PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.

GUILLERMO SAMUS, appellant.

D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
While it is true that the confessions of appellant
were made without benefit of counsel, they are still
admissible in evidence because of appellants failure
to make timely objections before the trial court. If only
the defense had proffered them on time, the
prosecution could have been warned of the need to
present additional evidence to support its case. To
disregard a major portion of the prosecutions case at
a late stage during an appeal goes against the norms
of fundamental fairness. Indeed, justice is dispensed
not only for the accused, but also for the
prosecution. Be that as it may, and even if we now
affirm appellants conviction for murder, we do not,
however agree with the trial courts imposition of the
death sentence, because the proven aggravating
circumstance of dwelling was not alleged in the
Information.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the
Decision
[1]
dated October 8, 1998, issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36,
in Criminal Case Nos. 5015-96-C and 5016-96-
C. The trial court found Guillermo Samus guilty
beyond reasonable of two counts of murder. The
decretal portion of its Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE:
A. With respect to Criminal Case No. 5015-96-C for the
killing of Dedicacion Balisi, the Court finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of, after
appreciating the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and
after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as
minimum up to 20 years of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum.
The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Dedicacion Balisi the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) for her death and another FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as and for moral and
actual damages and cost of suit.
B. With respect to Criminal Case No. 5016-96-C for the
killing of John Ardee Balisi, this Court finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of, after
appreciating the aggravating circumstance of dwelling,
death.
The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of
John Ardee Balisi the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) for his death and another FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as and for moral and
actual damages and cost of suit.
[2]

Two separate Informations,
[3]
both filed on
November 27, 1996,
[4]
charged appellant as follows:
Criminal Case No. 5015-96-C
That on or about 2:30 oclock in the afternoon of
September 2, 1996 at San Ramon de Canlubang, Brgy.
Canlubang, Municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused above-named, with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously hold
the neck, strangle and thereafter bange[d] the head on the
concrete pavement floor of one DEDICACION BALISI Y
SORIANO, a 61 years of age, woman, thereby inflicting
upon her fractured bones, serious and mortal wounds which
directly caused her death, to the damage and prejudice of
the surviving heirs of the said Dedicacion Balisi y Soriano.
That in the commission of the crime the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and
taking advantage of superior strength were in attendant and
ordinary aggravating circumstance committing a crime with
disregard of respect due the offended party by reason of her
age and sex.
Criminal Case No. 5016-96-C
That on or about 4:30 oclock in the afternoon
of September 2, 1996 at San Ramon de Canlubang, Brgy.
Canlubang, Municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused above-named, with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously hold
the neck, strangle and thereafter bang[ed] the head on the
concrete pavement floor of one JOHN ARDEE BALISI Y
SORIANO, a six year old boy, thereby inflicting upon him
fractured bones, serious and mortal wounds which directly
caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the
surviving heirs of the said John Ardee Balisi y Soriano.
That in the commission of the crime the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and
taking advantage of superior strength were in attendan[ce].
When arraigned on May 28, 1997, appellant,
assisted by his counsel de oficio,
[5]
pleaded not
guilty.
[6]
In due course, he was tried and found guilty.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
summarized the evidence for the prosecution in this
wise:
[7]

Appellant was a farmer, tilling and living in the land of
Miguel Completo at Barangay Niugan, Cabuyao,
Laguna. The victims, sixty two (62) year old Dedicacion
Balisi and her grandson, six (6) year old John Ardee Balisi,
were the neighbors of appellants father at San Ramon de
Canlubang, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna.
At 4:20 P.M. on September 2, 1996, Senior Police (SP)
Inspector Rizaldy H. Garcia was at his office at the 4
th
PNP
Criminal Investigation Group Regional Office at Camp
Vicente Lim in Calamba, Laguna when he received an
order from his superior to investigate the murder of the two
victims. Their office had received a telephone call from a
local barangay official informing them of the victims
deaths.
Arriving at the victims residence at Block 8, Lot 6 at San
Ramon, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba, Garcia and his team
conducted an investigation, making a sketch of the relative
positions of the victims, lifting fingerprints from the crime
scene and taking pictures. Thereafter, an investigation
report was prepared by Garcia and signed by his superior,
Colonel Pedro Tango. The investigators likewise found a
pair of maong pants, a white T-shirt, a handkerchief and
dirty slippers in the bathroom and roof of the house. A pair
of earrings worn by Dedicacion Balisi was likewise
reported missing from her body by her daughter, Nora B.
Llore[r]a.
The victims bodies were brought to the Funeraria Seerez
de Mesa in Calamba where Senior Inspector Joselito A.
Rodrigo, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, performed an autopsy. His findings showed
that John sustained three (3) contusions, one of which
lacerated his liver, caused by a blunt instrument, while
Dedicacion suffered four (4) contusions, also caused by a
blunt instrument.
On that same day, September 2, 1996, Ponciano Pontanos,
Jr., then a resident of Barangay Niugan, Cabuyao and an
acquaintance of appellant, happened to meet appellant at
Sammy Pachecas house in the same barangay where
appellant asked Ponciano to accompany him to Poncianos
wife to pawn a pair of earrings. Poncianos wife was mad at
first but upon Poncianos prodding, gave appellant P300.00
with no interest. The earrings were placed in a jewelry
box; thereafter, appellant received another P250.00.
At 6:00 P.M. on September 10, 1996, Major Jose Pante of
the Criminal Investigation Group received information that
appellant was the principal suspect in the killing of the two
(2) victims and that he was sighted inside the residence of
spouses Rolly and Josie Vallejo at Barangay Macabling,
Sta. Rosa, Laguna. He then formed and led a team
composed of SPO3 Galivo, Intelligence Commission
Officer Casis and SPO3 Mario Bitos. Arriving at the site at
past 7:00 P.M., the team, accompanied by local barangay
authorities, asked permission from the Vallejo spouses to
enter the house, which was granted. Shortly thereafter,
they heard loud footsteps on the roof. Rushing outside,
they saw appellant crawling on the roof. They ordered him
to stop, but he suddenly jumped from the roof and landed
hard on the ground, sustaining an injury on his ankle and
bruises on his left and right forearm. At that point, the
police team closed in on appellant who, while trembling
and shaking, admitted the killings upon a query from Rolly
Vallejo.
Appellant was brought to the Camp Vicente Lim PNP
Investigation Office where he was informed of his
constitutional rights by SPO3 Alex Malabanan. In the
morning of September 11, 1996, appellant, assisted by
Atty. Arturo Juliano, gave his statement admitting the
killings. SPO3 Malabanan also took the statements of
tricycle driver Rafael Baliso, the victims relatives
Salvacion and Mona Balisi and witness Mary Arguelles,
who saw appellant enter the house of Dedicacion Balisi.
On the same day, September 11, 1996, PNP Fingerprint
Examiner Reigel Allan Sorra took fingerprint samples from
appellant. His prints exactly matched with a set of prints
found at the crime scene on September 2, 1998. Later that
day, SPO3 Mario Bitos was able to recover the pawned
earrings from Ponciano who turned them over to SPO3
Malabanan. (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Alleging denial and alibi as defenses, appellant
presents his version of the incident as follows:
[8]

Mrs. Fe Vallejo testified that she knew Guillermo
Samus. At about 6:00 p.m. of September 10, 1996,
Guillermo Samus was in their house. It was then that CIS
operatives together with their Brgy. Captain entered their
house, arrested and handcuffed Guillermo Samus. It was
not true that accused Guillermo Samus hid himself on the
roof of her house. When the accused was arrested by the
CIS men, together with the barangay officials, the other
persons present were the witness and her 3 children. The
police were not armed with a warrant of arrest or search
warrant.
Accused Guillermo Samus denied the accusations against
him. He testified that he was a farmer, working on the land
of one Miguel Completo at Brgy. Niugan, Cabuyao. From
6:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. of September 2, 1996, he was
harvesting palay with Eligio Completo; that he never left
the farm. He took his lunch at the hut of Miguel Completo;
that he arrived home at 6:00 in the afternoon, took his
dinner then went to sleep.
He further testified that on September 10, 1996, he was at
the house of his friend, Rolly Vallejo at Brgy. Macabling,
Sta. Rosa, Laguna, when a group of CIS operatives arrived
and arrested him inside the same house. It was not true that
he jumped from the roof of the house. The CIS people did
not have any warrant for his arrest. His kumpadre Rolly
Vallejo was not present at that time. He was brought to
Camp Vicente Lim where he was tortured until he lost his
consciousness. On the same night, he was brought to a
hospital, was given medicine, then brought back to the cell
where he was handcuffed at the door of the cell. The CIS
got hold of the medical certificate. He was forced by the
CIS to admit the killing of the victims and the sale of
jewelry by means of torture and threat.
He also testified that he was forced to execute a document
admitting the killing. He was forced to sign said
document. He did not know Atty. Juliano and did not talk
to him. The victims were the neighbors of his father in the
province. He had been in the house of Dedicacion
Balisi. He was known to Dedicacion Balisi and her
household; and, that the last time he visited the house of
Dedicacion Balisi was on August 30, 1996. He was given
food by Dedicacion and he later washed dishes, swept the
floor, and put dirt in the trash can. He left at 12:00 p.m.
that same date and returned to his house in Brgy. Niugan.
On cross-examination, he testified that from Brgy. Niugan
to San Ramon de Canlubang it took less than 15 minutes to
travel, and he also mentioned that the media interviewed
him 2 days after his arrest. He and his relatives in Laguna
did not have the capacity to hire/secure the services of a
lawyer.
The defense also presented Exhibit B (and submarkings),
the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimony of
Atty. Juliano, given before the Municipal Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna on December 1, 1997 in connection with
[C]riminal [C]ase [N]o. 26099, also against Guillermo
Samus for theft (of the earrings). The prosecution admitted
the existence of said exhibit and the presentation of the
witness who was supposed the identify the same was
dispensed with. (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found enough pieces of
circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. Rejecting his alibi for
being unreliable and uncorroborated, it convicted him
of homicide for the death of Dedicacion Balisi; and of
murder, with dwelling as aggravating circumstance,
for the death of John Ardee Balisi.
Hence, this automatic review.
[9]

Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, appellant faults the court a quo with
the following alleged errors:
[10]

I
The lower court gravely erred in giving credence to the
testimonies of police officers to the effect that the accused
tried to escape when he was arrested and that he readily
admitted responsibility for the crimes.
II
The lower court gravely erred in admitting and
considering evidence that were obtained in violation of the
accuseds constitutional rights.
III
The lower court gravely erred in holding that there was
sufficient circumstantial evidence to warrant the conviction
of the accused.
IV
The lower court gravely erred when it ruled that the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
attended the killing of John Ardee Balisi.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Arrest of Appellant
As a general rule, the evaluation by the trial
court of the testimony of the witnesses is accorded
great respect, if not finality. In the present case,
however, there are cogent reasons to disregard its
findings with respect to the arrest of appellant on
September 10, 1996.
The police officers version of the arrest is
incredible. Not only are their allegations uncertain
and inconsistent, they are also contrary to human
experience. We find it hard to believe that anyone
would jump from the roof of a two-story house to
escape and, after landing on the ground without any
broken bones, make a complete turnaround and just
meekly surrender without further ado. Even if this
story were true, jumping from a roof is not a crime that
would justify the warrantless arrest of appellant.
It is undisputed that when the CIS team went to
the Vallejo residence on the evening of September
10, 1996, it had no warrant of arrest against
appellant. Yet, they arrested him. Under the
Rules,
[11]
peace officers may, without a warrant, arrest
a person under any of these circumstances: (a) when,
in their presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit, an offense; (b) when an offense has just
been committed, and they have probable cause to
believe, based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) when the person to be arrested
is a prisoner who has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another, or from a penal
establishment where he or she is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while the case is
pending.
None of these circumstances was present when
members of the Criminal Investigation Group (CIG)
arrested appellant. He was not a prisoner. The killing
of Dedicacion and John Ardee Balisi was not done in
the presence of the arresting officers. Since it took
place on September 2, 1996, it could not have been
considered as having just been committed.
Evidently, they unlawfully arrested appellant on
September 10, 1996. When they did so, we cannot
ascribe to them the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions, contrary to the
court a quosfinding.
Considering that the arrest of appellant was
unlawful, the apprehending officers uncertainty and
reluctance in admitting it becomes understandable. In
their Joint Affidavit executed on September 11, 1996,
they alleged that he had voluntarily surrendered to
them. On the other hand, he had allegedly been
merely invited by Chief Inspector Jose Pante,
according to SPO3 Alex Malabanan. It was only upon
being pressed that the police officers admitted that
they had indeed made the arrest.
[12]

We now proceed to the alleged confession. In
their Joint-Affidavit, the arresting officers said that
after appellant had initially jumped from a two-story
house to escape, they closed in on him and he
voluntarily surrendered. At the same place where he
did so, they conducted a preliminary interview, during
which he readily admitted killing Dedicacion and John
Ardee Balisi.
But during their testimonies, the police officers
denied questioning appellant after arresting
him. Instead, they claimed that it was Rolly Vallejo
who had conducted the preliminary interview in their
presence as follows: Pare totoo ba ang sinasabi nila
tungkol sa iyo na ikaw ay pinaghihinalaan nilang
pumatay sa mag-lola sa Canlubang[?]; to this
question appellant allegedly answered, [T]otoo nga
pare, ako nga. No further questions were allegedly
asked by the law enforcement officers. Instead, they
immediately brought appellant to Camp Vicente Lim
for further investigation.
SPO3 Mario Bitos, on the other hand, stated in
his Affidavit, also dated September 11, 1996, that
during the conduct of the preliminary interview,
appellant admitted that the victims pair of earrings
made of gold was taken by him after the incident and
x x x sold to Mr. Jhun Pontanosy Matriano, a resident
of Bgy. Niugan, Cabuyao, Laguna, for the amount of
five hundred (P500) pesos.
During his testimony, however, Bitos denied
that they had conducted any investigation.
[13]
Instead,
he claimed that upon their arrival at Camp San
Vicente Lim, an interview was conducted by the
media in the presence of Major Pante, SPO3 Bitos
and SPO3 Malabanan (the investigator).
[14]
From this
interview, the team was able to cull from appellant
that he was responsible for the killings, and that he
had stolen the earrings of Dedicacion Balisi and sold
them to Pontanos for P500. This information was
allegedly verified by Bitos upon the order of Major
Pante.
Thus, the apprehending officers contend that
the constitutional rights of appellant were not violated,
since they were not the ones who had investigated
and elicited evidentiary matters from him.
We are not persuaded. The events narrated by
the law enforcers in court are too good to be
true. Their Sworn Statements given a day after the
arrest contradict their testimonies and raise doubts on
their credibility.
We find the claims of appellant more believable,
supported as they are by Fe Vallejo who testified that
he had been arrested inside her house, and that Rolly
Vallejo was not around then.
Evidence to be believed, must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but
must be credible in itself -- such as [that which] the
common experience of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. We have no test
of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity
to our knowledge, observation, and
experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs
to the miraculous and is outside of judicial
cognizance.
[15]

Second Issue:
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
Appellant claims that his alleged confession to
the media while in police custody cannot be admitted
in evidence. He further contends that the pair of
earrings, the turnover receipt, as well as the
testimonies of Pontaos and Bitos, relative thereto
should be excluded for being fruits of the poisonous
tree.
We clarify. After being illegally arrested,
appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights
to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel. Hence, any admission elicited
from him by the law enforcers during custodial
investigation are normally inadmissible in evidence.
In their affidavits, the police officers readily
admitted that appellant was subjected to a preliminary
interview. Yet, during their examination in open court,
they tried to skirt this issue by stating that it was only
the media that had questioned appellant, and that
they were merely present during the interview.
However, an examination of the testimonies of
the three law enforcers show the folly of their crude
attempts to camouflage inadmissible evidence. SPO4
Arturo Casis testified as follows:
FISCAL:
Q: And after that what did you do with the
accused Guillermo Samus?
WITNESS:
A: He went with us voluntarily in Camp.
Q: Camp what?
A: Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna.
Q: After arriving at Camp Vicente Lim what
happened there?
A: We turned over him to our investigator CIS.
Q: To whom in particular?
A: SPO3 Alex Malabanan, sir.
Q: What was the purpose for your turning over
the accused to Alex Malabanan?
A: To ask him question and to investigate him.
Q: Before that when you arrived at the camp, did
you see many people at the camp?
A: I noticed some reporters were there.
Q: Where were the reporters at that time?
A: In our office.
Q: Do you know the reason why these reporters
were there at that time?
A They used to hang out at our office because
they have a press office holding in our
office.
Q: Did you notice these press people when you
brought Guillermo Samus to the camp?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did they do when you arrived?
A: They keep on asking who is this fellow we
have arrested.
Q: Did anyone answer them?
A: Its up for the investigator and Maj. Pante.
[16]

x x x x x
x x x x
Q: And the apprehending team did not ask
question regarding the alleged involvement
of Guillermo Samus to the kiling?
A: At the office, sir.
[17]

On the other hand, SPO3 Bitos declared:
Q And you said that in your earlier testimony
that Guillermo Samus was immediately
brought to Camp Vicente Lim which is your
headquarters after his arrest on September
10, 1996, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you said that the purpose of bringing
Guillermo Samus to your headquarters on
that day after his arrest was for further
investigation, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q The member of the CID once Guillermo
Samus was there in your custody at Camp
Vicente Lim he was immediately
investigated right then and there in the
headquarters, is that correct?
A He was interviewed by the media people
upon the arrival of said suspect. We were
not able to conduct the investigation
because of the media people who was also
asking question from him, sir.
Q Who authorized the media people to
propound questions to Guillermo Samus
when he was at your headquarters in the
night of September 10, 1996?
A I think nobody has given the authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation with
Guillermo Samus that is why we were
bother our investigation because these
media people were conducting immediate
interview with that suspect, sir.
[18]

x x x x x
x x x x
For his part, SPO3 Malabanan gave the
following testimony during his cross-examination:
Q By the way, what time did Guillermo Samus
finish giving the statement to the media
people on the night of September 10,
1996?
A I cannot recall the exact time as to when he
finished but I think it is past 8:00 oclock, sir.
Q If you know the reason, can you tell us why
Guillermo Samus had to be presented to
the media first before you as an investigator
assigned to the case actually take his
statement?
May I request, your Honor that the
statement of the witness transpired in the
vernacular be quoted (sila na po and nag-
interview).
A Because when we arrived at that time the
press people were already there and we
can no longer prevent from asking or
conducting an investigation or interview
because the case is already on public
knowledge.
ATTY. MANALO:
Q So, after 8:00 p.m. when Guillermo Samus
had already finished giving his statement to
the media, do you know where Guillermo
Samus was brought?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you tell us where?
A Yes, sir. After that Guillermo Samus was
brought to our office and Maj. Pante talked
to him, sir.
Q And do you know where Guillermo Samus
spent the night?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you tell us where?
A In our stockade, sir.
[19]

The above testimonies do not tie up. Casis
categorically stated that appellant had been turned
over to SPO3 Malabanan. Appellant noticed
reporters in their office, but he did not answer their
questions. SPO3 Bitos alleged that the interview by
the media could not have been prevented, because it
was an ambush interview. Meanwhile, SPO3
Malabanan claimed that when he arrived at the camp,
there were already reporters questioning
appellant. Malabanan further narrated that after 8:00
p.m., appellant was brought to the office where Major
Pante talked to him.
In the absence of testimony from any of the
media persons who allegedly interviewed appellant,
the uncertainties and vagueness about how they
questioned and led him to his confession lead us to
believe that they themselves investigated appellant
and elicited from him uncounselled admissions. This
fact is clearly shown by the Affidavits they executed
on September 11, 1997, as well as by their
testimonies on cross-examination.
Nonetheless, even if the uncounselled
admission per se may be inadmissible, under the
present circumstances we cannot rule it out because
of appellants failure to make timely
objections. Indeed, the admission is inadmissible in
evidence under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the
Constitution, because it was given under custodial
investigation and was made without the assistance of
counsel. However, the defense failed to object to its
presentation during the trial, with the result that the
defense is deemed to have waived objection to its
admissibility.
[20]

Can the testimony of Pontaos and the picture
of a pair of earrings together with the turnover receipt,
which appellant identified during his testimony, be
considered inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous
tree and hence be disregarded at this stage of
appeal?
Upon examination of the records, we find that
during the entire examination in court of Prosecution
Witness Pontaos, appellant did not question or
object to the admissibility of the formers
testimony. Worse, the latters counsel even freely
cross-examined the witness without any
reservations. Having made no objection before the
trial court, appellant cannot raise this question for the
first time on appeal.
[21]
The evidence having been
admitted without objection, we are not inclined to
reject it.
If only appellant had made a timely objection to
the admissibility of the said testimony, the prosecution
could have been warned of the need to present
additional evidence to support its case. To disregard
unceremoniously a major portion of its case at this
late stage when it can no longer present additional
evidence as substitute for that which is now claimed
to be inadmissible goes against fundamental fairness.
Third Issue:
Circumstantial Evidence
No one saw who killed Dedicacion and John
Ardee Balisi. However, to prove appellants
culpability for their deaths, the prosecution presented
the following circumstantial evidence:
1. Finger and palm prints matching
appellants own were found near
bloodstains at the scene of the crime.
2. Dedicacion Balisi owned a pair of
earrings that she wore every
day. Those earrings were missing
from her dead body. Appellant
pawned those same earrings to
Ponciano Pontaos wife on the
afternoon of September 2, 1996.
3. Appellant admitted killing Dedicacion
and John Ardee Balisi, whose dead
bodies were found inside their
residence on the afternoon of
September 2, 1996.
Circumstantial evidence would be sufficient for
conviction, if (a) there is more than one circumstance,
(b) the facts from which the inferences have been
derived are proven, and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such that it produces a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances must
be consistent with one other, and the only rational
hypothesis that can be drawn therefrom must be that
the accused is guilty. They must create a solid chain
of events, coherent and intrinsically believable, that
pinpoints the accused -- to the exclusion of others --
as the perpetrator of the crime and thereby sufficiently
overcomes the presumption of innocence in his or her
favor.
[22]

In the present case, it is indisputable that
someone entered the house of Dedicacion and John
Ardee Balisi, and that someone killed them and left
the house with Dedicacions earrings.
The left palm and right thumb prints of appellant
near the bloodstains found on the kitchen tiles,
together with other blood-smudged fingerprints, lead
to no other reasonable conclusion except that he was
in the house in the afternoon when the victim
died. Considering that the former had bloodstained
hands, it can reasonably be deduced that his hands
were responsible for producing the flow of blood
(shown in the pictures marked as Exhibits E to 7)
from the heads of Dedicacion and John Ardee Balisi.
The act of appellant -- pawning the earrings of
Dedicacion Balisi on the same afternoon of her death
-- is consistent with, and further supports the
conclusion that he was at the crime scene around the
time of her killing.
The absence of any indication of the presence
of any person other than appellant at the locus
criminis around the time of the victims deaths further
bolsters the hypothesis that he, to the exclusion of all
others, was the one who killed them.
The pieces of circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution are consistent with one
other, and the only rational hypothesis that can be
drawn therefrom is that appellant is guilty of killing
Dedicacion and John Ardee Balisi.
The prosecution evidence, taken together with
the extrajudicial admissions of appellant, passes the
test of moral certainty and establishes beyond
reasonable doubt that he was the person who killed
the victims.
Alibi
Appellants uncorroborated alibi -- that he was
at the farm in Cabuyao, Laguna -- was correctly
debunked by the court a quo. We have nothing to
add to the trial courts short and straightforward
discussion of the matter, which we reproduce
hereunder:
For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish not only
that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed
but that it was also physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission
(People v. Torrifiel, 326, Phil. 388). By the accuseds own
admission, the distance between his alleged whereabouts at
the time of the commission of the offense and the scene of
the crime was a fifteen minute drive. To the mind of this
court, the accuseds presence at the scene of the crime is
not impossible.
[23]

Fourth Issue:
Crime and Punishment
The testimony of Salvacion Balisi, as well as the
Birth Certificate of John Ardee Balisi (Exhibit
II),
[24]
prove that John was only six (6) years old at the
time of his death. As correctly ruled by the court a
quo, the killing of [the] child [was] characterized by
treachery because the weakness of the victim due to
his tender age resulted in the absence of any danger
to the accused.
[25]
Indeed [i]t has time and time
again been held that the killing of minor children who,
by reason of their tender years, could not be expected
to put up a defense is considered attended with
treachery even if the manner of attack was not
shown.
[26]
Indubitably, treachery qualified the killing of
six-year-old John Ardee Balisi as murder.
As for the death of Dedicacion Balisi, however,
none of the qualifying circumstances alleged in the
Information was proven by the prosecution. Hence,
appellant can be convicted of homicide only.
In either of the two cases, the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling cannot be appreciated
against appellant, simply because it was not alleged
in the Information.
[27]

There being no aggravating circumstances, the
imposable penalty for the homicide
[28]
of Dedicacion
Balisi is reclusion temporal in its medium period. In
this case, appellant is entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. For the same
reason, reclusion perpetua -- not death -- is the
correct penalty that should be imposed on appellant
for the murder
[29]
of John Ardee Balisi.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna (Branch 36) is
hereby AFFIRMED with the
followingMODIFICATIONS : in Criminal Case No.
5015-96-C, the maximum of the penalty is reduced to
17 years and four months of reclusion
temporalmedium; in Criminal Case No. 5016-96-C,
the penalty is reduced to reclusion
perpetua. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 128305. March 28, 2005]

FELINO QUIAMBAO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, NATIONAL APPELLATE BOARD,
Represented by its CHAIRMAN FEDERICO S.
COMANDANTE and MEMBERS, ATTYS. ROBERTO T.
AGAGON and ADELAIDA T. AGUILOS of the
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, RAUL S. IMPERIAL,
Police Chief, Philippine National Police and ESPIE S
/ L CATOLICO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:

This petition assails the Resolution[1] dated 10 January
1997 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Decision[2] dated 25 October 1993 and the
Resolution[3] dated 27 December 1993 of National
Appellate Board (Board), Third Division, National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM). The Boards ruling in turn,
which likewise affirmed the Decision[4] dated 31
October 1992 of Acting PNP Chief and Police Deputy
Director General dismissing PO3 Felino Quiambao from
the police service.

The operative facts of the case follow:

On 22 December 1990, at around 8:00 in the evening,
Espie Catolico (Catolico) was walking along Capulong
Street in Tondo, Manila, inquiring as to the whereabouts
of her housemaid Gynalin Garais who left the house the
day before. After having asked her neighbors and
bystanders to no avail, an old woman told her that a
certain policeman was looking for her as her housemaid
was in his custody. She went to the area as directed by
the old woman but there she was allegedly accosted by
petitioner, PO3 Felino Quiambao, a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), Western Police
District Command, and five (5) other persons.
Quiambao and his companions forcibly took Catolicos
handbag and carried away its contents consisting of
precious assorted merchandise, jewelry and other
personal items worth approximately Nine Thousand
Pesos (P9,000.00). Thereafter, petitioner forcibly
herded Catolico to his owner-type jeep and brought her
to the dimly lit portion of North Harbor and, while
thereat, he slapped her on the face several times and
warned her not to look anymore for her housemaid.[5]

In view of the incident, Catolico filed a sworn statement
on 24 June 1991 with the PNP Inspectorate Division,
accusing petitioner and six (6) others, with robbery-
holdup and mauling committed on 22 December
1990.[6] The complaint was corroborated by Grace
Commendador who witnessed the actual incident and
confirmed the statement of Catolico.[7]

On 22 August 1991, Catolico filed another
administrative complaint with the Office of the Hearing
Officer at NAPOLCOM, Western Police District, Manila,
charging petitioner with grave misconduct for the same
incident which occurred on 22 December 1990.[8] An
investigation was conducted on this administrative
charge by the Office of the Hearing Officer of
NAPOLCOM. On 30 March 1993, the case was forwarded
to the City of Manilas Peoples Law Enforcement Board
(PLEB) for adjudication.[9]

The PNP Inspectorate Division likewise conducted an
investigation on the charges filed. On 31 October 1992,
the Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer (SDHO)
recommended the dismissal of petitioner. This
recommendation was approved by Acting PNP Chief
and Police Deputy Director General, Raul S. Imperial
(Acting PNP Chief).[10]

Petitioner appealed the 31 October 1992 resolution to
the National Appellate Board (NAB) of the NAPOLCOM.
On 25 October 1993, the Third Division of the NAB,
rendered a decision affirming the dismissal of petitioner
from police service.[11] The motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner was denied in a Resolution dated 27
December 1993.[12] But it was only on 23 September
1996 when petitioner received a certified xerox copy of
the Resolution of the NAB denying his petition for
reconsideration.[13]

On 7 October 1996, petitioner filed a petition for review
with the Court of Appeals.[14] On 10 January 1997, the
appellate court dismissed the petition for review for
lack of merit.

The appellate court ruled that the petition did not state
all the specific material dates showing that it was filed
within the reglementary period provided by law as it
failed to state the date when petitioner received a copy
of the Resolution of NAB dated 27 December 1993,
denying his motion for reconsideration of NABs
decision dated 25 October 1993. It found out that NABs
decision dated 25 October 1993 was received by
petitioner on 22 November 1993, and on 2 December
1993, he filed his motion for reconsideration. The said
motion, however, was denied on 27 December 1993,
but according to the appellate court, petitioner did not
disclose the date when he received such denial. The
fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals started to run from
such date.[15]

Further, the appellate court ruled that the issue of
which administrative disciplinary authority had
jurisdiction over the case was raised by petitioner only
for the first time before it. He did not raise it before the
SDHO nor before the NAB. More importantly, it found
that the PNP Inspectorate Division had original,
exclusive and summary jurisdiction over the instant
case, and that NAB did not commit any reversible error
in deciding the appealed case without a priori
pronouncement as to which among the disciplinary
authorities under Republic Act No. 6975 had
jurisdiction over the case.[16] It also added that NABs
not having all the records requested by petitioner after
it had rendered its decision did not necessarily mean
that it did not have such documents at the time it
rendered its decision.[17] Petitioners claim was further
belied by the fact that Catolico was able to obtain
certified true copies of the relevant documents which
the PNP Chief transmitted to the NAPOLCOM.

Additionally, the appellate court found that a perusal of
the annexes to the comment of Catolico would readily
show that NAB resolved petitioners case based on
substantial evidence appearing on the record before
it.[18] It observed that petitioners claim that his case
was decided on the basis of an incomplete record was
merely an afterthought. Said defense was not raised by
petitioner in his motion for reconsideration of NABs
decision dated 25 October 1993.[19] Likewise,
petitioner was not denied due process as he was
afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit his evidence before the SDHO and to appeal to
NAB the decision of the Acting PNP Chief dismissing him
from the police service, the Court of Appeals ruled.[20]

On 27 January 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration
followed by the filing of his Motion for Reconsideration
on 17 February 1997. On the same day, the appellate
court issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion
for extension of time. On 5 March 1997, it issued a
resolution stating that the Motion for Reconsideration
was merely NOTED, the Resolution dated 10 January
1997 being already final.[21] Hence, the instant judicial
recourse.

The primordial thrust of the petition seeks the reversal
of the decisions and resolutions of Acting PNP Chief, the
NAB and the Court of Appeals, all upholding the validity
of the dismissal of petitioner from police service, and
his corresponding reinstatement in the police service.

Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred and
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petition is
not meritorious.[22] He specifically assigns the
following as errors which need to be rectified, to wit:
(1) that the appellate court ruled that petition did not
state the date when petitioner received a copy of the
Resolution of NAB dated 27 December 1993 to
determine if it was filed within the reglementary
period;[23] (2) that the appellate court sustained the
findings of the Acting PNP Chief and the NAB without
first resolving and/or giving a reason why it was the
Acting PNP Chief and neither the NAPOLCOM Hearing
Officer nor the PLEB that had the power to hear and
decide the case;[24] (3) that the appellate court
sustained, through misapprehension of facts and/or
contrary to evidence, the decision of NAB which was not
based on the complete records of the case;[25] (4) that
the appellate court ruled that the petition was not
meritorious and sustained the findings of the Acting
PNP Chief and the NAB although such findings were
arrived at without a hearing and absent substantial
evidence;[26] (5) that the appellate courts denial of the
motion for reconsideration was based on purely
technical considerations;[27] and (6) that the appellate
court had been passive to Catolicos surreptitious
introduction into the records of the case evidentiary
documents of which petitioner was not furnished and to
the latters prejudice.[28]

The petition is not imbued with merit.

Readily glaring upon examination of the petition filed
by petitioner is its title Petition for Review on
Certiorari.[29] The title would immediately lead us to
conclude that the petition is primarily anchored on Rule
45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Under
this mode of appeal, only questions of law may be
entertained by this Court and factual issues raised are
beyond the ambit of this review. Yet, the issues raised
by petitioner in the petition are fundamentally factual in
nature which are inappropriate for resolution via the
mode of review he availed of.

However, a perusal of issues in the petition would
indicate that the petition is actually anchored on Rule
65 as the issues principally sought to assail the
resolution rendered by the appellate court on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.[30]

Nonetheless, even assuming that the petition was
brought under Rule 65, the petition would still not lie as
the implausibility of the grounds on which the petition
rests are convincingly manifest and the grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as
the core of this mode of review is strikingly wanting.

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to
an excess, or a lack of jurisdiction, and the abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or hostility.[31] In certiorari proceedings under Rule
65, questions of fact are not generally permitted, the
inquiry being limited essentially to whether or not the
respondent tribunal had acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[32]
These grounds under Rule 65 are not attendant in the
instant case. Even if we take this case as so exceptional
as to permit a factual review, the petition at bar fails to
persuade us to rule in favor of petitioner.

Petitioner contends that the appellate court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in holding that the petition was not
meritorious since the petition filed with the appellate
court did not state the date when petitioner received a
copy of the Resolution of NAB dated 27 December 1993
to determine if the petition was indeed filed within the
reglementary period. There is reason basis for such
contention.

The petition with the appellate court by petitioner
substantially complied with Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95[33]. The pertinent portion of the
circular reads,

SECTION 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for
review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the
case, without impleading the court or agencies either as
petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise
statement of the facts and issues involved and the
grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied
by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true
copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution
appealed from, together with certified true copies of
such material portions of the record as are referred to
therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a
sworn certification against forum shopping as provided
in Revised Circular No. 28-91. The petition shall state
the specific material dates showing that it was filed
within the period fixed herein.[34]

The records reveal that the petition filed with the Court
of Appeals by petitioner provides the following,

18. On December 27, 1993, respondent National
Appellate Board rendered its Resolution denying the
motion in this manner:

WHEREFORE, finding no merit on this instant petition,
the same is hereby denied.

A certified xerox copy thereof, duly RECEIVED BY
PETITIONER ON SEPTEMBER 23, 1996 is hereto
attached as ANNEX M.[35]

A reading of the foregoing allegation, however,
disclosed the fact that on 27 December 1993, NAB
rendered a resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Although it would seem anomalous as
it is unnatural that the purported resolution was
received only by petitioner on 23 September 1996, we
are inclined to sustain petitioners assertion for the
same is supported by the certified xerox copy of the
resolution[36] and the evidence is bereft of any
showing that will warrant a contrary conclusion. Thus,
the aforecited allegation substantially complied with the
requirements under Section 6. The appellate court
believed that petitioner had already been served with a
copy of the resolution prior to 23 September 1996.[37]
Such a conclusion, however, is bereft of any evidentiary
basis and, thus, has no leg to stand on. It is noteworthy
that the date when petitioner received NABs resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration is material in
determining when the fifteen (15)-day reglementary
period for filing a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals starts to run.[38]

The failure to specifically state in the petition on
material dates such as the date when the resolution or
order denying a motion for reconsideration was
received is a ground for dismissal in accordance with
Section 7 of the administrative circular and Rule 43.[39]
But the scenario is not present in the case at bar for the
aforecited paragraph 18 of the petition filed with the
appellate court reflected the date when petitioner
actually received the resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration, which is 23 September 1996.
Procedural rules must be liberally interpreted and
applied so as not to frustrate substantial justice that this
Court seeks to achieve.

Now, on substantial issues rather than on mere
technicality. The pivotal questions posed in this petition
are whether the Acting Chief of the PNP had authority to
conduct summary dismissal proceedings over members
of the PNP and whether the summary dismissal of
petitioner was sufficiently established by the evidence
on record.

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of the
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which took
effect on 1 January 1991, defines the structural
components, powers and functions of the PNP as the
citizens guardian of peace and order and enforcer of
the law. The statute likewise delineates the procedural
framework in pursuing administrative complaints
against erring members of the police organization.
Section 41 of the law enumerates the authorities to
which a complaint against an erring member of the PNP
may be filed, thus;

Section 41. (a) Citizens Complaints. Any complaint by
an individual person against any member of the PNP
shall be brought before the following:

(1) Chiefs of police, where the offense is
punishable by withholding of privileges, restriction to
specified limits, suspension or forfeiture of salary, or
any combination thereof, for a period not exceeding
fifteen (15) days;

(2) Mayors of cities or municipalities, where
the offense is punishable by withholding of privileges,
restriction to specified limits, suspension or forfeiture
of salary, or any combination thereof, for a period of not
less than sixteen (16) days but not exceeding thirty (30)
days;

(3) Peoples Law Enforcement Board, as
created under Section 43 hereof, where the offense is
punishable by withholding of privileges, restriction to
specified limits, suspension or forfeiture of salary, or
any combination thereof, for a period exceeding thirty
(30) days; or by dismissal. . . . (Emphasis added)[40]

It is readily apparent that a complaint against a PNP
member which would warrant dismissal from service is
within the jurisdiction of the PLEB. However, Section 41
should be read in conjunction with Section 42 of the
same statute which reads, thus:

Sec. 42. Summary Dismissal Powers of the PNP Chief
and Regional Directors. - The Chief of the PNP and
regional directors, after due notice and summary
hearings, may immediately remove or dismiss any
respondent PNP member in any of the following cases:

(a) When the charge is serious and the evidence of
guilt is strong;

(b) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been
repeatedly charged and there are reasonable grounds to
believe that he is guilty of the charges; and

(c) When the respondent is guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a police officer. (Emphasis ours)

Evidently, the PNP Chief and regional directors are
vested with the power to summarily dismiss erring
PNP members if any of the causes for summary
dismissal enumerated in Section 42 is attendant. Thus,
the power to dismiss PNP members is not only the
prerogative of PLEB but concurrently exercised by the
PNP Chief and regional directors. This shared power is
likewise evident in Section 45.

SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. The
disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the PNP
shall be final and executory: Provided, That a
disciplinary action imposed by the regional director or
by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the
service may be appealed to the regional appellate board
within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the
notice of decision: Provided, further, That the
disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP
involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the
National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof: Provided, furthermore, That the
regional or National Appellate Board, as the case may
be, shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days from
receipt of the notice of appeal: Provided, finally, That
failure of the regional appellate board to act on the
appeal within said period shall render the decision final
and executory without prejudice, however, to the filing
of an appeal by either party with the Secretary.
(Emphasis ours)

Once a complaint is filed with any of the disciplining
authorities under R.A. No. 6975, the latter shall acquire
exclusive original jurisdiction over the case although
other disciplining authority has concurrent jurisdiction
over the case. Paragraph (c) of Section 41 explicitly
declares this point.

(c) Exclusive Jurisdiction A complaint or a charge filed
against a PNP member shall be heard and decided
exclusively by the disciplining authority who has
acquired original jurisdiction over the case and
notwithstanding the existence of concurrent
jurisdiction as regards the offense; Provided, That
offenses which carry higher penalties referred to a
disciplinary authority shall be referred to the
appropriate authority which has jurisdiction over the
offense. (Emphasis ours)

Clearly, the PLEB and the PNP Chief and regional
directors have concurrent jurisdiction over
administrative cases filed against members of the PNP
which may warrant dismissal from service.

This Court in Summary Dismissal Board and the
Regional Appellate Board, PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City v.
Torcita[41] recognized the authority of both the
Summary Dismissal Board and the Regional Appellate
Board of the PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City, to act on twelve
(12) administrative complaints filed against C/Insp.
Lazaro Torcita, even though the controversy occurred in
1994, after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6975. The Court
further declared that R.A. No. 6975 defines the
summary dismissal powers of the PNP Chief and
regional directors, among others in cases, where the
respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police
officer.

Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 prescribes the rules
and regulations in the conduct of summary dismissal
proceedings against erring PNP members and defines
conduct unbecoming of a police officer under Section
3(c), Rule II, as follows:

Conduct unbecoming of a police officer refers to any
behavior or action of a PNP member, irrespective of
rank, done in his official capacity, which, in dishonoring
or otherwise disgracing himself as a PNP member,
seriously compromise his character and standing as a
gentleman in such a manner as to indicate his vitiated
or corrupt state of moral character; it may also refer to
acts or behavior of any PNP member in an unofficial or
private capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing
himself personally as a gentleman, seriously
compromises his position as a PNP member and
exhibits himself as morally unworthy to remain as a
member of the organization.[42]

The same Memorandum Circular also defines the
phrase serious charge as a ground for summary
dismissal of PNP members. This includes charges for
commission of heinous crimes and those committed by
organized/syndicated crime groups wherein PNP
members are involved, gunrunning, illegal logging,
robbery, kidnapping for ransom, white slave trade,
illegal recruitment, carnapping, smuggling, piracy, drug
trafficking, falsification of land title and other
government forms, large scale swindling, film piracy,
counterfeiting, and bank frauds. Clearly, the robbery-
holdup and mauling incident which occurred on 22
December 1990 fall under the summary dismissal
power of PNP Chief and regional directors.

In the case at bar, the complaint for grave misconduct
against petitioner was first filed by Catolico before the
PNP Inspectorate Division on 24 June 1991. However,
another case was filed by Catolico with the Office of the
Hearing Officer, NAPOLCOM, WPD, on 22 August 1991.
The charges filed with the PNP Inspectorate Division
were investigated, and on 31 October 1992, the SDHO
recommended the dismissal of petitioner which was
approved by the Acting PNP Chief. Petitioner appealed
the case to the NAB which affirmed the decision of the
Acting PNP Chief. The motion for reconsideration was
also denied. Thus, in accordance with paragraph (c) of
Section 41, the PNP Inspectorate Division had acquired
exclusive original jurisdiction over the complaint of
Catolico to the exclusion of other investigating body. It
is as if the second complaint filed by Catolico with the
Office of the Hearing Officer, NAPOLCOM, WPD, had not
been filed.

Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the Acting PNP
Chief and the NAB were bereft of jurisdiction to rule on
the complaint filed by Catolico, petitioner, at the earliest
opportunity, neither raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction before the PNP Inspectorate Division nor
with the NAB but only before the appellate court.[43]
Despite the existence of a jurisprudential rule[44] that
jurisdictional question may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, an equitable exceptional rule has also been
laid down by this Court bars a party from raising
jurisdictional question on ground of laches or
estoppel.[45] Although the lack of jurisdiction of a court
may be raised at any stage of the action, a party may be
estopped from raising such questions if he has actively
taken part in the very proceedings which he questions,
belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the
event that the judgment or order subsequently
rendered is adverse to him.[46]

Petitioner also argues that the appellate court erred in
affirming the findings of the Acting PNP Chief and the
NAB, which was arrived at without hearing and
substantial evidence. We are not persuaded.

Summary dismissal proceedings are governed by
specific requirements of notification of the charges
together with copies of affidavits and other attachments
supporting the complaints, and the filing of an answer,
together with supporting documents. It is true that
consistent with its summary nature, the duration of the
hearing is limited, and the manner of conducting the
hearing is summary, in that sworn statements may take
the place of oral testimonies of witnesses, cross-
examination is confined only to material and relevant
matters, and prolonged arguments and dilatory
proceedings shall not be entertained.[47]

Notably, the recommendation of the SDHO was
approved by the Acting PNP Chief whose decision was
affirmed by the NAB. The findings of the NAB was also
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The unanimity in their
conclusions cannot just be disregarded and their factual
determinations are conclusive upon this Court for the
records show that petitioner was afforded reasonable
opportunity to defend his side, as he filed position
papers to substantiate his defense and arguments and
even filed motions for reconsideration to set aside
adverse decisions rendered against him. This
opportunity to defend himself was more than sufficient
to comply with due process requirements in
administrative proceedings

Well-entrenched is the rule that courts will not interfere
in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion
of the government agency entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under the special and technical
training and knowledge of such agency. Administrative
agencies are given a wide latitude in the evaluation of
evidence and in the exercise of their adjudicative
functions, latitude which includes the authority to take
judicial notice of facts within their special
competence.[48]

The instant case filed by Catolico is an administrative
case for grave misconduct against petitioner for the
alleged robbery-holdup and mauling incident that took
place on 22 December 1990. In resolving administrative
cases, conduct of full-blown trial is not indispensable to
dispense justice to the parties. The requirement of
notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial
proceedings.[49] Submission of position papers may be
sufficient for as long as the parties thereto are given the
opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings,
the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard, or an opportunity to explain ones side or
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.[50] This constitutional mandate is
deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity
to seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling.[51] It
does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those
in the courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard
either through oral arguments or through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.[52]

In administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence or that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion is required.[53] Thus, findings of fact of
quasi-judicial agencies are generally accorded respect
and even finality by the Supreme Court, if supported by
substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on
the specific matters under their consideration.[54]
Thus, factual determinations made by the SDHO and the
NAB as affirmed by the Court of Appeals are
undoubtedly beyond review and conclusive upon this
Court, they being triers of facts. The congruence in their
conclusion forecloses any possibility of reversible error
or misappreciation of facts. Such being the case, we
cannot but affirm their common conclusion as
petitioner failed to advance substantial and convincing
evidence and arguments that will merit the reversal of
prior decisions on the case.

Finally, petitioner also argues that the appellate court
erred in being passive to Catolicos surreptitious
introduction into the records of the case evidentiary
documents of which petitioner was not furnished and to
the latters prejudice. Sad to say, the matter is a factual
one which is outside the ambit of this mode of review.
Besides, this issue was not even raised in the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner with the Court of
Appeals.[55]

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 10 January 1997 AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 153660. June 10, 2003]

PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO, NESTOR ROMERO, NILO
ESPINA, EDDIE LADICA, ARMAN QUELING, ROLANDO
NIETO, RICARDO BARTOLOME, ELUVER GARCIA,
EDUARDO GARCIA and NELSON MANALASTAS,
petitioners, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC.,
respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals[1] dated 21 December 2001 which affirmed
with modification the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission promulgated 30 March 2001.[2]

On 15 February 1995 sixty-two (62) employees of
respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and its officers,
Lipercon Services, Inc., Peoples Specialist Services, Inc.,
and Interim Services, Inc., filed a complaint against
respondents for unfair labor practice through illegal
dismissal, violation of their security of tenure and the
perpetuation of the Cabo System. They thus prayed for
reinstatement with full back wages, and the declaration
of their regular employment status.

For failure to prosecute as they failed to either attend
the scheduled mandatory conferences or submit their
respective affidavits, the claims of fifty-two (52)
complainant-employees were dismissed. Thereafter,
Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera conducted clarificatory
hearings to elicit information from the ten (10)
remaining complainants (petitioners herein) relative to
their alleged employment with respondent firm.

In substance, the complainants averred that in the
performance of their duties as route helpers, bottle
segregators, and others, they were employees of
respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc. They further
maintained that when respondent company replaced
them and prevented them from entering the company
premises, they were deemed to have been illegally
dismissed.

In lieu of a position paper, respondent company filed a
motion to dismiss complaint for lack of jurisdiction and
cause of action, there being no employer-employee
relationship between complainants and Coca-Cola
Bottlers, Inc., and that respondents Lipercon Services,
Peoples Specialist Services and Interim Services being
bona fide independent contractors, were the real
employers of the complainants.[3] As regards the
corporate officers, respondent insisted that they could
not be faulted and be held liable for damages as they
only acted in their official capacities while performing
their respective duties.

On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera rendered a
decision ordering respondent company to reinstate
complainants to their former positions with all the
rights, privileges and benefits due regular employees,
and to pay their full back wages which, with the
exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages
must be computed upon proof of his dismissal as of 31
May 1998, already amounted to an aggregate of
P1,810,244.00.[4]

In finding for the complainants, the Labor Arbiter ruled
that in contrast with the negative declarations of
respondent companys witnesses who, as district sales
supervisors of respondent company denied knowing
the complainants personally, the testimonies of the
complainants were more credible as they sufficiently
supplied every detail of their employment, specifically
identifying who their salesmen/drivers were, their
places of assignment, aside from their dates of
engagement and dismissal.

On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the Labor
Arbiter that there was indeed an employer-employee
relationship between the complainants and respondent
company when it affirmed in toto the latters decision.

In a resolution dated 17 July 2001 the NLRC
subsequently denied for lack of merit respondents
motion for consideration.

Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the Court of
Appeals which, although affirming the finding of the
NLRC that an employer-employee relationship existed
between the contending parties, nonetheless agreed
with respondent that the affidavits of some of the
complainants, namely, Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor
Romero, Nilo Espina, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia,
Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas, should not have
been given probative value for their failure to affirm the
contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination. As
a consequence, the appellate court dismissed their
complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. In the same
Decision however, complainants Eddie Ladica, Arman
Queling and Rolando Nieto were declared regular
employees since they were the only ones subjected to
cross-examination.[5] Thus -

x x x (T)he labor arbiter conducted clarificatory
hearings to ferret out the truth between the opposing
claims of the parties thereto. He did not submit the case
based on position papers and their accompanying
documentary evidence as a full-blown trial was
imperative to establish the parties claims. As their
allegations were poles apart, it was necessary to give
them ample opportunity to rebut each others
statements through cross-examination. In fact, private
respondents Ladica, Quelling and Nieto were subjected
to rigid cross-examination by petitioners counsel.
However, the testimonies of private respondents
Romero, Espina, and Bantolino were not subjected to
cross-examination, as should have been the case, and no
explanation was offered by them or by the labor arbiter
as to why this was dispensed with. Since they were
represented by counsel, the latter should have taken
steps so as not to squander their testimonies. But
nothing was done by their counsel to that effect.[6]

Petitioners now pray for relief from the adverse
Decision of the Court of Appeals; that, instead, the
favorable judgment of the NLRC be reinstated.

In essence, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals
should not have given weight to respondents claim of
failure to cross-examine them. They insist that, unlike
regular courts, labor cases are decided based merely on
the parties position papers and affidavits in support of
their allegations and subsequent pleadings that may be
filed thereto. As such, according to petitioners, the Rules
of Court should not be strictly applied in this case
specifically by putting them on the witness stand to be
cross-examined because the NLRC has its own rules of
procedure which were applied by the Labor Arbiter in
coming up with a decision in their favor.

In its disavowal of liability, respondent commented that
since the other alleged affiants were not presented in
court to affirm their statements, much less to be cross-
examined, their affidavits should, as the Court of
Appeals rightly held, be stricken off the records for
being self-serving, hearsay and inadmissible in
evidence. With respect to Nestor Romero, respondent
points out that he should not have been impleaded in
the instant petition since he already voluntarily
executed a Compromise Agreement, Waiver and
Quitclaim in consideration of P450,000.00. Finally,
respondent argues that the instant petition should be
dismissed in view of the failure of petitioners[7] to sign
the petition as well as the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping, in clear violation of the
principle laid down in Loquias v. Office of the
Ombudsman.[8]

The crux of the controversy revolves around the
propriety of giving evidentiary value to the affidavits
despite the failure of the affiants to affirm their contents
and undergo the test of cross-examination.

The petition is impressed with merit. The issue
confronting the Court is not without precedent in
jurisprudence. The oft-cited case of Rabago v. NLRC[9]
squarely grapples a similar challenge involving the
propriety of the use of affidavits without the
presentation of affiants for cross-examination. In that
case, we held that the argument that the affidavit is
hearsay because the affiants were not presented for
cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules
of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings
before administrative bodies like the NLRC where
decisions may be reached on the basis of position
papers only.

In Rase v. NLRC,[10] this Court likewise sidelined a
similar challenge when it ruled that it was not necessary
for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-
examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require
otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose
of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by
the Rules and to make mandatory the application of the
technical rules of evidence.

Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v.
NLRC[11] succinctly states that under Art. 221 of the
Labor Code, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of
law do not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC. Further, it notes that the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively and without regard to technicalities of law
and procedure, all in the interest of due process. We
find no compelling reason to deviate therefrom.

To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are
not bound by the technical niceties of law and
procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law.
Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence may be given only stringent application,
i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.
The submission by respondent, citing People v.
Sorrel,[12] that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is
mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary
value, cannot find relevance in the present case
considering that a criminal prosecution requires a
quantum of evidence different from that of an
administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the
Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to
determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing.
Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the
cases may be decided based on verified position papers,
with supporting documents and their affidavits.

As to whether petitioner Nestor Romero should be
properly impleaded in the instant case, we only need to
follow the doctrinal guidance set by Periquet v.
NLRC[13] which outlines the parameters for valid
compromise agreements, waivers and quitclaims -

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against
public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered
into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is
binding on the parties and may not later be disowned
simply because of a change of mind. It is only where
there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from
an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of
settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law
will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But
where it is shown that the person making the waiver
did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he
was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is
credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.

In closely examining the subject agreements, we find
that on their face the Compromise Agreement[14] and
Release, Waiver and Quitclaim[15] are devoid of any
palpable inequity as the terms of settlement therein are
fair and just. Neither can we glean from the records any
attempt by the parties to renege on their contractual
agreements, or to disavow or disown their due
execution. Consequently, the same must be recognized
as valid and binding transactions and, accordingly, the
instant case should be dismissed and finally terminated
insofar as concerns petitioner Nestor Romero.

We cannot likewise accommodate respondents
contention that the failure of all the petitioners to sign
the petition as well as the Verification and Certification
of Non-Forum Shopping in contravention of Sec. 5, Rule
7, of the Rules of Court will cause the dismissal of the
present appeal. While the Loquias case requires the
strict observance of the Rules, it however provides an
escape hatch for the transgressor to avoid the harsh
consequences of non-observance. Thus -

x x x x We find that substantial compliance will not
suffice in a matter involving strict observance of the
rules. The attestation contained in the certification on
non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by
the party who executed the same. Petitioners must
show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly
be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction (underscoring supplied).

In their Ex Parte Motion to Litigate as Pauper Litigants,
petitioners made a request for a fifteen (15)-day
extension, i.e., from 24 April 2002 to 8 May 2002, within
which to file their petition for review in view of the
absence of a counsel to represent them.[16] The records
also reveal that it was only on 10 July 2002 that Atty.
Arnold Cacho, through the UST Legal Aid Clinic, made
his formal entry of appearance as counsel for herein
petitioners. Clearly, at the time the instant petition was
filed on 7 May 2002 petitioners were not yet
represented by counsel. Surely, petitioners who are
non-lawyers could not be faulted for the procedural
lapse since they could not be expected to be conversant
with the nuances of the law, much less knowledgeable
with the esoteric technicalities of procedure. For this
reason alone, the procedural infirmity in the filing of the
present petition may be overlooked and should not be
taken against petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the decision of the NLRC dated 30 March 2001 which
affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated
29 May 1998 ordering respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers
Phils., Inc., to reinstate Prudencio Bantolino, Nilo
Espina, Eddie Ladica, Arman Queling, Rolando Nieto,
Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and
Nelson Manalastas to their former positions as regular
employees, and to pay them their full back wages, with
the exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages
are yet to be computed upon proof of his dismissal, is
REINSTATED, with the MODIFICATION that herein
petition is DENIED insofar as it concerns Nestor
Romero who entered into a valid and binding
Compromise Agreement and Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim with respondent company.

SO ORDERED.




EUGENIO R. AVENIDO,
Petitioner,










- versus -











CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 177666

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:



Promulgated:

April 30, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - x


D E C I S I O N


PER CURIAM


This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision
dated 18 January 2007, rendered by the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 93210,[1] affirming the
Resolution[2] dated 6 August 2004, issued by the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), finding petitioner Eugenio
Avenido guilty of Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service, which warranted his
dismissal.

While petitioner was employed as an Administrative
Officer at the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC), he was approached by a town mate,
Pablo Daz (Daz), who was a representative of Animus
International Inc. (Animus International), a corporation
engaged in the business of importing mobile telephone
units and Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards.
During this visit from Daz, petitioner personally
prepared an Order of Payment for a Permit to Import
Cellular Phones in favor of Animus International.
Thereafter, petitioner accompanied Daz to the office of
Marcelo M. Bunag, Jr. (Bunag), the acting assessor and
processor of the Amateur, Dealer and Manufacturer
Service of the NTC licensing unit. Since petitioner
formerly served as an assessor, and is now Bunags
superior, Bunag relied on petitioners judgment and
approved the Order of Payment prepared by the
petitioner, which by itself, appeared regular. Petitioner
then personally delivered the Order of Payment,
together with the payment for the assessed fees of Two
Hundred Forty Pesos (P240.00), to the Cashier. Ivy
Daban (Daban), Clerk I and acting cashier, received the
payment and issued an Official Receipt for the Permit to
Import Cellular Phones.[3]

In a facsimile letter dated 21 February 2001,
Fernandino A. Tuazon, the Officer-in-Charge of the
Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the
Bureau of Customs, sought verification from Onofre de
Galindo (Galindo), the Chief of Equipment Standards
Division, NTC-NCR, whether Animus International was
authorized to import Motorola cellular phones in
commercial qualities. Attached to the said letter was a
copy of the Permit to Import, which appears to have
been signed by petitioner with the title ECE, Attorney
III. After examining the records of the NTC-NCR,
Galindo discovered that Animus International was not
an accredited distributors supplier of Motorola
Philippines.[4]

Further investigation conducted by Arnold P.
Barcelona (Barcelona), Engineer V and Chief of the
Enforcement & Monitoring Section of the NTC, showed
that Animus International did not even file any
application for a Permit to Import, an important
requisite before the preparation of an Order of Payment
and the issuance of a Permit to Import. Animus
International, however, was able to import
approximately P40,000,000.00 worth of cellular phone
SIM cards. Bunag and Barcelona confronted the
petitioner regarding the irregularity of the issuance of
the Permit to Import in favor of Animus International.
Thereafter, Bunag filed an administrative complaint
against petitioner.[5]

On 6 April 2001, the NTC issued a Show Cause
Order,[6] wherein the above-mentioned incidents were
recounted in detail, and petitioner was formally charged
with Dishonesty, Usurpation of Official Function and
Falsification of Public Document.

During the formal investigation conducted by the NTC,
petitioner was given an opportunity to present his
defense. He submitted a certification by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) stating that the signature
appearing in the Permit to Import was not his.
Petitioner averred that the signature was forged by his
town mate, Daz. He only admitted to preparing the
Order of Payment for the Permit to Import and
personally delivered the payment therefor to the
Cashier; and he did so merely to accommodate one of
his townsmate(s), an act of hospitality, which is very
much characteristic of the Filipino culture. [7]

In its Decision dated 23 May 2003, the NTC found
petitioner liable for Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service. The NTC gave credence to
the testimonies of Bunag and Daban. Bunag testified
that petitioner prepared the Order of Payment in the
name of Animus International by making the
assessment of the required fees. Daban testified that, as
cashier, she received from petitioner the assessment fee
of P240.00. The NTC underscored the following
irregularities in petitioners acts: (1) the preparation of
an Order of Payment without having been presented
with an application for Permit to Import and other
requirements, and (2) personally delivering the Order
of Payment to the Cashier, instead of turning over the
documents to Bunag, who should deliver the same to
the Cashier. By acting in such manner, petitioner
evinced a special interest in the issuance of a Permit to
Import in favor of Animus International and a lack of
concern for the proper procedure imposed by the
government in the issuance of permits and licenses.
The NTC also took note of the unusual fact that
petitioner did not take any legal action against Daz who
had falsified his signature, and caused grave damage to
his reputation. The NTC suspended petitioner from
service for ten (10) months.[8] The dispositive part of
the Decision stated that:

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the
Commission finds respondent EUGENIO R. AVENIDO
guilty of the lighter offense of conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of service and hereby imposes upon
him the penalty, for the 1st Offense, of Suspension for
Ten (10) months, effective upon notice, during which
period respondent shall not be entitled to all money
benefits including leave credits, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.[9]


On appeal, the CSC affirmed the findings of the NTC in
its Decision dated 23 May 2003, with modification. In
its Resolution dated 6 August 2004, the CSC found
petitioner guilty of Dishonesty, in addition to Conduct
Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service,
which merits the penalty of dismissal. The CSC declared
that Dishonesty involves the distortion of truth. By
preparing the Order of Payment and delivering the
same to the Cashier, petitioner made it appear that
Animus International complied with an application for
Permit to Import and other requirements; thus,
petitioner acted with Dishonesty. Moreover,
petitioners gross disregard for the established
procedures in the issuance of a Permit to Import is
unquestionably Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service. Lastly, the CSC pronounced that the NTC
observed due process for although the Show Cause
Order failed to designate any of the offenses as Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, the acts
described therein constituted the said offense.[10] The
dispositive part of the CSC Resolution reads:[11]

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Eugenio R. Avenido is
hereby DISMISSED. However, the Decision of the
National Telecommunications Company dated May 23,
2003 is hereby modified to the effect that Avenido is
additionally found liable for Dishonesty. Thus, Eugenio
R. Avenido is hereby meted out the penalty of dismissal
from the service with the accessory penalties of
cancellation of his Civil Service Eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service.


In the Decision dated 18 January 2007 in CA G.R. SP No.
93210, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 6 August 2004
Resolution of the CSC. It sustained the findings of the
CSC that the Show Cause Order sufficiently described
the irregularities committed by the petitioner, even if
one of the offenses for which petitioner was found
guilty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, was not specified therein. Furthermore, the
appellate court decreed that substantial evidence
supports the finding that petitioner is guilty of both
Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service.[12]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
afore-mentioned Decision of the Court of Appeals,
which was denied in a Resolution dated 24 April
2007.[13]

Hence, in the present Petition, the following issues are
being raised:[14]

I
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WAS AFFORDED
AMPLE DUE PROCESS OF LAW;

II
WHETHER OR NOT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OBTAINS
TO SUPPORT CHARGES AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

The petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioner claims that he was deprived of due
process of law when the NTC, thru a Show Cause Order,
charged him with Dishonesty, Falsification of Public
Documents and Usurpation of Authority, and then found
him guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service, an offense which he avers is so different
from the offenses with which he was earlier
charged.[15]

This Court has already ruled in Dadubo v. Civil
Service Commission, that the designation of the offense
or offenses with which a person is charged in an
administrative case is not controlling and one may be
found guilty of another offense, where the substance of
the allegations and evidence presented sufficiently
proves ones guilt:
It is true that the petitioner was formally charged with
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the bank and
not specifically with embezzlement. Nevertheless, the
allegations and the evidence presented sufficiently
proved her guilt of embezzlement of bank funds, which
is unquestionably prejudicial to the best interest of the
bank.

The charge against the respondent in an administrative
case need not be drafted with the precision of an
information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient
that he is apprised of the substance of the charge
against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the
acts complained of, not the designation of the
offense.[16]

Due process mandates that a party be afforded
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence he may have in support of his defense. In
administrative proceedings such as the one at bench,
due process simply means the opportunity to explain
one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.[17] In the instant
case, petitioner was furnished a copy of the charges
against him and he was able to file an answer and
present evidence in his defense. Consequently, a
decision was rendered by the NTC finding him guilty of
an offense which was not specifically designated in the
Show Cause Order, but was still based on acts that were
alleged therein, specifically, making an assessment for
the Order of Payment for an applicant who had not even
complied with the requirements; and personally
delivering the Order of Payment to the Cashier, instead
of turning over the documents to the authorized officer,
who should deliver the same to the Cashier. Clearly,
therefore, due process was observed in this case.

Acts may constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service as long as they tarnish the image
and integrity of his/her public office. The Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (Republic Act No. 6713) enunciates, inter
alia, the State policy of promoting a high standard of
ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.
Section 4(c) of the Code commands that [public
officials and employees] shall at all times respect the
rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, public safety and public
interest.[18] By showing undue interest in securing for
Animus International a Permit to Import, even if it had
not complied with the requirements, petitioner
compromised the image and integrity of his public
office. Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service are intrinsically connected since
acts of dishonesty would indubitably tarnish the
integrity of a public official.

Petitioner asserts that the finding of guilt against him is
not supported by substantial evidence. While he insists
that his act of making the assessment in the Order of
Payment is a commendable act of an accommodating
civil servant, it was not his duty to evaluate whether
Animus International was a qualified applicant for a
Permit to Import.[19] Such assertion is absurd.
Common sense dictates that any officer who takes it
upon himself to make an assessment of the fees for the
issuance of a permit or license should also take it upon
himself to ensure that the applicant is qualified. To
permit a government official to prepare assessments for
the issuance of permits or licenses and not place upon
him or her the concurrent duty of examining the
requirements would not only be inefficient, but would
also open the floodgates of corruption. Petitioners act
of making the assessment implies that he had already
examined the required documents and had found them
sufficient. Bunag, the acting assessor of the licensing
unit concerned, had in fact been misled by this same
presumption when petitioner personally delivered to
him the Order of Payment. As it turned out, Animus
International had not even applied for a Permit to
Import and was not an accredited dealer for Motorola,
but was nevertheless able to illegally import
P40,000,000.00 worth of SIM cards and Motorola
cellular phones. By willfully turning a blind eye to
Animus Internationals failure to comply with legal
requisites and misleading his NTC colleagues, petitioner
had not acted as a diligent civil servant as he claimed,
but rather a dishonest and dishonorable public official.

Petitioner also makes much of the findings made by the
NBI that his signature in the Permit to Import was
forged. Such fact, however, does not negate a finding of
guilt on the part of petitioner, who himself admitted
that he prepared and made the assessment in the Order
of Payment without examining the documents required
of Animus International. It was by his own act that left
room for Animus International to perpetuate the use of
a false permit.

Public service requires utmost integrity and discipline.
A public servant must exhibit at all times the highest
sense of honesty and integrity for no less than the
Constitution mandates the principle that a public office
is a public trust and all public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.[20] The Courts cannot overemphasize the
need for honesty and accountability in the acts of
government officials.

In all, the consistent findings of the NTC, the CSC and the
Court of Appeals on the petitioners guilt deserve
utmost respect, where their conclusions are supported
by the admissions made by petitioner, as well as the
testimonies of Bunag and Daban.

Well-settled in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that
findings of fact of administrative agencies must be
respected as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or
preponderant. The quantum of proof necessary for a
finding of guilt in administrative cases is only
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.[21]

Findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on
substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing
authority. It is not for the appellate court to substitute
its own judgment for that of the administrative agency
on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of
the witnesses. Administrative decisions on matters
within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can
only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion,
fraud or error of law.[22]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is
DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 93210, promulgated on 18
January 2007, is AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.



SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000

ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court
of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting
petitioner Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China.
In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of
Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has
stayed in the Philippines where he found employment
and eventually started his own business, married a
Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4,
1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be
admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as
required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications
enumerated in 3 of the law, stated

17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for
citizenship under the provisions of Letter of Instruction
No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization,
Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN
Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon
owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on
Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February,
1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for
naturalization by administrative process was
suspended;

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his
qualifications and presented three witnesses to
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was
Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of
petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether
the State intended to present any witness present any
witness against him, he remarked:

Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the
petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the
sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major
portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our part,
we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner
really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the
Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to
present any evidence to counteract or refute the
testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as
the petitioner himself.3

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted
the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine
citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which
he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his
former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473,
7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the
Philippines, in violation of 2; (4) has no known
lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes
have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in
contravention of 2; and (5) failed to support his
petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.4

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a
1977 petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with
the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case
No. 031767,5 in which petitioner stated that in addition
to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known
since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner,
however, failed to state this other name in his 1989
petition for naturalization, it was contended that his
petition must fail.6 The state also annexed income tax
returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977
to show that his net income could hardly support
himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to
conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended
that, although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona
Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in
1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner
actually lived with his wife without the benefit of
marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It
was alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953
marriage contract, if there be any. The State also
annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract8
and a Joint-Affidavit9 executed by petitioner and his
wife. These documents show that when petitioner
married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no
marriage license had been required in accordance with
Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona
Villaruel had been living together as husband and wife
since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This,
according to the State, belies his claim that when he
started living with his wife in 1953, they had already
been married.

The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's
Immigrant Certificate of Residence, 10 petitioner
resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not
include said address in the petition.

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered
its decision which, as already noted, reversed the trial
court and denied petitioner's application for
naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance
naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from
raising questions not presented in the lower court and
brought up for the first time on appeal. 11 The appellate
court held:

As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this
present petition for naturalization his other name,
"LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his
previous application under Letter of Instruction No.
270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the
petition for naturalization and failure to include the
same militates against a decision in his favor. . . This is a
mandatory requirement to allow those persons who
know (petitioner) by those other names to come
forward and inform the authorities of any legal
objection which might adversely affect his application
for citizenship.

Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition
for naturalization that he formerly resided in "J.M. Basa
St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the
Revised Naturalization Law requires the applicant to
state in his petition "his present and former places of
residence." This requirement is mandatory and failure
of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the petition.
As explained by the Court, the reason for the provision
is to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies
of the government, upon the publication of the petition,
an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their
objections against the petitioner. By failing to comply
with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the
public and said agencies of such opportunity, thus
defeating the purpose of the law. . .

Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner when he lived-in with his
wife for several years, and sired four children out of
wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that the
"applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without
the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three children
out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and
irreproachable as required by the Revised
Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies him
from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalization . . .

Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in
1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses, commissions
and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to
file an income tax return "because he is not liable for
income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It is
not only that the person having the employment gets
enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be
shown that the employment gives one an income such
that there is an appreciable margin of his income over
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming the
object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are
in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are
living on the allowance given to them by their children.
The monthly pension given by the elder children of the
applicant cannot be added to his income to make it
lucrative because like bonuses, commissions and
allowances, said pensions are contingent, speculative
and precarious. . .

Hence, this petition based on the following assignment
of errors:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN NATURALIZATION
CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN
APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE
BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE
RECORDS OF THE CASE.

II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT
THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN BY SOME OTHER
NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE PETITIONER STATED IN HIS PETITION
AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES
OF RESIDENCE.

IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A
PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate
court erred in considering the documents which had
merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief
and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the
trial court's decision. Not having been presented and
formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of
paper devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was
argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered.

The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note
Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court which provides that

These rules shall not apply to land registration,
cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient.
(Emphasis added).

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of
evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by
petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case
involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance
when said rules may be applied by analogy or
suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and
convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance
upon the documents presented by the State for the first
time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical
and convenient course of action considering that
decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered
by the rule on res judicata. 14 Consequently, a final
favorable judgment does not preclude the State from
later on moving for a revocation of the grant of
naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the
State to present and formally offer its documentary
evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right
to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving
him of his fundamental right to procedural due process.
15 We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the
rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has
not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party
the chance to object to their admissibility. 16 Petitioner
cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object
to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the
appellate court by the State. He could have included his
objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with
the Court of Appeals. thus:

The authenticity of the alleged petition for
naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was
supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not
been established. In fact, the case number of the alleged
petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case
number of the petition actually filed by the appellee is
031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and
should not be considered by the Honorable Court in
resolving the instant appeal. 17

Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged
discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for
as a typographical error on the part of petitioner
himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which
was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number
is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet 18 of the Special
Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed
as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner
offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the
documents presented by the State.

Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents
namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767,
petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit
executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income
tax returns are all public documents. As such, they
have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable.
Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of
any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the
authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion
that the appellate court did not err in relying upon
them.

One last point. The above discussion would have been
enough to dispose of this case, but to settle all the issues
raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's
failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his
petition, in accordance with 7, C.A. No. 473. This
address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, a document which forms part of the records
as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization.
Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address
in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant
Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully
published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes,
such publication constitutes substantial compliance
with 7. 20 This is allegedly because the publication
effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved
by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies
of the government the opportunity to check on the
background of the applicant and prevent suppression of
information regarding any possible misbehavior on his
part in any community where he may have lived at one
time or another. 21 It is settled, however, that
naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and
strictly construed in favor of the government and
against the applicant. 22 As noted by the State, C.A. No.
473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant for
naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present
and former places of residence. 23 This provision and
the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization
cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial
compliance" with the requirement under the Revised
Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant
petition ought to be denied.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 82340 August 12, 1991
DUMEZ COMPANY OF
FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and FLORANTE
JOSE, respondents.
Virgilio R. Garcia for petitioner.
Genie Castillo Quilas and R.P.
Liwanag Law Office for private
respondent.

FELICIANO, J .:p
Petitioner Dumez Company of France
("Dumez") is a French corporation which
hires Filipino workers through
Eastern Construction Company, Inc.
("ECCOI"), a corporation existing under
the laws of and domiciled in the
Philippines. Sometime in 1984, Dumez
needed additional manpower, including
four (4) Senior Draftsmen at a proposed
wage of US$600.00 per month for its
Medical City project in Riyadh Saudi
Arabia. Upon approval by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration
("POEA") of its corresponding request,
petitioner alleges, ECCOI summoned
these draftsmen and gave each of them
copy of their respective Manpower
Requisition Slip which indicated their
name, category ("Senior Draftsmen") and
monthly basic salary (US$600.00).
Among the draftsmen hired was private
respondent Florante Jose.
Consequently, ECCOI and the draftsmen
entered into an overseas employment
agreement.
Since ECCOI has no personality in Saudi
Arabia, the draftsmen signed another set
of overseas employmentagreements
with Dumez. Private respondent signed
his agreement on 16 January 1985. The
monthly salary under Section 3 (j) of that
agreement is based on eight (8) hours
per day for six (6) working days and one
(1) paid rest day per week or a total of
240 hours per month. Though the
employment agreements of the other
three (3) Senior Draftsmen reflected the
amount of US$600.00 as the monthly
base salary and US$2.50 as the normal
hourly rate, that of private respondent,
however, showed the amount of
US$680.00 monthly base salary but with
the same hourly rate of US$2.50.
On 23 January 1985, private respondent
commenced working at Medical City,
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Petitioner avers
that it discovered the discrepancy in
respondent's monthly base salary when
the site management in Saudi Arabia
prepared the papers relating to
respondent's first month's salary. This
was subsequently communicated to the
Philippine office. Mrs. Carmen Francisco
of ECCOI explained in her affidavit that
the discrepancy was due to a
typographical error, further alleging that
private respondent was given a copy of
the Manpower Requisition Slip prior to
his signing of the employment
agreement with Dumez. Petitioner also
claims that Florante Jose was
subsequently informed that the
necessary correction would have to be
made on his salary and was requested to
sign new contract papers showing his
monthly basic salary as US$600.00 with
an hourly rate of US$2.50, but that Jose
insisted on being paid US$680.00 a
month. Petitioner eventually acceded by
paying US$680.00 for services rendered
in the first month of his employment
subject, however, to the condition that
Mr. Jose would be transferred to a new
job classification that would match his
desired salary scale. Petitioner found
that no job with a higher classification
was at that particular time available. On
9 February 1985, Mr. Jose's services
were terminated on the ground of
"surplus employee, excess of manpower
and retrenchment." On 28 February
1985, private respondent was repatriated
to the Philippines with petitioner
shouldering his return fare expenses.
On 13 September 1985, private
respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the POEA, raising the
issue of whether or not there had been a
breach of contract of employment on the
part of Dumez.
The POEA in its decision dated 9 April
1987 dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit, holding that the termination of
private respondent's services was for a
just cause in accordance with Article 284
of the Labor Code and that the
requirement of notice was duly complied
with. The POEA also ruled that there
was no breach of contract on Dumez'
part for the reason that private
respondent had previous knowledge that
the monthly salary was in truth
US$600.00 since he was given a copy of
the Manpower Requisition Slip. It
likewise noted that computation of the
monthly base salary at US$2.50 per hour
for 240 hours per month results in
US$600.00.
On appeal, the National Labor
Relations Commission ("NLRC") in its
decision dated 20 January 1988
reversed the POEA, and ordered
petitioner Dumez to pay private
respondent's salary corresponding to the
unexpired portion of his contract term of
one (1) year in the amount of US$680.00
per month at the peso equivalent thereof
at the time of payment. It held that the
dismissal was not due to "surplus
employee, excess of manpower and
retrenchment" but rather to "wage
distortion" which is not one of the valid
grounds for termination of employment
under the Labor Code. The Commission
also ruled that private respondent was
not a "surplus employee" because he
was hired for a one year contract and he
only worked for one month and that if
there had not been a dispute regarding
his salary, respondent would not have
been dismissed. Public respondent
found the allegation of retrenchment as
unavailing considering that a valid
retrenchment measure must be based
on actual and substantial economic
losses which had not been duly
supported by petitioner's evidence.
In the instant Petition, petitioner Dumez
argues that there was no illegal dismissal
considering that the contract of
employment was inexistent as there was
no meeting of the minds concerning the
offer and acceptance. Even
assuming arguendo, petitioner
continues, that there existed a contract
of employment, private respondent's
refusal to accept the actual salary of
US$600.00 constituted serious
misconduct, fraud or an analogous case
under Article 283 (a), (c) and (d) of the
Labor Code.
Private respondent Jose, on the other
hand, contends that there was
constituted a valid and subsisting
contract of employment but that
petitioner Dumez reneged on its
undertaking. The Solicitor General in its
Comment suggests that the contract in
controversy was voidable by reason of
vitiated consent.
It is clear from the facts here that the
amount of the monthly salary base was a
prime or essential consideration of the
parties in signing the employment
contract. Mutual mistake, however,
prevented the proposed contract from
arising. Each of the parties signed the
employment agreement bearing a
different salary rate in mind. While
private respondent insists that he
entered the employment agreement on
the belief that he would be receiving the
amount of US$680.00 as his monthly
basic salary as stated in the employment
agreement, Dumez was able to prove
that said amount of US$680.00 was the
result of a clerical error and that it had
always intended to give only the amount
of US$600.00 for the services of private
respondent.
The evidence of both parties corroborate
petitioner's claim. The employment
agreements signed by the other Senior
Draftsmen with petitioner and the
Manpower Requisition Slips of each of
them duly show the amount of
US$600.00 as the monthly salary base.
The POEA itself mentioned in its
decision that it had approved the
proposed wage schedule of four (4)
Senior Draftsmen at US$600.00 per
month per draftsmen. Although the
employment agreement between private
respondent and Dumez showed the
amount of US$680.00 as the monthly
base salary, this amount is contradicted
by the normal hourly rate of US$2.50
inscribed thereon. Using the base salary
at US$2.50 per hour, we arrive at the
amount of US$600.00 as the monthly
base salary as follows:
US$ 2.50 normal
hourly rate per
employment contract
x 240 number of hours
worked 6 days a week in
a month plus paid rest
days per employment
agreement Section 3(J)
US$600.00 monthly
base salary
The discrepancy was moreover
adequately explained by the ECCOI
employee, Mrs. Francisco, as the result
of a typing error overlooked because of
the volume of paperwork involved in
documenting the persons recruited and
hired. She likewise stated that Mr. Jose
had been provided with a copy of his
Manpower Requisition Slip, which
allegation the pleadings filed by private
respondent did not controvert. Private
respondent did not prove any special
qualification or circumstance that might
have warranted a US$80.00 monthly
differential from the salary rate of the
other Senior Draftsmen.
The mutual mistake here present should
be distinguished from mistake which
vitiates consent in a voidable contract.
The latter case pre-supposes a valid and
existing contract with all the essential
requisites present, with the element of
consent, however, being vitiated. In the
case at bar, the element of consent was
not present at all. There was no
concurrence of the offer and acceptance
upon the subject matter and the cause
which are to constitute the
contract.
1
Petitioner was willing to offer
only the amount of US$600.00 for the kind
of services expected of private respondent,
while private respondent would accept
employment with petitioner only at a
monthly salary base of US$680.00. The
correct monthly base salary figure was an
essential consideration as far as each was
concerned. In a situation wherein one or
both parties consider that certain matters
or specifics, in addition to the subject
matter and thecausa should be stipulated
and agreed upon, the area of agreement
must extend to all points that the parties
deem material or there is no contract.
2

Petitioner cannot escape the fact,
however, that it was due to its own error
or negligence in the clerical processing
of the employment papers that mutual
mistake attended the execution of the
contract. Negligence causing damage to
another may generate liability though
both parties may be innocent of any
deliberate fraud. Thus, it has been held
by this Court that as between two (2)
innocent persons, he whose negligence
has enabled a third party to cause the
damage shall bear the loss.
3
Though
petitioner in the case at bar was clearly
innocent of deliberate wrong doing, the
failure of the administrative systems of
petitioner created some basis for private
respondent's belief (or hope) that he was
accepting a US$680.00 monthly salary and
thus generated a mutual mistake which
occasioned some damage or loss on the
part of private respondent. On general
principles of equity, petitioner should
compensate private respondent. We
believe that an amount equivalent to two
month's salary under the putative
employment agreement, at US$600.00 a
month or its peso equivalent at the time of
payment, would be sufficient recompense
for what might be designated as frustration
of expectations not without basis on the
part of private respondent that he had
landed a job.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to
GRANT the Petition and to SET ASIDE
and NULLIFY the Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission
dated 20 January 1988. The Court also
Resolved to REINSTATE the Decision of
the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration in POEA Case No. 85-09-
0689 with modification that private
respondent Florante Jose shall be
awarded the amount of US$1,200.00 or
its peso equivalent at the time of
payment. No costs.