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A Skeptical Approach to the Argument from Design

OR Deism is a Possibility, But in No way a Certainty



Humes Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion deals mainly with the debate
between two characters, Cleanthes and Philo, on the existence and nature of a divine
being. Specifically, Cleanthes argues for the necessity of an almighty and benevolent
who set the universe in motion (or a deistic Christian God) from an appeal to the
intricate design of nature. Philo, on the other hand, employs skepticism to argue that
Cleanthes conclusion can in no way be considered definitive. Philo eventually
demonstrates enough flaws in Cleanthes argument to achieve a victory, and does in
fact make a positive contribution to how we judge claims in general.
Cleanthes argument can be divided into two distinct parts a logical
framework and its application to the existence of God. The framework is one of
empirical inference, that like effects imply like causes. Cleanthes then considers the
universe and find[s] it to be nothing but one great machine (Hume 143)
1
. Not only
is it a machine, but it is one whose parts are adjusted to each other with an
accuracy (Hume 143) that they boggle the mind of any man. Since every watch
must have a watchmaker, so too must the universe have a creator who possesses
agency and intelligence akin to, but much greater than, that of the human mind. This
conclusion he see as essentially inevitable if one is to follow the rules of empirical
inference.
Philo does not argue with Cleanthes empirical strategy. Rather he adopts it
himself and points out that a deistic conclusion depends on two factors:

1
My copy of Dialogues seems to be about 90 pages ahead of the Penguin edition. I decided to go with
the page numbers in my book, hoping it wouldnt cause too much confusion

1) A true similarity of effects, in this case the resemblance of the world to a
machine
2) The uniqueness of the conclusion, or that a deistic god is the only option
Philo then flexes both of these factors to demonstrate arbitrariness, which ends up
being the key to his victory.
First, Philo accepts temporarily that the world is indeed a grand machine. But
there are many ways that a machine is built. Just as many architects combine to
build a house, so too perhaps several Deities combine[d] in contriving and framing
a world. (Hume 167). Since these Deities are numerous, they need to be anywhere
near as powerful as the almighty deity that Cleanthes proposes. So polytheism
becomes a viable option. Similarly, it is often the case that a creation outlasts its
creator, and it always the case (as far we know) that a creator is mortal. A once
mortal, now dead God becomes another possibility. Its not difficult to think of other
possibilities perhaps God is akin to a potter and only provided additional structure
to already existing matter. Cleanthes would object, and does, that all these
propositions still hinge on the hypothesis of design (Hume 169). This misses the
purpose of Philos argument. The key is to show that even taking the designed
nature of the universe as a fundamental axiom, there are several possible
conclusions. It requires more evidence to be able to narrow the playing field.
Philo also challenges the analogy of a machine. Perhaps inspired by Demeas
picture of God as the soul that animates the body of the universe, he compares the
universe to a plant that differs from a tree only in scale and intricacy. This leads to
the conclusion that the universe had no creator at all. Rather it was sprouted from a

seed. While the mechanisms of a seed is wondrous in complexity, the agency for that
complexity is not thought to go to the tree (Hume 177). Philo also suggests the
analogy of an animal, in which case the universe was birthed just a mother gives
birth to a child. In both these cases, theres no reason to ascribe divine attributes to
the origin of our universe.
The skeptical argument thus reveals several degrees of arbitrariness in
Cleanthes deistic conclusion. It is important to note that this is not necessarily a
disproof of the Christian God. It is however a strong step towards disproving the
necessity of that being. If we imagine the possibility space of the origins of our
universe, we find it populated by essentially infinite options. The chance of any of
these being true a priori is close to zero. We can equip ourselves with a posterio
axioms, but even seemingly strong ones such as that of a designed universe present
us with several options. We need stronger evidence to be able to conclude one
particular option.
It is precisely this evidence that Cleanthes argues for in Part III. He gives two
examples, one of a voice from heaven that we know to not come from any man and
the other a natural library populated by volumes that display undeniable levels of
craft (Hume 152-3). The key to these two examples is they are cases where we
would have no choice to ascribe some sort of divine power to their source. He then
suggests the human eye as an object whose divine design is self-evident. This is a
point that Philo never directly addresses, which is sometimes taken to be a
concession on his part.

Regardless, we can see that the response to this challenge is in the text itself.
The flaw in Cleanthes argument lies in the jump from a truly divine event to the
human eye. There is no proof of the human eyes divine design. And looking at this
example from the perspective of modern science, we have a clear sense of how
evolution and genetics could lead to such an intricate, well-adapted structure. But
even during Humes lifetime, there was ample evidence of the ability of science to
explain seemingly divine philosophy. One of the most dramatic is mentioned just
earlier in the text, namely the Copernican revolution of astronomy. The laws of
gravity provided a mechanistic explanation for how the heavens arranged
themselves. Of course the question could be raised as to whom or what framed
these mechanistic rules, but then we find ourselves back in that infinite probability
space of possible origins.
This argument of Cleanthes the suggestion of true indisputable miracles
demonstrates the broader epistemological implications of Philos objections. A
skeptic must accept that there might be a divine being with properties like that of
the Christian God. But every claim has to be framed in a truly empirical fashion. So if
there was a voice from the heaven, one must conduct extensive information as to its
cause. And only after exhausting all possible non-divine attributes can one begin to
make the claim that the origin is truly divine.
There does appear to be some asymmetry here between a divine cause and a
mechanistic cause. The reason for this comes again from the evidence we already
possess. We have never directly encountered anything that is immortal or
omniscient or omnipotent (Demea would disagree with this, but it seems Cleanthes

would concede this on pure sense experience). So a divine being requires more
stringent tests, if only for the reason that it is difficult to even conceive what that
test would resemble. But if we did manage to prove it rigorously, then a skeptic
would have no choice but to accept. Thus the true purpose of Philos argument, and
skepticism in general, seems to be guarding us against making unnecessary claims.
It guards us against falling prey to false beliefs, and sharpens the mind.
Philo successfully demonstrates the flaws in the argument from design,
which stem from attempting to make a definitive claim about an inherently
probabilistic event. He stresses the importance of sufficient evidence, and also
provides a heuristic with which to truly understand the origin and nature of the
universe.

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