2.

HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO CASTRO VS BUSTOS

FACTS: Respondent Apolonio Bustos was charged in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on October
26, 1962 with the crime of murder for the killing of Raymundo Castro whose heirs are now the
petitioners. The trial court found Bustos guilty only of homicide and, crediting him with two mitigating
circumstances, namely, passion or obfuscation and voluntary surrender, sentenced him to an
indeterminate prison term of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the petitioners, who were represented
in the case by a private prosecutor, in the sum of six thousand pesos (P6,000) "without prejudice to
whatever the accused (respondent) is entitled from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for
his services of around twenty-six (26) years as a public school teacher, prior to October 20, 1962." Both
respondent and petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, respondent asking that appellate, court
acquit him and petitioners praying, on the other hand, that respondent be convicted of murder, that the
portion regarding what said respondent will receive from the GSIS be deleted and that he be ordered to
pay petitioners "the aggregate sum of P50,764.00 as indemnity and actual, moral, temperate and
exemplary damages." For the purposes of their appeal, petitioners even filed unnecessarily a printed
record on appeal. On October 18, 1965, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment modifying that of the
trial court insofar as it concerned (1) the amount of damages to be awarded petitioners thus: ... Aside
from the P6,000 indemnity awarded by the trial court, which we uphold, we feel justified, in the exercise
of our discretion, to award to the heirs of the deceased moral damages in the amount of P6,000 plus
P13,380.00 to compensate for the loss of earning of the decedent at the annual salary of P2,676.00 ....
The arguments interposed by the appellant in his Motion for consideration to support the complete
reversal of the judgment appealed from, have been considered and passed upon in our decision, and we
see no reason to alter the same in so far as the appellant's guilt of the crime is concerned. On the other
hand, we agree with the appellant that in the interest of justice and equity and in view of the presence
of two mitigating circumstances, without any aggravating one to offset them, the award of moral and
compensatory damages should be eliminated.
petitioners have appealed. The prayer in their petition for certiorari asks for nothing more than that the
amended decision of the Court of Appeals be revoked and reversed, and its original decision be affirmed
in toto insofar as the award of indemnity and damages is concerned.
ISSUE: w/n the award of damages is proper
HELD: Court discussed damages
"every person criminally liable for a felony is also civily liable." (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code).
This civil liability, in case the felony involves death, includes indemnification for consequential damages
(Art. 104, id.) and said consequential damages in turn include "... those suffered by his family or by a
third person by reason of the crime." (Art. 107, id.) Since these provisions are subject, however, as
above indicated, to certain provisions of the Civil Code, We will now turn to said provisions.
GR: In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such
damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. (Art. 2202)
When w/ death: 2206
The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already been increased by this Court
first, to P6,000.00 in People v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately to P12,000.00 in the case of People v.
Pantoja, G. R. No. L-18793, promulgated October 11, 1968, and it must be stressed that this amount, as
well as the amount of moral damages, may be adjudicated even without proof of pecuniary loss, the
assessment of the moral damages being "left to the discretion of the court, according to the
circumstances of each case." (Art. 2216)
Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are
entitled to the following items of damages:
1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense P12,000.00, without the need of
any evidence or proof of damages, and even though there may have been mitigating circumstances
attending the commission of the offense.
2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased an amount to be fixed by the
Court according to the circumstances of the deceased related to his actual income at the time of death
and his probable life expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed and awarded by the court as a
matter of duty, unless the deceased had no earning capacity at said time on account of permanent
disability not caused by the accused. If the deceased was obliged to give support, under Art. 291, Civil
Code, the recipient who is not an heir, may demand support from the accused for not more than five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court.
3. As moral damages for mental anguish, an amount to be fixed by the court. This may be
recovered even by the illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased.
4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or more aggravating
circumstances, an amount to be fixed in the discretion of the court, the same to be considered
separate from fines.
5. As attorney's fees and expresses of litigation, the actual amount thereof, (but only when a
separate civil action to recover civil liability has been filed or when exemplary damages are awarded).
6. Interests in the proper cases.
7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning capacity of the deceased and
for moral damages are recoverable separately from and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00
corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death, and that these damages may, however, be
respectively increased or lessened according to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, except
items 1 and 4 above, for obvious reasons.
Court of Appeals erred in eliminating in its amended decision, the items of moral damages and
compensation for loss of earning capacity of the deceased
We, therefore, overrule the prayer for additional damages in petitioners' brief and We hold that,
on the basis of the facts not questioned by respondent, they are entitled only to the P6,000.00 as moral
damages and the P13,380.00 as compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased
awarded in the original decision of the Court of Appeals in addition, of course, to the indemnity for
death fixed also by said court at P6,000.00
4. SMITH BELL VS BORJA
FACTS: Smith Bell requested Customs for inspection on its vessel M/T King Family which was due to
arrive containing 750metric tons of alkyl benzene and methyl methacrylate monomer. Catalino Borja,
Customs Inspector was then on board the vessel to perform his duties. At around noon, while M/T King
Family was unloading chemicals unto 2 barges owned by respondent ITTC, sudden explosion occurred
setting the vessels afire. Upon hearing the explosion, Borja who was at that time inside the cabin
preparing reports, went outside to check what had happened, and another explosion was heard, seeing
the fire and fearing his life, jumped overboard to save himself. However, the water was likewise on fire
due mainly to the spilled chemicals. Despite the tremendous heat, he swam his way for 1 hour until he
was rescued by the people living in the squatters area and sent to San Juan De Dios Hospital. After
weeks of intensive care at the hospital, he was diagnosed as permanently disabled due to the incident.
He made demands against Smith Bell and ITTC for the damages caused by the explosion. However, both
denied liabilities and attributed to each other negligence.
The trial court[6] (RTC) ruled in favor of Respondent Borja and held petitioner liable for damages and
loss of income. The RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering [Petitioner] Smith Bell
Dodwell [S]hipping Agency Corporation to pay [Borja]:
1. The amount of P495,360.00 as actual damages for loss of earning capacity:
2. The amount of P100,000.00 for moral damages; and
3. The amount of P50,000.00 for and as reasonable attorneys fees.
The cross-claim of [Petitioner] Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corporation against co-defendant
International Towage and Transport Corporation and the latters counterclaim against [Borja] and cross-
claim with compulsory counterclaim against Smith Bell are hereby ordered dismissed.
CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: w/n Respondent Borja is entitled to the amount of damages awarded to him by the trial court
HELD: Petitioner insists that Borja is not entitled to the full amount of damages awarded by the lower
courts. It disputes the use of his gross earning as basis for the computation of the award for loss of
earning capacity. Both courts, in computing the value of such loss, used the remaining years of the
victim as a government employee and the amount he had been receiving per annum at the time of the
incident.
Counsel for Respondent Borja, on the other hand, claims that petitioner had no cause to complain,
because the miscomputation had ironically been in its favor. The multiplier used in the computation was
erroneously based on the remaining years in government service, instead of the life expectancy, of the
victim. Borjas counsel also points out that the award was based on the formers meager salary in 1987,
or about 23 years ago when the foreign exchange was still P14 to $1. Hence, the questioned award is
consistent with the primary purpose of giving what is just, moral and legally due the victim as the
aggrieved party.
Both parties have a point. In determining the reasonableness of the damages awarded under Article
1764 in conjunction with Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the factors to be considered are: (1) life
expectancy (considering the health of the victim and the mortality table which is deemed conclusive)
and loss of earning capacity; (b) pecuniary loss, loss of support and service; and (c) moral and mental
sufferings.[19] The loss of earning capacity is based mainly on the number of years remaining in the
persons expected life span. In turn, this number is the basis of the damages that shall be computed and
the rate at which the loss sustained by the heirs shall be fixed.[20]
The formula for the computation of loss of earning capacity is as follows:[21]
Net earning capacity = Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income - Living Expenses (50% of gross annual
income)], where life expectancy = 2/3 (80 - the age of the deceased).
Petitioner is correct in arguing that it is net income (or gross income less living expenses) which is to be
used in the computation of the award for loss of income. Villa Rey Transit v. Court of Appeals[23]
explained that the amount recoverable is not the loss of the entire earning, but rather the loss of that
portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received. Hence, in fixing the amount of the
said damages, the necessary expenses of the deceased should be deducted from his earnings.
In other words, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered; that is, the total of the
earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income, less living and other
incidental expenses. When there is no showing that the living expenses constituted a smaller percentage
of the gross income, we fix the living expenses at half of the gross income. To hold that one would have
used only a small part of the income, with the larger part going to the support of ones children, would
be conjectural and unreasonable.
Counsel for Respondent Borja is also correct in saying that life expectancy should not be based on the
retirement age of government employees, which is pegged at 65. In Negros Navigation Co, Inc. v.
CA,[25] the Court resolved that in calculating the life expectancy of an individual for the purpose of
determining loss of earning capacity under Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code, it is assumed that the
deceased would have earned income even after retirement from a particular job.
Respondent Borja should not be situated differently just because he was a government employee.
Private employees, given the retirement packages provided by their companies, usually retire earlier
than government employees; yet, the life expectancy of the former is not pegged at 65 years.
Petitioner avers that Respondent Borja died nine years after the incident and, hence, his life expectancy
of 80 years should yield to the reality that he was only 59 when he actually died.
We disagree. The Court uses the American Experience/Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial or
Combined Experience Table of Mortality, which consistently pegs the life span of the average Filipino at
80 years, from which it extrapolates the estimated income to be earned by the deceased had he or she
not been killed.
Respondent Borjas demise earlier than the estimated life span is of no moment. For purposes of
determining loss of earning capacity, life expectancy remains at 80. Otherwise, the computation of loss
of earning capacity will never become final, being always subject to the eventuality of the victims death.
The computation should not change even if Borja lived beyond 80 years. Fair is fair.
Having been duly proven, the moral damages and attorneys fees awarded are justified under the Civil
Codes Article 2219, paragraph 2; and Article 2208, paragraph 11, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: petitioner is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim damages in the amount of P320,240
as loss of earning capacity, moral damages in the amount of P100,000, plus another P50,000 as
attorneys fees. Costs against petitioner.
6. TRINIDAD VS ACAPULCO
FACTS: respondent Estrella Acapulco filed a Complaint before the RTC seeking the nullification of a sale
she made in favor of petitioner Hermenegildo M. Trinidad. She alleged: Sometime in February 1991, a
certain Primitivo Caete requested her to sell a Mercedes Benz for P580,000.00. Caete also said that if
respondent herself will buy the car, Caete was willing to sell it for P500,000.00.
Petitioner borrowed the car from respondent for two days but instead of returning the car as promised,
petitioner told respondent to buy the car from Caete for P500,000.00 and that petitioner would pay
respondent after petitioner returns from Davao. Following petitioners instructions, respondent
requested Caete to execute a deed of sale covering the car in respondents favor for P500,000.00 for
which respondent issued three checks in favor of Caete.
Respondent thereafter executed a deed of sale in favor of petitioner even though petitioner did not pay
her any consideration for the sale. When petitioner returned from Davao, he refused to pay respondent
the amount of P500,000.00 saying that said amount would just be deducted from whatever outstanding
obligation respondent had with petitioner. Due to petitioners failure to pay respondent, the checks that
respondent issued in favor of Caete bounced, thus criminal charges were filed against her. Respondent
then prayed that the deed of sale between her and petitioner be declared null and void; that the car be
returned to her; and that petitioner be ordered to pay damages.
Trial ensued and on March 23, 1992, the RTC rendered its Decision finding that no dacion en pago is
present in this case as common consent was not proven. The fallo of said decision reads:
Defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages; P20,000.00
as exemplary damages and attorneys fees of P20,000.00 as well as litigation expenses in the amount of
P5,000.00 and costs.
ISSUE: HE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING DAMAGES AGAINST THE PETITIONER
HELD: Finally, the Court agrees with petitioner that the trial court erred in awarding damages in favor of
respondent.
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral
suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like, and while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order
that moral damages may be awarded, it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily
show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal connection to defendants acts.[34]
Claims must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof[35] and there must be clear testimony on
the anguish and other forms of mental sufferings as mere allegations will not suffice.[36] Allegations of
besmirched reputation, embarrassment and sleepless nights are insufficient for it must be shown that
the proximate cause thereof was the unlawful act or omission of the opposing party.[37]
Indeed, for a court to arrive upon a judicious approximation of emotional or moral injury,
competent and substantial proof of the suffering experienced must be laid before it.[38] There must be
definite findings as to what the supposed moral damages suffered consisted of.[39] The award of moral
damages must be solidly anchored on a definite showing that the claiming party actually experienced
emotional and mental sufferings.[40]
In this case, respondent merely testified that after petitioner refused the payment of the car as
well as its return, she was very much worried, which if converted into monetary amount is equivalent to
P200,000.00.[41] We deem such testimony insufficient to warrant the award of moral damages.
Similarly, in order that exemplary damages may be awarded, it must be shown that the wrongful
act was accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner.[42]
Exemplary damages are also allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary damage
can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages.[43] As moral
damages are improper in the present case, so is the award of exemplary damages.
The decision of the trial court also does not mention the reason for the award of attorneys fees
and the award was simply contained in the dispositive portion of the decision. Again, the trial court
erred on this score as it must explicitly state in the body of its decision and not only in the dispositive
portion thereof the legal reason for the award of attorneys fees.[44]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16,
2001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The P500,000.00 which Hermenegildo M. Trinidad owed Estrella
Acapulco is offset against the P566,000.00 which Acapulco owed Trinidad. Acapulco is ordered to pay
Trinidad the amount of P66,000.00 plus interest at 12% per annum from May 20, 1992 until full
payment.
8. TAN VS OMC CARRIERS
FACTS: At around 6:15am, Respondent Arambala was driving a truck with a trailer, owned by OMC.
Driver noticed that the trucklost its brakes and told his companion to jump out. Both of them did.
The truck rammed into the house/tailoring shop of Petitioner Leticia Tan and husband Celedonio Tan.
The husband,standing at the doorway, was instantly killed.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against the owner of the truck + trailer,
OMC, and Arambala,the driver.
Petitioner argument:
O Collision was due to OMCs gross negligence in not properly maintaining the truck;
O And to the drivers recklessness when he abandoned the moving truck
Petitioners want:
O OMC + driver held solidarily liable for the actual damages (i.e., damage to property, funeral
expenses of thehusband, and his loss of earning capacity)
O Moral, exemplary, and atty fees
Responedent defense:
O Fortuitous event - slippery condition of the road caused by spilled motor oil
RTC found OMC + driver solidarily liable to damages based on vicarious liability.
O Relied on res ipsa loquitur - unusual for a truck to suddenly lose brakes
o Truck rammed into house raises presumption of negligence which both failed to refute
o Fortuitous defense not well taken - driver did not slow down or take any precautionary measure
to prevent theskidding; defective brake could have been discovered if there was a more rigid
inspection
RTC awarded damages: for the death, loss of earning capacity, actual damages, moral, exemplary,
atty fee.
CA affirmed but reduced award of actual damages, relying on official receipts which supports the
claim, deleted loss of earning capacity, reduced exemplary, deleted atty fees bec no discussion of legal
basis.
On petition for certiorari to CA, petitioners argue:
O Want compensation for the damage to the house, tailoring shop, sewing machines, etc. Since
the damage refer to the value of the destroyed property and not the cost of repairing, the value
cannot be evidenced by receipts
O Want actual damages for loss of earning capacity. Since he was a self-employed tailor, no
documentary evidence is available.
O Entitled to exemplary damages because RTC & CA found gross negligence and there was bad
faith when OMCand the driver made up the oil spill story.
O Entitled to atty fees bec they are entitled to exemplary damages.
SC denied the petition in a resolution.
6 months later, SC issued another resolution reinstating the petition on the basis of an MR.
ISSUE: w/n award of damages is proper
HELD: Yes.
Temperate damages: When recoverable
Temperate damages in lieu of actual damages
O To award actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss,
credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts.
O Absent competent proof on actual damages suffered, a party can claim temperate damages.
O Temperate damages may be allowed in cases where from the nature of the case, definite
proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced although the court is convinced that the aggrieved
party suffered some pecuniary loss
Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatorydamages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amountcan not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
In this case:
O Petitioners did not submit any receipt to prove the monetary value of the damge caused = no
award of actua ldamages
O Photos shown as evidence show the damages to the house/shop/machines which is
undeniably caused by th drivers negligence, but not enough to establish amount with certainty
O P200k is found to be a fair and sufficient award by way of temperate damages
Temperate damages in lieu of loss of earning capacity
O As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to claim for loss of earning capacity.
O Exception: damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when:
(1) The deceased is self-employed and earning less than the min wage under current
labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of
work, no documentary evidence is available; or
(2) The deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws.
Prior to death, husband earned P156k/year or P13k/month.
At the time of his death, the daily min wage was P145 or P3,770.00/month, provided the wage earner
had only one restday per week.
Even if SC takes judicial notice that a small tailoring shop normally does not issue receipts, husbands
alleged monthly income of P13k exceeded the monthly min wage.
Exemption provided does not apply.
BUT petitioners-children were minors when petition was filed and relied mainly on their fathers
income for their support.
Based on these and taking into account the unrebutted earnings, SC says the petitioners are entitled
to temperate damages of P300k [or estimated gross income for 2 years] to compensate for loss of the
earning capacity
Re: Other damages
Reduction of exemplary damages proper since death and destruction was due to gross
negligence.
Atty fees proper since there was award of exemplary
No discussion on moral damages
Disposition:
Indemnity for the death: P50k
Actual damages for funeral expenses: P72k
Temperate damages for the damage house, tailoring shop, equipment: P200k
Damages for the loss of earning capacity: P300k
Moral damages: P500k (as awarded by the RTC)
Exemplary damages: P200k
Atty fees: 10% of total amt
Costs of suit
10. BEATRIZ WASSMER VS VELEZ
12 SCRA 648 Civil Law Torts and Damages Article 21 of the Civil Code Moral Damages
Exemplary Damages - Breach of Promise to Marry
FACTS:In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it
on September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding
invitations, bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days
before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be
able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before the
wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he will
be returning soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually
judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of
Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous
events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry
Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the
award of exemplary and moral damages against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is
true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was
not a simple breach of promise to marry. because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the
wedding. Velezs unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. Wassmers cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides
in part any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral
damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages
is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to
Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner this warrants the imposition of exemplary
damages against him.