David v Arroyo GR No.

171396, May 3, 2006

Facts: As the nation celebrated EDSAs 20th anniversary, President Arroyo
issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and thereby
commanded the AFP and PNP to immediately carry out necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism
and lawless violence. This declaration led to cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the EDSA People Power I celebration. Rally permits were
revoked and warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including the
media, were implemented. Assemblies and rallyists were dispersed. Along
with the dispersal, petitioner was arrested without warrant.
A week after PP 1017, PP1021 was issued lifting the state of emergency.
Issue: Whether or not there is an actual controversy or case subject for
judicial review.
Whether or not there petition is with legal standing particularly on his
qualification to sue.
Ratio Decidendi: The Solicitor Generals refute that the case has been moot
and academic was not upheld by the Court. According to the Supreme Court,
courts will decide cases otherwise found moot and academic if: there is grave
Constitutional violation, the situations exceptional character and paramount
public interest involved, issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar and public, and lastly it is capable of
repetition yet evading review. Petitioner was found to be of legal standing on
the grounds that his personal rights were involved. The petitioner qualifies
under the direct injury test. The personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury qualifies him to impugn
the validity of the statute. To wit some of these direct injuries he sustained are
the illegal arrest and unlawful search he experienced. Given this fact, the
court entertained his petition as he has adequately shown that he entitled to
judicial protection. However, the court does not liberally declare statutes as
invalid although they may be abused and misabused and may afford an
opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or
ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to
accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. The Court
ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees, taking into
consideration that legislative power is vested only in congress. The Court
partly grants the petitions. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it allows the
President to call the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However,
commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence are
declared unconstitutional. Such proclamation does not also authorize the
President to take over privately-owned public utilities or business affected with
public interest without prior legislation. General Order No. 5 is constitutional
as it is a standard on how the AFP and PNP would implement PP1017, but
portion where acts of terrorism has not been defined and punishable by
congress is held unconstitutional. Furthermore, the following acts of the
government were held unconstitutional: warrantless arrest of the petitioner,
dispersal and warrantless arrests of rallyists in the absence of proof that said
petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, or violating BP 800; imposition of media standards and any form of
prior restraint on the press, as well as warrantless search of the Tribune
Offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials.

G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007 KILOSBAYAN VS ERMITA
Only natural-born Filipino citizens may be appointed as justice of the
Supreme Court
Decision of administrative body (Bureau of Immigration) declaring one
a natural-born citizen is not binding upon the courts when there are
circumstances that entail factual assertions that need to be threshed
out in proper judicial proceedings
FACTS:
This case arose when respondent Gregory S. Ong was appointed by
Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, as
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioners contended that
respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, born on May 25, 1953 to Chinese
parents. They further added that even if it were granted that eleven years after
respondent Ong's birth, his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by
naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born
citizen. For his part, respondent Ong contended that he is a natural-born
citizen and presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration and the
DOJ declaring him to be such.

ISSUE: whether or not the kilosbayan has a locus standi.

Held: First, as to standing. Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as
peoples organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of
utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the qualification
nay, the citizenship of a person to be appointed a member of this Court.
Standing has been accorded and recognized in similar instances


















FERDINAND TOPACIO vs. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY ONG and
OFFICE OF SOLICITOR GENERAL Gr. No.
179895 December 18, 2008
Facts:
Ong filed a petititon for correction of an entry in his certificate of birth before
the RTC in compliance with the SC
decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita on July 3, 2007 enjoining him
from accepting appointment to the position of Associate Justice of Supreme
Court until have shown through adversarial proceedings that he is a natural
born citizen.In the present case, Petitioner Topacio filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition to prevent Ong from exercising powers, duties and
responsibilities as a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. On September 5,
Topacio filed a letter-complaint praying that the Solicitor General to bring in a
quo warranto proceeding against Ong in the latters capacity as an incumbent
Sandiganbayan member. Petitioner invoked par. 1, Sec. 7, Art. VIII of the
Constitution and the decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita. Ongs birth
certificate and bar records evidenced his Chinese citizenship. Petitioner avers
that Ong should immediately vacate his post bearing out his status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. The Solicitor General informed the petitioner that it
cannot act favorably on the latters request for filing the quo warranto suit until
the resolution of the RTC case is decided by final judgment. In his answer,
Ong contends that in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, he voluntarily refused
to accept the
appointment in the Supreme Court and said decision does not annul his
appointment but merely enjoined him from accepting the post, there being no
definite pronouncement that he is not a natural born citizen. Ong then filed his
manifestation and motion to dismiss before the RTC alleging that he was
already recognized as a natural born citizen by a court decision. He attached
the said decision in his birth certificate. Ong further claims that the present
petition is devoid of merit, or at the very least, it must await the final
disposition of the RTC case which to him involves a prejudicial issue.
Meanwhile, the solicitor general alleges that the present petition is defectively
verified.
Issues:
1) WON the SolGen committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the filing
of quo warranto suit
2) WON the initiation by the petition for certiorari and prohibition is proper to
challenge the title to public office of
Justice Ong
Held:
1) No. There was no grave abuse of discretion in deferring an action on the
filing of a quo warranto suit until after the RTC case has been decided with
finality. Rule 66 provides that an action for usurpation of a public office,
position or
franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of
Republic of the Philippines against a public officer who does or suffers an act
which by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his office.
The Solgen when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe
that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof
must commence such action. However, the Solgen may suspend or struck
down the institution of action for quo warranto where there are just and valid
reasons. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate
action in court or he may opt not to file then suit at all. He may do everything
within his legal authority but always conformably with the national interest and
the policy of the government on the matter at hand. The Solgen noticed the
folly of re-litigation on the issue of Ongs citizenship in the quo warranto case
simultaneously with the RTC case. The Solgen merely advised the petitioner
to await the outcome of the RTC case.

2) No. SC declared that the proper petition is a quo warranto proceeding, not
petition for certiorari and prohibition for the former action seeks to declare null
and void. Petitioner claims that Ongs appointment as an Associate Justice of
Sandiganbayan is being unconstitutional. The petition professes to be for
certiorari and prohibition but it shows a quo warranto aspect of the petition.

As a collateral attack on a public officers title, the present petition for certiorari
and prohibition must be dismissed. The title of a public office may be
contested directly by no less a quo warranto suit. It cannot be invoked
collaterally even by
mandamus or motion to annul the order. A quo warranto proceeding is the
proper legal remedy to determine the title to a contested public office. It is
brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into or
unlawfully held or exercised the public office and may be commenced by the
Solicitor General as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled
to public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.
There must be a clear right to the contested office. There was no sufficient
proof of a clear franchise to the Office of Associate Justice of Sandiganbayan.
The petitioner conceded to that he was neither entitled to the contested office
which warrants the termination of the suit. It is the same with rightful authority
of a judge in the full exercise of his public function which can not be
questioned
by merely private suitor or by any other except in the form especially provided
by law. To uphold such action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to
resort to courts causing inculpable mischief and hindrance to the efficient
operation of the governmental machine.
The Court declares that Ong may either be a dejure officer who is deemed
legally appointed and whose term of office has not expired or a de facto
officer who enjoys certain rights among which is his title to said office may not
be
contested except directly by a quo warranto.










Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of
the Philippines

(G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, &
183962) (14 October 2008)
Facts:
On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP),
represented by the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process (PAPP), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were
scheduled to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD)
Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation
that
creates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRP grants the
authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the
Bangsamorodefined as the present geographic area of the ARMM
constituted by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and
Marawi City, as well as the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for
inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the
power to build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD also
described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE as associative,
characterized by shared authority and responsibility. It further provides that its
provisions requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall take
effect upon signing of a
Comprehensive Compact. Before the signing, however, the Province of North
Cotabato sought to compel the respondents to disclose and furnish it with
complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to hold a public
consultation thereon, invoking its right to information on matters of public
concern. A subsequent petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga
excluded from the BJE. The Court then issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) on 4 August 2008, directing the public respondents and their agents to
cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.

.
W/N the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
YES. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry
out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA No.
7160, and RA No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was
designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and
amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary, and despotic
exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual
refusal to perform the
duty enjoined.




Francisco vs. House of Representatives

Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
sponsored by Representative Fuentabella, which directed the Committee on
Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada held an impeachment
complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high
crimes. The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Suplico, Zamora
and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3 (2) of Article XI of the
Constitution, which provides the substantial rules in initiating impeachment
cases.
The House on Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the
same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint, or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with
the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and
Fuentabella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by the abovementioned
House Resolution.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et al.,
most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint was unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that no impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
On their comments on the petitions, respondent House of Representatives
through Speaker De Venecia and/or its co-respondents, submitted a
Manifestation asserting the Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less
prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and
co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance
of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases.
The Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Drilon, also filed a
Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly
premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of
filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it.
Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a Petition for Leave to Intervene, questioning the
status quo Resolution issued by the Court on the ground that it would
unnecessarily put Congress and the Court in a constitutional deadlock and
praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet
ripe for judicial determination. Several motions for intervention were filed and
were granted thereafter.
Issue: Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be
invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether or
not it should be exercised by the Court at this time.
Held: The matters will be discussed in seriatim.
1. Judicial Review
The Supreme Courts power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial
branch of the government in Sec. 1, Art. VII of our present 1987 Constitution,
the second paragraph of which states:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
Citing the case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Court expounded on
the power of judicial review stating that in cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments
and among the integral or constituent units thereof when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to
it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them
This moderating power to determine the proper allocation of powers of the
different branches of the government and to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels is inherent in all courts as a necessary
consequence of the judicial power itself, which is the power of the court to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive
and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission)
Ensuring the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of
discretion by any branch or instrumentalities of government, former Chief
Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, in his sponsorship
speech, even states that such power is not only a judicial power but a duty
to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
2. Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
The courts power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the
Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
a. Standing Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions,
contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice
has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. On the other hand, the
Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had,
in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens,
legislators in cases involving paramount public interest and transcendental
importance.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and
the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure while the
latter has constitutional underpinnings.
Standing is a special concern of the constitutional law because in some cases
suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence, the question
is whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
On the other hand, the question as to real-party-in-interest is whether he is
the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the
petitioners asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On
the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as
taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and
members of the bar and of the legal profession which were supposedly
violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators
when specific requirements have been met have been given standing in this
Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed, or that pubic money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he
has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.
As for the legislator, the Court allowed him to sue to question the validity of
any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a
legislator. Indeed a member of the House of Representatives has standing to
maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in his office.
An association has legal personality to represent its members, especially
when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their
vital interests. In class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening
must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned to
enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit, for a
judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is,
under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether
or not they were before the court. With respect to motions for intervention,
Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, the
courts may permit it when the applicant shows facts that satisfy the
requirements of the law authorizing intervention.
In this case, the Court granted motions to intervene except that of intervenor
Soriano, who asserts an interest as a taxpayer but failed to meet the standing
requirement for bringing taxpayers suit. In praying for the dismissal of the
petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners would result
in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to
any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar
does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
b. Ripeness and Prematurity
For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture. Only then may the courts pass on
the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an
appropriate proceeding.
The instant petitions raise the issue of the validity of the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the
House Impeachment Rules adopted by 12th Congress, the constitutionality of
which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e. the
second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been promulgated and
enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be
accomplished and performed before suit, has been complied with.
c. Justiciability
Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Citing Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner: The powers of government are generally considered
divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive, and the
Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law
is valid or not is vested in courts of justice courts of justice determine the
limits of powers of the agencies and offices of the government as well as
those of its officers. The judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether
or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but also a duty to pass judgment
on matters of this nature a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere
specter of the political law doctrine.
The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the
branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits. This Court thus now applies this standard to the present controversy.
The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the
merits of the second impeachment complaint. More importantly, any
discussion of this would require this Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislation.
On the other hand, issues regarding the constitutionality of Sections 15 and
16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress,
as a result thereof, barring the second impeachment complaint under Section
3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution, constitute the very lis mota or crux of the
instant controversy.
3. Conclusion This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance
as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. The Court found the
existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its
constitutionally vested power and duty of the judicial review over an issue
whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a
provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a
genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and
competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut
allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face with a
matter or problem that squarely falls under the Courts jurisdiction, no other
course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved
on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings
initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed
one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction
where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly
political questions. Because it not at all the business of this Court to assert
judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.
The Court, therefore, held sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, which were approved by the House
of Representatives on November 28, 2001, are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which was filed on October 23, 2003, is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
Personal Observation: This is a very recent case. Everything I learned
regarding jurisdiction is consistent to the principles applied in the case.
Generally, if the case is not justiciable, even if the court has the power and
authority to hear and decide the case, the court will refuse to decide or
exercise its jurisdiction. To be the subject of control of the court, 3 elements
must be present:
1. Actual controversy;
2. A case must be ripe for adjudication;
3. Parties to the case must have legal standing.
These three were given and were exhaustively explained in the case above.
Also, there are 2 Phases of Judicial Power:
1. Settlement of actual claims between two opposing claims or rights;
2. Duty to check acts of government done with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The present controversy falls under the second phase since, as the Court
explained, it involves a genuine constitutional issue, which this Court has the
right and duty to adjudicate.



























Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales and National
Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

D E C I S I O N
(En Banc)

PUNO, J .:

I. THE FACTS

As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact
disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between
then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano,
respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had
copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be
held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject
to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the National
Bureau of Investigation to go after media organizations found to have caused
the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.


Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and
TV network owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and
permits issued to them by government like the Provisional Authority and/or
Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that they shall not use their stations
for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful
misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the continuous airing or broadcast of
the Hello Garci taped conversations by radio and TV stations is a continuing
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional
Authority and/or Certificate of Authority. It warned that their broadcast/airing
of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause
for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations issued to the said media establishments.

Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng
mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) which resulted in the issuance of a Joint
Press Statement which stated, among others, that the supposed wiretapped
tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly.

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents
Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner has the legal standing/ proper party.

HELD: THE PROCEDURAL THRESHOLD: LEGAL STANDING

To be sure, the circumstances of this case make the constitutional challenge
peculiar. Petitioner, who is not a member of the broadcast media, prays that
we strike down the acts and statements made by respondents as violations of
the right to free speech, free expression and a free press. For another, the
recipients of the press statements have not come forwardneither
intervening nor joining petitioner in this action. Indeed, as a group, they issued
a joint statement with respondent NTC that does not complain about restraints
on freedom of the press.

It would seem, then, that petitioner has not met the requisite legal standing,
having failed to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

[19]

But as early as half a century ago, we have already held that where
serious constitutional questions are involved, the transcendental importance
to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside if we must, technicalities of procedure. [20]
Subsequently, this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield
procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious
legal questions that greatly impact on public interest,[21] in keeping with the
Court's duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other
branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given
to them.

Thus, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a case
involves an issue of overarching significance to our society,[22] we therefore
brush aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of this
petition,[23] seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all the civil
rights, the freedom of expression.

The petition raises other issues like the
extent of the right to information of the public. It is fundamental,
however, that we need not address all issues but only the most decisive
one which in the case at bar is whether the acts of the respondents
abridge freedom of speech and of the press.

But aside from the primordial issue of determining whether free speech
and freedom of the press have been infringed, the case at bar also gives
this Court the opportunity: (1) to distill the essence of freedom of
speech and of the press now beclouded by the vagaries of motherhood
statements; (2) to clarify the types of speeches and their differing
restraints allowed by law; (3) to discuss the core concepts of prior
restraint, content-neutral and content-based regulations and their
constitutional standard of review; (4) to examine the historical difference
in the treatment of restraints between print and broadcast media and
stress the standard of review governing both; and (5) to call attention to
the ongoing blurring of the lines of distinction between print and
broadcast media.

Senate vs. Ermita


G.R. No. 169777, July 14, 2006

Requisites of Judicial Review
Legislative Inquiry vs. Executive Privilege
Executive Privilege, defined
Kinds of Executive Privilege
Executive Privilege as applied to an official
Constitutionality of EO 464

FACTS:

This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well
as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29,
2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate
President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in
order to afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare
for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee
on its investigation. Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately,
which, among others, mandated that all heads of departments of the
Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either House of Congress. Pursuant to this Order,
Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and
AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has
not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig.
Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation.
Both faced court marshal for such attendance.

Hence, these petitions.

ISSUES:
Whether or not EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in
Congress
Whether or not EO 464 violates the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern
Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of
discretion when they implemented EO 464 prior to its publication
in a newspaper of general circulation

RULING:

ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
1. there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power;
2. the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised as the earliest
opportunity; and
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

LEGAL STANDING

Standing of the Senate

That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only
for intelligent public decision-making in a democratic system, but more
especially for sound legislation is not disputed. EO 464, however, allegedly
stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is
crucial to law-making. Verily, the Senate, including its individual members,
has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and
is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of EO 464. Indeed, legislators
have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question
the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives
as legislators.

Standing of an ordinary citizen

It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in
assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders and other
regulations must be direct and personal. In Francisco v. House of
Representatives, this Court held that when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest.

Requisites for transcendental importance: Establish (1) the character of the
funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence
of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the
lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.









GARCILLANO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(G.R. No. 170338 , December 23, 2008)
FACTS
-Garcillano (in G.R. No. 170338) filed a Petition for Prohibition to restrain the
House Representatives Committees from using the tape recordings of the
"illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and
for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any
reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the
respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the
recordings in any of the House proceedings.
-Ranada and Agcaoili (in G.R. No. 179275), retired justices of the CA, filed a
Petition for Prohibition to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled
legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry
violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.
-Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource
persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings,
moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.
18

While both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different
objectivesthe first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the
House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the
second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the
wiretapped conversation.
ISSUES
(1) WON petitioners have legal standing. [YES]
(2) WON there is an actual case or controversy. [NO: against the House of
Rep. YES: against the Senate]
HELD (The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants
the second, G.R. No. 179275.)
LOCUS STANDI
General Rule: Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury because of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he
has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.
Exception/Liberal application: However, considering that locus standi is a
mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the
stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo articulates that a
"liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of
Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.
Garcillano = direct injury. Ranada and Agcaoili = concerned citizens,
taxpayers, and members of the IBP. Intervenor Sagge = alleges violation of
his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate
hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the
investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and
wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned
hearings.
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution
of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due
process, they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the
petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve
the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance
not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be
resolved for the guidance of all.
34

Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it
has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the
Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and
intervenor Sagge.
ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
Versus House of Representatives
Court dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic.
Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by
this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution
of actual cases and controversies. By actual cases, we mean existing
conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory
opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical
questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which
no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose
has become stale. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a
case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any
practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.
The Court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and
heard by its members. There is also the widely publicized fact that the
committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and
submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees. Having
been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed
for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to
restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a
remedy for an act already accomplished.
Versus the Senate
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The
Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement.





ANAK MINDANAO PARTYLIST VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Mamalo Descendants
Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.)
Nos. 364 and 379, both issued in 2004, via the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief.

E.O. No. 364, which President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued on
September 27, 2004, reads:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364

TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM INTO THE
DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM

WHEREAS, one of the five reform packages of the Arroyo administration is Social
Justice and Basic [N]eeds;

WHEREAS, one of the five anti-poverty measures for social justice is asset
reform;

WHEREAS, asset reforms covers [sic] agrarian reform, urban land reform, and
ancestral domain reform;

WHEREAS, urban land reform is a concern of the Presidential Commission [for]
the Urban Poor (PCUP) and ancestral domain reform is a concern of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP);

WHEREAS, another of the five reform packages of the Arroyo administration is
Anti-Corruption and Good Government;

WHEREAS, one of the Good Government reforms of the Arroyo administration is
rationalizing the bureaucracy by consolidating related functions into one
department;

WHEREAS, under law and jurisprudence, the President of the Philippines has
broad powers to reorganize the offices under her supervision and control;

NOW[,] THEREFORE[,] I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, by the powers vested in me
as President of the Republic of the Philippines, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby transformed into
the Department of Land Reform. It shall be responsible for all land reform in
the country, including agrarian reform, urban land reform, and ancestral domain
reform.

SECTION 2. The PCUP is hereby placed under the supervision and control of
the Department of Land Reform. The Chairman of the PCUP shall be ex-officio
Undersecretary of the Department of Land Reform for Urban Land Reform.

SECTION 3. The NCIP is hereby placed under the supervision and control of the
Department of Land Reform. The Chairman of the NCIP shall be ex-officio
Undersecretary of the Department of Land Reform for Ancestral Domain
Reform.

SECTION 4. The PCUP and the NCIP shall have access to the services provided by
the Departments Finance, Management and Administrative Office; Policy,
Planning and Legal Affairs Office, Field Operations and Support Services Office,
and all other offices of the Department of Land Reform.

SECTION 5. All previous issuances that conflict with this Executive Order are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SECTION 6. This Executive Order takes effect immediately. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)


E.O. No. 379, which amended E.O. No. 364 a month later or on October 26, 2004,
reads:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 379

AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364 ENTITLED TRANSFORMING THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND
REFORM

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8371 created the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples;

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987, the President has
the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
National Government.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution and existing laws, do hereby order:

Section 1. Amending Section 3 of Executive Order No. 364. Section 3 of
Executive Order No. 364, dated September 27, 2004 shall now read as follows:

Section 3. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall be
an attached agency of the Department of Land Reform.

Section 2. Compensation. The Chairperson shall suffer no diminution in
rank and salary.

Section 3. Repealing Clause. All executive issuances, rules and regulations
or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby
revoked, amended or modified accordingly.

Section 4. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.


Held
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct
and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental
act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to
be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional
question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government,
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action. (Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs.
Executive Secretary, GR 166052, 29August 2007; En Banc, Carpio-Morales J,)

be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance, Senate
of the Philippines v. Ermita [G.R.No. 169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1]
requires that the following elements must be established: (1) the public
character of the funds or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a
clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of government, and (3) the lack of any
other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised. [Moreover,] Francisco, Jr. v. Fernando [G.R. No. 166501, November 16,
2006, 507 SCRA 173] more specifically declares that the transcendental
importance of the issues raised must relate to the merits of the petition. (Anak
Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary, GR 166052, 29 August 2007;
En Banc,Carpio-Morales J,















ASEAN Pacific Planters vs City of Urdaneta

FACTS:
The instant petition seeks to set aside the Resolutions[1] dated April 15,
2003 and February 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76170.
This case stemmed from a Complaint[2] for annulment of contracts with prayer
for preliminary prohibitory injunction and temporary restraining order filed by
respondent Waldo C. Del Castillo, in his capacity as taxpayer, against
respondents City of Urdaneta and Ceferino J. Capalad doing business under the
name JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP)
represented by Ronilo G. Goco and Asean Pacific Planners Construction and
Development Corporation (APPCDC) represented by Cesar D. Goco.
Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered
into five contracts for the preliminary design, construction and management of a
four-storey twin cinema commercial center and hotel involving a massive
expenditure of public funds amounting to P250 million, funded by a loan from
the Philippine National Bank (PNB). For minimal work, the contractor was
allegedly paid P95 million. Del Castillo also claimed that all the contracts are
void because the object is outside the commerce of men. The object is a piece of
land belonging to the public domain and which remains devoted to a public
purpose as a public elementary school. Additionally, he claimed that the
contracts, from the feasibility study to management and lease of the future
building, are also void because they were all awarded solely to the Goco family.
In their Answer,[3] APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are
valid. Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., who filed the citys Answer,[4]
joined in the defense and asserted that the contracts were properly executed by
then Mayor Parayno with prior authority from the Sangguniang
Panlungsod. Mayor Perez also stated that Del Castillo has no legal capacity to sue
and that the complaint states no cause of action. For respondent Ceferino J.
Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an Answer[5] with compulsory
counterclaim and motion to dismiss on the ground that Del Castillo has no legal
standing to sue.
Respondents Norberto M. Del Prado, Jesus A. Ordono and Aquilino Maguisa
became parties to the case when they jointly filed, also in their capacity as
taxpayers, a Complaint-in-Intervention[6] adopting the allegations of Del
Castillo.

HELD:
On the first point at issue, petitioners argue that a taxpayer may only
sue where the act complained of directly involves illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation. The allegation of respondents Del Castillo,
Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa that the construction of the project is funded
by the PNB loan contradicts the claim regarding illegal disbursement since the
funds are not directly derived from taxation.
Respondents Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa counter that their
personality to sue was not raised by petitioners APP and APPCDC in their
Answer and that this issue was not even discussed in the RTCs assailed
orders.
Petitioners contentions lack merit. The RTC properly allowed the taxpayers
suits. In Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Roxas,[23] we held:
In the case of taxpayers suits, the party suing as a taxpayer must prove that
he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised
by taxation. Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected
to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
x x x x
Petitioners allegations in their Amended Complaint that the loan contracts
entered into by the Republic and NPC are serviced or paid through a
disbursement of public funds are not disputed by respondents, hence, they
are invested with personality to institute the same.[24]
Here, the allegation of taxpayers Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and
Maguisa that P95 million of the P250 million PNB loan had already been paid
for minimal work is sufficient allegation of overpayment, of illegal
disbursement, that invests them with personality to sue. Petitioners do not
dispute the allegation as they merely insist, albeit erroneously, that public
funds are not involved. Under Article 1953[25] of the Civil Code, the city
acquired ownership of the money loaned from PNB, making the money public
fund. The city will have to pay the loan by revenues raised from local taxation
or by its internal revenue allotment.
In addition, APP and APPCDCs lack of objection in their Answer on the
personality to sue of the four complainants constitutes waiver to raise the
objection under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.[26]
On the second point, petitioners contend that only the City Prosecutor can
represent Urdaneta City and that law and jurisprudence prohibit the
appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as the citys counsel.
The Lazaro Law Firm, as the citys counsel, counters that the city was inutile
defending its cause before the RTC for lack of needed legal advice. The city
has no legal officer and both City Prosecutor and Provincial Legal Officer are
busy. Practical considerations also dictate that the city and Mayor Perez must
have the same counsel since he faces related criminal cases. Citing
Mancenido v. Court of Appeals,[27] the law firm states that hiring private
counsel is proper where rigid adherence to the law on representation would
deprive a party of his right to redress a valid grievance.[28]
We cannot agree with the Lazaro Law Firm. Its appearance as Urdaneta
Citys counsel is against the law as it provides expressly who should
represent it. The City Prosecutor should continue to represent the city.
Section 481(a)[29] of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991[30]
mandates the appointment of a city legal officer. Under Section
481(b)(3)(i)[31] of the LGC, the city legal officer is supposed to represent the
city in all civil actions, as in this case, and special proceedings wherein the
city or any of its officials is a party. In Ramos v. Court of Appeals,[32] we
cited that under Section 19[33] of Republic Act No. 5185,[34] city
governments may already create the position of city legal officer to whom the
function of the city fiscal (now prosecutor) as legal adviser and officer for civil
cases of the city shall be transferred.[35] In the case of Urdaneta City,
however, the position of city legal officer is still vacant, although its charter[36]
was enacted way back in 1998.
Because of such vacancy, the City Prosecutors appearance as counsel of
Urdaneta City is proper. The City Prosecutor remains as the citys legal
adviser and officer for civil cases, a function that could not yet be transferred
to the city legal officer. Under the circumstances, the RTC should not have
allowed the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm vice the City
Prosecutor. Notably, the citys Answer was sworn to before the City
Prosecutor by Mayor Perez. The City Prosecutor prepared the citys pre-trial
brief and represented the city in the pre-trial conference. No question was
raised against the City Prosecutors actions until the Lazaro Law Firm entered
its appearance and claimed that the city lacked adequate legal representation.
Moreover, the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as counsel for
Urdaneta City is against the law. Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC provides
when a special legal officer may be employed, that is, in actions or
proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the
provincial government. But this case is not between Urdaneta City and the
Province of Pangasinan. And we have consistently held that a local
government unit cannot be represented by private counsel[37] as only public
officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and public funds should not
be spent to hire private lawyers.[38] Pro bono representation in collaboration
with the municipal attorney and prosecutor has not even been allowed.[39]
Neither is the law firms appearance justified under the instances listed in
Mancenido when local government officials can be represented by private
counsel, such as when a claim for damages could result in personal
liability. No such claim against said officials was made in this case. Note that
before it joined the complainants, the city was the one sued, not its
officials. That the firm represents Mayor Perez in criminal cases, suits in his
personal capacity,[40] is of no moment.























ANAKBAYAN VS AQUINO

Facts:
Petitioners, as non-government orgs, congresspersons, citizens and
taxpayers, filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition seeking to compel
respondents, Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas
Aquino, et al., to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent
attachments and annexes thereto.
The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be
entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate
grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which includes trade in
goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in
services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement,
movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual
recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business
environment, and general and final provisions.
Petitioners emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the
said agreement violates their right to information on matters of public concern
and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents
undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of
social, political and economic decision making.
Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the
ground that the matter sought involves a diplomatic negotiation then in
progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the
policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA -
that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive
privilege.
Issues:
Procedural Issues:
1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus
in their capacity as citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of
the Congress?
2. Whether the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic
because of the subsequent event that occurred.

Held/Ratio:
(Procedural)
1. YES. The right of people to information on matters of public concern is a
public right by its very nature so petitioners need not show that they have any
legal or special interest in the result. It is enough that they are part of the
general public who possess the right. Since in the present position is
anchored on the right of information and the petitioners are suing in their
capacity as citizens, citizen-groups, petitioner-members of the House of Rep,
their standing to file the present suit is grounded on jurisprudence.
2. NOT ENTIRELY. The Supreme Court ruled that the principal relief
petitioners are praying for is the disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior
to its finalization between the two States parties, public disclosure of the text
of the JPEPA after its signing by the President, during the pendency of the
present petition, has been largely rendered moot and academic. The text of
the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has
become moot and academic to the extent that it seeks the disclosure of the
full text thereof. The petition is not entirely moot, however, because
petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the
Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.












































Planters Products Inc vs Fertiphil Corp G.R. No. 166006 March 14, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private corporations
incorporated under Philippine laws, both engaged in the importation and
distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals.
Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1465, imposing a capital recovery
component of Php10.00 per bag of fertilizer. The levy was to continue until
adequate capital was raised to make PPI financially viable. Fertiphil remitted
to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), which was then remitted the
depository bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from 1985 to 1986.
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the
P10 levy. Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amount it remitted,
however PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages,
questioning the constitutionality of LOI 1465, claiming that it was unjust,
unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted
to a denial of due process. PPI argues that Fertiphil has no locus standi to
question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because it does not have a
"personal and substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct injury as a
result of its enforcement." It asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any damage
from the imposition because "incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate
consumer or the farmers themselves, not on the seller fertilizer company.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the
constitutionality of LOI No. 1465.
What is the power of taxation?

RULING: Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine
of standing is a mere procedural technicality which may be waived.
The imposition of the levy was an exercise of the taxation power of the state.
While it is true that the power to tax can be used as an implement of police
power, the primary purpose of the levy was revenue generation. If the
purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and
substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax.
Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State.
These powers are distinct and have different tests for validity. Police power is
the power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare, while the power of
taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose. The main
purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while
taxation is revenue generation. The "lawful subjects" and "lawful means" tests
are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the police power.
The power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and
constitutional limitations.











Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs.
Duque III
(Austria-Martinez, October 9, 2007)

Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
Petitioner: Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines
Respondents: DOH Sec. Francisco Duque III, DOH Undersecretaries Dr.
Ethelyn Nieto, Dr. Margarita Galon, Atty. Alexander Padilla and Dr. Jade Del
Mundo; and Asst. Secretaries Dr. Mario Villaverde, Dr. David Lozada and Dr.
Nemesio Gako

Facts:
- Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) was issued by Pres.
Aquino on Oct. 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to her
under the Freedom Constitution.
(1) One of the preambular clauses of TMC the law seeks to give
effect to Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substituttes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the WHA (World Health
Assembly) in 1981.
- In 1990, the Philippine ratified the International Convention on the Rights
of the Child. Art. 24 of the instrument mandates that States should take
measure to diminish infant mortality and should ensure that all segments
of society are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.
- From 1982 2006, the WHA adopted several resolutions to the effect
that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence,
it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for
breastmilk substitutes.
- May 15, 2006 DOH issues the assailed RIRR (Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations of E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which was to
take effect on July 7, 2006. The RIRR imposes a ban on all
advertisements of breastmilk substitutes
- June 28, 2006 Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary
injunction.
- August 15, 2006 the Court issued a Resolution granting the TRO,
enjoining the respondents from implementing the assailed RIRR.
- Petitioner assails the RIRR for going beyond the provisions of TMC
thereby amending and expanding the coverage of the said law.
- DOH meanwhile contends that the RIRR implements not only TMC but
also various international instruments regarding infant and young child
nutrition. They posit that the said international instruments are deemed
part of the law of the land and therefore may be implemented by the DOH
in the RIRR.
ISSU: W/n the petitioner is the real party in interest?

HELD: Yes.
- An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of
direct interest of its members are affected by the action. An organization
has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents. (Exec Sec vs CA)
- The Court has rules that an association has the legal personality to
represent its members because the results of the case will affect their
vital interests. (Purok Bagong Silang Association Inc. vs. Yuipco)
- In the petitioners Amended Articles of Incorporation, it states that the
association is formed to represent directly or through approved
representatives the pharmaceutical and health care industry before the
Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the medical professions
and the general public.
- Therefore, the petitioner, as an organization, has an interest in fulfilling its
avowed purpose of representing members who are part of the
pharmaceutical and health care industry. Petitioner is duly authorized to
bring to the attention of the government agencies and courts any
grievance suffered by its members which are directly affected by the
assailed RIRR.
- The petitioner, whose legal identity is deemed fused with its members,
should be considered as a legal party-in-interest which stands to be
benefited or injured by any judgment in the case.






























MAMBA VS LARA

The decision to entertain a taxpayers suit is discretionary upon the Court. It can
choose to strictly apply the rule or take a liberal stance depending on the
controversy involved. Advocates for a strict application of the rule believe that
leniency would open floodgates to numerous suits, which could hamper the
government from performing its job. Such possibility, however, is not only
remote but also negligible compared to what is at stake - the lifeblood of the
State. For this reason, when the issue hinges on the illegal disbursement of
public funds, a liberal approach should be preferred as it is more in keeping with
truth and justice.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari with prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeks to set aside the April 27, 2004 Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 5, Tuguegarao City, dismissing the Petition for Annulment of
Contracts and Injunction with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction,[2] docketed as Civil Case No.
6283. Likewise assailed in this Petition is the August 20, 2004 Resolution[3] of
RTC, Branch 1, Tuguegarao City denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the
dismissal.

Factual Antecedents

On November 5, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan passed
Resolution No. 2001-272[4] authorizing Governor Edgar R. Lara (Gov. Lara) to
engage the services of and appoint Preferred Ventures Corporation as financial
advisor or consultant for the issuance and flotation of bonds to fund the priority
projects of the governor without cost and commitment.

On November 19, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, through Resolution No.
290-2001,[5] ratified the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)[6] entered into by
Gov. Lara and Preferred Ventures Corporation. The MOA provided that the
provincial government of Cagayan shall pay Preferred Ventures Corporation a
one-time fee of 3% of the amount of bonds floated.
On February 15, 2002, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved Resolution No.
2002-061-A[7] authorizing Gov. Lara to negotiate, sign and execute contracts or
agreements pertinent to the flotation of the bonds of the provincial government
in an amount not to exceed P500 million for the construction and improvement
of priority projects to be approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

On May 20, 2002, the majority of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Cagayan approved Ordinance No. 19-2002,[8] authorizing the bond flotation
of the provincial government in an amount not to exceed P500 million to fund
the construction and development of the new Cagayan Town Center. The
Resolution likewise granted authority to Gov. Lara to negotiate, sign and execute
contracts and agreements necessary and related to the bond flotation subject to
the approval and ratification by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

On October 20, 2003, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved Resolution No.
350-2003[9] ratifying the Cagayan Provincial Bond Agreements entered into by
the provincial government, represented by Gov. Lara, to wit:

a. Trust Indenture with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) Trust and Investment Division and Malayan Insurance Company, Inc.
(MICO).

b. Deed of Assignment by way of security with the RCBC and the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP).

c. Transfer and Paying Agency Agreement with the RCBC Trust and
Investment Division.

d. Guarantee Agreement with the RCBC Trust and Investment Division
and MICO.

e. Underwriting Agreement with RCBC Capital Corporation.

On even date, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan also approved Resolution No. 351-
2003,[10] ratifying the Agreement for the Planning, Design, Construction, and
Site Development of the New Cagayan Town Center[11] entered into by the
provincial government, represented by Gov. Lara and Asset Builders
Corporation, represented by its President, Mr. Rogelio P. Centeno.

On May 20, 2003, Gov. Lara issued the Notice of Award to Asset Builders
Corporation, giving to the latter the planning, design, construction and site
development of the town center project for a fee of P213,795,732.39.[12]

ISSUE: WON the petitioner is a proper party.

Held:
A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that the public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must
show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation. He must also prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and
that he will sustain a direct injury because of the enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract. In other words, for a taxpayers suit to prosper, two
requisites must be met: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by
a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or
some irregularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the
alleged act.
In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that contrary to the view of the RTC, a
taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. As long as
taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by the
government.
In this case, although the construction of the town center would be primarily
sourced from the proceeds of the bonds, which respondents insist are not
taxpayers money, a government support in the amount of P187 million would
still be spent for paying the interest of the bonds. In fact, a Deed of Assignment
was executed by the governor in favor of respondent RCBC over the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) and other revenues of the provincial government as
payment and/or security for the obligations of the provincial government under
the Trust Indenture Agreement dated September 17, 2003. Records also show
that on March 4, 2004, the governor requested the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to
appropriate an amount of P25 million for the interest of the bond. Clearly, the
first requisite has been met.
As to the second requisite, the court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent
direct injury test bearing in mind that locus standi is a procedural
technicality. By invoking transcendental importance, paramount public
interest, or far-reaching implications, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to sue even if they failed to show direct injury. In cases where serious
legal issues were raised or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were
involved, the court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers. Manuel
Mamba, et al. vs. Edgar R. Lara, et al., G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009.