OR Deism is a Possibility, But in No way a Certainty
Humes Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion deals mainly with the debate between two characters, Cleanthes and Philo, on the existence and nature of a divine being. Specifically, Cleanthes argues for the necessity of an almighty and benevolent who set the universe in motion (or a deistic Christian God) from an appeal to the intricate design of nature. Philo, on the other hand, employs skepticism to argue that Cleanthes conclusion can in no way be considered definitive. Philo eventually demonstrates enough flaws in Cleanthes argument to achieve a victory, and does in fact make a positive contribution to how we judge claims in general. Cleanthes argument can be divided into two distinct parts a logical framework and its application to the existence of God. The framework is one of empirical inference, that like effects imply like causes. Cleanthes then considers the universe and find[s] it to be nothing but one great machine (Hume 143) 1 . Not only is it a machine, but it is one whose parts are adjusted to each other with an accuracy (Hume 143) that they boggle the mind of any man. Since every watch must have a watchmaker, so too must the universe have a creator who possesses agency and intelligence akin to, but much greater than, that of the human mind. This conclusion he see as essentially inevitable if one is to follow the rules of empirical inference. Philo does not argue with Cleanthes empirical strategy. Rather he adopts it himself and points out that a deistic conclusion depends on two factors:
1 My copy of Dialogues seems to be about 90 pages ahead of the Penguin edition. I decided to go with the page numbers in my book, hoping it wouldnt cause too much confusion
1) A true similarity of effects, in this case the resemblance of the world to a machine 2) The uniqueness of the conclusion, or that a deistic god is the only option Philo then flexes both of these factors to demonstrate arbitrariness, which ends up being the key to his victory. First, Philo accepts temporarily that the world is indeed a grand machine. But there are many ways that a machine is built. Just as many architects combine to build a house, so too perhaps several Deities combine[d] in contriving and framing a world. (Hume 167). Since these Deities are numerous, they need to be anywhere near as powerful as the almighty deity that Cleanthes proposes. So polytheism becomes a viable option. Similarly, it is often the case that a creation outlasts its creator, and it always the case (as far we know) that a creator is mortal. A once mortal, now dead God becomes another possibility. Its not difficult to think of other possibilities perhaps God is akin to a potter and only provided additional structure to already existing matter. Cleanthes would object, and does, that all these propositions still hinge on the hypothesis of design (Hume 169). This misses the purpose of Philos argument. The key is to show that even taking the designed nature of the universe as a fundamental axiom, there are several possible conclusions. It requires more evidence to be able to narrow the playing field. Philo also challenges the analogy of a machine. Perhaps inspired by Demeas picture of God as the soul that animates the body of the universe, he compares the universe to a plant that differs from a tree only in scale and intricacy. This leads to the conclusion that the universe had no creator at all. Rather it was sprouted from a
seed. While the mechanisms of a seed is wondrous in complexity, the agency for that complexity is not thought to go to the tree (Hume 177). Philo also suggests the analogy of an animal, in which case the universe was birthed just a mother gives birth to a child. In both these cases, theres no reason to ascribe divine attributes to the origin of our universe. The skeptical argument thus reveals several degrees of arbitrariness in Cleanthes deistic conclusion. It is important to note that this is not necessarily a disproof of the Christian God. It is however a strong step towards disproving the necessity of that being. If we imagine the possibility space of the origins of our universe, we find it populated by essentially infinite options. The chance of any of these being true a priori is close to zero. We can equip ourselves with a posterio axioms, but even seemingly strong ones such as that of a designed universe present us with several options. We need stronger evidence to be able to conclude one particular option. It is precisely this evidence that Cleanthes argues for in Part III. He gives two examples, one of a voice from heaven that we know to not come from any man and the other a natural library populated by volumes that display undeniable levels of craft (Hume 152-3). The key to these two examples is they are cases where we would have no choice to ascribe some sort of divine power to their source. He then suggests the human eye as an object whose divine design is self-evident. This is a point that Philo never directly addresses, which is sometimes taken to be a concession on his part.
Regardless, we can see that the response to this challenge is in the text itself. The flaw in Cleanthes argument lies in the jump from a truly divine event to the human eye. There is no proof of the human eyes divine design. And looking at this example from the perspective of modern science, we have a clear sense of how evolution and genetics could lead to such an intricate, well-adapted structure. But even during Humes lifetime, there was ample evidence of the ability of science to explain seemingly divine philosophy. One of the most dramatic is mentioned just earlier in the text, namely the Copernican revolution of astronomy. The laws of gravity provided a mechanistic explanation for how the heavens arranged themselves. Of course the question could be raised as to whom or what framed these mechanistic rules, but then we find ourselves back in that infinite probability space of possible origins. This argument of Cleanthes the suggestion of true indisputable miracles demonstrates the broader epistemological implications of Philos objections. A skeptic must accept that there might be a divine being with properties like that of the Christian God. But every claim has to be framed in a truly empirical fashion. So if there was a voice from the heaven, one must conduct extensive information as to its cause. And only after exhausting all possible non-divine attributes can one begin to make the claim that the origin is truly divine. There does appear to be some asymmetry here between a divine cause and a mechanistic cause. The reason for this comes again from the evidence we already possess. We have never directly encountered anything that is immortal or omniscient or omnipotent (Demea would disagree with this, but it seems Cleanthes
would concede this on pure sense experience). So a divine being requires more stringent tests, if only for the reason that it is difficult to even conceive what that test would resemble. But if we did manage to prove it rigorously, then a skeptic would have no choice but to accept. Thus the true purpose of Philos argument, and skepticism in general, seems to be guarding us against making unnecessary claims. It guards us against falling prey to false beliefs, and sharpens the mind. Philo successfully demonstrates the flaws in the argument from design, which stem from attempting to make a definitive claim about an inherently probabilistic event. He stresses the importance of sufficient evidence, and also provides a heuristic with which to truly understand the origin and nature of the universe.