4 $e $ill e>amine the ra!ical conclusions
Hegel !ra$s from this thought.
5'+
i )
The limits of ethics
i. The transitoriness of the ethical
&n its oFective as"ect4 ethical life is uniGe! in the "olitical state. Through
the state "eo"le !eci!e ho$ they $ill live together4 an! this gives e>"licit
rationality to the $hole ethical community. That is $hy Hegel !escries the
state as Ethe actuality of the ethical &!eaE W2. N 5(=@4 an! Ethe actuality of
concrete free!omE W2. N 576@. The state is Ethe actuality of the sustantial
$ill4 an actuality that it "ossesses in the "articular self;consciousness $hen
this has een raise! to universalityA as such4 it is rational in an! for itselfE
W2. N 5(+@. Hegel even characteriDes the state ; in $hat might e regar!e!
as las"hemous terms ; as Ethe "resence of s"irit in the $orl!E W2. N 5=6.@4
an Eearthly !eityE W2. N 5=5A@4 an! Ethe march of /o! in the $orl!E W2. N
5(+A@.'
Hegel inten!s the terms EearthlyE an! Ein the $orl!E as signiGcant IualiGcations
on the state's claims to !ivinity. &t is only the &!ea of the state that
Hegel calls Ethis actual /o!.E This &!ea is !istinct from the e>isting state
$hich4 he says4 Eis no $or# of artA it e>ists in the $orl!4 an! hence in the
s"here of aritrariness4 contingency4 an! errorE W2. N 5(+A@. The state elongs
to the "ractical s"here4 Ethe stan!"oint of the merely Gnite4 tem"oral4
contra!ictory4 an! thus transitory4 unsatisGe!4 an! unlesse! s"iritE W%A 'C
'59<'5+@. &n the state4 Eit is only the rational free!om of the $ill that e>"licates
itselfEA as rational eings $e see# Ethe region of a higher4 more sustantial
truth4 in $hich all o""ositions an! contra!ictions of the Gnite can Gn!
their Gnal resolution an! free!om can Gn! its full satisfactionE W%A 'C ')=<
')=@;
This higher region is that of Easolute s"irit4E the higher cultural realms
of art4 religion4 an! science ?or "hiloso"hy@. Art4 religion4 an! "hiloso"hy4
too4 have their history4 ut the truth to $hich they give us access is asolute
an! timeless. This truth assumes three !iMerent forms in our threefol! mental
lifeC sensuous intuition ?Anschauung@4 re"resentation ?%orstellung@4 an!
the rational conce"t ?-egniM@. &n art4 asolute truth a""ears imme!iately to
us in sensuous intuition as the i!eal of eauty. &n religion4 $e relate to truth
through re"resentative thought ; in legen!s4 myths4 an! !octrines hel! y
faith. Only "hiloso"hy gras"s the asolute truth in conce"tual form4 as the
"hiloso"hical &!ea.
The s"heres of asolute s"irit have a history ecause the stages of human
history are stages of s"irit's self;un!erstan!ing. 2eo"le actualiDe !iMerent
5'9
ETH&CAL L&:E
conce"ts of their nature "ractically in !iMerent "rinci"les of ethical life. Li#e$ise4
their relation to eternal truth assumes !iMerent forms ; in !iMerent
aesthetic sha"es4 religious faiths4 an! "hiloso"hical theories. The cultures of
!iMerent ages e>"ress the asolute !iMerently4 ut the oFect "resente! us
y art4 religion4 an! "hiloso"hy Z the one asolute truth ; is the same in all
ages. We might thin# that as much coul! e sai! of ethical life4 since it strives
to actualiDe the free!om of s"irit4 an! its claim on us is con!itional on its
success in !oing this. Cru!er forms of art are less "erfect intuitions of the
aesthetic i!eal4 more "rimitive religious i!eas re"resent the !ivine less a!eIuately4
an! less !evelo"e! systems of "hiloso"hy miss im"ortant "arts of
the truth of the &!ea. &n the same $ay4 $e might thin#4 a less !evelo"e!
ethical or!er ?one involving the institution of slavery4 say4 or failing to "rovi!e
for suFective free!om@ actualiDes s"irit's free!om less com"letely.
Hegel $ants to !istinguish ethical life from s"heres of asolute s"irit at
this "oint. -ecause ethical life is "ractical4 it involves a se"aration et$een
the $ill an! its en!4 $hereas the s"heres of asolute s"irit !eal $ith a "erfection
that transcen!s any such se"aration. Art4 religion4 an! "hiloso"hy e>haust
their true content in relating us to eternal truthA their "ro"er aesthetic4
religious4 or "hiloso"hical claim on us consists only in their ca"acity to aMor!
us access to that truth. &f4 o$ing to cultural an! historical changes4 a $or#
of art4 a cult4 or a "hiloso"hical system loses its aesthetic4 religious4 or "hiloso"hical
value for us4 then it ecomes a suFect only for historians.
The same is not true of the ethical life of a community4 ecause ethical
life is s"irit's $ay of giving "ractical actuality to free!om here an! no$4 at a
!eGnite time an! "lace. The ethical vali!ity of la$s an! customs !e"en!s on
"eo"le's conG!ence that they actualiDe free!om4 ut an ethical institution is
not merely a theoretical statement aout free!omA it is a "ractical attem"t to
actualiDe it. Thus Hegel says an institution can still Ee vali!E ?gelten4 giiltig
sein@ in its o$n age even if4 from the higher "ers"ective of a later age4 it
involves the su""ression of free!om. We have seen that slavery4 for e>am"le4
occurs Ein the transition of humanity from natural to ethical con!itionsE ?2.
N (=.@A it violates the Eeternal human rightsE of "ersons4 an! so it is asolutely
$rong ?E/ N *))A@. -ut in the ancient $orl! it forme! a "art of the
ethical structure that actualiDe! s"irit's free!om to the fullest e>tent "ossile
at that time. Thus Hegel says that the ancient institution of slavery4 though
E$rong4E $as nevertheless Evali!E ?2. N (=A@.
Hegel's ethical theory "rovi!es for a rational critiIue of social institutions
in t$o $ays. :irst4 the &!ea or actuality of a system of ethical life may !iMer
from the contingent e>istence of this system ecause the latter elongs to the
s"here of contingency4 $here human $ic#e!ness may "ervert an! !eform it.
0econ!4 even the ethical &!ea of a society may e seen as !efective $hen it
is vie$e! from a higher4 more !evelo"e! stan!"oint. -ut Hegel !oes not
thin# that an institution altogether loses its vali!ity as soon as $e Gn! out
that it is at o!!s $ith $hat is rational or right. %ali! ethical norms are not
merely theoretical statements aout the right or the goo!. They elong to
5 5 6
THE L&,&T0 O: ETH&C0
"ractices that ?to some !egree4 or at some time an! "lace@ actualiDe the free!om
of s"irit. Even $hen they are seen to e !efective4 institutions remain
a "art of "ractical life until they are aolishe! in "ractice. Defective art4
religion4 an! "hiloso"hy4 to the e>tent that they are seen to e !efective4
cease to elong to the realm of asolute s"irit. -ut even a !efective ethical
life retains its vali!ity until it is aolishe! in "ractice an! re"lace! $ith something
etter.
Hegel !oes not conclu!e from this that $e are oun! asolute y the institutions
of the e>isting or!er ?no matter ho$ evil an! irrational they may e@.
2erha"s some $ill thin# his conclusions is even more scan!alous4 for it is
that there is a limit to the $hole realm of the ethical an! its rational authority
over us. The claim of all !uties on us !e"en!s on the rationality of an actual
social or!er. 1et there is no social or!er $hose rationality is "erfect4 "ermanent4
or uncon!itional. Every system of ethical life is transitory an! con!itione!
y the e>tent to $hich s"irit has reache! self;#no$le!ge in that time
an! "lace. ConseIuently4 each sha"e of ethical life necessarily falls short of
actualiDing the i!ea of free!om in all its ine>haustile !e"th. The claims of
the ethical are therefore al$ays con!itional4 im"erfect4 ultimately unsatisfying
to our reason. 3ant an! :ichte got things ac#$ar!s $hen they trie! to
ma#e morality or ethics the foun!ation of the highest things4 even of religion
an! s"eculative "hiloso"hy.
5. The ethical life;cycle
The ethical is limite! not only y the timeless realm of asolute s"irit4 ut
also oun!e! $ithin time. The ethical life of any state al$ays occu"ies a
!eterminate "lace in $orl! history4 $hich is the "rogress of the $orl! s"irit
to$ar! self;#no$le!ge an! self;actualiDation. The right of the state su"erse!es
that of astract right4 morality4 the family an! civil society4 ut it is
limite! y an even higher right ; that of the $orl! s"irit E$hose right is the
highest of allE ?2. N N ))4 )*6@.
Hegel sees $orl! history as a "rogressive succession of s"irit's attem"ts to
#no$ an! actualiDe its o$n free!om. EThe history of s"irit is its !ee!4 for it
is only $hat it !oes4 an! its !ee! it to ma#e itself4 as s"irit4 into an oFect of
its consciousness4 to gras" itself inter"retingly ?auslegen!@ for itselfE ?2. N
)*)@. 0"irit's successive attem"ts to inter"ret an! actualiDe itself constitute a
series of E"rinci"les.E These are the "rinci"les of "eo"les or nations?%ol#er@C
ENations are the conce"ts $hich s"irit has forme! of itselfE ?%/ (9<('@. A
"eo"le actualiDes its "rinci"le $hen it forms itself into a state. E0tates4 "eo"les
an! in!ivi!uals involve! in this concern of the $orl! s"irit emerge4 each
$ith its o$n "articular an! !eterminate "rinci"le4 $hich has its inter"retation
an! actuality in Ta nation'sU constitutionE ?2. N )**@.
A "eo"le !oes not egin as a state ?2. N )*9@4 ut ecomes one in the
course of its regular life cycle4 !uring $hich Eit lossoms4 gro$s strong4 then
fa!es a$ay an! !iesE ?%/ 7=;7+=;(+@. &n youth4 a nation is Eethical4 virtuous
55'
ETH&CAL L&:E
an! vigorousE ?%/ 7=<(+@. The "eo"le gro$s to maturity $hen it ecomes a
state4 so that its "rinci"le E"ro!uces an ethical4 "olitical organiDationE ?%/
'=+<'*(@. EThe transition of a family4 hor!e4 trie4 grou"4 etc. into the con!ition
of a state constitutes the formal realiDation of the &!ea in itE ?2. N
)*9@. Each stage in the $orl! s"irit's !evelo"ment is re"resente! y a !eterminate
national "rinci"le. A nation ecomes historically !ominant $hen its
"rinci"le corres"on!s to the level of self;a$areness attaine! y s"irit. E:or
at any time the timely nation4 the one $hich rules4 is the one $hich has
gras"e! the highest conce"t of s"iritE ?%/ 79<76@.5
When the "rinci"le of a nation no longer corres"on!s to s"irit's highest
conce"tion of itself4 then the time of that nation is "ast4 an! it gro$s ol! an!
!ies. &t may e conIuere! y another nation4 $ith a higher "rinci"le4 or it
may !ie a Enatural !eathE in $hich the ethical life of the nation stagnates an!
continues to susist in the senescent con!ition of mere hait ?%/ 7+;79<(9;
76@. Hegel sometimes insists that a nation's time can come ut once4 an! that
once the time of its "rinci"le is "ast4 it has no further role to "lay in $orl!
history ?2. N )*=.A %/ 79<764 '+6<'*+@. This suggests that historical !evelo"ment
occurs only transiently4 through the successive "rominence of a series
of !iMerent nations or national "rinci"les. Accor!ing to this "icture4 each
nation emo!ies a !eterminate ut unchanging "rinci"le4 an! "rogress consists
in the "assing of the torch of civiliDation successively from one nation ?or
nation;#in!@ to another ?e.g.4 from 2ersia to the /ree# city states to .ome to
the E/ermanicE nations of mo!ern Euro"e@.
Hegel suggests Iuite a !iMerent "icture $hen he !escries a secon! sort
of E!eathE that a nation may suMer $hen its hour is "ast. A nation's maturity
consists in the e>"ression of its national "rinci"le in a rational "olitical constitution
A this "rocess goes han! in han! $ith the !evelo"ment of the nation's
self;consciousness. EThis s"iritual self;consciousness of a nation is its highest
"ointE ?%/ '==<'*7@4 ut at the same time the nation's !o$nfall. &n reJecting
on its ethical life4 a nation ceases to follo$ its ethical "rinci"les s"ontaneouslyA
it egins to !eman! rational groun!s to follo$ them. The ans$er to
these !eman!s can consist only in the reJective a$areness of its o$n "rinci"le
an! of the rational asis of that "rinci"le. &n the course of ecoming
reJectively a$are of its "rinci"le4 it also inevitaly ecomes a$are of the
limitations of that "rinci"le an! of the groun!s for follo$ing itC EThis lies
inevitaly in any !eman! for groun!sE ?%/ '=+<'*7@. E:or thought4 as universal4
!issolves Tits oFectsU. . . . 0"irit has the "ro"erty of !issolving every
!eterminate content it encountersE ?%/ '=9<'*=@. &n this $ay4 Hegel says4
the !eath of a nation a""ears not as a merely natural !eath4 ut as a #in! of
suici!e4 the E#illing of itself y itselfE ?%/ =6<76@.
.eJective self;#no$le!ge lea!s inevitaly to !emoraliDationC EThus enters
the isolating of in!ivi!uals4 from one another an! from the $hole4 the intervention
of their selGshness an! vanity4 the see#ing of their o$n a!vantage at
the e>"ense of the $holeE ?%/ '=+<'*7@. When $e ehol! a "rinci"le in its
limite!ness4 $e "erceive that it is not truly universal or ultimately vali!.
5 5 5
THE L&,&T0 O: ETH&C0
What is universally vali! no$ a""ears to us as something !iMerent4 as a ne$
"rinci"le ?%/ '=9<'*=@.) -ut the ne$ "rinci"le cannot e gras"e! reJectively
in its !eterminacy until much later in history4 after it4 too4 has een actualiDe!.
The irony in the life of a "eo"le is that its !ee"est as"iration an! highest
achievement4 the self;#no$le!ge of its actualiDe! "rinci"le4 al$ays amounts
to that "rinci"le's self;!estructionC
The life of a "eo"le rings a fruit to ri"enessA for its activity is !irecte! to carrying
through its "rinci"le. -ut this fruit !oes not fall ac# into into its la"4 into the $om
from $hich it $as ornA the nation !oes not get to enFoy it. On the contrary4 it
ecomes a itter !rin#. 1et the nation cannot refuse it4 for it has an inGnite thirst for
itA ut the cost of the !rin# is its annihilation4 an! at the same time the rise of a ne$
"rinci"le. ?%/ =5<75;7)@
:ollo$ing this "icture4 history is not merely a series of nations or national
"rinci"les. &t is also the immanent "ro!uction of each successive "rinci"le
out of the one that "rece!e! it. A national "rinci"le is not really overcome
from outsi!e4 ut overcomes itself4 y revealing its o$n limitations to itself.
&n other $or!s4 history is !ialectical.
). History's su"reme right
Accor!ing to Hegel4 a ne$ ethical or!er achieves ascen!ancy over an ol!er
one ecause the "rinci"le of. the ne$ or!er re"resents a !ee"er an! truer
conce"tion of s"irit's free!om. 0ince the actualiDation of s"irit's free!om is
the foun!ation of the ethical4 $e might thin# of the transition from one ethical
or!er to another as an ethical a!vance4 the result of a gro$th in ethical
#no$le!ge. -ut it $oul! e a fallacy to infer that $e must thin# of it in that
$ay. The ethical elongs only to "ractical or oFective s"irit. 0"irit's free!om
is the groun! of the ethical4 ut not everything foun!e! on s"irit's free!om
is ethical4 an! some things foun!e! on s"irit's free!om may e higher than
the ethical. A ne$ an! higher or!er emo!ies ethical #no$le!ge4 an! su"erior
#no$le!ge of s"irit's free!om4 ut it !oes not follo$ that it emo!ies
su"erior ethical #no$le!ge. /iven Hegel's conce"t of the ethical4 in fact4
e>actly the o""osite follo$s. The ethical or!er's highest right is the right of
the stateA ut the right of the state is su"erse!e! y the right of the $orl!
s"irit in history ?2. NN ))4 )*6@. This higher right is asserte! at "recisely
those "oints $here the state or the ethical or!er is seen to e limite! an!
ina!eIuate in its rationality. Thus the right of $orl! history is a right that
su"erse!es the ethical. &t is4 if you li#e4 a right that is eyon! the ethical4
eyon! goo! an! evil.
&t might e argue! that the right of the $orl! s"irit in history al$ays su"erse!es
one ethical or!er in favor of another4 su"erior ethical or!er4 an! so
its right has to e i!entiGe! $ith the ethical right of the ne$ or!er. This
argument $oul! also e fallacious. There are t$o !istinguishale features of
the situationC
55)
ETH&CAL L&:E
i. The ol! or!er actualiDes s"irit's free!om in a $ay that is seen to e limite!4
hence ina!eIuate.
5. A ne$ or!er comes on the scene $hich actualiDes free!om etter4 or less
ina!eIuately.
:or Hegel4 ?i@ an! ?5@ are closely connecte!4 ecause he thin#s ?rather o"timistically@
that "eo"le's a$areness of the ina!eIuacy of one "rinci"le al$ays
gives rise to a ne$ an! su"erior "rinci"le.* Even if connecte!4 ho$ever4 ?'@
an! ?5@ are still !istinguishale. The $orl! s"irit's right over a !eca!ent
ethical or!er is ase! on ?'@ only4 not on ?5@. The ol! or!er loses its right
an! its hol! over "eo"le ecause "eo"le are a$are that its "rinci"le is limite!
an! the rational FustiGcation for its institutions is ina!eIuate. &t is a se"arate
Iuestion $hether there is rea!y to han! a ne$ "rinci"le or ne$ institutions
that have a etter FustiGcation. -esi!es4 until the ol! institutions have een
aolishe! in "ractice4 they still have ethical vali!ity4 even if they have lost
rational FustiGcation. The right ctf the $orl! s"irit over the !eclining ethical
or!er is4 if you li#e4 only a right to !estroy $hat is seen to e !ea! an!
hollo$. The right to create something etter is "erha"s conseIuent on this
Grst right4 ut it is Iuite se"arate from it.
We can see this "oint illustrate! in Hegel's account of the consciousness
that lives through the historical transition an! eMects it. Hegel stresses the
moral !eca!ence of the !eclining ethical or!er4 the isolation of in!ivi!uals
from one another an! from the ethical $hole4 their retreat into selGshness
an! vanity. Their e>"erience is !isillusionment $ith the ol! or!er4 not enthusiasm
for any ne$ one.
There are goo! reasons4 in Hegel's theory of the historical !ialectic4 ari!
even in his asic conce"tion of s"irit4 for !escriing the transition in e>actly
this $ay. A s"iritual eing is only $hat it !oesA its self;un!erstan!ing consists
in an inter"retation to itself of $hat it has !one. 2eo"le are ca"ale of
acIuiring a clear conce"tion of the ethical or!er only after it has een fully
actualiDe!4 Eonly at a time after the actuality of its "rocess of formation has
een com"lete!E ?2. 2reface 5(@. &t follo$s !irectly that the in!ivi!uals $ho
create a ne$ ethical or!er cannot have a clear conce"tion of $hat they are
creating4 an! cannot e in "ossession of rational #no$le!ge of its su"eriority
over the ol! or!er.
As an ethical or!er matures4 its memers ecome reJective4 an! this
ma#es "ossile a "ositive com"rehension of it ?such as Hegel tries to "rovi!e
for the mo!ern state in the 2hiloso"hy of .ight@. -ut $hen the ethical or!er's
time of maturity is "ast4 negative reJection on it also comes $ithin their
reach4 an! the ethical loses its right over the in!ivi!ual $ill. The ol! or!er
no$ comes into collision $ith forces animate! y a ne$ "rinci"le. &t is im"ossile
that those forces shoul! ta#e the form of a rationally $or#e! out
"lan or ethical Ei!eal4E $hich might !is"lay the su"eriority of the ne$ or!er
to the ol!. /iven Hegel's conce"tion of s"irit4 it follo$s that such an i!eal
form can ma#e its a""earance only after the ne$ or!er is fully actual. :or
this reason4 even if those $ho create the ne$ or!er $ere motivate! y high;
55*
THE L&,&T0 O: ETH&C0
min!e! ethical conce"tions or moral i!eals4 their i!eals $oul! have to e
inchoate an! there coul! e no cogent moral or ethical FustiGcation4 availale
to themselves for their actions. We shall see in N (4 ho$ever4 that Hegel
thin#s $orl! historical change ty"ically involves no such high;min!e! motivation.
*. History an! relativism
&n Cha"ter ''4 it $as argue! that Hegel's theory of ethical life is not committe!
to cultural relativism. We may no$ egin to $on!er $hether Hegel's
theory of history !oes not force us to revise this conclusion. Hegel clearly
!oes hol! that !iMerent forms of ethical life "revail at !iMerent stages of
history4 an! even that a form of ethical life may e Evali!E even $hen a
correct insight reveals its institutions to lac# rational FustiGcation. &t loo#s as
though the vali!ity of an ethical or!er consists sim"ly in the fact that its
institutions e>ist. That loo#s li#e a form of ethical relativism.
Hegel hol!s that a system of ethical life has vali!ity ecause4 an! for as
long as4 it actualiDes the highest stage of self;a$areness that s"irit has thus
far achieve!. That is not a feature that elongs to a social system merely
ecause it e>ists. He also maintains that !iMerent ethical or!ers have vali!ity
at !iMerent stages in history. -ut it is a mista#e to call a vie$ relativistic
sim"ly on that account. Hegel thin#s !iMerent ethical or!ers are vali! in
!iMerent ages only ecause he thin#s that s"irit's #no$le!ge of its free!om
gro$s an! !ee"ens through history4 an! so s"irit's attem"t to actualiDe that
free!om ta#es !iMerent forms in !iMerent ages. The vali!ity of a !uty4 for
instance4 !e"en!s on its eing "art of a system of ethical life that ?for a time@
actualiDes s"irit's free!om.
This nee! not !istinguish Hegel's vie$ ra!ically from he!onistic utilitarianism4
for instance. &f utilitarians thought that "eo"le's history sho$s them
"assing through !iMerent stages in their a$areness of "leasure an! ho$ it is
to e acIuire!4 then they might very $ell a!o"t a vie$ analogous to Hegel's.
Hegel's vie$ is more analogous to rule; than to act;utilitarianism4 ecause it
is a self;actualiDation theory in $hich the human goo! consists in manifesting
a certain i!entity in action rather than achieving certain en!s. .ule;utilitarians
might very naturally !istinguish et$een !iMerent historical systems of
rules for the "romotion of "leasure4 an! say that one set of rules is vali! so
long as "eo"le hol! one conce"tion of "leasure an! its "ursuit4 $hereas a
!iMerent set of rules ecomes vali! as soon as "eo"le acIuire greater #no$le!ge
aout these matters. The historical variaility of ethical stan!ar!s in
Hegel's theory is closely analogous to this.
Where Hegel's vie$ is signiGcantly !iMerent from utilitarianism4 as $ell as
from most other moral theories4 is in the i!ea that ethical stan!ar!s generally
have only a limite! role in humanity's "ursuit of the Gnal goal. :or Hegel4 the
actualiDation of s"irit's free!om sometimes FustiGes con!uct that !irectly violates
the only a""licale ethical stan!ar!s. This ha""ens in "erio!s of historical
transition4 $hen one ethical or!er is !ying an! another is eing orn.
55(
ETH&CAL L&:E
(. Worl! historical in!ivi!uals
The OH_e $orl! is still not conscious of its con!itionA the en! is to ring this aout.
This is the aim of $orl! historical human eings4 an! in this they Gn! their satisfaction.
They are conscious of the "o$erlessness of $hat is "resent4 of $hat still coasts
along ut only a""ears to e actuality. 0"irit4 having cultivate! itself in$ar!ly4 has
outgro$n its $orl! an! is aout ?im -egriM ist@ to "ass eyon! itA s"irit's self;consciousness
no longer Gn!s satisfaction in this $orl!4 ut this #in! of !issatisfaction
has not yet foun! $hat it $ills ; for this is not as yet aLrmatively at han! ; an! so
it stan!s on the negative si!e. &t is the $orl! historical in!ivi!uals $ho have then
tol! "eo"le $hat it is that they $ill. ?%/ 9+;99<+*@O
Worl! historical in!ivi!uals serve a cause ; that of Ethe higher universalE
?%/ 9=<+54 9+<+)@ ; ut they !o not serve this cause consciously4 intentionally4
or $ith #no$le!ge of so !oing. Their #no$le!ge of the higher universal
or ne$ "rinci"le of s"irit is not #no$le!ge of Ethe &!ea as suchEA it is not
rational com"rehension of the movement of history. &t is only a "ractical
insight into $hat must e !one ne>t in or!er to further their o$n "ersonal
en!s Z en!s that Fust ha""en to coinci!e $ith the larger en!s of s"irit. E0ince
these in!ivi!uals are the living e>"ressions of the sustantial !ee! of the
$orl! s"irit an! are thus imme!iately i!entical $ith it4 they cannot themselves
"erceive it an! it is not their oFect an! en!E ?2. N )*+@. Hegel !istinguishes
the Eimme!iateE insight of the $orl! historical in!ivi!ual from a reJective
or rational #no$le!ge of the i!ea4 $hich is the "rerogative of the
"hiloso"hical historian $ho comes along later an! com"rehen!s $hat they
have achieve! ?%/ 9+<+)@.7
Worl! historical in!ivi!uals hel" to actualiDe the free!om of s"irit y
ringing to irth a ne$ or!er of things. That "uts them among humanity's
greatest enefactors. Their conscious intentions4 ho$ever4 are y no means
"hilanthro"ic. On the contrary4 $orl! historical in!ivi!uals are men of aMairs4
statesmen4 an! military comman!ers4 such as Ale>an!er of ,ace!onia4
Hulius Caesar4 Charlemagne4 or Na"oleon -ona"arte. Along $ith their "ractical
insight into the higher universal to e actualiDe!4 they usually have a
sense of their o$n historical !estiny4 ut they are motivate! less y the nee!s
of the human race than y their o$n "ersonal amition an! glory. Their
insight into the nee!s of the time thus ty"ically ta#es the form of a #no$le!ge
of the $ay to enhance or "rotect their o$n "o$er ?%/ '6)<+=@.
Hegel says that Caesar's crossing the .uicon4 for e>am"le4 $as !one only
$ith the intention of "reserving himself4 "rotecting his comman! against those
$ho $ere on the "oint of ecoming his enemies ?%/ 96<=7@. Caesar !eGe! the
la$s an! comman!s of the .oman .e"ulic ecause he sa$ that it ha! ecome
a Elie4E Ethat this hollo$ structure ha! to e re"lace! y a ne$ one an! that the
structure he himself create! $as the necessary oneE ?%/ '6(<+9@. Nor are $orl!
historical in!ivi!uals fasti!ious in the means they use to achieve their en!s.
They are often ruthless an! un"rinci"le!4 Etreating other intrinsically a!mirale
interests an! sacre! rights in a carefree4 cursory4 hasty an! hee!less
manner. . . . A mighty Ggure must tram"le many an innocent Jo$er un!erfoot4
an! !estroy much that lies in its "athE ?%/ '6(<+9@.
557
THE L&,&T0 O: ETH&C0
We have seen ?Cha"ter '54 N 7@ that for Hegel a EheroE is someone $ho
creatively rings to irth something ne$4 an! that this is incom"atile $ith
!is"laying the Erectitu!eE characteristic of a memer of a rational social or!er.
Worl! historical in!ivi!uals are EheroesE ?%/ 97<+)@ in something li#e
this sense. 1et ecause they emerge in "erio!s of !eca!ence an! transition4
not in the Grst lossoming of a ne$ or!er ut at the en! of an ol! an! !eca!ent
one4 Hegel !oes not see them as characteriDe! y EvirtueE ?or Eethical
virtuosityE@4 any more than they are y rectitu!e. Ho$ever4 he !oes not re"resent
$orl! historical in!ivi!uals as selGsh or egoistically motivate! in the
sense that they see# their o$n "ersonal ha""iness. They are !riven y $hat
Hegel calls E"assionEC the concentration of the $hole in!ivi!uality on a single
goal?%/ +(<=5;=)4 95<=+@.= Nor4 in Hegel's vie$4 are $orl! historical in!ivi!uals
ty"ically ha""y "eo"leC EWhen their en! is attaine!4 they fall asi!e
li#e em"ty hus#s. They may have un!ergone great !iLculties in or!er to
accom"lish their en!4 ut as soon as they have !one so4 they !ie early li#e
Ale>an!er4 are mur!ere! li#e Caesar4 or !e"orte! li#e Na"oleonE ?%/ '66<
+(@. This is $hat Hegel calls the Ecunning of reasonE in history4 Ethat it sets
"assions to $or# in its service4 so that the agents y $hich it gives itself
e>istence must "ay the "enalty an! suMer the lossE ?%/ '6(<+9@.
Hu!ge! y moral or ethical stan!ar!s4 $orl! historical in!ivi!uals are ty"ically
a! men. They eneGt humanity4 ut they receive no honor an! no
gratitu!e4 either in their o$n time or in suseIuent ages. All they receive
from "osterity is un!ying fame as Eformal suFectivitiesE ?2. N )*+@. Hegel
!oes not !is"ute this Fu!gment of "osterity4 or claim that its ingratitu!e !oes
them any inFustice. Nor !oes he try to !isguise or mitigate the $ic#e!ness of
$orl! historical in!ivi!uals. On the contrary4 the morally goo! an! ethically
virtuous are those $ho o""ose the $orl! historical in!ivi!ual4 resisting the
"rogressive course of s"iritC EThose $ho4 $ith an ethical vocation an! a nole
!is"osition4 have resiste! $hat the "rogress of the i!ea of s"irit has ma!e
necessary4 stan! higher in moral $orth than those $hose crimes have een
transforme! into means to higher or!erE ?%/ '='<'*'@.
&n Hegel's vie$ this is ho$ it must e4 since the interests of s"irit re"resente!
y $orl! historical in!ivi!uals are "recisely those that reIuire the
!estruction of the e>isting ethical life4 overri!ing all moral or ethical claims
in favor of the higher right of the $orl! s"iritC
&n the course of history one essential moment is the "reservation of a "eo"le4 a
state4 an! the "reservation of the or!ere! s"heres of its life . . . that is4 the "reservation
of ethical life. -ut the other moment is that the susisting of a "eo"le's s"irit as
it is must e ro#en through4 ecause it is e>hauste! an! has $or#e! itself out4 in
or!er that $orl! history4 the $orl! s"irit4 shoul! go for$ar!. . . . &t is "recisely here
that there arise those great collisions et$een susisting4 recogniDe! !uties4 la$s an!
rights4 an! ne$ "ossiilities $hich are o""ose! to this system4 $hich violate it4 an!
even !estroy its foun!ation an! actuality. ?%/ 97;9=<+5@
&f it is the tas# of $orl! historical in!ivi!uals to hel" ring a ne$ ethical
or!er to irth y !estroying the ol! one4 it is har!ly to e e>"ecte! that
their !ee!s $ill e>hiit ethical virtue. Worl! historical in!ivi!uals share their
55=
ETH&CAL L&:E
time's cynical insight into the hollo$ness of the e>isting ethical or!er4 $hich
they therefore treat $ith contem"t ?%/ '6*<++@. Their "assions can achieve
the !estruction of the !ying ethical $orl! "recisely ecause Ethey !o not hee!
any of the restraints $hich right an! morality see# to im"ose u"on themE
?%/ =9<7+@. 2assion is the force that rings the ne$ ethical or!er to irth4
ecause it is the only force "o$erful enough to rea# the on!s of the ethical.
7. -eyon! the ethical
There is nothing ne$ in Hegel's i!ea that some of humanity's greatest enefactors
have een criminals an! evil!oers. This i!ea stan!s sIuarely in the
tra!ition of ,an!eville's E"rivate vices4 "ulic eneGts4E A!am 0mith's Einvisile
han!4E Turgot's vie$s aout the role of $ar an! amition in human
"rogress4 an! 3ant's theory ?!erive! "artly from .ousseau@ that our rational
ca"acities ?inclu!ing our ca"acity for morality itself@ are !evelo"e! only
through social com"etition an! the !rive for unFust ascen!ancy over others
?&/ 56;55<**;*(@. What "erha"s ma#es Hegel's vie$ more scan!alous than
its "recursors is the further i!ea that these $ic#e! in!ivi!uals are asolutely
FustiGe! in their unethical con!uct. When they violate astract right4 morality4
an! ethics4 they Ehave the asolute right on their si!e4 ut a right of a
$holly "eculiar #in!E ?%/ 9+<+*@.
The assertion that someone coul! have a right to !o $hat is morally or
ethically $rong may alrea!y seem li#e a straightfor$ar! self;contra!iction.
-ut in fact it follo$s Iuite naturally from Hegel's ethical theory that there
shoul! e such a right. E.ight4E in the most general an! fun!amental sense4
refers to $hatever gives e>istence to the $ill's free!om ?2. N 59@. The more
com"letely an! less con!itionally something actualiDes free!om4 the higher
its right. ,oral suFectivity actualiDes free!om more fully than astract right4
so its right is higher. Ethical life4 in turn4 gives greater actuality to free!om
than morality4 an! so its right is higher than theirs. The right of any ethical
or!er itself is also limite! y the im"erfect $ay in $hich its "rinci"le actualiDes
s"irit's free!om. These limits sho$ themselves in an era of $orl!;historical
transition4 $hen "eo"le's $ills no longer Gn! satisfaction in the e>isting
ethical or!er ut no ne$ form of ethical life has arisen to ta#e its "lace. At
such a time4 the free!om of s"irit is given e>istence y those $ho violate an!
overturn the ol! or!er. &n fact4 these actions give free!om a higher e>istence
than !oes the !eca!ent ethical or!er they are violating. &n the most general
an! fun!amental sense4 then4 their unethical actions constitute a Eright4E in
fact a higher right than the ethical or!er those actions oMen!. There can e
a right that overri!es the ethical ecause the FustiGcation of ethics itself4
through the $ay it actualiDes s"irit's free!om4 has al$ays een only a limite!
an! con!itional FustiGcation. &n that sense4 no moral or ethical im"erative
can ever e categorical.
:or Hegel4 the s"here of $orl! history is higher than that of the ethical.
:rom its higher stan!"oint4 ethical right an! $rong !o not cease to e>ist4
ut they no longer matter. &t is to the s"here of Econscious actualityE ; of
55+
THE L&,&T0 O: ETH&C0
"ractical life live! in the "resent ; that such things as EFustice an! virtue4
$rong!oing4 violence an! vice4 guilt an! innocenceE have their E!eterminate
signiGcanceEA it is in this s"here alone that Etalents4 "assions4 the s"len!or4
in!e"en!ence4 ha""iness or unha""iness of in!ivi!uals an! statesE are to
EGn! Fu!gment an! ?al$ays im"erfect@ Fustice.E -ut E$orl! history falls outsi!e
these "oints of vie$E ?2. N )*(@. 2hiloso"hical historians shoul! not
ma#e moral or ethical Fu!gments4 not ecause their !isci"line is Evalue freeE
ut ecause its stan!"oint on human free!om ; the ultimate value ; is higher
than the ethical stan!"oint.
T:rom the $orl!;historical stan!"ointU the !ee!s of the great men $ho are the
in!ivi!uals of $orl! history4 a""ear FustiGe! not only in the inner signiGcance of
$hich those in!ivi!uals $ere unconscious4 ut also from a $orl!ly stan!"oint. :rom
this "oint of vie$4 no claims must e raise! against $orl!;historical !ee!s an! their
"er"etrators y moral circles4 to $hich they !o not elong. The litany of "rivate
virtues ; mo!esty4 humility4 charity4 an! tem"erance ; must not e raise! against
them. Worl! history coul! $holly !is"ense $ith the circle in $hich falls morality4
an! the often mista#enly !iscusse! !ichotomy et$een morals an! "olitics. ?%/ '=';
'=5<'*'@
Hegel is "articularly intereste! in attac#ing those moralists $ho see in great
men an! their !ee!s only $ic#e! "assions an! vices4 an! treat the stu!y of
history chieJy as a gymnasium in $hich to e>ercise our ca"acity for moral
in!ignationC
What schoolmaster has not !emonstrate! of Ale>an!er the /reat or Hulius Caesar
that they $ere im"elle! y such "assions an! $ere therefore immoral charactersB ;
from $hich it follo$s that the schoolmaster himself is a more a!mirale man than
they $ere4 ecause he !oes not have such "assions ?the "roof eing that he !oes not
conIuer Asia or vanIuish Darius an! 2orus4 ut sim"ly lives an! lets live@. ?%/ '6)<
+=@
Hegel's $ritings contain t$o Iuite !istinct !efenses of Egreat menE against
small;min!e! moralists. &n oth conte>ts he Iuotes the :rench on motC ENo
man is a hero to his valet !e chamreE ; $ith the are! a!!ition that this
is not ecause the hero is not a hero4 ut ecause the valet is only a valet ?2.
N '5*AA %/ '6)<=+A cf. 2h/ U 77(@.+ -ut the t$o !efenses are very !iMerent.
in im"ort. One is a moral !efense of the great man4 claiming that those $ho
achieve great things $ithin the s"here of morality an! ethical life shoul! not
e criticiDe! morally on the groun! that their achievements $ere satisfying
to them an! motivate! "artly y "ersonal amition4 so long as their insight
an! intention accor! $ith the goo! ?2. N '5*A cf. Cha"ter +4 NN );=@. Here
the small;min!e!ness of the moralist consists in !$elling one;si!e!ly on motivation44
an! in "erversely !ra$ing "ointless !istinctions et$een !iMerent
motivational frames of min! $hich ?Hegel alleges@ are all morally cre!itale
to the agent.
The other !efense of Egreat menE is not moral ut amoral in its im"ort.
&t a""lies to the !ee!s of great men that are a!mitte!ly $rong4 "lain violations
of "eo"le's rights4 or other ethical "rinci"les. This !efense says that the
559
ETH&CAL L&:E
$ic#e!ness of great men4 though lamale from a moral or ethical stan!"oint4
has no signiGcance from the higher stan!"oint of $orl! history. The
small;min!e!ness of the moralist here !oes not consist4 as in the Grst case4
in an error in moral Fu!gment. &t consists instea! in failing to see that great
men have a FustiGcation for the crimes they commit $hich transcen!s the
moral an! ethical s"heres altogether. Here the small;min!e!ness of moralists
consists in the fact that $hen they consi!er $orl! historical !ee!s4 they thin#
it a""ro"riate to ma#e any moral Fu!gments at all.
=. E>ercising the right to !o $rong
Though he ri!icules the anal moraliDing of the schoolmaster4 there is something
rather trite aout Hegel's o$n a!miration for the men nineteenth;century
schooloys rea! aout in their history oo#s4 an! something very
schoolmasterish aout the $ay Hegel turns the history lesson into a Etime to
"raise famous men.E 0ome of us might have "referre! an alternative history
curriculum4 in $hich $hat ,ar> calle! Ethe high;soun!ing !rama of states
an! "rincesE is su""lemente! y an account of ho$ history is really sha"e!
incrementally y the !ee!s of countless "eo"le $hom the schoolmaster never
hear! of an! $oul! in any case not have time to name. &f Hegel must vie$
history as a military museum4 some of us $oul! "refer it if his gallery also
containe! "ortraits of "eo"le li#e 0"artacus4 Wat Tyler4 Heanne !'Orleans4
an! 0ten#a .aDin.
These4 ho$ever4 have not een "eo"le's only4 or !ee"est4 Iualms aout
Hegel's "hiloso"hy of history. What scan!aliDes more "eo"le is Hegel's notion
that there can e actions that morality ?even ethics@ has no right to
Fu!ge. We may e re"ulse! y the thought that there are "eo"le $ho4 though
$ic#e! an! !estructive4 have an Easolute rightE or su"ramoral FustiGcation
for their evil !ee!s4 so that it is ina""ro"riate an! small;min!e! to raise any
moral oFections against them. &t may frighten us to thin# $hat "eo"le might
!o if they got the notion that they "ossesse! such a right. 0ome of Hegel's
critics have even thought that his !octrines might4 $ithout any !istortion or
misun!erstan!ing4 e use! to Fustify the !ee!s of all those ruthless in!ivi!uals
through $hose cruelty human history a""ears to us ?in Hegel's all too
can!i! $or!s@ as the Eslaughter;ench on $hich the ha""iness of "eo"les4
the $is!om of states4 an! the virtue of in!ivi!uals have een sacriGce!E
?%2/ )(<5'A cf. %/ +6<79@.
Hegel !enies that the Easolute rightE of history elongs to Fust any "o$erful
"erson4 or to anyone $ho ta#es it into his hea! to o""ose the estalishe!
ethical or!er. &n!ivi!uals have the Easolute rightE of $orl! history on their
si!e4 he says4 Eonly insofar as their en! is in accor! $ith the en! of s"irit as
it is in an! for itselfE ?%/ 9+<+*@4 in other $or!s4 only insofar as their !ee!s
really !o serve to ring aout the further actualiDation of s"irit's free!om.
Those of $hom this is not true ?even if they thin# it is@ are merely criminals
an! $rong!oers4 $ho !eserve every Fust "unishment they receive. :or
5)6
THE L&,&T0 8: ETH&C0
that matter4 the fate even of genuine $orl! historical in!ivi!uals4 as Hegel
!e"icts it4 is usually a harsh oneA an! he no$here claims that they !eserve
etter.
As Hegel conceives it4 the Easolute FustiGcationE of $orl! historical in!ivi!uals
is relevant only from the stan!"oint of the reJective historian. &ts
"oint is not to;"romote the careers of $orl! historical in!ivi!uals or to "rotect
them from the conseIuences rif their !ee!s4 ut only to "rotect "hiloso"hical
historians from missing the rational meaning of history y ma#ing
moral Fu!gments of;!ee!s $hose signiGcance transcen!s the s"here of ethics
or morality.
&f4 as a "ractical matter4 you $ante! to .avail yourself of the asolute right
of the $orl! s"irit in history4 you;$oul! have to haveOreason to elieveOof
your o$n crimes an! amitions that'they "romote the further actualiDation
of s"irit's free!om is history. &t is Hegel's vie$ that no one coul! ever have
reason to elieve this. The historical signiGcance of s"irits !ee!s can e un!erstoo!
only after those !ee!s are there to reJect on. What $e can a""reciate4
as a matter of "ractical reason4 is the relation of our !ee!s to the fully
forme! ethical or!er of our age ; as conforming to this or!er or violating it4
or at most as hel"ing it more fully to actualiDe its o$n i!ea.
Consi!er the reJections of .o!ion .as#olni#ov4 as he sits in "rison4 contem"lating
his mur!er of the t$o ol! $omen he has #ille!C
EWhy !oes my action stri#e them as so hi!eousBE he #e"t saying to himself. E&s it
ecause it $as a crimeBE What !oes 'crimeO meanB ,y conscience is !ear. No !out
& have committe! a criminal oMense4 no !out & violate! the letter of the la$ an!
loo! $as she!. All right4 e>ecute me for the letter of the la$ an! have !one $ith itc
Of course in that case many of the enefactors of man#in!4 $ho seiDe! "o$er instea!
of inheriting it4 shoul! have een e>ecute! at the very start of their careers. -ut those
men $ere successful an! so they $ere right an! & $as not successful an! thereforec
ha! no right to "ermit myself such a ste".E9
.as#olni#ov is su""ose! to e a stu!ent of "hiloso"hy4 ut he still has a lot
to learn aout the suFect. &f some criminal acts have a su"ramoral FustiGcation4
it !oesn't follo$ from this that all criminal acts might have it. 0till less
!oes it follo$ that there is no longer any such thing as criminality4 or any
!istinction ?e>ce"t in terms of the letter of the la$@ et$een $hat is criminal
an! $hat is not. &f .as#olni#ov is reasoning from a Hegelian theory of history4
then he is committing a grotesIue error if he tries to Fustify his crime
y a""ealing to the asolute right of $orl! history4 for such a FustiGcation is
never availale to $orl! historical in!ivi!uals themselves. Nor $oul! genuine
$orl!;historical in!ivi!uals ever thin# of loo#ing for oneA as Hegel !escries
them4 they are !riven y such "o$erful "assions that they $ill not
e !eterre! y moral scru"les4 an! they $ill e unintereste! in "hiloso"hical
arguments4 $hether moralistic or amoralistic. :rom the mere fact that
.as#olni#ov nee!e! to Fustify his crime to himself y a! "hiloso"hical arguments4
he might have #no$n that he $as not of the same il# as the ol!4
unscru"ulous heroes Hegel ha! in min!.'6
5)'
ETH&CAL L&:E
+. Historical self;o"acity
.as#olni#ov's reasoning from a Hegelian "hiloso"hy of history is inconseIuent4
ut the !irection of his thin#ing may nevertheless raise some serious
issues for Hegel's vie$s. Once $e a!mit the "ossiility of an asolute4 su"raethical
right of $orl! history an! $hat $e might call a Eteleological sus"ension
of the ethicalE for $orl! historical in!ivi!uals4 it seems inevitale
that $e shoul! $on!er4 $ith .as#olni#ov4 ho$ far our o$n actions might
fall un!er this right. This4 in turn4 seems inevitaly to o"en the !oor in
"ractice to a frightening amoralism.
Hegel's $ay of avoi!ing these conclusions !e"en!s on his s#e"ticism concerning
the historical meaning of our o$n actions. &n a "erio! of historical
transition4 the meaning of our !ee!s !e"en!s on the ne$ an! higher "rinci"le
of s"irit4 $hich those !ee!s hel" to ring to actuality. -ut that actuality4
together $ith the "ossiility of rationally com"rehen!ing the "rinci"le4 !e"en!s
on a future gro$th in s"irit's self;#no$le!ge. ConseIuently4 the historical
meaning of such !ee!s is eyon! the com"rehension of the in!ivi!uals
$ho !o them. They are necessarily ignorant of the historical meaning of $hat
they !oA they are o"aIue to themselves.
The main "oint of Hegel's argument for this historical self;o"acity $as later
articulate! y 3arl 2o""er. 2o""er argues that $e cannot "re!ict the course of
human history to the e>tent that it !e"en!s on the further gro$th of human
#no$le!ge4 since that gro$th is in "rinci"le not "re!ictale y us.'' During
"erio!s of historical transition4 Hegel thin#s $e cannot un!erstan! the meaning
of our $orl! historical !ee!s4 ecause that meaning !e"en!s on the futureA
ut $e cannot foresee ?an!4 a fortiori4 cannot com"rehen!@ that future4 ecause
in it a ne$ "rinci"le of s"irit is at $or#. To com"rehen! that ne$ "rinci"le
an! its ethical life $ill reIuire a further gro$th in s"irit's self;#no$le!ge4
to $hich $e have in "rinci"le no access in the "resent.
The "ractical conclusions Hegel !ra$s from this "oint are evi!ent
throughout the 2hiloso"hy of .ight4 ut es"ecially em"hatic in the 2refaceC
$e cannot overlea" our o$n time any more than $e can EFum" over .ho!esEA
the only self;trans"arency availale to us lies in "hiloso"hy4 $hich Ecom"rehen!s
its o$n time in thoughtsE an! reFoices in the rational com"rehension
of the historical "resent. This it can !o only $hen a Eform of life has gro$n
ol!EC Ethe o$l of ,inerva egins its Jight only $ith the falling of the !us#E
?2. 2reface 5=;5+@. As $e have oserve! efore4 these !octrines are not
necessarily conservative in their im"ort4 since they allo$ for rational action
to actualiDe the e>isting social or!er4 reforming it y correcting ?as far as $e
are ale@ its ?inevitale@ contingent Ja$s an! ringing it as fully as "ossile
into harmony $ith its rational i!ea. -ut they !o rule out the "ossiility of
ra!ical social change ase! on historical reason. 2o""er4 though $ith some
changes of em"hasis4 !ra$s similar ?antira!ical@ conclusions from his argument.
0ince $e cannot "re!ict the historical future4 he $arns us against un!erta#ing
ra!ical social change an! urges us to content ourselves $ith cautious4
"iecemeal social e>"erimentation.l5
5)5
THE L&,&T0 O: ETH&C0
-oth Hegel an! 2o""er e>aggerate the s#e"tical conclusions to $hich this
line of argument entitles them. 2o""er's argument !oes not rule out the "ossiility
of ra!ical social action4 even $ith rational "re!ictions as to its success4
foun!e! on $hat $e alrea!y #no$. :or all 2o""er's reasoning sho$s4 it
might e evi!ent that the "resent social or!er is ethically unacce"tale4 that
some ra!ically !iMerent social or!er is oth reIuire! y the ethical #no$le!ge
$e alrea!y have an! historically inevitale ase! on our "resent sociological
#no$le!ge.
Hegel is in a etter "osition to rule out such a "ossiility4 ase! on his
conce"tion of ethical life an! his theory of s"irit. Hegel's ethical theory says
that ethical stan!ar!s are rationally #no$ale only as "art of an actual form
of ethical lifeA his theory of history says that $e can gain such rational com"rehension
only after a form of ethical life has gro$n to maturity. Thus Hegel's
vie$ !oes Fustify saying that $e cannot un!erta#e ra!ical social change
on ethical groun!s. &t also !enies us a rational com"rehension of the social
or!er $e are creating. -ut it !oes not follo$ from Hegel's vie$ that $e cannot
un!erta#e ra!ical social change $ith a rational #no$le!ge of the fact that
$e are creating a ne$ an! higher social or!er. We can !o this if $e can form
a conce"tion of the historical meaning of our actions that is not ethical in
character an! not !e"en!ent on a !eterminate conce"tion of the social or!er
$e are in the "rocess of creating.
2rocesses involving the gro$th of our #no$le!ge are in "rinci"le un"re!ictale
in certain res"ects4 ut not in all. A team of scientists searching for
a cure for A&D0 cannot "re!ict "recisely $hat the cure $ill e. -ut after
some "reliminary research4 they might e in a "osition to ma#e FustiGe! "re!ictions
concerning such things as $hether the cure $ill e foun! at all4 the
ty"e of research that $ill lea! to it4 the general nature of the cure4 an! the
a""ro>imate length of time it $ill ta#e to Gn! it. &n a similar $ay4 even if
Hegel's theory of history is correct an! it is im"ossile to "re!ict the nature
of ne>t ethical or!er4 it still might e "ossile to i!entify in the "resent ethical
or!er the social "rolems that the future one $ill have to solve. &t might
e "ossile to say something aout the general character of the coming ethical
or!er ?e.g.4 to say $hether it $ill have to e more egalitarian or more meritocratic
than the "resent one@. &t might even e "ossile to i!entify the ty"e
of social movement that $ill ring it into eing.
Whether or not ,ar>'s conce"tion of revolutionary "ractice $as !evise!
$ith Hegel's "hiloso"hy of history in min!4 it serves to illustrate the "oint
that has Fust een ma!e. ,ar> "reten!s to no clear conce"tion of $hat future4
"ostca"italist society $ill e li#e. He !eclines to $rite Ereci"es for the
coo#sho"s of the futureE ecause4 he insists4 future society $ill !e"en! on
Ea series of historic "rocesses4 transforming circumstances an! menE ; in
2o""er's language4 on Ethe further gro$th of our #no$le!ge.E') ,ar> !oes
thin# that $e can no$ com"rehen! the class structure of "resent;!ay society4
i!entify the class movement that $ill ring aout the higher social form4 an!
so rationally align ourselves $ith that movement. This is $hat ,ar> an!
Engels mean $hen they say that Ecommunism is not for us a state of aMairs
5))
ETH&CAL L&:E
to e rought aout4 an i!eal to $hich reality $ill have to a!Fust itselfA $e
call communism the actual movement that is aolishing the "resent state of
aMairs.E'* As communists4 in this sense4 $e engage in $hat Hegel $oul! call
E$orl! historicalE action4 $e consciously engage in the creation of a ne$
social or!er ; an! $e !o so $ith historical self;trans"arency.
,ar> may very $ell have een mista#en aout the $or#ing;class movementA
the history in $hich $e are involve! may in fact have een as o"aIue
to him as it is to the rest of us. -ut if4 consistent $ith Hegelian "rinci"les4
it is even conceivale thathe might have een right4 then;$e must a!mit that
Hegel's theory of history !oes not "reclu!e the "ossiility that there might
e such a thing as self;trans"arent $orl!;historical agency. &f there is4 then
it might e "ossile for you to #no$ of your o$n action that it "ossesses a
su"ramoral FustiGcation. 1ou might e ale #no$ingly to e>ercise the $orl!
historical right to !o $rong.
9. Hegel's amoralism
.evolutionary "ractice4 as ,ar> thought of it4 also illustrates one as"ect 7i
the amoralism in Hegel's theory of history. :or ,ar>4 $orl! historical agency
assumes the sha"e not of the Egreat manE ut of the revolutionary class4 an!
so the lever of historical change is not the "assionate amition of the $orl!
historical in!ivi!ual4 ut class interest4 conceive! not as the "rivate interest
of the class's in!ivi!ual memers4 ut as the interest that the class as a $hole
has in fulGlling its historic mission. Li#e in!ivi!ual amitions4 class interests
fall outsi!e morality or ethics. :or ,ar>4 class moralities are only the false4
mystiGe! i!eological forms ta#en y class interests. When $orl! historical
agents conceive of their actions in moral or ethical terms4 they are victims of
i!eological illusion an! their agency ecomes self;P"aIue. :or this reason4
,ar> consistently reFects all a""eals to moral conce"tions or i!eals $ithin
the $or#ing;class movement.'( Once again4 even if ,ar>Bs vie$ is in fact
mista#en4 as long as $e agree that it might have een correct4 then $e must
recogniDe that ?$hether Hegel himself a!mits it or not@ the Hegelian "hiloso"hy
of history !oes allo$ for the "ossiility that someone might self;consciously
an! FustiGaly e>ercise the Easolute rightE of $orl! history4 $hich
transcen!s an! overri!es all moral an! ethical claims.
Hegel's "hiloso"hy of history contains a secon! sort of amoralism4 involving
not a right to !o $rong4 ut a case in $hich unethical con!uct is rational4
or at least not contrary to reason. Hegel hol!s the vie$ that $hen a culture
ecomes reJectively a$are of the "rinci"le un!erlying its ethical life4 it "asses
through t$o main stages. &n the Grst stage4 the culture ecomes reJectively
a$are of the Ereasons for ethical con!uctA in this "erio!4 not only is
ethical con!uct oFectively rational ut also its rationality is gras"e! y "eo"le
reJectively an! suFectively. &n the secon! stage4 ho$ever4 as its reJection
continues4 the culture eventually comes to see the limits of that "rinci"le.
No$ $hen it e>amines the reasons for follo$ing ethical !uties4 it Gn!s
these reasons insuLcient. Ethical con!uct that $as rationally FustiGe! in re;
O)*
THE L&,&T0 O: ETH&C0
lation to its earlier reJection4 no$ ceases to e so4 an! this lea!s to a "erio!
of suFective self;in!ulgence4 vanity4 an! !eca!ence ?%/ '=+;'+6<'*(;'*7@.
2eo"le's right to elong to a rational ethical or!er ?2. N '()@ is no longer
satisGe!. Ethical !uties are no longer rationally in!ing on them. They are4
if you li#e4 free of their !uties from the stan!"oint of reason. &n the !ee"est
sense4 ho$ever4 they are less free than they $ere in a more harmonious time4
ecause they are no longer $ith themselves in their social life.
Accor!ing to Hegel4 one "ossiility for agents at this stage is to turn in$ar!4
aan!oning the ethical life ?$hich has ecome Efaithless to etter
$illsE@ in favor of a suFective an! "ersonal moral co!e ?2. N ')+.@. Another
"ossiility is sim"ly to "ut one's o$n selGsh interests an! ca"rices ahea! of
ethical con!uct ; Esee#ing Tone'sU o$n a!vantage an! satisfaction at the e>"ense
of the $holeE ?%/ '=9<'*7@. Hegel's vie$ im"lies that in a !eca!ent
age "eo"le are FustiGe! in turning a$ay from their ethical !uties. %anity4
selGshness4 an! the aan!onment of ethical virtue constitute a rational mo!e
of con!uct.
0ome may Gn! it "ara!o>ical that the same con!uct that is su""ose! to
e rationally FustiGe! y reJection at one time ceases to e so at a later time.
They may thin# that this involves Hegel in some sort of relativism either
aout ethical truth or aout rationality. 0uch reactions are mista#en. No matter
ho$ oFective $e ta#e ethical truth an! rationality to e4 any Fu!gment of
the rationality of a course of con!uct is al$ays relative to someone's e"istemic
situation. &t is al$ays "ossile that con!uct that is rational for me relative to
the reasons & have at my !is"osal at one time $ill turn out to e irrational
relative to the reasons & have at a later time. ,oreover4 as oFective circumstances
change4 there may also e a change in the course of con!uct that it
is oFectively rational to follo$. When an ethical or!er is in its "rime of life4
it $ill e true that it actualiDes s"irit's free!om ?accor!ing to the highest
conce"tion of itself that s"irit has thus far attaine!@4 an! it $ill e rational
for "eo"le living in that age to !is"lay ethical virtue an! !o their ethical
!uties. As reJection !ee"ens4 ho$ever4 s"irit's conce"tion of itself egins to
change4 an! the ol! ethical or!er is no longer suLcient to actualiDe the
emerging conce"tion. .eJective in!ivi!uals egin to realiDe this4 an! ethical
!uties lose their rational FustiGcation for them. &n such an age4 the Iuestion
EWhy e ethicalBE has no rational ans$er. There is no goo! reason to e
ethical.
Hegel's "hiloso"hy of history is not innocuous. &t inclu!es a genuine amoralism4
though a restricte! an! con!itione! one. Ethical con!uct lac#s rational
FustiGcation4 ut only in ages of !eca!ence an! historical transition. There
is an asolute right to !o $rong4 ut it elongs only to those $hose !ee!s
really !o clear the groun! for a ne$ or!er of things. Only someone as !emente!
as the hero of a .ussian novel coul! thin# this right is a""licale
?for e>am"le@ to the mur!ers .as#olni#ov committe!. &f Hegel's !octrine
frightens us ecause $e thin# it FustiGes in!iscriminate $rong!oing4 then
our fear is ase! on a sim"le misun!erstan!ing.
This is not 3#ely to Iuiet our !ee"est fears4 ho$ever. We #no$ only too
O)(
ETH&CAL L&:E
$ell ho$ insanely "eo"le can ehave $hen a sense of historical mission ta#es
"ossession of them. We see all aroun! us that the usual eMect of "olitical
violence is not to eneGt or lierate humanity4 ut merely to inJict "ointless
harm on innocent "eo"le. Our most asic reluctance to acce"t Hegel's historical
amoralism "roaly !erives from the thought that anyone $ho countenances
the i!ea of FustiGe! $rong!oing in history no longer has any clear
$ay in "ractice of !ra$ing the line against some of the $orst e>am"les of
senseless inhumanity that "eo"le have committe! against one another.
We shoul! not attem"t to !eny that Hegel's amoralism is a !angerous !octrine.
Our !efense shoul! rather e that the !anger is not Hegel's creationA
he is only the earer of a! ne$s. ,oral restraints shoul! not in! us $hen
they stan! in the $ay of human lieration. &f there really are times $hen the
human s"irit can e emanci"ate! only through !oing $rong4 then it $oul!
e !rea!ful if $e let our fear of $rong!oing #ee" us forever in chains. On
the one han!4 if it $ere al$ays "ossile for the human s"irit to a!vance in a
calm an! or!erly $ay4 in accor! $ith right an! morality4 then Hegel's historical
amoralism $oul! never Gn! a""lication. On the other han!4 if it $ere
al$ays easy for "eo"le to #no$ "recisely $hen terrile an! immoral actions
$ere reIuire! in the interests of human free!om4 then there $oul! e little
!anger of the !octrine's ever eing ause!. -ut human aMairs are com"le>
an! eset $ith amiguity. We sometimes !o have !iLculty !istinguishing
senseless crimes an! !etestale atrocities from e>traor!inary historical !ee!s
necessary to the a!vancement of the human race. ,oreover4 some of those
necessary !ee!s may at the same time e !etestale atrocities. Hegel is not
to lame for those trouling facts of human life.
5)7
2rolems of mo!ern ethical life
i. The "rinci"le of the mo!ern state
The 2hiloso"hy of .ight is oth an ethical theory an! a social theory. &t is an
ethical theory ase! on the con!itions for human self;actualiDation in the
mo!ern $orl!4 an! an attem"t to sho$ that mo!ern social institutions "rovi!e
for self;actualiDation. &n this cha"ter4 $e $ill loo# at selecte! "arts of
Hegel's attem"t to !efen! mo!ern society4 an! at some of his "rolems. As
a social oserver4 Hegel $as sutle an! far seeing. The !iLculties he encounters
in !emonstrating the rationality of the mo!ern state are sel!om merely
theoretical mista#es. They usually "oint to "ractical "rolems of the mo!ern
ethical life $e are still living.
Hegel says that the !istinctive "rinci"le of the mo!ern state is the "rinci"le
of suFective free!om ?2. N 5=)AA cf. 2. NN '+(.4 567.4 5764 575A4 599.A
)'7AA %2/ (*6<*(7@. -ut this is not to e un!erstoo! in the sense of 3ant's
lieral "olitical theory4 that the en! of the state is to ma>imiDe in!ivi!ual
free!om un!er la$. Hegel reFects the vie$ that ta#es the en! of the state to
e E"ersonal free!om an! the "rotection of "ro"erty4 or the interest of the
in!ivi!ual as suchE ?2. N 5(+.A %2/ *)*<(*5@A that is to confuse the state
$ith civil society or the Enecessity stateE ?Notstaat@ ?2. N '+)@. On the contrary4
for Hegel the state is an Easolute unmove! en! in itselfE ?2. N 5(+A
cf. %2/ (*6<*(7@4 or Ethe universal4 having the universal as such for its en!E
?%2.*C 7)(@. The "oint is rather that unli#e any "revious culture4 the ethical
life of the mo!ern $orl! recogniDes that suFective free!om turns out to e
an in!is"ensale "art of that asolute en!.
The en! of s"irit in history4 an! the foun!ation of Hegelian ethical theory4
is the self;actualiDation of free!om. The mo!ern state4 ho$ever4 is Ethe actuality
of concrete free!omEA concrete free!om consists in Ethe com"lete !evelo"ment
of "ersonal in!ivi!uality an! the recognition of its right for itselfE
comine! $ith their Etransition through themselves an! $ith #no$le!ge an!
$ill into the interest of the universal4 so that they recogniDe it as their sustantial
s"irit an! are active for it as their Gnal en!E ?2. N 576.@ &n other
$or!s4 concrete free!om is actual $hen free "eo"le4 $hose in!ivi!uality is
fully !evelo"e! an! "rotecte! y right4 choose to !evote themselves to a
universal or collective en! $hich they ac#no$le!ge as the foun!ation of their
in!ivi!ual $orth itself. &n the rational mo!ern state4 the common en! is not
"ut ahea! of in!ivi!ual interests or "romote! y coercing or mani"ulating
in!ivi!ual $ills. At the same time4 in!ivi!uals !o not lea! lives !evote! to
5)=
ETH&CAL L&:E
their o$n "rivate goo! or the goo! of their family of class. Their !ee"est
in!ivi!ual self;actualiDation is foun! in their "romotion of the common goo!.
ENeither is the universal accom"lishe! an! given vali!ity $ithout "articular
interests4 #no$le!ge4 an! $ill4 nor !o in!ivi!uals live only for the latter as
"rivate "ersons $ithout at the same time $illing in an! for the universal4
consciously eing eMective in ehalf of this en!E ?2. N 576@.
This is free!om in the Hegelian sense of Eeing $ith oneself in an otherE
ecause in it the free in!ivi!ual "erson an! suFect achieves rational a$areness
of its o$n Gnal en! as an oFective4 social en!4 $ith universal signiGcance.
E,y sustantial an! "articular interest is containe! an! "reserve! in
the interest an! en! of another ?the state@ in its relation to me as an in!ivi!ual
; so this other is imme!iately not an other for me4 an! in that consciousness
& am freeE ?2. N 57+A E/ N ()(@.
Thus it is a serious !istortion of Hegel's vie$ to say that he regar!s true
free!om as the free!om of a collective rather than the free!om of in!ivi!uals.
The state is an oFective an! collective en!4 ut the free!om it actualiDes is
the free!om of the in!ivi!uals $ho are active in its ehalfC E&f you as# ho$
in!ivi!uality achieves its highest right4 then this is the s"iritual universality
$hich the state is. Only in the state !oes the in!ivi!ual have oFective free!omE
?%2.igC 569;5'6@. &n!ivi!uals are free only through the state ecause
the !ee"est nee! of in!ivi!uals is to actualiDe their rational nature4 their universality4
an! they can !o this only y contriuting to the state as a collective
en! an! an en! in itself.
5. .ationality an! suFectivity
&n!ivi!uality an! suFective free!om also have an essential role to "lay in the
content of this collective en!. Although the state is not a means to the free!om
or ha""iness of its memers4 the $ay in $hich it "rovi!es systematically
for their $ell;eing an! suFectivity is $hat ma#es it into an en! in itself.
The state is an en! in itself for our rational nature ecause the state itself is
rational ?2. N 5(+@. EAstractly consi!ere!4 rationality in general consists in
the inter"enetrating unity of universality an! in!ivi!ualityA in content here
concretely it consists in the unity of oFective free!om an! suFective free!omE
?2. N 5(+.@. .ationality in !elieration consists in harmoniDing an!
a!Fusting !iMerent aims so that they form a coherent an! self;Fustifying comination.
What ma#es the state rational is that its institutional arrangements
comine the free!om an! interests of many in!ivi!uals into a single organiDe!
$hole.
The city;states of /ree# antiIuity $ere rational in this sense4 ecause they
harmoniDe! the ha""iness of their citiDens into a larger ha""iness of the
$hole "eo"le.' -ut in classical culture4 the harmony et$een the interests of
the in!ivi!ual an! the interests of the $hole $as something Eimme!iateE or
!irectC E2articularity ha! not een release!4 set free4 an! rought ac# to
universality4 i.e.4 to the universal en! of the $holeE ?2. N 576A@. That is
$hy !iMerences et$een the interests of the state an! "articular interests4
5)+
2.O-LE,0 O: ,ODE.N ETH&CAL L&:E
such as those of the in!ivi!ual or the family4 $ere $renching an! tragic for
the ancients ?2h/ 'JT *=(;*=7@. &n the mo!ern state4 the harmony is not only
et$een collective an! in!ivi!ual ha""iness4 ut also et$een the collective
goo! an! the suFective free!om of in!ivi!ualsC
The essence of mo!ern states is that the universal is comine! $ith the com"lete
free!om of "articularity an! the $elfare of in!ivi!uals4 . . . so that the universality
of the en! cannot "rogress $ithout the "ro"er #no$le!ge an! $illing of "articulars
that "reserve their right. Thus the universal must e activate!4 ut on the other si!e
suFectivity must e $holly an! vitally !evelo"e!. Only through the susistence of
oth moments in their strength is a state to e regar!e! as articulate!4 an! truly organiDe!.
?2. N 576A@
Hegel's theory of the mo!ern.state !eman!s a s"ecialE#in! of social CDhesiveness4
un#no$n to any earlier society. The staters institutions must not
only "rotect in!ivi!ual interests ut also in!ivi!ual free!om4 an! they must
even "rovi!e for the !evelo"ment of in!ivi!uality in $ays that satisfy in!ivi!uals
an! so in! them the more Grmly to these institutions. Our E"olitical
lifeE must not e an e>traor!inary activity that !ra$s us a$ay form our normal
"rofessional res"onsiilities4 or our freely chosen "lans for our o$n or
our family's $ell;eing. &n!ivi!uals must e>"erience !evotion to the common
goo! not as a sacriGce of the "rivate for the sa#e of something Ehigher4E
ut sim"ly as the ever;"resent !ee"er "ur"ose ehin! every!ay life $hich
"revents it from eing a mere "rivate self;see#ing. ?2. N 57+@ .5
2erha"s4 contrary to Hegel's Grm convictions4 the e>"erience of such a
free an! rational social life is also Iuite foreign to us. That $oul! e>"lain
$hy some of Hegel's rea!ers can inter"ret his vision of the state only as the
totalitarian intrusion of the state into every corner of "rivate life4 or else as
the e>"ression of the com"lacent self;!ece"tion that i!entiGes "atriotism
sim"ly $ith4 min!ing one's o$n usiness an! letting the state !o $hatever it
li#es. &f the mo!ern state is not really as Hegel "ortrays it4 then the attem"t
to "ersua!e yourself that it is4 or the unsuccessful attem"t to force it to e
$hat it is not4 might very naturally lea! in one or oth of those unattractive
!irections. -ut even more asic to Hegelian ethics than the claim that the
state e>hiits this s"ecial unity of universality an! "articularity is the claim
that it must !o so if our free!om is to e actualiDe!. This means that if the
community $e live in is not alrea!y a Hegelian state4 $e cannot e $hole or
free until it ecomes something li#e one.
). Civil societyC suFective free!om an! cor"orate
s"irit
Hegel elieves that the mo!ern state's successful uniGcation of universality
$ith "articularity is !ue to the one institution that is uniIue to itC civil society.
Civil society "rovi!es the "ulic social s"ace in $hich in!ivi!uals as free
"ersons an! suFects "ursue their o$n $elfare in their o$n $ay4 choose their
o$n $ay of life4 an! enter into voluntary relations $ith others $ho are li#e$ise
free choosers of their o$n en!s an! activities ?2. N '+5@. Without it4
5)9
ETH&CAL L&:E
$e $oul! have a state Ease! on a "atriarchal or religious "rinci"le or on the
"rinci"le of a more s"iritual ut sim"ler ethical life4 ut al$ays on an original
natural intuition4 $hich cannot $ithstan! the !ivision arising as self;conscious
ecame inGnitely reJecte! into itselfE ?2. N '+(.@. &n 2lato's state4
for instance4 economic life is left entirely in the han!s of the rulers. ,o!ern
in!ivi!uals $oul! e>"erience such an arrangement as a !enial of their human
rights an! a violation of their inner life ?2. NN '+(.4 567.4 575A@. &n this
$ay4 Hegel antici"ates the "erennial critiIue of all forms of state;run or collectiviDe!
economy.
At the same time4 Hegel thin#s that civil society also !etermines the !istinctive
#in!s of social cohesiveness that ma#e it "ossile to unify suFective
"articularity $ith a universal en!. :or one thing4 civil society !etermines the
sha"e of oth the mo!ern family an! the mo!ern "olitical state. Unli#e the
0tamrrty the clan or $i!er #inshi" grou"4 the mo!ern family is not an economic
organiDation.) The family's sole remaining function is to "rovi!e in!ivi!uals
$ith social on!s ase! on the imme!iate feeling of love4 a refuge
from the s"irit of in!ivi!uality4 rational reJection4 an! self;see#ing $hich
characteriDes civil society. Civil society also !etermines the form of the mo!ern
state. As free suFects4 in!ivi!uals can no longer elong to the state $ithout
ecoming conscious of the "ulic usiness an! $anting to "artici"ate in
it. ConseIuently4 the mo!ern state must inclu!e re"resentative institutions.*
Hegel also thin#s the "rinci"le of suFective free!om !etermines the the essentially
monarchical "rinci"le of the mo!ern state. &n the mo!ern $orl!4
$e must see the state's la$s an! "olicies not merely as results of a collective
!ecision;ma#ing "rocess4 ut as the !ecisions of a suFect. Hence the state's
sovereignty must assume the sha"e of an in!ivi!ual human eing.s
Hust as im"ortant4 civil society itself generates its o$n social soli!arity4
$hich eMects the transition from in!ivi!uality to universality. Hegel thin#s
that $ithout the s"ecial form of community engen!ere! y civil society4 it is
not even "ossile for in!ivi!uals to actualiDe their suFective free!om. This
crucial "oint is misse! entirely if $e thin# of civil society only as a mar#et"lace
$here economic agents meet to further their "rivate en!s.
When Hegel o""oses the ten!ency to EatomicityE in mo!ern society ?%2/
()*<*(5A %2.iyC '*)@4 he is not only reFecting the i!ea of society as a !isorganiDe!
aggregate of in!ivi!uals. He is also attac#ing a merely astract conce"tion
of social in!ivi!uals themselves4 as mere non!escri"t units ; as legal
"ersons an! moral suFects4 or as economic calculators4 !esire;satisGers4 an!
resource;!e"loyers ; $hose lives an! in!ivi!ualities receive their content
merely through "rivate choice an! chance an! are not a matter of social concern.
&n a civil society $here "eo"le live out this conce"tion of themselves4
in!ivi!uals $ill never achieve $hat Hegel calls Ee>istenceE or E!eterminate
"articularity.E
Hegel insists that each in!ivi!ual's social "osition must e me!iate!
through that in!ivi!ual's aritrary choice ?2. N '+(@. -ut the o"tions et$een
$hich in!ivi!uals choose must e meaningfulC
5*6
2.O-LE,0 O: ,ODE.N ETH&CAL L&:E
The in!ivi!ual attains actuality only y entering into e>istence4 an! hence into
!eterminate "articularityA he must accor!ingly limit himself e>clusively to one of the
"articular s"heres of nee!. The ethical !is"osition $ithin this system is therefore that
of rectitu!e an! the honor of one's estate4 so that each in!ivi!ual4 y a "rocess of
self!etermination4
ma#es himself a memer of one of the moments of civil society. ?2.
N 56=@
&n or!er to achieve Ee>istenceE in civil society4 in!ivi!uals have to e conscious
of themselves as engage! in activities $hose oFective $orth is recogniDe!
y others. &n or!er to have E!eterminate "articularity4E their activities
must e s"eciGcally recogniDe! as "art of society's ethical life. The in!ivi!ual's
social "osition or estate must e a !eGnite vocation4 "rofession4 or tra!e
?/e$ere@. &n or!er to achieve e>"licitness an! "ulic recogniDaility4 these
tra!es must organiDe themselves4 as cor"orations.O
Cor"orations have several !iMerent ut relate! functions. The memers
of a cor"oration collectively assume res"onsiility to civil society for "erforming
the social tas# of their s"eciGc tra!e or "rofession ?%2.igC 56)@. To
this en!4 the cor"oration is to recruit4 e!ucate4 train4 an! certify its memers
in a""ro"riate numers ?2. N 5(5@. The cor"oration also has res"onsiilities
to its memers. &t Ecomes on the scene li#e a secon! familyE for them ?2. N
5(5@4 "rovi!ing them $ith a sense of i!entity an! honor4 as $ell as an assurance
of economic security in the times of har!shi" that are unavoi!ale in
the life of civil society ?2. N 5()4.@. -ecause memers of a cor"oration have
common interests an! a common ethical !is"osition4 Hegel also sees cor"orations
as the "ro"er avenue for or!inary citiDens' "olitical "artici"ation in the
state ?2. N )''@.=
W *. Hegel's !ilemmaC suFective free!om or ethical
goals
2erha"s the cor"oration's most im"ortant function is to "rovi!e its memers
$ith Eethical goalsE ?%2.igC 567@. Unless an in!ivi!ual elongs to a cor"oration4
Hegel says4 he lac#s the Ehonor of his estateEC
His isolation re!uces him to the selGsh as"ect of his tra!e4 an! his livelihoo! an!
satisfaction lac# staility. He $ill accor!ingly try to gain recognition through the e>ternal
manifestations of success in his tra!e4 an! these are unoun!e!4 ecause it is
im"ossile for him to live in a $ay a""ro"riate to his estate if his estate !oes not e>ist.
?2. N 5().@
Without the ethical integration "rovi!e! y cor"oration memershi"4 the
only i!entity & have in civil society is that of a freelance hustler of $hatever
resources4 s#ills4 or other commo!ities & may have for sale. ,y !estiny is
sim"ly to sell myself4 an! my only as"iration is to !o so at the highest "rice
an! on the most favorale terms. ,y self;$orth in civil society $ill e sim"ly
the mar#et "rice of $hatever it is & have to sell. ConseIuently4 & Gn! myself
in the con!ition Emile Dur#heim !escrie! as Eanomy.E+ -ecause & have no
5*'
ETH&CAL L&:E
!eterminate ethical i!entity4 there are no "ro"er oun!s or measures for my
life4 for either my nee!s or my accom"lishments. ,y life in civil society can
ring no self;satisfaction4 ecause there is no !eterminate self for me to satisfy.
Without ethical goals4 !irecting my activity to the nee!s of others an!
to a larger universal goo!4 & li#e$ise Gn! myself in the con!ition Dur#heim
calle! Eegoism.E9 ,y "artici"ation in civil society is re!uce! to oun!less
in!ivi!ual self;see#ing4 $hich is self;!efeating y its very nature ecause it
can never lea! to ha""iness or self;actualiDation.
Hegel insists that he is not telling the $orl! ho$ it ought to e4 ut only
teaching us ho$ the actual mo!ern state is to e rationally un!erstoo! ?2.
2reface 5(@. 1et Hegel $as generally a "ro"onent of the 0tein an! Har!energ
"olitical reforms4 an! "lainly favore! their continuance in the !irection
of constitutionalism an! re"resentative government. He clearly ha! mi>e!
feelings4 though4 aout some of their economic reforms4 motivate! y the
freeXtra!e !octrines of A!am 0mith an! C. H. 3raus. The e!icts of Novemer
54 '+'6 an! 0e"temer =4 '+'5 aolishe! guil! mono"olies that stoo! in
the $ay of occu"ational free!om an! assure! the livelihoo! of in!ivi!ual
artisans or tra!esmen4 "rotecting them from o"en mar#et com"etition. Hegel
attac#s the Es"irit of atomicityE in mo!ern civil society $hich has rought the
cor"orations to ruin ?%2.'=C '*)@. He insists that he $ants no restoration of
the Emiserale guil! system4E ut on closer ins"ection4 he seems to o""ose
only the "rivileges of guil!s to resist the state's economic controls ?2. N
5((A@.
&n fact4 Hegel's conce"tion of the cor"oration in civil society can e seen
as Iuite ra!ical. 2erha"s it is even Uto"ian4 un$or#ale in the conte>t of a
mar#et economy. No !out in actual mar#et economies some of the functions
Hegel assigns to cor"orations !o sometimes get fulGlle! for some "eo"le ;
y "rofessional organiDations4 cor"orate Grms4 or laor unions. -ut no institution
fulGlls them in the comine! an! systematic $ay a Hegelian cor"oration
is su""ose! to.
This may e no acci!ent. &nsofar as cor"orations assBure a livelihoo! to
in!ivi!ual memers of each tra!e4 to that !egree their con!uct of usiness
an! their fortunes cannot e sensitive to mar#et factors. &f oLcal cor"orations
!etermine $hat tra!es are recogniDe!4 an! even regulate the numers
of "eo"le engage! in various tra!es4 then these matters cannot e vulnerale
to the o"en mar#et. &n a cor"orate civil society4 it $oul! e not the mar#et
ut the state's !ecision to recogniDe various cor"orations that !etermines
$hether "eo"le engage in the "ro!uction of microchi"s or uggy $hi"s.
Hegel $ants to have it oth $aysC a'free mar#et system for the full lossoming
of suFective free!om4 an! a cor"orate organiDation 7f civil society
for ethical e>istence an! !eterminate "articularity. Hegel;;even nee!s toO have
it oth $ays4 since oth suFective free!om an! ethical e>istence are eIually
in!is"ensaleO if the mo!ern self is to actualiDe its free!om through the institution
of civil society. &f Hegel's account of civil society turns out to e Uto"ian4
then "erha"s it is only through an illusion that "eo"le continueO to e;
5*5
2.O-LE,0 O: ,ODE.N ETH&CAL L&:E
lieve that a mar#et;ase! civil society oMers the "ossiility of suFective
free!om.
(. 0ustantiality an! reJection
Civil society is the institution in $hich suFective free!om is to e actualiDe!A
-ut in Hegel's state4 the genuine "artici"ants in civil society are a !istinct
minority of the a!ult "o"ulation. The Euniversal estateE ?of civil servants@
shares in the e!ucate! an! reJective s"irit of civil society4 ut only the EformalE
or Eusiness ?/e$ere@ estate4E the uran ourgeoisie4 lives essentially
through the mar#et system4 an! organiDes itself into cor"orations ?2. NN
56*4 5(6@. Hegel regar!s the rural noility4 an! the "easantry as essentially
unsuite! to the reJective s"irit of civil society. Among them EreJection an!
the $ill of the in!ivi!ual "lay a lesser4 role4 an! its sustantial !is"osition in
general is that of an imme!iate ethical life ase! on family relationshi" an!
on trustE ?2. N 56)@. Hegel "uts it even more luntlyC EThe agricultural
estate is. thus more incline! to suservience4 the usiness estate to free!omE
?<Q<BN 56)A@.
&n Hegel's rational state4 $omen are also e>clu!e! from civil society4 an!
from "ulic life generally. EWoman has her sustantial vocation in the family4
an! her ethical !is"osition consists in this TfamilyU "ietyE ?2. N '77A cf.
N '7*A@4 Though formally $omen are "ersons $ith astract rights ?2. NA
*9.A %2.iyC *=@4 marriage is the mutual surren!er y oth "arties of their
in!e"en!ent "ersonality ?2. NN '7)4 '7=;'7+@. 0ince $omen are restricte!
to the family y their ethical !is"osition4 the rights of "ersonality an! suFective
free!om a""ly to them only in anormal circumstances4 $hen they are
out of their "ro"er element ?as $hen they Gn! themselves in a !ivorce court
or earning an in!e"en!ent living@ ?2iB NN '(+;'(9@. Hegel Gn!s $omen unsuite!
y nature for a rational an! reJective e!ucation4 an! conseIuently for
life in civil society an! the stateC EWomen may $ell e e!ucate!4 ut they
are not ma!e for the higher sciences4 for "hiloso"hy an! certain artistic "roO
!uctions $hich reIuire a universal element. Women ..may have insights ?Einf!lle@4
taste4 an! !elicacy4 ut they !o not "ossess the i!ealE ?2. N '77A@.
Though he recogniDes in!ivi!ual e>ce"tions to this4 Ethese e>ce"tions are not
the ruleEA $hen $omen tres"ass into $hat are "ro"erly male "rovinces4 Ethey
"ut the "rovinces themselves in !angerE ?%2.FC (5(@. EWhen $omen are in
charge of government4 the state is in !angerE ?2. N '77A@.
0uch remar#s are no !out Iuaintly re"ugnant remin!ers of the social
"ractices of Hegel's age an! the "reFu!ices of his class. -ut $e shoul! not
miss the !ee"er motivation ehin! them. Hegel's theory of mo!ern ethical
life is ase! on the i!ea that the mo!ern.s"irit reconciles t$o contrasting
"rinci"les4 $hich might easily e seen as; hostile4 o""ose!4 even incom"atile.
On one si!e is the sustantial "rinci"le oth in the in!ivi!ual character
an! in social life4 $hich sho$s itself in the human character !ominate! y
hait an! feeling4 an! in social institutions em"hasiDing .trust an! tra!ition
5*)
ETH&CAL L&:E
or concrete relationshi"s et$een in!ivi!uals. &ts social center is the family4
an! its cultural e>"ression is chieJy religious. On the other si!e is the mo!ern
reJective "rinci"le4 $hich favors "ersonal insight an! reason4 in the guise
oth of self;intereste! calculation an! of im"artial4 im"ersonal moral thin#ing.
.eJection also "re!ominates in the s"eciGcally mo!ern social institutions4
civil society4 an! the mo!ern "olitical stateA it trium"hs culturally in
the mo!ern $orl! through the sciences of the un!erstan!ing an! through
"hiloso"hical reason.
Hegel's thesis is that s"irit is sustance that ecomes suFectC The sustantial
"rinci"le is s"irit's asis4 $hereas reJection is its essence an! vocation
?2h/h '+A WL7C '9+<()9A E/ N (7*A %/ 5+<5=@. :or Hegel4 the error of the
Enlightenment $as to !ismiss the sustantial an! "lace e>clusive reliance on
reJection4 $hereas the error of Hegel's .omantic contem"oraries $as to restore
the sustantial y attem"ting to revo#e or su""ress reJection. &n o""!sition
to oth4 Hegel thin#s that the mo!ern s"irit can e actualiDe!4 in!ivi!ually
an! socially4 only through the reconciliation of oth "rinci"les.
Hegel's theory of this reconciliation is foun!e! on his i!ea that a !evelo"e!
ethical or!er must e Earticulate!E ?geglie!ert@ ; an organism com"ose! of
!iMerentiate! social institutions $ith com"lementary functions. ?/enerally
s"ea#ing4 the sustantial "rinci"le has its "lace in "rivate family life4 $hereas
the reJective "rinci"le "re!ominates in the "ulic !omains of civil society
an! the "olitical state.@ Ne>t4 Hegel hol!s that !iMerentiate! institutions reIuire
a social !iMerentiation among in!ivi!uals. Each "rinci"le must have its
"ro"er re"resentatives an! guar!ians. Hence even in the ethical or!er $hose
!istinctive "rinci"le is suFective free!om4 there $ill e many $hose character
an! life;style !o not e>em"lify that "rinci"le.
7. ,an an! $oman
:or Hegel these consi!erations legitimate the agricultural estate's Einclination
to suservience4E as $ell as the e>clusion of $omen from Ethe universal
element.E Our in!ignation at Hegel's con!escen!ing o"inion of $omen's intellectual
ailities may "revent us from seeing that this is not his asic reason
for hol!ing that $omen's vocation is "ro"erly restricte! to family life. On
the contrary4 he insists that the natural !iMerences et$een the se>es are
foun!e! in reason4 an! that is $hat gives them Ean intellectual an! ethical
signiGcanceE ?2. N '7(@. &n other $or!s4 Hegel conten!s that there are
soun! ethical reasons $hy $omen shoul! !evote themselves e>clusively to
the family4 an! this ma#es sense of $hatever natural "roclivities an! limitations
$e Gn! in them that "oint in this !irection.
Hegel's theory is that the t$o se>es re"resent the contrasting "rinci"les of
ethical sustantiality an! suFective reJection. The female is Es"irituality
that maintains itself in unity as #no$le!ge an! volition of the sustantial in
the form of concrete in!ivi!uality an! feeling<9 $hereas the male is Es"irituality
that !ivi!es itself u" into "ersonal self;suLciency $ith eing for itself
an! the #no$le!ge an! volition of free universality4 i.e.4 into the self;con;
5**
2.O-LE,0 O: ,ODE.N ETH&CAL L&:E
sciousness of conce"tual thought an! the volition of the oFective an! ultimate
en!E ?2. N '77@. Hegel's vie$ of the se>es is un!enialy tra!itional4
ut not as one;si!e! as it might a""ear from the remar#s & have thus far
Iuote!. He thin#s that men are naturally su"erior to $omen in the reJective
ailities nee!e! for Elife in the state4 in science4 an! struggle $ith the e>ternal
$orl! an! $ith himself.E The other si!e of this vie$ is that $omen are naturally
su"erior in the Iualities that foster Ea suFective ethical life of feelingE
?2. N '77@.
&n other $or!s4 men are etter at gras"ing astract ethical "rinci"les4 ut
$omen are more "erce"tive aout "articular ethical relationshi"s an! etter
at res"on!ing emotionally to them. The $oman Eor!ers things accor!ing to
her feelings4 an! thus governs Tthe familyU in a genuine sense4 !eriving $hat
shoul! ha""en from her in!ivi!ualityE ?%2.FC ()6;()'@. &t shoul! not e
forgotten that the feminine i!eal for Hegel is Antigone's heroic !efense of
!ivine la$ an! family oligationC EAntigone is the most eautiful !escri"tion
of femininityA she hol!s fast to the on! of the family against the Tstate'sU
la$E ?%2. 'C )6'A cf. 2. N '77.A ,& *7*;*7+4 *=);*=(A %A5C 76<5'(4 F C
((6<*C)i+@. This is har!ly a vision of $oman as generally stu"i!4 sumissive4
$ea#4 or inca"ale. &t even has something in common $ith some contem"orary
feminist theories4 such as those of Nancy Cho!oro$ an! Carol /illigan4
$hich em"hasiDe $omen's !istinctive moral ca"acities an! vie$"oint.'6
The main "rolem $ith Hegel's theory is its attem"t to comine three
i!eas that !on't go $ell togetherC
'. The reconciliation of the sustantive an! reJective "rinci"les reIuires a
!iMerentiation of social roles4 conGning $omen to the s"here of family
life.
5. The "rinci"le of the mo!ern $orl! is suFective free!omA for mo!ern in!ivi!uals
self;actualiDation involves the actualiDation of "ersonhoo! an! suFectivity
through civil society.
). Christianity has taught us that all in!ivi!uals are eIually "ersons an! suFects.
2oints ?'@ an! ?5@ create a "rolem ecause they assign a role to $omen
that is socially necessary4 yet !evalue! ecause it !oes not re"resent the "rinci"le
given "riority in the mo!ern ethical or!er. 2oints ?'@ an! ?)@ conJict
to the e>tent that the e>clusion of $omen from "ulic life is e>"erience! as
a !enial of their "ersonhoo! an! suFectivity. 2oints ?5@ an! ?)@ create a
!iLculty ecause they ten! to turn everyone into a guar!ian of the reJective
"rinci"le4 leaving the sustantive "rinci"le un!erem"hasiDe! in social life.
Hegel's rational state4 in eMect4 grants suFective free!om only to the male
ourgeoisie4 at the e>"ense of $omen an! the rural "o"ulation. Hegel thin#s
that this is acce"tale ecause the sustantial !is"osition of the feminine "ersonality
an! the naturally servile inclination of the "easantry guarantee that
$omen an! "easants $ill not miss the suFective free!om of $hich they are
!e"rive!. We no$ #no$ Hegel $as seriously mista#en aout this. Once you
grant "oints ?5@ an! ?)@4 those $ho !o not enFoy the status of "erson an!
5*(
ETH&CAL L&:E
suFect to the fullest e>tent $ill inevitaly see themselves as o""resse! an!
!egra!e! y their social role.
Hegel's main "rolem4 ho$ever4 is ho$ to reconcile the sustantive an!
reJective "rinci"les. That "rolem $ill not e solve! y turning everyone
into a re"resentative of the reJective "rinci"le. Hegel's critiIue of the moral
stan!"oint is an attac# on the i!ea that ethics can e foun!e! on astract
"rinci"les of autonomy. His theory of ethical life4 li#e the feminist theories
Fust mentione!4 em"hasiDes the foun!ation of the ethical in feelings4 !is"ositions4
an! "ersonal relationshi"s. His theory !oes give "riority to the masculine
"rinci"le of reJection4 ut it also recogniDes the in!is"ensaility of the
feminine or sustantive "rinci"le.
The "rolem has not gone a$ay. ,o!ern civil society nee!s to a!mit
$omen to full memershi"4 ut it also fears !oing so. &t is !ee"ly torn over
$hether oLcially to accor! $omen the status of "ersons $ith eIual rights
un!er the la$4 an! there is terrile moral ferocity ehin! the "ro"osition
that $omen's natural re"ro!uctive vocation must "lace limits on their Furis!iction
over the life "rocesses going on $ithin their o$n o!ies. ,o!ern
society is "olariDe! y the fact that there is a contra!iction in the i!ea of a
$oman $ho is a full an! free memer of civil society.
One attractive $ay out of Hegel's "rolem might e to reFect his i!ea that
the sustantive an! reJective "rinci"les shoul! e assigne! each to one gen!er.
&nstea!4 it might e "ro"ose! that $e integrate oth "rinci"les $ithin
each human "ersonality. On this vie$4 every human eing shoul! e a $hole4
an! in!ivi!uals $oul! relate to one another as eIuals fully an! concretely4
$ithin all ethical relationshi"s.
Hegel never consi!ers this o"tion. He sho$s no sym"athy for the vie$s of
his .omantic contem"oraries 3arl Lu!$ig von Haller an! A!am ,iiller4
$ho thin# that the "rinci"le of social hierarchy ; "ara!igmatically4 the "rinci"le
of "atriarchy ; is intrinsically right an! goo!4 legislate! to us y nature
or /o!. -ut neither !oes Hegel see anything inherently a! ?as long as the
formal eIuality of "ersons is maintaine!@ aout ethical relations involving
relations of "o$er an! "ersonal authority. One !evelo"ment in mo!ern ethical
life since his time is that such relations are increasingly regar!e! as unacce"tale4
or at least un!esirale.
The im"lications of this solution4 ho$ever4 may e more ra!ical than $e
$oul! li#e to realiDe. Hegel's remar#s aout the allege! natural inca"acities
of the female se> are easy to !eri!e4 an! it is easy to agree $ith the "latitu!es
that men shoul! e more sensitive4 $omen more self;conG!ent. -ut $e have
never really seen $hat human "ersonalities $oul! e li#e if they $ere not
socialiDe! through the tra!itional system of gen!er stereoty"es. We !o not
#no$ $hat rolegen!er !iMerences might "lay in "ersonalities alancing the
sustantial "rinci"le $ith the reJective. ,oreover4 the mo!ern social or!er
as it actually e>ists is not one in $hich such "ersonalities coul! !evelo" or
thrive. &t is un!erstan!ale4 if not a!mirale4 that many fear the un#no$n
"ath to ne$ "ossiilities more than the "resent contra!ictions they arec living.
5*7
2.O-LE,0 O: ,ODE.N ETH&CAL L&:E
=. 2overty in civil society
Hegel regar!s the !e facto e>clusion of oth $omen an! the "easantry from
!irect "artici"ation in civil4 society as FustiGe! y their social "osition an!
ethical !is"osition. -ut he recogniDes that mo!ern civil society eMectively
e>clu!es many others in a $ay that cannot e so FustiGe!. &n civil society4
Hegel argues4 the accumulation of $ealth is facilitate! y the EuniversaliDationE
oth of human nee!s an! of the means of their satisfaction ?in other
$or!s4 y mass "ro!uction an! mar#eting@. ,ass "ro!uction lea!s to the
Ein!ivi!ualiDation an! limitation'' of !etail laor4 $hich "ro!uces the greatest
"roGts "recisely ecause it is uns#ille!4 an! so can comman! only a lo$
$age. As a conseIuence4 many "eo"le fall into a con!ition of E!e"en!ence
an! $antE ?2. N 5*)@.
Along $ith its in!ustry4 moreover4 civil society is also constantly e>"an!ing
its "o"ulation ?2. N 5*)@. ,uch of this increase4 es"ecially in uran
centers4 consists of in!ivi!uals $ith fe$ resources or salale s#ills. The !is"lacement
of the $i!er #inshi" grou" y the nuclear family leaves these
in!ivi!uals $ithout any "rotection against the contingencies of the mar#et
system ?2. N 5*'@. They can comman! only the lo$est $ages4 an! they live
$ith the constant threat of unem"loyment. The $ealth in civil society ten!s
to accumulate in a fe$ han!s ?2. N 5**@4 an! in the han!s of those $ho
eneGt most from the e>istence of "overtyC EWhen there is great "overtyA
the ca"italist Gn!s many "eo"le $ho $or# for small $ages4 $hich increases
his earningsA an! this has the further conseIuences that smaller ca"italists
fall into "overtyE ?%2.*C 7'6@. 2overty is not an acci!ent4 a misfortune or
the result of human error or vice. .ather4 Ethe com"lications of civil society
itself "ro!uce "overtyE ?%2.'=C ')+A cf. 2. N 5*)A %2. *C 76(A %2.igC
'9*@.
What is to e !one aout "overty in civil societyB &n a society $here there
is $i!es"rea! "overty4 there is al$ays am"le sco"e for "rivate morality to
engage in $or#s of charity. -ut Hegel regar!s moral charity as no real reme!y
at all. -y their very nature as $ell as in their eMects4 moral acts of charity
are contingent an! cannot e counte! u"on ?2. N 5*5@. Charity ten!s to
humiliate its reci"ients4 to un!ermine their self;res"ect ?2iB N 5().@. Thus
charity even aggravates the fun!amental ethical "rolem "ose! y "overty4
since it violates the asic "rinci"le of civil society that in!ivi!uals shoul!
come y a !ecent livelihoo! through their o$n $or#. Hegel thin#s that civil
society as a $hole4 through the "ulic authority of the state4.must Een!eavor
to ma#e T"rivate charityU less necessary y i!entifyingO universal as"ects of
$ant an! ta#ing ste"s to reme!y themE ?2. N 5*5@.
This is all the more necessary since in Hegel's vie$ civil society al$ays
remains a society4 a Euniversal familyE ?2. N 5)9@ that e>ists for the "ur"ose
of satisfying the nee!s of its memers4 inclu!ing their nee! for free!om an!
self;actualiDation. Each memer of civil society has a !uty to $or# for it4 ut
also a right to a self;fulGlling livelihoo! earne! through laor. &t is the state's
5*=
ETH&CAL L&:E
res"onsiility to "rotect that right4 a res"onsiility elonging to the state's
E"oliceE'' "o$er ?2. N 5)+4AA %2.*C 769@.
At the same time4 Hegel a!mits that he !oes not see ho$ this res"onsiility
is to e fulGlle! $ithout contra!icting the asic "rinci"les of civil society
itself. On the one han!4 the state might "rovi!e the "oor !irectly $ith the
necessities of life4 "erha"s through ta>es levie! on the rich. That $oul! contra!ict
the "rinci"le of civil society that all are to earn their o$n livelihoo!
y their o$n laor. On the other han!4 the state might "rovi!e the "oor $ith
the o""ortunity to $or#. -ut the original "rolem that create! $i!es"rea!
"overty $as that there $as an e>cess of goo!s an! services in relation to
eMective !eman!4 an! the state's s"onsorshi" of more laor $ill only e>acerate
that situation. EThis sho$s that !es"ite an e>cess of $ealth4 civil society
is not $ealthy enough ; i.e.4 its o$n !istinct resources are not suLcient to
"revent an e>cess of "overty an! the formation of a raleE ?2. N 5*(@.
Hegel's reJections on the "rolem of "overty conclu!e $ith a virtual counsel
of !es"airC &n Englan!4 he says4 it has een foun! that the est $ay of !ealing
$ith "overty is sim"ly Eto leave the "oor to their fate an! !irect them to eg
from the "ulicE ?2. N 5*(.A cf. %2.*C 7'5@.
+. Does Hegel have an ans$erB
&t is easy to un!erstan! $hy Hegel says that Ethe im"ortant Iuestion of ho$
"overty can e reme!ie! is one that es"ecially agitates an! torments mo!ern
societiesE ?2. N 5**A@. -ut Hegel never share! the o"timistic o"inion of his
frien! an! follo$er E!uar! /ans4 $ho thought that ecause the e>istence of
an im"overishe! class Eis only a fact4 not something right4 it must e "ossile
to get to the asis of this fact an! aolish it.E'5 Hegel "lainly regar!s the est
measures against "overty availale to the state as mere "alliatives4 an Een!less
"rogressE that $ill never attain to a EGnal solution.E ) Hegel !iscusses the
colonial e>"ort of civil society's sur"lus "o"ulation4 ut only as an eMect of
"overty4 not as a cure for it ?2. NN 5*7;5*=@.
Ho$ is the "rolem of "overty relate! to Hegel's larger "roFect of "resenting
the mo!ern state as the actuality of reason an! the oFectiGcation of free!omB
0hlomo Avineri regar!s Hegel's !iscussion of "overty as a stri#ing
anomaly in his system ; sim"ly a "rolem to $hich the system oMers no
solution ; a victory of Hegel's farsighte!ness an! honesty as a social analyst
over his Deal an! ingenuity as a s"eculative system;uil!er an! theo!icist.'*
Against this4 it is sometimes suggeste! that it is "recisely such insolule
"rolems that !rive Hegel's !ialectical system of categories. Astract right4
en!ing $ith $rong ?2. N +'@4 "asses over into morality4 $hich en!s $ith
evil an! hy"ocrisy ?2. NN ')9;'*6@A Hegel's treatment of the family en!s
$ith its !issolution as its memers ta#e their "lace in civil society ?2. N '+'@.
Li#e$ise4 accor!ing to 3laus Hartmann's version of the suggestion4 Hegel's
EesotericE ans$er to the "rolem of "overty in civil society is Ethat there
must e a higher categorial structure4 a structure $ith a more aLrmative
relationshi" of the many to one another than otains in the antagonisms ty"i;
5*+
2.O-LE,0 O: ,ODE.N ETH&CAL L&:E
cal of civil society.E This structure is the state4 in $hich society for the Grst
time ecomes Etruly universal.E'(
Even the state4 ho$ever4 is a limite! an! Gnite realm4 as $e see from its
inevitale involvement in $ar ?2. N )5*4.@4 an! every state is !oome! to
succum to the transitoriness of its "rinci"le in $orl! history ?2. N )*=@.
Thus it is never in the Gnite an! tem"oral realm of the "ractical that sour
reason can Gn! satisfaction4 ut only in the higher realms of asolute s"irit.
This vie$ in eMect locates Hegel's real ans$er to the "rolem of "overty
in his s"eculative theo!icy4 $hich "rovi!es the groun!s for "hiloso"hical
resignation in the face of the contingency an! im"erfection of everything
Gnite.'7
0uch ti!y resolutions of the "rolem of "overty certainly are Eesoteric4E in
the sense that they are never foun! any$here in Hegel's o$n !iscussions of
that "rolem. Hegel never !escries "overty as an inherent limitation of a
Gnite s"here $ithin his system. His !iscussion of "overty !oes not conclu!e
his treatment of civil society4 as $rong conclu!es the treatment of right4 or
evil the treatment of morality. &nstea!4 "overty arises in connection $ith the
state's "olice "o$er4 $hich is charge! $ith the tas# of !ealing $ith "overty4
ut turns out to e necessarily inca"ale of fulGlling its res"onsiilities. Hegel's
treatment of civil society actually en!s $ith his !iscussion of cor"orations4
an! he e>"licitly i!entiGes the limit of the s"here of civil society as the
restricte! an! Gnite character of the cor"oration's en!s4 $hich must therefore
"ass over into the universal en!s of the state ?2. N 5(7@.
As $e sa$ earlier ?Cha"ter ')4 N '@4 Hegel thin#s that "hiloso"hy can
!emonstrate that all tem"oral e>istence is suFect to !efects an! acci!ents4
an! therefore the $ise !o not e>"ect "erfection of anything in this $orl!. All
things human are marre! y contingency4 "articularly the contingency of the
Gnite $ill4 $ith its irrationality4 ca"rice4 an! $ic#e!ness. A""eal to these
consi!erations is an im"ortant "art of Hegel's rational theo!icy of the state.
The actual state is rational4 ut the e>isting state is never $holly actual ?see
&ntro!uction4 N (@. &t is al$ays to some !egree marre! y the error an! miscon!uct
of those in!ivi!uals $ho are in charge of "ulic aMairs ?2. N 5(+A@.
This theme in Hegel's "hiloso"hy "rovi!es no solution to the "rolem of
"overty4 ecause "overty in civil society is no acci!ent. &t is not a result of
contingent im"erfections that efall a rational system $hen it achieves out$ar!
e>istence4 or of the aritrary $ill of in!ivi!uals. 2art of the evil of
"overty is that it suFects "eo"le's lives to contingency4 ut "overty is not
itself a contingent feature of civil society. On the contraryC c]The emergence
of "overty is in general a conseIuence of civil society an! on the $hole arises
necessarily out of itE ?%2.igC '9)@. ,oreover4 it is the asic "rinci"les of
civil society itself that stan! in the $ay of the state's attem"ts to "revent
"overty or reme!y it ?2. N 5*(@.
There is a very hollo$ ring to Hartmann's suggestion that the "rolem of
"overty is solve! $hen Hegel's system moves on to the EuniversalE community
of the state. 2art of $hat $orries Hegel aout "overty is the fact that
the "oor are systematically e>clu!e! from the eneGts of social life. They
5*9
ETH&CAL L&:E
have no "artici"ation in the state4 ho$ever in!irect. The state's "olice "o$er
ears the res"onsiility for !ealing $ith their !istress4 ut it necessarily fails.
A""eals to rational theo!icy are un"ersuasive for similar reasons. The "oor
are sai! to e e>clu!e! es"ecially from the s"iritual eneGts of mo!ern society
; from the e!ucation necessary to a""reciate art an! "hiloso"hy4 even
from the consolation of religion ?2. NN 5*'4 5*)A %2.'=C ')+A %2.igC
%2.*C 767@. Hegel is no frien!4 in any case4 to those $ho regar! religious
consolations as an a""ro"riate res"onse to social evilsC E&f the "ro"osition
Tthat the state nee!s religion as its foun!ationU means that in!ivi!uals must
have religion in or!er that their fettere! s"irit can e more eMectively o""resse!
$ithin the state4 then the meaning is a a! oneE ?2. N 5=6A@A it is
sim"ly Ea moc#ery to !ismiss resentment to$ar!s tyranny y !eclaring that
the o""resse! shoul! Gn! consolation in religionE ?2. N 5=6.@.
Closer to the mar# is Hohn ,cCumer's suggestion that Hegel's $ritings
contain a EcovertE ut Era!ical an! systematic in!ictment of the state.E'=
Closer4 ut still not very close. Hegel never set himself to argue against the
thesis that the mo!ern state is a fun!amentally rational system. On the contrary4
that is his o$n most fun!amental thesis aout the state. The most
reasonale vie$4 & thin#4 is either Avineri's ; that "overty is sim"ly an unsolve!
"rolem for Hegel's system ; or else a mo!iGe! version of ,cCumer's4
$hich says that Hegel's theory of "overty in mo!ern civil society might
su""ort an in!ictment against it4 ut not one that Hegel $as ever incline! to
!ra$ u". &n N '64 $e $ill loo# at a $ay$ar! stran! in Hegel's thought $here
this "ossiility is "ursue! to the furthest e>tent.
This leaves Hegel's "osition messy4 maye inconsistent. -ut it is not an
im"lausile inter"retation. Even no$4 a"ologists for mo!ern ca"italism
sometimes realiDe that "overty is an unavoi!ale feature of the system ut
!o not relinIuish their asic loyalty to it on that account. &f intelligent "eo"le
can still ta#e this "osition even in the late t$entieth century4 then surely it
must have een "ossile for Hegel to ta#e it in the '+56s4 $ithout the a!!itional
'=6 years of ca"italism staring him in the face.
9. The rale mentality
Des"ite massive changes in technology4 economics4 an! the sociology of "overty
since Hegel's !ay4 most of his oservations aout "overty in civil society
are still a""licale. When Hegel $rote that Efor "eo"le $ho have money an!
#ee" to the main high$ay4 the $orl! is in goo! sha"e4E he $as on a visit to
the Lo$ Countries in '+55 ?- 5C *))<(9*@A ut he coul! have een !escriing
any Jourishing ca"italist society that is enFoying the u"si!e of its tra!e cycle.
Hegel's treatment of "overty in civil society is characteristically har!hea!e!.
He $astes little "ity on the suMerings of the "oor4 an! !oes not "lace
moral lame for their con!ition on them4 or on anyone else. &nstea!4 he
!evotes his min! $ith remorseless honesty to consi!ering the causes of "overty4
its conseIuences4 an! its ethical signiGcance. &t is also characteristic
that Hegel's !ee"est reJections have to !o $ith "overty's s"iritual eMects on
5(6
2.O-LE,0 O: ,ODE.N ETH&CAL L&:E
"eo"le ; its im"act on their self;un!erstan!ing4 an! their relation to the social
institutions an! ethical norms that structure their lives. Hegel $as unfamiliar
$ith $i!es"rea! !rug;!e"en!ency an! other self;!estructive life;styles
often associate! $ith "overty4 nor $as "overty as he #ne$ it reinforce! y
the eMects of racism. -ut his analysis of the Weltanschauung that "overty
"ro!uces in those suFect to it still has much to say to us.
When the "oor form a concentrate! mass4 as they !o in cities4 Hegel calls
them the EraleE ?2oel@ an! he gives the name Erale mentalityE ?2oelhaftig#eit@
to the characteristic attitu!e of min! that !evelo"s among them.
Hegel !escries the rale as a EclassE rather than an EestateE ?2. NN 5*)4
5*(4A@. Estates rest on Econcrete !istinctionsE et$een functionally !iMerent
an! com"lementary social "ositions or roles. Class !istinctions rest on mere
EineIualitiesE of irth4 $ealth4 e!ucation4 social status4 an! self;valuation
?N2 7)@. The rale is a class !ra$n from those $hose $ealth4 e!ucation4
an! s#ills are minimal4 an! therefore have either a marginal "lace in civil
society or none at all. Though they are "ro!ucts of civil society4 the rale
are Emore or less !e"rive! of all the a!vantages of societyE ?2. N 5*'@4 an!
unale Eto enFoy the $i!er free!oms of civil society4 "articularly its s"iritual
a!vantagesE ?2. N 5*)@. Lac#ing in economically valuale s#ills or general
e!ucation ?%2. *C 767@4 they also lac# the economic means to "reserve their
"hysical health ?%2.'9C '9(@4 to "rotect their rights as "ersons in the formal
legal system of civil society ?%2. *C 767@4 or to share fully in its culture or
its religion ?%2.'9C '9(A 2. N 5*'@.
This lea!s to a !ee"er se"aration of the "oor from civil society4 one of
Emin!E or EemotionE ?/emut@C The "oor see themselves simultaneously as
human eings an! as eings !e"rive! of humanity4 as eings $hose humanity
is constantly violate! an! !egra!e! y the very society from $hich they
!erive the "rinci"le that it shoul! e recogniDe! an! res"ecte!. They res"on!
to this treatment $ith an in!ignation that is !ra$n !irectly from the
ethical "rinci"les of mo!ern society4 ut is also !irecte! ac# against these
"rinci"lesC EThe "oor man feels himself e>clu!e! an! moc#e! y everyone4
an! this necessarily gives rise to an inner in!ignation. He is conscious of
himself as an inGnite4 free eing4 an! thus arises the !eman! that his e>ternal
e>istence shoul! corres"on! to this consciousnessE ?%2.'9C '9(@. &t is aove
all this in!ignation4 orn of a sense of e>clusion from society4 that turns the
"oor into a EraleEC E2overty in itself !oes not re!uce "eo"le to a raleA a
rale is create! only y the !is"osition associate! $ith "overty4 y in$ar!
reellion against the rich4 against society4 against the government4 etc.E ?2.
N 5**A@.
The "oor !o not suMer merely a contingent !enial of certain rights4 $hich
might leave intact the suFect's !ignity an! $ill to !efen! them. 2overty
!estroys the sense of self $hich is the necessary vehicle of moral self;consciousness
an! the ethical attitu!e in mo!ern in!ivi!uals. &f the "oor retain
the sense that they are inGnite an! free eings $ith rights4 this remains
merely an astract notion4 $hich never reaches as far as the aLrmation of a
concrete life of !uties !one $ith self;satisfaction. &t sustains envy4 in!igna;
5('
ETH&CAL L&:E
tion4 an! hatre! against those $ho seem to enFoy the humanity of $hich they
are !e"rive!4 ut not a sense of honor4 !ignity4 or res"ect for their o$n
$orth. The rale mentality is therefore a con!ition of ethical vice an! moral
!egra!ationC E2overty is a con!ition in civil society that is on every si!e unha""y
an! forsa#en. &t is not only e>ternal !istress that ur!ens the "oor4
ut this is also accom"anie! y a moral !egra!ationE ?%2.igC '9*@. ,oral
vices !o not cause "overty4 ut they are cause! y it.
&t is the loss of Eself;feelingE that turns Eingenuous "overtyE ?unefangene
Armut@ into the rale mentalityC
When in!ivi!uals have not "rogresse! to a self;consciousness of their right4 then
they remain in ingenuous "overty. -ut then this ingenuous "overty "rogresses at
least as far as the con!ition of the i!le an! unem"loye!4 $ho are in the hait of Fust
loaGng aroun!. With that4 the mo!iGcations of self;feeling are totally lost. &n the "oor
there arises an envy an! hatre! against all those $ho have something. ?%2.igC '9(;
'97@
When the "oor lose Ethe feeling of right4 of the integrity an! honor of susisting
through one's o$n activity an! $or#E ?2. N 5**@4 they ecome laDy4 an!
their sense of right !egenerates into the !eman! that civil society shoul!
"rovi!e a living for themC EHere is laDiness an! at the same time the consciousness
of a right to Gn! susistence in civil society. . . . The rale is
the gree!iest after its rights4 al$ays hammering a$ay at civil society's oligation
to maintain itE ?%2. *C 769@. The fun!amental "rinci"le of civil society4
that each in!ivi!ual shoul! e self;!e"en!ent an! live through their o$n
$or#4 has no$ turne! into its o""ositeC The only right remaining to the
rale is the right to live y the $or# of others.
&n the rale mentality4 the very conce"ts of right an! free "ersonhoo!
themselves are "ut in Feo"ar!y. Living un!er con!itions of "overty4 & e>"erience
in myself that the i!eas of free!om4 "ersonhoo!4 an! right are a mere
sham ; em"ty notions lac#ing any real e>istence. 0ince & !o not e>"erience
my recognition y others as a free "erson4 & cease in turn to recogniDe the
"ersonhoo! of anyone elseC E0elf;consciousness a""ears !riven to the "oint
$here it no longer has any rightsA free!om has no e>istence. TConseIuently4U
the recognition of universal free!om !isa""ears. :rom this con!ition arises
that shamelessness that $e Gn! in the raleE ?%2.igC '9(@. The rale
mentality concerns Hegel ecause for him the rale is in one res"ect at least
$hat the "roletariat $as later to e for ,ar>4 Ea class in civil society that is
not of civil society.E The rale live ami! civil society4 ut they are systematically
!e"rive! of the rights "ertaining to its memers4 an! conseIuently of
their !uties as $ellC EThe rale is a !angerous TsocialU ill4 ecause they have
neither rights nor !utiesE ?%2. < C )55@.
Though the rale mentality is an eMect of "overty4 Hegel realiDes that it
can also Gn! its $ay into other classes of civil society4 most es"ecially the
richC EThe rale is !istinct from "overtyA usually it is "oor4 ut there are
also rich raleE ?%2. *C 76+@. The !egra!e! con!ition of the "oor "uts
them at the rich man's !is"osal. This teaches him as $ell as them that in
5(5
2.O-LE,0 O: ,ODE.N ETH&CAL L&:E
civil society there is no such thing as human !ignity eyon! "rice4 that no
one's universal human rights mean anything $hen the "articular $ill to violate
them has enough $ealth at its !is"osal.
The rale !is"osition arises also $ith the rich. The rich man thin#s that everything
can e ought4 ecause he #no$s himself as the might of the "articularity of
self;consciousness. Hence $ealth can lea! to the same moc#ery an! shamelessness
that $e Gn! among the rale. The !is"osition of the master over the slave is the
same as that of the slave. ?%2.igC '97@
'6. The class $ith neither rights nor !uties
Hegel !oes not a""rove of the rale mentality. &n his vocaulary4 2oel is
al$ays an e"ithet of ause. -ut he agrees that the memers of civil society
have a !uty to $or# for it only to the e>tent that they have against it a right
to an e!ucation an! social "osition enaling them to Gn! an honorale an!
self;fulGlling livelihoo! through their $or# ?2. NN 5)94 5)+4A@. Thus the
con!ition of the "oor in civil society is not merely sa! or regrettale4 it is a
systematic $rong or inFusticeC EAgainst nature no one can assert a right4 ut
$ithin the con!itions of society har!shi" at once assumes the form of a $rong
inJicte! on this or that classE ?2. N 5**A@.
Hegel grants e>"licitly that the rale have the rights on $hich their in!ignation
is ase!. He further a!mits that civil society violates those rights to
such an e>tent that the "oor are !e"rive! of their "ersonhoo!. ConseIuently4
he regar!s the in!ignation that !rives the rale mentality as Iuite FustiGe!.
When the rale regar! their "overty as a $rong or inFustice4 they are entirely
correctC
The Trale'sU !is"osition is foun!e! on the fact that everyone has the right to Gn!
his susistenceA insofar as he !oes not Gn! it he is "oor4 ut ecause he has the right
to susistence his "overty ecomes a $rong ?Unrecht@4 an oMense against right4 an!
this "ro!uces a !issatisfaction $hich simultaneously assumes the form of right. ?%2.
*C 769@
&n another "assage4 Hegel s"ea#s of the rale mentality as the result of
generaliDing4 a""arently $ith FustiGcation4 the Eright of necessityE $hich
ta#es "riority over the astract right of "ersons ?2. NN '5=;'5+A see Cha"ter
(4 N (@. The right of necessity is usually su""ose! to a""ly only un!er e>traor!inary
con!itions of momentary !anger or !istress. -ut $hen you are
"oor4 the right of necessity ceases to a""ly only in e>ce"tional moments4
ecause your $hole life goes on eneath the minimum level recogniDe! as
necessary for a memer of civil society ?2. N 5**@. ConseIuently4 the right
of necessity comes to a""ly universallyA necessity overri!es everyone's rights4
no one any longer has rights. &n this $ay4 the rale mentality turns into a
criminal mentality4 for $hich any violation of right is FustiGe!. &f crimes are
sometimes "unishe!4 this no longer has any ethical meaning for the rale4
ut ecomes merely a "iece of a! luc#4 another contingency to $hich the
life of "overty is e>"ose!.
5()
ETH&CAL L&:E
Earlier $e consi!ere! the right of necessity as referring to a momentary nee!. T&n the
case of "overty4 ho$ever4U necessity no longer has this merely momentary character. &n
the emergence of "overty4 the might of the "articular against the reality of free!om
comes into e>istence. This "ro!uces the inGnite Fu!gment of the criminal. Crime can of
course e "unishe!4 ut this "unishment is contingent. . . . 0o on "overty rests the rale
mentality ?2oelhaftig#eit@4 the nonrecognition of right. ?%2.<"C '97@
As Hegel "resents it4 the rale mentality involves a #in! of argument.
The "remises of the argument are !ra$n from norms of mo!ern ethical life
an! facts aout the actual status to $hich mo!ern society consigns the "oor4
an! the conclusion is that at least for the "oor4 there is no vali!ity to the
$hole i!ea of "ersonal right. &n one version4 the argument rings together
the ethical i!ea that all human eings are eIually "ersons $ith rights an! the
rutal fact that civil society necessarily generates a class of "oor4 in $hom
Eself;consciousness no longer has any rights4 free!om has no e>istence.E The
conclusion is that the entire i!ea of "ersons an! their rights is a sham4 Ethe
recognition of universal free!om !isa""earsE ?%2.ig C '9(@. &n another version4
the argument rests on the i!ea that "eo"le in a con!ition of !istress or
necessity ?Not@ have a Eright of necessityE $hich overri!es the astract right
of "ersons.'+ &t comines this $ith the oservation that civil society consigns
$hole classes of "eo"le systematically an! "ermanently to the con!ition of
!istress. :rom this it follo$s that the astract right of others in general has
no claim to their recognition.
These are soun! arguments4 though some of their "remises may e controversial.
0ome might not agree that "overty is systematically "ro!uce! y the
$or#ings of civil society ?2. NN 5*);5*(@4 treating it instea! as the "ro!uct
of social factors e>traneous to the mar#et system as such4 or else of a! luc#
or human error or $ic#e!ness. Hegel ac#no$le!ges that "overty can e a
result of a! luc# or of in!ivi!ual failings an! im"rovi!ence4 ut maintains
that civil society has oth the right an! the res"onsiility to com"ensate for
such factors an! "rotect in!ivi!uals against them ?2. NN 5)9;5*6@. &t might
also e !is"ute! $hether all memers of civil society have a right to a satisfactory
livelihoo! through their o$n $or#. &n some "laces4 Hegel seems to hol!
that to e a "erson $ith astract right4 the only reIuirement is that one o$ns
some "ro"erty ?2. N *94A@. -ut later he claims a roa!er conce"tion of a
"erson's right4 on the groun! that civil society is not merely a natural or!er
arising contingently out of the free acts of in!ivi!uals4 ut a genuine society
$ith a Eform of universalityE ?2. N '+5@ $hich can !eman! "artici"ation y
its memers ecause4 li#e a Euniversal family4E it un!erta#es to "rovi!e to
their $elfare ?2. NN 5)+A4 5)9@.
''. Ethical self;!estruction
/iven Hegel's "remises4 the conclusion follo$s that for the "oorQ there are
neither rights nor !uties ?%2. < C )55@. At least these conclusions follo$
$ithin the conte>t of Hegelian ethical theory. There4 ethical !uties an! rights
are closely oun! u" $ith actual social "ractices. &f there are to e vali!
5(*
2.O-LE,0 O: ,ODE.N ETH&CAL L&:E
rights an! !uties4 then the "ractices must succee!4 at least $ithin the limits
of the contingency an! im"erfection aficting everything Gnite4 in actualiDing
the s"iritual "rinci"les they e>"ress. When a social or!er systematically
fails to actualiDe its o$n ethical "rinci"les4 that amounts to the self;!estruction
of those "rinci"les.
The main "ur"ose of Hegel's theory is to e>hiit the rationality of the
ethical or!er. 2lainly4 the line of thin#ing Hegel "ursues in his analysis of
the rale mentality !oes not cohere $ell $ith that "ur"ose4 ecause it lea!s
to the conclusion that the "oor have neither rights nor !uties ; a conclusion
Hegel himself sometimes e>"licitly !ra$s. This suggests some even more
!rastic conclusions. &t is a fun!amental "rinci"le of mo!ern ethical life that
all in!ivi!uals are eIual "ersons $ith rights. &f civil society systematically
"ro!uces a class $hose e>istence violates that "rinci"le4 then that ten!s to
un!ermine the rationality of the ethical or!er as a $hole. &n a social system
that un!ermines its o$n "rinci"les4 can anyone really e sai! to have vali!
rights or !utiesB Can the "artici"ants in such a system truly e E$ith themselvesE
as rational eings in its institutions an! "racticesB & suggest that
Hegel is $orrie! y an! hostile to the rale mentality in "art ecause he
correctly sees it as a threat to the rationality of mo!ern ethical life as a $hole4
hence to the fun!amental aim of his entire theory of oFective s"irit.
The rale mentality also coheres $ith an im"ortant theme in his "hiloso"hy
of history. &n Cha"ter ') $e sa$ that every ethical or!er must ultimately
!estroy itself through the reJective a$areness of its o$n "rinci"les an! their
limits. &f the rational state as Hegel "resents it is Ea form of life gro$n ol!4E
then $e may e>"ect on the asis of Hegelian "rinci"les that its time of !estructive
self;a$areness an! !eca!ence cannot e too far oM. Hegel's
reJection on the mo!ern state4 though "ositive in intent4 may also egin
to reveal the limits of its "rinci"le.
&f the rale mentality re"resents such an a$areness4 then it Gts in $ith
Hegel's "hiloso"hy of history in another $ay as $ell Z $ith its amoralism.
The rale is seen y Hegel not as the creator of a ne$ or!er4 ut only as
the corru"ter of the ol!. &ts mentality contains O nothing so res"ectale as
Ei!ealsE of a etter $orl!4 nor even a Eright of revolutionE against the ol!
one.'9 &t is sim"ly an alienate! mentality of envy an! hatre!4 a !erisive reFection
of all !uties an! ethical "rinci"les4 a contem"tuous refusal to recogniDe
anyone's rights4 a itter !enial of all human !ignity an! self;res"ect ; su""orte!'y
a cogent rational FustiGcation through the self;!estruction of mo!ern
ethical "rinci"les.
Hegel often cites 2lato's su""ression of the emerging historical "rinci"le
of free suFectivity as the most serious limitation of his "olitical thought ?2.
NN*74 '+*A4 '+(.4 567.4 575A4 599.@. -ut he insists that !es"ite this4 2lato
E"rve!Xhis greatness of s"iritE y the fact that the "oint that most troule!
him $as Ethe "ivot on $hich turne! the im"en!ing $orl! revolutionE ?2.
2reface 5*@. &t may still e too soon to say4 ut "erha"s y the same stan!ar!
Hegel's attem"t to gras" his time in thought also !is"lays s"iritual greatness
$here it reaches its o$n limits.
5((
Conclusion
i. Ethics an! society
Hegel's ethical thought !oes not !issolve ethics in sociology or re!uce it to
"olitics4 ut social relationshi"s an! institutions !o "lay an im"ortant role in
the $ay Hegel's theory groun!s ethical stan!ar!s on the self;actualiDation of
s"irit's free!om. Ethical !uties an! "rinci"les rest on universal reason4 ut
they must also e the "rinci"les of an actual social or!er. The actual is al$ays
rational4 ut no e>isting social or!er is ever $holly actual. &n its e>istence4
the rational &!ea of an ethical or!er is al$ays to some e>tent !isGgure! y
contingency4 error4 an! $ic#e!ness. The "resent social or!er must e measure!
not y a timeless stan!ar! ut y its o$n immanent &!ea4 sim"ly ecause
Ein the most recent time4 the "erfection of the &!ea is al$ays the highestE
?%2. *C ='=@. There is "lenty of room in Hegel's ethical theory for
criticism of the e>isting or!er as an immature or im"erfect emo!iment of
its o$n &!ea.
Hegel's ethical thought has an out$ar!4 social orientation. &ts theory of
"ersonal morality stresses "articular situations an! social relaltionshi"s4 an!
Gn!s the goo! $ill only in out$ar! actions an! results4 not in em"ty4 unactualiDe!
intentions. Hegelian morality treats the suFect as a thin#er4 an! hol!s
in$ar! earnestness to oFective stan!ar!s of Tightness. -ecause moral action
ta#es "lace in the oFective $orl!4 Hegelian ethics sees the moral $orth of
agents as !elivere! over to the la$s an! contingencies of that $orl!.
The "rinci"les of an ethical or!er are vali! only so long as that or!er is
rational. -ecause s"irit is al$ays a!vancing in its self;#no$le!ge4 there are
no !eterminate ethical "rinci"les vali! for all times an! "laces. What ha!
rational vali!ity yester!ay no longer has it to!ay4 an! $hat has it to!ay $ill
lose it tomorro$. The foun!ation of the ethical is its actualiDation of s"irit's
free!om. The cause of that free!om is serve! not only y the structure of a
rational social or!er4 ut also y the !estruction of an or!er that has lost its
rationality. ConseIuently4 the ethical itself has only a limite! an! con!itional
FustiGcation.
&nevitaly4 Hegel's ethical theory focuses critical attention on "revailing
social institutionsC Does the e>isting or!er actualiDe its &!eaB &s the ethical
or!er itself rational4 or has it lost its foun!ation in s"irit's struggle to actualiDe
free!omB Through its conce"tion of the self;actualiDation of s"irit's free!om4
Hegel's theory also "ro"oses stan!ar!s y $hich these Iuestions are to e
ans$ere!. -ecause the 2hiloso"hy of .ight !efen!s the rationality of the mo!;
5(7
CONCLU0&ON
ern state4 the intent of the theory is su""ose! to e a"ologetic4 a !efense of
mo!ern society ; an! of the e>isting or!er to the e>tent ?ut only to the
e>tent@ that it .actualiDes the &!ea of oFective free!om4
Hegel tries to sho$ that the institutions of mo!ern society ; the family4
civil society4 an! the state ; actualiDe human free!om in the mo!ern $orl!.
That attem"t "resu""oses the "ossiility that mo!ern society might fail to
meet those same critical stan!ar!s. &n that case4 the real im"ort of Hegel's
ethical theory $oul! e ra!ical. The "ossiility of a ra!ical Hegelian EleftE
is inherent in Hegel's ethical thought4 along $ith the "ossiility of a conservative
or a"ologetic Hegelian ErightE an! a mo!erate or reformist Hegelian
Ecenter.E The historical Hegel $as "retty clearly a Ecentrist4E ut to !eci!e
in a more "ro"erly "hiloso"hical sense $hich cam" has the right to claim Ethe
real HegelE is to !eci!e $hether mo!ern society really is rational accor!ing to
the stan!ar!s of Hegelian ethical theory.
5. Hegel as lieral
:or Hegel4 the rationality of the mo!ern state turns ultimately on its actualiDation
ol free!om. A free society is one in $hich in!ivi!uals are $ith themselves
in their ethical institutions. &n the mo!ern $orl!4 this reIuires that
social institutions guarantee the right of "ersons an! "rovi!e sco"e for the
suFective free!om of in!ivi!uals. As a "erson4 & must have an e>ternal
s"here of free!om over $hich society res"ects an! "rotects my right to aritrary
free!om. As a suFect4 the !irection of my life must4 in the res"ects
that matter most to me4 e at the mercy of my choices an! conscience. Hegel
argues that this means & must have civil free!om an! the o""ortunity to
choose a "lace in civil society4 an! give my in!ivi!uality !eterminate e>istence
through my o$n laor there.
These Hegelian !octrines have much in common $ith the lieral tra!ition
?$hose success in the West may e measure! y the fact that it encom"asses
the e>haustive "olarity of ElieralismE an! EconservatismE as those terms are
commonly use! in contem"orary "olitics@. ,oreover4 the constitutional
monarchy !escrie! in the 2hiloso"hy of .ight is Iuite lieral y the stan!ar!s
of the time in $hich it $as $ritten. &t "rovi!es not only for nearly'all
of the "olitical an! economic lieraliDation that ha! een accom"lishe! y
the 0tein an! Har!energ a!ministrations in 2russia et$een '+6+ an! '+'+4
ut also for most of the further inten!e! reforms $hich $ere successfully
resiste! y the reactionaries $ho ha! Fust come to "o$er $hen the oo# $as
"ulishe!. The contents of Hegel's theory sim"ly can't e reconcile! $ith
the assum"tion that he $as inten!ing an uncritical en!orsement of restoration
2russia as it e>iste! in '+56 an! after. The :rench "hiloso"her %ictor
Cousin ha! Hegel's actual "olitical vie$s in min! $hen he sai! that4 li#e
himself4 Hegel $as Einfuse! $ith the ne$ s"iritA he consi!ere! the :rench
.evolution to e the greatest ste" for$ar! ta#en y human#in! since Christianity.
He $as "rofoun!ly lieral $ithout eing the least it re"ulican.E'
&t is no $on!er that .u!olf Haym4 $ho is chieJy res"onsile for the tra!i;
5(=
CONCLU0&ON
tion of rea!ing Hegel as an a"ologist for the 2russian reaction4 also foun! it
necessary to charge Hegel's $hole "olitical theory $ith E!u"licity.E Haym
$as $ell a$are that Hegel's state is a lieral reforme! 2russia4 not a reactionary4
asolutist 2russia. Thus Haym ha! to claim that $hen Hegel "rofesses
allegiance to restoration 2russia in the 2. 2reface4 he at last sho$s his true
colors4 or ?in Haym's $or!s@ Estri"s This systemU of its lieralistic sheen.E5
Less informe! lieral critics ro Haym's "osition of this sutlety y sim"ly
ta#ing for grante! that Hegel is an a"ologist for reactionary 2russia an! ignoring
the fact that Hegel's state has a very lieral loo# to it.
Haym's !ee"er intention $as to !emonstrate that4 !es"ite these a""earances4
the "hiloso"hy of /erman i!ealism is antilieral in its im"lications.
Haym's argument for this conclusion is su"erGcial an! Ja$e!4 ut the conclusion
itself is essentially correct.
). Hegel versus lieralism
When $e consi!er them in their historical conte>t4 Hegel's "olitical i!eas
leave the lierals' state "retty much intact. Hegel's ethical theory4 on the
other han!4 shre!s the lieral rationale for it. Hegel attac#s the suFectivistic4
atomistic4 an! moralistic foun!ations of mo!ern lieralism4 an! he "rovi!es
an alternative rationale for Iuite similar social institutions4 ase! on a comination
of communitarian "rinci"les an! the ra!ical /erman i!ealist conce"tion
of asolute free!om. Thus Cousin's remar# nee!s correctionC Although
the state Hegel favors may e Iuite lieral4 the ethical theory through $hich
he FustiGes it is not lieral at all.
&n Hegel's theory4 "ersonal4 suFective4 an! civil free!om are valuale ecause
they serve !eterminate "ur"oses in the conte>t of actualiDing asolute
free!om. & !o this only $hen my "rivate life ta#es on meaning $ithin a
larger4 collective life4 $hen my "articular en!s "ass over into the en!s of
the community. Hegelian ethical theory "rovi!es a !efense of the value of
in!ivi!ual free!om4 ut at the same time also a criterion for !eci!ing $hen
in!ivi!ual free!om matters an! $hen it !oes not. &ts han!ling of these matters
might very $ell "oint us in Iuite a !iMerent !irection from some stan!ar!
lieral theories of in!ivi!ual free!om.
The s"eciGc function of suFective free!om is to actualiDe the in!ivi!ual's
"articularity. 0uFective free!om is suor!inate! to the en! of in!ivi!ual
self;actualiDation. Hegel is $orrie! aout the Es"irit of atomismE in civil society
ecause he thin#s that too little social structuring of in!ivi!ual "ossiilities
an! e>"ectations ?too much of $hat lierals usually value un!er the name
of free!om@ might actually frustrate the $hole aim of suFective free!om.
Hegel "lainly fears that a mar#et system $ithout the sort of ethical structure
he assigne! to cor"orations might $ell e self;!efeating in Fust this $ay.
Hegel also !iverges from the lieral tra!ition $hen he insists that collective
goo!s have a value in themselves not re!ucile to the "rivate goo! of in!ivi!uals.
&n Hegel's theory4 collective goo!s !o not normally com"ete $ith in!ivi!ual
goo! or in!ivi!ual free!om. On the contrary4 the state's rationality4
5(+
CONCLU0&ON
$hich ma#es it an en! in itself4 consists in the systematic i!entiGcation of its
institutions $ith the actualiDation of suFective free!om an! "rivate goo! for
in!ivi!uals. Nor is Hegel !enying the virtual tautology that collective goo!s
have value ecause they have value for in!ivi!uals. His claim is that $hat
has the most value for in!ivi!uals4 $hat actualiDes their free!om most com"letely4
is the "ursuit of a universal or collective en!4 not the "ursuit of their
o$n "rivate en!s as such. &f a lieral state is one that has no universal4 collective
goals ut e>ists only to serve the "articular $hims an! !esires of its
in!ivi!ual memers4 then Hegelian ethical theory says that the memers of
a lieral state4 for all their "ersonal4 suFective4 an! civil free!oms4 are fun!amentally
D<ftfree.
*. The free society
To acce"t Hegel's thesis that the mo!ern state actually meets the !eman!s
of his ethical theory is to "ro"ose an antilieral vision of $hat mo!ern society
is an! ho$ $e shoul! try to #ee" it true to itself. Communitarian theories of
mo!ern society lie in that !irection4 though ?as & have suggeste! inCha"ters
'' an! '5@ Hegel is more rationalistic an! universalistic than most communitarians
are to!ay.
This oo#4 ho$ever4 has suggeste! a fe$ reasons for !outing Hegel's
thesis. 2lainly the nation;state cannot serve the e>alte! function in human
life $hich Hegel assigne! it ?Cha"ter '4 N =@. Neither it nor any other mo!ern
institution "rovi!es for the transition of in!ivi!ual into communal life in
the $ay Hege2s theory !eman!s. This is true to such a !egree that Hegel's
very conce"tion here is har! for us to gras"4 an! $e are a"t to inter"ret it
either as an a!vocacy of totalitarianism or else as a com"lacent so"histry
?Cha"ter '*4 NN ';5@. .eJective in!ivi!uals in mo!ern society are ty"ically
so i!> from eing ale to i!entify themselves rationally $ith their social roles
that Hegel's notion of lieration through ethical !uty is to stri#e them as
either !angerous humug or a a! Fo#e ?Cha"ter 54 N '6@.
&t is !outful that the mar#et system of mo!ern civil society can "rovi!e
oth suFective free!om an! the social structure necessary to a sense of in!ivi!ual
i!entity ?Cha"ter '*4 N );*@. ,o!ern society's failure to reconcile the
"rinci"les of sustantiality an! reJection sho$s itself in the untenaility of
Hegel's conce"tion of the family an! the social role of $omen4 along $ith
the asence of any alternative that satisfactorily a!!resses the same "rolem
?Cha"ter '*4 NN (;7@. :inally4 Hegel himself calls our attention to "overty
as a systematic "ro!uct of mo!ern civil society ?Cha"ter '*4 N =;+@. He sees
ho$ it violates mo!ern society's o$n conce"tion of "ersonal right ?Cha"ter
'*4 N '6A Cha"ter *4 N '64 Cha"ter (4 N =@ an! ho$ it threatens to un!ermine
its rationale for criminalFustice ?Cha"ter 74 N (@ an! even mo!ern ethical life
as a $hole ?Cha"ter '*4 NN 94 ''@.
Our recognition of this failure of mo!ern society !oes not "rovi!e us $ith
anything li#e an alternative EHegelianE vision of the free society4 $hich might
e set over against Hegel's o$n vision of the mo!ern state. -ut it might "oint
5(9
CONCLU0&ON
Hegel's ethical theory in a ra!ical !irection4 since it suggests several !iMerent
$ays in $hich mo!ern civil society cannot satisfy the !eman!s to $hich Hegel's
ethical theory gives rise. &t suggests that mo!ern civil society cannot
fulGll its o$n "rinci"les of universal human free!om an! !ignity4 ecause it
systematically consigns $hole classes to con!itions of life that are suhuman
y its o$n stan!ar!s. ,oreover4 mo!ern society seems unale to fulGll the
in!ivi!uality even of those $ho esca"e this fate4 ecause it is not structure!
enough to "revent anomy an! not cohesive enough to $el! "eo"le's "ersonal
rights4 suFective free!om4 an! in!ivi!ual $ell;eing into a universal en!
that can e collectively "ursue!.
The same consi!erations4 ho$ever4 might raise !outs aout Hegelian ethical
theory itself. &f mo!ern society has not satisGe! the !eman!s of Hegel's
ethical theory4 $e might $on!er aout the reasonaleness of those !eman!s.
Are Hegelian free!om an! self;actualiDation goo!s that a social or!er can e
e>"ecte! to "rovi!eB 0elf;actualiDation4 it may e sai!4 means !iMerent
things to !iMerent "eo"le4 an! one in!ivi!ual's meaningful life structure is
al$ays going to e someone else's o""ressive social constraint. &n!ivi!uals
are notoriously unale to agree $hen it comes to !eci!ing the higher4 collective
"ur"oses of society. &n theory4 lierals $ill tell us4 the vision of Heg!'s
free society is very tem"ting. -ut in "ractice4 $e have goo! reason to reFect
an! even to fear it4 ecause attem"ts to realiDe it al$ays lea! to$ar! a society
that smothers in!ivi!ual free!om an! $ell;eing un!er some set of collective
goals $hose ogus Euniversal vali!ityE turns out to e nothing ut a "rete>t
for the e>ercise of tyrannical "o$er.
These fears may e e>aggerate!4 ut $e miss the "oint if $e are too Iuic#
to allay them. Hegel himself $as a "olitical mo!erate4 ut his thought has
certainly een im"licate! in "olitical movements4 oth right an! left4 some
of $hose !ee!s have een monstrously !estructive. On the other han!4 the
aim of this oo# has een to "resent Hegel's ethical theory as a $ell;conceive!
articulation of the mo!ern Western image of humanity an! human self;actualiDation.
That theory sets amitious stan!ar!s for any society that $ants to
call itself free4 an! groun!s these stan!ar!s in oth reason an! history. Until
its vision is actualiDe!4 $e cannot e>clu!e the "ossiility that the Hegelian
!eman! for a free society may e Fust another sym"tom of our culture's most
incurale !isease. -ut no theory of society that fails to ac#no$le!ge that call
to lieration $ill ever un!erstan! the mo!ern $orl! or $hat it is aoutA no
society that leaves it unans$ere! can e roote! in the !ee"est nee!s of its
memers. .a!ical ho"es themselves are actual as long as they have their roots
in us. The !angerous self;!eceiving Uto"ian !reamers are those $ho turn
against these ho"es4 haroring the com"lacent $ish that they $ill Fust go
Iuietly a$ay an! let our ro#en !ream $orl! slumer in "eace.
576
Notes
&ntro!uction
i. &t is surely "ara!o>ical to say Grst that "hiloso"hy !e"en!s on the em"irical sciences
an! then that "hiloso"hy $ill turn this em"irical #no$le!ge into a "riori
#no$le!ge. -ut this might seem a""ro"riate if4 as Hegel conten!s4 "hiloso"hy
!emonstrates that these em"irical facts are "osite! y nothing ut the thin#ing
min!4 !e"en!ent on no e>ternal in"uts. 2erha"s the right conclusion is Fust that
the a "riori<em"irical !istinction4 as tra!itionally un!erstoo! in the 3antian tra!ition4
is one $hich Hegel means to challenge. &n his e>cellent oo#4 Hegel's Theory
of ,ental Activity ?&thacaC Cornell University 2ress4 '9++@4 "". '*4 5=;5+4 )';
)(4 Willem !e%ries suggests that a "riority for Hegel is something that al$ays
a!mits of !egreesA !iMerent claims have !iMerent !egrees of em"irical sensitivity.
5. The claims aout Hegel's metho!ological "roFect ma!e in this "aragra"h have
een argue! very convincingly y ,ichael :orster in his e>cellent oo# Hegel
an! 0#e"ticism ?Camri!ge4 ,AC Harvar! University 2ress4 '9+9@.
). :or t$o goo! !iscussions of Hegel's rea!ing of the 3antian antinomies4 an! its
inJuence on his o$n conce"tion of !ialectic4 see ,artial /ueroult4 ELe Fugement
!e Hegel sur l'AntithRiIue !e la .aison 2ure4E .evue !e ,eta"hysiIue et !e
,orale F+ ?'9)'@A a /erman translation of this article is to e foun! in .olf;
2eter Horstmann ?e!.@4 0eminarC Diale#ti# in !er2hiloso"hie Hegels ?:ran#furtC
0uhr#am"4 '9=+@A an! Hohn Lle$ellyn4 E3antian Antinomy an! Hegelian Dialectic4E
in 0te"hen 2riest ?e!.@4 Hegel's CritiIue of 3ant ?O>for!C Claren!on 2ress4
'9+=@.
*. Lu!$ig Wittgenstein4 -emer#ungen uer !ie /run!lagen !er ,athemati#l.emar#s
on the :oun!ations of ,athematics4 e!. %on Wright4 .hees4 Anscome
?O>for!C -lac#$ell4 '97*@4 NN '54 +64 "". ('4 '6*.
(. 0ee /. E. ,ueller4 EThe Hegel Legen! of 'Thesis;Antithesis;0ynthesis'4E Hournal
of the History of &!eas ig ?'9(+@4 *'';*'*.
7. ,ichael .osen4 Hegel's Dialectic an! &ts Criticism ?Camri!geC Camri!ge University
2ress4 '9+5@4 ". '=9.
=. 0ee Herert 0chna!elach4 2hiloso"hy in /ermany i+Fi;igFF ?Camri!geC
Camri!ge University 2ress4 '9+*@4 "". ==4 5*'.
+. Ernst Cassirer4 The ,yth of the 0tate ?'9*7@ ?/ar!en City4 NHC Doule!ay4
'9((@. 2; ) E ;
9. .aymon! 2lant4 Hegel ?-loomington4 &NC &n!iana University 2ress4 '9=)@4 ".
'+*.
'6. Charles Taylor4 Hegel ?Camri!geC Camri!ge University 2ress4 '9=(@.
''. At this "oint4 the 2. 2reface echoes a note$orthy "assage to$ar! the eginning
of Hegel's un"ulishe! essay of '+66 on /erman "olitics4 customarily entitle!
EThe /erman ConstitutionEC
57'
NOTE0 TO 22. & ; l +
The thoughts containe! in this essay can in their "ulic e>"ression have no
other en! or eMect than "romoting the un!erstan!ing of $hat is4 an! thus furthering4
oth in actual contact an! in $or!s4 a more "eaceful outloo# on an! a mo!erate
en!urance of $hat is. :or it is not $hat is $hich ma#es us irascile an! "assionateA
rather4 it is that it is not as it ought to e. -ut if $e recogniDe it is as it
must e4 i.e. that it is not aritrariness an! contingency $hich ma#e it $hat it is4
then $e $ill also recogniDe that it ought to e that $ay. ?D% *7)<'*(@
'5. /eorg Lu#acs4 The Ontology of 0ocial -eingC Hegel4 trans. Davi! :ernach ?Lon!onC
,erlin 2ress4 '9=+@4 ". *=.
'). 06ren 3ier#egaar!4 Conclu!ing UnscientiGc 2ostscri"t4 trans. Walter Lo$rie
?2rinceton University 2ress4 '9*5@4 ". '6+A W. H. Walsh4 Hegelian Ethics ?Ne$
1or#C /arlan! 2ulishers4 '9+*@4 "". ''4 ((A Herert ,arcuseC .eason an!.evolutionC
Hegel an! the .ise of 0ocial Theory ?-ostonC -eacon 2ress4 '97+@4 ".
566.
'*. 0ee also Taylor4 Hegel4 "". 5+5;5+7.
'(. 0ee ,anfre! .ie!el4 -et$een Tra!ition an! .evolutionC The Hegelian Transformation
of 2olitical 2hiloso"hy4 trans. Walter Wright ?Camri!geC Camri!ge
University 2ress4 '9+*@4 ". 5+.
'7. Har!energ's constitutional "lan can e foun! in an A""en!i> to Alfre! 0tern4
/eschichte Euro"as '+'(;'+=' ?-erlinC Wilhelm HertD4 '+9*@4 l C 7*9;7(). :or
Humol!t's much longer !raft4 see Wilhelm von Humol!t4 /esammelte 0chriften
?-erlinC -ehr4 '96*@4 '5'C 55(;597. 0ee also :rie!rich ,einec#e4 The Age of
/erman Lieration4 'HP(;'+'( ?'967@4 e!. 2. 2aret an! H. :ischer ?-er#eleyC
University of California 2ress4 '9==@A an! Walter 0imon4 The :ailure of the 2russian
.eform Era ?&thacaC Cornell University 2ress4 '9((@4 "". 56';56=.
'=. Hegel's lectures of the "erio! Fust "rece!ing the "ulication of the 2hiloso"hy of
.ight4 $hich have een e!ite! only Iuite recently4 she! consi!erale light on
the ol! ut "erennially sensational Iuestion of Hegel's relation to the restoration
2russian state $hich em"loye! him after '+'+. 0ee 3arl;HeinD & #ing's intro!uctions
to %2. ' ?"". 5(;'57@4 %2. * ?"" *(;77@4 an! %2.iy ?"". '=;)*@A an!
Dieter Henrich's intro!uction to %2.'9 ?es"ecially ""_ 9;'=4 5*;)6@. :or further
illuminating !iscussion of these issues4 see 0hlomo Avineri4 Hegel's Theory of the
,o!ern 0tate ?Camri!geC Camri!ge University 2ress4 '9=5@4 Cha"ter 7A an!
,ichael Theunissen4 Die %er$ir#lichung !er %ernunft. Vur Theorie;2ra>is Dis#ussion
im Anschluss an Hegel4 2hiloso"hische .un!schau4 -eiheft 7 ?'9=6@A cf.
Theunissen4 0ein un! 0chein ?:ran#furtC 0uhr#am"4 '9+6@4 "". *=5;*+7A The
!eGnitive recent account of the long history of this controversy is Henning Ottmann4
&n!ivi!uum un! /emeinschaft ei Hegel4 -!. 'C Hegel im 0"iegel !er &nter"retationen
?-erlinC De/ruyter4 '9==@.
'+. 0ee Thomas Ni""er!ey4 Deutsche /eschichte '+66;'+76C -urger$elt un!
star#er 0taat ?,unichC C. H. -ec#4 '9+)@4 ". *=9A Hohn E!$ar! Toev<s Hegelianism
?Camri!geC Camri!ge University 2ress4 '9+6@4 "". 5();5(*.
Cha"ter '
'. 0ee 0amuel 0chefer4 E,oral 0#e"ticism an! &!eals of the 2erson4E ,onist 75
?i9=9@.
5. Dere# 2ar Gt4 .easons an! 2ersons ?O>for!C Claren!on 2ress4 '9+*@. 3orsgaar!
suggests that this !iMerence et$een 2arGt an! the 3antians lies in the fact that
575
NOTE0 TO 22. . 5;5;)O)
for 2arGt4 as for all em"iricists4 the stuM of; $hich selves are ma!e is sim"ly the
"assive having of e>"eriences ?so that even acting is inter"rete! as a #in! of un!ergoing
of the e>"erience of agency@4 $hereas the 3antians regar! agency as fun!amental
to selfhoo!4 an! fun!amentally !iMerent from any "assively enFoye! e>"erience
TChristine 3orsgaar!4 E2ersonal &!entity an! the Unity of Agency4E
2hiloso"hy an! 2ulic AMairs '+ ?'9+9@U. :or other relevant !iscussions of 2arGt
on selfhoo!4 see 0usari'Wolf4 E0elf;interest an! &nterest in 0elves4E Ethics 67E
?'9+7@A an! .oert ,errihe$ A!ams4 E0houl! Ethics -e ,ore &m"ersonalBE The
2hiloso"hical .evie$ g+ ?'9+9@.
). H!hn Loc#e4 0econ! Treatise on /overnment e!. T. 2ear!on ?&n!iana"olisC
t-os;,errill4 '9(5@4 N +=A cf. NN 74 5=4 (9.
*. E/ermanicE in this sense of course inclu!es E/ermany "ro"erE W!as eigentliche
Deutschlan!@ ; $hich Hegel un!erstan!s to inclu!e the :ran#s4 the Normans4
ari! the "eo"les of Englan! an! 0can!inavia ?%2/ *5'<)*9@. -ut it is not limite!
to thatA eIually E/ermanic4E in Hegel's sense of the $or!4 '.are the E.omanicE
"eo"les of :rance4 &taly4 0"ain4 an! 2ortugalC the %isigoths4 Ostrogoths4 Lomar!s4
an! -urgun!ians ?%2/ *57<)*+@4 ari! even the ,agyars'an! the 0lavs of
Eastern Euro"e ?%2/. *55<)(6@. -ut the "rominence he gives oth to Tacitus's
image of the Teutonic character an! to the Lutheran .eformation in!icates that
Hegel regar!s /erman culture in a fairly narro$ sense4 as "laying a very "rominent
role in the !evelo"ment of the mo!ern s"iritC?cf. D% *7(;*7=<'*7;'(64 ()5;
())<565;56)A %2/ *9*<*'*@;
(. As ,anfre! .ie!el has sho$n4 More Hegel the term urgerliche /esellschaft ;
along $ith its eIuivalents in Latin4 :rench4 an! English ; $as al$ays eIuate!
$ith the "olitical state4 an! !istinguishe! from the family4 the only recogniDe!
form of E"rivate society.E 0ee .ie!el4 -et$een[ Tra!itionan!'.evolution ?Camri!geC
Camri!ge University 2ress4 '9+*@4 Cha"ter 7.
7. The error is Iuote! from an other$ise illuminating !iscussion in Alan .yan4
2ro"erty an! 2olitical Theory ?O>for!C< -lac# $ell4 '9+*@4'X. ')*. :or a etter
!iscussion of this "articular "oint4 see 0hlomo Avineri4 Hegel's Theory of the
,o!ern 0tate ?Camri!geC Camri!geUniversity 2ress4 '.9=5@4' Cha"ter =A an!
-ernar! /ullen4 ;Hegel's 0ocial an!2olitical ; Thought .WNe$1or#C 0t. ,artin's
2ress4 '9=9@A Cha"ter (4;es"ecially "". 9';9*.
=. Hohn 0tuart ,ill4 Utilitarianism ?&n!iana"olisC Hac#ett 2ulishing'Co.4 '9=9@4
". )).
+. 0eeTA O'Hagan4 EOn Hegel's CritiIue of 3ant's ,oral an! 2olitical 2hiloso"hy4E
in 0te"hen 2riest ?e!.@4 Hegel's CritiIue of 3ant ?O>for!C Claren!on. 2ress4
'9+=@4. ". '(=.
9. The uniIueness of the ty"e of theory fouti! in the 2hiloso"hy of .ight is a""reciate!
y Hans;:rie!rich :ul!a4 EVum Teoriety"us!er Hegelschen .echts"hiloso"hie4E
in D. Henrich an! ..;2. Horstmann ?ecR@4 Hegels2hilos!"hie!es
.echtsC Die Theorie !er .echtsformenun! ihre Logi# ?0tuttgartC 3Hett;Cotta %erlag4
'9+5@4 "". )9);*5=.' elieveO ho$ever4 that :ul!a un!erestimates the !egree
to $hich Hegel's ethical theory has a content analogous to that of other ty"es of
ethical theory.
'6. What & am calling a Eself;actualiDationE theory ears a close resemlance to $hat
Hulius ,oravcsi# calls in Ei!eal ethical theoryE ;'a'ty"e of theory he claims to
Gn! in certain classical;/ree# te>ts4 for e>am"le4 in the Eu!eniian Ethics 7f Aristotle.
H. ,oravcsi#4 E&!ealXEthics in theCEuaemianOEthics E un"ulishe! "a"er.
''. .ichar! -.O-ran!t4 A Theory of the /oo! an! the .ight ?O>for!C Claren!on4
57)
NOTE0 TO 22. ) * X ) 9
'9=9@4 2art &A 2eter .ailton4 E,oral .ealism4E The 2hiloso"hical .evie$ 9(
?'9+7@4 '=';'+*.
'5. & o$e this "oint to a conversation $ith ,ilton Wachserg. O
'). ,ar>4 Wer#e ?-erlinC DietD %erlag4 '97';'977@4 5FC 5)A Ca"ital ?Ne$ 1or#C
&nternational 2ulishers4 '97=@4 < C ,ar>;Engels4 0electe! Wor#s ?Ne$ 1or#C
&nternational 2ulishers4 '97+@4 ". 59(.
Cha"ter 5
'. 0ee E. :. Carritt4 E.e"lyE in Walter 3aufmann ?e!.@4 Hegel's 2olitical 2hiloso"hy
?Ne$ 1or#C Atherton 2ress4 '9=6@4 ". )+. This echoes the more famous criticism
of .u!olf HaymC EThe system of right4 as THegelU !eGnes it in one of his Grst
"aragra"hs4 is 'the realm of actualiDe! free!om.' The $hole oo# has to !o $ith
nothing ut free!om. . . . Only the $or! 'free!om' is a coin $hose rate of e>change
Gn!s itself in constant Juctuation. Only one's !is"osition !etermines the
sense of the $or!. The version of it that Hegel gives $ill etray the fun!amental
$ea#nesses of his "hiloso"hyE THaym4 Hegel un! seine Veit ?-erlinC .u!olf
/aertner4 '+(=@4 "". )79;)=6A cf. ,anfre! .ie!el ?e!.@4 ,aterialien Du Hegels
.echts"hiloso"hie ?:ran#furtC 0uhr#am"4 '9=(@4 ". )=7U.
5. & o$e this remar# to Ernst Tugen!hat.
). 0ee /eral! /. ,cCallum4 E2ositive an! Negative :ree!om4E The 2hiloso"hical
.evie$ +7 ?'97=@.
*. &t is not clear $hether Hegel means to say only that ?'@ $e are ale to act against
any of our !esires4 ho$ever "o$erfulA or $hether he means to ma#e the even
stronger claim that ?5@ $e are ca"ale of acting against all our !esires at once ;
in eMect4 that $e are ca"ale of acting in a $ay "rom"te! y none of our !esires
an! against $hich all our !esires s"ea#. &n favor of ?'@ is the fact that Hegel
insists ?2. N (@ that the "o$er of astraction is inca"ale of any "ositive actionA
in or!er to !o anything4 he hol!s4 the $ill must "articulariDe itself ?2. N 7@4 an!
this a""arently means ringing into "lay at least one of its "articular !esires. -ut
in favor of ?5@ is Hegel's a""arent elief that there is such a thing as Enegative
free!om4E $hich attem"ts to actualiDe the self as nothing ut the "o$er of astraction.
Hegel "lainly regar!s negative free!om as irrational an! $holly !estructive4
ut if he thin#s it is "ossile at all4 that $oul! seem to im"ly a #in! of action that
!eGes all "articular !esires at once.
(. &saiah -erlin4 :our Essays on Lierty ?O>for!C O>for! University 2ress4 '979@4
". '55.
7. 2aul /uyer has calle! my attention to a "assage in the Lectures on Ethics4 $here
3ant !istinguishes et$een Ethe ca"acity for free!omE an! Ethe state of free!omE
or Einner free!om4E an! $here it might loo# as though the latter is the same as
autonomy or free!om as a state of actuality. Ho$ever4 a closer loo# reveals that
here4 too4 3ant is thin#ing of free!om as a ca"acity ; namely the ca"acity to
com"el oneself4 or the aility to !o so $ith relative easeC EThe more a man can
com"el himself4 the freer he is. The less he nee! e com"elle! y others4 the
greater his inner free!om. . . . The more a man "ractices self;com"ulsion4 the
freer he ecomes. 0ome men are y nature more !is"ose! to magnanimity4 forgiveness4
righteousness. &t is easier for them to com"el themselves an! they are
to that e>tent freerE ?%E )=;)+<)6;)'@. E&nner free!omE in this "assage is not
autonomous action itself ut the virtue of character $hich gives one a greater
ca"acity to act autonomously. When 3ant says4 EThe more a man "ractices self;
57*
NOTE0 TO 22. * ' ; * 5
com"ulsion the freer he ecomes4E he is not asserting the tautology that the more
one acts autonomously the more one acts autonomouslyA rather4 he is saying that
freIuent acts of self;com"ulsion ma#e it easier to com"el oneself4 or increase one's
ca"acity for self;com"ulsionA that is $hat Einner free!omE is.
=. Hohn Loc#e4 0econ! Treatise on /overnment4 e!. T. 2ear!on ?&n!iana"olisC
-os;,errill4 '9(5@4 N 554 ". '(. &n the same vein4 Loc#e saysC EThat ill;!eserves
the name of conGnement $hich he!ges us in only from ogs an! "reci"icesE
?0econ! Treatise N (=4 "C )5@A an! he as#sC E&s it $orth the name oi :ree!om
to e at lierty to "lay the :ool4 an! !ra$ 0hame an! ,isery u"on a ,an's
selfB &f to rea# loose from the con!uct of .eason . . . e Lierty4 true Lierty4
ma! ,en an! :ools are the only :reemenE [An Essay Concerning Human Un!erstan!ing4
e!. 2eter Ni!!itch ?O>for!C O>for! University 2ress4. '9=(@4 -oo# &&4
Ch. 5'4 N (64 ". 57(U.
+. ELierty can consist only in the "o$er of !oing $hat one ought to $illE TCharles
Louis !e 0econ!at4 -aron !e ,ontesIuieu4 Oeuvres Com"letes ?2arisC /allimar!4
'9('@ 5C )9(A cL The 0"irit of the La$s ?Ne$ 1or#C Hafner4 '9*9@4 ".
'(6UA ELierty consists in eing ale to !o $hatever !oes not inFure anotherE
TDeclaration of the .ights of ,an an! CitiDen ?'=+9@4 N *U. 3ant follo$s .ousseau
in hol!ing that the transition from the state of nature to the civil state is one
in $hich no real loss of free!om is involve! ?3ant .L )'7<+6;+'@.
9. Hean;HacIues .ousseau4 Oeuvres Com"letes ?2arisC /allimar!4 '97*@XC )7*A cf.
The 0ocial Contract an! Discourses ?Ne$ 1or#C E. 2. -utton4 '9(6@4 ". '+.
'6. Hohn 0tuart ,ill4 On Lierty4 e!. EliDaeth .a"a"ort ?&n!iana"olisC Hac#ett4
'9=+@4 ". '54 italics a!!e!.
''. &saiah -erlin4 :our Essays on Lierty4 ". '*+.
'5. Heremy -ent ham4 Of La$s in /eneralA e!. H. L. A. Hart4 in H. H. -urns ?e!.@4
Collecte! Wor#s of Heremy -entham ?Lon!onC Athlone 2ress4 '97+;@4 Cha"ter 7A
N);
'). -erlin4 :our Essays on Lierty4 ". '(5.
'*. -erlin4 :our Essays on Lierty4 "". '(';'()4. There is this much to e sai! for
-erlin's "ositionC Hegel thin#s that a free society is one in $hich rational institutions
?s"eciGcallyC institutions "rotecting "ersonal an! civil free!om for the sa#e
of suFective free!om@ are EuniversalE or common en!s to e "ursue! collectively
for their o$n sa#e. -ut su""ose some EHegeliansE altogether forgot the content
of these'en!s4 an! retaine! only the thought that social institutions must e en!s
in themselves "ursue! y the $hole community. &n that case4 $e can easily imagine
that they might have fe$ scru"les aout foisting !iMerent en!s on the community4
$ithout a""reciating that it is essential for these en!s to harmoniDe $ith
"eo"le's suFective free!om. At the same time4 it is easy to imagine that the en!s
they $ant to im"ose might e resiste! y many memers of the community4
ma#ing coercion4 mani"ulation4 an! thought control all the more necessary to
getting society to acce"t them. &n that sort of case4 it $oul! certainly e E"sychologically
an! historically intelligileE that a society run y EHegeliansE might
move in a totalitarian !irection ?see Cha"ter '*4 NN ';5@. &t is a se"arate Iuestion4
ho$ever4 $hether anything li#e this is the correct e>"lanation for the !evelo"ment
of totalitarian states in actual cases. The main "oint not to miss is that this
$oul! e self;!efeating for Hegelians in e>actly the same $ay that it is self;!efeating
for lierals to su""ress these same free!oms in the name of "rotecting the
EfreeE society from suversion.
'(. -erlin4 :our Essays on Lierty4 ". '().
57(
NOTE0 TO 22. * 5 ; * 7
'7. EA thing is sai! to e free $hen it e>ists solely from the necessity of its nature4
an! is !etermine! to act y itself alone. . . . T&t isU constraine! if it is !etermine!
y another thing to e>ist an! to act in a !eGnite an! !eterminate $ay4E 0"inoDa4
The Ethics4 trans. 0. 0hirley ?&n!iana"olisC Hac#ett4 '9+5@4 &D=4 ". )'.
'=. :or :ichte4 this entails that legitimate government al$ays rests on the actual consent
of the "eo"le an! is al$ays res"onsile to the "eo"le. .ealiDing ho$ far the
"olitical institutions of his time $ere from meeting this con!ition4 he conclu!esC
EAny constitution of the state is in accor!ance $ith right $hich !oes not ma#e
im"ossile the "rogress4 in general an! for in!ivi!uals4 to$ar! something etterA
an! one can serve it $ith a goo! conscience. Only that constitution is com"letely
contrary to right $hich has the en! of "reserving everything as it "resently isE
?0L )7'<)=(@.
'+. 0ee ,ar>;Engch Wer#e ?-erlinC DietD %erlag4 '97';'977@4 < C ('*4 F C 7=A
,ar>;Engels Collecte! Wor#s ?Ne$ 1or#C &nternational 2ulishers4 '9=(;@4 F C
5=*4(C+=.
'9. 0ee4 for instance4 -ernar! 1ac#4 The Longing for Total .evolution ?2rincetonC
2rinceton University 2ress4 '9+7@. 1ac# e>cuses Hegel from such criticisms ecause
of the right;Hegelian inter"retation he gives of the 2hiloso"hy of .ight.
Accor!ing to 1ac#4 Hegel recommen!s Eresignation to the limitations of our aility
to achieve our "ractical en!s in societyE ?". 556@ ecause he has arrive! at the
ErealisticE "osition that no form of society can ever eliminate Ethe social sources
of human !issatisfaction "ose! y the in!iMerence of nature to our "ractical en!sE
?". 555@. The !ourly com"lacent vie$s Fust Iuote! a""ear to e 1ac#'s o$n.
They are clearly not Hegel'sC E.eason Tis notU content $ith that col! !es"air
$hich sumits to the vie$ that in this earthly life things are truly a! or at est
only tolerale4 though they cannot e im"rove!4 an! this is the only reJection
that can #ee" us at "eace $ith the $orl!E ?2. 2reface 5(@.
56. &saiah -erlin4 :our Essays on Lierty4 ". ')(.
5'. E"ictetus4 Enchiri!ion4 trans. T. Higginson ?Ne$ 1or#C Lieral Arts 2ress4
'9*+@4 ". '=.
55. Actually4 Hegel's Grst use of the term et sich to mean Efree!omE occurs in the
2henomenology of 0"irit ?2h/ H '9=@. -ut there it is use! to characteriDe the
com"letely self;containe! an! therefore limite! free!om of 0toicism4 $hich is at
est an astract version of Eeing $ith oneselfE as it a""ears in Hegel's later $ritings4
since 0toicism ?as Hegel "resents it@ e>clu!es otherness rather than conIuering
it. Hegel's conce"tion of free!om is not merely Eeing $ith oneselfE ut Eeing
$ith oneself in another.E Of course4 this conce"tion of free!om4 e>"resse! in
other terms4 goes ac# at least as far as Hegel's Hena "erio!C EA free!om for $hich
something is genuinely e>ternal an! alien is no free!omA the essence an! formal
!eGnition Tof free!omU is Fust that nothing is asolutely e>ternalE ?N. **=<+9@.
5). Hegel !oes not regar! my en! as something sim"ly e>isting in me4 $hich4 $hen
& achieve it4 gets su""lemente! y an e>ternal state of aMairs. &nstea!4 he insists
that the very suFectivity of my en!4 the fact that it is something in me4 is a !efect
in it4 something $hich nee!s to e ma!e goo! through the oFective actualiDation
of that same en! ?2. NN +;9@. ,y en! ?V$ec#@ itself is4 most "ro"erly s"ea#ing4
that $hich is simultaneously suFective an! oFectiveA it is the thing & suFectively
$ille!4 ut it is that thing in the form of an oFect $hich stan!s over an! against
that $illing as $hat it has create! ?2. NN '6+;'69@.
5*. On the sense of Einter"retationE relevant to Hegel's "hiloso"hical metho!4 see
577
NOTE0 TO 22. * = ; 7 6
Willem !e%ries4 Hegel's Theory of ,ental Activity ?&thacaC Cornell University
2ress4 '9+9@4 ". '7.
5(. 0ee Harry :ran#furt4 E:ree!om of the $ill an! the Conce"t of a 2erson4E Hournal
of 2hiloso"hy 7y ?'9='@.
57. &t a""ears so4 for instance4 to Ernst Tugen!hat4 0elf;Consciousness an! 0elf;
Determination4 trans. 2aul 0tern ?Camri!ge4 ,AC ,&T 2ress4 '9+7@4 Lecture
Cha"ter )
'. Aristotle4 Nicomachean Ethics 'C (4 '69(6'(;'697)'6.
5. Cf. 2lato4 /orgias *7+a;*=oe.
). Descartes4 2assions of the 0oul4 in Hohn Cottingham4 .oert 0toothoM an! Dugal!
,ur!och ?e!s.@4 2hiloso"hical Writings of Descartes ?Camri!geC Camri!ge
University 2ress4 '9+(@4 < C )+';)+5.
*. Hoes4 Leviathan < C '' ?&n!iana"olisC -os;,errill4 '9(+@4 ". +7.
(. 0ee Nicolas ,aleranche4 Oeuvres Com"letes4 e!. A. .oinet ?2arisC H. %rin4
'9(9;'9=+@4 (C 97A Antoine Arnaul!4 Oeuvres ?2arisC 0igismon! D'Arnay4
'=+6@4 F o C )7=;)7+. Com"are 0t. Thomas AIuinas4 0umma Contra /entiles L.
)C C. 57. Li#e AIuinas4 most 0cholastics i!entify true ha""iness not $ith any
earthly con!ition ut $ith the eatiGc vision of /o! in a future life. A !is"ute!
issue concerns $hether this vision is an act of the intellect ?AIuinas's "osition@4
or an act of the $ill ; the vie$ of most :ranciscan thin#ers ?com"are Duns 0cotus4
O"us O>on. P. '4 Dist. 5(@. :or the 0cholastics4 eatiGc vision is an act of
the soul4 ut it is not a suFective state4 an! most Jatly !eny that it is to e
i!entiGe! $ith the "leasure or enFoyment ?!electatio@ involve! in it. Even a !issenter
on this "oint4 such as the :ranciscan 2eter Aureol4 em"hasiDes that it is
enFoyment of the oFect4 not of the state of seeing the oFect ?2eter Aureoli4
0cri"tum su"er 2rimum 0ententiarum4 Distinctio '4 0ect. =@C The eatiGc vision
of /o! is su"reme ha""iness ecause it is a vision of /o!4 not ecause of any
suFective Iualities it may "ossess.
7. Loc#e4 Essay Concerning Human Un!erstan!ing 5 .'5'C*54 e!. 2eter H. Ni!!itch
?O>for!C O>for! University 2ress4 '9=(@4 ". 5(9.
=. Loc#e4 Essay Concerning Human Un!erstan!ing 5X5'C*)4 "". 5(9;576.
+. Anthony Ashley Coo"er4 Thir! Earl of 0haftesury4 Characteristics of ,en4
,anners4 O"inions4 Times ?'=''@ ?&n!iana"olisC -os;,errill4 '97*@4 %ol. '4
Treatise &%C A$ &nIuiry Concerning %irtue or ,erit Hli4 59);59(.
9. Loc#e4 Essay Concerning Human Un!erstan!ing 5C5'C*)4 ". 5(9.
'6. E"icurus4 ELetter to ,enoeceus4E Letters4 2rinci"al Doctrines an! %atican 0ayings4
trans. .ussel ,. /eer ?&n!iana"olisC -os;,errill4 '97*@4 "". ((;(+.
''. 0ee .ichar! 3raut4 ET$o Conce"tions of Ha""iness4E The 2hiloso"hical .evie$
++ ?'9=9@.
'5. 3ier#egaar!4 Either<Or4 trans. Walter Lo$rie ?Ne$ 1or#C Doule!ay4 '9(9@4
es"ecially the Dia"salma EEither<OrC An Ecstatic LectureE ?"". )=;)9@ an! the
essay EThe .otation ,etho!E ?5=9;597@.
'). 3ier#egaar!4 The 0ic#ness Unto Death4 trans. H. Hong ?2rincetonC 2rinceton
University 2ress4 '9+6@4 "". )6;)). &t is arguale that .omantic irony $as the
Grst form of the outloo# on life that has since een calle! Ehi"E or Ecool.E & remain
!elierately alienate!4 uninvolve!4 aloof4 itterly smiling at the $orl!4 refusing
57=
NOTE0 TO 22. 7 ' ; + *
my emotional com"licity in anything the outsi!e $orl! chooses to ta#e seriously.
Hegel regar!s .omantic irony as an attitu!e of monstrous arrogance an! selfconceit
?2. N i*o.4A@4 since the ironic self treats itself as su"erior4 to everything
else4 inclu!ing even the most sacre! things. -ut Hegel $as assuming that our life
in the $orl! ?es"ecially the social $orl!@ can e rationally satisfying4 an! gives
us no goo! reason not to ta#e it seriously. &n its more recent versions4 the ironic
attitu!e seems more a""ro"riately inter"rete! as asically a !efensive one4 "rotecting
my !ignity as a suFect against an ethically an#ru"t $orl! that refuses to
recogniDe me an! constantly outrages my sense of Fustice an! !ecency. &n either
form4 ho$ever4 $e have to ta#e seriously Hegel's critiIue of the ironic attitu!e as
a !ece"tion that fails to !eliver the free!om it "romises.
'*. .u!olf .eic#e4 Lose -latter aus 3ants Nachlass ?3onigsergC :er!. -eyer4
'++9@4 < C '';'54 cf. 2aul Arthur 0chil""4 3ant's 2re;critical Ethics4 5n! e!.
?EvanstonC North$estern University 2ress4 i976@4 ". '59.
'(. This suggestion $as ma!e to me in a conversation y /ottfrie! 0eeass.
'7. Hegel's reFection of utilitarianism in this conte>t has much in common $ith Hohn
.a$ls's reFection of he!onism as a $ay of !evising a !ecision "roce!ure for a "lan
of life T.a$ls4 A Theory of Hustice ?Camri!geC Harvar! University 2ress4 '9='@4
22. ((*;(7oU.
'=. ,artin Hei!egger4 -eing an! Time4 trans. Hohn ,acIuarrie an! E!$ar! .oinson
?Ne$ 1or#C Har"er R .o$4 '975@4 ". )*).
'+. Dieter Henrich4 E!itor's &ntro!uction to %2. igC )';)(.
Cha"ter *
'. 2hilonen#o em"hasiDes this $hen he "oints out that :ichte "osits mutual recognition
not sim"ly as a con!ition for self;consciousness4 ut as a con!ition in $hich
self;consciousness ecomes "ossileC E:ichte in fact $rites not that a man is a
man only among men4 ut that a man ecomes a man only among men.E Ale>is
2hilonen#o4 UOeuvre !e :ichte ?2arisC H. %rin4 '9+*@4 ". *7.
5. 0ee Hean 2iaget4 The ,oral Hu!gment of the Chil! ?Ne$ 1or#C Harcourt -race4
'9)5@A cf. Calvin 0. Hall an! /ar!ner Lin!Dey4 E2sychoanalytic Theory an! &ts
A""lications in the 0ocial 0ciences4E in Lin!Dey ?e!.@4 Han!oo# of 0ocial 2sychology4
%ol. ' ?Ne$ 1or#C A!!ison Hall4 '9(*@4 "". '*);'+6. This rea!ing of
:ichte's theory of recognition4 im"lying a form of socialiDation an! moral e!ucation4
has also een !evelo"e! very creatively y An!reas Wil!t4 Autonomie un!
Aner#ennung ?0tuttgartC 3lett Cotta %erlag4 '9+5@4 "". 5(9;5+).
). E,y free!om is "ossile only through the other's remaining in his s"hereA hence
in !eman!ing my free!om for all the future4 & !eman! that he limit himselfA an!
since he is free4 & !eman! it for all the futureC an! all this imme!iately4 in "ositing
myself as an in!ivi!ual. . . . -ut he can limit himself only in conseIuence of a
conce"t from me as a free eing. -ut & !eman! this limitation asolutelyA Ehence
& !eman! consistency from him4 i.e.4 that all his future conce"ts shoul! e !etermine!
y a certain "revious conce"t4 his cognition of me as a rational eingE
?/N. (5<=+@.
*. Again4 see An!reas Wil!t4 Autonomie un! Aner#ennung ?0tuttgartC 3lett Cotta
%erlag4 '9+5@4 "". 5(9;5+).
(. :or an illuminating !iscussion of the relation of Hegel's Hena theory of self;consciousness
to his overall "hiloso"hical "roFect4 see .oert 2i""in4 Hege%s &!ealism
?Camri!geC Camri!ge University 2ress4 '9+9@4 Cha"ter =. 2roaly the
57+
NOTE0 TO 22. + = ; ' 6 7
est stu!y of Hegel's Hena "erio! theory of recognition itself is Lu!$ig 0ie"4
Aner#ennung als 2rinDi" !er "ra#tischen 2hiloso"hie ?,unichC Aler4 '9=9@.
7. Thomas Hoes4 Leviathan &&<56 ?&n!iana"olisC -os;,errill4 '9(+@4 ". '7(.
=. Hoes4 Leviathan ''<564 ". '77.
+. Hoes4 Leviathan <<'*;'(4 "". '69;')5.
Cha"ter (
'. .ights as E"ermissionsE may e regar!e! as Hohfel!ian E"rivilegesE or Elierties4E
$hereas rights as E$arrantsE may e ta#en as Hohfel!ian Eclaim;rights.E Wesley
Ne$com Hohfel!4 :un!amental Legal Conce"tions ?Ne$ HavenC 1ale University
2ress4 '97*@.
5. Loc#e4 0econ! Treatise on /overnment4 e!. T. 2ear!on ?&n!iana"olisC -os;
,errill4 '9(5@4 N 5=.
). This "oint is em"hasiDe! y Alan .yan4 2ro"erty an! 2olitical Theory ?O>for!C
-lac#$ell4 '9+*@4 "". ')6;')'.
*. /. A. Cohen4 E0elf;O$nershi"4 Worl!;O$nershi" an! EIuality4E in :ran# Lucash
?e!.yrHustice an! EIuality Here an! No$ ?&thacaC Cornell University 2ress4
'9+7@4 "". '6+;')(A E0elf;O$nershi"4 Worl!;O$nershi" an! EIualityC 2art &&4E
0ocial 2hiloso"hy an! 2olicy F ?'9+7@4 ==;97.
(. Loc#e4 0econ! Treatise on /overnment4 N +=.
7. 0ee Christine 3orsgaar!4 E3ant's :ormula of Humanity4E 3ant;0tu!ien yy
?'9+7@4 '97;'9=.
=. Hohn .a$ls4 A Theory of Hustice ?Camri!ge4 ,AC Harvar! University 2ress4
'9='@4 "". '54 (6(4 (7'.
+. This is the $ay it is rea!4 for instance4 y Alan .yan4 2ro"erty an! 2olitical
Theory ?O>for!C -lac#$ell4 '9+*@4 ". '55.
9. That Hegel $as thin#ing of .eherg is in!icate! at %2.*C '97A cf. %2.iyC 59(.
'6. cf. .onal! D$or#in4 Ta#ing .ights 0eriously ?Camri!ge4 ,AC Harvar! University
2ress4 '9=+@4 ". >i.
''. Thomas Hoes4 Leviathan <<'*;'(4 <<<'=.
'5. The state has its Easolute rightE only ecause it is a rational state4 that is4 a
human community structure! in certain !eterminate $ays $hich ensure that the
values an! interests involve! in a mo!ern rational self;un!erstan!ing are "rotecte!
an! actualiDe!. Among other things4 a mo!ern state is a community that
treats its memers as "ersons an! "rotects their astract rightA to the e>tent that
some e>isting state fails to !o this4 it is !efective as a state. A EstateE that systematically
faile! to "rotect the astract rights of its citiDens4 or that $antonly tram"le!
on these rights4 $oul! not e a state at ailA it $oul! e a !es"otism ?2. N 5=6.4
". *5+<'=)@. As $e note! earlier ?Cha"ter )4 N '6@ Hegel "refers to s"ea# of
in!ivi!uals having rights $ithin the state rather than rights against the state ?2.
N 57'.@A $hat $e might regar! as an in!ivi!ual's rights against the state4 Hegel
"refers to see as a feature of the state as an institution that recogniDes an! guarantees
in!ivi!ual rights.
'). Carole 2ateman4 The 2rolem of 2olitical. Oligation ?-er#eley4 CAC University
of California 2ress4 '9+(@4 "". ''5;'').
'*. Hegel ignores the fact that restrictions on "rivate "ro"erty a""ly only to the
guar!ians in 2lato's state4 an! that they !o not necessarily fori! all "rivate "ro"erty4
even for the guar!ians. 0ee .e"ulic *'7;*'=.
'(. &f Hegel's !octrine on this "oint shoc#s us4 $e might com"are it $ith the teaching
579
NOTE0 TO 22. & O = ; & & 5
of :ichte4 $ho hol!s that in marriage it is the $ife only $ho surren!ers her "ersonalityA
marrie! men remain "ersons as efore4 $hereas marrie! $omen !o notC
EThe $ife elongs not to herself ut to her husan!E ?/N. )'5<*6'4 )5(;)57<
*'+@.
'7. Loc#e4 0econ! Treatise on /overnment4 N 5=.
Cha"ter 7
'. 0ee Hohn .a$ls4 ET$o Conce"ts of .ules4E 2hiloso"hical .evie$ 7* ?'9((@.
5. Thus in his '9)9 "a"er E2unishment4E H. D. ,aott errs in regar!ing himself
as a retriutivist for arguing that the institution of "unishment ?$hich he thin#s
$e a!o"t for various conseIuentialist reasons@ reIuires violations of the la$ to e
"unishe! sim"ly ecause they are violations of la$. The !istinction on $hich his
error turns is that et$een Fustifying a "ractice an! Fustifying a "articular action
falling un!er it4 $hich $as the suFect of Hohn .a$ls's '9(( "a"er ET$o Conce"ts
of .ules.E -oth "a"ers have een re"rinte! in .oert -air! an! 0tuart E. .osenaum
?e!s.@4 2hiloso"hy of 2unishment ?-uMaloC 2rometheus -oo#s4 '9++@.
). &t has sometimes een allege! that Hege2s FustiGcation of "unishment rests on
the i!ea that it has a morally e!ucative eMect on the "erson "unishe!. 0ee H. E.
,cTaggart4 EHege2s Theory of 2unishment4E &nternational Hournal of Ethics 7
?'+97@4 re"rinte! in /ertru!e EDors#y ?e!.@4 2hiloso"hical 2ers"ectives on 2unishment
?AlanyC 0UN1 2ress4 '9=5@A an! Hean Ham"ton4 EThe ,oral E!ucation
Theory of 2unishment4E in 2hiloso"hy an! 2ulic AMairs &H ?'9+*@4 56+.
-ut this i!eas has no real te>tual asis4 an! it Jies in the face of Hege2s assertion
that the "unishment of chil!ren y their "arents is !iMerent from the "unishment
of criminals "recisely ecause the latter aims at Fustice $hereas the former aims
at moral e!ucation an! not at Fustice ?2. N '=*@.
*. E2unishment is not an asolute en!. When this is asserte! either e>"ressly or
through "ro"ositions that ta#e such "remises as a tacit "resu""osition ?e.g.4 the
unmo!iGe! categorical assertion that $hoever has #ille! must !ie@4 no thought at
all is eing e>"resse!. 2unishment is only a means for the state's Gnal en!4 "ulic
safety4 an! its only intention is that harm can e "revente! y threatening itE
?/N. 575<)*(@. EAgainst our theory of "unishment generally . . . an asolute
right to "unish is set u"4 accor!ing to $hich Fu!icial "unishment is consi!ere!
not a means ut as itself an en!4 foun!e! on an inscrutale categorical im"erative.
- u t . . . $e can reFect this theory on the groun! of the inscrutaility of the "roofs
for its assertionsE ?/N. 5+5;5+)<)=5@.
(. Davi! E. Coo"er4 EHege2s Theory of 2unishment4E in V. -. 2elcDyns#i ?e!.@4
HegelOs 2hiloso"hy of .ightC 2rolems an! 2ers"ectives ?Camri!geC Camri!ge
University 2ress4 '9='@A cf. also Le$ Hinchman4 EHege2s Theory of Crime an!
2unishment4E .evie$ of 2olitics ** ?'9+5@A 2eter 0teinerger4 EHegel on Crime
an! 2unishment4E American 2olitical 0cience .evie$ ?'9+)@.
7. Hoel :einerg4 EThe E>"ressive :unction of 2unishment4E in /ertru!e EDors#y
?e!.@4 2hiloso"hical 2ers"ectives on 2unishment ?AlanyC 0UN1 2ress4 '9=5@.
=. Coo"er4 EHege2s Theory of 2unishment4E ". '7).
+. Coo"er4 EHege2s Theory of 2unishment4E ". '7*.
9. Hege2s conce"ts of Ea""earanceE ?Erscheinung@ an! Esho$E ?0chein@ are relate!
to his theory of truth4 reJective eing4 an! essence. This is a com"le> an! sutle
matter4 the most !eGnitive !iscussion of $hich is "roaly ,ichael Theunissen4
0ein un! 0chein ?:ran#furtC 0uhr#am"4 '9+6@. 0ee also Charles Taylor4 Hegel
5=6
NOTE0 TO 22. & & ) ; & 5 =
?Camri!geC Camri!ge University 2ress4 '9=(@4 Cha"ter ''A an! .oert
2i""in4 Hegel's &!ealism ?Camri!geC Camri!ge University 2ress4 '9+9@4
Cha"ter 9.
'6. &n this last "assage4 Hegel is "ara"hrasing 3ant ?.L )))<'65@.
''. Cesare -eccaria4 On Crimes an! 2unishments4 trans. Henry 2aolucci ?&n!iana"olisC
-os;,errill4 '97)@4 "". '5;').
'5. A contem"orary !efen!er of a similar vie$ is C. 0. Nino4 EA Consensual Theory
of 2unishment4E 2hiloso"hy an! 2ulic AMairs '5 ?'9+)@.
'). A similar theory of "unishment4 ascrie! ?some$hat creatively4 & thin#@ to 3ant4
ut lac#ing the foun!ation "rovi!e! y a :ichtean or Hegelian theory of recognition4
is !evelo"e! y E!mun! 2incoMs4 The .ationale of Legal 2unishment ?Ne$
1or#C Humanities 2ress4 '977@4 Cha"ter '.
'*. 0ee Davi! Lyons ?e!.@4 .ights ?-elmont4 CAC Wa!s$orth4 '9=9@4 &ntro!uction4
22; );*;
'(. Of course if the argument of N ( of this cha"ter is correct4 then Hegel's theory
!oes not Eman!ateE or reIuire that a criminal shoul! e "unishe! at all4 ut only
in!icates $hat may $ith right e !one to a criminal. &f that is right4 then it is o"en
to a follo$er of Hegel's theory to choose for its goo! conseIuences any "unishment
that the theory says is not unFust.
'7. This is not at all to say that theft or roery of ?'66 shoul! e "unishe! y a Gne
of only Hioo. Clearly a theft4 involving the forcile entry into my house4 or $orse
yet a roery involving a threat against my "erson4 is a much $orse serious violation
of my right than my eing or!ere! y a court to "ay a'66.
'=. -eccaria4 On Crimes an! 2unishments4 ". *(. -eccaria also consi!ers the "ossiility
that the state might #ill the oMen!er not y the right of "unishment ut y the
right of $ar4 !eeming this to e necessary for the "reservation of the state. He
reFects this !efense of the !eath "enalty also4 on the groun!s that life im"risonment
at har! laor $oul! al$ays e a greater !eterrent to any act than the !eath "enalty
?"". *7;(5@.
'+. Even those of us $ho elieve that "eo"le have a right to commit suici!e or "ermit
euthanasia might thin# that letting yourself e #ille! as "art of a contractual e>change
is $rong in much the same $ay that selling yourself into slavery is $rong.
'9. :or e>am"le4 see HeMrey H. .eiman4 EHustice4 CiviliDation an! the Death 2enalty4E
in .. -air! an! 0. .osenlum ?e!s.@4 2hiloso"hy of 2unishment ?-uMaloC
2rometheus 2ress4 '9++@.
56. -eccaria4 Of Crimes an! 2unishments4 ". *7.
5'. Hean Ham"ton4 EThe ,oral E!ucation Theory of 2unishment4E in 2hiloso"hy an!
2ulic AMairs &H ?'9+*@4 5)=.
55. Hean Ham"ton4 EThe ,oral E!ucation Theory of 2unishment4E 2hiloso"hy an!
2ulic AMairs &H ?'9+*@4 56+.
Cha"ter =
'. 0ee H. 0. Harris4 Hegel's Develo"mentC To$ar! the 0unlight '==6;'+6' ?O>for!C
O>for! University 2ress4 '9='@A an! .aymon! 2lant4 Hegel ?-loomingtonC
&n!iana University 2ress4 '9=)@. These are t$o of the many accounts of Hegel's
early !evelo"ment. 0ee also -ernar! Cullen4 Hegel's 0ocial an! 2olitical Thought
?Ne$ 1or#C 0t. ,artin's '9=9@4 Cha"ters ';*A Charles Taylor4 Hegel ?Camri!geC
Camri!ge University 2ress4 '9=(@4 Cha"ter 5A 0hlomo Avineri4 Hegel's
Theory of the ,o!ern 0tate ?Camri!geC Camri!ge University 2ress4 '9=5@4
5='
NOTE0 TO 22. & ) & ; ' ( (
Cha"ter 5A /. Lu#acs4 The 1oung Hegel4 trans. .o!ney Livingstone ?Camri!ge4
,AC ,&T 2ress4 '9=(@A Laurence Dic#ey4 HegelC .eligion4 Economics an! the
2olitics of 0"irit lyyo;i0oy ?Camri!ge University 2ress4 '9+=@.
5. Hegel ha!4 of course4 use! the term 0ittlich#eit efore4 for instance4 in the DiMerence
?D 9)<'();'(*@A ut it is only in :aith an! 3no$le!ge that he egan to use
the term in its !istinctively Hegelian sense4 in $hich it is o""ose! to ,oralitat.
). Concerning the term E"olice state4E ho$ever4 see Cha"ter '*4 note ''.
*. The economics an! sociology "resente! in this e>am"le is inten!e! to e "urely
hy"othetical. To loo# at the e>tent to $hich Hegel might en!orse it4 see Cha"ter
HQ N =.
Cha"ter +
'. The meaning of this last sentence is unclear. Does Hegel mean that no arsonist
?ho$ever thoughtless@ coul! "ossily have een ignorant of the fact that a set Gre
might s"rea! out of controlB &f so44 then he "roaly un!erestimates the thoughtlessness
of some arsonists. Does he "erha"s mean that $e are FustiGe! in treating the
arsonist as if he #ne$ it4 $hether he !i! or notB That thought $oul! seem more
a""ro"riate to a !iscussion of legal accountaility than moral res"onsiilityA Hegel
!i! not al$ays a!eIuately atten! to this !istinction ?see N 5 of this cha"ter@. Whatever
Hegel's meaning is4 the intent of the remar# is "lainly to reconcile this "rovision
of his theory of res"onsiility $ith the im"lications of his term Eright of #no$le!ge.E
5. 0ee -ernar! Williams4 E&nternal an! E>ternal .easons4E ,oral Luc# ?Camri!geC
Camri!ge University 2ress4 '9+'@4 "". '6';'').
). 0ee Thomas Nagel4 E,oral Luc#4E ,ortal Puestions ?Camri!geC Camri!ge
University 2ress4 '9=9@A an! -ernar! Williams4 E,oral Luc#4E ,oral Luc#.
*. %2.iy4 note '5(4 "". )6);)6*.
(. 0ee Christine 3orsgaar!4 E3ant's :ormula of Humanity4E 3ant;0tu!ien yy
?'9+7@4 '974 566;565.
7. That is4 Fust as in the !ictionary any $or! eginning $ith EAE comes efore any
$or! eginning $ith E-4E so any right has "riority over any amount of $ell;eing.
0ee .a$ls4 A Theory of Hustice ?Camri!ge4 ,AC Harvar! University 2ress4
'9='@4 "". *5;*).
=. 0ee -arara Herman4 EOn the %alue of Acting from the ,otive of Duty4E The
2hiloso"hical .evie$ go ?'9+'@4 )=*;)=7.
+. 0ee 2aul Dietrichson4 EWhat Does 3ant ,ean y 'Acting from Duty'BE in .. 2.
WolM ?e!.@4 3antC A Collection of Critical Essays ?/ar!en CityC Doule!ay4
'97=@A an! Allen Woo!4 3ant's ,oral .eligion ?&thacaC Cornell University 2ress4
'9=6@4 "". 5*(;5*=.
9. 0ee Herman4 EOn the %alue of Acting from the ,otive of Duty4E "". )=7;)+5.
'6. 0ee .ichar! 0chacht4 EHegel on :ree!om4E in A. ,aclntyre ?e!.@4 HegelC A Col;
lection of Critical Essays ?/ar!en CityC Doule!ay4 '9=5@4 ". )69A an! /. H. ..
2ar#inson4 EHegel's Conce"t of :ree!om4E in ,. &n $oo! ?e!.@4 Hegel ?O>for!C
O>for! University 2ress4 '9+(@4 ". '(7.
Cha"ter 9
'. H. 0. ,ill4 Utilitarianism4 e!. /eorge 0her ?&n!iana"olisC Hac#ett4 '9=9@4 ". *.
5. /ottlo August Tittel4 UerHerr3ants ,oralreform ?:ran#furtC 2fahler4 '=+7@4
5=5
NOTE0 TO 22. ' ( 7 ; ' + 6
"". '*;'(4 )5;)7. Cf. :re! -eiser4 The :ate of .eason ?Camri!ge4 ,AC Harvar!
University 2ress4 '9+=@4 "". '+(;'+7.
). 0ee Thomas 2ogge4 EThe Categorical &m"erative4E in Otfrie! HoMe ?e!.@4 /run!legung
Dur ,eta"hysi# !er0ittenC Ein #oo"erativer 3ommentar ?:ran#furtC %ittorio
3ostermann4 '9+9@.
*. Here & follo$ the inter"retation of the formula of universal la$ !evelo"e! y
Onora Nell ?O'Neill@4 Acting on 2rinci"leC An Essay on 3antian Ethics ?Ne$
1or#C Columia University 2ress4 '9=(@4 Cha"ters ';(.
(. & o$e this "oint to the te>t of an un"ulishe! lecture on Hegelian ethics y Ernst
Tugen!hat.
7. The novels of Ayn .an! sometimes "rovi!e mo!erately "ersuasive Gctional accounts
of such fantastic eings.
=. Arthur 0cho"enhauer4 The Worl! as Will an! .e"resentation4 trans. E. :. H.
2ayne ?Ne$ 1or#C Dover4 '979@4 < C (5(.
+. Hegel may also inten! slyly to suggest that the latter has to e the real ma>im of
those $ho hel" others. He may inten! to call our intention to the hy"ocrisy
of those $ho engage in charitale !ee!s in or!er to e>ercise "o$er over those
they Ehel"E ; or at least to feel su"erior to them. Or he may have in min! the
"oint that those $ho give real4 eMective hel" to others on a regular asis must
ta#e on that tas# as a concrete vocation4 an! Gn! self;satisfaction in it. He is
certainly right to e sus"icious of moralists $ho e>hort us to hel" others $ithout
e>"laining ho$ our eMorts are to e rationally integrate! into our o$n lives or
the larger life of society. These "oints may all e $ell;ta#en4 ut they !o not
sho$ that the ma>im EHel" the "oorcE ?ta#en in the sense 3ant means it@ contra!icts
itself.
9. This e>am"le is from -ruce Aune4 3ant's ,oral 2hiloso"hy ?2rincetonC
2rinceton University 2ress4 '9=+@4 "". '5);'5(.
'6. 0ee ,arcus 0inger4 /eneraliDation in Ethics ?Ne$ 1or#C Alfre! 3no"f4 '97'@4
"". 595;59(A Dieter Henrich4 EDas 2rolem !er /run!legung !er Ethi#
ei 3ant un! im s"e#ulativen &!ealismus4E in 2. Engelhar!t ?e!.@4 0ein un!
Ethos ?,ainD4 '97)@A An!reas Wil!t4 Autonomie un! Aner#ennung ?0tuttgartC
3lett;Cotta %erlag4 '9+5@4 "". +*;97A Christine 3orsgaar!4 E3ant's :ormula
of Universal La$4E 2aciGc 2hiloso"hical Puarterly 77 ?'9+(@A an! Onora
Nell ?O'Neill@4 Acting on 2rinci"le4 es"ecially Cha"ter (. An e>ce"tion to the
rule is ,ichael Har!imon4 &n!ivi!ual ,orality an! .ational 0ocial LifeC A
0tu!y of Hegel's Ethics ?University of Chicago4 2h.D. !issertation F '9+(@4
Cha"ter '.
''. 0ee my oo# 3ant's ,oral .eligion ?&thacaC Cornell University 2ress4 '9@=6@4 "".
*]Q;(5;
'5. Later4 ho$ever4 $e $ill e>"lore the "ossiility that ethical life !eals more satisfactorily
$ith !uties to others involving E!iMerential "ullE= ?see Cha"ter '54 N )@.
Cha"ter '6
'. 0ee E. Hirsch4 EDie -eisetDung !er .omanti#er in Hegels 2hanmenologie4E
Deutsche %iertelFahrschrift fur Literatur$issenschaft un! /eistesgeschichte 5
?'95*@4 ('7;(55A Otto 2oggeler4 Hegels 3riti# !er .omanti# ?-onnC Ahan!lungen
Dur 2hiloso"hic4 2sychologie un! 2a!agogi#C -!. *4 '9(7@.
5O .ichar! 2regiDer4 Die "olitischen &!een !es 3arl :ollen ?TuigenC ,hr4 '9'5@4
". =6A an! 3. /. :aer4 E0tu!ent un! 2oliti# in er ersten !eutschen -ursc3en;
5=)
NOTE0 TO 22. '+6;'+(
schaft4E /eschichte in Wissenschaft un! Unterricht 5' ?5' ?'9=6@4 ==. Cf. 3arl;
HeinD &lting4 %2. 'C *+;*9.
). 0uch sentiments $ere actually e>"resse! y Hegel's colleague4 the :riesian theologian
,artin Leerecht !e Wette ?'=+6;'+*9@ in a letter to 0an!'s motherA the
letter $as interce"te! y the authorities4 an! !e Wette $as !ismisse! from his
"rofessorshi" in theology at -erlin ?restore! in '+5)@. ?0ee 3. A. von ,uller4
3arlLu!$ig0an! T,unichC C. H. -ec#4 '95(U4 ". '=7A an! &lting4 %2. 'C *+.@
Though Hegel a""arently sym"athiDe! $ith !e Wette's "light ?contriuting to a
fun! for his su""ort@4 he strongly !isa""rove! of his statement. &lting argues that
"rior to '+'9 Hegel ha! ta#en a more "ermissive attitu!e to$ar! such acts as
"olitical assassination an! tyrannici!e4 an! hence that he must have change! his
min! ?&lting4 %2. 'C *9;(64 7)@. -ut this conclusion is un$arrante!. Throughout
his career Hegel al$ays insists that a Emoral intentionE can never e>cuse or
Fustify an act that is $rong ?2h/ '' *5(A %2.iyC +)A 2. N '574.@. At the same
time4 Hegel al$ays thought that "olitical assassination ?or at least tyrannici!e@
coul! e FustiGe! in some circumstances. Hegel evi!ently elieve! that 0an!'s
assassination of 3otDeue4 ho$ever4 $as not such a case4 an! that 0an!'s conviction
to the contrary coul! not Fustify either him or his act of mur!er.
*. Aristotle4 Nicomachean Ethics FCa4 '''*);'''*.
(. Of course4 sometimes those $ho ta#e the $rong si!e in moral !is"utes !eceive
themselves an! are $e!!e! to their "osition y interest or "reFu!ice rather than
argument. -ut this can eIually e the "sychology of those $ho ta#e the right si!e
of the !is"ute. &t seems gratuitous an! "ernicious to assume a "riori that it must
e the "sychology of at least one si!e in every moral !is"ute. &f $e go into every
moral !is"ute $ith this assum"tion4 then $e "reclu!e ta#ing the arguments of
oth si!es at face valueA $e seem com"elle! to inter"ret one si!e's attem"ts at
rational argument as no more than rationaliDations of a "osition that the arguer
cannot really elieve. That "reclu!es from the start the sort of honest an! o"en
!ialogue on moral Iuestions $hich :ichte himself regar!s as in!is"ensale to the
common life of free rational eings ?0L 5)7;5*'<5*6;5*7@.
7. 0ee Alan Donagan4 The Theory of ,orality ?ChicagoC University of Chicago
2ress4 '9==@4 "". ')6;')*.
=. Although :ries's name is never mentione!4 the allusions to him m2. N '*6. are
"lain enough. Hegel's rief mention of the ethics of conviction in the 2reface
!oes mention :ries e>"licitly ?2. 2reface '=4 5)@. Hegel also inter"rets :ries's
?3antian@ !enial that $e can #no$ the thing in itself as the Eso;calle! "hiloso"hy
$hich says that the truth is un#no$aleE ?2. 2reface '=@4 an! it is un!er this
same lael that he !escries the ethics of conviction in 2. N '*6. ?". 5=)@. Hegel's
references in this conte>t to "olitical assassination ?%2. *C )++;)+9@ also
suggest that he has :ollen an! 0an! in min!.
+. H. :. :ries4 letter of Hanuary 74 '+5'4 in /unther Nicolin ?e!.@4 Hegel in -erichten
seiner Veitgenossen ?HamurgC :eli> ,einer4 '9=6@4 ". 55'. Of course this is
really not true at allA it is aout eIual in viciousness an! unfairness to Hegel's
charge that :ries's ethics of conviction "rovi!es a FustiGcation for any mis!ee!.
The most that coul! e sai! is that Hegel's !e"iction of his o$n theory ?chieJy
in the 2reface@ is !esigne!4 from motives of self;"rotection4 to !eem"hasiDe an!
!isguise its "rogressive an! reformist as"ects. &t is not at all certain that Hegel
$as violating his conscience in !oing this4 though it is un!erstan!ale that4
:ries ; alrea!y a "rou! martyr ar the han!s of the reaction ; might $ant4 in such
matters4 to hol! Hegel to stan!ar!s that Hegel never share!.
5=*
NOTE0 TO 22. ' + 7 ; ' + 9
9. This $ay of "utting it rings out a similarity et$een the ethics of conviction an!
3ier#egaar!'s Etruth is suFectivityEC
&f one $ho lives in the mi!st of Christen!om goes u" to the house of /o!4 the
house of the true /o!4 $ith the true conce"tion of /o! in his #no$le!ge4 an!
"rays4 ut "rays in a false s"iritA an! one $ho lives in an i!olatrous community
"rays $ith the entire "assion of the inGnite4 though his eyes rest u"on the image
of an i!olA $here is there most truthB The one "rays in truth to /o! though he
$orshi"s an i!olA the other "rays falsely to the true /o!4 an! hence $orshi"s in
fact an i!ol. T3ier#egaar!4 Conclu!ing UnscientiGc 2ostscri"t4 trans. Walter Lo$rie
?2rincetonC 2rinceton University 2ress4 '9*'@4 "". '=9;'+6U
This story ma#es sense only if $e su""ose that the true /o! ?unli#e the /o! of
&srael@ is entirely free of Fealousy ; very "artial to $orshi""ers4 ut in!iMerent as
to $hether they !eci!e to ma#e him or something else their oFect of $orshi". &f
it turns out that you are save! eIually no matter $hat you elieve in4 then ?contrary
to 3ier#egaar!'s usual "rotestations@ there ceases to e any ris# at all in
ta#ing the lea" of faith. Or rather4 the only real ris# is that you $ill come to
elieve the !octrine that truth is suFectivityA for4 since on that !octrine all faiths
are eIually saving4 an! none of them involves any ris# for me an! & cannot elieve
anything $ith the "assion atten!ing an inGnite ris#4 the !octrine that truth is
suFectivity guarantees that any lea" $ill e to safety4 an! thus insures that my
elief ?$hatever its content@ $ill e comfortale4 lu#e$arm4 an! lac#ing in "assion.
'6. 2hili""a :oot4 E,oral -eliefs4E 2rocee!ings of the Aristotelian 0ociety ?'9(+@.
''. We nee! only thin# of 2ascal's account of Hesuitical casuistry4 to $hich Hegel
allu!es ?2. N '*6.@. 2ascal imagines the Hesuit giving moral a!vice to a $ealthy
"atron4 sha"ing the a!vice more to the !esires an! interests of the "atron than to
the !eman!s of morality or religion. &n this connection4 he Iuotes the o"inion of
the Hesuit :ather LaymanC EA !octor4 $hen consulte!4 may give a!vice not
merely "roale accor!ing to his o"inion4 ut contrary to his o"inion4 if it is
consi!ere! "roale y others4 $hen this vie$4 contrary to his o$n4 ha""ens to
"rove more favorale an! attractive to the "erson consulting himE ?-laise 2ascal4
The 2rovincial Letters4 trans. A. H. 3railsheimer ?Harmon!s$orthC 2enguin4
'97=@4 ". +*@.
'5. The only $ay to "reserve a total allegiance to one's suFective conviction4 Hegel
suggests4 is to go a ste" further than the ethics of conviction !oes4 an! say that
T/oo!ness itselfU is something constructe! y my conviction4 sustaine! y me
alone4 an! that &4 as lor! an! master4 can ma#e it come an! go. As soon as &
relate myself to something oFective4 it ceases to e>ist for me4 an! so & am "oise!
aove an immense voi!4 conFuring u" sha"es an! !estroying them. This su"remely
suFective "oint of vie$ can arise only in a cultivate! age in $hich faith
has lost its seriousness4 $hich e>ists essentially only in the vanity of all things.
?2. N '*6A@
This vie$ Hegel associates $ith :rie!rich 0chlegel's theory of irony4 $hose im"ort
he ta#es to e o"enly immoralisticC E&n this sha"e4 suFectivity is conscious
of the vanity of all ethical content in the $ay of rights4 !uties4 an! la$s4 an! is
accor!ingly evilE ?2. N '*6@. This clearly involves a misun!erstan!ing of 0chlegel
?"erha"s a !elierate an! malicious one@. The .omantic conce"t of irony is not
a mere lac# of seriousness4 ut a res"onse to $hat 0chlegel sees as the "ara!o>ical
5=(
NOTE0 TO 22. ' + 9 ; 5 O &
human situation of eing ?religiously@ conscious of asolute inGnitu!e4 yet inca"ale
of e>"ressing this consciousness a!eIuately in language4 $hich elongs to
the every!ay Gnite human $orl!. T0ee Ernst -ehler4 E:rie!rich 0chlegel un!
Hegel4 Hegel;0tu!ienE 5 ?'97)@A an! Hans Eichner4 :rie!rich 0chlegel ?Ne$
1or#C T$ayne4 '9=6@4 "". 79;=(.U -ut Hegel's "olemics are not $holly a result
of misun!erstan!ing. 0chlegel thin#s that as Gnite creatures $e are !oome! to a
con!ition of alienation from the inGnite or !ivine4 an! so our most "rofoun!
relation to it must al$ays involve a #in! of self;!etachment. Hegel's "hiloso"hy4
on the contrary4 is an attem"t to Gn! the inGnite immanent in the $orl!4 to
overcome the .omantics' alienation through a rational com"rehension of the actual
$hich enales us to feel at home in our every!ay lives4 in our relationshi"s
to others4 in human language4 even in the life of state. The .omantic attitu!e4
usually $ithout religious scenery in the ac#groun!4 Jourishes in our o$n century.
Usually it ta#es the form of a so"histicate! survival;mechanism in res"onse
to social alienation an! !es"air ; ranging from "o"ular attitu!es ?Ehi"E an!
EcoolEA see Cha"ter )4 note ')@ to the highly intellectualiDe! aesthetic of much
t$entieth;century "oetry4 an! tren!s in recent "hiloso"hy4 $hich vie$ reason
itself as the !ee"est enemy of free!om4 an! clever self;!estructiveness as thought's
only means to lierate itself.
'). Aristotle4 Nicomachean Ethics F C )4 '''6D59.
'*. This sensile "rinci"le is4 ho$ever4 one that $oul! e !iLcult to acce"t if you are
a moral s#e"tic or noncognitivist4 since if there is no such thing as moral #no$le!ge
at all4 then our moral ignorance is al$ays totalA so4 follo$ing Hegel's "rinci"le4 no
one is ever to lame for anything. The conclusion & !ra$ from this is that Hegel's
"rinci"le is "erfectly all right4 an! that moral s#e"ticism an! noncognitivism have
asur! conseIuences. Cf. Nicholas 0turgeon4 EWhat DiMerence Does &t ,a#e &f
,oral .ealism &s TrueBE 0outhern Hournal of2hiloso"hy 5* ?'9+7@4 '57;'5=.
'(. This "oint is forcefully !irecte! against Hegel y Ernst Tugen!hat4 0elf Consciousness
an! 0elf;De termination4 trans. 2aul 0tern ?Camri!ge4 ,AC ,&T
2ress4 '9+7@4 Lecture '*. -ut Tugen!hat overstates his case in su""osing that
Hegel is hostile to critical reJection on social norms. &nstea!4 for the "ur"oses of
the 2hiloso"hy of .ight he is su""osing a rational state ?see aove4 &ntro!uction
N 7@4 an! hence that correct reJection $ill al$ays !iscover that the norms of
society are rational. As $e shall see in the ne>t cha"ter4 Hegel's conce"tion of
ethical life itself involves something li#e a critical reJection on society as it e>ists4
though Hegel has his reasons ?oth "hiloso"hical an! "olitical@ for not em"hasiDing
this in the 2hiloso"hy of .ight.
'7. 0ee .oert ,errihe$ A!ams4 E&nvoluntary 0ins4E The 2hiloso"hical .evie$ 9*
?'9+(@O );)';
Cha"ter ''
'. 0ometimes Hegel also uses Ethi# to signify ,oralitat an! 0ittlich#eit ta#en together
?see Wer#e '+C ***;**(@.
5. Cf. 0o"hocles4 Antigone4 lines *((;*(=.
). Hohn 0tuart ,ill4 On Lierty4 e!. EliDaeth .a"a"ort ?&n!iana"olisC Hac#ett4
'9=+@A Cha"ter ).
*. EWhen & $ill $hat is rational4 then & act not as a "articular in!ivi!ual ut in
accor!ance $ith the conce"ts of ethics in general. &n an ethical action4 $hat &
5=7
NOTE0 TO 22. 5 6 5 ; 5 & (
vin!icate is not myself ut the thing ?0ache@. . . . The rational is the high roa!
$here everyone travels ut no one is cons"icuousE ?2. N. '(A@.
(. 0ee ,ichael 0an!el ?e!.@4 Lieralism an! &ts Critics ?O>for!C -lac#$ell4 '9+*@.
7. :or instance4 Onora O'Neill4 EEthical .easoning an! &!eological 2luralism4E
Ethics g+ ?'9++@4 refers to these critics re"eate!ly as EHegeliansE an! uses the
term 0ittlich#eit to !enote the various fol#$ays that the critics e>alt aove the
stan!ar!s of Western lieralism. No lieral moralist4 ho$ever4 coul! e any more
hostile than Hegel is to ,aclntyre's notion that $e $oul! e etter oM in a "remo!ern
society governe! y hait an! tra!ition than $e are in a mo!ern social
or!er foun!e! on the conce"tions of human in!ivi!uals as right;earing "ersons
an! reJective moral suFects.
=. Charles Louis !e 0econ!at4 -aron !e ,ontesIuieu4 The 0"irit of the La$s4 trans.
T. Nugent ?Ne$ 1or#C Hafner4 '975@4 =C'C)4 2; \;
+. Hegel !oes argue that the American states are re"ulican only ecause they are
E"hysically not fully !evelo"e!4 an! even less a!vance! in terms of their "olitical
organiDation. . . . North America $ill e com"arale $ith Euro"e only after the
measureless s"ace $hich this country aMor!s is Glle! an! its civil society egins
to "ress in u"on itselfE ?%/ 569<'=6@.
Cha"ter '5
'. Amartya 0en4 E.ational :ools4E in :ran# Hahn an! ,artin Hollis ?e!s.@4 2hiloso"hy
an! Economic Theory ?O>for! University 2ress4 '9=9@4 "". +=;'69.
5. Christina HoM 0ommers4 E:ilial,orality4n Hournal of 2hiloso"hy +F ?'9+7@4 **('.
). 0ommers4 E:ilial ,orality4E "". *();*(*.
*. 0ommers4 E:ilial ,orality4E ". *(7.
(. 2eter .ail ton4 EAlienation4 ConseIuentialism4 an! the Deman!s of ,orality4E
2hiloso"hy an! 2ulic AMairs &H ?'9+*@4 ')*;'='.
7. .ailton4 EAlienation4 ConseIuentialism4 an! the Deman!s of ,orality4E ". '((.
=. Henry 0i!g$ic#4 The ,etho!s of Ethics ?&n!iana"olisC Hac#ett4 '9+'@4 "". *95;
*9(. The est;#no$n recent argument for this conclusion is y -ernar! Williams4
EA CritiIue of Utilitarianism4E in H. H. C. 0mart an! -ernar! Williams ?e!s.@4
Utilitarianism :or an! Against ?Camri!geC Camri!ge University 2ress4 '9=)@.
&t has also een argue! recently that conseIuentialists have an es"ecially har!
time reconciling their !octrine $ith the #in!s of commitment involve! in "ersonal
relationshi"sA see William Wilco>4 EEgoists4 ConseIuentialists an! Their
:rien!s4E 2hiloso"hy an! 2ulic AMairs '7 ?'9+=@.
+. .ailton !oes a goo! Fo of ma#ing this "oint ?EAlienation4 ConseIuentialism4 an!
the Deman!s of ,orality4E "". '*7;'*+@.
9.. 2erha"s Hegel comes !angerously close to !eman!ing this in the EantinomianE
"hase of his ethical thought4 !uring the :ran#furt "erio! ?see aove4 Cha"ter =4
N )@. :or there he thin#s that the goo! $ill acts s"ontaneously out of love4 an!
every moral reJection on its acts ren!ers them im"ure an! hy"ocritical.
'6. 0ee Aristotle4 Nicomachean Ethics '67()'54 ''67+'(;)6.
''. Aristotle4 Nicomachean Ethics ''6=a4 2. N '(6.A cf. 3ant's reFection of the i!ea
that virtue is a mean4 TL *6*<7(.
'5. EThe /ree# heroes ste" forth in a "re;legal age4 or they are themselves the foun!ers
of states4 so that right an! social or!er4 la$ an! custom ?0itte@4 "rocee! from
them4 an! actualiDe themselves as their in!ivi!ual $or#4 remaining connecte! to
5==
NOTE0 TO 22. 5 ' = ; 5 5 5
them. &n this $ay Hercules $as "raise! y the ancients themselves4 an! stan!s
there as an i!eal of original an! heroic virtue. His free an! self;!e"en!ent virtue4
in $hich he cham"ione! the right an! attle! against the monstrosities of men
an! nature4 is not the universal con!ition of the age4 ut elongs e>clusively an!
"ro"erly to himE ?%A 'C 5*6;5*'<5(6@.
'). Hean 2iaget4 The ,oral Hu!gment of the Chil!4 trans. ,arForie /aain ?/lencoe4
&LC :ree 2ress4 i976@4 ". '+.
'*. La$rence 3ohlerg4 Essays in ,oral Develo"ment4 %ol. 5C The 2sychology of
,oral Develo"ment ?0an :ranciscoC Har"er an! .o$4 '9+*@4 "". '=5;'==. Cf.
the "hiloso"hical use ma!e of this !evelo"mental "sychology y Hiirgen Haermas4
E,oral Develo"ment an! Ego &!entityE an! EThe Develo"ment of Normative
0tructures4E Communication an! the Evolution of 0ociety ?-ostonC -eacon
2ress4 '9=9@. The em"hasis "lace! y Haermas ?EThe Develo"ment of Normative
0tructures4E "". ''7;'59@ o n institutional !iMerentiation an! rationaliDation
in mo!ern society accor!s $ell $ith Hegel's treatment of mo!ern ethical life.
'(. :or a goo! !iscussion of this "assage4 see Lu!$ig 0ie"4 EThe Aufheung of ,orality
in Ethical Life4E in L. 0te"elevich an! D. Lam ?e!s.@4 HegelOs 2hiloso"hy
of Action ?Atlantic Highlan!s4 NHC Humanities 2ress4 '9+)@4 "". '*7;'().
Cha"ter ')
'. Hegel uses such language not ecause he E$orshi"s the state4E ut ecause he
$ants to insist on the immanence of /o! in the $orl! ; "articularly in the s"iritual
$orl! of human society an! history. He o""oses $hat he sees as the Emonstrous
!iselief in natureE foun! in ancient Here$ religion4 for $hich the $orl!4
Eif not a nothing4 is su""ose! to e sustaine! y a /o! alien to it4 $ho is to
"arta#e of nothing in nature4 ut y $hom everything is to e !ominate!E ?TH
5=*4 5H9<ETW '+54 '+=@A Hegel eIually criticiDes the Eunha""y consciousnessE
of me!ieval Christianity4 $hich vie$s /o! as an unchangeale Eeyon!4E se"arate!
from the Gnite human self sorro$ing over its sinfulness4 consuming itself
in yearning4 !evotion4 an! self;mortiGcation4 relating to /o! only through !egra!ing
suservience to a "riesthoo! ?2h/ f t 567;5)6@. He $ants his "hiloso"hy
to e more in the s"irit of ancient /ree# fol# religion4 $hich vie$e! nature oth
$ithin us an! aroun! us as a manifestation of the !ivine4 an! unite! "eo"le's
religious life $ith their service to the state. Hegel $ants to e the "hiloso"her of
a truer Christianity4 for $hom /o! actualiDes himself in the $orl! y ta#ing a
human form an! is !irectly "resent to us in the Es"iritE ; the human community.
5. Hegel regar!s "olitical su"remacy4 an! even military success4 as "laying a role in
a nation's historical !ominance. Thus Hegel treats the /ree# victory over the
2ersians as the victory of the /ree# "rinci"le over the Oriental one ?%2/ )');
)'7<5(7;57+@A an! the !efeat of the ,ace!onian 3ing 2erseus y the .omans in
'*7 -.C. as the transition of the /ree# "rinci"le into the .oman one ?%2/ ))=;
))+<5==@. :urther4 Hegel's theory of history harmoniDes $ith the im"erialist mentality
of nineteenth;century Euro"eans. ECiviliDe!E nations4 he says4 are correct to
treat ac#$ar! ones as ararians4 having an EuneIual rightE an! only a EformalE
in!e"en!ence ?2. N )('@4 At the very least4 Hegel sees the $orl! historical nation
as one that "ossesses "olitical autonomy ?2. N )55@A $hen a once !ominant nation
loses its autonomy4 Hegel ta#es this as a sign that its time is "ast ?2. N )*=.@.
1et the !ominance of a nation for Hegel consists not in "olitical rule over other
nations ut in the currency of its "rinci"le4 as e>"ressing the highest conce"t that
5=+
NOTE0 TO 22. 5 5 ) ; 5 5 7
s"irit has yet forme! of itself. This is not something that coul! e create! y
mere military4 "olitical4 or economic mightA at most4 Hegel sees military conIuest
an! "olitical or economic hegemony as instruments y $hich the !ominant nation
!isseminates its "rinci"le.
Hegel's account of his theory is also highly mislea!ing if it sometimes suggests
that each nation has a !istinct "rinci"le an! that at any given time there is only
a single !ominant nation state. When $e loo# at the four E$orl! historical realmsE
into $hich Hegel !ivi!es history ?the Oriental4 the /ree#4 the .oman4 the /ermanic@4
$e see that only one of them ?the .oman@ is characteriDe! y the !ominance
of a single nation state. ,ore ty"ically4 a $orl! historical realm ty"ically
involves the "revalence of a certain #in! of state4 or the "reeminence of a family
of states4 sharing a single $orl! historical "rinci"le. This is clearly the $ay in
$hich Hegel vie$s the mo!ern $orl! ?the /ermanic realm@4 in $hich the Euro"ean
nations are the !ominant onesC EThe Euro"ean nations form a family4 in
accor!ance $ith the common "rinci"le of their legislation4 their customs ?0itten@4
an! their culture ?-il!ung@E ?2. N ))9A@.
). EThis !issolution through thought is necessarily at the same time the "ro!uction
of a ne$ "rinci"le. The universal essence Tof the nation's ol! "rinci"leU is "reserve!4
ut its universality as such is lifte! out of it. The "revious "rinci"le is
transGgure! y universality. 0"irit4 in its ne$ in$ar! !etermination4 has ne$
interests an! en!s eyon! those $hich it formerly "ossesse!E ?%/ '=9<'*=@.
*. This same o"timistic elief $as later e>"resse! y ,ar> $hen he sai!C EHumanity
sets itself only such tas#s as it can solveE T,ar> Engels 0electe! Wor#s ?in one
volume@ ?Ne$ 1or#C &nternational 2ulishers4 '9==@4 ". '+)U.
(. Hegel !oes not have a Egreat manE theory of history in Carlyle's sense. He !oes
not elieve that the course of history is !etermine! y $hat certain e>traor!inary
in!ivi!uals ha""en to $ill4 or that things $ill go etter in human aMairs if "eo"le
honor their heroes than if they !on't. :or Hegel the course of history is set y
the nee!s of s"irit an! the gro$th of its self;#no$le!ge. The in!ivi!uals $ho
facilitate the satisfaction of these nee!s are sim"ly the necessary instruments of
s"irit's "ur"ose. They achieve their en!s ecause they have a #in! of insight into
$hat the time reIuires. &f this in!ivi!ual ha! not ha""ene! to articulate the nee!s
of the time4 someone else $oul! have. Hegel's vie$ $as very $ell articulate! later
y 2le#hanov4 in his critiIue of Egreat manE theoriesC
TThe great manU "oints to the ne$ social nee!s create! y the "rece!ing !evelo"ment
of social relationshi"sA he ta#es the initiative in satisfying these nee!s.
He is a hero. -ut he is a hero not in the sense that he can sto" or change the
natural course of things4 ut in the sense that his activities are the conscious
an! free e>"ression of this inevitale an! conscious course. Herein lies all his
signiGcanceA herein lies his $hole "o$er. -ut this signiGcance is colossal4 an!
the "o$er is terrile. T/. 2le#hanov4 :un!amental 2rolems of ,ar>ism4 ?'+9+@
?.e"rintC Ne$ 1or#C &nternational 2ulishers4 '979@4 ". '=7U
7. 0hlomo Avineri THege%s Theory of the ,o!ern 0tate ?Camri!geC Camri!ge
University 2ress4 '9=5@4 ". 5))U Gn!s Hegel's vie$ inconsistent at this "oint4
claiming that Hegel !escries the $orl! historical in!ivi!ual Eas4 alternatively4 ?'@
$holly conscious of the i!ea of history an! its !evelo"mentA ?5@ only instinctively
conscious of itA an! ?)@ totally una$are of it.E Hegel "roaly hel! ?5@A & !out
that he hel! either ?'@ or ?)@. Avineri cites no "assage4 ho$ever4 in $hich Hegel
commits himself to any of ?i@;?)@4 much less to all three simultaneously. &n the
5=9
NOTE0 TO 22. 5 5 = ; 5 ) )
case of ?'@4 the "assage Avineri Iuotes is the one Iuote! at the eginning of this
"aragra"hA it says only that the $orl! historical in!ivi!ual E#no$sE the higher
universal an! ma#es it his en!A it !oes not say that either the #no$le!ge or the
"ur"osiveness involves conscious rational com"rehension of the universal. The
"assage he Iuotes in favor of ?5@ says that ETCaesarU acte! instinctively to ring
to "ass $hat the times reIuire!4E an! says nothing either $ay aout Caesar's
a$areness of $hat the times reIuire!. The "assage Avineri Iuotes in favor of ?)@
says that $orl! historical in!ivi!uals have Eno consciousness of the &!ea as suchE<4
that oviously !oes not say that they are totally una$are of it. &n the "aragra"h
to $hich this note is a""en!e!4 & have trie! to in!icate the #in! of historical
a$areness Hegel attriutes to $orl! historical in!ivi!uals.
=. 2assion is not far from $hat $e earlier ?Cha"ter )4 N =@ calle! Emonomania4E an!
!istinguishe! from the total4 harmonious satisfaction of !esires that constitutes
ha""iness.
+. ENo man is a hero to his valet !e chamreE is usually attriute! to ,arie !e
.autin;Chantal4 ,arIuise !e 0evigne ?'757;'797@. -ut the est evi!ence4 a
letter y Charlotte Elisaeth Aisse ?'79(;'=))@4 attriutes it to ,me. Cornuel
?'76(;'79*@C E& remin! you of $hat ,me. Cornuel sai!4 that there is no hero at
all for his valet !e chamre4 an! no fathers of the church for their contem"orariesE
WLettres !e ,ile. Aisse a ,me. Calen!rini ?2arisC 0toc#4 Delamain R -outelleau4
'9*)@4 letter of August ')4 '=5+. Cf. alsoC E:e$ ,en Have -een A!mire!
y Their DomesticsE T,ontaigne ?'());'(95@4 Essays F C 5UA $hen the ,ace!onian
general Antigonus ?c.)+5;)6' -.C.@4 $as !escrie! y Hermo!otus as E0on
of the 0un4E he re"lie!C E,y servant is not a$are of itE ?Iuote! y 2lutarch4
A"othegms4 EAntigonusE@. Hegel $as the Grst to a!!C E1et not ecause the former
is no hero4 ut rather ecause the latter is only a valet !e chamreE ?2h/ ' 77(@.
T$o years later4 /oethe use! the saying ?$ith a slightly !iMerent version of Hegel's
$ry a!!ition@ in the novel Die Wahlver$an!tschaften ?EElective ALnitiesE@
?'+6+@C EThere is4 it is sai!4 no hero for his chamer servant. That is only ecause
a hero can e recogniDe! only y a hero. The servant $ill "roaly #no$ ho$ to
evaluate only his eIualsE TElective ALnities4 2art (4 Cha"ter 5C EOttilie's !iaryEA
/oethe4 Wer#e4 e!. Erich TrunD ?,unichC -ec#4 '9+5@4 7C )9+A cf. %/ '6*<+=U.
9. Dostoyevs#y4 Crime an! 2unishment4 trans. Davi! ,agarshac# ?Harmon!s$orthC
2enguin4 '9('@4 ". ((5.
'6. The "oint $as a""reciate! y the Devil $ho a""ears to &van 3aramaDov in his
!eliriumC E 'All things are la$ful'4 an! that's the en! of itc That's all very charmingA
ut if you $ant to s$in!le4 $hy !o you $ant a moral sanction for !oing itB
-ut that's our mo!ern .ussian all over. He can't ring himself to s$in!le $ithout
a moral sanctionE TDostoyevs#y4 The -rothers 3aramaDov4 trans. Constance /arnett
?Ne$ 1or#C .an!om House4 '9(6@4 "". =+9;=96U.
''. 3arl 2o""er4 The 2overty of His toricism ?-ostonC -eacon4 '9(=@4 "". i>;>.
'5. 2o""er4 The 2overty of Historicism4 "". +);++. -ecause 2o""er's !iscussions of
Hegel an! ,ar> are characteriDe! every$here y unrelenting hostility foun!e!
on ignorant igotry4 he never a""reciates the e>tent to $hich Hegel antici"ates
oth his o$n conclusions an! his EantihistoricistE argument for themA nor !oes
he realiDe the e>tent to $hich ,ar> has ta#en the same consi!erations into account
in formulating his theory of revolutionary "ractice.
'). 0ee ,ar>4 Ca"ital ?Ne$ 1or#C &nternational 2ulishers4 '97=@4 < C '=A ,ar>
Engels 0electe! Wor#s ?in one volume@ ?Ne$ 1or#C &nternational 2ulishers4
'97+@4 "". 59*;59(.
5+6
NOTE0 TO 22. 5 ) * ; 5 ) 9
'*. ,ar> Engels Wer#e ?-erlinC DietD %erlag4 '97';'977@ F C )(A cf. ,ar> Engels
Collecte! Wor#s ?Ne$ 1or#C &nternational 2ulishers4 '9=(;@4 ( C *9.
'(. & have !iscusse! this "oint at length in other $ritingsA see E,ar> Against ,orality4E
in 2eter 0inger ?e!.@4 A Com"anion to Ethics ?O>for!C -lac#$ell4 '996@A
E,ar>'s &mmoralism4E in Chavance ?e!.@4 ,ar> en "ers"ective ?2arisC E!itions
!e 2Ecole !es Hautes Etu!es en 0ciences 0ociales4 '9+(@A EHustice an! Class &nterests4E
2hiloso"hica )) ?'9+*@A 3arl ,ar> ?Lon!onC .out le!ge4 '9+'@4 Cha"ters
9;'6.
Cha"ter '*
'. Cf. 2lato4 .e"ulic *56A Aristotle4 Nicomachean Ethics 'C54 '69*D=;'64 2olitics
'C' '5(5)(.
5. ET2rivateU en!s constitute an! re"ro!uce themselves for the $ell;eing of in!ivi!uals4
ut resolve themselves into the $ell;eing of the universal. The universal
in the state !oes not let the "articular en!s ossify as such4 ut ma#es them resolve
themselves ever again into the universal en!E ?%2.'= Ci**@.
). 0ince in!ivi!uals must enter the s"here of laor an! nee! satisfaction as free
"ersons4 then there is no longer any social legitimacy for the 0tamm4 aroun!
$hich feu!al society4 an! much of earlier agrarian life4 $ere organiDe! ?2. N
'==@. The mo!ern family4 unli#e the clan4 is not an ai!ing social structureA its
!uration is limite! to a single generation4 since it is !estine! to !issolve as the
chil!ren reach maturity an! ta#e their "lace as "ersons in civil society ?2. N '+6@
an! foun! ne$ families of their o$n ?2. N '==@. The only legitimate family is
the ourgeois nuclear family ; ty"ically a husan!4 a $ife4 an! their minor chil!ren
?2. N '=5@. :rom the stan!"oint of civil society4 each family constitutes a
single "erson4 $hose "ro"erty or resources are o$ne! in common ?2. N '79@.
The in!ivi!ual family memers retain the status of "ersons $ith rights4 even
though these rights a""ear as such only $ith the !issolution of the family itself ;
as in cases of !ivorce ?2. N '=7@ or the !ivision of the family resources $hen the
hea! of the family !ies ?2. N '=+@.
*. Li#e that other great nineteenth;century anti!emocrat Hohn 0tuart ,ill4 Hegel is
a Grm eliever in government4 not y the "o"ulace generally ut y an e!ucate!
class of e>"erts ?2. N 59'@. ,ill e>"resses Hegel's "osition Iuite $ell in "assages
li#e the follo$ingC
The "ro"er !uty of a re"resentative assemly in regar! to matters of a!ministration
is not to !eci!e them y its o$n vote4 ut to ta#e care that the "ersons
$ho have to !eci!e them shall e the "ro"er "ersons. . . . &t is eIually true4
though only of late an! slo$ly eginning to e ac#no$le!ge!4 that a numerous
assemly is as little Gtte! for the !irect usiness of legislation as for that of a!ministration.
There is har!ly any #in! of intellectual $or# $hich so much nee!s to
e !one4 not only to e>"erience! an! e>ercise! min!s4 ut y min!s traine! to
the tas# through long an! laorious stu!y4 as the usiness of ma#ing la$s. THohn
0tuart ,ill4 On .e"resentative /overnment4 e!. C. 0hiel!s ?&n!iana"olisC
-os;,errill4 '9(+@4 "". =*;=7U
1et Hegel also insiste! that in an ethical life characteriDe! y the "rinci"le of
suFective free!om4 citiDens are concerne! aout the universal usiness of the
$holeA they form suFective o"inions aout it4 an! !eman! that their vie$s e
rought to ear on the "olitical state. Thus li#e ,ill4 Hegel also regar!e! re"re;
5+'
NOTE0 TO 22. 5 * 6 ; 5 * '
sentative institutions as essential to the mo!ern state4 serving not only as an ultimate
chec# on the "o$er of the government ?2. NN 59=4 )65@4 ut also4 most
im"ortantly4 as a vehicle for the free e>"ression of "ulic o"inion in "olitical
aMairs through the "ulic e>change of everyone's vie$s on matters of universal
concern ?2. NN )694 )'*@. Again4 ,ill's $or!s are a"tC
&nstea! of the function of governing4 for $hich it is ra!ically unGt4 the "ro"er
oLce of a re"resentative assemly is to $atch an! control the governmentA to
thro$ the light of "ulicity on its actsA to com"el a full e>"osition an! FustiGcation
of all of them $hich anyone consi!ers Iuestionale. . . . &n a!!ition to this4 the
2arliament has an oLce4 not inferior even to this in im"ortanceC to e at once
the nation's Committee of /rievances an! its Congress of O"inions ; an arena in
$hich not only the general o"inion of the nation4 ut that of every section of it4
an! as far as "ossile of every eminent in!ivi!ual $hom it contains4 can "ro!uce
itself in full light an! challenge !iscussionA $here every "erson in the country
may count u"on Gn!ing someo!y $ho s"ea#s his min!4 as $ell as or etter than
he coul! s"ea# it himself4 not to frien!s an! "artisans e>clusively4 ut in the
face of o""onents4 to e teste! y a!verse controversy. ?,ill4 On .e"resentative
/overnment4 "". +';+5@
(. &t may hel" us to ta#e Hegel's "osition on this more seriously if $e reJect on the
im"ortance ?es"ecially in this latter age of mass communication@ of the "resi!ent's
or "rime minister's function4 in a mo!ern re"resentative re"ulic4 as the symolic
re"resentative or "ersoniGcation of the state. The Hegelian constitutional monarch
!iMers most from the hea!s of state $ith $hich $e are more familiar in
having less actual "olitical "o$er than they !o ?2. NN 5=9A4 5+6A@. .eal "o$er
in the Hegelian rational state is su""ose! to lie $ith a "rofessional governing
class4 un!er the $atchful eye of a re"resentative estates assemly $ith the "o$er
to recall any "articular ministry an! re"lace it $ith another ?%2.'=C '+=@. &t is
im"ortant to Hegel that the state's "ersoniGe! sovereignty shoul! remain inviolale4
an! hence that it not e confuse! $ith the ministers $ho must ear res"onsiility
for controversial acts an! "olicies of the state ?%2.'= C '7*A %2.ig C 5*7@.
Hegel argues that it is "recisely ecause the state's "olicies are not at the mercy
of the in!ivi!ual Fu!gment of the sovereign "rince that it is a""ro"riate for this
to e an Eimme!iateE in!ivi!ual $ho comes y the "osition EnaturallyE through
here!ity ?2. N 5+6@.
7. &n Hegel's /erman4 of course4 the term Ecor"orationE ?3or"oratton@ !oes not
mean ?as in English@ the A#tiengesellschaft or incor"orate! limite! liaility Grm
?in English4 Lt!. or &nc.A in /erman4 /mH ; /esellschaft mit eschran#erHaftung@.
&t refers instea! to a fello$shi" or guil! ?/enossenschaft4 Vunft@ ma!e u"
of "eo"le $ho follo$ the same tra!e or "rofession. 0trictly s"ea#ing4 for Hegel a
Ecor"orationE is any society oLcially recogniDe! y the "olitical state that is not
itself a "art of the "olitical state. Thus Hegel counts munici"al governments ?2.
N 5++@ an! churches ?2. N 5=6.@ as Ecor"orations4E along $ith "rofessional
guil!s. He seems to inten! that estates re"resentation shoul! e organiDe! aroun!
cor"orations in this roa!er sense4 as $hen he s"ea#s of re"resentatives !ra$n
from Eassociations4 communities an! cor"orationsE ?N )6+A munici"al re"resentatives
$ere "rominent in the 2russian estates "ro"ose! in the '+'9 constitutional
"lans of Humol!t an! Har!energ4 to $hich the "olitical constitution of 2.
ears a strong resemlance@. &n this cha"ter4 ho$ever4 $e $ill e concerne! $ith
5+5
NOTE0 TO 22. 5 * ' ; 5 ( *
cor"orations in the narro$er sense4 as tra!e or "rofessional organiDations $ithin
the economic s"here.
=. The EestatesE ?0tan!e@ as a re"resentative o!y must e foun!e! on the cor"orate
organiDation of the 0tan!e of civil society ?2. N )6).@. De"uties to the estates
are to re"resent !eterminate4 organiDe! ranches of civil society ?2. N )6+@. Only
in this $ay can $e ma#e "rovision for all to feel that their concrete interests an!
vie$"oint are re"resente!A $hen re"resentatives are electe! from the "o"ulace at
large or y mere geogra"hical !istricts4 in!ivi!uals are alienate! from the state
rather than integrate! into it y the election "rocess. EAs for mass elections in
large states4 it shoul! e note! that the electorate inevitaly ecomes in!iMerent
in vie$ of the fact that a single vote has little eMect $hen numers are so largeA
ho$ever highly they are urge! to value the right to vote4 those $ho enFoy this
right $ill sim"ly fail to ma#e use of itE ?2. N )''@.
+. Emile Dur#heim4 0uici!e4 trans. Hohn A. 0"aul!ing an! /eorge 0im"son ?/lencoe4
&LC :ree 2ress4 '9('@4 "". 5*';5=7.
9. Dur#heim4 0uici!e4 "". '(5;5'7.
'6. Nancy Cho!oro$4 The .e"ro!uction of ,otheringC 2sychoanalysis an! the 0ociology
of /en!er ?-er#eleyC University of California 2ress4 '9=+@A Carol /illigan4
&n a DiMerent %oiceC 2sychological Theory an! Women's Devel!"ment ?Camri!ge4
,AC Harvar! University 2ress4 '9+5@.
''. Hegel !eGnes E"oliceE as Ethe state insofar as it relates to civil societyE ?%2.igC
'+=@. This usage $as in his !ay not the least i!iosynctratic. Until the mi!nineteenth
century4 the $or! 2oliDei in /erman inclu!e! all the functions of the state
that su""orte! an! regulate civil society4 inclu!ing "ulic $or#s4 uil!ing regulation4
Gre "rotection4 "ulic health4 an! "oor relief. &t $as not until after '+*6
that the term came to e limite! to the state function of maintaining "eace an!
or!er. 0ee /. C. von Unruh4 E2oliDei4 2oliDei$issenschaft un! 3ameralisti#4E in
3. /. A. Heserich4 Hans 2ohl4 an! /. C. von Unruh ?e!s.@4 Deutsche %er$altungsgeschichte
?0tuttgartC Deutsche %erlagsanstalt4 '9+)@4 < C )++;*5=.
'5. E!uar! /ans4 Naturrecht un! Universalrechtsgeschichte4 e!. ,. .ie!el ?0tuttgartC
3lett;Cotta4 '9+'@4 ". 95.
'). Henning Ottmann4 EHegelsche Logi# un! .echts"hiloso"hie. UnDulangliche -emer#ungen
Du einem ungelosten 2rolem4E in Dieter Henrich an! .olf;2eter
Horstmann ?e!s.@4 Hegels 2hiloso"hie !es .echtsC Die Theorie !er .echtsformen
un! ihre Logi# ?0tuttgartC 3lett;Cotta4 '9+5@4 ". )++.
'*. 0hlomo Avineri4 Hegel's Theory of the ,o!ern 0tate ?Camri!geC Camri!ge
University 2ress4 '9=5@4 ". '(*.
'(. 3laus Hartmann4 ETo$ar!s a Ne$ 0ystematic .ea!ing of Hegel's 2hiloso"hy of
.ight4OO in V. A. 2elcDyns#i ?e!.@4 The 0tate an! Civil 0ocietyC 0tu!ies in Hegel's
2olitical 2hiloso"hy ?Camri!geC Camri!ge University 2ress4 '9+*@4 ". '56.
The same solution is suggeste! in the same volume y /aris 3ortian4 E0uFectivity
an! Civil 0ociety4E ". 56(.
'7. -ernar! 1ac#4 The Longing for Total .evolution ?2rincetonC 2rinceton University
2ress4 '977@4 "". 556;555. 0ee aove4 Cha"ter 54 note '9.
'=. Hohn ,cCumer4 EContra!iction an! .esolution in the 0tateC Hegel's Covert
%ie$E Clio '9 ?'9+7@.
'+. Hegel's conce"tion of the right of necessity is roa!er than the i!ea of a right to
secure one's "hysical survival in case of a momentary emergency. When he ta#es
this right4 for instance4 to groun! the .oman legal notion of a eneGcium com"e;
5+)
NOTE0 TO 22. 5 ( ( ; 5 ( +
tentiae guaranteeing that a !etor $ill not e !e"rive! of the resources necessary
to carry on his tra!e W2. N '5=.@4 Hegel in!icates that he inter"rets the right of
necessity in close association $ith civil society's !uty to "rovi!e a livelihoo! for
each of its memers. TWhen he ta#es the right of necessity in his roa! sense to
overri!e other rights4 Hegel merely mo!erates :ichte's contention that $hen the
e>tent of your "ro"erty leaves you unale to earn your livelihoo!4 the "ro"erty
of others imme!iately ceases to e theirs an! ecomes yours ?/N. 5'5;5'*<59);
59*@;U
'9. ,cCumer !escries Hegel's references to the Eright of !istressE an! the rale's
Ein!ignationE as culminating in Ethe rage of a FustiGe! revolutionE ?EContra!iction
an! .esolution in the 0tate4E ". )+5@. & ho"e & have ma!e it clear alrea!y
$hy this has to e regar!e! as a misinter"retation.
Conclusion
'. %ictor Cousin4 E0ouvenirs !'Allemagne4E .evue !es !eu> mon!es ?August4
'+77@4 7'7;7'=.
5. .u!olf Haym4 Hegel un! seine Veit ?-erlinC .u!olf /aertner4 '+(=@4 ". )7+A cf.
,anfre! .ie!el4 ,aterialien Du Hegels .echts"hiloso"hie ?:ran#furtC 0uhr#am"4
i9=(@_ HQ )=(;
5+*
&n!e>
a "riori4 i4 .57' .
aortion4 9=4 '+6;'4 5*7
Asicht4 see intention
asolute oe!ience4 '6(
acting from !uty4 '*7;+4 '7=;=54 5'=
action ?Han!lung@4 '*6;5
actuality ?Wir#lich#eit@4 '6;''4 ')4 5'+;56
A!ams4 .oert ,errihe$4 57)4 5=7
aesthetic Fu!gment4 '=+
aesthetic man4 764 57=;+
agricultural estate ?ac#erauen!e 0tan!4
-auernstan!@4 5*)
Aisse[ Charlotte Elisaeth4 5+6
AFa>4 '*6
Ale>an!er of ,ace!onia4 557
alienation4 7;=4 5*4 '5+4 '()4 5694 5'5Z'*4
5=+
all things are la$ful4 5+6
Altenstein4 3arl von4 ')
America4 56=4 5==
amoralism4 55)4 55+;)'4 5)*;74 5+'
Aner#ennung4 see recognition
anomy4 5*'
Antigone4 '9(4 5*(4 5=7
Antigonus4 ,ace!onian general4 5+6
antinomianism4 '594 5==
antinomy4 5;*4 9+4 57'
a""earance ?Erscheinung@4 '64 ''54 '9=4 5=6A
see also actualityA illusion
aritrariness ?Will#ur@4 554 5(4 *+4 764 ==4
5*64 575
Aristotle4 94 '54 '*4 '=4 564 ()4 ((;=4 =64 '+'4
.'+94 5'*;'(4 57)4 57=4 5=*4 5=74 5==
Arnaul!4 Antoine4 (*4 57=
arson4 '*'4 '954 5=5
art4 5'9;56
articulation ?/lie!erung@4 5664 5**
assassination4 "olitical4 '=+4 '+6;'4 '954 5=*
atomicity4 56';54 5*64 5(+
aufheen4 see su"erse!e
Augustine4 0aint4 (=
Aune4 -ruce4 5=)
Aureol4 2eter4 57=
Austria4 56=
authenticity4 .5'7
autonomy4 )'4 )9;*'4 '5+;94 ')'4 '*74 '(6;
)A see also free!om
Avineri4 0hlomo4 5*+4 5(64 5754 57)4 5='4
5=9;+64 5+)
eatiGc vision4 (=4 57=
-eccaria4 Cesare4 ''*4 '5'4 5='
-egriM4 see conce"t
-ehler4 Ernst4 5=7
eing $ith oneself ?-eisichselstsein@.4 *(;('4
5)+4 .577A see also free!om
-eiser4 :re!eric# C 4 5=)
eneGcium com"etentiae4 5+);*
-entham4 Heremy4 *'4 57(
-erlin4 &saiah4 )+4 *';54 (54 57*4 57(4 577 ;
-eschliessen4 see resolving
-estimmung4 see !etermination
ifurcation ?EntD$eiung@4 9
-il!ung4 see culture
lame4 '+6;(4 '9';5
-oleyn4 Anne4 '*=
-osanIuet4 -ernar!4 **
-ra!ley4 :rancis Herert4 **
-ran!t4 .ichar!4 ))4 57)
-u#o$s#i4 Charles4 77
urgher ?-ulger4 ouigeois@4 5=4 594 56=A see
also civil society
usiness estate ?0tan! !es /eucers@4 5664 5*)
Caesar4 Hulius4 557;=4 5R\
ca"italism4 '6=4 5*=;((
Carlsa! Decrees4 '=+
Carlyle4 Thomas4 5=9
Carritt4 E. :.4 57*
Cassirer4 Ernst4 (4 57'
casuistry4 '=(
causality4 "sychological4 '(6
censorshi"4 '5
certainty4 '=7;=
Cervantes4 ,iguel4 5'7
Chalyaus4 Heinrich ,oritD4 );*
character ?Chara#ter@4 5*4 '=(4 5'*
charity4 '(9;764 5((
Charlemagne4 557
chil!ren4 )*4 +64 9(4 9=4 '*54 5674 5'6
O(
&NDEK
Cho!oro$4 Nancy4 5*(4 5+)
choosing ?W!hlen@4 (9;764 7+;9
Christianity4 =4 ');'*4 5);(4 (=4 +*4 '5=;+4
')). i=*Q 56=. 5*(. 5=+
citiDen ?-urger4 citoyen@4 5=;+
civil servants ?allgemeine 0tan!@4 566;'4 5*)
civil society ?urgerliche /essellschaft@4 57;+4
5)9;*)4 5*=;((4 5(=;764 57)4 5+'4 5+)
class4 5('
classicism4 =4 56'
coercion ?V$ang@4 )=4 +'
cogniDance ?3enntnis@4 '+9;96
Cohen4 /. A.4 974 579
collective eneGt4 '7(
collective rationality4 '7(;=
colonialism4 56*;(4 5*+4 5=+
commercial estate ?Han!elstan!@4 566
commitment4 5''
communism4 5)*
communitarianism4 565;)4 5'54 5(9
com"atiilism4 '('
conce"t ?-egriM@4 5'9A moments of4 '+A see
also in!ivi!ualA "articularA universal
conscience ?/e$issen@4 '(64 '=*;954 '9+A
e!ucaility of4 '=+A formal4 '+=A infalliility
of4 '==;9A truthful4 '+=
conseIuentialism4 >iii4 )6;'4 5');'*4 5==
constitution4 ')4 56);(4 555
Constitution of -ayonne4 56=;+
contingency ?Vufallig#eit@4 '64 =*4 '*+4 5'94
5*94 575
contract ?%ertrag@4 964 99;'6'4 '');'*4 ''7A
social4 +64 +54 '654 ''*
conviction ?UerDeugung@4 '==4 '+);*4 5=*O_
see also ethics of convictionA :ries4 Ha#o
:rie!rich
Ecool4E 57=;+4 5=7
Coo"er4 Davi!4 m 4 5=6
Cornuel4 ,me.4 5+6
cor"oration4 limite! liaility4 '6)4 5+5
cor"oration ?3or"oration@4 5=4 56';54 5*6;)4
5(+4 5+5;)
cosm"olitanism4 594 5674 56+
Cousin4 %ictor4 5(=;+4 5+*
crime ?%errechen@4 '694 5)'4 5()4 5(9A
nullity of4 '>5;'(4 ''=A against the state4
''+;'9
Cullen4 -ernar!4 57)4 5='
culture ?-il!ung@4 5*;(4 =64 974 '))4 5'74 5=9
custom ?0itte@4 '9(4 '9+4 5654 5==4 5=9
!ar#ening of moral consciousness4 '==
Dasein4 see e>istence
!e %ries4 Willem4 57'4 57=
!e Wette4 ,artin Leerecht4 5=*
!eath "enalty4 '5';54 5='
!eca!ence4 5554 55*4 5)(
!econstruction4 5=7
!ee! ?Tat@4 '*6
!emagogue "ersecutions4 '=+
!eman! ?AuMor!erung@4 =+;+6
!emocracy4 5+'
!eontologism4 >iii4 )6;'
!e"osit4 '(7;=4 '(9
Descartes4 .ene[ '4 (4 '94 (*4 '=7;=4 57=
!esiraility characteriDation4 '*'
!esire ?-egier!e@4 +*
!es"air4 76
!etermination ?-estimmung@4 '54 564 )54 *=;
9
!eterminism4 "sychological4 '(6;)
!ialectic4 ';*4 '94 55)4 5*+;9
Dic#ey4 Laurence4 5=5
Dietrichson4 2aul4 5=5
E!iMerential "ull4E 5'';'*4 5=)
!is"lacement ?%erstettung@4 '()
!is"osition ?/esinnung@4 56(;74 5'=A ethical4
566;'4 5694 5'*4 5'+A moral4 '*9;(6A
"olitical4 see "atriotism
!ivorce4 5+'
Donagan4 Alan4 '+54 5=*
Dostoyevs#y4 :yo!or4 ''=4 5)'4 5+6
!rives ?Triee@4 )=4 *=;94 (+;764 7+4 '(6;'4
'=6
Dur#heim4 Emile4 5*';54 5+)
!uties4 !octrine of ?2Jichtenlehre@4 5'4 '(*4
'=5
!uty ?2Jicht@4 (6;'4 =);*A ethical4 569;'*4
5)(4 5(74 5(9A see also relationshi"s4 !uties
of
D$or#in4 .onal!4 579
economics4 5''4 5)9;*)
e!ucation ?ErDiehung@4 =9;+64 5=6
egoism4 (7;+4 5*5A see also eu!aimonismA
selGshness
Eichner4 Hans4 5=7
em"tiness charge4 stronger an! $ea#er form
of4 '(*;(4 '=5;)A see also moral la$4
em"tiness of
en! ?V$ec#@4 '79;=54 '99;5664 577
Engels4 :rie!rich4 5))
Enlightenment4 >iii;>iv4 =4 *)4 '6*4 '5+4 '9(;
74 '9=4 5674 56+4 5'5
EntD$eiung4 see ifurcation
E"ictetus4 *(4 577
E"icurus4 ((4 57=
EeIual "ull4E 5'';'*
error4 moral4 '+6;)4 '+9;964 5)64 5=*
Erscheinung4 see a""earance
5+7
&NDEK
estate ?0tan!@4 ')4 5=4 566;54 5'74 5+)
Estates ?0t!n!e4 0tan!eversammlung@4 see
estateA re"resentative government
ethical ?sittitch@4 "eForative use of term4 5'=
ethical life ?0ittlich#eit@4 554 5(;74 (64 9+4
'5=4 ')64 ')';)4 i9)b5)7_ 5(74 5=54 5=+A
ancient /ree#4 55;)4 (=4 '5=4 '*64 '954
5664 56*4 5674 5'(;'74 5554 5)+4 5==4 5=+A
as harmony of reason an! sense4 ')5A
mo!ern4 5(;)64 '=(4 56(;+4 5)=;((A
oFective si!e of4 '9(;56+A as organism4
')5A suFective si!e of4 '97;+4 569;'+
ethical theoryC classical4 =4 564 )'4 ();+A
Hegelian4 >iii;>iv4 7;=*A #in!s of4 )6;'A
self;actualiDation theory as !istinct #in! of4
)6;)A self;!efeat of4 5'5;'*
ethics4 limits of4 5'9;)(4 5*9Q 5(OQ
ethics ?Ethi#@4 9*4'9(4 5=7
ethics of conviction ?UerDeugungsethi#@4
'=+;+9A see also :ries4 Ha#o :rie!rich
ethnocentrism4 56*;(
eu!aimonism4 )'4 =6;'4 '7*;7A see also
ha""iness
Eu!o>us4 ((
evi!ence4 '=7;+
evil ?-ose@4 '=*4 '+*;(4 '+7;=
e>istence ?Dasein@4 '6;''4 =';54 5'74 5*6
e>istentialism4 (4 '()
e>"erience ?Erfahrung@4 '94 5')
e>"ressivism4 7
:aer4 /.4 5=)
fact of reason4 '7=
falliility4 '==;+
family ?:amilie@4 57;+4 '674 56=4 5694 5'64
5*64 5*)4 5*74 5+'
:einerg4 Hoel4 no4 5=6
feu!alism4 *)4 56)4 5+'
Gat iustitia4 "ereat mun!us4 '*7
:ichte4 Hohann /ottlie4 )4 =4 '54 5)4 )74 ('4
9(4 '664 '*74 '=*4 '+';54 55'4 57(4 57+4
5=*4 5+*A allege! atheism4 ')'A conce"t of
free!om4 )94 *);(4 *=;+A moral
e"istemology4 '(74 '=7;+A "rinci"le of
morality4 '(74 '=7A as re"resentative of
Emorality4E ')';5A theory of "unishment4
'694 5=6A theory of recognition4 ==;+)4 +94
9'A theory of self;a$areness4 '=;'+4 ==;+'A
vie$s on marriage4 579;=6
:ilmer4 .oert4 *'
Gnitu!e4 '()
:ollen4 3arl4 '=9;+64 5=)4 5=*
:oot4 2hili""a4 '+74 5=(
:orster4 ,ichael4 57'
:ranciscans4 57=
:ran#furt4 Harry4 57=
free!om ?:reiheit@t 564 )54 )7;(54 '994 5664
5'=4 5)64 5)=;+4 5(74 5(9;764 57(;7A
asolute4 )+;*64 =6;'4 '9'A astract an!
concrete4 )+A civil4 >iv4 )+4 *'4 ('A formal4
)=4 *'4 ==4 '(64 57*A #in!s of4 )+A an!
necessity4 '('A negative4 )+4 *+4 ==A
oFective4 )+A "ersonal4 55;)4 )+4 *'4 ('A
"olitical4 )+A "ositive4 )+A suFective4 5);(4
5+4 )+4 ('4 (=4 5564 5)+;*)4 5*(4 5((4 5(=;
94 5+';5
:rench .evolution4 )+4 *'4 '664 56=4 5(=4 57(
:rie!rich Wilhelm &&&4 3ing of 2russia4 ')
:rie!rich Wilhelm &%4 3ing of 2russia4 '*
:ries4 Ha#o :rie!rich4 '=(4 '=+;0=4 56)4
5=*A antisemitism of4 '+7;=A ethics of
conviction4 '=+;+=A rivalry $ith Hegel4
'=+A as victim of "ersecution4 '=+4 5=*
:ul!a4 Hans;:rie!rich4 57)
/ans4 E!uar!4 >iv4 5*+4 5+)
/e!iegenheit4 see nole sim"licity
/eist4 see s"irit
/eistes$issenschaften4 see human sciences
/emut4 see heart
gen!er !iMerentiation4 5*);7
genius4 moral4 '=*4 '=7
/ermanic realm ?germanische .eich@4 5)4 ')*4
56+4 5554 57)4 5=9
/esinnung4 see !is"osition
/e$ere4 see usiness estateA "rofession
/illigan4 Carol4 5*(4 5+)
/o!4 *4 '64 5*4 5'9;564 5=(4 5=+A eatiGc
vision of4 (=4 57=A Fealous4 5=(
/oethe4 Hohann Wolfgang von4 =4 5+6
goo! ?/ut@4 '=4 )'4 (=4 '99A astract4 '+7A
living4 '994 5'6
/ree# realm ?griechische .eich@4 see ethical
life4 ancient /ree#
groun!4 oFective4 '75;+
/ueroult4 ,artial4 57'
/uyer4 2aul4 57*
Haermas4 Hurgen4 5=+ <
hait ?/ev>hnheit4 ethos@4 5'*4 5'+
Hall4 Calvin4 57+
Haller4 3arl Lu!$ig von4 5*7
Ham"ton4 Hean4 5=64 5='
han!icraft estate ?Han!$er#sstan!@4 566
Han!lung4 see action
ha""iness ?/luc#selig#eit@4 564 ();='4 '*(4
'(54 55=4 5594 57=4 5+6A in!eterminacy of4
7);7A as issue of oFectivity4 ();7A
suFectivity of4 ((;+4 76;)A $hy $e care
aout it4 77;=6A see also eu!aimonism
5+=
&NDEK
Har!energ4 :rie!rich von4 see Novalis
Har!energ4 3arl August von4 ')4 r+74 5*54
5(=4 5754 5+5
Har!imon4 ,ichael4 5=)
Harris4 H. 0.4 5='
Hartmann4 3laus4 5*+;94 5+)
Haym4 .u!olf4 5(=;+4 57*4 5+*
heart ?/emut@4 5*;(4 5'(4 5('
he!onism4 754 55(4 57+A see also "leasure
Hegel4 /eorg Wilhelm :rie!richC -erne an!
Tuigen "erio!4 '5=;+A conce"tion of
goo!4 '*7A conce"tion of "hiloso"hical
science4 >iii4 ';7A DiMerence -et$een
:ichte's an! 0chelling's 0ystem of
2hiloso"hy ?'+6'@4 74 94 ')'4 '7+A
Encyclo"e!ia of 2hiloso"hical 0ciences
?'+'=4 rev. '+5=4 '+)6@4 *4 5'4 =+4 +*4 ++;
964 ')*4 '754 '7+4 '=6;='A ethical theory4
>iii;>iv4 +;'64 '(;=*A :aith an! 3no$le!ge
?'+65@4 ')'4 '7+;94 5=5A :ran#furt "erio!4
'5+;)'4 5694 5==A inJuence of4 >iii;>iv4 (4
5(9;76A Hena "erio!4 '4 *;(4 ''94 ')';)4
'((. i(+_ l7o_ l7+_ 565X)4 56(;74 5'=4 5774
57+A Hena .eal"hiloso"hie4 +(;74 ''94 56'4
56(;7A lectures on right4 >iv;>v4 ')4 '('4
57'A 0atural .ight ?'+65@4 ')';)54 565;)4
56(A oscurity of his $ritings4 >ivA
2henomenology of0"int ?'+6=@4 '4 *4 +);+4
96. i))_ H()_ l7+_ O=\_ l'*0Q l +=. 56(;74
5=+A "hiloso"hy of history4 5'9;)7A
2hiloso"hy of .ight ?'+5'@4 74 +4 '';'*4 56;
'4 )';54 *)4 *9;('4 (+4 964 ')*4 '7+4 '=54
'=*;(4 l9RO '9+;94 56)4 56+4 5'';'54 5'+4
55*4 5)54 5)=4 5(7;+4 5+5A "hiloso"hy of
the state4 >iii;>iv4 (;74 '6;')4 5'9;5'4
5)=;*)A 0cience of Logic ?'+'54 '+'7@4 =4
7)4 =54 ')=A EThe /erman ConstitutionE
?'+6'@4 57';5A theory of recognition4 +);
9)A theory of universals4 7);*A vie$s on
non;Euro"ean "eo"les4 9)4 56*;(A vie$s on
"olitical oligation4 '6(A vie$s on $omen4
574 9)4 5*);7
Hegelianism4 (
Hei!egger4 ,artin4 =4 57+
Henrich4 Dieter4 =*4 5754 57+4 5=)
Henry %&&&4 3ing of Englan!4 '*=4 '()
Hera#les4 5'(4 5=+
Her!er4 Hohann /ottfrie!4 565
Herman4 -arara4 5=5
Hermo!otus4 5+6
hero ?Hel!@4 '*94 5'(;'74 557;+4 5==;+4 5=9;
+6
Hinchman4 Le$is4 5=6
Ehi"4E see EcoolE
Hirsch4 E.4 5=)
history4 see $orl! history
Hoes4 Thomas4 *'4 9';54 '654 57=4 579A
conce"t of ha""iness4 (*A on !es"otical
!ominion4 +=
Hohfel!4 Wesley Ne$com4 579
Holy Alliance4 '=+
honor of one's estate ?0tan!esehre@4 5=4 56'4
5*'
Hotho4 H. /.4 '('
human eing ?,ensch@4 5=
human sciences ?/eistes$issenschaften@4 (
Humol!t4 Wilhelm von4 ')4 5754 5+5
Hume4 Davi!4 '=
Husserl4 E!mun!4 '
hy"ocrisy ?Heuchelei@4 ')64 ')=;94 >*)_ O()_
'=*4 '+*4 '+=;94 5'=4 5=)4 5=(4 5==
& ?&ch@4 the4 '+4 *+4 +*
&!ea ?&!ee@4 *4 9;'64 =54 ==4 '994 5'9;564 5554
5574 5(7
i!ealism4 >iii4 )4 *);*
i!entity4 "ersonal4 '+4 *(4 575;)
i!entity4 social4 '9=4 56'4 5694 5*';)4 5(+
illusion ?0chetn@4 '64 ''54 5=6;'
& #ing4 3arl;HeinD4 '*);(4 5754 5=*
imagination4 *+4 '=7
im"erative4 )6;'4 5=6A hy"othetical4 7*;7A of
right4 )'4 9*
im"utaility ?&m"utailitat4 Vurechnung@4
'*6;*A see also res"onsiility
in!ivi!ual ?EinDelne4 &n!ivi!uum@4 5'4 5);(4
5+4 *54 '674 '=9;+64 56(;74 5'64 5'74 5(+A
$orl! historical4 557;)'4 5=9;+6
inGnity ?Unen!lich#eit@4 54 764 974 5=7
inheritance4 '67
inner an! outer4 i!entity of4 ')=;9
insight ?Einsicht@4 '=(4 '954 5'+A right of4
'+9;9'
institutionalism4 =*
intention ?Asicht@4 ')=4 '*';54 '('4 '=';54
5(74 5=*A right of4 '*5
interest ?&nteresse@4 '(5
inter"retation4 *74 55'4 55*4 577;=
intuition ?Anschauung@4 5'9
irony4 764 57=;+4 5=(;7
Heanne !'Orleans4 5)6
Hesuits4 5=(
Hesus4 '5=;9
Hu!aism4 5*4 '5=;+4 '+7;=4 5=+
Fustice ?/erechtig#eit@4 '69;'6A see also right
3ant4 &mmanuel4 >iii;>iv4 ';54 (4 =4 '54 5)4
59_ )'. ((_ (=;+Q 7=4 =64 ++4 9=4 '654 '5=;
+4 ')(4 '*)4 '==4 i=9_ E+94 569;'64 5'54
5'*4 5'(4 5'74 55'4 55+4 5)=4 57'4 575457);
*4 57+4 5='4 5=*A conce"t of free!om4 )94
&NDEK
*K_ *)b(_ *=;+_ 57*' conce"t of goo!4 '**;
7A conce"t of ha""iness4 76;)A conce"t of
the goo! $ill4 ')=;94 '*7;+4 '(5;)4 '7=;
=54 5'(A !efense of asolute oe!ience4 '6(A
:irst Antinomy4 =9A formula of autonomy4
'(7A formula of humanity4 '(7A formula of
universal la$4 '(*;7'A formula of universal
la$4 !e!uction of4 '7';=A on "henomenal
an! noumenal causality4 '(6;)A realm of
en!s4 594 '99;566A as re"resentative of
morality4 ')';5A retriutivist vie$ of
"unishment4 '69A 0econ! Antinomy4 );*4
57'A theory of a""erce"tion4 '=;'+
3aramaDov4 &van4 5+6
3ier#egaar!4 06ren Aaye4 ')4 764 '()4 5754
57=4 5=(
#no$ thyself ?gnothi seauton@4 )5
#no$le!ge ?Wissen@4 right of4 '*64 5=5
3ohlerg4 La$rence4 5=+
3orsgaar!4 Christine4 575;)4 5794 5=54 5=)
3ortian4 /aris4 5+)
3otDeue4 August von4 '=+4 '+6;'4 '954
5=*
3raus4 C. H.4 5*5
3raut4 .ichar!4 (74 57=
laor ?Areit@4 +=
laesio enormis4 '66;'
language4 =5;)
la$ ?.echt4 /esetD@4 *'4 =54 '6);74 '+94 56=A
in!ing only if right in itself4 '6*;(A
co!iGcation of4 '6);*4 5\=OQ constitutional
?0taatsrecht@4 '6)A an! criminal co!e4 '56A
English common4 56=A historical school of4
'6*A "rivate ?2rivatrecht@4 '6)A violation
of4 ''+;'9
Layman4 :ather4 5=(
le>ical or!ering of goo!s4 '*(4 5=5
liaility ?Haftung@4 legal4 '**
lieralism4 >iv4 554 )7;=4 *6;54 (54 '96;'4
'9=4 565;)4 5\7i 56+4 5(=;764 57(4 5==
life im"risonment4 '554 5='
life ?Leen@4 '994 5654 5'6
Lin!Dey4 /ar!ner4 57+
Lle$ellyn4 Hohn4 57'
Loc#e4 Hohn4 '=4 554 57)4 57=4 5794 5=6A
conce"t of free!om4 *6;'4 57(A conce"t of
ha""iness4 (*;(A theory of "ro"erty4 9(;74
'6=
Loc#ean "roviso4 '6=
logicC Aristotelian4 'A !ialectical4 ';*A formal4
*;(A s"eculative4 >iii4 ';7
love ?Liee@4 574 '594 5694 5==
luc#4 moral4 '*5;)4 '()4 '=74 '+'4 5=5
Lu#acs4 /eorg4 74 5754 5=5
Lyons4 Davi!4 5='
,aott4 H. D.4 5=6
,cCallum4 /eral!4 57*
,cCumier4 Hohn4 5(64 5+)4 5+*
,aclntyre4 Alas!air4 5654 5'54 5==
,cTaggart4 H. ,cT. E.4 5=6
mala in se4 ''+
mala "rohiit a4 ''+
,aleranche4 Nicolas4 (*4 57=
,an!eville4 -ernar!4 55+
,arcuse4 Herert4 575
mar#et4 574 5*6;)4 5(9
marriage ?Ehe@4 '654 '674 5'64 5*)4
579;=6
,ar>4 3arl4 =4 ));(4 **4 5)64 5));*4 5(54
57*4 5774 5=94 5+6;'
,ar>ism4 (4 ')5
master;servant ?Herr;3necht@4 +)4
+7;95
,einec#e4 :rie!rich4 575
meta"hysics4 >iii4 '
,etternich4 Clemens Lothar4 ')
,i!!le Ages4 5(
military estate ?,ilitarstan!4 0ol!atenstan!@4
56'
,ill4 Hohn 0tuart4 594 (54 '((;74 '(94 56'4
57)4 5=54 5=74 5+'A conce"t of free!om4 *'4
57(A conce"t of ha""iness4 (*A conce"t of
in!ivi!uality4 566;'A critiIue of 3ant4 '((;
74 '(9A on re"resentative government4 5=74
5+'
monarchy4 ')4 '654 5*64 5+5
monomania4 7=;94 .5+6
,ontaigne4 ,ichel EyIuem4 5+6
,ontesIuieu4 Charles Louis !e 0econ!at4
-aron !e4 *'4 56=4 57(4 5==
moral la$4 em"tiness of4 ')6;'4 '(*;=)
moral "oint of vie$4 5'6
moral $orth4 '*7;()4 '=94 5(7
morality4 554 5);(4 (64 =*49+;94'6'4 '5(;954
'9(4 '9+;94 56(4 569;'64 5'=4 5594 5(7A
cannot e legislate!4 99;'66A as ethical life
of the ourgeoisie4 ')5A hy"ocrisy of4 ')6A
im"otence of4 ')6A "ositivity of4 '59
,oravcsi#4 Hulius4 57)
motive ?-etveggrun!4 -e$egungsgrun!4
-estimmungsgrun!4 Triefe!er@4 '(6;'4
'79;=5
,ueller4 /. E.4 57'
,uller4 A!am4 5*7
,uller4 3. A. von4 5=*
Nagel4 Thomas4 5=5
Na"oleon -ona"arte4 56=;+4 557;=
Na"oleonic Co!e4 '6*
nation ?%ol#4 natio@4 see "eo"le
nationalism4 '6*
&NDEK
naturalism4 ethical4 '5;'*4 ))Eb(_ &++4 5=7A
historiciDe!4 ));(A i!ealiDe! "reference4
))b*
nature ?Natur@4 *4 '64 '9+A of an action4 '*'A
an! custom as secon! nature4 '9+
nee! of "hiloso"hy ?-e!urfnis !er
2hiloso"hie@4 74 9
negligence ?:ahrl!ssi#eit@4 '*);(
NietDsche4 :rie!rich4 =
Nino4 C. 0.4 5='
Ni""er!ey4 Thomas4 575
nole sim"licity ?/e!iegenheit@4 '*6
noncognitivism4 5=7
Notrecht4 see right4 of necessity
Notstaat4 see state4 of necessity
Novalis ?:rie!rich von Har!energ@4 >iv4 '=*
oligation4 "olitical4 '6(4 579
O!ysseus4 *6
Oe!i"us4 '*64 '95
O'Hagan4 T.4 57)
O'Neill4 Onora4 5=)4 5==
o""ression4 95;)
Oriental realm ?otientalische .eich@4 5)4 )+4
5674 5554 5=+;9
Ottmann4 Henning4 5754 5+)
ought ?0ollen@4 '54 9+4 ')64 '(*4 5694 575
o$l of ,inerva4 5)5
"ara!o>es4 5;*
2arGt4 Dere#4 '+4 575;)
2ar#inson4 /. H. ..4 5=5
"articular ?-eson!ere@4 5'74 5)+A an!
E!eterminate "articularity4E 5*6
2ascal4 -laise4 5=(
"assion ?Lei!enschaft@4 '(54 '=64 55=;+4
5+6
2ateman4 Carole4 579
"aternalism4 )7
"atriarchy4 574 5*74 5=64 5+'
"atriotism4 5+4 5)+;9
"eo"le ?%ol#@4 56)A "rinci"le of4 55';)4 5=+;
9
"ermission ?Erlaunis@4 9*4 ''7;'=4 579
"erson4 55;)4 )54 ==4 9*;'674 '9=4 5654 5*(4
5+'
2Jicht4 see !uty
2harisaism4 ')64 5'=4 5==
2hei!ias4 56'
2hilonen#o4 Ale>is4 57+
"hiloso"hyC /ree#4 =A Hegel's conce"tion of4
>iii4 'A "ractical4 +4 '';'*4 )5
2iaget4 Hean4 57+4 5=+
2incoMs4 E!mun!4 5='
2i""in4 .oert4 57+;94 5='
2lant4 .aymon!4 57'4 5='
2lato4 '5;')4 O=. 564 *'. ()_ ((_ (=_ =8_ EQ7_
5((4 57=4 5794 5+'
"leasure4 ();(A see also he!onism
2le#hanov4 /.4 5=9
2lutarch4 5+6
2oel4 see rale
2ogge4 Thomas4 5=)
2oggeler4 Otto4 5=)
"olice ?2oliDei@4 5*=;+4 5=54 5+)
"olitical economy4 57
2o""er4 3arl4 5)5;)4 5+6
"ositivity4 '5=;94 X(
"overty ?Armut@4 '674 ''(4 ')+4 '764 5*=;((4
5(94 5=54 5=)4 5+);*A ingenuous4 5(5A
reme!ies for4 5*=;+
"rayer4 '+74 5=(
2regiDer4 .ichar!4 5=)
"roailism4 5=(
"rofession ?/e$ere@4 5=4 56'4 5*6;5
"ro"erty4 554 )=4 (64 =)4 +64 9(4 '654 5)=4
579A "rivate4 '67;=
2russia4 '5;')4 >=+_ '+64 56=4 5(+A .eform
Era4 ')4 '+64 '+7;=4 5*54 5(=4 5+5;)
"ulic o"inion4 (';54 5+5
"unishment4 '6+;5*4 5=6A ca"ital4 '5';54
5='A as !eterrent4 '5)4 5=6A of egregious
crimes4 '55;)A as e>"ressing society's
con!emnation of an act4 n o A FustiGcation
of4 '6+;94 measure of4 n 9;5'4 5='A as
morally e!ucative4 '5)4 5=6A retriutive
nature of4 '6+A $e shoul! not e>"ect an
ethical FustiGcation of4 '55;(
"ur"ose ?%orsatD@4 '*6;5
Pui>ote4 Don4 5'7
rale ?2oel@4 5*+4 5(6;(4 5+*A rich4
5(5
racism4 95;)4 '+7;=4 '954 56*4 5=+
ra!icalism4 **4 (54 '=9;+64 5)5;*4 5(=4 5764
57(4 5=);=*
.ailton4 2eter4 ))4 5'5;'*4 57*4 5==
.an!4 Ayn4 5=)
.as#olni#ov4 .o! ion4 5)';)4 5)(
.a$ls4 Hohn4 9=4 57+4 5794 5=64 5=5
.aDin4 0ten#a4 5)6
realm of en!s ?.eich !er V$ec#e@4 594 '99;
566
reason ?%ernunft@4 '6;''4 ')4 +*4 56(4 5'*4
5'+4 5(74 579A cunning of4 55=A internal4
'*';54 '*9A negative4 )A "ositive4 )
recognition ?Aner#ennung@4 ==;9)4 H*;i(Q
5*'4 5(5;(4 5='
rectitu!e ?.echtschaMenheit@4 5=4 '*94 5'(;
'74 55=
reJection4 '9+4 5'=;'+4 55*4 5*);74 5=7
&NDEK
.eherg4 August von4 ioo4 579
.eiman4 HeMrey4 H.4 5='
relationshi"s4 !uties of ?2Jichten !er
%etitaltnisse@4 5'';'*
relativism4 >iv4 '=4 '+)4 565;)4 55(Q 5)(
religion4 >iii4 '594 '))4 5674 56+4 5'9;564 5(6A
fol#4 '5+
re"resentation ?%orstellung@4 5'9
re"resentative government4 56=4 5*64 5+';)
resolving ?-eschliessen@4 (94 7+;9
res"onsiility4 5)4 '*6;*4 '9';5A moral an!
legal4 '**4 '=9A see also right4 of insight
retriutivism4 '6+;''4 5=64 5='
revenge4 '69
revolution4 right of4 5+*
.ho!es4 5)5
.ie!el4 ,anfre!4 5754 57)
right ?.echt@4 =';)4 55)4 55+4 579A astract4
55;)_ )'. (o. =(;i5*. '='. i=9Q 5)=_ 5(Ob
(A astract4 limits of4 '6';)A to !o $rong4
55+;)54 5)*A forfeiture of4 ''(4 '5';5A
im"rescri"tile4 994 '66A inalienale4 994
'664 '5';5A of insight4 '+9;9'A of
#no$le!ge4 '*6A to livelihoo!4 5*=A natural4
'6*;(A of necessity4 '65;)4 5();(4 5+)b*A
not to e #ille!4 '5'A over one's o$n o!y4
974 '664 5*7A to "ersonality itself4 99;'6'A
relation of4 +';)A of revolution4 5((A an!
rights as Etrum"s4E '65A of $orl! s"irit4
E);(
.oman realm ?$mische .eich@4 55;(4 9(4 '664
56(;74 5554 5574 5=94 5+);*
.omanticism4 >iii;>iv4 =4 574 764 '6*4 '=*4
'9(4 56'4 565;)4 56=_ 5\+Q 5i74 5*74 57=;
+_ 5=)4 5=(;7
.osen4 ,ichael4 57'
.ousseau4 Hean;HacIues4 *'4 +*4 55+4 57(
.ussia4 56=
.yan4 Alan4 57)4 579
0an!4 3arl Lu!$ig4 '=+4 '+6;'4 '954 5=*
0an!el4 ,ichael4 5654 5==
0avigny4 3arl :rie!rich von4 '6*
0chacht4 .ichar!4 5=5
0chefer4 0amuel4 575
0chein4 see illusion
0chelling4 :rie!rich Wilhelm Hosef4 )4 74
')'
0chiller4 :rie!rich4 74 5'7
0chlegel4 :rie!rich4 >iv4 764 '=*4 57+4 5=(;7
0chleiermacher4 :rie!rich Ernst Daniel4 =4
'=*
0chna!elach4 Herert4 57'
0cholasticism4 (*
0cho"enhauer4 Arthur4 7(4 5=)
0ch$een4 see $avering
science ?Wissenschaft@4 ''4 5'9;56A
"hiloso"hical4 =A see also Hegel4 conce"tion
of "hiloso"hical scienceA "hiloso"hy
0cotus4 Hohn Duns4 57=
0eeass4 /ottfrie!4 57+
self;actualiDation ?0elstver$ir#lichung@4 '=;
)(4 5*54 576
self;a$areness4 '=;'94 ==;+'4 +(;9)
self;certainty ?0elstge$issheit@4 +(;9)
self;concern4 74 '+4 )54 '+7
self;!ece"tion4 '==;+4 '+5
self;!estruction4 ethical4 5(*;(
self;image4 '+;'94 5=_ &6&_ 5&)bO*
self;inter"retation4 *7
selGshness ?0elstsucht@4 ='4 '7*;74 5''4 5)(
self;o"acity4 '+94 5)5;)
self;o$nershi"4 974 '66
self;"ositing ?0elstsetDung@4 '+4 =+;9
self;satisfaction ?0estefrie!igung@4 '*(4
'=6;54 5'*
self;suLciency ?0elstan!ig#eit@4 *)4 +*
0en4 Amartya4 5>'4 5==
0evigne[ ,arie !e .autin;Chantal4 ,arIuise
!e4 5+6
0haftesury4 Anthony Ashley Coo"er4 Thir!
Earl of4 (*4 57=
0heri!an4 .ichar! -rinsley4 77
sho"#ee"er4 honest4 '*=;(64 '(5;)4 '=9
sho$ ?0chein@4 see illusion
0i!g$ic#4 Henry4 5')4 5==
0ie"4 Lu!$ig4 5794 5=+
0imon4 Walter4 575
0inger4 ,arcus4 5=)
0itte4 see customA ethical life
0ittlich#eit4 see ethical life
s#e"ticism4 '
slavery4 9=;94 5674 5564 5()A see also masterservant
0mith4 A!am4 55+4 5*5
0ocrates4 ()4 5'+
0ommers4 Christina HoM4 5'';'54 5== ;
0o"hocles4 .'*64 '954 '9(4 5*(4 5=7
0"ain4 56=;+
0"artacus4 5)6
s"ecies ?/attung@4 +6
s"here ?0"hare@4 e>ternal4 ==4 +6;'4 9(
0"inoDa4 -ene!ict4 *54 577
s"irit ?/eist@4 *4 '9;5'4 *)4 +(4 ++;954 '9=4
'9+;94 55';)4 5=+A asolute4 5'9;56A
oFective4 *4 ''4 564 5'A suFective4 *4 564
5'
0tamm4 see family
0tan!4 see estate
0tan!e4 0tan!eversatnmlung4
0tan!evertretung4 see re"resentative
government
&NDEK
0tan!esehre4 see honor of one's estate
state ?0taat@4 5=;)64 '=54. 56+4 5''4 5'9;5)4
5)=;+4 5(+;94 5794 5=+4 5+'A life cycle of4
55';)A mo!ern4 5)=;9A of necessity
?Notstaat@4 5)=
0tein4 -aron Heinrich :rie!rich 3arl vom
un! Dum4 5*54 5(=
0teinerger4 2eter4 5=6
0toicism4 564 **;(4 ();(4 964 5'+4 577
struggle to the !eath4 +(;7
0turgeon4 Nicholas4 5=7
suFect ?0uFe#t@4 5)4 )54 5*(A as thin#er4 '*54
'95
suFectivity ?0uFe#tivitat@4 ')*;(4 '=*;(4
'9';54 '974 '9=4 5'=;'+4 5=(
sustance an! acci!ent ?0ustanD un!
A#Di!enD@4 '97;=
sustance4 ethical ?sittliche 0ustanD@4 5(;74
'97;=4 56(4 5*);7
su"erse!e ?aufheen@4 )4 +74 ++4 '594
O))
su"erstars4 77
su"erstition ?Aetglaue@4 5'=
0urface4 Charles4 77
Taylor4 Charles4 74 57'4 5754 5=64 5='
teleological ethics4 )6;'4 5');'*4 5==
teleological sus"ension of the ethical4 5)5
terrorism4 '+6
theo!icy4 +4 '6;''4 5*9
Ethesis;antithesis;synthesis4E );*4 57'
Theunissen4 ,ichael4 5754 5=6
thing ?0ache@4 9(
Thomas AIuinas4 0aint4 (*4 (=4 57=
thought !eterminations ?Den#estimmungen@4
'
thro$nness4 '()
time4 55'
Tittel4 /ottlo August4 '((4 '(94 5=5
Toe$s4 Hohn E!$ar!4 575
tolerance4 56*
totalitarianism4 *54 5)94 5(94 57(
trage!y4 /ree#4 (=
trait4 5'*
trust4 '(+4 5'+
truth con!itions an! acce"taility con!itions4
5')
Tugen!hat4 Ernst4 57*4 57=4 5=)4 5=7
Turgot4 Anne;.oert;HacIues4 55+
Tyler4 Wat4 5)6
un!erstan!ing ?%erstan!@4 5;(4 =64 5'+
unethical ?unsittliche@ institutions4 567
unha""y consciousness ?ungluc#liche
-e$usstsein@4 ');'*4 5*
universal ?Allgemeine@4 '+4 5(4 5+4 7)4 79;=64
++;954 '=64 '=)4 5)=
universalism4 565;(4 5'5;'*<historiciDe!4
56*;(
universality of a""licaility4 ')(;74 '7*;=
universality of concern4 ')(;=
unmove! mover4 5674 5)=
Unruh4 /. C. von4 5+)
utilitarianism4 5'4 )'4 *'4 5'5;'*4 55(4
5==
utility function4 7+
valet4 no man a hero to his4 '*94 5594
5+6
vali! ?gelten4 giiltig setn@4 9+4 ''(4 56=4 556;
'4 55*;(
valor ?Ta"fer#eit@4 56'
value ?Wert@4 974 '56;'
%ernunft4 see reason
%erstan!4 see un!erstan!ing
virtue ?Tugen!@4 '=(4 5'*;'7A as mean4 5'(4
5==
%ol#4 see "eo"le
%orsatD4 see "ur"ose
voting4 5+)
Wachserg4 ,ilton4 57*
Wahlen4 see choosing
Walsh4 W. H.4 575
$ar4 5+4 '6)4 56'4 5='4 5=+
$arrant ?-efugnis@4 9*4 579
Warturg :estival4 '=+
$avering ?0ch$een@4 *+4 '=7
$ell;eing ?Wohl@4 '*(A see also ha""iness
Wilco>4 William4 5==
Wil!t4 An!reas4 57+4 5=)
$ill ?Wille@4 '+4 5*;(4 +*4 '');'*A
contra!iction in4 '(=;7'A criminal4 ''5;'7A
!istinguishe! from $ish4 ')=A free4 5'4 )=4
'(6A goo!4 '*7;()A moral4 '*6;(*4 '7=;=5A
natural4 (+A "ure4 '*=;+4 '+(
Williams4 -ernar!4 5654 5=54 5==
Will#ur4 see aritrariness
Wir#lich#eit4 see actuality
$ish ?Wunsch@4 '(+
Wissenschaft4 see science
Wittgenstein4 Lu!$ig4 )4 57'
Wittgenstein4 Wilhelm Lu!$ig /eorg :urst
von4 ')
Wolf4 0usan4 57)
$omen4 574 9)4 5*);74 579;=6
Woo!4 Allen4 5=54 5=)4 5+'
$orl! historical in!ivi!ual4 see in!ivi!ual4
$orl! historical
$orl! history ?Weltgeschichte@4 5'9;)74 5=9A
595
&NDEK
its right is su"reme4 '6'4 55);)6A see also
ethical life4 ancient /ree#A /ermanic
realmA Oriental realmA .oman realmA
s"irit
$rong ?Unrecht@4 '79;'64 5()A see also crimeA
"unishment
1ac#4 -ernar!4 5774 5+)
Vufallig#eit4 see contingency
Vurechnung4 see im"utailityA res"onsiility
V$ang4 see coercion
V$ec#4 see en!
59)

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