NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS/ TB.

KUDRAT KUN

First of all, we know that UN formed with purpose for world peace. And as we know, the nuclear
in North Korea is affecting in our lives in world peace. Northeast Asia is not only one of the most
important, but also one of the most tension-filled regions in the present world. These inter-state disputes
and contested claims undermine regional stability and may trigger serious conflicts.
High security risk in and around the Korean Peninsula is manifested by the worlds largest
concentration of combat-ready troops. At one time, it seemed, tensions there started to de-escalate and
the North Korean regime was opening up to the outside world. At the end of 2002, however, the positive
engagement of North Korea in international relations was disrupted after the North, accusing the United
States of threatening its security, acknowledged the existence of a uranium enrichment program. In the
next few months the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) further escalated tensions on the
Korean Peninsula when it withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), expelled
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, moved to restart its plutonium production program
frozen under the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework and then withdrew from the 1992 agreement with
the Republic of Korea (ROK) on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Pyongyang further hardened its position on the nuclear issue because it became increasingly
convinced that possession of nuclear deterrence forces probably constituted the only credible guarantee
of its survival in the face of the perceived US threat. Since the prime goal of the North Korean leadership
was to ensure the continuity and security of its regime, the DPRK declared its intention to develop nuclear
weapons unless it received direct and unambiguous security guarantees from the United States.
Needless to say, these developments had a strong negative impact on the overall security situation in
Northeast Asia and even beyond this region.
In an effort to de-escalate the tensions caused by the North Korean nuclear program and to avert
its destabilizing consequences for regional and global security, the United States, China, Russia, Japan
and South Korea began their search for effective political methods to resolve the problem. Since August
2003 these states and North Korea have held three rounds of six-party talks in Beijing, a channel for all
concerned parties to resolve the nuclear crisis through dialogue and cooperation. The results of the third
round of these talks held in June 2004 produced a measure of cautious optimism among some
participants and observers. This optimism was caused, first, by a more productive atmosphere than at the
previous two rounds of talks, which allowed participants to concentrate on searching for a comprehensive
solution to the problem. Second, the United States put forward a constructive enough proposal, which
could have served as a basis for an eventual agreement. Its main points included demands to North
Korea to dismantle all its nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible way; to place under
international control all its missile materials; and to return IAEA inspectors to the country. In return, the
United States would agree to the resumption of heavy fuel oil deliveries to North Korea by Japan and
South Korea and offer provisional security guarantees. On its part, North Korea seemed to respond
positively to these proposals by offering to freeze its military nuclear program and to start negotiations on
dismantling equipment related to this program in return for assistance in energy supplies, lifting of
economic sanctions and security guarantees from the United States. One month after the completion of
the third round of six-party talks, the US Secretary of State and the North Korean Minister of Foreign
Affairs held a meeting in Jakarta which left the impression that the principal parties in conflict were
reducing their differences on the nuclear issue.
The impression of reduced differences proved to be wrong. The United States continued to insist
on the cessation of all North Korean nuclear programs, including those for the peaceful use of nuclear
energy, a demand that Pyongyang called unacceptable. North Korea was also strongly offended by some
public statements made during the US presidential campaign, including those by President Bush himself,
about the nature of the North Korean regime. All this resulted in North Korea's refusal to attend the fourth
round of six-party talks scheduled for September 2004. Citing hostile US policy aimed allegedly at
changing the existing political regime in North Korea by force, including by use of preventive nuclear
strikes.
The reason given for these actions was again the hostile policy of the United States toward North
Korea. There may be some truth in this, but it also seems true that the DPRKs nuclear declaration was
made deliberately at the time when, in the opinion of North Korean leadership, the United States was tied
down in Iraq, making it more accommodating to North Korean demands of security guarantees and more
likely to abandon its intention to change the regime in Pyongyang. The North Korean leaders, however,
seriously misjudged the reaction of the international community to Pyongyangs nuclear declaration. The
statements were deeply deplored throughout the world, including by all the other countries that
participated in the six-party talks.
The United States interpreted the North Korean statement as a confirmation of its earlier
suspicions that Pyongyang had already been in possession of nuclear weapons since the 1990s.
Washington also rejected the DPRKs proposal to hold direct talks, which was made following North
Koreas announcement that it had become a nuclear power.
Among possible steps that Washington considered was referring the issue to the UN Security
Council and asking for imposition of international sanctions against North Korea. Also in case of further
delay by North Korea to re-start the talks, Washington was reported to contemplate a set of more
assertive steps tool kit aimed at tracking down and stopping North Korean export sales of missiles and
other weapons technologies as well as at undercutting its drug trafficking and counterfeit deals.
Washington was reported to consider adoption of punitive measures within the framework of the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) against North Korea.
Japan and South Korea also expressed their sincere regret and deep concern over the situation
in the region following Pyongyangs proclamation of possessing nuclear weapons. They strongly urged
North Korea to resume its participation in the six-party talks, which, in their opinion, was in the best
interests of all countries involved in them, North Korea above all.
That was where the similarity between Japans and South Koreas attitudes to the current stage
of the North Korean nuclear crisis largely ended. Indeed, Japan took a tougher stand on this issue and
demanded from North Korea not only a return to the six-party talks at an early date without any
preconditions, but also a commitment to complete dismantling of all its nuclear programs. Japan, similar
to the United States, was also in favor of imposing more stringent economic sanctions on North Korea if it
refused to yield to these demands. It was also prepared to join the United States in applying measures
under the PSI against North Korea.
In the opinion, however, the door of opportunity to resolve the crisis by political means is still
open. The North Korean leadership, in spite of its aggressive rhetoric and its demand to turn the six-party
talks into a wider disarmament forum, is basically interested not in the possession of nuclear weapons,
but rather in trading them off for international security guarantees and massive foreign economic
assistance. It is North Koreas rapidly escalating domestic economic crisis, and not possible US military
action, that presents the greatest threat to the North Korean regime. If such a trade-off is achieved in the
case of North Korea, the existing political regime in Pyongyang will continue to stay in place for some
time. That may not suit those thinking of regime change in North Korea, yet it will be infinitely better than
a military (even nuclear) conflict in the densely populated region.
Although at this stage the highest priority for all major international and regional actors is an early
resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis, it does not mean that the situation on the Korean Peninsula
may be completely normalized, even after the current nuclear crisis is reduced to an acceptable level.
The reason for that lies in the fact that the security situation on the Korean Peninsula has dynamics
embedded in the long and painful history of a Korean civil war and great power rivalries. The major
international actors, the United States and China in particular, continue to hold highly divergent views on
the future of the Korean Peninsula and of the Korean unification. This makes the current Korean nuclear
crisis only a transitory event, although an important one, in the long-term strategic development of the
region.