Sujoy Bhattacharyya 2300 Words

Philosophy 225
T01173814

Possible Resolutions to the Non-Identity Problem

The Non-Identity Problem, first outlined by Derek Parfit, is an issue that arises in
moral decisions that not only influence the quality of life of people in the future, but also
determines the individuals that exist in that future. In this paper, I will discuss the exact
nature of the Non-Identity Problem, it application to environmental ethics and potential
ways to resolve the issues it raises.

The Non-Identity Problem arises from Parfits Time-Dependence claim, which, in
its less controversial form, states that if any particular person had not been conceived
within a month of when he was actually conceived, he would in fact never have existed.
The reasoning is clear every individual is a unique combination of a particular sperm
with a particular egg and that combination is clearly contingent on when conception
occurred. Applying this to questions of morality, however, leads to interesting and
perhaps troubling conclusions. Consider Parfits example of a 14-year-old girls (Anne)
decision to have a child. Lets suppose that her youth would lead to her giving the child a
life that was worth living, but filled with considerable hardships. If she waits 10 years
before giving birth, she will be able to give her child a much better life. Intuitively, it
seems that it is morally wrong for Anne to have a child when 14. But considering the
Time-Dependence Claim, these two children are two distinct individuals. Thus any
attempt to claim that Anne has done harm would find it difficult to locate an individual
she has harmed. It is true that if 14-year-old Anne gives birth to Baby A, he would suffer
a considerable amount. But if she had waited, then baby A would never have been born.
This contains the crux of the Non-Identity Problem when a decision affects whether or
not an individual exists, that individual cannot be directly harmed by not taking the path
of higher quality of life.

The application to environment ethics is straightforward. Any serious
environmental policy will affect many decisions that current individuals make, and
correspond to a different set of future people. Consider two policies, one of Depletion (D)
and the other of Conservation (C). Depletion corresponds to consuming resources heavily
now, leaving little for our distant descendants. The quality of life for the next three
generations is higher than currently, but after that resources are so depleted that the
quality of life is significantly lower than present. On the other hand, Conservation
corresponds to consuming resources at a rate that ensures our distant ancestors enjoy a
quality of life higher than those in Depletions future. Let us immediately set aside
concerns about the exact results of this dichotomy, such as whether the higher initial
consumption during Depletion would mean we would more readily find substitutes for
the spent resources, and focus on the problem as Parfit presents it. Just as in the case of
Anne and her two potential children, we (or at least, many of us) are instinctively against
depriving our future descendants of the quality of life they could have enjoyed. But again,
since the people in each future are distinct, nobody has been directly harmed.

It is immediate that most of, if not all, of the problem in the Non-Identity
Problem arises from adopting a person affecting view of consequentialism. In this, an
Sujoy Bhattacharyya 2300 Words
Philosophy 225
T01173814
outcome is worse if and only if actual people are harmed. The converse of this is that an
action is only better if and only if those same people benefit. This is a reasonable view
moral deliberations must surely focus on moral agents so first lets consider ways to
resolve the Non-Identity Problem in this paradigm, before turning to the more
controversial possibility of perhaps discarding it.

The first of these would be to set some sort of Minimum quality of life and make
it morally wrong to take actions that put people below it. This Minimum would be above
the level of a life worth living, yet considerably below that which, say, most Oberlin
College students enjoy. The existence of such a level doesnt seem so controversial. A
life worth living is, after all, a very low bar. Raising the bar does present some
possibility at resolving the Non-Identity Problem. In the case of Anne, baby A might well
be below this Minimum level and thus we can say that it is immoral to bear it. Similarly,
if the D policy led to many people in the distant future living below the Minimum, we
could advocate for C. It is key to note here the moral algorithm is to isolate actions or
policies that are morally wrong, and then find those that are morally good through
cancellation.

The problem is that the Minimum theory, as it stands, doesnt clearly point us to
courses of action that we should take. If we modified the D policy so that future
generations had a lower quality of life, but one that was still above the Minimum then
there seems to be no reason to pick it over a C policy (except perhaps, our intuition). One
way to resolve this is to raise the Minimum so that it corresponded to a level of life that
was consistent, or close to, what the C future would enjoy. But this seems to be arbitrarily
setting conditions to favor a particular outcome. If we consider applying the same
technique to the conception example, then suddenly every woman giving birth to a child
in rural India is guilty of a moral fault. This seems patently ridiculous. While the exact
level of the Minimum is worth investigating, it seems unlikely that raising it will lead to a
case where C is favored over D.

A more successful approach might be to acknowledge implicitly the probabilistic
nature of this example. Since we are talking exclusively about future consequences,
everything should be expressed as an expected variable. Every possible outcome comes
with an associated probability of occurrence and our goal is to maximize the expected
good (as Bentham originally intended). This immediately presents one compelling reason
to pick C over D. Assuming that our analysis is correct, D now has a much higher chance
of putting more people under the Minimum than C. To understand this, note that the
quality of life we have been considering in this example must necessarily be the average
of all people who inhabit a particular future. Making the reasonable assumption that the
each population is distributed normally, with similar spreads
1
, around their respective
average leads to the inevitable conclusion that D is expected to put more people under the
Minimum. Whats interesting is that this is true for D of any scale, as long as that distant
level is below that of C. So despite also utilizing a cancellation algorithm, this theory
does pick C over D.

1
Formally, both are Gaussian distributions with the same standard deviation but different means
Sujoy Bhattacharyya 2300 Words
Philosophy 225
T01173814

There are a few problems with the expectations theory. The first is that we have to
take into account the greater good expected during the early parts of D. Since it is higher
than that in the early parts of C, our above analysis implies that this portion of D is
morally desirable. However, if we take the long run into view the relative length of this
high consumption period becomes essential. If it is relatively short, then the positive
effects are but a small blip on a generally negative background. If it is longer, then
perhaps D is not morally wrong. Considering that there are finite resources, a restriction
that would require extraordinary amounts of human ingenuity to overcome, it does seem
that the former is more likely. If alternative resources werent generated during high
consumption, its hard to imagine they would be during the depleted period. Another
criticism is the assumption that the spreads are equal
2
, which was key in leading us to
pick C. This is in fact unrealistic Cs population would probably have a tighter spread
than Ds. A stricter control, chosen of free will or mild coercion, on our use of resources
would lead to less variation between different individuals
3
. The opposite is true of D so if
anything, this should make us favor C even more.

The larger issue is whether this game of probability and standard deviations
should be the basis for our moral deliberations. It seems both dangerously heuristic and to
mix in a little too much empiricism into our philosophy. But it seems as if we have little
choice. We are evaluating very long term policies what choice do we have but to rely
on expected value? We have to examine the goodness of entire populations what other
tool can we use but statistical composition?
4
Our final conclusion is still based on the
relatively non-objectionable concept that it is morally wrong to place an individual below
the Minimum, even with the Non-Identity Problem at play.

We can ease this worry by changing the time scale on which were making the
choice between these two policies. Imagine that once a generation the Earth comes
together to make a choice between C and D, but only for the next generation. In this case,
they will make decisions based on the future good of themselves and their direct
offspring. The reason for this process stems from an uneasiness with the basic setup of
the example. To pick such a long lasting policy with such drastic effects seems to infringe
on the basic agency of our future descendants. Parfit mentions this, but quickly dismisses
it as irrelevant. I find it a little harder to dismiss. Strictly speaking, any of our actions is
an infringement of future generations agency. And if we were to give this moral
weight, wed find ourselves paralyzed. But for an action of such longevity and
magnitude, it doesnt seem unreasonable to at least exercise caution and, not too venture
too far into political philosophy, have the decision makers be those actually affected.
5

The good news is that this eliminates the Non-Identity Problem since we are restricting
ourselves to considering, and being responsible for only a few generations, all extant, at a

2
That the distribution would be roughly Gaussian is hard to dispute
3
Alas, questions of whether government or some similar coercion would be required and justified
must be left aside in this paper
4
Answers to both these questions are welcome
5
This might be also a result of my recent macroeconomics exam
Sujoy Bhattacharyya 2300 Words
Philosophy 225
T01173814
time. The problem is that it is unclear whether to pick C or D. D seems morally right for
at least a while, but then comes a time when the potential loss to our offspring will
outweigh the benefits to us, prompting a switch. Thus while this doesnt present a clear
answer (which would require more investigation into the calculus of the good) it does
present a way to make such decisions while limiting the Non-Identity Problem.

A more radical way to resolve the Non-Identity Problem is to discard, or at least
loosen, our adherence to the person-affecting view. There are two compelling reasons for
this. The first is the fundamental moral asymmetry of birth. Before birth, a person is a
moral non-entity. Then after birth (discarding debates about conception) it has moral
significance that must be accounted for. This is unlike almost any other situation we
encounter on any regular basis, specifically in regards to how it affects the person
affecting view. There was no person before birth, so it any attempt to apply it directly
(without consideration of the Minimum-expectation theory outlined earlier) results in an
empty moral theory, suggesting we need one that is more substantial. The second is that
the Non-Identity Problem is just an inevitable result of the complexity of our interactions.
Yes, the individuals that comprise the future will be different. But it seems a stretch to
use that to rid the situation of moral relevance. Just as the impossibility of perfect
information and accounting isnt a deathblow to utilitarianism, the presence of a variable
we cannot control in our moral deliberations shouldnt be used to not face hard moral
choices.

Derek Parfit proposes a potential non-person-affecting view, which he calls Q.
Simply put, if the same number of people would ever live it would be bad if those who
live are worse off than those who would have lived. This view, of course, immediately
points to C over D. But how coherent is it? If we take the inevitability of not having any
control over which individuals comprise the future, since too far too many random
variables effect the combination of sperms and eggs that are born, then this effectively
simply modifies the person affecting view. The Non-Identity Problem becomes another
exogenous constraint on our moral theory, just like imperfect information and random
chance. We know there will be a group of future people whose composition is
uncontrollable. Thus we attempt to benefit rather than harm them.

In conclusion, the Non-Identity Problem presents many wrinkles to our moral
deliberations on environmental issues. However, it is no way a crippling blow. We can
appeal to an expectation theory of the Minimum, which presents a clear way to resolve it.
We could restructure our actual decision making process to be more in line with concerns
of future agency, dissolving the problem but leaving the final decision a little unclear. Or
we could even loosen the person-affecting view, and treat all future individuals equally.


Bibliography:
The Non-Identity Problem, Derek Parfit
Handout 8 Future Generations and the Non Identity Problem, Tim Hall