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2
(6) 4.52, p 0.61; isolation,
2
(4) 3.21, p 0.52; introaggression,
2
(6) 8.42,
p 0.21; introjection of opposite sex,
2
(16) 16.49, p 0.42; introjection of another
object,
2
(22) 20.25, p 0.57; projection,
2
(2) 1.93, p 0.38; regression,
2
(2)
1.93, p 0.38).
Table 2 presents a comparison between conditions for various perceptual thresholds that
are regarded important in the DMT (see e.g. Kragh, 1985). If the reasoning behind the
DMT is valid, it seems reasonable to predict that a heightened perceptual threshold would
characterize the threatful stimulus condition as compared with the neutral and friendly
ones. As shown in Table 2, there was no signicant difference in any of the thresholds that
were meaningful to compare. Thus, the thresholds for Percept (P
1
the rst time a
meaningful percept was reported), Hero (H
1
the rst time the hero was perceived), and
Peripheral person (PP
1
the rst time the peripheral person was perceived) were not
signicantly different in the three stimulus conditions. Further, the proportion of
participants who gave a correct description of the main characteristics of the picture at the
Table 1. Mean unweighted (u) and weighted (w) scores (SDs in parentheses) on the DMT defence
categories as a function of stimulus condition, and F-ratios and p-values for the effect of condition
Defence Score Threatful Neutral Friendly F p
(n 20) (n 20) (n 18)
1. Repression u 0.45 (0.69) 0.45 (0.83) 0.17 (0.38) 1.12 0.33
w 0.55 (1.00) 0.45 (0.83) 0.22 (0.55) 0.79 0.46
2. Isolation u 0.15 (0.49) 0.10 (0.31) 0.17 (0.38) 0.15 0.87
w 0.20 (0.70) 0.15 (0.49) 0.28 (0.67) 0.20 0.82
3. Denial u 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) not relevant
w 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) not relevant
4. Reaction formation u 1.35 (1.09) 0.65 (0.81) 1.67 (2.06) not relevant
w 2.60 (2.42) 1.60 (2.16) 4.28 (5.21) not relevant
5. Identication with u 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) not relevant
the aggressor w 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) not relevant
6. Introaggression u 0.20 (0.52) 0.40 (0.68) 0.17 (0.17) 0.76 0.47
w 0.55 (1.39) 1.05 (1.84) 0.33 (1.41) 1.05 0.36
7. Introjection of u 3.45 (2.80) 2.40 (2.35) 3.22 (3.14) 0.79 0.46
opposite sex w 6.75 (5.60) 4.85 (5.30) 7.11 (6.96) 0.81 0.45
8. Introjection of u 2.50 (3.07) 2.95 (3.12) 3.28 (3.53) 0.28 0.76
another object w 4.55 (6.35) 5.75 (6.50) 7.33 (8.33) 0.74 0.48
9. Projection u 0.00 (0.00) 0.05 (0.22) 0.00 (0.00) 0.95 0.39
w 0.00 (0.00) 0.15 (0.67) 0.00 (0.00) 0.95 0.39
10. Regression u 0.00 (0.00) 0.05 (0.22) 0.00 (0.00) 0.95 0.39
w 0.00 (0.00) 0.05 (0.22) 0.00 (0.00) 0.95 0.39
Total u 6.75 (4.67) 6.40 (4.59) 7.00 (5.56) 0.07 0.93
w 12.60 (9.50) 12.45 (8.89) 15.28 (12.09) 0.45 0.64
Comparisons between conditions on defences Nos 3, 4, and 5 are not relevant for reasons explained in the text.
The total score (Total) is computed after omission of the non-relevant defences.
Experimental validation of the DMT 289
Copyright #2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 16: 283294 (2002)
last (2000 ms) exposure was 0.32, 0.21, and 0.28 in the threatful, neutral, and friendly
condition, respectively. These differences were statistically nonsignicant as well,
F (2, 53) 0.26, p 0.77.
DISCUSSION
We tested the proposition that, provided the psychodynamic theory behind the DMT was
valid, signs of defence or misperceptions would appear to a greater extent in responses to
the threatening than to the neutral and friendly variants of the picture, and further, that
perceptual thresholds would be higher in the former case than in the two latter. On the
other hand, if our proposed perception-distortion hypothesis were valid, we expected the
number and character of misperceptions as well as the level of perceptual thresholds to be
the same for the three variants of the picture. Employing parametric and non-parametric
statistical tests, we found that all tested between-picture effects were far from statistical
signicance. Thus, we failed to reject our perception-distortion hypothesis. Evidently,
this situation leads to a discussion of the power of the statistical tests. Unfortunately, a
more sophisticated examination of this issue is not easy to carry out because a power
analysis requires a specication of an alternative hypothesis and an estimation of the effect
size. The two previous studies of a similar character (Kragh, 1962; Cooper & Kline, 1986)
did not actually employ the ofcial DMT picture (Kragh, 1985), tested other DMT
variables than those employed in this study, or did not provide necessary statistical
information for the present DMT variables to permit a meaningful comparison.
Consequently, an appropriate specication of the effect size and a satisfactory estimation
of power seems difcult. In this case, one could use Cohens (1988) guidelines and equate
a small, medium, and large effect size with 0.20, 0.50, and 0.80, respectively. Looking at
Kraghs (1962) data, one might guess that the threatfulnonthreatful picture effect is large
because in that study, which was based on a large sample (N113 60), a comparatively
low percentage (023%) of participants displayed DMT defences in the non-threatful
condition whereas a comparatively large percentage (2665%) displayed the same
defences in response to the threatening picture. Assuming, thus, that the effect size here is
large, and that we focus on the comparison of the threatful (M
1
) versus the non-threatful
(M
2
) pictures using a directed hypothesis (i.e. M
1
>M
2
) with an alpha 0.05, the power
would be 0.88 (Cohen, 1988, pp. 30, 42), which is quite satisfactory. Evidently, assuming
smaller effect sizes will lead to lower power estimates, decreasing from 0.88 to 0.54 when
the effect size moves from large to medium.
Some previous research on the DMT has also questioned the proposition that perceptual
distortions in the test are reections of defence mechanisms in a psychoanalytical sense
Table 2. Mean perceptual thresholds in ms (SDs in parentheses) as a function of stimulus condition,
and F-ratios and p-values for the effect of condition
Threshold Threatful Neutral Friendly F p
(n 20) (n 20) (n 18)
Percept (P
1
) 24 (16) 23 (14) 26 (21) 0.09 0.91
Hero (H
1
) 25 (14) 42 (68) 29 (27) 0.79 0.46
Peripheral person (PP
1
) 52 (69) 41 (42) 39 (33) 0.36 0.70
290 B. Ekehammar et al.
Copyright #2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 16: 283294 (2002)
(e.g. Cooper & Kline, 1989; Eriksen, Nordby, Olff, & Ursin, 2000; Eriksen, Olff, Mann,
Sterman, & Ursin, 1996; Kline, 1993; Stoll & Meier-Civelli, 1991; Zuber & Ekehammar,
1997). As empirical evidence, Cooper and Kline (1989) disclosed that a DMT which was
objectively scored (i.e. on the basis of naturally occurring response categories) was a
successful predictor of trainee pilots performance. Based on Q-factor analysis, the authors
labelled the major factor general defensiveness, because those scoring high on this factor
reported only a few details about the persons in the picture. Further, no response category
dealing with perception of threatening details in the picture loaded on the factor, and
nally, the factor correlated signicantly with an independent measure of perceptual
defence but not with the traditional DMT defences (Cooper & Kline, 1989).
In a similar way, our previous study (Zuber & Ekehammar, 1997) disclosed that the
location in the DMT picture, rather than similarity according to some known criteria of
psychodynamic theory, was the major explanatory principle for the distribution of
perceptual distortions (signs of defence) on factors. Thus, the rst factor in our factor
analysis was denoted perceptual defence and was dened by late perception of threat (i.e.
high perceptual threshold for threat) and, in addition, variables linked to misperceptions of
the Hero. A striking similarity between the results of our previous and Cooper and Klines
study is the appearance of late perception, including late perception of threat, as a major
source of variance in the DMT. At the same time, the original DMT defences did not seem
to contribute in a predicted and systematic way to the results. These outcomes taken
together indicate that perceptual distortions in the DMT are not mainly due to
psychodynamic defence mechanisms as maintained by Kragh (1998, 2001), for example.
The results of the present study also sustain the view that the DMT signs of defence are
perceptual distortions that cannot be understood as reecting psychodynamic defence
mechanisms. Thus, our results showed that amount of perceptual distortions, and levels of
perceptual thresholds, were the same regardless of the pictures emotional content and
threatfulness. The friendly and neutral pictures, having no anxiety-evoking elements, gave
rise to the same type of perceptual distortions (signs of defence) as the threatful, and
assumedly anxiety-evoking, original DMT picture. This outcome could hardly be
explained from the view of psychoanalytical theory on which the DMT is grounded.
Instead, and in accord with the previous results discussed above, the results imply
that individual differences observed in the DMTare not linked to the threatful and anxiety-
evoking elements in the pictures but are of a more general character that has to do with late
perception, that is, whether the person is quick or slow in his or her perceptual ability
or visual information processing. Some recent evidence supporting this view can be
found in two neuropsychological studies (Eriksen et al., 1996, 2000) where peoples
DMT scores have been related to their brain activation as measured by electroencephalo-
gram (EEG).
Thus, Eriksen et al. (1996) found that participants with high DMT scores disclosed
higher cortical arousal during the rst two seconds following a DMT exposure than those
with low DMT scores. Further, these differences in stimulus processing appeared to be
independent of the psychological content of the pictures, which made the authors suggest
that it was the novelty rather than the threatfulness of the stimulus that caused the
differences in cortical arousal. The differences seemed, according to Eriksen et al. (1996),
to be related to the general orienting response (OR), which operates regardless of the
content of the stimulus. In a follow-up study also based on EEG recordings (Eriksen et al.,
2000), the authors compared DMT low- and high-scorers on event-related potentials
(ERPs) obtained from processing of neutral stimuli (sine-wave tones with different
Experimental validation of the DMT 291
Copyright #2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 16: 283294 (2002)
pitches). The results disclosed that those with high DMT scores showed less ability to
perceive the environment correctly immediately after a sudden event, [and t]hey seem to
rely more on later associative mechanisms for the nal perception of the stimulus
(Eriksen et al., 2000, p. 266). The authors nal conclusion from this study read:
The differences between the two groups, classied as having high or low
psychological defense, occurred to simple tones, rather than complex and threatening
visual material, as in the Kragh tests. This suggests that the two groups differ in basic
neurophysiological mechanisms connected with the way these subjects orient to new
stimuli (Eriksen et al., 2000, p. 267).
Thus, compared with other projective techniques, such as the Rorschach and TAT, the
DMT seems to tap general information-processing and perceptual factors reecting basic
neurophysiological mechanisms. This might be an advantage when it, for example,
comes to selecting people who in their professions must be able to perceive quickly
complex, visual stimuli (like drivers, pilots, divers). It might be a disadvantage, however,
when it comes to drawing conclusions about peoples personalities (Zuber & Ekehammar,
1997, p. 93). Further, if there is a basic difference between the DMT and other methods
aimed at measuring defence mechanisms, one would not expect to nd a relationship
between DMT defence scores and other defence (or coping) measures. We examine this
issue in a study in progress (Ekehammar, Zuber, & Konstenius, unpublished manuscript),
which is primarily focused on the construct validity of the DMT.
As a nal theoretical conclusion, it must be emphasized that the results of the present
study do not contradict the existence of unconscious psychological processes in general.
However, in line with the view of Kihlstrom (1999) and others, our results suggest that the
study of unconscious processes using subliminal and other techniques do not support
psychoanalytical theory. In a review of experimental studies on the psychological
unconscious, Kihlstrom (1999, p. 435) concluded that
None of the experiments reviewed involve sexual or aggressive contents, none of their
results imply defensive acts of repression, and none of their results support
hermeneutic methods of interpreting manifest contents in terms of latent contents. To
say that this body of research supports psychoanalytic theory is to make what the
philosopher Gilbert Ryle called a category mistake.
As a nal methodological conclusion from the present study, we suggest that in order to
measure efciently what the DMT in fact seems to tap (i.e. perceptual factors reecting
basic neurophysiological mechanisms) the test could protably be substituted by a
procedure where various (not necessarily one or two) pictures (not necessarily anxiety
evoking or TAT-like) are presented briey (not necessarily during 5 to 2000 ms) a couple
of times (not necessarily 22), after which peoples perceptual distortions are evaluated
according to some simple scoring scheme (not necessarily based on psychoanalytical
defence theory).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The study was supported by a grant (F 617/94) to Bo Ekehammar from the Swedish
Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences. The authors are obliged to
Jeanette Wennergren and Sophia Marongiu Ivarsson for administrating the DMT, to Nazar
292 B. Ekehammar et al.
Copyright #2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 16: 283294 (2002)
Akrami for judging the DMT protocols in the manipulation check, and to three anonymous
reviewers for valuable comments on a previous draft of the paper.
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