PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, et. al. vs. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, et. al.

,
G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005, TINGA, J .:

FACTS:
On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court, District of
Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate)
by ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights. The presiding judge
rendered a Final Judgment awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty
Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents
($1,964,005,859.90) which was eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial Court,
City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. On 5 February 1998,
the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the
correct filing fees.
On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada of the Makati RTC
issued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. Respondent judge opined
that the subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation, as it
involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of
money. RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately Four Hundred
Seventy Two Million Pesos, which obviously had not been paid.

ISSUE:
What provision should apply in determining the filing fees for an action to enforce a
foreign judgment?

RULING:
Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for
enforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular courts.
Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to enforce the US
District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an
action based on judgment against an estate. We find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3) of Rule
141, involving as it does, "other actions not involving property."
As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids unreasonableness, as it
recognizes that the subject matter of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment is the
foreign judgment itself, and not the right-duty correlatives that resulted in the foreign judgment.
In this particular circumstance, given that the complaint is lodged against an estate and is based
on the US District Court's Final Judgment, this foreign judgment may, for purposes of
classification under the governing procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3)
of Rule 141, i.e., within the class of "all other actions not involving property." Thus, only the
blanket filing fee of minimal amount is required.





Bayan Muna vs Romulo
G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the
marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was
impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for
the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national
criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under
international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression.

On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome
Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory
states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to
have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among
the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral
agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter),
the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals
embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US
government. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as persons of
the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense
partnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have
been effected by and between the US and 33 other countries.

The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:
1. For purposes of this Agreement, persons are current or former Government officials,
employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.

2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent
of the first Party,

(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose,
unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or

(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to
a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless
such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council.

3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines to a
third country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third
country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN
Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines [GRP].

4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a third
country, the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country
to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the [US].

5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party notifies
the other of its intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall
continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or any allegation arising, before the effective
date of termination.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-
surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the
exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international law;
and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US
Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and
ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared
as without force and effect.

Issue:
Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting
obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized
principles of international law.


Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit.

Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being
that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.

Petitioners contentionperhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international
doctrines, practices, and jargonsis untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as
expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An
exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements, which is an
internationally accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections
(Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:

An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the
private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the
parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the
usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. The
signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The
technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure,
or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.

In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executive agreements have been
used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that
becomes binding through executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements concluded
by the President sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more
formal documents denominated agreements or protocols. As former US High Commissioner
to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of Trade
Agreement Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and
agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise
begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. x x x
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03be it viewed as the Non-
Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be
boundis a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract
among nations.

Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance
with Principles of International Law

Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral
obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of
international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner
would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that
deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an
American criminal to the [ICC] x x x.63

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as already
discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its
sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute,
contrary to international law principles.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as
aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and
punish crimes under its national law. x x x The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and
competence of the countrys judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and
dispense justice fairly and judiciously.

Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow
Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial
and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized
under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with
the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities
necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the
Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international
tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the
crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or
violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal
jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both
Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.














BAYAN v. ZAMORA G. R. No. 138570 October 10, 2000

Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and
negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos
approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, (2/3) votes.

Cause of Action:

Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable
and not Section 21, Article VII.

Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are
sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is
requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all
the members of the senate.

ISSUE:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of
the Constitution?

HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases,
troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense,
however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue
and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid
concurrence of the senate.

The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find nothing in
section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed
permanently in the Philippines.

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement
because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

Tanada v. Angara

Facts:

On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of
Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its
respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek
approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine
Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement.

This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19,
Article II, providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy, and
Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the Filipino first policy.

Issue:
Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitution
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it
recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolation a
list policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national
economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community.
The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby
making it a part of the law of the land. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal
department in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there
is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the
WTO Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a
mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as
may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken





LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO
(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)

FACTS:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she
and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of
the Philippines."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:

Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people are the judge.
The Court further held that:

The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire
country;

It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and The
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.



















VINUYA VS ROMULO GR NO 162230 APRIL 28, 2010
FACTS:
Members of the MALAYA LOLAS filed to the Supreme Court a petition to compel the
Philippine Government through the DOJ, DFAand OSG requesting assistance in filing their
claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of
the comfort women stations in the Philippines during WWII. The officials of the Executive
Department, however, declined to assist the petitioners for the reason that the individual claims
of the victims for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the
Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

ISSUE:
Are all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions depriving the courts the
authority to construe or invalidate treatiesand executive agreements?

RULING:
Certain types of cases are found to present political questions, one such category involves
questions of foreign relations. However, notall cases implicating foreign relations
present political questions and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or
invalidatetreaties and executive agreements. But to the questions whether the Philippine
government should espouse claims of its nationalsagainst a foreign government is a foreign
relations matter, the authority for which is committed by our Constitution not to the courts butto
the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the
best interest of the country towaive all claims of the nationals for reparations against Japan in
the Treaty of Peace of 1951.






AKBAYAN VS AQUINO GR 170516 JULY 16, 2008

Facts:
The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines
of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinkiin September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a milestone
in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic partnership
for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).
JPEPA which has been referred to as a mega treaty is a comprehensive plan for opening up of
markets in goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a
deal that encompasses even our commitments to the WTO.The complexity of JPEPA became all
the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee on Trade and Commerce last
November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and
perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard Governments rosy projections on the
economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of environmental and trade
activists who raised there very serious concerns about the country being turned into Japans toxic
wastebasket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning
trade and economic relations with Japan butone that touches on broader national development
concerns.

Issues:
1. Do the petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as
citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and asmembers of the Congress2. Can this Honorable
Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of the instant petition.3. Are
the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the
general rules on transparency andfull public disclosure such that the Philippine government is
justified in denying access thereto.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of Akbayan
Citizens Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest
Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought to compel
respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish
petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and
the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all
pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the
JPEPA has been made accessible to the public since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to
be furnished with copy of the said document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding
this, however, the Court lengthily discussed the substantive issues, insofar as they impinge on
petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the
negotiations.
The Court held: Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while
the final text of the JPEPA may
not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be 'ample opportunity for discussion
before [a treaty] is approved' the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the
Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic
confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future
negotiations.
It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations
would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during
negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a
process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser
importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest. In the
same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. It
said: We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect
our people's right to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We
fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavor to guard against the abuse of executive
privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would
strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof







PIMENTEL VS. EXEC SECRETARY G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005
ROME STATUTE Signing of Treaty vs. Ratification Significance of Ratification Who has
power to ratify

FACTS: The Rome Statute established the ICC which shall have the power to exercise its
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The Philippines, through Charge d
Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the UN, signed the Rome Statute on Dec.
28, 2000. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval
of the signatory states. Petitioners now file this petition to compel the Office of the President to
transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate for its concurrence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the DFA have a ministerial duty to transmit to the
Senate the copy of the Rome Statute

HELD:
We rule in the negative.

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ
and authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations.
As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with
respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with
foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations,
enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-
making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to
provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of
the legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy
system of checks and balance necessary in the nations pursuit of political maturity and growth.

Signing vs. Ratification of Treaty

It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and
distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily
intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the
parties. It is usually performed by the states authorized representative in the diplomatic mission.
Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the
provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an executive act,
undertaken by the head of the state or of the government.

Purpose of Ratification

Petitioners submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to
ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final
consent of the state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof.
In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by
which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a
treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such
treaty. After the treaty is signed by the states representative, the President, being accountable to
the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the
treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the
President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative
whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not
contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so, the
requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that a state
has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries.
There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be
based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other
state would be justified in taking offense.

President has the Power to Ratify Treaties

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited
only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within
the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its
consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty
which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such
decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this
Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the
President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of
mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive
branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.


International Law and the Constitutionality of the Milk Code of the Philippines




In the very fresh en banc constitutional case of PHARMACEUTICAL and HEALTH CARE
ASSOCIATION of the PHILIPPINES vs. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T.
DUQUE III, et. al., G.R. NO. 173034, October 9, 2007,
the Philippine Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition by declaring NULL AND
VOID Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012, dated May 12, 2006, for
being ultra vires and prohibited the Department of Health from implementing the said provisions.
With regard to the issue of whether petitioner may prosecute the case as the real party-in-interest,
the Court held that the modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to
its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An
association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its
members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its
constituents.
Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby
amending and expanding the coverage of said law. The defense of the DOH is that the RIRR
implements not only the Milk Code but also various international instruments regarding infant
and young child nutrition. It is respondents' position that said international instruments are
deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the
RIRR.
The Court however held that the international instruments invoked by respondents, namely, (1)
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and (3) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, only provide in general terms that steps must be taken by
State Parties to diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages of
breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being of families, and ensure that women are provided
with services and nutrition in connection with pregnancy and lactation; however, they do not
contain specific provisions regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes. The
international instruments that have specific provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are the
ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII,
Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate. Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by
the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic
conflicts.
The Court held that the ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate as required under Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
However, according to the Court, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been
transformed into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the
Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se. The
Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but the Court noted that the Milk
Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms
of promotion to the general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk
Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be
allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee
(IAC).
Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations. The provisions embodies the incorporation method.
Generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding
result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice
on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates(opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
Generally accepted principles of international law refers to norms of general or customary
international law which are binding on all states, i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of
national policy, the principle of sovereign immunity, a person's right to life, liberty and due
process, and pacta sunt servanda, among others. The concept of generally accepted principles of
law has also been depicted in this wise:
Customary international means a general and consistent practice of states followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation [opinio juris]. This statement contains the two basic elements of
custom: the material factor, that is, how states behave, and the psychological or subjective factor,
that is, why they behave the way they do. The initial factor for determining the existence of
custom is the actual behavior of states. This includes several elements: duration, consistency, and
generality of the practice of states. Once the existence of state practice has been established, it
becomes necessary to determine why states behave the way they do. Do states behave the way
they do because they consider it obligatory to behave thus or do they do it only as a matter of
courtesy? Opinio juris, or the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what makes
practice an international rule. Without it, practice is not law.

It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute soft law or non-binding norms,
principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law does not fall into any of the
categories of international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the
International Court of Justice. It is, however, an expression of non-binding norms, principles, and
practices that influence state behavior. Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN General
Assembly fall under this category. The most notable is the UN Declaration of Human Rights,
which this Court has enforced in various cases, specifically, Government of Hongkong Special
Administrative Region v. Olalia, Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, Mijares v. Raada and Shangri-la
International Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group of Companies, Inc.
The Court stressed that for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be
established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to
comply with such rules (opinio juris). However, according to the Court, the respondents have not
presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the
member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states;
neither have respondents proven that any compliance by member states with said WHA
Resolutions was obligatory in nature. Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of
pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international law that may be deemed part of the law
of the land. Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA
Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as
part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a
law enacted by the legislature.
May the DOH may implement the provisions of the WHA Resolutions by virtue of its powers
and functions under the Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law?
Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the
DOH shall define the national health policy and implement a national health plan within the
framework of the government's general policies and plans, and issue orders and regulations
concerning the implementation of established health policies.
The crucial issue was whether the absolute prohibition on advertising and other forms of
promotion of breastmilk substitutes provided in some WHA Resolutions has been adopted as
part of the national health policy.


Respondents submit that the national policy on infant and young child feeding is embodied in
A.O. No. 2005-0014, dated May 23, 2005. Basically, the Administrative Order declared the
following policy guidelines: (1) ideal breastfeeding practices, such as early initiation of
breastfeeding, exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months, extended breastfeeding up to two
years and beyond; (2) appropriate complementary feeding, which is to start at age six months; (3)
micronutrient supplementation; (4) universal salt iodization; (5) the exercise of other feeding
options; and (6) feeding in exceptionally difficult circumstances. Indeed, the primacy of
breastfeeding for children is emphasized as a national health policy. However, nowhere in A.O.
No. 2005-0014 is it declared that as part of such health policy, the advertisement or promotion of
breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited. Hence, the Court held that the national
policy of protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding cannot automatically be equated
with a total ban on advertising for breastmilk substitutes.The Milk Code does not contain a total
ban on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes but instead specifically creates an
IAC which will regulate said advertising and promotion. A total ban policy could be
implemented only pursuant to a law amending the Milk Code passed by the constitutionally
authorized branch of government, the legislature. The Court emphasized that only the provisions
of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented by
the DOH through the subject RIRR.
The Court held that the Sec. 3 of the Milk Code's coverage is not limited only to children 0-12
months old. Section 3 of the Milk Code. The coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent on the
age of the child but on the kind of product being marketed to the public. The law treats infant
formula, bottle-fed complementary food, and breastmilk substitute as separate and distinct
product categories.
Section 4(h) of the Milk Code defines infant formula as a breastmilk substitute x x x to satisfy
the normal nutritional requirements of infants up to between four to six months of age, and
adapted to their physiological characteristics; while under Section 4(b), bottle-fed
complementary food refers to any food, whether manufactured or locally prepared, suitable as a
complement to breastmilk or infant formula, when either becomes insufficient to satisfy the
nutritional requirements of the infant. An infant under Section 4(e) is a person falling within the
age bracket 0-12 months. It is the nourishment of this group of infants or children aged 0-12
months that is sought to be promoted and protected by the Milk Code.
But there is another target group. Breastmilk substitute is defined under Section 4(a) as any
food being marketed or otherwise presented as a partial or total replacement for breastmilk,
whether or not suitable for that purpose. This section conspicuously lacks reference to any
particular age-group of children. Hence, the provision of the Milk Code cannot be
considered exclusive for children aged 0-12 months. In other words, breastmilk substitutes may
also be intended for young children more than 12 months of age. Therefore, by regulating
breastmilk substitutes, the Milk Code also intends to protect and promote the nourishment of
children more than 12 months old. Evidently, as long as what is being marketed falls within the
scope of the Milk Code as provided in Section 3, then it can be subject to regulation pursuant to
said law, even if the product is to be used by children aged over 12 months.
To resolve the question of whether the labeling requirements and advertising regulations under
the RIRR are valid, the Court had to discuss the nature, purpose, and depth of the regulatory
powers of the DOH, as defined in general under the 1987 Administrative Code, and as delegated
in particular under the Milk Code. Health is a legitimate subject matter for regulation by the
DOH (and certain other administrative agencies) in exercise of police powers delegated to it. The
sheer span of jurisprudence on that matter precludes the need to further discuss it.. However,
health information, particularly advertising materials on apparently non-toxic products like
breastmilk substitutes and supplements, is a relatively new area for regulation by the DOH. The
1987 Administrative Code tasked respondent DOH to carry out the state policy pronounced
under Section 15, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which is to protect and promote the right
to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. To that end, it was granted
under Section 3 of the Administrative Code the power to (6) propagate health information
and educate the population on important health, medical and environmental matters which have
health implications.When it comes to information regarding nutrition of infants and young
children, however, the Milk Code specifically delegated to the Ministry of Health (hereinafter
referred to as DOH) the power to ensure that there is adequate, consistent and objective
information on breastfeeding and use of breastmilk substitutes, supplements and related
products; and the power tocontrol such information. Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk
Code to control the content of any information on breastmilk vis--vis breastmilk substitutes,
supplement and related products. The DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the
information and to whom such information may be disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of
the Milk Code to ensure that the information that would reach pregnant women, mothers of
infants, and health professionals and workers in the health care system is restricted to scientific
and factual matters and shall not imply or create a belief that bottle feeding is equivalent or
superior to breastfeeding. It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power under the Milk
Code to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not absolute
as the power to control does not encompass the power to absolutely prohibit the advertising,
marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes.
Nonetheless, the Court held that the framers of the constitution were well aware that trade must
be subjected to some form of regulation for the public good. Despite the fact that our present
Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the
power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. Free enterprise does not
call for removal of protective regulations. It must be clearly explained and proven by
competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of
trade. In this case, petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk manufacturers
participation in any policymaking body (Section 4(i)), classes and seminars for women and
children (Section 22); the giving of assistance, support and logistics or training (Section 32); and
the giving of donations (Section 52) would unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk
substitutes. Petitioner has not established that the proscribed activities are indispensable to the
trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the aforementioned
provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and oppressive for being in restraint of trade.
In fine, the Court held that except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR
are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code, constituting
reasonable regulation of an industry which affects public health and welfare and, as such, the rest
of the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint of trade nor are they violative of the due process
clause of the Constitution.



















Kuroda v. JalandoniG.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949

THE FACTS
S h i n e g o r i Ku r o d a , a f o r me r Li e u t e n a n t Ge n e r a l o f t h e J apanes e I mper
i al Ar my and Commandi ng Gener al of t heJ apanes e I mper i al For ces i n t he
Phi l i ppi nes was char gedbefore the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes. As
hewas the commanding general during such period of war, hewas tried for failure to
discharge his duties and permitting thebrutal atrocities and other high crimes
committed by his menagainst noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japaneseforces, in
violation of of the laws and customs of war.Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the
Military Commission isnot a valid court because the law that created it,
ExecutiveOr der No. 68, i s uncons t i t ut i onal . He f ur t her cont ends t hat using as
basis the Hague Conventions Rules and Regulationscovering Land Warfare for the war
crime committed cannotstand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of
suchr ul es i n s uch convent i on. Fur t her mor e, he al l eges t hat t heUnited States is
not a party of interest in the case and that thetwo US prosecutors cannot practice law in the
Philippines.

THE ISSUES Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?
THE RULING
[ T h e Co u r t DENIED t h e p e t i t i o n a n d u p h e l d t h e validity and
constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]

YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3,that The Philippines renounces war
as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the nation. In accordance with the generally accepted
principle of i nt er nat i onal l aw of t he pr es ent day i ncl udi ng t he Hague
Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence
established by the United Nationa t hos e per s on mi l i t ar y or ci vi l i an who have been
gui l t y of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
c o mmi s s i o n o f c r i me s a n d o f f e n s e s c o n s e q u e n t i a l a n d incidental thereto
in violation of the laws and customs of war of
h u ma n i t y a n d c i v i l i z a t i o n a r e h e l d a c c o u n t a b l e t h e r e f o r . Co n s e q u e
n t l y i n t h e p r o mu l g a t i o n a n d e n f o r c e me n t o f Execution Order No. 68 the
President of the Philippines hasacted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies
of international law which are part of the our Constitution
.xxx xxx xxx Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission
h a s n o j u r i s d i c t i o n t o t r y p e t i t i o n e r f o r a c t s c o mmi t t e d i n violation of
the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention becaus e t he Phi l i ppi nes i s not
a s i gnat or y t o t he f i r s t and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied
that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and
are wholly based on the generally
acceptedp r i n c i p a l s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w. I n f a c t s t h e s e r u l e s a n d princ
iples were accepted by the two belligerent nations the Uni t ed St at e and J apan
who wer e s i gnat or i es t o t he t wo Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form
part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions
embodying them for our Constitution has been del i ber at el y gener al and
ext ens i ve i n i t s s cope and i s not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of
international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a
signatory.