ARTI CLE

The making of a failed state: the case

of Kosovo
Spyros Economides
Published online: 11 November 2011
Centre for European Studies 2011
Abstract The status of Kosovo remains an issue more than three years after its
unilateral declaration of independence. Since then, Kosovo has been maintained,
as a state, by an international presence and commitment. This article suggests
that the history of this commitment has been the cause of state failure and that
we are at a critical juncture in the future of this state.
Keywords Kosovo Serbia State failure Western Balkans
UNSC Resolution 1244 Ahtisaari Plan
Introduction
The recent European Commission progress report on Kosovo [3] and the
relevant section on Kosovo in the Commissions Enlargement Strategy and Main
Challenges 20112012 make for depressing reading [2]. The reports make it
perfectly clear that Kosovo is lagging behind in all its reform efforts: politically,
economically and in the field of justice. The reports highlight weaknesses in
public administration, the rule of law, the protection of minorities and in the
fight against criminality and corruption. In economic terms, it is indicated that
Kosovo has made no progress towards establishing a functioning market
economy [2]. The perhaps unmanageable budget deficit has resulted in the
interruption of an International Monetary Fund Stand-By Arrangement and
Commission funding for macro-financial assistance. There is also the outstanding
S. Economides (&)
The London School of Economics and Political Science,
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
e-mail: kk@thinkingeurope.eu
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European View (2011) 10:195200
DOI 10.1007/s12290-011-0182-2
allegation stemming from the Council of Europes report on the Inhuman
treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo, which
implicated high-ranking government officials [1].
The European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), deployed in Kosovo since
2008 under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), has had its
authority challenged and undermined by domestic actors, while the relationship
with Serbia remains very hostile. The recent dialogue opened up between
Belgrade and Pristina, brokered by the EU, has broken down after outbreaks of
violence at border crossings in northern Kosovo which had to be quelled by
Kosovo Force (KFOR). Kosovo is now recognised by 85 UN member states, which
may be a significant figure but falls far short of the two-thirds majority of the 193
UN members who would have to vote in favour for Kosovo to be admitted to the
UN. Equally importantly, five EU Member States (Cyprus, Greece, Romania,
Slovakia and Spain) have yet to recognise Kosovo.
Essentially, what we have is a state which does not control all of its territory,
relies on external actors such as KFOR for the provision of internal security,
depends on financial assistance from Europe and further afield to prop up its
domestic economy, falls short in almost every area of reform and institution-
building (as identified by its primary sponsor, the EU), and is less-than-universally
recognised as a state. Some could say that this is a maintained state, but to all
intents and purposes it could also be classified as a failed state.
In all fairness, it is only just over three years since Kosovo declared its
independence and 12 years since the conflict there. However, it is clear that
since 1999 Kosovo has been maintained by external actors and since
independence would have failed as a state were it not for substantial
international support. The key questions to be asked in this context are: How
did we get here? Has Kosovo ever truly functioned as a normal, sovereign state?
and How can its most serious issue, its status and hence its relationship with
Serbia, be managed, if not resolved?
Creating state failure
Kosovos current predicament stems directly from the two most important
documents and plans for its future, which have emanated from the UNs
attempts to reach a solution to Kosovos status. The first of these documents is
UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244, passed in June 1999. The second is
the Ahtisaari Plan, a set of proposals laid out by the UN Secretary Generals
Special Envoy Marti Ahtisaari in March 2007. Each of these documents, in
content and tone, set the foundations for the difficulties we are encountering
within Kosovo today with respect to its status and in its international relations.
The implications of Resolution 1244
UNSC Resolution 1244 was passed in the aftermath of Operation Allied Force in
an attempt to legitimise NATO intervention, restore stability to the region and
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perhaps lay the groundwork for a longer-lasting peace process. But UNSC
Resolution 1244 aimed for the impossible by trying to balance the rights of a
sovereign state, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), with the expectations
of a people, the Kosovo Albanians, to whom the NATO intervention was more
than an act of humanitarian rescue: it brought the promise of independence. By
reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of FRY, as well as calling for a
degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo [4], the UN
attempted a compromise which both sides would claim as a maximalist position:
the law of states was inevitably going to clash with the law of peoples. In terms
of Kosovos future status, this resolution set up the conditions for a very difficult
relationship between the Serbs and Albanians: the former claimed that the UN
was now guaranteeing FRY sovereign rights over Kosovo, while the Albanians
claimed that the UN was readying their territory for independence. So, while
Kosovo was not a state, the end of the conflict in 1999 was codified in a
resolution containing conflicting aims which solidified competing claims to the
territory.
In addition, the international community was to secure peace and stability in
Kosovo through an immense military and civilian presence in the form of KFOR
and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), respectively. It
was obvious that without these twin presences Kosovo could not be sustained
as an entity. But the very presence of these twin institutions also cemented the
notion that Kosovo was not a state: it very quickly became clear that the
international community had in fact created a protectorate under foreign
tutelage. Despite all the legislation in favour of autonomy and democratisation,
and all the attempted capacity building and reform packages, Kosovo would
remain dependent on these international presences for the purposes of politico-
economic governance and physical security. UNSC Resolution 1244 had set up a
collision between the two ethnic communities and put in place an international
administration and security system that overwhelmed domestic capacity and
action.
The implications of the Ahtisaari Plan
The Ahtisaari Plan of 2007 set out to delineate the structure and content of the
state of Kosovo and openly called for independence. While this was well
received in Pristina and in many Western capitals, especially in the US, France
and Germany, it caused major upheaval in Serbia. Kosovos status was to have
been resolved through discussion and negotiation; the Ahtisaari Plan was seen
as a fait accompli which was imposed on Belgrade. For our purposes, in terms of
explaining the nature of the state of Kosovo, it is the type of independence
proposed which matters most. Kosovos was to be a supervised independence
in which the EU would take over from UNMIK as the international communitys
lead civilian administrative organ. The implication of this was that the status of
Kosovo would remain in question and would be dependent on the guarantees
of a significant external sponsor and presence in Kosovo. That the Ahtisaari Plan
was never accepted by the UN Security Council points to the tension evident in
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that body over the implications of this type of challenge to a states sovereignty
and territorial integrity. Russia, for a variety of reasons, would never allow such a
resolution to be accepted by the Security Council, and division quickly emerged
in the EU, with five states evidently not willing to accept an independent Kosovo
without Serbias consent. The result was a stalemate which created conditions
not of supervised independence of the state of Kosovo, but of an internationally
maintained entity short of statehood; in short, an entity in limbo.
The result of this impasse, both within the Security Council and in the EU, was
a dash to unilateral independence, which was declared by Kosovo on 17
February 2008. This unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), which met
with some Western support, with the UK, Germany, France and Italy quickly
recognising the new state, brought about the third stage in the failure of Kosovo
(of course, after a UDI one can talk of a failing or failed state). Essentially, Kosovo
entered the limbo mentioned above because its independence was not
universally recognised. While it received recognition from significant actors like
the US and the aforementioned European states, the implication of a UDI which
seemingly infringed the general principles of international law, as well as the
right of Serbia to have a say over its sovereign territory, proved too much for the
majority of UN member states. This, in conjunction with an increasingly active
Serbian diplomatic effort to encourage states not to recognise it and the backing
of a potential Russian veto in the UN Security Council, meant that Kosovos
independence was incomplete. Its status, in practice, remained unresolved, it
was precluded from UN membership and effectively Serbia would have to be
included in any dialogue facilitating a resolution of mutual differences. In
addition, the EU deployed EULEX, and (a much reduced) KFOR remained in place
to guarantee security between the two rival ethnic communities and perhaps
create the requisite space for reconciliation.
The EU had taken over from UNMIK as Kosovos material and technical
provider: Kosovo remained and remains dependent on the EU for its economic
survival. Its political and administrative institutions, and general internal
governance, are reliant on external support and legitimisation. However,
Europeans remain somewhat divided on Kosovos status. In a recent visit to
Belgrade, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made it clear, in no uncertain terms,
that Serbia would be wise to relinquish its claims over Kosovar territory and
make speedy concessions to Pristina if it wished for a smooth path to EU
membership. Others in the EU, especially those five states which still do not
recognise Kosovos independence, are less strident, seeking a negotiated
settlement and the agreement of Serbia in any solution. But behind this array of
actors lies perhaps the most significant external actor of all, the US. It was the
willingness and ability of the US to intervene, through NATO, in 1999 that
resulted in the beginning of the process of independence for Kosovo. Pristina
sees Washington as the greatest champion of its unilateral independence and, as
such, is often not concerned with what Europeans have to say. In Kosovos
independence the US sees proof of its success in intervening in 1999, and the
safeguard that the stalemate of Bosnia (where the US also intervened in the
1990s and brokered a long-standing peace dealthe Dayton Agreement) will
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not be repeated. The Kosovar leadership knows this and exploits this support
accordingly.
Therefore what we have in Kosovo is a state in name, but not necessarily in
practice. Internationally, it has its supporters, some of them highly powerful and
influential, but Kosovo is recognised by less than half of the UNs membership
and is thus blocked from membership itself. Even its main provider, the EUthe
institution which maintains Kosovo economicallyharbours dissenters in its
midst. Russia and China oppose the recognition of Kosovo for their own national
interests far beyond the seeming defence of Serbias rights. In practice, Kosovo is
a state, but not to the whole international community: it is not, therefore, a
complete state. Domestically, as mentioned above, Kosovo can only survive and
function through external support. The Ahtisaari Plan spoke of supervised
independence. In effect what we have is a maintained state with a frozen
conflict which, without external support and provision, would surely fail. If that
categorises Kosovo as a failed state, then so be it.
Where do we go from here?
The BelgradePristina dialogue, which began in March 2011 and is facilitated by
the EU, was meant to be the first step in an attempt to normalise relations
between Serbia and Kosovo. By tackling and agreeing to the free movement of
people and goods, and to regional cooperation, for example, it was hoped that
common ground could be found to start building towards a permanent
settlement of the status issue in a European context.
Serbias predicament is that domestic public opinion will not allow it to make
grand concessions in pursuit of European membership. Until recently, it was
believed that recognition of Kosovo would be the key to Serbias European
prospects, which would have been politically unsustainable for President Tadic
and his Democratic Party. In Pristina, European pressure can be side-stepped. If
Kosovo is not maintained internationallyand especially by the EUthen it will
create an unacceptable security vacuum in the Western Balkans, as well as
counting as a failure of the EUs foreign policy. With this in mind, and with the
unwavering backing of the US, Kosovo can afford to maintain a hard-line stance
in its relations with Serbia.
The end result is a stalemate which results in the types of violent outbreaks
seen in August and September between the ethnic communities, which draw in
the international presence as well.
The October Opinion of the Commission on Serbias membership prospects,
and the recommendation that candidacy be conferred, offers Belgrade a
tremendous opportunity. By the time the December meeting of the European
Council makes a final decision on Serbias EU prospects, Belgrade could make an
offer of substance. Serbian public opinion will not tolerate a relinquishing of all
claims to parts of Kosovo, especially not the giving up of rights to protect the
Serb minority and the religious sites (nor will it recognise Kosovo). Kosovo and its
international backers will not tolerate the status quo or partition, nor do they
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want to physically enforce the full independence plan proposed by Ahtisaari.
The solution lies in a formula which would afford an enhanced form of
autonomy for the Serbs in northern Kosovo, offer guarantees for those in the
enclaves below the Ibar River and perhaps grant special status to the religious
sites. In turn, Serbia would no longer object to other states recognition of
Kosovo or block it from membership of international organisations such as the
UN. This would then allow for a gradual normalisation of SerbiaKosovo relations
and perhaps eventual recognition. It would also open the door for Serbias EU
candidacy and a date for accession negotiations to begin, which would go part-
way to placating the more nationalist elements in Serbia. If Serbia were to
propose this type of formulaand this is but a sketchin a clearly iterated and
viable plan, it would win many plaudits in European circles, perhaps swing the
decision of the upcoming European Council meeting and put an internationally
sponsored solution firmly on track. This would be a bold move which would
have to overcome hurdles both domestically and in Washington and Moscow. It
would take a true act of statesmanship for Belgrade to propose this and for it to
be carried. But it would also mean that Kosovos future would be firmly
ensconced within a regional and European perspective that would remove state
failure from the agenda.
References
1. Council of Europe (2010) AS/Jur 4612
2. European Commission (2011a) Enlargement strategy and main challenges 20112012. Commu-
nication, COM (2011) 666 final. Brussels, 12 October
3. European Commission (2011b) Kosovo 2011 Progress report. Commission staff working paper, SEC
(2011) 1207. Brussels, 12 October
4. United Nations (1999) UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), Preamble. New York, 10 June
Spyros Economides is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations and European
Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
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