Theory of Judicial Review

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Constitutional Law 1 Cases

Theory of Judicial Review
Angara v. Electoral Commission
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,
respondents.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from
taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election
of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of
Tayabas.

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The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:

(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents,
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of
the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;

(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-
elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;

(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;

(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following
resolution:

[No. 8]

RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA
PRESENTADO PROTESTA.

Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado
debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente,
son aprobadas y confirmadas.

Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.

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(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission
a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only
protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that
said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas,
or that the election of said position be nullified;

(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which
provides:

6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia.

(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the
aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a)
that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during
which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid
resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that
the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;

(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest
against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation;

(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid
"Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";

(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on
January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
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The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:

(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards
the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;

(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said
election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or
the National Assembly;

(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose
exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for
decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its
proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such
proceedings;

(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and
obeyed;

(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6
of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as
under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court
has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an
interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.

On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent
Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses:

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(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of
December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of
any member of the National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of
the implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry
out the power and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in
question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the
legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of
the Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the
Supreme Court;

(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did
not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed
within the time that might be set by its own rules:

(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or
corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.

The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2,
1936, setting forth the following as his special defense:

(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there
was no existing law fixing the period within which protests against the election of members of the
National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was
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exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial
attributes;

(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December
9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;

(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said
respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23,
1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said
commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;

(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which
protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed
subsequent thereto;

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with
quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;

( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation,
board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that
neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution
and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;

(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the
united States) has no application to the case at bar.

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The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner
prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission
which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this court of
March 21, 1936.

There was no appearance for the other respondents.

The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions:

1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However,
the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a
case prim impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader
aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and
vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our
consideration.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
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various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so
far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This,
however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the
President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he
chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense
that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain
officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established,
to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls
the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks
the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive
and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power
to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it
hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political
excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among
the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much
as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument
which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government
intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets
forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies.
If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels,
for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of
sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation
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and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the
United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the governments of the government.

But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought
not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief
palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its
guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the
authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in
consultation rooms and court chambers.
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In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the
election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the
previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner,
the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral
Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission
of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents,
the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the
National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed
said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, should be upheld.

Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional
nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other.
From the very nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of American
experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable
obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral
Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific
purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with,
when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of
the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it
were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and
agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate
cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers
of our constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given
effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American
example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the
power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the
rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function.
For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to
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examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar
declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power.
This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3,
Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain
(arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are
established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy
shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two
agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who
will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void
be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the
entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we
avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of
the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining
the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."

Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second
proposition and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed
out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom
shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into
the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the
people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
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The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying
down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its
members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States
providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the
insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively,
shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ."
apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein
specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of
Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)

The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested
elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report
on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to
hear legislature but also against the election of executive officers for whose election the vote of the
whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against specified executive and
judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three
justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which the
contest corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to
be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the latter
shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to
the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the
legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated one each from the
two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from the two major
parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive department in
the persons of two representatives to be designated by the President.

Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the
Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative
Department, reads as follows:
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The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting the
election of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each
House, by three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of votes
therein, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and as to
its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.

The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by
the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121,
Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the
Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and
limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified
the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral
Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral
instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934,
reads as follows:

(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases
contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of
three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three
elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said
justices.

During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others,
proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the
following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the
Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:

x x x x x x x x x
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Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines,
paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of
the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and
qualification of the member whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral
Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged;
that is why the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the election
of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be
determined.

Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the
election of those whose election is not contested?

Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House of
Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is
not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has been elected, that is
sufficient, unless his election is contested.

Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the
auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his
pay.

Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What
happens with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election? The
municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims in this case the municipal council
proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is
no need on the part of the Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the
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case referred to by the gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another
who was declared elected. From example, in a case when the residence of the man who has been
elected is in question, or in case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question.

However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain
maneuvers upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to
give to the Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections,
returns and qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.

Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.

Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.

Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos
Norte when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz.
This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as separate from the first
part of the sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.

Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are already
included in the phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections"
was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.

Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to
confirm the elections of the members."

Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.

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Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?

THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.

Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.

Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to the
assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest the election and
qualification of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-
thirds of the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot
remove him for that reason.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.

Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question the
eligibility of its members?
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Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and
make the question before the Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not
contested.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.

Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power and
authority to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even though that
question has not been raised.

Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.

In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship
Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols,
Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference between the original draft and the draft as
amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:

x x x x x x x x x

Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios
Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" parece que da a la Comision Electoral la
facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar
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esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo
que se lea como sigue: "All cases contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision
Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the
amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation also took place:

El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera

El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?

El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y
tres a la Corte Suprema, no cree Su Seoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los
miembros del Tribunal Supremo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema
consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para
dar el triunfo.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la
mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.

x x x x x x x x x
19
Choco Notes

The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to
decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly
to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).

In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two
members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this
amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan
character of the commission.

As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:

(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party
having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party
having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.

The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:

SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom
shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members
of the National Assembly.

20
Choco Notes

When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee,
through President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the
phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections", which
was accordingly accepted by the Convention.

The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is
by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.

Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives
a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition
of contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are partly quoted by the
petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:

153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding
prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and rights of membership. One of the
standing committees appointed at the commencement of each session, was denominated the
committee of privileges and elections, whose functions was to hear and investigate all questions of this
description which might be referred to them, and to report their proceedings, with their opinion
thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When an election petition was referred to this committee
they heard the parties and their witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence,
together with their opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or
disagreed to by the house. The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself.
When this court was adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same
manner as by a committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a select committee. The
committee of privileges and elections although a select committee was usually what is called an open
one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named was required
to be present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the committee and vote if they
pleased.

21
Choco Notes

154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of membership
gradually assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770, controverted
elections had been tried and determined by the house of commons, as mere party questions, upon
which the strength of contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert
Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse
vote upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted
under this system, that "Every principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted,
from whence the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the
same licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in questions of higher importance to the public
welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of commons, undertook to
propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the
house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in
parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the
existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the
principal dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is scandalously notorious
that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-
elective, and not bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own
inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested election, many members of this house, who
are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as
parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial management of the very business, upon
which they should determine with the strictest impartiality."

155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met
with the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was
the celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it
"was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the security of the
constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of
the evil, or the apparent success of the remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the
measure to the information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading
statesmen of the day, and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was
objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr.
Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the
introduction of the new system was an essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total
abrogation of one of the most important rights and jurisdictions of the house of commons.

22
Choco Notes

As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan
settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of
the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made
for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence
(Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and
Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883
[46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England,
vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally
heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the
Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house, are
since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the
election of members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative
Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19)
and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide
contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding
legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of
the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of
June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.

The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and
the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there
was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As
the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January
29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral
Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House of
Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four
designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two
houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the
experience of America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member
of that body on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States
and its Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] Relentless Partisanship of Electoral
Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.

23
Choco Notes

The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority
men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and
political development of other countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create
an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing
upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly,
they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the
experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was
designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant.
Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan,
as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is
that, upon the approval of the constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression
of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4,
1861.)

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in
its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge
and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of
determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting
through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission.
With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with
judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.
Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when
acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative
department than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral
Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its
compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it
is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.

24
Choco Notes

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if
it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as
effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte
Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power
claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral
Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests
should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in
such case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the
regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our
Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual
authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad
spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking
cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority
effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that
intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the
National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of
the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.

We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding
the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a
coordinate department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he
characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests
against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the
Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time
with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that
where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise
of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight
ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure
to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
25
Choco Notes

relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may
abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of
the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse
is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of
abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral
Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must
be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are
not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the
Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the
specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to
it for decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific
purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action
must be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for
which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies
might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In
the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of
its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be
challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.

But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations
of equitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the
controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date
the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into
effect. The new National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution
confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved by that body on December 3,
1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed
on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was
formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the
first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protest.
When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the
26
Choco Notes

election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither
does it appear that said body had actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified
copies of official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record
of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the six members
of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only on
December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested
elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the
presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly on the hypothesis that it still
retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases had already barred the presentation of
protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode
and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This
result was not and could not have been contemplated, and should be avoided.

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members
against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be
construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have
been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the
legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature,
confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the
authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the
filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members
against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended
by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein
petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of
any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a
matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a
member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body
(No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).

Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United
States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return
of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy
the privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp.
27
Choco Notes

331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases
of contested elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the
judges' decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons,
and the House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the
same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue
of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may
require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the
particular house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment
of the return (Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).

Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine
Legislature fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This
was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the
election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387)
empowering each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest in
the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the
filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or approving the
returns of such members against whose election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time.
This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those members
not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record First
Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin
[Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese
[Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs.
Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The
Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to
have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contest relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked
the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor
constitutional provisions which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on
December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members. And what the
National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of
confirmation.

Summarizing, we conclude:
28
Choco Notes

(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation
of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.

(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes
difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.

(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised
finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of
the other two departments of the governments.

(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of
the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their
elective members.

29
Choco Notes

(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature
with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the
Electoral Commission.

(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and
complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.

( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would
be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations
regarding the manner of conducting said contests.

(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making
each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to
prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the
time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the
costs and expenses of contest.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before
such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest
had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its
incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly should be filed.

30
Choco Notes

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the
National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against
the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a
constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present
controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.

Avancea, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I concur in the result and in most of the views so ably expressed in the preceding opinion. I am,
however, constrained to withhold my assent to certain conclusions therein advanced.

31
Choco Notes

The power vested in the Electoral Commission by the Constitution of judging of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, is judicial in nature.
(Thomas vs. Loney, 134 U.S., 372; 33 Law. ed., 949, 951.) On the other hand, the power to regulate the
time in which notice of a contested election may be given, is legislative in character. (M'Elmoyle vs.
Cohen, 13 Pet., 312; 10 Law. ed., 177; Missouri vs. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496; 50 Law. ed., 572.)

It has been correctly stated that the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally
the theory of the separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial. Legislative power is
vested in the National Assembly. (Article VI, sec. 1.) In the absence of any clear constitutional provision
to the contrary, the power to regulate the time in which notice of a contested election may be given,
must be deemed to be included in the grant of legislative power to the National Assembly.

The Constitution of the United States contains a provision similar to the that found in Article VI, section
4, of the Constitution of the Philippines. Article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the United States
provides that each house of the Congress shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications
of its own members. Notwithstanding this provision, the Congress has assumed the power to regulate
the time in which notice of a contested election may be given. Thus section 201, Title 2, of the United
States Code Annotated prescribes:

Whenever any person intends to contest an election of any Member of the House of Representatives of
the United States, he shall, within thirty days after the result of such election shall have been
determined by the officer or board of canvassers authorized by law to determine the same, give notice,
in writing, to the Member whose seat he designs to contest, of his intention to contest the same, and, in
such notice, shall specify particularly the grounds upon which he relies in the contest. (R. S., par. 105.)

The Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law, also contained a provision to the
effect that the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members. Notwithstanding this provision, the
Philippine Legislature passed the Election Law, section 478 of which reads as follows:

32
Choco Notes

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall by resolution respectively prescribe the time and
manner of filing contest in the election of members of said bodies, the time and manner of notifying the
adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and shall fix the costs and expenses of contest
which may be paid from their respective funds.

The purpose sought to be attained by the creation of the Electoral Commission was not to erect a body
that would be above the law, but to raise legislative elections contests from the category of political to
that of justiciable questions. The purpose was not to place the commission beyond the reach of the law,
but to insure the determination of such contests with the due process of law.

Section 478 of the Election Law was in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, Article XV,
section 2, of which provides that

All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution,
until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and all references in such laws
to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to
refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution.

The manifest purpose of this constitutional provision was to insure the orderly processes of
government, and to prevent any hiatus in its operations after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines. It was thus provided that all laws of the Philippine Islands shall remain operative even
after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, unless inconsistent with the
Constitution, and that all references in such laws to the government or officials of the Philippine Islands
shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the government and corresponding officials under
the Constitution. It would seem to be consistent not only with the spirit but the letter of the
Constitution to hold that section 478 of the Election Law remains operative and should now be
construed to refer to the Electoral Commission, which, in so far as the power to judge election contests
is concerned, corresponds to either the Senate or the House of Representative under the former regime.
It is important to observe in this connection that said section 478 of the Election Law vested the power
to regulate the time and manner in which notice of a contested election may be given, not in the
33
Choco Notes

Philippine Legislature but in the Senate and House of Representatives singly. In other words, the
authority to prescribe the time and manner of filing contests in the elections of members of the
Philippine Legislature was by statute lodged separately in the bodies clothed with power to decide such
contests. Construing section 478 of the Election Law to refer to the National Assembly, as required by
Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, it seems reasonable to conclude that the authority to prescribe
the time and manner of filing contests in the election of members of the National Assembly is vested in
the Electoral Commission, which is now the body clothed with power to decide such contests.

In the light of what has been said, the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, could
not have the effect of barring the right of the respondent Pedro Ynsua to contest the election of the
petitioner. By the same token, the Electoral Commission was authorized by law to adopt its resolution of
December 9, 1935, which fixed the time with in which written contests must be filed with the
commission.

Having been filed within the time fixed by its resolutions, the Electoral Commission has jurisdiction to
hear and determine the contest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the petitioner Jose A.
Angara.
Angara v. Electoral Commission Digest
Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

D E C I S I O N
(En Banc)

LAUREL, J.:

I. THE FACTS

34
Choco Notes

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National
Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a
resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the
adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the
petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9,
1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any
election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal
of respondents protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

II. THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly.

35
Choco Notes

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the
time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if
it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in
character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the
one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.

Aquino v. Enrile

G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA,
JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, petitioners,
vs.
36
Choco Notes

HON JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY,
respondents.


IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES, TEODORO M. LOCSIN,
SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALINA GALANG, GO ENG GUAN, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO
CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; THE
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, et al., respondents.


IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I. DIOKNO, *1
petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES. respondents.


MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, petitioners,
vs.
37
Choco Notes

HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO TATAD, PRESS
SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35547 September 17, 1974 *2

ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, respondents.


IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND TAN CHIN
HIAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, respondents.


IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA JUAN L. MERCADO,
HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN, BREN GUIAO, RUBEN
CUSIPAG, ROBERTO ORDOEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE BAUN, petitioners,
vs.
38
Choco Notes

HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE

G.R. No. L-35571 September 17, 1974. *3

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M. GUIAO,
petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES: AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE


ERNESTO RONDON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO MIANA, respondents.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p

39
Choco Notes

These cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained by
the military by virtue of the President's Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972.

At the outset a word of clarification is in order. This is not the decision of the Court in the sense that a
decision represents a consensus of the required majority of its members not only on the judgment itself
but also on the rationalization of the issues and the conclusions arrived at. On the final result the vote is
practically unanimous; this is a statement of my individual opinion as well as a summary of the voting on
the major issues. Why no particular Justice has been designated to write just one opinion for the entire
Court will presently be explained.

At one point during our deliberations on these cases it was suggested that as Chief Justice I should write
that opinion. The impracticability of the suggestion shortly became apparent for a number of reasons,
only two of which need be mentioned. First, the discussions, as they began to touch on particular issues,
revealed a lack of agreement among the Justices as to whether some of those issues should be taken up
although it was not necessary to do so, they being merely convenient for the purpose of ventilating
vexing questions of public interest, or whether the decision should be limited to those issues which are
really material and decisive in these cases. Similarly, there was no agreement as to the manner the
issues should be treated and developed. The same destination would be reached, so to speak, but
through different routes and by means of different vehicles of approach. The writing of separate
opinions by individual Justices was thus unavoidable, and understandably so for still another reason,
namely, that although little overt reference to it was made at the time, the future verdict of history was
very much a factor in the thinking of the members, no other case of such transcendental significance to
the life of the nation having before confronted this Court. Second and this to me was the insuperable
obstacle I was and am of the opinion, which was shared by six other Justices 1 at the time the
question was voted upon, that petitioner Jose W. Diokno's motion of December 28, 1973 to withdraw
his petition (G.R. No. L-35539) should be granted, and therefore I was in no position to set down the
ruling of the Court on each of the arguments raised by him, except indirectly, insofar as they had been
raised likewise in the other cases.

It should be explained at this point that when the Court voted on Diokno's motion to withdraw his
petition he was still under detention without charges, and continued to remain so up to the time the
separate opinions of the individual Justices were put in final form preparatory to their promulgation on
September 12, which was the last day of Justice Zaldivars tenure in the Court. 2 Before they could be
40
Choco Notes

promulgated, however, a major development supervened: petitioner Diokno was released by the
President in the morning of September 11, 1974. In view thereof all the members of this Court except
Justice Castro agreed to dismiss Diokno's petition on the ground that it had become moot, with those
who originally voted to grant the motion for withdrawal citing said motion as an additional ground for
such dismissal.

The petitioners in the other cases, except Benigno Aquino, Jr. (G.R. No. L-35546), either have been
permitted to withdraw their petitions or have been released from detention subject to certain
restrictions. 3 In the case of Aquino, formal charges of murder, subversion and illegal possession of
firearms were lodged against him with a Military Commission on August 11, 1973; and on the following
August 23 he challenged the jurisdiction of said Commission as well as his continued detention by virtue
of those charges in a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in this Court (G.R. No.
L-37364). The question came up as to whether or not Aquino's petition for habeas corpus should be
dismissed on the ground that the case as to him should more appropriately be resolved in this new
petition. Of the twelve Justices, however, eight voted against such dismissal and chose to consider the
case on the merits. 4

On Diokno's motion to withdraw his petition I voted in favor of granting it for two reasons. In the first
place such withdrawal would not emasculate the decisive and fundamental issues of public interest that
demanded to be resolved, for they were also raised in the other cases which still remained pending.
Secondly, since it was this petitioner's personal liberty that was at stake, I believed he had the right to
renounce the application for habeas corpus he initiated. Even if that right were not absolute I still would
respect his choice to remove the case from this Court's cognizance, regardless of the fact that I
disagreed with many of his reasons for so doing. I could not escape a sense of irony in this Court's
turning down the plea to withdraw on the ground, so he alleges among others, that this is no longer the
Court to which he originally applied for relief because its members have taken new oaths of office under
the 1973 Constitution, and then ruling adversely to him on the merits of his petition.

It is true that some of the statements in the motion are an affront to the dignity of this Court and
therefore should not be allowed to pass unanswered. Any answer, however, would not be foreclosed by
allowing the withdrawal. For my part, since most of those statements are of a subjective character,
being matters of personal belief and opinion, I see no point in refuting them in these cases. Indeed my
41
Choco Notes

impression is that they were beamed less at this Court than at the world outside and designed to make
political capital of his personal situation, as the publicity given to them by some segments of the foreign
press and by local underground propaganda news sheets subsequently confirmed. It was in fact from
that perspective that I deemed it proper to respond in kind, that is, from a non-judicial forum, in an
address I delivered on February 19, 1974 before the LAWASIA, the Philippine Bar Association and the
Philippine Lawyers' Association. Justice Teehankee, it may be stated, is of the opinion that a simple
majority of seven votes out of twelve is legally sufficient to make the withdrawal of Diokno's petition
effective, on the theory that the requirement of a majority of eight votes applies only to a decision on
the merits.

In any event, as it turned out, after petitioner Diokno was released by the President on September 11 all
the members of this Court except Justice Castro were agreed that his petition had become moot and
therefore should no longer be considered on the merits. This notwithstanding, some of the opinions of
the individual members, particularly Justices Castro and Teehankee, should be taken in the time setting
in which they were prepared, that is, before the order for the release of Diokno was issued.

The Cases.

The events which form the background of these nine petitions are related, either briefly or in great
detail, in the separate opinions filed by the individual Justices. The petitioners were arrested and held
pursuant to General Order No. 2 of the President (September 22, 1972), "for being participants or for
having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to
take over the Government by force ..."

General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the powers he assumed by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1081 (September 21, 1972) placing the entire country under martial law. The portions
of the proclamation immediately in point read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

42
Choco Notes

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers
vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire
Philippines as defined in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as
their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law
and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act
of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently detained, as well as all others who may
hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and
offenses committed in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith, for crimes against national security and the law of nations, crimes against public order,
crimes involving usurpation of authority, rank, title and improper use of names, uniforms and insignia,
crimes committed by public officers, and for such other crimes as will be enumerated in orders that I
shall subsequently promulgate, as well as crimes as a consequence of any violation of any decree, order
or regulation promulgated by me personally or promulgated upon my direction shall be kept under
detention until otherwise ordered released by me or by my duly designated representative.

The provision of the 1935 Constitution referred to in the proclamation reads: "the President shall be
commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In
case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires
it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law."

1. The first major issue raised by the parties is whether this Court may inquire into the validity of
Proclamation No. 1081. Stated more concretely, is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the
exercise of the power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry? Is the question political or
justiciable in character?

43
Choco Notes

Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino hold that the question is political and
therefore its determination is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. The reasons are given at length in
the separate opinions they have respectively signed. Justice Fernandez adds that as a member of the
Convention that drafted the 1973 Constitution he believes that "the Convention put an imprimatur on
the proposition that the validity of a martial law proclamation and its continuation is political and non-
justiciable in character."

Justice Barredo, on the other hand, believes that political questions are not per se beyond the Court's
jurisdiction, the judicial power vested in it by the Constitution being plenary and all-embracing, but that
as a matter of policy implicit in the Constitution itself the Court should abstain from interfering with the
Executive's Proclamation, dealing as it does with national security, for which the responsibility is vested
by the charter in him alone. But the Court should act, Justice Barredo opines, when its abstention from
acting would result in manifest and palpable transgression of the Constitution proven by facts of judicial
notice, no reception of evidence being contemplated for purposes of such judicial action.

It may be noted that the postulate of non-justiciability as discussed in those opinions involves disparate
methods of approach. Justice Esguerra maintains that the findings of the President on the existence of
the grounds for the declaration of martial law are final and conclusive upon the Courts. He disagrees
vehemently with the ruling in Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, December 11, 1971, and advocates a
return to Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905), and Montenegro vs. Castaeda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952).
Justice Barredo, for his part, holds that Lansang need not be overturned, indeed does not control in
these cases. He draws a distinction between the power of the President to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, which was the issue in Lansang, and his power to proclaim martial law, calling
attention to the fact that while the Bill of Rights prohibits suspension of the privilege except in the
instances specified therein, it places no such prohibition or qualification with respect to the declaration
of martial law.

Justice Antonio, with whom Justices Makasiar, Fernandez and Aquino concur, finds that there is no
dispute as to the existence of a state of rebellion in the country, and on that premise emphasizes the
factor of necessity for the exercise by the President of his power under the Constitution to declare
martial law, holding that the decision as to whether or not there is such necessity is wholly confided to
him and therefore is not subject to judicial inquiry, his responsibility being directly to the people.
44
Choco Notes

Arrayed on the side of justiciability are Justices Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Muoz Palma. They
hold that the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation may be inquired into by the Court, and
would thus apply the principle laid down in Lansang although that case refers to the power of the
President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The recognition of justiciability accorded
to the question in Lansang, it should be emphasized, is there expressly distinguished from the power of
judicial review in ordinary civil or criminal cases, and is limited to ascertaining "merely whether he (the
President) has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested
in him or to determine the wisdom of his act." The test is not whether the President's decision is correct
but whether, in suspending the writ, he did or did not act arbitrarily. Applying this test, the finding by
the Justices just mentioned is that there was no arbitrariness in the President's proclamation of martial
law pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; and I concur with them in that finding. The factual bases for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, particularly in regard to the existence of a state
of rebellion in the country, had not disappeared, indeed had been exacerbated, as events shortly before
said proclamation clearly demonstrated. On this Point the Court is practically unanimous; Justice
Teehankee merely refrained from discussing it.

Insofar as my own opinion is concerned the cleavage in the Court on the issue of justiciability is of not
much more than academic interest for purposes of arriving at a judgment. I am not unduly exercised by
Americas decisions on the subject written in another age and political clime, or by theories of foreign
authors in political science. The present state of martial law in the Philippines is peculiarly Filipino and
fits into no traditional patterns or judicial precedents.

In the first place I am convinced (as are the other Justices), without need of receiving evidence as in an
ordinary adversary court proceeding, that a state of rebellion existed in the country when Proclamation
No. 1081 was issued. It was a matter of contemporary history within the cognizance not only of the
courts but of all observant people residing here at the time. Many of the facts and events recited in
detail in the different "Whereases" of the proclamation are of common knowledge. The state of
rebellion continues up to the present. The argument that while armed hostilities go on in several
provinces in Mindanao there are none in other regions except in isolated pockets in Luzon, and that
therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the country, ignores the sophisticated nature
and ramifications of rebellion in a modern setting. It does not consist simply of armed clashes between
organized and identifiable groups on fields of their own choosing. It includes subversion of the most
45
Choco Notes

subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is no actual fighting.
Underground propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in whispers;
recruitment of armed and ideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and material,
fifth-column activities including sabotage and intelligence all these are part of the rebellion which by
their nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts. They cannot be counteracted effectively
unless recognized and dealt with in that context.

Secondly, my view, which coincides with that of other members of the Court as stated in their opinions,
is that the question of validity of Proclamation No. 1081 has been foreclosed by the transitory provision
of the 1973 Constitution [Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)] that "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and
acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and
shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after ... the ratification of this Constitution ..." To be
sure, there is an attempt in these cases to resuscitate the issue of the effectivity of the new
Constitution. All that, however, is behind us now. The question has been laid to rest by our decision in
Javellana vs. Executive Secretary (L-36142, 50 SCRA 30, March 31, 1973), and of course by the existing
political realities both in the conduct of national affairs and in our relations with other countries.

On the effect of the transitory provision Justice Muoz Palma withholds her assent to any sweeping
statement that the same in effect validated, in the constitutional sense, all "such proclamations,
decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President." All that she
concedes is that the transitory provision merely gives them "the imprimatur of a law but not of a
constitutional mandate," and as such therefore "are subject to judicial review when proper under the
Constitution.

Finally, the political-or-justiciable question controversy indeed, any inquiry by this Court in the present
cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has
become moot and purposeless as a consequence of the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973. The
question propounded to the voters was: "Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires,
can continue in office beyond 1973. Do you want President Marcos to continue beyond 1973 and finish
the reforms he initiated under Martial Law?" The overwhelming majority of those who cast their ballots,
including citizens between 15 and 18 years, voted affirmatively on the proposal. The question was
thereby removed from the area of presidential power under the Constitution and transferred to the seat
of sovereignty itself. Whatever may be the nature of the exercise of that power by the President in the
46
Choco Notes

beginning whether or not purely political and therefore non-justiciable this Court is precluded from
applying its judicial yardstick to the act of the sovereign.

2. With respect to the petitioners who have been released from detention but have not withdrawn their
petitions because they are still subject to certain restrictions, 5 the ruling of the Court is that the
petitions should be dismissed. The power to detain persons even without charges for acts related to the
situation which justifies the proclamation of martial law, such as the existence of a state of rebellion,
necessarily implies the power (subject, in the opinion of the Justices who consider Lansang applicable, to
the same test of arbitrariness laid down therein), to impose upon the released detainees conditions or
restrictions which are germane to and necessary to carry out the purposes of the proclamation. Justice
Fernando, however, "is for easing the restrictions on the right to travel of petitioner Rodrigo" and others
similarly situated and so to this extent dissents from the ruling of the majority; while Justice Teehankee
believes that those restrictions do not constitute deprivation of physical liberty within the meaning of
the constitutional provision on the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

It need only be added that, to my mind, implicit in a state of martial law is the suspension of the said
privilege with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the
proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety
against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival take precedence. On
this particular point, that is, that the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of
the writ as to the persons referred to, the Court is practically unanimous. Justice Fernando, however,
says that to him that is still an open question; and Justice Muoz Palma qualifiedly dissents from the
majority in her separate opinion, but for the reasons she discusses therein votes for the dismissal of the
petitions.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING AND FOR THE REASONS STATED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE COURT IN
THEIR SEPARATE OPINIONS, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED DISMISSING ALL THE PETITIONS, EXCEPT
THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY WITHDRAWN BY THE RESPECTIVE PETITIONERS WITH THE
APPROVAL OF THIS COURT, AS HEREINABOVE MENTIONED. NO COSTS.

Makasiar, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
47
Choco Notes

Prefatory Note

(written on September 12, 1974)

My separate opinion below in the nine cases at bar was handed to Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal
on Monday, September 9, 1974, for promulgation (together with the individual opinions of the Chief
Justice and the other Justices) on September 12 (today) as agreed upon by the Court.

On September 11 the petitioner Jose W. Diokno was released from military custody. The implications of
this supervening event were lengthily discussed by the Court in its deliberations in the afternoon. Eleven
members thereafter voted to dismiss Diokno's petition as being "moot and academic;" I cast the lone
dissenting vote. Although perhaps in the strictest technical sense that accords with conventional legal
wisdom, the petition has become "moot" because Diokno has been freed from physical confinement, I
am nonetheless persuaded that the grave issues of law he has posed and the highly insulting and
derogatory imputations made by him against the Court and its members constitute an inescapable
residue of questions of transcendental dimension to the entire nation and its destiny and to the future
of the Court questions that cannot and should not be allowed to remain unresolved and unanswered.

I have thus not found it needful nor even advisable to recast my separate opinion or change a word of it.

I invite the reader to assess my 38-page separate opinion which immediately follows, in the light of the
foregoing context and factual setting.

FRED RUIZ CASTRO
Associate Justice.

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Choco Notes

SEPARATE OPINION
(written before Sept. 9, 1974)
L-35539, L-35546, L-35538, L-35540, L-35567, L-35556,
L-35571, L-35573, and L-35547
Aquino v. Enrile Digest
Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the
arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them.
Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enriles answer
contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos
declaration of Martial Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.
HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger
against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the
state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent
danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the Presidents order.
Conditions for the exercise of Judicial Review

IBP v. Zamora
[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M.
LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:

49
Choco Notes

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine
National Police (the PNP) in visibility patrols around the metropolis.

In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and
carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint
visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the PNP and
the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said
order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent
Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000*1+ (the LOI) which detailed the manner by
which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.[2] Task Force
Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.

Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a
Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.[3]
In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in
Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols.[4]
The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the
AFP is necessary.[5] Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other
for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence.[6] Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the
anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved.[7]

The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols as follows:

x x x

50
Choco Notes

2. PURPOSE:

The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the PNP NCRPO and the Philippine Marines
partnership in the conduct of visibility patrols in Metro Manila for the suppression of crime prevention
and other serious threats to national security.

3. SITUATION:

Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by
organized syndicates whose members include active and former police/military personnel whose
training, skill, discipline and firepower prove well-above the present capability of the local police alone
to handle. The deployment of a joint PNP NCRPO-Philippine Marines in the conduct of police visibility
patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of crimes specially those perpetrated by active or former
police/military personnel.

4. MISSION:

The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to conduct joint NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to
keep Metro Manila streets crime-free, through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all
forms of high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members
include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.

5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS:

a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the NCRPO [National Capital Regional Police Office]
and the Philippine Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of
the state against insurgents and other serious threat to national security, although the primary
responsibility over Internal Security Operations still rests upon the AFP.
51
Choco Notes

b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes
perpetrated by organized crime syndicates operating in Metro Manila. This concept requires the military
and police to work cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach in
addressing crime prevention. Along this line, the role of the military and police aside from neutralizing
crime syndicates is to bring a wholesome atmosphere wherein delivery of basic services to the people
and development is achieved. Hand-in-hand with this joint NCRPO-Philippine Marines visibility patrols,
local Police Units are responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in their locality.

c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a provisional Task Force TULUNGAN shall be
organized to provide the mechanism, structure, and procedures for the integrated planning,
coordinating, monitoring and assessing the security situation.

xxx.[8]

The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta
Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA
and Domestic Airport.[9]

On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant petition to annul
LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and
unconstitutional, arguing that:

I

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:

52
Choco Notes

A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY,
THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN
DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;

B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN
FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF
THE CONSTITUTION;

C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE
CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

II

IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY
MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.[10]

Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold
the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of
the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a Resolution,[11] dated 25 January 2000,
required the Solicitor General to file his Comment on the petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor
General submitted his Comment.

The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the President in deploying the
Marines, contending, among others, that petitioner has no legal standing; that the question of
deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political question;
53
Choco Notes

that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police
officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the
Constitution.

The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2)
Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review; and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in
joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and
the civilian character of the PNP.

The petition has no merit.

First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the
issues in the petition. Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the
Constitution.

The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

54
Choco Notes

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.[12]

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged.*13+ The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.[14]
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.*15+

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of
law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in
support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too
general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards
above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the
case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the
standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be
affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National
President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing
him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have
varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National
President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by
virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly
represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols.
Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been
violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed
55
Choco Notes

militarization of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may
cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed injury not personal in
character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of
standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence
of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the
Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to
raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy
this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.

Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance
of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is
involved.[16] In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a
petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.[17]
Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure.[18] In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless
violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the
legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face
again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now,
rather than later.

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of the President of the
necessity of calling the armed forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this
regard, the IBP admits that the deployment of the military personnel falls under the Commander-in-
Chief powers of the President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the
power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What
the IBP questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines under the aforestated provision.
According to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for the calling of the military to
assist the police force. It contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the
56
Choco Notes

calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court review the sufficiency of the factual basis for
said troop *Marine+ deployment.*19+

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue pertaining to the necessity of calling
the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the
resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court.

As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and limits, and the
extent of judicial review. But, while this Court gives considerable weight to the parties formulation of
the issues, the resolution of the controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes beyond the
narrow confines of the issues raised. Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the power exercised
by the President is the power to call out the armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power
involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the general
welfare.[20] For one, the realities on the ground do not show that there exist a state of warfare,
widespread civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not brought upon the
citizenry, a point discussed in the latter part of this decision. In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes
in Marcos v. Manglapus:

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers as protector of the peace.
[Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely
to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against
external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary
powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on
the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace
is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow
cannot be said to exclude the Presidents exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling
of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in
order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.

57
Choco Notes

xxx[21]

Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the Presidents power to call out the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the
controversy will reach a similar result.

We now address the Solicitor Generals argument that the issue involved is not susceptible to review by
the judiciary because it involves a political question, and thus, not justiciable.

As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court
review.[22] It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds
recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual
constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases
wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are political questions. The reason is that political questions are
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being
assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will
not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need
for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.

As Taada v. Cuenco*23+ puts it, political questions refer to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. Thus,
if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a
particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question. In
the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr,*24+ *p+rominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
58
Choco Notes

unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question.

The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that (T)he Judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.*25+ Under this definition, the Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue
involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power
is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or
conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being one of legality
or validity, not its wisdom.[26] Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been
given to this Court.[27] When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination
as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.[28]

By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.[29] Under this definition, a court is without power to directly
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no
power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may look into the question
of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.[30] A showing that plenary power
is granted either department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the
improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy.[31]

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent
of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to
overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination
of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give
59
Choco Notes

the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence
to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in
such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the
performance of this Courts duty of purposeful hesitation*32+ before declaring an act of another
branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Presidents judgment. To doubt is to sustain.

There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary
power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power.
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as Commander-
in-Chief, provides in part:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law.

x x x

The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling
out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus:

x x x

60
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Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation
or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning
of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court
may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision
dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The
61
Choco Notes

distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law
and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation
and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters.[33] That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to call
is fully discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, to
wit:

FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President
as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress
lawless violence; then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can impose
martial law. This is a graduated sequence.

When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, his judgment is subject to review. We are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and
subject to concurrence by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of calling on
the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed
by anybody.

x x x

FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the matter can be handled by
the first sentence: The President may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger.

MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent danger, the matter can be
handled by the First Sentence: The President....may call out such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger,
of invasion or rebellion, instead of imposing martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus, he
62
Choco Notes

must necessarily have to call the Armed Forces of the Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that
the idea?

MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial
review.[34]

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to
grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it
is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment
and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards
by Congress and review by this Court.

Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there
must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not
required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in
the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual
basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual
necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established
since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always
accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge
necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the
courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In
many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the
armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

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Choco Notes

On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather
information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state.
In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency
situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to
call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were
to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in
Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The
determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could
be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a
temporary restraining order every time it is exercised.

Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so
in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show
that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment deserves
to be accorded respect from this Court.

The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his
Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, *V+iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups,
kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila...*35+ We do not doubt the veracity of
the Presidents assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court
takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls,
public utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI
2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for
military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.

The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the
civilian character of the police force.

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Choco Notes

Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines,
the IBP asserts that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is
militarized in violation of Section 3, Article II*36+ of the Constitution.

We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the
LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines authority. It is noteworthy
that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority
belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine
Marines joint visibility patrols.[37] Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the
soldiers on police patrol procedures.[38] It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment
of the Marines.[39] It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and
render logistical support to these soldiers.[40] In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued
that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to
assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an
insidious incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article
XVI of the Constitution.[41]

In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged
involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of
the aforecited provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the
head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the case, it does not matter
whether the AFP Chief actually participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any
authority or control over the same. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members
of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the
Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in
conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no insidious incursion of the military in civilian affairs
nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
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It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in
Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the
assistance of the military in the implementation and execution of certain traditionally civil functions.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, some of the multifarious activities wherein military aid
has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both the civilian and the military together in a
relationship of cooperation, are:

1. Elections;[42]

2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;[43]

3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;[44]

4. Amateur sports promotion and development;[45]

5. Development of the culture and the arts;[46]

6. Conservation of natural resources;[47]

7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program;[48]

8. Enforcement of customs laws;[49]

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9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;[50]

10. Conduct of licensure examinations;[51]

11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students;[52]

12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;[53]

13. Sanitary inspections;[54]

14. Conduct of census work;[55]

15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;[56]

16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;[57]

17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units.[58]

This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a systematic, unbroken,
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before questioned.[59]
What we have here is mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not
derogation of civilian supremacy.

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In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility towards the use of military force
for domestic purposes has persisted,[60] and whose Constitution, unlike ours, does not expressly
provide for the power to call, the use of military personnel by civilian law enforcement officers is
allowed under circumstances similar to those surrounding the present deployment of the Philippine
Marines. Under the Posse Comitatus Act[61] of the US, the use of the military in civilian law
enforcement is generally prohibited, except in certain allowable circumstances. A provision of the Act
states:

1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of
Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as posse comitatus or otherwise to execute
the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.[62]

To determine whether there is a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in the use of military personnel,
the US courts[63] apply the following standards, to wit:

Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law enforcement officers at Wounded Knee in
such a manner that the military personnel subjected the citizens to the exercise of military power which
was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory[64] George Washington Law Review, pp. 404-433 (1986),
which discusses the four divergent standards for assessing acceptable involvement of military personnel
in civil law enforcement. See likewise HONORED IN THE BREECH: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO
EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH MILITARY FORCE, 83 Yale Law Journal, pp. 130-152, 1973. 64 in nature,
either presently or prospectively?

x x x

When this concept is transplanted into the present legal context, we take it to mean that military
involvement, even when not expressly authorized by the Constitution or a statute, does not violate the
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Posse Comitatus Act unless it actually regulates, forbids or compels some conduct on the part of those
claiming relief. A mere threat of some future injury would be insufficient. (emphasis supplied)

Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case to determine whether
there is permissible use of the military in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no
violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution is committed. On this point, the Court
agrees with the observation of the Solicitor General:

3. The designation of tasks in Annex A[65] does not constitute the exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or
compulsory military power. First, the soldiers do not control or direct the operation. This is evident
from Nos. 6,[66] 8(k)[67] and 9(a)[68] of Annex A. These soldiers, second, also have no power to
prohibit or condemn. In No. 9(d)[69] of Annex A, all arrested persons are brought to the nearest police
stations for proper disposition. And last, these soldiers apply no coercive force. The materials or
equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c)[70] of Annex A, are all low impact and defensive in
character. The conclusion is that there being no exercise of regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory
military power, the deployment of a handful of Philippine Marines constitutes no impermissible use of
military power for civilian law enforcement.[71]

It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the
military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions,
however, are unfounded. The power to call the armed forces is just that - calling out the armed forces.
Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the President
has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people,
this Court is not inclined to overrule the Presidents determination of the factual basis for the calling of
the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has
complained that his political or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the
Marines. It was precisely to safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the
joint visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom only when people feel
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secure in their homes and in the streets, not when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk
in their midst.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
IBP v. Zamora Digest

FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada,
in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
instrumentality of the Government.
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When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to
these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme
over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake
the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the
military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1

Bayan v. Zamora
[G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000]

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a JUNK VFA MOVEMENT, BISHOP TOMAS MILLAMENA (Iglesia
Filipina Independiente), BISHOP ELMER BOLOCAN (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), DR. REYNALDO
LEGASCA, MD, KILUSANG MAMBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, PROLABOR,
and the PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY DOMINGO SIAZON, DEFENSE SECRETARY ORLANDO MERCADO, BRIG.
GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELO FERNAN, SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON,
SENATOR BLAS OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO BIAZON, and SENATOR FRANCISCO TATAD, respondents.
[G.R. No. 138572. October 10, 2000]

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC.(PHILCONSA), EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA, AMADOGAT
INCIONG, CAMILO L. SABIO, AND RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as
71
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Executive Secretary, HON. ORLANDO MERCADO, as Secretary of National Defense, and HON. DOMINGO
L. SIAZON, JR., as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, respondents.
[G.R. No. 138587. October 10, 2000]

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., RAUL S. ROCO, and SERGIO R. OSMEA III, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., ORLANDO B. MERCADO, MARCELO B.
FERNAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, BLAS F. OPLE and RODOLFO G. BIAZON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 138680. October 10, 2000]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its National President, Jose Aguila Grapilon,
petitioners, vs. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, in his capacity as President, Republic of the Philippines, and
HON. DOMINGO SIAZON, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, respondents.
[G.R. No. 138698. October 10, 2000]

JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO TAADA, ZENAIDA QUEZON-AVENCEA, ROLANDO SIMBULAN,
PABLITO V. SANIDAD, MA. SOCORRO I. DIOKNO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCISCO C.
RIVERA JR., RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, KILOSBAYAN, MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, SENATE PRESIDENT
MARCELO B. FERNAN, SENATOR BLAS F. OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO G. BIAZON, AND ALL OTHER
PERSONS ACTING THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION, DIRECTION, AND INSTRUCTION IN RELATION TO THE
VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT (VFA), respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BUENA, J.:

Confronting the Court for resolution in the instant consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition
are issues relating to, and borne by, an agreement forged in the turn of the last century between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America -the Visiting Forces Agreement.
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The antecedents unfold.

On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement
which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States
military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the
United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties
agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and
aircraft.[1]

In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and
the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September
16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines.[2]
With the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises conducted
between the two countries were held in abeyance. Notwithstanding, the defense and security
relationship between the Philippines and the United States of America continued pursuant to the
Mutual Defense Treaty.

On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia
Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo
Severino Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of the United States and the
Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements
of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Negotiations by both panels on the VFA led to a
consolidated draft text, which in turn resulted to a final series of conferences and negotiations[3] that
culminated in Manila on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved
the VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.

On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
ratified the VFA.[4]
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On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines,[5] the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the
President[6] and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by Senator Blas F.
Ople, and its Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, for
their joint consideration and recommendation. Thereafter, joint public hearings were held by the two
Committees.[7]

On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443[8] recommending the
concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and the creation of a Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee
its implementation. Debates then ensued.

On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds
(2/3) vote[9] of its members. Senate Resolution No. 443 was then re-numbered as Senate Resolution
No. 18.[10]

On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between respondent
Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Hubbard.

The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and nine (9) Articles, provides for the mechanism for regulating
the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present
in the Philippines, and is quoted in its full text, hereunder:

Article I
Definitions

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As used in this Agreement, United States personnel means United States military and civilian
personnel temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine
Government.

Within this definition:

1. The term military personnel refers to military members of the United States Army, Navy, Marine
Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard.

2. The term civilian personnel refers to individuals who are neither nationals of, nor ordinary residents
in the Philippines and who are employed by the United States armed forces or who are accompanying
the United States armed forces, such as employees of the American Red Cross and the United Services
Organization.

Article II
Respect for Law

It is the duty of the United States personnel to respect the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and
to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and, in particular, from any
political activity in the Philippines. The Government of the United States shall take all measures within
its authority to ensure that this is done.

Article III
Entry and Departure

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1. The Government of the Philippines shall facilitate the admission of United States personnel and their
departure from the Philippines in connection with activities covered by this agreement.

2. United States military personnel shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations upon entering
and departing the Philippines.

3. The following documents only, which shall be presented on demand, shall be required in respect of
United States military personnel who enter the Philippines:

(a) personal identity card issued by the appropriate United States authority showing full name, date of
birth, rank or grade and service number (if any), branch of service and photograph;

(b) individual or collective document issued by the appropriate United States authority, authorizing the
travel or visit and identifying the individual or group as United States military personnel; and

(c) the commanding officer of a military aircraft or vessel shall present a declaration of health, and
when required by the cognizant representative of the Government of the Philippines, shall conduct a
quarantine inspection and will certify that the aircraft or vessel is free from quarantinable diseases. Any
quarantine inspection of United States aircraft or United States vessels or cargoes thereon shall be
conducted by the United States commanding officer in accordance with the international health
regulations as promulgated by the World Health Organization, and mutually agreed procedures.

4. United States civilian personnel shall be exempt from visa requirements but shall present, upon
demand, valid passports upon entry and departure of the Philippines.

5. If the Government of the Philippines has requested the removal of any United States personnel from
its territory, the United States authorities shall be responsible for receiving the person concerned within
its own territory or otherwise disposing of said person outside of the Philippines.
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Article IV
Driving and Vehicle Registration

1. Philippine authorities shall accept as valid, without test or fee, a driving permit or license issued by
the appropriate United States authority to United States personnel for the operation of military or
official vehicles.

2. Vehicles owned by the Government of the United States need not be registered, but shall have
appropriate markings.

Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction

1. Subject to the provisions of this article:

(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses
committed within the Philippines and punishable under the law of the Philippines.

(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the Philippines all criminal
and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law of the United States over United
States personnel in the Philippines.

2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to
offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the Philippines, punishable under the laws of the
Philippines, but not under the laws of the United States.
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(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to
offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the United States, punishable under the laws of
the United States, but not under the laws of the Philippines.

(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an offense relating to security
means:

(1) treason;

(2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense.

3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules shall apply:

(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all offenses committed
by United States personnel, except in cases provided for in paragraphs 1(b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this
Article.

(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over United
States personnel subject to the military law of the United States in relation to.

(1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or offenses solely against the
property or person of United States personnel; and

(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official duty.
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(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other government to waive
their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case.

(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to maintain good order and
discipline among their forces, Philippine authorities will, upon request by the United States, waive their
primary right to exercise jurisdiction except in cases of particular importance to the Philippines. If the
Government of the Philippines determines that the case is of particular importance, it shall
communicate such determination to the United States authorities within twenty (20) days after the
Philippine authorities receive the United States request.

(e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense charged by authorities of
the Philippines against United states personnel arises out of an act or omission done in the performance
of official duty, the commander will issue a certificate setting forth such determination. This certificate
will be transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines and will constitute sufficient proof
of performance of official duty for the purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this Article. In those cases where
the Government of the Philippines believes the circumstances of the case require a review of the duty
certificate, United States military authorities and Philippine authorities shall consult immediately.
Philippine authorities at the highest levels may also present any information bearing on its validity.
United States military authorities shall take full account of the Philippine position. Where appropriate,
United States military authorities will take disciplinary or other action against offenders in official duty
cases, and notify the Government of the Philippines of the actions taken.

(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the
authorities of the other government as soon as possible.

(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each other of the disposition of
all cases in which both the authorities of the Philippines and the United States have the right to exercise
jurisdiction.

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4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines and United States shall
assist each other in the arrest of United States personnel in the Philippines and in handling them over to
authorities who are to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this article.

5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify Philippine authorities of the arrest or
detention of United States personnel who are subject of Philippine primary or exclusive jurisdiction.
Philippine authorities shall promptly notify United States military authorities of the arrest or detention
of any United States personnel.

6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall
immediately reside with United States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of
the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon
formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to
those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which
the person has been charged in extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its position
to the United States Government regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take into
full account. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the United
States shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one-year period will not include the
time necessary to appeal. Also, the one-year period will not include any time during which scheduled
trial procedures are delayed because United States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine
authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.

7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine authorities shall assist each
other in the carrying out of all necessary investigation into offenses and shall cooperate in providing for
the attendance of witnesses and in the collection and production of evidence, including seizure and, in
proper cases, the delivery of objects connected with an offense.

8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the provisions of this Article and
have been acquitted or have been convicted and are serving, or have served their sentence, or have had
their sentence remitted or suspended, or have been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the same
offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall prevent United States military
80
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authorities from trying United States personnel for any violation of rules of discipline arising from the
act or omission which constituted an offense for which they were tried by Philippine authorities.

9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or prosecuted by Philippine
authorities, they shall be accorded all procedural safeguards established by the law of the Philippines. At
the minimum, United States personnel shall be entitled:

(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;

(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made against them and to have
reasonable time to prepare a defense;

(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such witnesses;

(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses;

(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the same basis as nationals of
the Philippines;

(f) To have the service of a competent interpreter; and

(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by United States authorities, and to have
such authorities present at all judicial proceedings. These proceedings shall be public unless the court, in
accordance with Philippine laws, excludes persons who have no role in the proceedings.

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10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried
out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. United States
Personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance.

11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of ordinary jurisdiction,
and shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine military or religious courts.

Article VI
Claims

1. Except for contractual arrangements, including United States foreign military sales letters of offer
and acceptance and leases of military equipment, both governments waive any and all claims against
each other for damage, loss or destruction to property of each others armed forces or for death or
injury to their military and civilian personnel arising from activities to which this agreement applies.

2. For claims against the United States, other than contractual claims and those to which paragraph 1
applies, the United States Government, in accordance with United States law regarding foreign claims,
will pay just and reasonable compensation in settlement of meritorious claims for damage, loss,
personal injury or death, caused by acts or omissions of United States personnel, or otherwise incident
to the non-combat activities of the United States forces.

Article VII
Importation and Exportation

1. United States Government equipment, materials, supplies, and other property imported into or
acquired in the Philippines by or on behalf of the United States armed forces in connection with
activities to which this agreement applies, shall be free of all Philippine duties, taxes and other similar
charges. Title to such property shall remain with the United States, which may remove such property
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from the Philippines at any time, free from export duties, taxes, and other similar charges. The
exemptions provided in this paragraph shall also extend to any duty, tax, or other similar charges which
would otherwise be assessed upon such property after importation into, or acquisition within, the
Philippines. Such property may be removed from the Philippines, or disposed of therein, provided that
disposition of such property in the Philippines to persons or entities not entitled to exemption from
applicable taxes and duties shall be subject to payment of such taxes, and duties and prior approval of
the Philippine Government.

2. Reasonable quantities of personal baggage, personal effects, and other property for the personal use
of United States personnel may be imported into and used in the Philippines free of all duties, taxes and
other similar charges during the period of their temporary stay in the Philippines. Transfers to persons
or entities in the Philippines not entitled to import privileges may only be made upon prior approval of
the appropriate Philippine authorities including payment by the recipient of applicable duties and taxes
imposed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The exportation of such property and of
property acquired in the Philippines by United States personnel shall be free of all Philippine duties,
taxes, and other similar charges.

Article VIII
Movement of Vessels and Aircraft

1. Aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the Philippines upon approval
of the Government of the Philippines in accordance with procedures stipulated in implementing
arrangements.

2. Vessels operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the Philippines upon approval
of the Government of the Philippines. The movement of vessels shall be in accordance with
international custom and practice governing such vessels, and such agreed implementing arrangements
as necessary.

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3. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces shall not be subject
to the payment of landing or port fees, navigation or over flight charges, or tolls or other use charges,
including light and harbor dues, while in the Philippines. Aircraft operated by or for the United States
armed forces shall observe local air traffic control regulations while in the Philippines. Vessels owned or
operated by the United States solely on United States Government non-commercial service shall not be
subject to compulsory pilotage at Philippine ports.

Article IX
Duration and Termination

This agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the parties have notified each other in
writing through the diplomatic channel that they have completed their constitutional requirements for
entry into force. This agreement shall remain in force until the expiration of 180 days from the date on
which either party gives the other party notice in writing that it desires to terminate the agreement.

Via these consolidated[11] petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners - as legislators, non-
governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers - assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute
to herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.

We have simplified the issues raised by the petitioners into the following:

I

Do petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the
constitutionality of the VFA?

II
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Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?

III

Does the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty?

a. Are Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by US military
personnel?

b. Is the Supreme Court deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or
higher?

IV

Does the VFA violate:

a. the equal protection clause under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution?

b. the Prohibition against nuclear weapons under Article II, Section 8?

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c. Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution granting the exemption from taxes and duties for the
equipment, materials supplies and other properties imported into or acquired in the Philippines by, or
on behalf, of the US Armed Forces?

LOCUS STANDI

At the outset, respondents challenge petitioners standing to sue, on the ground that the latter have not
shown any interest in the case, and that petitioners failed to substantiate that they have sustained, or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the operation of the VFA.[12] Petitioners, on the other hand,
counter that the validity or invalidity of the VFA is a matter of transcendental importance which justifies
their standing.[13]

A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show not only that
the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or in is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. He must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason
of the statute complained of.[14]

In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they have
sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As
taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing
or spending powers.*15+ On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayers suit refers to a case where the
act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.[16]
Thus, in Bugnay Const. & Development Corp. vs. Laron[17], we held:

x x x it is exigent that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be benefited or injured by
the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in interest. Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
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enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public.

Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of
any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as
taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.

Similarly, Representatives Wigberto Taada, Agapito Aquino and Joker Arroyo, as petitioners-legislators,
do not possess the requisite locus standi to maintain the present suit. While this Court, in Phil.
Constitution Association vs. Hon. Salvador Enriquez,[18] sustained the legal standing of a member of the
Senate and the House of Representatives to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition
imposed on an item in an appropriation bull, we cannot, at this instance, similarly uphold petitioners
standing as members of Congress, in the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person
or to the institution to which they belong.

Beyond this, the allegations of impairment of legislative power, such as the delegation of the power of
Congress to grant tax exemptions, are more apparent than real. While it may be true that petitioners
pointed to provisions of the VFA which allegedly impair their legislative powers, petitioners failed
however to sufficiently show that they have in fact suffered direct injury.

In the same vein, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is stripped of standing in these cases.
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, the IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the
absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to
commence the present action.[19]

Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues
raised in the petitions, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural
barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have done in the early Emergency Powers Cases,[20]
where we had occasion to rule:

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x x x ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest
shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties
and ruled that transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. We have since then
applied the exception in many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343). (Underscoring Supplied)

This principle was reiterated in the subsequent cases of Gonzales vs. COMELEC,[21] Daza vs.
Singson,[22] and Basco vs. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[23] where we emphatically held:

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Courts
duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the government
have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused
the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken
cognizance of this petition. x x x

Again, in the more recent case of Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr.,[24] thisCourt ruled that in cases of
transcendental importance, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper
even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.

Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine of
separation of powers, which enjoins upon the departments of the government a becoming respect for
each others acts,*25+ this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petitions.

APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the determination of which provision of the Constitution
applies, with regard to the exercise by the senate of its constitutional power to concur with the VFA.
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Petitioners argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable considering that the VFA has for its subject
the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines. Respondents, on the contrary, maintain that
Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement
which involves merely the temporary visits of United States personnel engaged in joint military
exercises.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on
treaties or international agreements. Section 21, Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads:

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:

After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the senate and, when the Congress
so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general, in which case, the
concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject
treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays
down the general rule on treatise or international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a
wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treatise or those economic
in nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject
matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be
valid and effective.

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In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the
presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the
concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional
requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further
requires that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines only by
virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other
contracting state.

It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other, actually
share some common ground. These constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the negative and
thus, are deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. In particular, Section 21 opens with the clause
No treaty x x x, and Section 25 contains the phrase shall not be allowed. Additionally, in both
instances, the concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render the treaty or international
agreement valid and effective.

To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and
that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case,
whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that
the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.

On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and
personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military
personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the
matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.

Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense,
however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for
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the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the
Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder.

It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law prevails over a
general one. Lex specialis derogat generali. Thus, where there is in the same statute a particular
enactment and also a general one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is
embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must
be taken to affect only such cases within its general language which are not within the provision of the
particular enactment.[26]

In Leveriza vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[27] we enunciated:

x x x that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give
way to a special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only
cases in which the special provisions are not applicable (Sto. Domingo vs. de los Angeles, 96 SCRA 139),
that a specific statute prevails over a general statute (De Jesus vs. People, 120 SCRA 760) and that where
two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially
should prevail (Wil Wilhensen Inc. vs. Baluyot, 83 SCRA 38).

Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient
agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a
military base. On this score, the Constitution makes no distinction between transient and
permanent. Certainly, we find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or
facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.

It is a rudiment in legal hermenuetics that when no distinction is made by law, the Court should not
distinguish- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos.

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In like manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since
no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. Notably, a
perusal of said constitutional provision reveals that the proscription covers foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities. Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities
without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects. The use of comma and
the disjunctive word or clearly signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from the others
included in the enumeration,[28] such that, the provision contemplates three different situations - a
military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign
facilities - any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.

To this end, the intention of the framers of the Charter, as manifested during the deliberations of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, is consistent with this interpretation:

MR. MAAMBONG. I just want to address a question or two to Commissioner Bernas.

This formulation speaks of three things: foreign military bases, troops or facilities. My first question is: If
the country does enter into such kind of a treaty, must it cover the three-bases, troops or facilities-or
could the treaty entered into cover only one or two?

FR. BERNAS. Definitely, it can cover only one. Whether it covers only one or it covers three, the
requirement will be the same.

MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the Philippine government can enter into a treaty covering not bases
but merely troops?

FR. BERNAS. Yes.

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MR. MAAMBONG. I cannot find any reason why the government can enter into a treaty covering only
troops.

FR. BERNAS. Why not? Probably if we stretch our imagination a little bit more, we will find some. We
just want to cover everything.*29+ (Underscoring Supplied)

Moreover, military bases established within the territory of another state is no longer viable because of
the alternatives offered by new means and weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided
missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for months and years without
returning to their home country. These military warships are actually used as substitutes for a land-
home base not only of military aircraft but also of military personnel and facilities. Besides, vessels are
mobile as compared to a land-based military headquarters.

At this juncture, we shall then resolve the issue of whether or not the requirements of Section 25 were
complied with when the Senate gave its concurrence to the VFA.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence
handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution, whether under the general requirement in Section 21, Article VII, or the specific mandate
mentioned in Section 25, Article XVIII, the provision in the latter article requiring ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required
it.

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As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty or international
agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of
the Senate. On the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty be duly
concurred in by the Senate.

Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate is
clearly required so that the concurrence contemplated by law may be validly obtained and deemed
present. While it is true that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among other things, that the treaty-the
VFA, in the instant case-be duly concurred in by the Senate, it is very true however that said provision
must be related and viewed in light of the clear mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in
more specific terms, requires that the concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement, be made by a
two -thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article XVIII must not be treated
in isolation to section 21, Article, VII.

As noted, the concurrence requirement under Section 25, Article XVIII must be construed in relation to
the provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a more particular language, the concurrence of the Senate
contemplated under Section 25, Article XVIII means that at least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate favorably vote to concur with the treaty-the VFA in the instant case.

Under these circumstances, the charter provides that the Senate shall be composed of twenty-four (24)
Senators.[30] Without a tinge of doubt, two-thirds (2/3) of this figure, or not less than sixteen (16)
members, favorably acting on the proposal is an unquestionable compliance with the requisite number
of votes mentioned in Section 21 of Article VII. The fact that there were actually twenty-three (23)
incumbent Senators at the time the voting was made,[31] will not alter in any significant way the
circumstance that more than two-thirds of the members of the Senate concurred with the proposed
VFA, even if the two-thirds vote requirement is based on this figure of actual members (23). In this
regard, the fundamental law is clear that two-thirds of the 24 Senators, or at least 16 favorable votes,
suffice so as to render compliance with the strict constitutional mandate of giving concurrence to the
subject treaty.

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Having resolved that the first two requisites prescribed in Section 25, Article XVIII are present, we shall
now pass upon and delve on the requirement that the VFA should be recognized as a treaty by the
United States of America.

Petitioners content that the phrase recognized as a treaty, embodied in section 25, Article XVIII,
means that the VFA should have the advice and consent of the United States Senate pursuant to its own
constitutional process, and that it should not be considered merely an executive agreement by the
United States.

In opposition, respondents argue that the letter of United States Ambassador Hubbard stating that the
VFA is binding on the United States Government is conclusive, on the point that the VFA is recognized as
a treaty by the United States of America. According to respondents, the VFA, to be binding, must only be
accepted as a treaty by the United States.

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting
party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.[32] To require the other contracting state,
the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence
pursuant to its Constitution,[33] is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.[34]

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.[35] To be
sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said
agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

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A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is an international instrument
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a
single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular designation.*36+
There are many other terms used for a treaty or international agreement, some of which are: act,
protocol, agreement, compromis d arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of notes,
pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out that
the names or titles of international agreements included under the general term treaty have little or no
legal significance. Certain terms are useful, but they furnish little more than mere description.[37]

Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that the provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of
terms in the present Convention are without prejudice to the use of those terms, or to the meanings
which may be given to them in the internal law of the State.

Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their
binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within
their powers.[38] International law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive
agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations.[39]

In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even without the
concurrence of the Senate or Congress. In Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading,[40] we had
occasion to pronounce:

x x x the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have
entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-
favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation
arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by
our courts.

x x x x x x x x x
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Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized the validity and
constitutionality of executive agreements entered into without Senate approval. (39 Columbia Law
Review, pp. 753-754) (See, also, U.S. vs. Curtis Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 81 L. ed. 255;
U.S. vs. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81 L. ed. 1134; U.S. vs. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 86 L. ed. 796; Ozanic vs. U.S.
188 F. 2d. 288; Yale Law Journal, Vol. 15 pp. 1905-1906; California Law Review, Vol. 25, pp. 670-675;
Hyde on International Law [revised Edition], Vol. 2, pp. 1405, 1416-1418; willoughby on the U.S.
Constitution Law, Vol. I [2d ed.], pp. 537-540; Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 210-218;
Hackworth, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 390-407). (Italics Supplied) (Emphasis Ours)

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution is enlightening
and highly-instructive:

MR. MAAMBONG. Of course it goes without saying that as far as ratification of the other state is
concerned, that is entirely their concern under their own laws.

FR. BERNAS. Yes, but we will accept whatever they say. If they say that we have done everything to
make it a treaty, then as far as we are concerned, we will accept it as a treaty.*41+

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has
stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA.[42]
For as long as the united States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself
further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the
mandate of the Constitution.

Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the concurrence of the
Senate should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression of our nations consent to be bound by said
treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder.

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Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed.[43] A
State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the
State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such
ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed that ratification should be
required, (c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the
intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its
representative, or was expressed during the negotiation.[44]

In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the
legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to
the ratification.[45]

With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes
between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on
our part, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no
less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution,[46] declares that the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.

As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for
the conduct of its international relations. While the international obligation devolves upon the state and
not upon any particular branch, institution, or individual member of its government, the Philippines is
nonetheless responsible for violations committed by any branch or subdivision of its government or any
official thereof. As an integral part of the community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our
government, Constitution and laws will carry out our international obligation.[47] Hence, we cannot
readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-compliance with our obligations, duties
and responsibilities under international law.

Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International
Law Commission in 1949 provides: Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations
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arising from treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its
constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty.*48+

Equally important is Article 26 of the convention which provides that Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. This is known as the principle of
pacta sunt servanda which preserves the sanctity of treaties and have been one of the most
fundamental principles of positive international law, supported by the jurisprudence of international
tribunals.[49]

NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

In the instant controversy, the President, in effect, is heavily faulted for exercising a power and
performing a task conferred upon him by the Constitution-the power to enter into and ratify treaties.
Through the expediency of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners in these consolidated cases impute
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the chief Executive in ratifying the VFA, and referring the same
to the Senate pursuant to the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.

On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[50]

By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole
organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief
architect of the nations foreign policy; his dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then)
conceded.*51+ Wielding vast powers an influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as
Jefferson describes, is executive altogether."*52+

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As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same
in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the
Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are
exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and
diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation
the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.[53] Consequently, the acts or
judgment calls of the President involving the VFA-specifically the acts of ratification and entering into a
treaty and those necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts - squarely fall within the
sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less calibrated by
this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion.

It is the Courts considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in submitting the same to
the Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines and limits of the powers vested in him by the
Constitution. It is of no moment that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude of discretion and
in the honest belief that the VFA falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution,
referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse
of discretion, much less a grave, patent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be imputed to the
President in his act of ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose of
complying with the concurrence requirement embodied in the fundamental law. In doing so, the
President merely performed a constitutional task and exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the
functions of his office. Even if he erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the
provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of Section 25 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, still, the
President may not be faulted or scarred, much less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of
discretion in some patent, gross, and capricious manner.

For while it is conceded that Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution has broadened the scope of
judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to
national security, it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in
the field of foreign relations.*54+ The High Tribunals function, as sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, is
merely (to) check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a
showing (of) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective powerIt has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.*55+
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As to the power to concur with treaties, the constitution lodges the same with the Senate alone. Thus,
once the Senate[56] performs that power, or exercises its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed
by the Constitution, the concurrence cannot, in like manner, be viewed to constitute an abuse of power,
much less grave abuse thereof. Corollarily, the Senate, in the exercise of its discretion and acting within
the limits of such power, may not be similarly faulted for having simply performed a task conferred and
sanctioned by no less than the fundamental law.

For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in character;[57] the Senate, as
an independent body possessed of its own erudite mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject
the proposed agreement, and whatever action it takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion,
pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. In this sense, the Senate partakes a principal,
yet delicate, role in keeping the principles of separation of powers and of checks and balances alive and
vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments remain true to their form in a democratic government
such as ours. The Constitution thus animates, through this treaty-concurring power of the Senate, a
healthy system of checks and balances indispensable toward our nations pursuit of political maturity
and growth. True enough, rudimentary is the principle that matters pertaining to the wisdom of a
legislative act are beyond the ambit and province of the courts to inquire.

In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, this Court- as
the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people - is then without
power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in character
and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes and
bounds within which each of the three political branches of government may exercise the powers
exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
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Bayan v. Zamora Digest
YAN v. ZAMORA
G. R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000

Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and
negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved
the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas
Hubbard.

Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it
by (2/3) votes.

Cause of Action:

Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not
Section 21, Article VII.

Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
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Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires
for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of
the senate.

ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?

HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or
facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the
provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole
purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.

The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find nothing in
section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in
the Philippines.

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
John Hay People v Lim
[G. R. No. 119775. October 24, 2003]

JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION, MATEO CARIO FOUNDATION INC., CENTER FOR
ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS FOUNDATION INC., REGINA VICTORIA A. BENAFIN REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY
HER MOTHER MRS. ELISA BENAFIN, IZABEL M. LUYK REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER MRS.
REBECCA MOLINA LUYK, KATHERINE PE REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER ROSEMARIE G. PE,
SOLEDAD S. CAMILO, ALICIA C. PACALSO ALIAS KEVAB, BETTY I. STRASSER, RUBY C. GIRON, URSULA C.
103
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PEREZ ALIAS BA-YAY, EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, CARMEN CAROMINA, LILIA G. YARANON, DIANE
MONDOC, petitioners, vs. VICTOR LIM, PRESIDENT, BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY;
JOHN HAY PORO POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CITY OF BAGUIO, TUNTEX (B.V.I.) CO. LTD.,
ASIAWORLD INTERNATIONALE GROUP, INC., DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By the present petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with prayer for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners assail, in the main, the
constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994, CREATING AND DESIGNATING A
PORTION OF THE AREA COVERED BY THE FORMER CAMP JOHN [HAY] AS THE JOHN HAY SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7227.

Republic Act No. 7227, AN ACT ACCELERATING THE CONVERSION OF MILITARY RESERVATIONS INTO
OTHER PRODUCTIVE USES, CREATING THE BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY FOR
THIS PURPOSE, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise known as the
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992, which was enacted on March 13, 1992, set out the
policy of the government to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive
uses of the former military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America Military Bases
Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations as well as their extensions including the
John Hay Station (Camp John Hay or the camp) in the City of Baguio.[1]

As noted in its title, R.A. No. 7227 created public respondent Bases Conversion and Development
Authority[2] (BCDA), vesting it with powers pertaining to the multifarious aspects of carrying out the
ultimate objective of utilizing the base areas in accordance with the declared government policy.

R.A. No. 7227 likewise created the Subic Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ) the metes
and bounds of which were to be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the
Philippines.[3]
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R.A. No. 7227 granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption
of businesses therein from local and national taxes, to other hallmarks of a liberalized financial and
business climate.[4]

And R.A. No. 7227 expressly gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation,
subject to the concurrence of the local government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones
(SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San
Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay.[5]

On August 16, 1993, BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with
private respondents Tuntex (B.V.I.) Co., Ltd (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc.
(ASIAWORLD), private corporations registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands, preparatory to
the formation of a joint venture for the development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as
premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. Four months later or on December 16, 1993, BCDA,
TUNTEX and ASIAWORD executed a Joint Venture Agreement[6] whereby they bound themselves to put
up a joint venture company known as the Baguio International Development and Management
Corporation which would lease areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of turning
such places into principal tourist and recreation spots, as originally envisioned by the parties under their
Memorandum of Agreement.

The Baguio City government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions in response to the actions taken
by BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay.

By Resolution[7] of September 29, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City (the sanggunian)
officially asked BCDA to exclude all the barangays partly or totally located within Camp John Hay from
the reach or coverage of any plan or program for its development.

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By a subsequent Resolution[8] dated January 19, 1994, the sanggunian sought from BCDA an abdication,
waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over the home lots being occupied by residents of nine (9)
barangays surrounding the military reservation.

Still by another resolution passed on February 21, 1994, the sanggunian adopted and submitted to BCDA
a 15-point concept for the development of Camp John Hay.*9+ The sanggunians vision expressed,
among other things, a kind of development that affords protection to the environment, the making of a
family-oriented type of tourist destination, priority in employment opportunities for Baguio residents
and free access to the base area, guaranteed participation of the city government in the management
and operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously named nine barangays from the area for
development, and liability for local taxes of businesses to be established within the camp.[10]

BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD agreed to some, but rejected or modified the other proposals of the
sanggunian.[11] They stressed the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its
full development in accordance with the mandate of R.A. No. 7227.[12]

On May 11, 1994, the sanggunian passed a resolution requesting the Mayor to order the determination
of realty taxes which may otherwise be collected from real properties of Camp John Hay.[13] The
resolution was intended to intelligently guide the sanggunian in determining its position on whether
Camp John Hay be declared a SEZ, it (the sanggunian) being of the view that such declaration would
exempt the camps property and the economic activity therein from local or national taxation.

More than a month later, however, the sanggunian passed Resolution No. 255, (Series of 1994),[14]
seeking and supporting, subject to its concurrence, the issuance by then President Ramos of a
presidential proclamation declaring an area of 288.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance with
the provisions of R.A. No. 7227. Together with this resolution was submitted a draft of the proposed
proclamation for consideration by the President.[15]

On July 5, 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420,[16] the title of which was earlier
indicated, which established a SEZ on a portion of Camp John Hay and which reads as follows:
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x x x

Pursuant to the powers vested in me by the law and the resolution of concurrence by the City Council of
Baguio, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby create and designate a portion of the
area covered by the former John Hay reservation as embraced, covered, and defined by the 1947
Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended, as
the John Hay Special Economic Zone, and accordingly order:

SECTION 1. Coverage of John Hay Special Economic Zone. The John Hay Special Economic Zone shall
cover the area consisting of Two Hundred Eighty Eight and one/tenth (288.1) hectares, more or less, of
the total of Six Hundred Seventy-Seven (677) hectares of the John Hay Reservation, more or less, which
have been surveyed and verified by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as
defined by the following technical description:

A parcel of land, situated in the City of Baguio, Province of Benguet, Island of Luzon, and particularly
described in survey plans Psd-131102-002639 and Ccs-131102-000030 as approved on 16 August 1993
and 26 August 1993, respectively, by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, in detail
containing :

Lot 1, Lot 2, Lot 3, Lot 4, Lot 5, Lot 6, Lot 7, Lot 13, Lot 14, Lot 15, and Lot 20 of Ccs-131102-000030

-and-

Lot 3, Lot 4, Lot 5, Lot 6, Lot 7, Lot 8, Lot 9, Lot 10, Lot 11, Lot 14, Lot 15, Lot 16, Lot 17, and Lot 18 of
Psd-131102-002639 being portions of TCT No. T-3812, LRC Rec. No. 87.

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With a combined area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT AND ONE/TENTH HECTARES (288.1 hectares);
Provided that the area consisting of approximately Six and two/tenth (6.2) hectares, more or less,
presently occupied by the VOA and the residence of the Ambassador of the United States, shall be
considered as part of the SEZ only upon turnover of the properties to the government of the Republic of
the Philippines.

Sec. 2. Governing Body of the John Hay Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 7227, the Bases Conversion and Development Authority is hereby established as the governing
body of the John Hay Special Economic Zone and, as such, authorized to determine the utilization and
disposition of the lands comprising it, subject to private rights, if any, and in consultation and
coordination with the City Government of Baguio after consultation with its inhabitants, and to
promulgate the necessary policies, rules, and regulations to govern and regulate the zone thru the John
Hay Poro Point Development Corporation, which is its implementing arm for its economic development
and optimum utilization.

Sec. 3. Investment Climate in John Hay Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to Section 5(m) and Section
15 of Republic Act No. 7227, the John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation shall implement all
necessary policies, rules, and regulations governing the zone, including investment incentives, in
consultation with pertinent government departments. Among others, the zone shall have all the
applicable incentives of the Special Economic Zone under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227 and those
applicable incentives granted in the Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the
Foreign Investment Act of 1991, and new investment laws that may hereinafter be enacted.

Sec. 4. Role of Departments, Bureaus, Offices, Agencies and Instrumentalities. All Heads of
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the government are hereby directed to
give full support to Bases Conversion and Development Authority and/or its implementing subsidiary or
joint venture to facilitate the necessary approvals to expedite the implementation of various projects of
the conversion program.

Sec. 5. Local Authority. Except as herein provided, the affected local government units shall retain
their basic autonomy and identity.
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Sec. 6. Repealing Clause. All orders, rules, and regulations, or parts thereof, which are inconsistent
with the provisions of this Proclamation, are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

Sec. 7. Effectivity. This proclamation shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-
four.

The issuance of Proclamation No. 420 spawned the present petition[17] for prohibition, mandamus and
declaratory relief which was filed on April 25, 1995 challenging, in the main, its constitutionality or
validity as well as the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement between
public respondent BCDA and private respondents TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.

Petitioners allege as grounds for the allowance of the petition the following:

I. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, SERIES OF 1990 (sic) IN SO FAR AS IT GRANTS TAX
EXEMPTIONS IS INVALID AND ILLEGAL AS IT IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE BY THE PRESIDENT OF
A POWER GRANTED ONLY TO THE LEGISLATURE.

II. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, IN SO FAR AS IT LIMITS THE POWERS AND INTERFERES WITH
THE AUTONOMY OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO IS INVALID, ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

III. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, SERIES OF 1994 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT IT
VIOLATES THE RULE THAT ALL TAXES SHOULD BE UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE.

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IV. THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY HAVING BEEN ENTERED INTO ONLY BY
DIRECT NEGOTIATION IS ILLEGAL.

V. THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY AND
BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RESPONDENT BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS (sic)
ILLEGAL.

VI. THE CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN OF RESPONDENTS NOT HAVING UNDERGONE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IS BEING ILLEGALLY CONSIDERED WITHOUT A VALID
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT.

A temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction was prayed for to enjoin BCDA, John
Hay Poro Point Development Corporation and the city government from implementing Proclamation No.
420, and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD from proceeding with their plan respecting Camp John Hays
development pursuant to their Joint Venture Agreement with BCDA.[18]

Public respondents, by their separate Comments, allege as moot and academic the issues raised by the
petition, the questioned Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement having already been
deemed abandoned by the inaction of the parties thereto prior to the filing of the petition as in fact, by
letter of November 21, 1995, BCDA formally notified TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD of the revocation of their
said agreements.[19]

In maintaining the validity of Proclamation No. 420, respondents contend that by extending to the John
Hay SEZ economic incentives similar to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ which was established under R.A.
No. 7227, the proclamation is merely implementing the legislative intent of said law to turn the US
military bases into hubs of business activity or investment. They underscore the point that the
governments policy of bases conversion can not be achieved without extending the same tax
exemptions granted by R.A. No. 7227 to Subic SEZ to other SEZs.

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Denying that Proclamation No. 420 is in derogation of the local autonomy of Baguio City or that it is
violative of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection, respondents assail petitioners lack of
standing to bring the present suit even as taxpayers and in the absence of any actual case or controversy
to warrant this Courts exercise of its power of judicial review over the proclamation.

Finally, respondents seek the outright dismissal of the petition for having been filed in disregard of the
hierarchy of courts and of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Replying,[20] petitioners aver that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies finds no
application herein since they are invoking the exclusive authority of this Court under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 7227 to enjoin or restrain implementation of projects for conversion of the base areas; that the
established exceptions to the aforesaid doctrine obtain in the present petition; and that they possess
the standing to bring the petition which is a taxpayers suit.

Public respondents have filed their Rejoinder[21] and the parties have filed their respective memoranda.

Before dwelling on the core issues, this Court shall first address the preliminary procedural questions
confronting the petition.

The judicial policy is and has always been that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it except
when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts, or when exceptional and compelling
circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Courts primary
jurisdiction.[22] Neither will it entertain an action for declaratory relief, which is partly the nature of this
petition, over which it has no original jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, as it is only this Court which has the power under Section 21[23] of R.A. No. 7227 to enjoin
implementation of projects for the development of the former US military reservations, the issuance of
which injunction petitioners pray for, petitioners direct filing of the present petition with it is allowed.
Over and above this procedural objection to the present suit, this Court retains full discretionary power
111
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to take cognizance of a petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of
the issues raised, warrant.[24] Besides, remanding the case to the lower courts now would just unduly
prolong adjudication of the issues.

The transformation of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay into a SEZ is not simply a re-
classification of an area, a mere ascription of a status to a place. It involves turning the former US
military reservation into a focal point for investments by both local and foreign entities. It is to be made
a site of vigorous business activity, ultimately serving as a spur to the countrys long awaited economic
growth. For, as R.A. No. 7227 unequivocally declares, it is the governments policy to enhance the
benefits to be derived from the base areas in order to promote the economic and social development of
Central Luzon in particular and the country in general.[25] Like the Subic SEZ, the John Hay SEZ should
also be turned into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center.*26+

More than the economic interests at stake, the development of Camp John Hay as well as of the other
base areas unquestionably has critical links to a host of environmental and social concerns. Whatever
use to which these lands will be devoted will set a chain of events that can affect one way or another
the social and economic way of life of the communities where the bases are located, and ultimately the
nation in general.

Underscoring the fragility of Baguio Citys ecology with its problem on the scarcity of its water supply,
petitioners point out that the local and national government are faced with the challenge of how to
provide for an ecologically sustainable, environmentally sound, equitable transition for the city in the
wake of Camp John Hays reversion to the mass of government property.*27+ But that is why R.A. No.
7227 emphasizes the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and
their extensions consistent with ecological and environmental standards.*28+ It cannot thus be gainsaid
that the matter of conversion of the US bases into SEZs, in this case Camp John Hay, assumes
importance of a national magnitude.

Convinced then that the present petition embodies crucial issues, this Court assumes jurisdiction over
the petition.

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As far as the questioned agreements between BCDA and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD are concerned, the
legal questions being raised thereon by petitioners have indeed been rendered moot and academic by
the revocation of such agreements. There are, however, other issues posed by the petition, those which
center on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 420, which have not been mooted by the said
supervening event upon application of the rules for the judicial scrutiny of constitutional cases. The
issues boil down to:

(1) Whether the present petition complies with the requirements for this Courts exercise of
jurisdiction over constitutional issues;

(2) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and local tax exemption
within and granting other economic incentives to the John Hay Special Economic Zone; and

(3) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional for limiting or interfering with the local autonomy
of Baguio City;

It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are raised, the court can exercise its
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and
question is the lis mota of the case.[29]

An actual case or controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory.[30] The controversy needs to be definite and concrete,
bearing upon the legal relations of parties who are pitted against each other due to their adverse legal
interests.[31] There is in the present case a real clash of interests and rights between petitioners and
respondents arising from the issuance of a presidential proclamation that converts a portion of the area
covered by Camp John Hay into a SEZ, the former insisting that such proclamation contains
unconstitutional provisions, the latter claiming otherwise.

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R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation
of SEZs out of all the base areas in the country.[32] The grant by the law on local government units of
the right of concurrence on the bases conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for
it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or surrounding a particular base
area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the
legality of Proclamation No. 420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the government act being challenged.[33] Theirs is a material interest, an
interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an interest in the question involved or an
incidental interest,[34] for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proclamation No. 420 is the very
economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City.

Petitioners locus standi parallels that of the petitioner and other residents of Bataan, specially of the
town of Limay, in Garcia v. Board of Investments[35] where this Court characterized their interest in the
establishment of a petrochemical plant in their place as actual, real, vital and legal, for it would affect
not only their economic life but even the air they breathe.

Moreover, petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio
at the time, engaged in the local governance of Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and
on behalf of their constituents the question of whether to concur with the declaration of a portion of
the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, petitioners Claravall and Yaranon, as city
officials who voted against[36] the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) supporting the
issuance of the now challenged Proclamation No. 420, have legal standing to bring the present petition.

That there is herein a dispute on legal rights and interests is thus beyond doubt. The mootness of the
issues concerning the questioned agreements between public and private respondents is of no moment.

By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is
deemed to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.*37+

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As to the third and fourth requisites of a judicial inquiry, there is likewise no question that they have
been complied with in the case at bar. This is an action filed purposely to bring forth constitutional
issues, ruling on which this Court must take up. Besides, respondents never raised issues with respect to
these requisites, hence, they are deemed waived.

Having cleared the way for judicial review, the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 420, as framed in
the second and third issues above, must now be addressed squarely.

The second issue refers to petitioners objection against the creation by Proclamation No. 420 of a
regime of tax exemption within the John Hay SEZ. Petitioners argue that nowhere in R. A. No. 7227 is
there a grant of tax exemption to SEZs yet to be established in base areas, unlike the grant under Section
12 thereof of tax exemption and investment incentives to the therein established Subic SEZ. The grant
of tax exemption to the John Hay SEZ, petitioners conclude, thus contravenes Article VI, Section 28 (4) of
the Constitution which provides that No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.

Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420, the challenged provision, reads:

Sec. 3. Investment Climate in John Hay Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to Section 5(m) and Section
15 of Republic Act No. 7227, the John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation shall implement all
necessary policies, rules, and regulations governing the zone, including investment incentives, in
consultation with pertinent government departments. Among others, the zone shall have all the
applicable incentives of the Special Economic Zone under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227 and those
applicable incentives granted in the Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the
Foreign Investment Act of 1991, and new investment laws that may hereinafter be enacted. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Upon the other hand, Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 provides:

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x x x

(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and the
pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be developed
into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment
opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments;

b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory
ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of the Subic Special
Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty free importations of raw materials,
capital and equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic
Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties
and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines;

(c) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, no taxes,
local and national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone. In lieu of paying taxes,
three percent (3%) of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special
Economic Zone shall be remitted to the National Government, one percent (1%) each to the local
government units affected by the declaration of the zone in proportion to their population area, and
other factors. In addition, there is hereby established a development fund of one percent (1%) of the
gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone to be
utilized for the Municipality of Subic, and other municipalities contiguous to be base areas. In case of
conflict between national and local laws with respect to tax exemption privileges in the Subic Special
Economic Zone, the same shall be resolved in favor of the latter;

(d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities
and futures shall be allowed and maintained in the Subic Special Economic Zone;

(e) The Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, shall supervise and regulate the operations of
banks and other financial institutions within the Subic Special Economic Zone;
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(f) Banking and Finance shall be liberalized with the establishment of foreign currency depository
units of local commercial banks and offshore banking units of foreign banks with minimum Central Bank
regulation;

(g) Any investor within the Subic Special Economic Zone whose continuing investment shall not be less
than Two Hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), his/her spouse and dependent children under
twenty-one (21) years of age, shall be granted permanent resident status within the Subic Special
Economic Zone. They shall have freedom of ingress and egress to and from the Subic Special Economic
Zone without any need of special authorization from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. The
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority referred to in Section 13 of this Act may also issue working visas
renewable every two (2) years to foreign executives and other aliens possessing highly-technical skills
which no Filipino within the Subic Special Economic Zone possesses, as certified by the Department of
Labor and Employment. The names of aliens granted permanent residence status and working visas by
the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority shall be reported to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
within thirty (30) days after issuance thereof;

x x x (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear that under Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 it is only the Subic SEZ which was granted by Congress
with tax exemption, investment incentives and the like. There is no express extension of the aforesaid
benefits to other SEZs still to be created at the time via presidential proclamation.

The deliberations of the Senate confirm the exclusivity to Subic SEZ of the tax and investment privileges
accorded it under the law, as the following exchanges between our lawmakers show during the second
reading of the precursor bill of R.A. No. 7227 with respect to the investment policies that would govern
Subic SEZ which are now embodied in the aforesaid Section 12 thereof:

x x x
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Senator Maceda: This is what I was talking about. We get into problems here because all of these
following policies are centered around the concept of free port. And in the main paragraph above, we
have declared both Clark and Subic as special economic zones, subject to these policies which are, in
effect, a free-port arrangement.

Senator Angara: The Gentleman is absolutely correct, Mr. President. So we must confine these policies
only to Subic.

May I withdraw then my amendment, and instead provide that THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE OF
SUBIC SHALL BE ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING POLICIES. Subject to style, Mr.
President.

Thus, it is very clear that these principles and policies are applicable only to Subic as a free port.

Senator Paterno: Mr. President.

The President: Senator Paterno is recognized.

Senator Paterno: I take it that the amendment suggested by Senator Angara would then prevent the
establishment of other special economic zones observing these policies.

Senator Angara: No, Mr. President, because during our short caucus, Senator Laurel raised the point
that if we give this delegation to the President to establish other economic zones, that may be an
unwarranted delegation.

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So we agreed that we will simply limit the definition of powers and description of the zone to Subic, but
that does not exclude the possibility of creating other economic zones within the baselands.

Senator Paterno: But if that amendment is followed, no other special economic zone may be created
under authority of this particular bill. Is that correct, Mr. President?

Senator Angara: Under this specific provision, yes, Mr. President. This provision now will be confined
only to Subic.[38]

x x x (Underscoring supplied).

As gathered from the earlier-quoted Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227, the privileges given to Subic SEZ consist
principally of exemption from tariff or customs duties, national and local taxes of business entities
therein (paragraphs (b) and (c)), free market and trade of specified goods or properties (paragraph d),
liberalized banking and finance (paragraph f), and relaxed immigration rules for foreign investors
(paragraph g). Yet, apart from these, Proclamation No. 420 also makes available to the John Hay SEZ
benefits existing in other laws such as the privilege of export processing zone-based businesses of
importing capital equipment and raw materials free from taxes, duties and other restrictions;[39] tax
and duty exemptions, tax holiday, tax credit, and other incentives under the Omnibus Investments Code
of 1987;[40] and the applicability to the subject zone of rules governing foreign investments in the
Philippines.[41]

While the grant of economic incentives may be essential to the creation and success of SEZs, free trade
zones and the like, the grant thereof to the John Hay SEZ cannot be sustained. The incentives under R.A.
No. 7227 are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of the same to the John Hay SEZ finds
no support therein. Neither does the same grant of privileges to the John Hay SEZ find support in the
other laws specified under Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420, which laws were already extant before
the issuance of the proclamation or the enactment of R.A. No. 7227.

119
Choco Notes

More importantly, the nature of most of the assailed privileges is one of tax exemption. It is the
legislature, unless limited by a provision of the state constitution, that has full power to exempt any
person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its
power to tax.[42] Other than Congress, the Constitution may itself provide for specific tax
exemptions,[43] or local governments may pass ordinances on exemption only from local taxes.[44]

The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitutions imposition that a law
granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of
Congress.[45] In the same vein, the other kinds of privileges extended to the John Hay SEZ are by
tradition and usage for Congress to legislate upon.

Contrary to public respondents suggestions, the claimed statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ from
taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based; it must
be expressly granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken.[46] Tax exemption
cannot be implied as it must be categorically and unmistakably expressed.[47]

If it were the intent of the legislature to grant to the John Hay SEZ the same tax exemption and
incentives given to the Subic SEZ, it would have so expressly provided in the R.A. No. 7227.

This Court no doubt can void an act or policy of the political departments of the government on either of
two groundsinfringement of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion.[48]

This Court then declares that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of tax exemption and other privileges to
the John Hay SEZ is void for being violative of the Constitution. This renders it unnecessary to still dwell
on petitioners claim that the same grant violates the equal protection guarantee.

With respect to the final issue raised by petitioners that Proclamation No. 420 is unconstitutional for
being in derogation of Baguio Citys local autonomy, objection is specifically mounted against Section 2
thereof in which BCDA is set up as the governing body of the John Hay SEZ.[49]
120
Choco Notes

Petitioners argue that there is no authority of the President to subject the John Hay SEZ to the
governance of BCDA which has just oversight functions over SEZ; and that to do so is to diminish the city
governments power over an area within its jurisdiction, hence, Proclamation No. 420 unlawfully gives
the President power of control over the local government instead of just mere supervision.

Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit. Under R.A. No. 7227, the BCDA is entrusted with, among
other things, the following purpose:[50]

x x x

(a) To own, hold and/or administer the military reservations of John Hay Air Station, Wallace Air Station,
ODonnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station, Mt. Sta. Rita Station
(Hermosa, Bataan) and those portions of Metro Manila Camps which may be transferred to it by the
President;

x x x (Underscoring supplied)

With such broad rights of ownership and administration vested in BCDA over Camp John Hay, BCDA
virtually has control over it, subject to certain limitations provided for by law. By designating BCDA as
the governing agency of the John Hay SEZ, the law merely emphasizes or reiterates the statutory role or
functions it has been granted.

The unconstitutionality of the grant of tax immunity and financial incentives as contained in the second
sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 notwithstanding, the entire assailed proclamation cannot
be declared unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being repugnant to law or the Constitution.
The delineation and declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ was well
within the powers of the President to do so by means of a proclamation.[51] The requisite prior
121
Choco Notes

concurrence by the Baguio City government to such proclamation appears to have been given in the
form of a duly enacted resolution by the sanggunian. The other provisions of the proclamation had
been proven to be consistent with R.A. No. 7227.

Where part of a statute is void as contrary to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid
portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.[52] This Court finds that the other
provisions in Proclamation No. 420 converting a delineated portion of Camp John Hay into the John Hay
SEZ are separable from the invalid second sentence of Section 3 thereof, hence they stand.

WHEREFORE, the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 is hereby declared NULL AND
VOID and is accordingly declared of no legal force and effect. Public respondents are hereby enjoined
from implementing the aforesaid void provision.

Proclamation No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and effective.

SO ORDERED.
John Hay People v. Lim Digest

J OHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATI VE COALI TI ON, MATEO CARI O FOUND
ATI ON I NC. , CENTER FORALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS FOUNDATION INC., REGINA
VICTORIA A. BENAFIN REPRESENTED AND JOINEDBY HER MOTHER MRS. ELISA
BENAFIN, IZABEL M. LUYK REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHERMRS. REBECCA
MOLINA LUYK, KATHERINE PE REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER
ROSEMARIEG. PE, SOLEDAD S. CAMILO, ALICIA C. PACALSO ALIAS "KEVAB," BETTY I.
STRASSER, RUBY C. GIRON,URSULA C. PEREZ ALIAS "BA-YAY," EDILBERTO T.
CLARAVALL, CARMEN CAROMINA, LILIA G.
YARANON,DI ANE MONDOC, pet i t i oner s , vs . VI CTOR LI M, PRESI DENT, BASE
S CONVERSI ON DEVELOPMENTAUTHORITY; JOHN HAY PORO POINT
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CITY OF BAGUIO, TUNTEX (B.V.I.)CO. LTD., ASIAWORLD
INTERNATIONALE GROUP, INC., DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURALRESOURCES, respondents.
122
Choco Notes

Facts:
The controversy stemmed from the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 by then President Ramos declaring
a portion of Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and creating a regime of tax exemption
within the John Hay Special Economic Zone. In the present petition, petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the
proclamation. The Court also held that it is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the Constitution, that has the full
power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as
broad as its power to tax. The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitution's
imposition that a law granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.
Moreover, the claimed statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and
unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based. Thus, the Court declared that the grant by
Proclamation No. 420 of tax exemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ was void for being
violative of the Constitution. However, the entire assailed proclamation cannot be declared
unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being repugnant to the law or the Constitution. The delineation and
declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ was well within the powers of the President
to do so by means of a proclamation. Where part of a statute is void as contrary to the Constitution, while another
part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, as in the case at bar, may stand and be enforced.
Issue:
WON the petitioners have legal standing to bring the petition
Ruling:
YES
Rationale:
R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the
base areas in the country. The grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence on
the bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of
the real interests that communities nearby or surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of
petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of Proclamation No. 420, is personal and
substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being challenged.
Theirs is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an interest in
the question involved or an incidental interest, for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proclamation No.
420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City. ... Moreover, petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall
and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local governance
of Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents the question of whether to concur
with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, petitioner sClaravall and
Yaranon, as city officials who voted against the sanggunian Resolution No.
123
Choco Notes

255 (Series of 1994)supporting the issuance of the now challenged Proclamation No. 420, have legal
standing to bring the present petition.

Enrile v. Senate electoral Commission
[G.R. No. 132986. May 19, 2004]

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR.,
respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
assailing for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion Resolution 97-22*1+ denying petitioners
Motion to Annul/Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentels Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of
Ballots in the Presence of All Parties; and Resolution No. 98-02[2] denying his motion for reconsideration
in SET Case No. 001-95, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. vs. Gregorio B. Honasan, et al.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On January 20, 1995, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, private respondent herein, filed with the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) an election protest against Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, petitioner, and other
senatorial candidates who won in the May 1995 senatorial elections, docketed as SET Case No. 001-95.

On June 30, 1995, petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest. Issues having been joined, the SET
required the parties to submit the list of pilot precincts numbering not more that 25% of the total
precincts involved in respondents protest.

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Choco Notes

Subsequently, the SET conducted the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts, namely: Paoay, Ilocos
Norte; Tarlac, Tarlac; Tawi-Tawi; Maguindanao; Sulu; Bulacan; Lanao del Sur; Lanao del Norte; Pasig City;
Bian, Laguna; Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija; Pangasinan; Agusan del Sur and Agusan del Norte. Thereafter, the
SET directed the parties to submit their evidence and memoranda.

On August 21, 1997, the SET, without resolving the election protest, held a press conference at the
Supreme Court Session Hall announcing the partial and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the
pilot precincts. A press release entitled Partial Results in Pimentels Protest*3+ was then issued
accompanied by the tabulation of votes for the parties. In the said tabulation, the name of petitioner
dropped from number 11 to number 15.[4]

On September 24, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentels Protest and
to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties.*5+ Petitioner alleged that the
partial results were manifestly erroneous. The SET then issued Resolution No. 97-20 requiring all the
parties to file their respective comments on petitioners motion. Only respondent and Senator Nikki
Coseteng filed their separate comments alleging, among others, that petitioners motion is premature
considering that the SET has not yet resolved respondents election protest.

In its assailed Resolution No. 97-22, the SET admitted there was an oversight, hence, the tally of votes
for Paoay, Ilocos Norte should be made. Consequently, the 30,000 votes deducted by the SET from
those garnered by petitioner were given back to him.

Nevertheless, the SET denied petitioners motion, holding that there is no sufficient basis to discard its
partial tabulation.

The Tribunal took pains in reviewing its records and hereby acknowledges that an adjustment should
be made in the tally of votes for the Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte. However, the Tribunal alone
should not be faulted for this oversight. Although the Regional Tally for Region I was offered in evidence
by the Protestant, Protestee Enrile, far from claming that the same reflected the accurate number of
votes garnered by the senatorial candidates, even went to the extent of objecting to its admissibility.
125
Choco Notes

In the province of Ilocos Norte, the vote total of Enrile in the SOV/M of 65,343 is listed in the PCOC at
95,343 or an increase of 30,000 votes. As unearthed, Enriles votes had already been corrected by the
COMELEC in the Regional Tally such that the 30,000 votes deducted by the Tribunal must be, as it is
hereby, given back to him. Similarly, Mitra regains the 20,000 votes deducted from him in this province.

These corrections, notwithstanding, the Tribunal finds no sufficient basis to discard its partial tabulation.
In fact, the ranking of the parties is not at all affected by the omission.

Finally, to grant Enriles prayer to have himself represented in the appreciation of ballots by the Tribunal
amounts to an encroachment on judicial functions. Needless to state, appreciation of evidence is the
Tribunals exclusive domain.

Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration but was denied by the SET in its Resolution No. 98-02.

Hence, this petition, petitioner contending that:

A.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT NO SIFFICIENT BASIS EXISTS TO ANNUL THE MANIFESTLY ERRONEOUS
TABULATION OF THE RESULTS OF REVISION AND APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS.

B.

126
Choco Notes

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED PATENT AND GROSS ERROR IN RECTIFYING THE RESULTS OF THE
PHYSICAL COUNT, AS REFELCTED IN THE REVISION RPORTS BY USING OTHER ELECTIOB DOCUMENTS.

C.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RELEASED PARTIAL AND
TENTATIVE RESULTS WHICH CAUSED GRAVE PREJUDICE TO HEREIN PETITIONER.

D.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS
NOT ENTITLED TO BE HEARD IN THE APPRECIATION PROCEEDINGS.

The main issue for our resolution is whether or not the SET committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners Motion To Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentels Protest and to Conduct Another
Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of all Parties.

Petitioner contends that the partial results released by the SET are erroneous because they are
improbable and not supported by evidence.

In their comments, both respondent and the Solicitor General maintain that the SET did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged Resolutions. Furthermore, the Solicitor General
asserts that the present petition has become moot and academic because the tenure of the contested
senatorial position subject of respondents protest where the assailed Resolutions originated expired on
June 30, 1998.

127
Choco Notes

In its assailed Resolution No. 97-22, the SET explained the process in determining the partial results,
thus:

The entire process in determining the parties votes in the pilot municipalities is explained in the
corresponding written reports thereon shortly to be completed. In the meantime, let it be stressed that
the proceedings conducted by the Tribunal with respect to the pilot areas of Protestant Pimentel
consisted of several stages or steps, to wit:

a. Recount and revision of the ballots where the parties are represented;

b. Recount and revision of the ballots where the parties are represented;

c. Examination of the different election documents including the verification of the accuracy of the
addition of the figures appearing on Statement of Votes by Precincts (SOV/M or SOV/C); and

d. Comparison of the figures appearing on the SOV/P, the Municipal or City Certificate of Canvass
(MCOC or CCOPC), the SOV/M or SOV/C and the Provincial Certificate of Canvass (PCOC).

From the arguments of protestee Enrile, it is apparent that only the revision of ballots and the SOV/P
were taken into account. Worse, he speculated on the rulings made in the appreciation of ballots.

x x x

Put differently, the number of ballots objected to against a particular party is not necessarily the
maximum number of votes that may be deducted from the said party, in the same way as the number of
ballots/votes claimed by a party is not necessarily the maximum number of votes that may be credited
128
Choco Notes

to said party. As a result of the appreciation of the contested ballots, the parties may be deducted more
votes than the number of ballots specifically objected to against them, or may be credited with
additional votes even if the parties made no claims.

Aside from the ruling on the claims and objections, the Tribunal likewise verified the accuracy of the
counting of ballots done by the revision teams. Errors in the revision reports were rectified which also
resulted in the addition to, or deduction of votes from the parties.

Consistent with the allegation of Protestant Pimentel that Operation Dagdag-Bawas was affected
through the padding or deduction of votes in the different election documents, the Tribunal also
conducted accuracy checks on the addition of the figures appearing on the SOV/P and the SOV/M. The
verification process disclosed errors which have resulted in the addition or deduction of votes from the
parties.

To ensure that the correct figures were recorded from one election document to the other, the Tribunal
compared the figures appearing on the SOV/P vis--vis the MCOC/CCOC; the MCOC/CCOC with the
PCOC. Where the discrepancies in the figures were noted, the corresponding adjustments were made
which resulted in the addition or deduction of votes from the parties.

Thus, while the votes of the parties in the municipal level are determined through the counting and
appreciation of the ballots, the votes of the parties on the provincial level are also adjusted on the basis
of the comparison of the different election documents. The written report/decision on the pilot
precincts, soon to be released, contains the specifics and sets forth in detail the reason for each addition
or deduction of votes.

The above process clearly shows why the figures presented by petitioner in his motion do not tally with
the figures released by the SET.

129
Choco Notes

At any rate, we agree with the Solicitor General that the petition has become moot and academic. The
tenure of the contested senatorial position subject of this petition expired as early as June 30, 1998.

A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or
no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.[6]

In Garcia vs. COMELEC,*7+ we held that where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value.

Likewise, in Gancho-on vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment,[8] we ruled:

It is a rule of universal application that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will
not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases.
And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which
petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Enrile v. Senate Electoral Commission Digest
Enrile v Senate Electoral Tribunal

Facts: On January 20, 1995, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) an
election protest against Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and other senatorial candidates who won in the May
1995 senatorial elections.
130
Choco Notes

On June 30, 1995, the petitioner, Sen. Enrile, filed his answer in counter-protest. Issues having joined,
the SET required the parties to submit the list of pilot precincts number not more than 25% of the total
precints involved.
On Aug. 21, 1997, SET held a press conference at the Supreme Court Session Hall announcing the partial
and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts without resolving the protest. In the
tabulation presented, the petitioners name dropped to the 15th position in the senatorial race.
On September 24, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Partial Results in Sen. Pimentels Protest
and to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties. Respondent and Sen.
Coseteng filed separate comments alleging petitioners motion is premature considering the SET has not
resolved respondents election protest.
Nevertheless, the SET denied petitioners motion holding no sufficient basis to discard the partial
tabulation. The SET also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
A petition for Certiorari assailed for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion the resolution
that denied petitioners Motion to Annul/Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentels Protest and to conduct
another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties.

Issue: Whether or not there is still useful purpose that can serve in passing upon merits of said petition.

Held: The Court finds the petition becoming moot and academic. The tenure of the contested senatorial
position subject to respondents protest expired on June 30, 1998. The case became moot considering
there is no more actual controversy between the parties and has no useful purpose that can serve in
passing upon any merit.
Where issues have become moot and academic, justiciable controversies are lost, thereby rendering the
resolution of no practical use or value.

The petition is dismissed
Gonzales v. Narvasa
[G. R. No. 140835. August 14, 2000]
131
Choco Notes

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA, as Chairman, PREPARATORY
COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS; HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary;
COMMISSION ON AUDIT; ROBERTO AVENTAJADO, as Presidential Consultant on Council of Economic
Advisers/Economic Affairs; ANGELITO C. BANAYO, as Presidential Adviser for/on Political Affairs;
VERONICA IGNACIO-JONES, as Presidential Assistant/ Appointment Secretary (In charge of
appointments), respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

In this petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales,
in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers
and assistants. Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers
and assistants from acting as such, and to enjoin Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora from enforcing
their advice and recommendations. In addition, petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit
from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants. Finally, petitioner prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with
information on certain matters.

On January 28, 2000, respondent Hon. Andres R. Narvasa, impleaded in his capacity as Chairman of the
PCCR, filed his Comment to the Petition. The rest of the respondents, who are being represented in this
case by the Solicitor General, filed their Comment with this Court on March 7, 2000. Petitioner then
filed a Consolidated Reply on April 24, 2000, whereupon this case was considered submitted for
decision.

I. Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform

The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on
November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend
132
Choco Notes

proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the
same.*1+ Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR on two grounds. First, he contends that
it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.[2] Secondly, petitioner asserts
that by creating such a body the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded
by the Constitution the amendment of the fundamental charter.[3]

It is alleged by respondents that, with respect to the PCCR, this case has become moot and academic.
We agree.

An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues
involved have become academic or dead.[4] Under E.O. No. 43, the PCCR was instructed to complete its
task on or before June 30, 1999.[5] However, on February 19, 1999, the President issued Executive
Order No. 70 (E.O. No. 70), which extended the time frame for the completion of the commissions
work, viz

SECTION 6. Section 8 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Time Frame. The Commission shall commence its work on 01 January 1999 and complete the same on
or before 31 December 1999. The Commission shall submit its report and recommendations to the
President within fifteen (15) working days from 31 December 1999.

The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by
the President on the same day. It had likewise spent the funds allotted to it.[6] Thus, the PCCR has
ceased to exist, having lost its raison detre. Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the
Court has nothing left to resolve.

The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief
prayed for by petitioner. Basically, petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR from acting as such.[7]
Clearly, prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. It
133
Choco Notes

is well established that prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is
already fait accompli.[8] At this point, any ruling regarding the PCCR would simply be in the nature of an
advisory opinion, which is definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power.

In addition to the mootness of the issue, petitioners lack of standing constitutes another obstacle to the
successful invocation of judicial power insofar as the PCCR is concerned.

The question in standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.*9] In assailing
the constitutionality of E.O. Nos. 43 and 70, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer.[10]
A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury
as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[11] In Kilosbayan,
Incorporated v. Morato,[12] we denied standing to petitioners who were assailing a lease agreement
between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation, stating that,

in Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, G.R. No. 78716, Sept. 22, 1987, standing was
denied to a petitioner who sought to declare a form of lottery known as Instant Sweepstakes invalid
because, as the Court held,

Valmonte brings the suit as a citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three (3) minor children. But
nowhere in his petition does petitioner claim that his rights and privileges as a lawyer or citizen have
been directly and personally injured by the operation of the Instant Sweepstakes. The interest of the
person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show,
not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or in immediate danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties
by reason of the statute complained of.
134
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We apprehend no difference between the petitioner in Valmonte and the present petitioners.
Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. It does not
detract from the high regard for petitioners as civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of that
required to maintain an action under Rule 3, d 2.

Coming now to the instant case, petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not
petitioner, which can claim any injury in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has
encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the
Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither
does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall
be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed
to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.

A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that
public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.[13], Thus
payers action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power.[14] This was our ruling in a recent case wherein petitioners Telecommunications and Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines (TELEBAP) and GMA Network, Inc. questioned the validity of section 92 of
B.P. No. 881 (otherwise knows as the Omnibus Election Code) requiring radio and television stations
to give free air time to the Commission on Elections during the campaign period.[15] The Court held that
petitioner TELEBAP did not have any interest as a taxpayer since the assailed law did not involve the
taxing or spending power of Congress.[16]

Many other rulings have premised the grant or denial of standing to taxpayers upon whether or not the
case involved a disbursement of public funds by the legislature. In Sanidad v. Commission on
Elections,*17+ the petitioners therein were allowed to bring a taxpayers suit to question several
presidential decrees promulgated by then President Marcos in his legislative capacity calling for a
national referendum, with the Court explaining that

135
Choco Notes

...[i]t is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute Presidential Decrees are of such nature
may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the instance
of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that
the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The breadth of Presidential Decree No.
991 carries an appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes.
Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. The
interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public
money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating
said funds.

In still another case, the Court held that petitioners the Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., a non-
profit civic organization - had standing as taxpayers to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
3836 insofar as it provides for retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leaves to
Senators and Representatives and to the elective officials of both houses of Congress.[18] And in Pascual
v. Secretary of Public Works,*19+ the Court allowed petitioner to maintain a taxpayers suit assailing the
constitutional soundness of Republic Act No. 920 appropriating P85,000 for the construction, repair and
improvement of feeder roads within private property. All these cases involved the disbursement of
public funds by means of a law.

Meanwhile, in Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron,[20] the Court declared that
the trial court was wrong in allowing respondent Ravanzo to bring an action for injunction in his capacity
as a taxpayer in order to question the legality of the contract of lease covering the public market
entered into between the City of Dagupan and petitioner. The Court declared that Ravanzo did not
possess the requisite standing to bring such taxpayers suit since *o+n its face, and there is no evidence
to the contrary, the lease contract entered into between petitioner and the City shows that no public
funds have been or will be used in the construction of the market building.

Coming now to the instant case, it is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing
or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O.
No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its operational
expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. The relevant provision states -
136
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Appropriations. The initial amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated for
the operational expenses of the Commission to be sourced from funds of the Office of the President,
subject to the usual accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Additional amounts shall be released
to the Commission upon submission of requirements for expenditures.

The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. In fact, there was
no an appropriation at all. In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the
legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury,
while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a
particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors.
*21+ The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the
exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to section 25 (5) of article VI of the
Constitution.

In the final analysis, it must be stressed that the Court retains the power to decide whether or not it will
entertain a taxpayers suit.*22+ In the case at bar, there being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a
taxpayer, but rather, he must establish that he has a personal and substantial interest in the case and
that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.*23+ In other words,
petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by
the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit.[24] Nowhere in his pleadings does
petitioner presume to make such a representation.

II. Presidential Consultants, Advisers, Assistants

The second issue raised by petitioner concerns the presidential consultants. Petitioner alleges that in
1995 and 1996, the President created seventy (70) positions in the Office of the President and appointed
to said positions twenty (20) presidential consultants, twenty-two (22) presidential advisers, and
twenty-eight (28) presidential assistants.[25] Petitioner asserts that, as in the case of the PCCR, the
President does not have the power to create these positions.[26]
137
Choco Notes

Consistent with the abovementioned discussion on standing, petitioner does not have the personality to
raise this issue before the Court. First of all, he has not proven that he has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining any injury as a result of the appointment of such presidential advisers. Secondly, petitioner
has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers
interest in this particular issue. Unlike the PCCR which was created by virtue of an executive order,
petitioner does not allege by what official act, whether it be by means of an executive order,
administrative order, memorandum order, or otherwise, the President attempted to create the
positions of presidential advisers, consultants and assistants. Thus, it is unclear what act of the
President petitioner is assailing. In support of his allegation, petitioner merely annexed a copy of the
Philippine Government Directory (Annex C) listing the names and positions of such presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants to his petition. However, appointment is obviously not synonymous
with creation. It would be improvident for this Court to entertain this issue given the insufficient nature
of the allegations in the Petition.

III. Right to Information

Finally, petitioner asks us to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora
to answer his letter (Annex D) dated October 4, 1999 requesting for the names of executive officials
holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of
luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacanang.[27]

The right to information is enshrined in Section 7 of the Bill of Rights which provides that

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

138
Choco Notes

Under both the 1973[28] and 1987 Constitution, this is a self-executory provision which can be invoked
by any citizen before the courts. This was our ruling in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,[29] wherein
the Court classified the right to information as a public right and when a *m+andamus proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact
that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.
However, Congress may provide for reasonable conditions upon the access to information. Such
limitations were embodied in Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise knows as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which took effect on March 25, 1989. This law
provides that, in the performance of their duties, all public officials and employees are obliged to
respond to letters sent by the public within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof and to ensure
the accessibility of all public documents for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours,
subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality.[30]

Elaborating on the significance of the right to information, the Court said in Baldoza v. Dimaano[31] that
*t+he incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free
exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the
nations problems, nor a meaningful democratic decisionmaking if they are denied access to information
of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies
of the times. The information to which the public is entitled to are those concerning matters of public
concern, a term which embrace*s+ a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the
interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case
basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.*32+

Thus, we agree with petitioner that respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary,
has a constitutional and statutory duty to answer petitioners letter dealing with matters which are
unquestionably of public concern that is, appointments made to public offices and the utilization of
public property. With regard to petitioners request for copies of the appointment papers of certain
officials, respondent Zamora is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of the same subject to the
reasonable limitations required for the orderly conduct of official business.[33]

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish
petitioner with the information requested.
139
Choco Notes

SO ORDERED.
Gonzales v. Narvasa Digest
Gonzales v Narvasa G.R. No. 140835, August 14,
2000Facts:On December 9, 1999, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed assailing theconstit
utionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform(PCCR) and of the
positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. In his capacity as citizen and as taxpayer,
he seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the
presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants. Petitioner also prays that the Executive Secretary be compelled through amandamus
to furnish the petitioner with information requesting the names of executive officials holding multiple
positions in government, copies of their appointments and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles
seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacaang.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a citizen and as taxpayer.

Ratio Decidendi:

The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing to bring suit as citizen. Petitioner did not in
fact show what particularized interest they have to bring the suit. As civic leaders, they still fall short of
the requirements to maintain action. Their interest in assailing the EO does not present to be of a direct
and personal character. Furthermore, they do not sustain or are in immediate danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.As taxpayers, petitioners cannot attack the EO. There is no appropriation granted fromCon
gress but only an authorization by the president. There being exercise by Congress of its taxing and
spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the PCCRs creation. The petitioner has failed
to show that he is a real party in interest.
With regards to the petitioners request of disclosure to public information, the Court upheld that
citizens may invoke before the courts the right to information. When a mandamus proceeding involves
the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the
petitioner is a citizen.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition with the exception that respondent Executive Secretary is
ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested.

Alunan III v. Mirasol
[G.R. No. 108399. July 31, 1997]

140
Choco Notes

RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG), the BOARD OF ELECTION SUPERVISORS composed of Atty. RUBEN M. RAMIREZ, Atty. RAFAELITO
GARAYBLAS, and Atty. ENRIQUE C. ROA, GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, in her capacity as Director of the
Barangay Bureau, City Treasurer Atty. ANTONIO ACEBEDO, Budget Officer EUFEMIA DOMINGUEZ, all of
the City Government of Manila, petitioners, vs. ROBERT MIRASOL, NORMAN T. SANGUYA, ROBERT DE
JOYA, ARNEL R. LORENZO, MARY GRACE ARIAS, RAQUEL L. DOMINGUEZ, LOURDES ASENCIO,
FERDINAND ROXAS, MA. ALBERTINA RICAFORT,and BALAIS M. LOURICH, and the HONORABLE
WILFREDO D. REYES,Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Metro Manila, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 19, 1993 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch 36),[1] nullifying an order of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG), which in effect cancelled the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) slated on
December 4, 1992 in the City of Manila, on the ground that the elections previously held on May 26,
1990 served the purpose of the first elections for the SK under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
No. 7160).

Section 423 of the Code provides for a SK in every barangay, to be composed of a chairman, seven (7)
members, a secretary, and a treasurer. Section 532(a) provides that the first elections for the SK shall be
held thirty (30) days after the next local elections. The Code took effect on January 1, 1992.

The first local elections under the Code were held on May 11, 1992. Accordingly, on August 27, 1992,
the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 2499, providing guidelines for the holding of the
general elections for the SK on September 30, 1992. The guidelines placed the SK elections under the
direct control and supervision of the DILG, with the technical assistance of the COMELEC.[2] After two
postponements, the elections were finally scheduled on December 4, 1992.

141
Choco Notes

Accordingly, registration in the six districts of Manila was conducted. A total of 152,363 youngsters,
aged 15 to 21 years old, registered, 15,749 of them filing certificates of candidacies. The City Council
passed the necessary appropriations for the elections.

On September 18, 1992, however, the DILG, through then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III, issued a letter-
resolution exempting the City of Manila from holding elections for the SK on the ground that the
elections previously held on May 26, 1990 were to be considered the first under the newly-enacted
Local Government Code. The DILG acted on a letter of Joshue R. Santiago, acting president of the KB
City Federation of Manila and a member of City Council of Manila, which called attention to the fact that
in the City of Manila elections for the Kabataang Barangay (the precursor of the Sangguniang Kabataan)
had previously been held on May 26, 1990. In its resolution, the DILG stated:

[A] close examination of . . . RA 7160 would readily reveal the intention of the legislature to exempt
from the forthcoming Sangguniang Kabataan elections those kabataang barangay chapters which may
have conducted their elections within the period of January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 under BP 337.
Manifestly the term of office of those elected KB officials have been correspondingly extended to
coincide with the term of office of those who may be elected under RA 7160.

On November 27, 1992 private respondents, claiming to represent the 24,000 members of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the RTC of Manila to set aside
the resolution of the DILG. They argued that petitioner Secretary of Interior and Local Government had
no power to amend the resolutions of the COMELEC calling for general elections for SKs and that the
DILG resolution in question denied them the equal protection of the laws.

On November 27, 1992, the trial court, through Executive Judge, now COMELEC Chairman, Bernardo P.
Pardo, issued an injunction, ordering petitioners to desist from implementing the order of the
respondent Secretary dated September 18, 1992, . . . until further orders of the Court. On the same
day, he ordered petitioners to perform the specified pre-election activities in order to implement
Resolution No. 2499 dated August 27, 1992 of the Commission on Elections providing for the holding of
a general election of the Sangguniang Kabataan on December 4, 1992 simultaneously in every barangay
throughout the country.
142
Choco Notes

The case was subsequently reraffled to Branch 36 of the same court. On January 19, 1993, the new
judge, Hon. Wilfredo D. Reyes, rendered a decision, holding that (1) the DILG had no power to exempt
the City of Manila from holding SK elections on December 4, 1992 because under Art. IX, C, 2(1) of the
Constitution the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall is vested solely in the COMELEC; (2) the COMELEC
had already in effect determined that there had been no previous elections for KB by calling for general
elections for SK officers in every barangay without exception; and (3) the exemption of the City of
Manila was violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because, according to the DILGs
records, in 5,000 barangays KB elections were held between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 but
only in the City of Manila, where there were 897 barangays, was there no elections held on December 4,
1992.

Petitioners sought this review on certiorari. They insist that the City of Manila, having already
conducted elections for the KB on May 26, 1990, was exempted from holding elections on December 4,
1992. In support of their contention, they cite 532(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
provides that:

All seats reserved for the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan in the different sanggunians shall
be deemed vacant until such time that the sangguniang kabataan chairmen shall have been elected and
the respective pederasyon presidents have been selected: Provided, That, elections for the kabataang
barangay conducted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 at any time between January 1, 1988 and January
1, 1992 shall be considered as the first elections provided for in this Code. The term of office of the
kabataang barangay officials elected within the said period shall be extended correspondingly to
coincide with the term of office of those elected under this Code. (emphasis added)

They maintain that the Secretary of the DILG had authority to determine whether the City of Manila
came within the exception clause of 532(d) so as to be exempt from holding the elections on December
4, 1992.

143
Choco Notes

The preliminary question is whether the holding of the second elections on May 13, 1996[3] rendered
this case moot and academic. There are two questions raised in this case. The first is whether the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government can exempt a local government unit from holding
elections for SK officers on December 4, 1992 and the second is whether the COMELEC can provide that
the Department of Interior and Local Government shall have direct control and supervision over the
election of sangguniang kabataan with the technical assistance by the Commission on Elections.

We hold that this case is not moot and that it is in fact necessary to decide the issues raised by the
parties. For one thing, doubt may be cast on the validity of the acts of those elected in the May 26, 1990
KB elections in Manila because this Court enjoined the enforcement of the decision of the trial court and
these officers continued in office until May 13, 1996. For another, this case comes within the rule that
courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading
review.*4+ For the question whether the COMELEC can validly vest in the DILG the control and
supervision of SK elections is likely to arise in connection with every SK election and yet the question
may not be decided before the date of such elections.

In the Southern Pacific Terminal case, where the rule was first articulated, appellants were ordered by
the Interstate Commerce Commission to cease and desist from granting a shipper what the ICC
perceived to be preferences and advantages with respect to wharfage charges. The cease and desist
order was for a period of about two years, from September 1, 1908 (subsequently extended to
November 15), but the U.S. Supreme Court had not been able to hand down its decision by the time the
cease and desist order expired. The case was decided only on February 20, 1911, more than two years
after the order had expired. Hence, it was contended that the case had thereby become moot and the
appeal should be dismissed. In rejecting this contention, the Court held:

The question involved in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are usually continuing (as
are manifestly those in the case at bar), and these considerations ought not to be, as they might be,
defeated, by short-term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review, and at one time the
government, and at another time the carriers, have their rights determined by the Commission without
a chance of redress.[5]

144
Choco Notes

In Roe v. Wade,[6] petitioner, a pregnant woman, brought suit in 1970 challenging anti-abortion statutes
of Texas and Georgia on the ground that she had a constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy at
least within the first trimester. The case was not decided until 1973 when she was no longer pregnant.
But the U.S. Supreme Court refused to dismiss the case as moot. It was explained: *W+hen, as here,
pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short
that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination
makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive. Our laws should not be that rigid.
Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be capable of
repetition, yet evading review.*7+

We thus reach the merits of the questions raised in this case. The first question is whether then DILG
Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III had authority to determine whether under 532(d) of the Local
Government Code, the City of Manila was required to hold its first elections for SK. As already stated,
petitioners sustain the affirmative side of the proposition. On the other hand, respondents argue that
this is a power which Art.IX,C, 2(1) of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC. Respondents further
argue that, by mandating that elections for the SK be held on December 4, 1992 in every barangay,
the COMELEC in effect determined that there had been no elections for the KB previously held in the
City of Manila.

We find the petition to be meritorious.

First. As already stated, by 4 of Resolution No. 2499, the COMELEC placed the SK elections under the
direct control and supervision of the DILG. Contrary to respondents contention, this did not contravene
Art. IX, C, 2(1) of the Constitution which provides that the COMELEC shall have the power to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall. Elections for SK officers are not subject to the supervision of the COMELEC in
the same way that, as we have recently held, contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. In Mercado v. Board of Election Supervisors,[8] it was contended that

COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is null and void because: (a) it prescribes a separate set of rules for the
election of the SK Chairman different from and inconsistent with that set forth in the Omnibus Election
145
Choco Notes

Code, thereby contravening Section 2, Article 1 of the said Code which explicitly provides that it shall
govern all elections of public officers; and, (b) it constitutes a total, absolute, and complete abdication
by the COMELEC of its constitutionally and statutorily mandated duty to enforce and administer all
election laws as provided for in Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution; Section 52, Article VIII of
the Omnibus Election Code; and Section 2, Chapter 1, Subtitle C, Title 1, Book V of the 1987
Administrative Code.[9]

Rejecting this contention, this Court, through Justice Davide, held:

Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of paragraph (2), Section 2, Article IX-C of
the Constitution on the COMELECs exclusive appellate jurisdiction over contests involving elective
barangay officials refer to the elective barangay officials under the pertinent laws in force at the time
the Omnibus Election Code was enacted and upon the ratification of the Constitution. That law was B.P.
Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, and the elective barangay officials referred to
were the punong barangay and the six sangguniang bayan members. They were to be elected by those
qualified to exercise the right of suffrage. They are also the same officers referred to by the provisions
of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines on election of barangay officials. Metropolitan and
municipal trial courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to their election. The
decisions of these courts were appealable to the Regional Trial Courts.

. . . .

In the light of the foregoing, it is indisputable that contests involving elections of SK (formerly KB)
officials do not fall within Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and paragraph 2, Section 2, Article
IX-C of the Constitution and that no law in effect prior to the ratification of the Constitution had made
the SK chairman an elective barangay official. His being an ex-officio member of the sangguniang
barangay does not make him one for the law specifically provides who are its elective members, viz., the
punong barangay and the seven regular sangguniang barangay members who are elected at large by
those who are qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution and who are
duly registered voters of the barangay.[10]

146
Choco Notes

The choice of the DILG for the task in question was appropriate and was in line with the legislative policy
evident in several statutes. Thus, P.D. No. 684 (April 15, 1975), in creating Kabataang Barangays in every
barangay throughout the country, provided in 6 that the Secretary of Local Government and
Community Development shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary to
effectively implement the provisions of this Decree. Again, in 1985 Proclamation No. 2421 of the
President of the Philippines, in calling for the general elections of the Kabataang Barangay on July 13-14,
1985, tasked the then Ministry of Local Government, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, and
the Commission on Elections to assist the Kabataang Barangay in the conduct of the elections. On the
other hand, in a Memorandum Circular dated March 7, 1988, President Corazon C. Aquino directed the
Secretary of Local Government to issue the necessary rules and regulations for effecting the
representation of the Kabataang Barangay, among other sectors, in the legislative bodies of the local
government units.

The role of the COMELEC in the 1992 elections for SK officers was by no means inconsequential. DILG
supervision was to be exercised within the framework of detailed and comprehensive rules embodied in
Resolution No. 2499 of the COMELEC. What was left to the DILG to perform was the enforcement of the
rules.

Second. It is contended that, in its resolution in question, the COMELEC did not name the barangays
which, because they had conducted kabataang barangay elections between January 1, 1988 and January
1, 1992, were not included in the SK elections to be held on December 4, 1992. That these barangays
were precisely to be determined by the DILG is, however, fairly inferable from the authority given to the
DILG to supervise the conduct of the elections. Since 532(d) provided for kabataang barangay officials
whose term of office was extended beyond 1992, the authority to supervise the conduct of elections in
that year must necessarily be deemed to include the authority to determine which kabataang barangay
would not be included in the 1992 elections.

The authority granted was nothing more than the ascertainment of a fact, namely, whether between
January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 elections had been held in a given kabataang barangay. If elections
had been conducted, then no new elections had to be held on December 4, 1992 since by virtue of
532(d) the term of office of the kabataang barangay officials so elected was extended correspondingly
to coincide with the term of office of those elected under *the Local Government Code of 1991+. In
doing this, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government was to act merely as the agent of the
147
Choco Notes

legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take
effect.[11] There was no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. That this is constitutionally permissible is the teaching of our cases.[12]

Third. Respondents claim, however, that the May 26, 1990 KB elections in Manila were void because (a)
they were called at the instance of then Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez who did not have authority to do so
and (b) it was not held under COMELEC supervision.

The 1990 elections for the Kabataang Barangay were called by then Manila Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez,
Jr., who in his Executive Order No. 21 dated April 25, 1990 stated:

WHEREAS, the Kabataang Barangay as an organization provided for under Batas Pambansa Bilang 337,
has been practically dormant since the advent of the present national administration;

WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to involve the youth in the affairs and undertakings of the
government to ensure the participation of all sectors of our population in the task of nation building;

WHEREAS, the last elections for the Kabataang Barangay officers were held in November 1985 yet,
which is over their three years term of office;

WHEREAS, most of the present crop of KB officers are way past the age limit provided for under the law;

. . . .

148
Choco Notes

The elections were actually held on May 26, 1990 in the 897 barangays of Manila. Later, on June 30,
1990, KB City Federation elections were conducted.

It was precisely to foreclose any question regarding the validity of KB elections held in the aftermath of
the EDSA revolution and upon the effectivity of the new Local Government Code that the exception
clause of 532(d) was inserted. The proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee which drafted
the Code show the following:[13]

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: Isa-cite na lang ko ano iyong title o chapter o section, ha!

HON. LINA: . . .

Page 436, lines 13 to 14 delete within eighteen months prior to December 31, 1990, and in lieu thereof,
insert from 1988 up to the effectivity of the Code. The rationale. . . .

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: How should it be read?

HON. LINA: It will read as follows: Provided however, that the Local Government Units which have
conducted elections for the Kabataang Barangay as provided for, in Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, up to
the effectivity. . . .

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: So, any deletion from the word within, ha, up to. . . .

HON. LINA: Remove the words, the phrase, within eighteen months prior to December 31, 1990, and
insert from 1988 up to the effectivity of this Code.

149
Choco Notes

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: From?

HON. LINA: From 1988 up to the effectivity of this Code. Kasi meron nang mga election, eh, na ginawa,
eh. There are five thousand barangays, based on the record of the DILG, out of forty thousand, imagine
that, na nag-conduct na ng election nila based on the KB Constitution and By-Laws, and theyre sitting
already, now if we do not recognize that, mag[ka]karoon sila ng question.

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: Accepted, Mr. Chairman.

Section 532(d) may thus be deemed to be a curative law. Curative laws, which in essence are
retrospective in effect, are enacted to validate acts done which otherwise would be invalid under
existing laws, by considering them as having complied with the existing laws. Such laws are recognized in
this jurisdiction.[14]

Fourth. It is finally contended that the exemption of the barangays of the City of Manila from the
requirement to hold elections for SK officers on December 4, 1992 would deny the youth voters in those
barangays of the equal protection of laws. Respondents claim that only in the barangays in the City of
Manila, which then numbered 897, were elections for SK not held in 1992 on the ground that between
January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 there had already been SK elections held, when, according to
petitioners own evidence, during that period, SK elections had actually been conducted in 5,000
barangays.

Whether this claim is true cannot be ascertained from the records of this case. Merely showing that
there were 5,000 barangays which similarly held KB elections between January 1, 1988 and January 1,
1992 does not prove that despite that fact these same barangays were permitted to hold elections on
December 4, 1992. For one thing, according to the Manila Bulletin issue of November 18, 1992 (p. 9),
568 barangays in the Province of Bulacan did not have SK elections on December 4, 1992 either, because
they already had elections between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992. For another, even assuming
that only barangays in Manila were not permitted to hold SK elections on December 4, 1992 while the
rest of the 5,000 barangays were allowed even if KB elections had already been held there before, this
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fact does not give the youth voters in the 897 Manila barangays ground for complaint because what the
other barangays did was contrary to law. There is no discrimination here.

In People v. Vera[15] this Court struck down the Probation Law because it permitted unequal application
of its benefits by making its applicability depend on the decision of provincial governments to
appropriate or not to appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers, with the result that those
not disposed to allow the benefits of probations to be enjoyed by their inhabitants could simply omit to
provide for the salaries of probation officers. The difference between that case and the one at bar lies
in the fact that what youth voters in the other barangays might have been allowed was not a right which
was denied to youth voters in Manila. If those barangays were not entitled to have SK elections on
December 4, 1992 but nevertheless were allowed to have such elections, that fact did not mean those in
Manila should similarly have been allowed to conduct elections on December 4, 1992 because the fact
was that they already had their own, just two years before on May 26, 1990. Respondents equal
protection argument violates the dictum that one wrong does not make another wrong right.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 is REVERSED and the case
filed against petitioner by private respondents is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Alunan III v. Mirasol Digest
Alunan vs MirasolGR No. 108399 July 31, 1997Facts:

LGC of 1991 provided for an SK in every barangay to be composed of a chairman, 7members, a secretary
and a treasurer, and provided that the first SK elections were to be held 30 days after the next local
elections. The Local Government Code was enacted January 1, 1992.

The first elections under the code were held May of 1992. August 1992, COMELEC provided guidelines
for the holding of the general elections for the SK on Sept. 30,1992, which also placed the SK elections
under the direct control and supervision of DILG, with the technical assistance of COMELEC. After
postponements, they wereheld December 4, 1992.

Registration in 6 districts of Manila was conducted. 152,363 people aged 15-21registered, 15,749 of them
filing certificated of candidacy. The City Council passedthe necessary appropriations for the elections.

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September 18, 1992 The DILG, through Alunan, issued a letter-resolutionexempting Manila from
holding SK elections because the elections previously held onMay 26, 1990 were to be considered the
first SK elections under the new LGC. DILG acted on a letter by Santiago, acting President of the KB
(Kabataang Barangay) City Federation of Manila and a member of the City Council of Manila, which
stated thatelections for the Kabataang Barangay were held on May 26, 1990. In this resolution,DILG
stated that the LGC intended to exempt those barangay chapters which conducted their KB elections from
January 1, 1998 to January 1, 1992 from the forthcoming SK elections. The terms of those elected would
be extended to coincidewith the terms of those elected in the SK elections

Private respondents, claiming to represent 24,000 members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus, arguing that the DILG had no power to amend the resolutions of the
COMELEC calling for general elections for SKs, and that DILG denied them equal protection of laws.

RTC issued an injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from implementing the order of the DILG
Secretary, and ordered them to perform the specified pre-election activities in order to implement
the general elections. The case was reraffled to a different branch of the same court, and the new judge
held that DILG had no power to exempt Manila from holding SK elections, because that power rests
solely in COMELEC, and that COMELEC already determined that Manila has not previously held elections for KB by
calling for a general election, and that the exemption of Manila violated the equal protection clause
because of the 5,000 barangays that previously held elections, only in Manila, 897 barangay, were there
no elections.

Issue: Whether COMELEC can validly vest the DILG with the power of direct control and supervision
over the SK elections with the technical assistance of COMELEC Whether DILG can exempt an LGU
from holding SK elections

Held:

Despite the holding of SK elections in 1996, the case is not moot; it is capable of repetition, yet evading
review.

DILG had the authority to determine whether Manila would be required to hold SK elections.

COMELEC vesting DILG with such powers is not unconstitutional. Election for SK officers are not
subject to the supervision of COMELEC in the same waythat contests involving elections of SK officials
do not fall within the jurisdiction of COMELEC.
Justice Davide, in Mercado vs Board of Election Supervisors, stated that the provision in the Omnibus
Election Code that states that COMELEC shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
contest involving elective barangay officials only refer to elective barangay officials under the laws in
force at the time the Code was enacted, which was the old LGC.

Moreover, DILG was only acting or performing tasks in accordance to the framework of detailed and
comprehensive rules embodied in a resolution of COMELEC. Although it is argued that no barangays
were named in the resolution, DILG was not given discretionary powers because they merely used the
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time period set by COMELEC as a reference in designating exempted barangays. Likewise, the LGC of 1991
was held to be curative, and thus should be given retroactive effect, giving the mayor the authority to call
elections; thus, the 1990 KB elections were not null and void for being conducted without authority.

The contention of violation of the equal protection clause could not be determined from the records of
this case. The mere showing that there were other barangays that held KB elections during the set period
but were not exempted from the 1992 SK elections is not sufficient to prove that violation. An article in
manila Bulletin stated that barangays in Bulacan did not have elections in 1992 because they held
elections on January 1, 1988.

Salonga v. Pano
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII (Quezon
City), HON. JUDGE RODOLFO ORTIZ, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXI
(Quezon City) CITY FISCAL SERGIO APOSTOL of Quezon City; COL. BALBINO DIEGO and COL. ROMAN
MADELLA, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due
process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an
information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks this Court to prohibit and prevent the
respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the
democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The background of this case is a matter of public knowledge.
A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October
of 1980. On September 6, 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los
Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the
explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession
by police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime in May, 1980 at the birthday
party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Petitioner
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Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures
together with other guests, including Lovely.
As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to
the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital) where he was placed in the custody and detention of Col.
Roman P. Madella, under the over-all direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence
and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar
Lovely were charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property.
On September 12, 1980, bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in
the death of an American lady who was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which
caused injuries to a number of persons.
On September 20, 1980, the President's anniversary television radio press conference was broadcast.
The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the conference. In his interview,
Romeo stated that he had driven his elder brother, Victor, to the petitioner's house in Greenhills on two
occasions. The first time was on August 20, 1980. Romeo stated that Victor did not bring any bag with
him on that day when he went to the petitioner's residence and did not carry a bag when he left. The
second time was in the afternoon of August 31, 1980 when he brought Victor only to the gate of the
petitioner's house. Romeo did not enter the petitioner's residence. Neither did he return that day to
pick up his brother.
The next day, newspapers came out with almost Identical headlines stating in effect that petitioner had
been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1980, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit and
transferred to the office of Col. Madella where he was held incommunicado for some time.
On the night of October 4, 1980, more bombs were reported to have exploded at three big hotels in
Metro Manila, namely: Philippine Plaza, Century Park Sheraton and Manila Peninsula. The bombs
injured nine people. A meeting of the General Military Council was called for October 6, 1980.
On October 19, 1980, minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the
International Conference of the American Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International
Convention Center, a small bomb exploded. Within the next twenty-four hours, arrest, search, and
seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in
the series of bombings in Metro Manila. One of them was herein petitioner. Victor Lovely offered
himself to be a "state witness" and in his letter to the President, he stated that he will reveal everything
he knows about the bombings.
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On October 21, 1980, elements of the military went to the hospital room of the petitioner at the Manila
Medical Center where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma
and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed the petitioner the ASSO form which however
did not specify the charge or charges against him. For some time, the petitioner's lawyers were not
permitted to visit him in his hospital room until this Court in the case of Ordoez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et
al., (G.R. No. 55345, October 28, 1980) issued an order directing that the petitioner's right to be visited
by counsel be respected.
On November 2, 1980, the petitioner was transferred against his objections from his hospital arrest to
an isolation room without windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. The petitioner
states that he was not informed why he was transferred and detained, nor was he ever investigated or
questioned by any military or civil authority.
Subsequently, on November 27, 1980, the petitioner was released for humanitarian reasons from
military custody and placed "under house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without the
benefit of any investigation or charges.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a "Notice of Preliminary
Investigation" inPeople v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating
that "the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o'clock p.m. on
December 12, 1980" and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and
the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the
time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not
received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
On February 9, 1981, the records of the case were turned over by the Judge Advocate General's Office
to the Ministry of Justice.
On February 24, 1981, the respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing petitioner, among others of
having violated Republic Act No. 1700, as amended by P.D. 885 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 in relation
to Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. The inquest court set the preliminary investigation for March
17, 1981.
On March 6, 1981, the petitioner was allowed to leave the country to attend a series of church
conferences and undergo comprehensive medical examinations of the heart, stomach, liver, eye and ear
including a possible removal of his left eye to save his right eye. Petitioner Salonga almost died as one of
the principal victims of the dastardly bombing of a Liberal Party rally at Plaza Miranda on August 20,
1971. Since then, he has suffered serious disabilities. The petitioner was riddled with shrapnel and
pieces still remain in various parts of his body. He has an AV fistula caused by a piece of shrapnel lodged
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one millimeter from his aorta. The petitioner has limited use of his one remaining hand and arms, is
completely blind and physical in the left eye, and has scar like formations in the remaining right eye. He
is totally deaf in the right ear and partially deaf in the left ear. The petitioner's physical ailments led him
to seek treatment abroad.
On or around March 26, 1981, the counsel for petitioner was furnished a copy of an amended complaint
signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated March 12, 1981, charging the petitioner, along with 39 other
accused with the violation of R.A. 1700, as amended by P.D. 885, Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 and P.D. 1736.
Hearings for preliminary investigation were conducted. The prosecution presented as its witnesses
Ambassador Armando Fernandez, the Consul General of the Philippines in Los Angeles, California, Col.
Balbino Diego, PSC/NISA Chief, Investigation and Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command and
Victor Lovely himself.
On October 15, 1981, the counsel for petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges against petitioner
for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him.
On December 2, 1981, the respondent judge denied the motion. On January 4, 1982, he issued a
resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as
amended, against forty (40) people, including herein petitioner.
The resolutions of the respondent judge dated December 2, 1981 and January 4, 1982 are now the
subject of the petition. It is the contention of the petitioner that no prima facie case has been
established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to
sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule
of law exists in the Philippines today.
After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds the evidence offered by the prosecution
utterly insufficient to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner. We grant the petition.
However, before going into the merits of the case, we shall pass upon a procedural issue raised by the
respondents.
The respondents call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to quash or to
dismiss, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari; that since the question of
dismissal will again be considered by the court when it decides the case, the movant has a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that public interest dictates that criminal
prosecutions should not be enjoined.
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The general rule is correctly stated. However, the respondents fail to appreciate or take into account
certain exceptions when a petition for certiorari is clearly warranted. The case at bar is one such
exception.
In the case of Mead v. Angel (115 SCRA 256) the same contentions were advanced by the respondents
to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
... Respondents advert to the rule that when a motion to quash filed by an accused in a criminal case
shall be denied, the remedy of the accused-movant is not to file a petition for certiorari or mandamus or
prohibition, the proper recourse being to go to trial, without prejudice to his right to reiterate the
grounds invoked in his motion to quash if an adverse judgment is rendered against him, in the appeal
that he may take therefrom in the manner authorized by law. (Mill v. People, et al., 101 Phil. 599;Echarol
v. Purisima, et al., 13 SCRA 309.)
On this argument, we ruled:
There is no disputing the validity and wisdom of the rule invoked by the respondents. However, it is also
recognized that, under certain situations, recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus to question the denial of a motion to quash is considered proper in the
interest of "more enlightened and substantial justice", as was so declared in "Yap v. Lutero, G.R. No. L-
12669, April 30, 1969."
Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect
for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from
unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a person is
carelessly included in the trial of around forty persons when on the very face of the record no evidence
linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists. Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga, himself a victim of the still
unresolved and heinous Plaza Miranda bombings, was arrested at the Manila Medical Center while
hospitalized for bronchial asthma. When arrested, he was not informed of the nature of the charges
against him. Neither was counsel allowed to talk to him until this Court intervened through the issuance
of an order directing that his lawyers be permitted to visit him (Ordonez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., G.R.
No. 55345, October 28, 1980). Only after four months of detention was the petitioner informed for the
first time of the nature of the charges against him. After the preliminary investigation, the petitioner
moved to dismiss the complaint but the same was denied. Subsequently, the respondent judge issued a
resolution ordering the filing of an information after finding that a prima facie case had been established
against an of the forty persons accused.
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In the light of the failure to show prima facie that the petitioner was probably guilty of conspiring to
commit the crime, the initial disregard of petitioner's constitutional rights together with the massive and
damaging publicity made against him, justifies the favorable consideration of this petition by this Court.
With former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. now deceased, there are at least 38 other co-accused to be
tried with the petitioner. The prosecution must present proof beyond reasonable doubt against each
and every one of the 39 accused, most of whom have varying participations in the charge for subversion.
The prosecution's star witness Victor Lovely and the only source of information with regard to the
alleged link between the petitioner and the series of terrorist bombings is now in the United States.
There is reason to believe the petitioner's citation of international news dispatches * that the
prosecution may find it difficult if not infeasible to bring him back to the Philippines to testify against the
petitioner. If Lovely refused to testify before an American federal grand jury how could he possibly be
made to testify when the charges against the respondent come up in the course of the trial against the
39 accused. Considering the foregoing, we find it in the interest of justice to resolve at this stage the
issue of whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the questioned
resolutions.
The respondents contend that the prosecution will introduce additional evidence during the trial and if
the evidence, by then, is not sufficient to prove the petitioner's guilt, he would anyway be acquitted.
Yes, but under the circumstances of this case, at what cost not only to the petitioner but to the basic
fabric of our criminal justice system?
The term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient
to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of
innocence to warrant a conviction. The question raised before us now is: Were the evidences against the
petitioner uncontradicted and if they were unexplained or uncontradicted, would they, standing alone,
sufficiently overcome the presumption of innocence and warrant his conviction?
We do not think so.
The records reveal that in finding a case against the petitioner, the respondent judge relied only on the
testimonies of Col. Balbino Diego and Victor Lovely. Ambassador Armando Fernandez, when called upon
to testify on subversive organizations in the United States nowhere mentioned the petitioner as an
organizer, officer or member of the Movement for Free Philippines (MFP), or any of the organizations
mentioned in the complaint. Col. Diego, on the other hand, when asked what evidence he was able to
gather against the petitioner depended only on the statement of Lovely "that it was the residence of ex-
Senator Salonga where they met together with Renato Taada, one of the brains of the bombing
conspiracy ... and the fact that Sen. Salonga has been meeting with several subversive personnel based
in the U.S.A. was also revealed to me by Victor Burns Lovely; 11 and on the group pictures taken at
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former Congressman Raul Daza's birthday party. In concluding that a conspiracy exists to overthrow by
violent means the government of the Philippines in the United States, his only bases were "documentary
as well as physical and sworn statements that were referred to me or taken by me personally," which of
course negate personal knowledge on his part. When asked by the court how he would categorize
petitioner in any of the subversive organizations, whether petitioner was an organizer, officer or a
member, the witness replied:
A. To categorize former Senator Salonga if he were an organizer, he is an officer or he is a member, your
Honor, please, we have to consider the surrounding circumstances and on his involvement: first, Senator
Salonga wanted always to travel to the United States at least once a year or more often under the
pretext of to undergo some sort of operation and participate in some sort of seminar. (t.s.n., April 21,
1981, pp- 14-15)
Such testimony, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely hearsay, can hardly qualify as
prima facie evidence of subversion. It should not have been given credence by the court in the first
place. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, -has no probative value as the affiant could not
have been cross-examined on the facts stated therein. (See People v. Labinia, 115 SCRA 223; People v.
Valero, 112 SCRA 661). Moreover, as Victor Lovely, himself, was personally examined by the court, there
was no need for the testimony of Col. Diego. Thus, the inquest judge should have confined his
investigation to Victor Burns Lovely, the sole witness whose testimony had apparently implicated
petitioner in the bombings which eventually led to the filing of the information.
Lovely's account of the petitioner's involvement with the former's bombing mission is found in his sworn
statement made before Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella and taken on October 17, 1980 at the AFP
Medical Center. Lovely was not presented as a prosecution or state witness but only as a defense
witness for his two younger brothers, Romeo and Baltazar, who were both included in the complaint but
who were later dropped from the information. Victor Lovely was examined by his counsel and cross-
examined by the fiscal. In the process, he Identified the statement which he made before Col. Diego and
Lt. Col. Madella. After Lovely's testimony, the prosecution made a manifestation before the court that it
was adopting Lovely as a prosecution witness.
According to Lovely's statement, the following events took place:
36. Q. Did Psinakis tell you where to stay?
A. Yes, at first he told me to check-in at Manila Hotel or the Plaza Hotel where somebody would come to
contact me and give the materials needed in the execution of my mission. I thought this was not safe so
I disagreed with him. Mr. Psinakis changed the plan and instead told me to visit the residence of Ex-Sen.
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Jovito Salonga as often as I can and someone will meet me there to give the materials I needed to
accomplish my mission
37. Q. Did you comply as instructed?
A. Yes, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980 and stayed at the residence of Mr. Johnny Chua, husband
of my business partner, then I went to the Hospital where I visited my mother and checked-in at Room
303 of the YMCA at Concepcion Street, Manila.
38. Q. Did you visit the residence of former Senator Jovito Salonga as directed by Psinakis?
A. I visited Sen. Salonga's place three (3) times, the first visit was August 20 or 21, and the last was 4:00
P.M. of August 31, 1980. In addition to these visits, I TALKED to him on the phone about three or four
times. On my first visit, I told him "I am expecting an attache case from somebody which will be
delivered to your house," for which Sen. Salonga replied "Wala namang nagpunta dito at wala namang
attache case para sa iyo." However, if your attache case arrives, I'll just call you." I gave him my number.
On my second visit, Salonga said, "I'll be very busy so just come back on the 31st of August at 4 P.M." On
that date, I was with friends at Batulao Resort and had to hurry back to be at Salonga's place for the
appointment. I arrived at Salonga's place at exactly 4 P.M.
39. Q. What happened then?
A. I was ushered to the sala by Mrs. Salonga and after five minutes, Sen. Salonga joined me in the sala.
Sen. Salonga informed me that somebody will be coming to give me the attache case but did not tell me
the name.
40. Q. Are there any subject matters you discuss while waiting for that somebody to deliver your
materials?
A. Yes, Salonga asked if Sen. Aquino and I have met, I explained to him the efforts of Raul Daza in setting
up that meeting but I have previous business commitments at Norfolk, Virginia. I told him, however, that
through the efforts of Raul Daza, I was able to talk with Ninoy Aquino in the airport telephone booth in
San Francisco. He also asked about Raul Daza, Steve Psinakis and the latest opposition group activities
but it seems he is well informed.
41. Q. How long did you wait until that somebody arrived?
A. About thirty (30) minutes.
41. Q. What happened when the man arrived?
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A. This man arrived and I was greatly surprised to see Atty. Renato Taada Jovy Salonga was the one
who met him and as I observed parang nasa sariling bahay si Taada nung dumating. They talked for five
(5) minutes in very low tones so I did not hear what they talked about. After their whispering
conversations, Sen. Salonga left and at this time Atty. "Nits" Taada told me "Nasa akin ang kailangan
mo, nasa kotse."
43. Q. Were the materials given to you?
A. When Sen. Salonga came back, we asked to be permitted to leave and I rode in Atty. "Nits" Taadas
old Pontiac car colored dirty brown and proceeded to Broadway Centrum where before I alighted, Atty.
Taada handed me a "Puma" bag containing all the materials I needed.
xxx xxx xxx
45. Q. What were the contents of the Puma bag?
A. Ten (10) pieces of Westclox pocket watch with screw and wirings, ten (10) pieces electrical blasting
caps 4" length, ten (10) pieces non-electrical blasting caps 1 " length, nine (9) pieces volts dry cell
battery, two (2) improvised electrical testers. ten (10) plastic packs of high explosive about 1 pound
weight each.
However, in his interview with Mr. Ronnie Nathanielz which was aired on Channel 4 on November 8,
1980 and which was also offered as evidence by the accused, Lovely gave a different story which
negates the above testimony insofar as the petitioner's participation was concerned:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Who were the people that you contacted in Manila and for what purpose?
A. Before I left for the Philippines, Mr. Psinakis told me to check in at the Manila Hotel or the Plaza
Hotel, and somebody would just deliver the materials I would need. I disapproved of this, and I told him
I would prefer a place that is familiar to me or who is close to me. Mr. Psinakis suggested the residence
of Sen. Salonga.
And so, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980, 1 made a call to Sen. Salonga, but he was out. The next
day I made a call again. I was able to contact him. I made an appointment tsee him. I went to Sen.
Salonga's house the following day. I asked Sen. Salonga if someone had given him an attache case for
me. He said nobody. Afterwards, I made three calls to Sen. Salonga. Sen. Salonga told me "call me again
on the 31st of August. I did not call him, I just went to his house on the 31st of August at 4 P.M. A few
minutes after my arrival Atty. Renato Taada arrived. When he had a chance to be near me, he (Atty.
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Tanada) whispered to me that he had the attache case and the materials I needed in his car. These
materials were given to me by Atty. Tanada When I alighted at the Broadway Centrum. (Emphasis
supplied)
During the cross-examination, counsel for petitioner asked Lovely about the so-called destabilization
plan which the latter mentioned in his sworn statement:
Q. You mentioned in your statement taken on October 17, 1980, marked Exhibit "G" about the so-called
destabilization plan of Aquino. When you attended the birthday party of Raul Daza wherein Jovito
Salonga was also present, was this destabilization plan as alleged by you already formulated?
WITNESS:
A. Not to my knowledge.
COURT TO WITNESS:
Q. Mr. Witness, who invited you to the party?
A. Raul Daza, your Honor.
Q. Were you told that Mr. Salonga would be present in the party.
A. I am really not quite sure, your Honor.
Q. Alright. You said initially it was social but then it became political. Was there any political action taken
as a result of the party?
A. Only political discussion, your Honor. (TSN, July 8, 1981, pp. 69-84).
Counsel for petitioner also asked Lovely whether in view of the latter's awareness of the physical
condition of petitioner, he really implicated petitioner in any of the bombings that occurred in Metro
Manila. The fiscal objected without stating any ground. In sustaining the objection, the Court said:
Sustained . . . The use of the word 'implicate' might expand the role of Mr. Salonga. In other words, you
are widening the avenue of Mr. Salonga's role beyond the participation stated in the testimony of this
witness about Mr. Salonga, at least, as far as the evidence is concerned, I supposed, is only being in the
house of Mr. Salonga which was used as the contact point. He never mentions Mr. Salonga about the
bombings. Now these words had to be put in the mouth of this witness. That would be unfair to Mr.
Salonga. (TSN. July 8, 1981, p. 67)
Respondent judge further said:
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COURT:
As the Court said earlier, the parts or portions affecting Salonga only refers to the witness coming to
Manila already then the matter of . . . I have gone over the statement and there is no mention of
Salonga insofar as activities in the United States is concerned. I don't know why it concerns this cross-
examination.
ATTY. YAP:
Because according to him, it was in pursuance of the plan that he came to Manila.
COURT:
According to him it was Aquino, Daza, and Psinakis who asked him to come here, but Salonga was
introduced only when he (Lovely) came here. Now, the tendency of the question is also to connect
Salonga to the activities in the United States. It seems to be the thrust of the questions.
COURT:
In other words, the point of the Court as of the time when you asked him question, the focus on Salonga
was only from the time when he met Salonga at Greenhills. It was the first time that the name of
Salonga came up. There was no mention of Salonga in the formulation of the destabilization plan as
affirmed by him. But you are bringing this up although you are only cross-examining for Salonga as if his
(Lovely's) activities in the United States affected Salonga. (TSN. July 8, 1981, pp. 73-74).
Apparently, the respondent judge wanted to put things in proper perspective by limiting the petitioner's
alleged "participation" in the bombing mission only to the fact that petitioner's house was used as a
"contact point" between Lovely and Taada, which was all that Lovely really stated in his testimony.
However, in the questioned resolution dated December 2, 1981, the respondent judge suddenly
included the "activities" of petitioner in the United States as his basis for denying the motion to dismiss:
On the activities of Salonga in the United States, the witness, Lovely, in one of his statements declared:
'To the best of my recollection he mentioned of some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being
most likely should reforms be not instituted by President Marcos immediately.
It is therefore clear that the prosecution's evidence has established facts and circumstances sufficient
for a finding that excludes a Motion to Dismiss by respondent Salonga. The Movement for Free
Philippines is undoubtedly a force born on foreign soil it appears to rely on the resources of foreign
entities, and is being (sic) on gaining ascendancy in the Philippines with the use of force and for that
163
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purpose it has linked itself with even communist organizations to achieve its end. It appears to rely on
aliens for its supporters and financiers.
The jump from the "contact point" theory to the conclusion of involvement in subversive activities in the
United States is not only inexplicable but without foundation.
The respondents admit that no evidence was presented directly linking petitioner Salonga to actual acts
of violence or terrorism. There is no proof of his direct participation in any overt acts of subversion.
However, he is tagged as a leader of subversive organizations for two reasons-
(1) Because his house was used as a "contactpoint"; and
(2) Because "he mentioned some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should
reforms be not instituted by President Marcos immediately."
The "contact point" theory or what the petitioner calls the guilt by visit or guilt by association" theory is
too tenuous a basis to conclude that Senator Salonga was a leader or mastermind of the bombing
incidents. To indict a person simply because some plotters, masquerading as visitors, have somehow
met in his house or office would be to establish a dangerous precedent. The right of citizens to be secure
against abuse of governmental processes in criminal prosecutions would be seriously undermined.
The testimony of Victor Lovely against petitioner Salonga is full of inconsistencies. Senator Salonga and
Atty. Renato Taada could not have whispered to one another because the petitioner is almost totally
deaf. Lovely could not have met Senator Salonga at a Manglapus party in Washington, D.C. in 1977
because the petitioner left for the United States only on November, 1978. Senator Salonga denies having
known Mr. Lovely in the United States or in the Philippines. He states that he has hundred of visitors
from week to week in his residence but cannot recall any Victor Lovely.
The presence of Lovely in a group picture taken at Mr. Raul Daza's birthday party in Los Angeles where
Senator Salonga was a guest is not proof of conspiracy. As stated by the petitioner, in his many years in
the turbulent world of politics, he has posed with all kinds of people in various groups and various places
and could not possibly vouch for their conduct. Commenting on the matter, newspaper columnist
Teodoro Valencia stated that Filipinos love to pose with important visitors and the picture proves
nothing.
It is likewise probable that a national figure and former politician of Senator Salonga's stature can expect
guests and visitors of all kinds to be visiting his home or office. If a rebel or subversive happens to pose
with the petitioner for a group picture at a birthday party abroad, or even visit him with others in his
home, the petitioner does not thereby become a rebel or subversive, much less a leader of a subversive
164
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group. More credible and stronger evidence is necessary for an indictment. Nonetheless, even if we
discount the flaws in Lovely's testimony and dismiss the refutations and arguments of the petitioner, the
prosecution evidence is still inadequate to establish a prima facie finding.
The prosecution has not come up with even a single iota of evidence which could positively link the
petitioner to any proscribed activities of the Movement for Free Philippines or any subversive
organization mentioned in the complaint. Lovely had already testified that during the party of former
Congressman Raul Daza which was alleged to have been attended by a number of members of the MFP,
no political action was taken but only political discussion. Furthermore, the alleged opinion of the
petitioner about the likelihood of a violent struggle here in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted,
assuming that he really stated the same, is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and
expression. No man deserves punishment for his thoughts. Cogitationis poenam memo meretur. And as
the late Justice Oliver W. Holmes stated in the case of U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, " ... if there is
any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the
principle of free thought not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that
we hate."
We have adopted the concept that freedom of expression is a "preferred" right and, therefore, stands
on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. The primacy, the high estate accorded
freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. (Gonzales v. Commission
on Elections, 29 SCRA 835). As explained by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut (302 U.S. 319) this
must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought
and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom. Protection is especially
mandated for political discussions. This Court is particularly concerned when allegations are made that
restraints have been imposed upon mere criticisms of government and public officials. Political
discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal
indictments.
The United States Supreme Court in Noto v. United States (367 U.S. 290) distinguished between
the abstract teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence
and speech which would prepare a group for violent action and steel it to such action. In Watts v. United
States (394 U.S. 705), the American court distinguished between criminal threats and constitutionally
protected speech.
It stated:
We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner fits within that statutory
term. For we must interpret the language Congress chose against the background of a profound national
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commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (376 U.S. 254). The language of the
political arena, like the language used in labor disputed is often vituperative abusive, and inexact. We
agree with petitioner that his only offense was a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a
political opposition to the President.
In the case before us, there is no teaching of the moral propriety of a resort to violence, much less an
advocacy of force or a conspiracy to organize the use of force against the duly constituted authorities.
The alleged remark about the likelihood of violent struggle unless reforms are instituted is not a threat
against the government. Nor is it even the uninhibited, robust, caustic, or unpleasantly sharp attack
which is protected by the guarantee of free speech. Parenthetically, the American case of Brandenburg
v. Ohio (395 U.S. 444) states that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action. The words which petitioner allegedly used according to the best recollections of Mr. Lovely
are light years away from such type of proscribed advocacy.
Political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is within the protective
clause of freedom of speech and expression. The same cannot be construed as subversive activities per
se or as evidence of membership in a subversive organization. Under Presidential Decree No. 885,
Section 3, paragraph 6, political discussion will only constitute, prima facie evidence of membership in a
subversive organization if such discussion amounts to:
(6) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any
plan or enterprise thereof.
As stated earlier, the prosecution has failed to produce evidence that would establish any link between
petitioner and any subversive organization. Even if we lend credence to Lovely's testimony that a
political discussion took place at Daza's birthday party, no proof whatsoever was adduced that such
discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the government through illegal means. The
alleged opinion that violent struggle is likely unless reforms are instituted by no means shows either
advocacy of or incitement to violence or furtherance of the objectives of a subversive organization.
Lovely also declared that he had nothing to do with the bombing on August 22, 1980, which was the
only bombing incident that occurred after his arrival in Manila on August 20, and before the YMCA
explosion on September 6, 1980. (See TSN, pp. 63-63, July 8, 1981). He further testified that:
WITNESS:
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Actually, it was not my intention to do some kind of bombing against the government. My bombing
mission was directed against the particular family (referring to the Cabarrus family [TSN, p. 11, July 9,
1981] [Rollo, p. 10].
Such a statement wholly negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment which Lovely was
supposed to have been commissioned to perform upon the orders of his co- accused and which was the
very reason why they answer charged in the first place. The respondent judge also asked Lovely about
the possible relation between Cabarrus and petitioner:
COURT:
Q. Did you suspect any relation between Cabarrus and Jovito Salonga, why did you implicate Jovito
Salonga?
A. No, your Honor. I did not try to implicate Salonga.
It should be noted that after Lovely's testimony, the prosecution manifested to the court that it was
adopting him as a prosecution witness. Therefore, the prosecution became irreversively bound by
Lovely's disclaimers on the witness stand, that it was not his intention "to do some kind of bombing
against the government" and that he "did not try to implicate Salonga", especially since Lovely is the
sole witness adopted by the prosecution who could supposedly establish the link between the petitioner
and the bombing incidents.
The respondent court should have taken these factors into consideration before concluding that a prima
facie case exists against the petitioner. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances. (People v. Dayad, 56 SCRA 439). In the case at bar, the
prosecution cannot even present a credible version of the petitioner's role in the bombings even if it
ignores the subsequent disclaimers of Lovely and without relying on mere affidavits including those
made by Lovely during his detention.
The resolution dated January 4, 1982 suffers from the same defect. In this resolution, Lovely's previous
declarations about the bombings as part of the alleged destabilization plan and the people behind the
same were accorded such credibility by the respondent judge as if they had already been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the
trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive
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trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary
investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process.
(See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not
enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor
shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State.
More important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who
live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve
the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient
to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of
the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause
since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its
existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the
examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear
dictates of reasons (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal,
therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later
turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to
uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so. Mercado v. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93).
The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court's judgment had been arrived
at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January
18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to
drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the
prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one
of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.
We were constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft
ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court's
crowded agenda for further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this
decision has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.
Respondent Fiscal Sergio Apostol correctly points out, however, that he is not precluded from filing new
charges for the same acts because the petitioner has not been arraigned and double jeopardy does not
apply. in that sense, the case is not completely academic.
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Recent developments in this case serve to focus attention on a not too well known aspect of the
Supreme Court's functions.
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved
by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome
powers of Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection
given by constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as
excessive and, therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while his petition was
pending. The petition became moot because of his escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision and
stated:
The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in
language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the
unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly
be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center's new
charter pursuant to the President's legislative powers under martial law. Stan, this Court discussed the
constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national Identity.
(Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), during the pendency of the case, 26
petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner
was facing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition
was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from
promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.
In this case, the respondents agree with our earlier finding that the prosecution evidence miserably fails
to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan
to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. They have taken
the initiative of dropping the charges against the petitioner. We reiterate the rule, however, that this
Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of evidence against the petitioner
found in the records.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.

Salonga v. Pano Digest
Salonga vs. Cruz-
PanoG.R. No. L-59524 Feb. 18,
1985Gutierrez, Jr., J.:FACTS: Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-
Subversion Act after he was implicated, along with other 39 accused, by Victor Lovely in the series of
bombings in Metro Manila. He was tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the leader of subversive
organizations for two reasons (1)because his house was used as a and (2) because of
his remarks during the party of Raul Daza in Los Angeles. He allegedly opined about the likelihood of a
violent struggle in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted immediately by then President Marcos.
ISSUE: Whether or not alleged remarks are protected by the freedom of speech. HELD Yes.
The petition is dismissed. RATIO The opinion is nothing but a legitimate exercise of
freedom of thought and expression. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. Political
discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal
indictments. The constitutional guaranty may only be proscribed when such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. In the case at
bar, there is no threat against the government. In PD 885, political discussion will only constitute prima
facie evidence of membership in a subversive organization if such discussion amounts to conferring with
officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise
thereof. In the case, there is no proof that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the
government through illegal means. Lovely also declared that his bombing mission was not against the
government, but directed against a particular family. Such a statement negates any politically motivated
or subversive assignment. OBITER DICTUM: To withhold the right to preliminary investigation, it
would be to transgress constitutional due process. However, it is not enough that the preliminary
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investigation is conducted to satisfy the due process clause. There must be sufficient evidence to sustain a
prima facie case or that probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.
Acop v. Guingona
[G.R. No. 134855. July 2, 2002]

CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP and SR. SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-appellants, vs. HON.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, and SENIOR
STATE PROSECUTOR JUDE ROMANO, in his capacity as the Director of the Government's Witness
Protection Program; SPO2 EDUARDO DELOS REYES and SPO2 CORAZON DELA CRUZ, respondents-
appellees.
R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Chief Supt.
Romeo M. Acop and Sr. Supt. Francisco G. Zubia seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated July
30, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which dismissed this petition for
injunction.

The factual antecedents leading to the present petition are as follows:

On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspected members of the criminal group known as the Kuratong Baleleng
gang were killed along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City in an alleged shootout with the Anti-Bank
Robbery Intelligence Task Group of the Philippine National Police (PNP).

SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) of the PNP and who
was one of the officers assigned to conduct an investigation of the May 18, 1995 incident, made a public
disclosure of his findings that there was no shootout and the eleven suspected members of the
171
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Kuratong Baleleng gang were instead summarily executed. SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, also a member of
the CIC, made the same statement corroborating the claim of SPO2 delos Reyes.

The Senate conducted hearings to determine the circumstances surrounding the subject incident. SPO2
delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz testified before the Senate hearings. On June 2, 1995, former Senator
Raul Roco, who was then the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights,
recommended that SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz be admitted to the government's Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program. Accordingly, SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz were
admitted into the said Program.

On March 12, 1996, herein petitioners, in their capacity as taxpayers, but who are among the PNP
officers implicated in the alleged rubout, filed before the court a quo a petition for injunction with
prayer for temporary restraining order questioning the legality of the admission of SPO2 delos Reyes
and SPO2 dela Cruz into the Program. Petitioners contend that under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981, law
enforcement officers, like SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz, are disqualified from being admitted
into the witness protection program even though they may be testifying against other law enforcement
officers.

On July 30, 1998, the trial court rendered the herein assailed decision.

Hence, the petition anchored on a sole assignment of error, to wit:

"THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS SPO2 EDUARDO DELOS REYES AND SPO2
CORAZON DELA CRUZ ARE QUALIFIED TO BE ADMITTED INTO THE WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM
DESPITE THEIR CLEAR DISQUALIFICATION FROM THE PROGRAM UNDER SECTION 3(D) OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 6981, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'WITNESS PROTECTION, SECURITY AND BENEFIT ACT'."

Petitioners pray that the decision of the RTC be reversed and set aside and instead -
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"a) An Injunction be issued enjoining the Department of Justice from continuing to provide the benefits
accruing under the Witness Protection Program to respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz;

"b) Order the immediate discharge of respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz from WPP and
for the latter to be ordered to cease and desist from accepting the benefits of the WPP; and

"c) Order respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz to return whatever monetary benefits they
have received from the government as a consequence of their wrongful and illegal admission into the
WPP."[1]

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that the petition lacks merit and that the
same has been rendered moot and academic because the coverage of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela
Cruz under the Program was already terminated on December 3, 1997 and August 23, 1998,
respectively, as evidenced by the letter of the Director of the Program addressed to the OSG, dated
February 10, 1999.[2] In their comment, private respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz
agree with the OSG.

Indeed, prayers a) and b) above had been rendered moot and academic by reason of the release of
SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz from the coverage of the Program. However, we find it necessary
to resolve the merits of the principal issue raised for a proper disposition of prayer c) and for future
guidance of both bench and bar as to the application of Sections 3(d) and 4 of R.A. No. 6981. As we
have ruled in Alunan III vs. Mirasol,[3] and Viola vs. Alunan III,[4] "courts will decide a question
otherwise moot and academic if it is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'"

Petitioners' main contention is that Section 3 of R.A. No. 6981 lays down the basic qualifications a
person must possess in order to be admitted into the Program and that Section 4 of the same statute is
not an exception to Section 3 but, it simply adds requirements for witnesses before they may become
eligible for admission into the Program in case of legislative investigations.
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We do not agree.

Section 3(d) provides:

Sec. 3. Admission into the Program. - Any person who has witnessed or has knowledge or information
on the commission of a crime and has testified or is testifying or about to testify before any judicial or
quasi-judicial body, or before any investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program: Provided,
That:

x x x

(d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying against the other law enforcement
officers. In such a case, only the immediate members of his family may avail themselves of the
protection provided for under this Act.

Section 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Witness in Legislative Investigations. - In case of legislative investigations in aid of legislation, a
witness, with his express consent, may be admitted into the Program upon the recommendation of the
legislative committee where his testimony is needed when in its judgment there is pressing necessity
therefor: Provided, That such recommendation is approved by the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be.

A careful reading of Sections 3 and 4 readily shows that these are distinct and independent provisions. It
is true that the proviso in Section 3(d) disqualifies law enforcement officers from being admitted into
the Program when they "testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any investigating
174
Choco Notes

authority." This is the general rule. However, Section 4 provides for a specific and separate situation
where a witness testifies before a legislative investigation. An investigation by a legislative committee
does not fall under the category of "any investigating authority" referred to in Section 3. Section 4
contains only a proviso that the witness' admission to the Program must be recommended by the
legislative committee when in its judgment there is a pressing necessity therefor and said
recommendation is approved by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be. Section 4 does not contain any proviso similar to Sec. 3(d) as
quoted above, nor does Section 4 refer to the application of the proviso under Section 3. In other
words, Section 4 did not make any qualification or distinction.

It is basic under the law on statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish.[5] The operation of a proviso is usually and properly confined to the clause or distinct
portion of the enactment which immediately precedes it or to which it pertains, and does not extend to
or qualify other sections or portions of the statute, unless the legislative intent that it shall so operate is
clearly disclosed.[6]

In the present case, it is clear that the legislative intent that the proviso under Section 3(d) of R.A. No.
6981 does not apply to Section 4. The trial court did not err in concluding that if the framers of the law
intended otherwise, they could have easily placed the same proviso of Section 3(d) or referred to it
under Section 4. Hence, in the absence of a clear proviso or reference to Section 3(d), a witness in a
legislative investigation whether or not he is a law enforcement officer, may be admitted into the
Program subject only to the requirements provided for under Section 4. It is not disputed that the
Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, chaired by then Senator Raul Roco, had recommended
the admission of SPO2 delos Reyes and dela Cruz into the Program and was duly indorsed by then
Senate President Edgardo J. Angara.

WHEREFORE, we DENY DUE COURSE to the petition and AFFIRM the assailed decision.

SO ORDERED.
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Acop v. Guingona digest (No digest)
Dumlao v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:

This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by
petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51,
52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.

The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has
filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30,
1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such,
176
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has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo
Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.

Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
Said Section 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and
disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the
elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.

Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement
benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the
same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the
classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."

For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory provisions:

Sec 7. Terms of Office Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove
mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of
March 1980.

.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.

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Sec. 4. ...

Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for
any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein:

provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive
evidence of such fact and

the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact.

... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).

Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials ... The election shall be held on January 30, 1980.
(Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52)

Section 6. Election and Campaign Period The election period shall be fixed by the Commission
on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall
commence on December 29, 1979 and terminate on January 28, 1980. (ibid.)

In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the
accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg.
53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution, which provides that a
"bona fide candidate for any public office shall be it. from any form of harassment and discrimination.
"The question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs.
COMELEC et als. No. L-52232) where the issue has been squarely raised,
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Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for
being violative of the Constitution.

I . The procedural Aspect

At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence,
traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions.
Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan Petitioner Dumlao does
not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao
in his. The respectively contest completely different statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined
this suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in
the nature of a taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners plead nine constraints as the reason of their joint
Petition, it would have required only a modicum more of effort tor petitioner Dumlao, on one hand said
petitioners lgot and Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the interest of orderly
procedure.

For another, there are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of judicial
review, namely (1) the existence of an appropriate case:, (2) an interest personal and substantial by the
party raising the constitutional question: (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity and (4) the necessity that the constiutional question be passed upon in order to decide the
case (People vs. Vera 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).

It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties have
raised the issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.

This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.

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A. Actual case and controversy.

It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and
controversies.

Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and
seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been
adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has
been filed before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this
Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue,
and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a
detailed factual record Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring
Opinion of now Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent
COMELEC as provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the pertinent portion of which
reads:

"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions:

1) xxx

2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:

Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.
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B. Proper party.

The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).

In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that
Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one has been
convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for
local elective positions. Neither one of them has been calle ed to have been adversely affected by the
operation of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional Theirs is a generated grievance.
They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can
claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress.

It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and that the
rule enunciated in People vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public
Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:

... it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct
injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying at the instance of
taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of
public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.

In the same vein, it has been held:

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In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also
taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and
they may, therefore, question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys.
(Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et als., 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).

However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1,
and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While, concededly, the
elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or
that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public
Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither
do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]),
citing Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a
taxpayer's suit, per se is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43
SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to
whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.

C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.

Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of an act of
the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and
presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented."

We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not an
"appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They are actually
without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent,
and procedural regularity would require that this suit be dismissed.
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II. The substantive viewpoint.

We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts not being
entirely without discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural standard was relaxed
in Tinio vs. Mina (26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec
(27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion in the Tinio and Gonzalez cases having been penned by our present
Chief Justice. The reasons which have impelled us are the paramount public interest involved and the
proximity of the elections which will be held only a few days hence.

Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is
belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions
based on the challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15,
respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful
discrimination.

The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is neither
well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be
treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years
of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age
are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be
more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not
be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law
would be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other
hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

183
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Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a
reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from
government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65,
for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal
office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as
provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of
the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired
employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which,
by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will
neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny
equal protection neither does it permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons
similarly situated are sinlilarly treated.

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What
is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not
violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is
germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs.
Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and
Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil.
1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments.
The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at
times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief
Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).

There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned
provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach. Courts are practically
unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the
Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt (Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper
vs. Telfair 4 Dall 14; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the
184
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compentence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate
for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case.

In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenge, may be divided in two parts.
The first provides:

a. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact
...

The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a
statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are
constrained to hold that this is one such clear case.

Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel
(Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not
synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of
innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges
have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In
ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of
acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be
ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that
charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already
convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).

185
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And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be
rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time
constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome
the prima facie evidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather
than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between
two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided.
Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted
for a judicial determination.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable
portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.

WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.
Said paragraph reads:

SEC. 4. Special disqualification. In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the
Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby declared as
disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective
provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is
entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of
office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office
from which he has retired.

2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that
"... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
186
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preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for
being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

SO ORDERED.
Dumlao v. COMELEC digest
Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been
receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local
elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of
Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition
was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot
and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term
of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged
for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal
protection in the eye of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.
HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been
merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not
meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be
followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate
case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite
was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for
public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would
already disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken.
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated
differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been
validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to
compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
187
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In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be
more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not
be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law
should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other
hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local
officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may
neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local
official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or
municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.
Montesclaros v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 152295. July 9, 2002]

ANTONIETTE V.C. MONTESCLAROS, MARICEL CARANZO, JOSEPHINE ATANGAN, RONALD ATANGAN and
CLARIZA DECENA, and OTHER YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON
in his capacity as Senate President and SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL in his capacity as Minority Leader
of the Senate of the Philippines, CONGRESSMAN JOSE DE VENECIA in his capacity as Speaker,
CONGRESSMAN AGUSTO L. SYJOCO in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms, and CONGRESSMAN EMILIO C. MACIAS II in his capacity as Chairman of the
Committee on Local Government of the House of Representatives, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN, AND ALL THEIR AGENTS AND
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:

The Case
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Before us is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction. The petition seeks to prevent the postponement of the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK for brevity) elections originally scheduled last May 6, 2002. The petition also seeks to
prevent the reduction of the age requirement for membership in the SK.

Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, filed this petition as a taxpayers and class suit, on their own behalf
and on behalf of other youths similarly situated. Petitioners claim that they are in danger of being
disqualified to vote and be voted for in the SK elections should the SK elections on May 6, 2002 be
postponed to a later date. Under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), membership in
the SK is limited to youths at least 15 but not more than 21 years old.

Petitioners allege that public respondents connived, confederated and conspired to postpone the May
6, 2002 SK elections and to lower the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but less than 18 years of
age. Petitioners assail the alleged conspiracy because youths at least 18 but not more than 21 years old
will be summarily and unduly dismembered, unfairly discriminated, unnecessarily disenfranchised,
unjustly disassociated and obnoxiously disqualified from the SK organization.*1+

Thus, petitioners pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction -

a) To prevent, annul or declare unconstitutional any law, decree, Comelec resolution/directive and
other respondents issuances, orders and actions and the like in postponing the May 6, 2002 SK
elections.

b) To command the respondents to continue the May 6, 2002 SK elections set by the present law and in
accordance with Comelec Resolutions No. 4713 and 4714 and to expedite the funding of the SK
elections.

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c) In the alternative, if the SK elections will be postponed for whatever reason, there must be a definite
date for said elections, for example, July 15, 2002, and the present SK membership, except those
incumbent SK officers who were elected on May 6, 1996, shall be allowed to run for any SK elective
position even if they are more than 21 years old.

d) To direct the incumbent SK officers who are presently representing the SK in every sanggunian and
the NYC to vacate their post after the barangay elections.*2+

The Facts

The SK is a youth organization originally established by Presidential Decree No. 684 as the Kabataang
Barangay (KB for brevity). The KB was composed of all barangay residents who were less than 18
years old, without specifying the minimum age. The KB was organized to provide its members with the
opportunity to express their views and opinions on issues of transcendental importance.[3]

The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the KB to SK and limited SK membership to those youths
at least 15 but not more than 21 years of age.*4+ The SK remains as a youth organization in every
barangay tasked to initiate programs to enhance the social, political, economic, cultural, intellectual,
moral, spiritual, and physical development of the youth.*5+ The SK in every barangay is composed of a
chairperson and seven members, all elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Katipunan ng Kabataan
in every barangay is composed of all citizens actually residing in the barangay for at least six months and
who meet the membership age requirement.

The first SK elections took place on December 4, 1992. RA No. 7808 reset the SK elections to the first
Monday of May of 1996 and every three years thereafter. RA No. 7808 mandated the Comelec to
supervise the conduct of the SK elections under rules the Comelec shall promulgate. Accordingly, the
Comelec on December 4, 2001 issued Resolution Nos. 4713[6] and 4714[7] to govern the SK elections on
May 6, 2002.

190
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On February 18, 2002, petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros (Montesclaros for brevity) sent a
letter[8] to the Comelec, demanding that the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002.
Montesclaros also urged the Comelec to respond to her letter within 10 days upon receipt of the letter,
otherwise, she will seek judicial relief.

On February 20, 2002, Alfredo L. Benipayo (Chairman Benipayo for brevity), then Comelec Chairman,
wrote identical letters to the Speaker of the House[9] and the Senate President[10] about the status of
pending bills on the SK and Barangay elections. In his letters, the Comelec Chairman intimated that it
was operationally very difficult to hold both elections simultaneously in May 2002. Instead, the
Comelec Chairman expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon that proposed to hold the
Barangay elections in May 2002 and postpone the SK elections to November 2002.

Ten days lapsed without the Comelec responding to the letter of Montesclaros. Subsequently,
petitioners received a copy of Comelec En Banc Resolution No. 4763[11] dated February 5, 2002
recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections to November 2002 but holding the
Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled.[12]

On March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed their respective bills postponing
the SK elections. On March 11, 2002, the Bicameral Conference Committee (Bicameral Committee for
brevity) of the Senate and the House came out with a Report[13] recommending approval of the
reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050[14] and House Bill No. 4456.[15] The Bicameral
Committees consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to July 15, 2002 and lowered the
membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age.

On March 11, 2002, petitioners filed the instant petition.

On March 11, 2002, the Senate approved the Bicameral Committees consolidated bill and on March 13,
2002, the House of Representatives approved the same. The President signed the approved bill into law
on March 19, 2002.

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The Issues

Petitioners[16] raise the following grounds in support of their petition:

I.

RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC)
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY
INTENDED TO POSTPONE THE SK ELECTIONS.

II.

INTENDED TO DISCRIMINATE, DISENFRANCHISE, SINGLE OUT AND DISMEMBER THE SK MEMBERS WHO
ARE 18 BUT NOT LESS[17] (SIC) THAN 21 YEARS OLD COMPOSED OF ABOUT 7 MILLION YOUTH.

III.

WILLFULLY FAILED TO FUND THE SK ELECTION PURPORTEDLY TO POSTPONE THE SAME IN ORDER TO
IMPLEMENT THEIR ILLEGAL SCHEME AND MACHINATION IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THERE ARE
AVAILABLE FUNDS FOR THE PURPOSE.

IV.
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THE INCUMBENT SK OFFICERS WANTED TO PERPETUALLY SIT ON THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES CONTRARY
TO THE ENVISION (SIC) OF THE CREATION OF THE SK ORGANIZATION, HENCE, IN VIOLATION OF LAW
AND CONSTITUTION.*18+

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, the Court takes judicial notice of the following events that have transpired since
petitioners filed this petition:

1. The May 6, 2002 SK elections and May 13, 2002 Barangay elections were not held as scheduled.

2. Congress enacted RA No. 9164[19] which provides that voters and candidates for the SK elections
must be at least 15 but less than 18 years of age on the day of the election.*20+ RA No. 9164 also
provides that there shall be a synchronized SK and Barangay elections on July 15, 2002.

3. The Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 4846, the rules and regulations for the conduct of the July
15, 2002 synchronized SK and Barangay elections.

Petitioners, who all claim to be 20 years old, argue that the postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK
elections disenfranchises them, preventing them from voting and being voted for in the SK elections.
Petitioners theory is that if the SK elections were postponed to a date later than May 6, 2002, the
postponement would disqualify from SK membership youths who will turn 21 years old between May 6,
2002 and the date of the new SK elections. Petitioners claim that a reduction in the SK membership age
to 15 but less than 18 years of age from the then membership age of 15 but not more than 21 years of
193
Choco Notes

age would disqualify about seven million youths. The public respondents failure to hold the elections
on May 6, 2002 would prejudice petitioners and other youths similarly situated.

Thus, petitioners instituted this petition to: (1) compel public respondents to hold the SK elections on
May 6, 2002 and should it be postponed, the SK elections should be held not later than July 15, 2002; (2)
prevent public respondents from passing laws and issuing resolutions and orders that would lower the
membership age in the SK; and (3) compel public respondents to allow petitioners and those who have
turned more than 21 years old on May 6, 2002 to participate in any re-scheduled SK elections.

The Courts power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following
requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota
of the case.[21]

In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless
amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has
reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. With respect to the date of the
SK elections, there is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial intervention.

Petitioners prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership
age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to
judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally
enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty.
The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would
be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of judicial
review cannot be exercised in vacuo.[22] The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states

194
Choco Notes

which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court
can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.

Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from
setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of
Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills by
members of Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the
Bicameral Committee of approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by
each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of
constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the
internal processes or procedures of Congress.[23]

The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that Congress should
enact into law. The judicial power to review the constitutionality of laws does not include the power to
prescribe to Congress what laws to enact. The Court has no power to compel Congress by mandamus
to enact a law allowing petitioners, regardless of their age, to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002
SK elections. To do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely crafted by the
Constitution for the three co-equal, coordinate and independent branches of government.

Under RA No. 9164, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of
the SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old.
Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of
the Local Government Code of 1991. Every law passed by Congress is always subject to amendment or
repeal by Congress. The Court cannot restrain Congress from amending or repealing laws, for the power
to make laws includes the power to change the laws.[24]

195
Choco Notes

The Court cannot also direct the Comelec to allow over-aged voters to vote or be voted for in an
election that is limited under RA No. 9164 to youths at least 15 but less than 18 years old. A law is
needed to allow all those who have turned more than 21 years old on or after May 6, 2002 to
participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Youths from 18 to 21 years old as of May 6, 2002 are also
no longer SK members, and cannot participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Congress will have to
decide whether to enact an amendatory law. Petitioners remedy is legislation, not judicial intervention.

Petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. A party must show that he
has been, or is about to be denied some personal right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled.[25] A
party must also show that he has a real interest in the suit. By real interest is meant a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or
inconsequential interest.[26]

In the instant case, petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred by law on those who were at
least 15 but not more than 21 years old. Now, with the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is limited to
those who on the date of the SK elections are at least 15 but less than 18 years old. The new law
restricts membership in the SK to this specific age group. Not falling within this classification, petitioners
have ceased to be members of the SK and are no longer qualified to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK
elections. Plainly, petitioners no longer have a personal and substantial interest in the SK elections.

This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No.
9164, which reset the SK elections and reduced the age requirement for SK membership, was not yet
enacted into law. After the passage of RA No. 9164, petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No.
9164 that could be unconstitutional. To grant petitioners prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for
in the July 15, 2002 SK elections necessitates assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. This,
petitioners have not done. The Court will not strike down a law unless its constitutionality is properly
raised in an appropriate action and adequately argued.[27]

The only semblance of a constitutional issue, albeit erroneous, that petitioners raise is their claim that
SK membership is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution.*28+ Since certain public
offices are reserved for SK officers, petitioners also claim a constitutionally protected opportunity to
196
Choco Notes

occupy these public offices. In petitioners own words, they and others similarly situated stand to lose
their opportunity to work in the government positions reserved for SK members or officers.*29+ Under
the Local Government Code of 1991, the president of the federation of SK organizations in a
municipality, city or province is an ex-officio member of the municipal council, city council or provincial
board, respectively.[30] The chairperson of the SK in the barangay is an ex-officio member of the
Sangguniang Barangay.[31] The president of the national federation of SK organizations is an ex-officio
member of the National Youth Commission, with rank of a Department Assistant Secretary.[32]

Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer
qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right
to SK membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest, based on a statutory right, any
act disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a
property right protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law.
Congress may amend at any time the law to change or even withdraw the statutory right.

A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a *P+ublic office is a public
trust.*33+ No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of
holding a public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel,[34] decided in 1920, the Court already ruled:

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to
consider an office a property. It is, however, well settled x x x that a public office is not property
within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency. x x
x The basic idea of the government x x x is that of a popular representative government, the officers
being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary
or contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the
law and holds the office as a trust for the people he represents. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should realize from the very start that no one
has a proprietary right to public office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a
local government legislative council, the law does not confer on petitioners a proprietary right or even a
proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils. The constitutional principle of a public office
197
Choco Notes

as a public trust precludes any proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy directing equal
access to opportunities for public service*35+ cannot bestow on petitioners a proprietary right to SK
membership or a proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices.

Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youths involvement in public affairs,*36+ this policy
refers to those who belong to the class of people defined as the youth. Congress has the power to
define who are the youth qualified to join the SK, which itself is a creation of Congress. Those who do
not qualify because they are past the age group defined as the youth cannot insist on being part of the
youth. In government service, once an employee reaches mandatory retirement age, he cannot invoke
any property right to cling to his office. In the same manner, since petitioners are now past the
maximum age for membership in the SK, they cannot invoke any property right to cling to their SK
membership.

The petition must also fail because no grave abuse of discretion attended the postponement of the SK
elections. RA No. 9164 is now the law that prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the
SK elections. This law also fixes the date of the SK elections. Petitioners are not even assailing the
constitutionality of RA No. 9164. RA No. 9164 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and will apply
to the July 15, 2002 SK elections.

Petitioners have not shown that the Comelec acted illegally or with grave abuse of discretion in
recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections. The very evidence relied upon by
petitioners contradict their allegation of illegality. The evidence consist of the following: (1) Comelec en
banc Resolution No. 4763 dated February 5, 2002 that recommended the postponement of the SK
elections to 2003; (2) the letter of then Comelec Chairman Benipayo addressed to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate; and (3) the Conference Committee Report
consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050 and House Bill No. 4456.

The Comelec exercised its power and duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall*37+ and to recommend to
Congress effective measures to minimize election spending.*38+ The Comelecs acts enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.[39] These acts cannot constitute proof,
198
Choco Notes

as claimed by petitioners, that there exists a connivance and conspiracy (among) respondents in
contravention of the present law. As the Court held in Pangkat Laguna v. Comelec,*40+ the Comelec, as
the government agency tasked with the enforcement and administration of elections laws, is entitled to
the presumption of regularity of official acts with respect to the elections.

The 1987 Constitution imposes upon the Comelec the duty of enforcing and administering all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of elections. Petitioners failed to prove that the Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress the postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK
elections. The evidence cited by petitioners even establish that the Comelec has demonstrated an
earnest effort to address the practical problems in holding the SK elections on May 6, 2002. The
presumption remains that the decision of the Comelec to recommend to Congress the postponement of
the elections was made in good faith in the regular course of its official duties.

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.[41]
Public respondents having acted strictly pursuant to their constitutional powers and duties, we find no
grave abuse of discretion in their assailed acts.

Petitioners contend that the postponement of the SK elections would allow the incumbent SK officers to
perpetuate themselves in power, depriving other youths of the opportunity to serve in elective SK
positions. This argument deserves scant consideration. While RA No. 9164 contains a hold-over
provision, incumbent SK officials can remain in office only until their successors have been elected or
qualified. On July 15, 2002, when the SK elections are held, the hold-over period expires and all
incumbent SK officials automatically cease to hold their SK offices and their ex-officio public offices.

In sum, petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. This petition
presents no actual justiciable controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is alleged to
be unconstitutional. Lastly, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
199
Choco Notes

SO ORDERED.
Montesclaros v. COMELEC digest
G.R. No. 152295 July 9, 2002
Montesclaros, et al vs. Comelec, et al

Facts:

Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date since doing so
may render them unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of the age limitation set by law for those
who may participate. The SK elections was postponed since it was deemed "operationally very difficult"
to hold both SK and Barangay elections simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin
the lowering of age for membership in the SK.
Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
imputable to respondents.

Held:
The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the
power of judicial review.
While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless
amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has
reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. Under the same law, Congress
merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the
maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a
vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government
Code of 1991.
200
Choco Notes

RA 9164 which resets and prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK elections was
held to be applicable on the July 15 2002 election. Its constitutionality not having been assailed in the
first place.

The Court ruled that petitioners had no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit, that
the petition presented no actual justiciable controversy, that petitioners did not cite any provision of law
that is alleged to be unconstitutional, and that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondents.
CHR Employees Assoc. v CHR
[G.R. No. 155336. November 25, 2004]

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (CHREA) Represented by its President,
MARCIAL A. SANCHEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Can the Commission on Human Rights lawfully implement an upgrading and reclassification of personnel
positions without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?

Before this Court is a petition for review filed by petitioner Commission on Human Rights Employees
Association (CHREA) challenging the Decision[1] dated 29 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 59678 affirming the Resolutions[2] dated 16 December 1999 and 09 June 2000 of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), which sustained the validity of the upgrading and reclassification of certain
personnel positions in the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) despite the disapproval thereof by the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Also assailed is the resolution dated 11 September
2002 of the Court of Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.

201
Choco Notes

The antecedent facts which spawned the present controversy are as follows:

On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR. These
special provisions state:

1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding and within the limits
of their respective appropriations as authorized in this Act, the Constitutional Commissions and Offices
enjoying fiscal autonomy are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of
their respective offices, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances, and other benefits of their
personnel, and whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in their personal services
itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer of item or creation of new positions in their
respective offices: PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are affected by such
reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance
with existing laws, which shall be payable from any unexpended balance of, or savings in the
appropriations of their respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof shall be
in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation
standardization laws.

2. Use of Savings. The Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are hereby
authorized to use savings in their respective appropriations for: (a) printing and/or publication of
decisions, resolutions, and training information materials; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of
central and regional offices, facilities and equipment; (c) purchase of books, journals, periodicals and
equipment; (d) necessary expenses for the employment of temporary, contractual and casual
employees; (e) payment of extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses, commutable representation and
transportation allowances, and fringe benefits for their officials and employees as may be authorized by
law; and (f) other official purposes, subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations. (Emphases
supplied)

202
Choco Notes

On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR, through its then Chairperson Aurora P. Navarette-
Recia and Commissioners Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo, and Jorge
R. Coquia, promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998, adopting an upgrading and
reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission, to wit:

WHEREAS, the General Appropriations Act, FY 1998, R.A. No. 8522 has provided special provisions
applicable to all Constitutional Offices enjoying Fiscal Autonomy, particularly on organizational
structures and authorizes the same to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their
respective offices to fix and determine the salaries, allowances and other benefits of their personnel and
whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in the personnel services itemization including,
but not limited to, the transfer of item or creation of new positions in their respective offices:
PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are affected by such reorganization or
adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance with existing laws,
which shall be payable from any unexpanded balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their
respective offices;

WHEREAS, the Commission on Human Rights is a member of the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
(CFAG) and on July 24, 1998, CFAG passed an approved Joint Resolution No. 49 adopting internal rules
implementing the special provisions heretoforth mentioned;

NOW THEREFORE, the Commission by virtue of its fiscal autonomy hereby approves and authorizes the
upgrading and augmentation of the commensurate amount generated from savings under Personal
Services to support the implementation of this resolution effective Calendar Year 1998;

Let the Human Resources Development Division (HRDD) prepare the necessary Notice of Salary
Adjustment and other appropriate documents to implement this resolution; . . . .[3] (Emphasis supplied)

Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one
Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer II with
203
Choco Notes

Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners.
[4]

On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055[5] providing for the upgrading or raising of
salary grades of the following positions in the Commission:

Number of Positions

Position

Title

Salary Grade

Total Salary Requirements

From

To

From
204
Choco Notes

To

12

Attorney VI (In the Regional Field Offices)

Director IV

26

28

P229,104.00

4

Director III

Director IV
205
Choco Notes

27

28

38,928.00

1

Financial & Management Officer II

Director IV

24

28

36,744.00

1

Budget Officer III
206
Choco Notes

Budget Officer IV

18

24

51,756.00

1

Accountant III

Chief Accountant

18

24

51,756.00

1
207
Choco Notes

Cashier III

Cashier V

18

24

51,756.00

1

Information Officer V

Director IV

24

28

36,744.00[6]
208
Choco Notes

It, likewise, provided for the creation and upgrading of the following positions:

A. Creation

Number of Positions

Position Title

Salary Grade


4

Security Officer II (Coterminous)

15

684,780.00

B. Upgrading
209
Choco Notes

Number of Positions

Position Title

Salary Grade


From

To

From

To

1
210
Choco Notes

Attorney V

Director IV

25

28

P28,092.00

2

Security Officer I

Security Officer II

11

15

57,456.00
211
Choco Notes

------------------

Total 3

212
Choco Notes

P 85,548.00[7]

To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the
augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel Services.

By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR collapsed the vacant positions
in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among the positions
collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk
III, and one Accounting Clerk II.[8]

The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its
approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request on the following
justification:

Based on the evaluations made the request was not favorably considered as it effectively involved the
elevation of the field units from divisions to services.

The present proposal seeks further to upgrade the twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to
Director IV, SG-28. This would elevate the field units to a bureau or regional office, a level even higher
than the one previously denied.

The request to upgrade the three (3) positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central
Office in effect would elevate the services to Office and change the context from support to substantive
without actual change in functions.

213
Choco Notes

In the absence of a specific provision of law which may be used as a legal basis to elevate the level of
divisions to a bureau or regional office, and the services to offices, we reiterate our previous stand
denying the upgrading of the twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director III, SG-27 or Director
IV, SG-28, in the Field Operations Office (FOO) and three (3) Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28 in
the Central Office.

As represented, President Ramos then issued a Memorandum to the DBM Secretary dated 10 December
1997, directing the latter to increase the number of Plantilla positions in the CHR both Central and
Regional Offices to implement the Philippine Decade Plan on Human Rights Education, the Philippine
Human Rights Plan and Barangay Rights Actions Center in accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis in
the original)

Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) FY 1998, no
organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by
the President, thus, the creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office cannot be
given favorable recommendation.

Moreover, as provided under Section 2 of RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation
Standardization Law, the Department of Budget and Management is directed to establish and
administer a unified compensation and position classification system in the government. The Supreme
Court ruled in the case of Victorina Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119155, dated January 30, 1996,
that this Department has the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation and position
classification system of the National Government.

Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify,
upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are
authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and
determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised
within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under
RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law. We therefore reiterate our
previous stand on the matter.[9] (Emphases supplied)
214
Choco Notes

In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National
Capital Region Office, through a memorandum dated 29 March 1999, recommended to the CSC-Central
Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs disapproval of the plantilla
reclassification.

Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees of the
CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA
stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law
to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions.

The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and reversed
the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. The decretal
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the request of Ronnie N. Rosero, Hubert V. Ruiz, Flordeliza A. Briones, George Q. Dumlao
[and], Corazon A. Santos-Tiu, is hereby denied.[10]

CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same on 09 June 2000.

Given the cacophony of judgments between the DBM and the CSC, petitioner CHREA elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central
Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the
justification that such action is within the ambit of CHRs fiscal autonomy. The fallo of the Court of
Appeals decision provides:

215
Choco Notes

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is ordered DISMISSED and the questioned Civil
Service Commission Resolution No. 99-2800 dated December 16, 1999 as well as No. 001354 dated June
9, 2000, are hereby AFFIRMED. No cost.[11]

Unperturbed, petitioner filed this petition in this Court contending that:

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, THE
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ENJOYS FISCAL AUTONOMY.

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8522 (THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR 1998) DESPITE ITS BEING IN SHARP CONFLICT WITH THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND THE STATUTE
ITSELF.

C.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE VALIDITY OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION RESOLUTION NOS. 992800 AND 001354 AS WELL AS THAT OF THE OPINION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN STATING THAT THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ENJOYS FISCAL
AUTONOMY UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND THAT THIS FISCAL AUTONOMY INCLUDES THE
ACTION TAKEN BY IT IN COLLAPSING, UPGRADING AND RECLASSIFICATION OF POSITIONS THEREIN.[12]

216
Choco Notes

The central question we must answer in order to resolve this case is: Can the Commission on Human
Rights validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in
the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?

Petitioner CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-Central Office both erred in sanctioning
the CHRs alleged blanket authority to upgrade, reclassify, and create positions inasmuch as the
approval of the DBM relative to such scheme is still indispensable. Petitioner bewails that the CSC and
the Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar as financial matters
are concerned, particularly with regard to the upgrading and reclassification of positions therein.

Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus standi considering that there exists no
official written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona fide organization of its
employees nor is there anything in the records to show that its president, Marcial A. Sanchez, Jr., has
the authority to sue the CHR. The CHR contends that it has the authority to cause the upgrading,
reclassification, plantilla creation, and collapsing scheme sans the approval of the DBM because it enjoys
fiscal autonomy.

After a thorough consideration of the arguments of both parties and an assiduous scrutiny of the
records in the case at bar, it is the Courts opinion that the present petition is imbued with merit.

On petitioners personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one
who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained
of.[13] Here, petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that the
upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the
Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the
injury test. Indeed, the CHRs upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the
Commissions savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services,
from which the benefits of the employees, including those in the rank and file, are derived.

217
Choco Notes

Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance
of the CHREAs request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital Region Office.
CHREAs personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the Court of Appeals when it passed upon the
merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled
jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice,
and due process.[14]

We now delve into the main issue of whether or not the approval by the DBM is a condition precedent
to the enactment of an upgrading, reclassification, creation and collapsing of plantilla positions in the
CHR.

Germane to our discussion is Rep. Act No. 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and
Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization
Law, dated 01 July 1989, which provides in Sections 2 and 4 thereof that it is the DBM that shall
establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System. Thus:

SEC. 2. Statement of Policy. -- It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide equal pay for
substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. In determining rates of pay, due regard
shall be given to, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. For this
purpose, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is hereby directed to establish and
administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System, hereinafter referred to as the
System as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended, that shall be applied for all
government entities, as mandated by the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied.)

SEC. 4. Coverage. The Compensation and Position Classification System herein provided shall apply to
all positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing or hereafter created in the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial
institutions.

218
Choco Notes

The term government refers to the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches and the
Constitutional Commissions and shall include all, but shall not be limited to, departments, bureaus,
offices, boards, commissions, courts, tribunals, councils, authorities, administrations, centers, institutes,
state colleges and universities, local government units, and the armed forces. The term government-
owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall include all corporations and financial
institutions owned or controlled by the National Government, whether such corporations and financial
institutions perform governmental or proprietary functions. (Emphasis supplied.)

The disputation of the Court of Appeals that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary
Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof, as defined above, encompasses the
entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.

This power to administer is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the Court of
Appeals. The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or
superintend the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to
administer the government of the state.[15]

The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in
jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA) v. Jesusito L.
Buag,[16] this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Reynato Puno, ruled that compensation, allowances,
and other benefits received by PRA officials and employees without the requisite approval or authority
of the DBM are unauthorized and irregular. In the words of the Court

Despite the power granted to the Board of Directors of PRA to establish and fix a compensation and
benefits scheme for its employees, the same is subject to the review of the Department of Budget and
Management. However, in view of the express powers granted to PRA under its charter, the extent of
the review authority of the Department of Budget and Management is limited. As stated in Intia, the
task of the Department of Budget and Management is simply to review the compensation and benefits
plan of the government agency or entity concerned and determine if the same complies with the
prescribed policies and guidelines issued in this regard. The role of the Department of Budget and
Management is supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to ascertain that the proposed
219
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compensation, benefits and other incentives to be given to PRA officials and employees adhere to the
policies and guidelines issued in accordance with applicable laws.

In Victorina Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[17] we held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to
administer the compensation and position classification system of the national government.

In Intia, Jr. v. Commission on Audit,[18] the Court held that although the charter[19] of the Philippine
Postal Corporation (PPC) grants it the power to fix the compensation and benefits of its employees and
exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position
Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system established by the
PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM. This Court intoned:

It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the compensation
structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC
Board of Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBMs function is
merely to ensure that the action taken by the Board of Directors complies with the requirements of the
law, specifically, that PPCs compensation system conforms as closely as possible with that provided for
under R.A. No. 6758. (Emphasis supplied.)

As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must first
be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. This
is consonant to the mandate of the DBM under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Section 3,
Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:

SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the President
in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control
of the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary
process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations,
administration of compensation and position classification systems, assessment of organizational
220
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effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational
implications. (Emphasis supplied.)

Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and
creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal
justification.

Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed
reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As
such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously sought from the
DBM is a superfluity.

The Court of Appeals incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is
a constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.[20]

Palpably, the Court of Appeals Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the
species of constitutional commissions. But, Article IX of the Constitution states in no uncertain terms
that only the CSC, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall be tagged as
Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy. Thus:

Sec. 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission,
the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.

Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, in Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on Distribution
of Powers of Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the Civil Service
221
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Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit, which are granted
independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of
similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus:

SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent,
are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved
annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

SEC. 29. Other Bodies. There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of the
Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority, and a
national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may establish an
independent economic and planning agency. (Emphasis ours.)

From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not
among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others.
Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an end to what is
implied.[21]

Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence,
fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by law.
It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to
the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to time.[22] In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon
v. Drilon,[23] it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission
on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Thus, in Bengzon,[24] we explained:

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As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman
contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and
dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees,
fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay
plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed
by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

. . .

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express
mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest
of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, [the] Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this
grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision. (Emphasis supplied.)

Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy
Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a
tag obtainable by membership.

We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the heading
of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the special provision to
formulate and implement organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage to include
Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy. In contrast, the Special Provision
Applicable to the Judiciary under Article XXVIII of the General Appropriations Act of 1998 specifically
mentions that such special provision applies to the judiciary and had categorically authorized the Chief
223
Choco Notes

Justice of the Supreme Court to formulate and implement the organizational structure of the Judiciary,
to wit:

1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding and within the limits of
their respective appropriations authorized in this Act, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is
authorized to formulate and implement organizational structure of the Judiciary, to fix and determine
the salaries, allowances, and other benefits of their personnel, and whenever public interest so requires,
make adjustments in the personal services itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer of item
or creation of new positions in the Judiciary; PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions
are affected by such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation
pay in accordance with existing law, which shall be payable from any unexpended balance of, or savings
in the appropriations of their respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof
shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation
standardization laws. (Emphasis supplied.)

All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus
of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.

Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that
the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the
Salary Standardization Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thus-

Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify,
upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are
authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and
determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised
within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under
RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.[25] (Emphasis supplied.)

224
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The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act No.
8522 that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other
benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws.*26+

Indeed, the law upon which respondent heavily anchors its case upon has expressly provided that any
form of adjustment in the organizational structure must be within the parameters of the Salary
Standardization Law.

The Salary Standardization Law has gained impetus in addressing one of the basic causes of discontent
of many civil servants.[27] For this purpose, Congress has delegated to the DBM the power to administer
the Salary Standardization Law and to ensure that the spirit behind it is observed. This power is part of
the system of checks and balances or system of restraints in our government. The DBMs exercise of
such authority is not in itself an arrogation inasmuch as it is pursuant to the paramount law of the land,
the Salary Standardization Law and the Administrative Code.

In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law of providing
equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in
duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions, the DBM, in the case under
review, made a determination, after a thorough evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading
scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal rationalization.

The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY
1998, which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that no
organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by
the President. Here, the DBM discerned that there is no law authorizing the creation of a Finance
Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHRs proposal to upgrade twelve
positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director
IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this would change the context from
support to substantive without actual change in functions.

225
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This view of the DBM, as the laws designated body to implement and administer a unified
compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government agency,
which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction
of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,[28] we echoed the basic rule that the
courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of
such agencies.

To be sure, considering his expertise on matters affecting the nations coffers, the Secretary of the DBM,
as the Presidents alter ego, knows from where he speaks inasmuch as he has the front seat view of the
adverse effects of an unwarranted upgrading or creation of positions in the CHR in particular and in the
entire government in general.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision dated 29 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 and its Resolution dated 11 September 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The ruling dated 29 March 1999 of the Civil Service Commision-National Capital Region is REINSTATED.
The Commission on Human Rights Resolution No. A98-047 dated 04 September 1998, Resolution No.
A98-055 dated 19 October 1998 and Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998 without the
approval of the Department of Budget and Management are disallowed. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.
CHR Employees Assoc. v CHR digest
Facts:

RA 8522 or the General Appropriations Act of 1998 provided special provisions applicable to all
Constitutional Offices.
The Commission on Human Rights through then its Chair, Aurora P. Navarette Recina and
Commissioner Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo and Jorge R. Coquia
upgraded or raised the salaries (A98-0555 October 1998) reclassified selection positions (Resolution No.
226
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A98-047 September, 1998) and collapsed vacant positions (A98-062 November 1998) without the
approval of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
The petitioners Commission on Human Rights Employees Association (CHREA) through its then President
Marcial A. Sanchez, Jr. filed a petition before the Court of Appeals alleging that they have locus standi
because the reorganization demoralizes the rank and file employees and will only benefit those in top
positions; but, the Court of Appeals (CA) exempted the CHR from the Salary Standardization Law.

Issue: Whether the fiscal autonomy enjoyed the CHR emp0wers them to reclassify, adjust salaries and
collapse vacant positions without the approval of DBM?

Held:

No. The Supreme Court held that the duty of DBM is to ascertain that the proposed compensation,
benefits and other incentives be given in adherence to the policies and guidelines in accordance with
applicable laws. The mandate of the DBM under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Section 4,
Chapter 1, Title XVII to wit: shall assist the President in the preparation of a national resources and
expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and
maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy
and efficiency in the management of government operations, administration of compensation and
position classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of
legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications. Furthermore, Administrative Code,
in Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional
commissions shall include only the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit, which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy.
Philconsa v. Enriquez
G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and A. GONZALES, petitioners,
227
Choco Notes

vs.
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and Management; HON. VICENTE T. TAN, as
National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

G.R. No. 113174 August 19, 1994

RAUL S. ROCO, as Member of the Philippine Senate, NEPTALI A. GONZALES, Chairman of the Committee
on Finance of the Philippine Senate, and EDGARDO J. ANGARA, as President and Chief Executive of the
Philippine Senate, all of whom also sue as taxpayers, in their own behalf and in representation of
Senators HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, JOSE D. LINA, JR., ERNESTO F.
HERRERA, BLAS F. OPLE, JOHN H. OSMENA, GLORIA MACAPAGAL- ARROYO, VICENTE C. SOTTO III,
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, WIGBERTO E. TAADA and FREDDIE N. WEBB,
petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, and THE NATIONAL
TREASURER, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, impleaded herein as an unwilling
co-petitioner, respondents.

G.R. No. 113766 August 19, 1994

WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as Members of the Senate and as taxpayers, and
FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ,
JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, HON. CARIDAD
VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer, and THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

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G.R. No. 113888 August 19, 1994

WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as Members of the Senate and as taxpayers,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ,
JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, HON. CARIDAD
VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer, and THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

Ramon R. Gonzales for petitioners in G.R. No. 113105.

Eddie Tamondong for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 113766 & 113888.

Roco, Buag, Kapunan, Migallos & Jardeleza for petitioners Raul S. Roco, Neptali A. Gonzales and
Edgardo Angara.

Ceferino Padua Law Office fro intervenor Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (Lamp).

QUIASON, J.:

Once again this Court is called upon to rule on the conflicting claims of authority between the Legislative
and the Executive in the clash of the powers of the purse and the sword. Providing the focus for the
contest between the President and the Congress over control of the national budget are the four cases
229
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at bench. Judicial intervention is being sought by a group of concerned taxpayers on the claim that
Congress and the President have impermissibly exceeded their respective authorities, and by several
Senators on the claim that the President has committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without
jurisdiction in the exercise of his veto power.

I

House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by
both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on
certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also
authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them
and to realign their respective operating budgets.

Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution,
Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.

On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become
Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the
President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on
which he imposed certain conditions.

No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the vetoes.

In G.R. No. 113105, the Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon A. Gonzales as
taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLI on the
Countrywide Development Fund, the special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for
Operational Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount
230
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appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9 Billion allocated for the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the veto of the President of the Special Provision of
Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 88-90, 104-105)

In G.R. No. 113174, sixteen members of the Senate led by Senate President Edgardo J. Angara, Senator
Neptali A. Gonzales, the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, and Senator Raul S. Roco, sought the
issuance of the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and the National Treasurer.

Suing as members of the Senate and taxpayers, petitioners question: (1) the constitutionality of the
conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b)
Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed
Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU'S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC's); and (2) the
constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service.

In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Alberto G. Romulo and Wigberto Taada (a co-petitioner in G.R. No.
113174), together with the Freedom from Debt Coalition, a non-stock domestic corporation, sought the
issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, the National Treasurer, and the COA.

Petitioners Taada and Romulo sued as members of the Philippine Senate and taxpayers, while
petitioner Freedom from Debt Coalition sued as a taxpayer. They challenge the constitutionality of the
Presidential veto of the special provision in the appropriations for debt service and the automatic
appropriation of funds therefor.

In G.R. No. 11388, Senators Taada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this petition, petitioners contest the
constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provision added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and
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(2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).

Petitioners also sought the issuance of temporary restraining orders to enjoin respondents Secretary of
Budget and Management, National Treasurer and COA from enforcing the questioned provisions of the
GAA of 1994, but the Court declined to grant said provisional reliefs on the time- honored principle of
according the presumption of validity to statutes and the presumption of regularity to official acts.

In view of the importance and novelty of most of the issues raised in the four petitions, the Court invited
former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former Associate Justice Irene Cortes to submit their
respective memoranda as Amicus curiae, which they graciously did.

II

Locus Standi

When issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are compresent: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal
and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial
review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the
case (Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 [1990]; Dumlao v.
Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).

While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 113105, he
claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other petitions is political (i.e., to override the vetoes) in
effect saying that they do not have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits.

232
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The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA
452 (1990). In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire membership of the Upper House of
Congress, filed a petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989. The filing of
the suit was authorized by Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on February 2, 1989, and which reads as
follows:

Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of the
Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the Constitutionality of
the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General
Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes.

In the United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress to sue has been recognized (United
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F. 2d 384, 391 [1976]; Notes: Congressional Access To The Federal
Courts, 90 Harvard Law Review 1632 [1977]).

While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including the Senate President and the
Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was not authorized by the Senate itself. Likewise, the
petitions in
G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an enabling resolution for the purpose.

Therefore, the question of the legal standing of petitioners in the three cases becomes a preliminary
issue before this Court can inquire into the validity of the presidential veto and the conditions for the
implementation of some items in the GAA of 1994.

We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal
standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an
appropriation bill.

233
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Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the
President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain
of the Legislature arises (Notes: Congressional Standing To Challenge Executive Action, 122 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1366 [1974]).

To the extent the power of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution (Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]).

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress (Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp.
353 [1976]). In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted:

This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or individual Senators as such having a
substantial interest in the question at issue. It could likewise be said that there was the requisite injury
to their rights as Senators. It would then be futile to raise any locus standi issue. Any intrusion into the
domain appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly, if the situation were reversed, and it is the
Executive Branch that could allege a transgression, its officials could likewise file the corresponding
action. What cannot be denied is that a Senator has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office (Memorandum, p. 14).

It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said
remedy, however, is available only when the presidential veto is based on policy or political
considerations but not when the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the duty
of the Court to draw the dividing line where the exercise of executive power ends and the bounds of
legislative jurisdiction begin.

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III

G.R. No. 113105

1. Countrywide Development Fund

Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up a Countrywide Development Fund of P2,977,000,000.00 to "be
used for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities
and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries." Said Article provides:

COUNTRYWIDE DEVELOPMENT FUND

For Fund requirements of countrywide
development projects P 2,977,000,000

New Appropriations, by Purpose
Current Operating Expenditures

A. PURPOSE

Personal Maintenance Capital Total
Services and Other Outlays
235
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Operating
Expenses

1. For Countrywide
Developments Projects P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000 P2,977,000,000

TOTAL NEW
APPROPRIATIONS P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000 P2,977,000,000

Special Provisions

1. Use and Release of Funds. The amount herein appropriated shall be used for infrastructure,
purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities, and credit facilities to
qualified beneficiaries as proposed and identified by officials concerned according to the following
allocations: Representatives, P12,500,000 each; Senators, P18,000,000 each; Vice-President,
P20,000,000; PROVIDED, That, the said credit facilities shall be constituted as a revolving fund to be
administered by a government financial institution (GFI) as a trust fund for lending operations. Prior
years releases to local government units and national government agencies for this purpose shall be
turned over to the government financial institution which shall be the sole administrator of credit
facilities released from this fund.

The fund shall be automatically released quarterly by way of Advice of Allotments and Notice of Cash
Allocation directly to the assigned implementing agency not later than five (5) days after the beginning
of each quarter upon submission of the list of projects and activities by the officials concerned.

2. Submission of Quarterly Reports. The Department of Budget and Management shall submit
within thirty (30) days after the end of each quarter a report to the Senate Committee on Finance and
236
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the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from this Fund. The report shall include
the listing of the projects, locations, implementing agencies and the endorsing officials (GAA of 1994, p.
1245).

Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the projects
and activities to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund is an encroachment by the legislature
on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act in implementation of a law. They argue
that the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution (Rollo, pp. 78- 86).

Under the Constitution, the spending power called by James Madison as "the power of the purse,"
belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President. The President may propose the
budget, but still the final say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in the Congress.

The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded
under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.

The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure, purchase of
ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to qualified
beneficiaries . . ." It was Congress itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation.

Executive function under the Countrywide Development Fund involves implementation of the priority
projects specified in the law.

The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be
implemented by the President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994, the President must perforce
examine whether the proposals submitted by the members of Congress fall within the specific items of
expenditures for which the Fund was set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are in
line with other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for funding
237
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under the Funds, it is the President who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and
identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory.

The procedure of proposing and identifying by members of Congress of particular projects or activities
under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 is imaginative as it is innovative.

The Constitution is a framework of a workable government and its interpretation must take into account
the complexities, realities and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of
government. Prior to the GAA of 1991, there was an uneven allocation of appropriations for the
constituents of the members of Congress, with the members close to the Congressional leadership or
who hold cards for "horse-trading," getting more than their less favored colleagues. The members of
Congress also had to reckon with an unsympathetic President, who could exercise his veto power to
cancel from the appropriation bill a pet project of a Representative or Senator.

The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that
individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues are
likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given
each project.

2. Realignment of Operating Expenses

Under the GAA of 1994, the appropriation for the Senate is P472,000,000.00 of which P464,447,000.00
is appropriated for current operating expenditures, while the appropriation for the House of
Representatives is P1,171,924,000.00 of which P1,165,297,000.00 is appropriated for current operating
expenditures (GAA of 1994, pp. 2, 4, 9, 12).

The 1994 operating expenditures for the Senate are as follows:

238
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Personal Services

Salaries, Permanent 153,347
Salaries/Wage, Contractual/Emergency 6,870

Total Salaries and Wages 160,217
=======

Other Compensation

Step Increments 1,073
Honoraria and Commutable Allowances 3,731
Compensation Insurance Premiums 1,579
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 1,184
Medicare Premiums 888
Bonus and Cash Gift 14,791
Terminal Leave Benefits 2,000
Personnel Economic Relief Allowance 10,266
Additional Compensation of P500 under A.O. 53 11,130
Others 57,173
239
Choco Notes

Total Other Compensation 103,815

01 Total Personal Services 264,032
=======

Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses

02 Traveling Expenses 32,841
03 Communication Services 7,666
04 Repair and Maintenance of Government Facilities 1,220
05 Repair and Maintenance of Government Vehicles 318
06 Transportation Services 128
07 Supplies and Materials 20,189
08 Rents 24,584
14 Water/Illumination and Power 6,561
15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 3,270
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 2,225
18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses 9,360
23 Advertising and Publication
24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,325
29 Other Services 89,778
240
Choco Notes

Total Maintenance and Other Operating Expenditures 200,415

Total Current Operating Expenditures 464,447
=======

(GAA of 1994, pp. 3-4)

The 1994 operating expenditures for the House of Representatives are as follows:

Personal Services

Salaries, Permanent 261,557
Salaries/Wages, Contractual/Emergency 143,643

Total Salaries and Wages 405,200
=======

Other Compensation

Step Increments 4,312
Honoraria and Commutable
241
Choco Notes

Allowances 4,764
Compensation Insurance
Premiums 1,159
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 5,231
Medicare Premiums 2,281

Bonus and Cash Gift 35,669
Terminal Leave Benefits 29
Personnel Economic Relief
Allowance 21,150
Additional Compensation of P500 under A.O. 53
Others 106,140

Total Other Compensation 202,863

01 Total Personal Services 608,063
=======

Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses

02 Traveling Expenses 139,611
03 Communication Services 22,514
242
Choco Notes

04 Repair and Maintenance of Government Facilities 5,116
05 Repair and Maintenance of Government Vehicles 1,863
06 Transportation Services 178
07 Supplies and Materials 55,248
10 Grants/Subsidies/Contributions 940
14 Water/Illumination and Power 14,458
15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 325
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 7,236
18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses 14,474
20 Anti-Insurgency/Contingency Emergency Expenses 9,400
23 Advertising and Publication 242
24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,420
29 Other Services 284,209

Total Maintenance and Other Operating Expenditures 557,234

Total Current Operating Expenditures 1,165,297
=======

(GAA of 1994, pp. 11-12)

The Special Provision Applicable to the Congress of the Philippines provides:
243
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4. Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses. A member of Congress may realign his
allocation for operational expenses to any other expenses category provide the total of said allocation is
not exceeded. (GAA of 1994, p. 14).

The appropriation for operating expenditures for each House is further divided into expenditures for
salaries, personal services, other compensation benefits, maintenance expenses and other operating
expenses. In turn, each member of Congress is allotted for his own operating expenditure a
proportionate share of the appropriation for the House to which he belongs. If he does not spend for
one items of expense, the provision in question allows him to transfer his allocation in said item to
another item of expense.

Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for
operational expenses to any other expense category (Rollo, pp. 82-92), claiming that this practice is
prohibited by Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. Said section provides:

No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations: however, the President, the President
of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.

The proviso of said Article of the Constitution grants the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives the power to augment items in an appropriation act for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their appropriations, whenever there is a law authorizing such
augmentation.

The special provision on realignment of the operating expenses of members of Congress is authorized by
Section 16 of the General Provisions of the GAA of 1994, which provides:
244
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Expenditure Components. Except by act of the Congress of the Philippines, no change or modification
shall be made in the expenditure items authorized in this Act and other appropriation laws unless in
cases
of augmentations from savings in appropriations as authorized under Section 25(5) of Article VI of the
Constitution (GAA of 1994, p. 1273).

Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, but not
the individual members of Congress are the ones authorized to realign the savings as appropriated.

Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the members of Congress
only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for their operating
expenses. They are in the best position to do so because they are the ones who know whether there are
savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in other items of their operating
expenses that need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of
approval, these two officials will have to see to it that:

(1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from
which the same are to be taken; and

(2) The transfer or realignment is for the purposes of augmenting the items of expenditure to which
said transfer or realignment is to be made.

3. Highest Priority for Debt Service

While Congress appropriated P86,323,438,000.00 for debt service (Article XLVII of the GAA of 1994), it
appropriated only P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of Education Culture and Sports. Petitioners
245
Choco Notes

urged that Congress cannot give debt service the highest priority in the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 93-94)
because under the Constitution it should be education that is entitled to the highest funding. They
invoke Section 5(5), Article XIV thereof, which provides:

(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will
attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and
other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.

This issue was raised in Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991), where this Court held that
Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, is merely directory, thus:

While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to "assign
the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as
to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of
other state policies or objectives.

As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade and
improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been doubled. The
amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the
General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6381), is the highest budgetary allocation among all department
budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest priority
to education.

Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its
good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the
greater portion of which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor
and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at
stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share
246
Choco Notes

allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed
as unconstitutional.

G.R. No. 113105
G.R. No. 113174

Veto of Provision on Debt Ceiling

The Congress added a Special Provision to Article XLVIII (Appropriations for Debt Service) of the GAA of
1994 which provides:

Special Provisions

1. Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein shall be used for payment of principal and
interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness; PROVIDED, That any payment in excess of the amount
herein appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with the
concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall this fund be
used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators.

2. Reporting Requirement. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Department of Finance shall
submit a quarterly report of actual foreign and domestic debt service payments to the House Committee
on Appropriations and Senate Finance Committee within one (1) month after each quarter (GAA of
1944, pp. 1266).

The President vetoed the first Special Provision, without vetoing the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation
for debt service in said Article. According to the President's Veto Message:
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IV. APPROPRIATIONS FOR DEBT SERVICE

I would like to emphasize that I concur fully with the desire of Congress to reduce the debt burden by
decreasing the appropriation for debt service as well as the inclusion of the Special Provision quoted
below. Nevertheless, I believe that this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994
GAA. This must be addressed by revising our debt policy by way of innovative and comprehensive debt
reduction programs conceptualized within the ambit of the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan.

Appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated
pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26,
Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987. I wish to emphasize that the
constitutionality of such automatic provisions on debt servicing has been upheld by the Supreme Court
in the case of "Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., and Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Guillermo N. Carague, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, et al.," G.R. No. 94571, dated April 22, 1991.

I am, therefore vetoing the following special provision for the reason that the GAA is not the appropriate
legislative measure to amend the provisions of the Foreign Borrowing Act, P.D. No. 1177 and E.O. No.
292:

Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein shall be used for payment of principal and interest
of foreign and domestic indebtedness: PROVIDED, That any payment in excess of the amount herein
appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of
the Congress of the Philippines: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall this fund be used to pay for
the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators (GAA of 1994, p. 1290).

Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the Special Provision on the appropriation for debt
service without vetoing the entire amount of P86,323,438.00 for said purpose (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105,
pp. 93-98; Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 16-18). The Solicitor General counterposed that the Special
248
Choco Notes

Provision did not relate to the item of appropriation for debt service and could therefore be the subject
of an item veto (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 54-60; Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 72-82).

This issue is a mere rehash of the one put to rest in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990). In
that case, the issue was stated by the Court, thus:

The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the President of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Section 55
FY '89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY
'90), is unconstitutional and without effect.

The Court re-stated the issue, just so there would not be any misunderstanding about it, thus:

The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded
by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto "provisions" of an
Appropriations Bill?

The bases of the petition in Gonzales, which are similar to those invoked in the present case, are stated
as follows:

In essence, petitioners' cause is anchored on the following grounds: (1) the President's line-veto power
as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she
exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) which are
provisions; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the
item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the
power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987
249
Choco Notes

Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative
to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.

The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without
vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill
may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision
in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and
that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987
Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an
Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and
does not relate to the entire bill.

The Court went one step further and ruled that even assuming arguendo that "provisions" are beyond
the executive power to veto, and Section 55
(FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) were not "provisions" in the budgetary sense of the term, they are
"inappropriate provisions" that should be treated as "items" for the purpose of the President's veto
power.

The Court, citing Henry v. Edwards, La., 346 So. 2d 153 (1977), said that Congress cannot include in a
general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it
does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as "item", which can be vetoed by
the President in the exercise of his item-veto power.

It is readily apparent that the Special Provision applicable to the appropriation for debt service insofar as
it refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill, is an "inappropriate" provision
referring to funds other than the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of
1991.

250
Choco Notes

Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign
Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the Court in
Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.

The Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto, the same as it will
presume the constitutionality of an act of Congress (Texas Co. v. State, 254 P. 1060; 31 Ariz, 485, 53
A.L.R. 258 [1927]).

The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process
(Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is found in Article VI on
the Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive Department in the Constitution.
There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on
those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.

Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power is the power given to the
President to veto any particular item or items in a general appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI,
Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire item.

A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of
money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit (Beckman, The Item Veto Power of the
Executive,
31 Temple Law Quarterly 27 [1957]).

The item veto was first introduced by the Organic Act of the Philippines passed by the U.S. Congress on
August 29, 1916. The concept was adopted from some State Constitutions.

251
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Cognizant of the legislative practice of inserting provisions, including conditions, restrictions and
limitations, to items in appropriations bills, the Constitutional Convention added the following sentence
to Section 20(2), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution:

. . . When a provision of an appropriation bill affect one or more items of the same, the President cannot
veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates . . . .

In short, under the 1935 Constitution, the President was empowered to veto separately not only items
in an appropriations bill but also "provisions".

While the 1987 Constitution did not retain the aforementioned sentence added to Section 11(2) of
Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, it included the following provision:

No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in
its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (Art. VI, Sec. 25[2]).

In Gonzales, we made it clear that the omission of that sentence of Section 16(2) of the 1935
Constitution in the 1987 Constitution should not be interpreted to mean the disallowance of the power
of the President to veto a "provision".

As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill
must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular
item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate
provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the category of
"inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend
other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill. These are matters
of general legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate enactments. Former Justice Irene
252
Choco Notes

Cortes, as Amicus Curiae, commented that Congress cannot by law establish conditions for and regulate
the exercise of powers of the President given by the Constitution for that would be an unconstitutional
intrusion into executive prerogative.

The doctrine of "inappropriate provision" was well elucidated in Henry v. Edwards, supra., thus:

Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional powers conferred on the
legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers conferred on
him as chief executive officer of the state by including in a general appropriation bill matters more
properly enacted in separate legislation. The Governor's constitutional power to veto bills of general
legislation . . . cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such measures in a general appropriation
bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose between approving unacceptable substantive legislation or
vetoing "items" of expenditures essential to the operation of government. The legislature cannot by
location of a bill give it immunity from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's veto power
over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true
conditions or limitations on an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to
impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of government in
contravention of the separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no more willing to allow the legislature
to use its appropriation power to infringe on the Governor's constitutional right to veto matters of
substantive legislation than we are to allow the Governor to encroach on the Constitutional powers of
the legislature. In order to avoid this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts inappropriate
provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as "items" for purposes of the
Governor's item veto power over general appropriation bills.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to encumber the general appropriation
bill with veto-proof "logrolling measures", special interest provisions which could not succeed if
separately enacted, or "riders", substantive pieces of legislation incorporated in a bill to insure passage
without veto . . . (Emphasis supplied).

253
Choco Notes

Petitioners contend that granting arguendo that the veto of the Special Provision on the ceiling for debt
payment is valid, the President cannot automatically appropriate funds for debt payment without
complying with the conditions for automatic appropriation under the provisions of R.A. No. 4860 as
amended by P.D. No. 81 and the provisions of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by the Administrative Code of
1987 and P.D. No. 1967 (Rollo, G.R. No. 113766, pp. 9-15).

Petitioners cannot anticipate that the President will not faithfully execute the laws. The writ of
prohibition will not issue on the fear that official actions will be done in contravention of the laws.

The President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the Special Provision of the item on debt service,
including the provisions that the appropriation authorized in said item "shall be used for payment of the
principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and that "in no case shall this fund be used
to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." These provisions are germane to and
have a direct connection with the item on debt service. Inherent in the power of appropriation is the
power to specify how the money shall be spent (Henry v. Edwards, LA, 346 So., 2d., 153). The said
provisos, being appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the item veto of said
provisions is void.

We reiterate, in order to obviate any misunderstanding, that we are sustaining the veto of the Special
Provision of the item on debt service only with respect to the proviso therein requiring that "any
payment in excess of the amount herein, appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the President
of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines . . ."

G.R. NO. 113174
G.R. NO. 113766
G.R. NO. 11388

1. Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUC's.
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Choco Notes

In the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC's), the President vetoed special provisions
which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds. The
Special Provisions vetoed are the following:

(H. 7) West Visayas State University

Equal Sharing of Income. Income earned by the University subject to Section 13 of the special provisions
applicable to all State Universities and Colleges shall be equally shared by the University and the
University Hospital (GAA of 1994, p. 395).

xxx xxx xxx

(J. 3) Leyte State College

Revolving Fund for the Operation of LSC House and Human Resources Development Center (HRDC). The
income of Leyte State College derived from the operation of its LSC House and HRDC shall be constituted
into a Revolving Fund to be deposited in an authorized government depository bank for the operational
expenses of these projects/services. The net income of the Revolving Fund at the end of the year shall
be remitted to the National Treasury and shall accrue to the General Fund. The implementing guidelines
shall be issued by the Department of Budget and Management (GAA of 1994, p. 415).

The vetoed Special Provisions applicable to all SUC's are the following:

12. Use of Income from Extension Services. State Universities and Colleges are authorized to use
their income from their extension services. Subject to the approval of the Board of Regents and the
approval of a special budget pursuant to Sec. 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O.
255
Choco Notes

No. 292, such income shall be utilized solely for faculty development, instructional materials and work
study program (GAA of 1994, p. 490).

xxx xxx xxx

13. Income of State Universities and Colleges. The income of State Universities and Colleges derived
from tuition fees and other sources as may be imposed by governing boards other than those accruing
to revolving funds created under LOI Nos. 872 and 1026 and those authorized to be recorded as trust
receipts pursuant to Section 40, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 shall be deposited with the National
Treasury and recorded as a Special Account in the General Fund pursuant to P.D. No. 1234 and P.D. No.
1437 for the use of the institution, subject to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292L PROVIDED,
That disbursements from the Special Account shall not exceed the amount actually earned and
deposited: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That a cash advance on such income may be allowed State half of
income actually realized during the preceding year and this cash advance shall be charged against
income actually earned during the budget year: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That in no case shall such
funds be used to create positions, nor for payment of salaries, wages or allowances, except as may be
specifically approved by the Department of Budge and Management for income-producing activities, or
to purchase equipment or books, without the prior approval of the President of the Philippines pursuant
to Letter of Implementation No. 29.

All collections of the State Universities and Colleges for fees, charges and receipts intended for private
recipient units, including private foundations affiliated with these institutions shall be duly
acknowledged with official receipts and deposited as a trust receipt before said income shall be subject
to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292
(GAA of 1994, p. 490).

The President gave his reason for the veto thus:

Pursuant to Section 65 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, Section 44, Chapter 5, Book
VI of E.O. No. 292, s. 1987 and Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, all income earned by all
256
Choco Notes

Government offices and agencies shall accrue to the General Fund of the Government in line with the
One Fund Policy enunciated by Section 29 (1), Article VI and Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution.
Likewise, the creation and establishment of revolving funds shall be authorized by substantive law
pursuant to Section 66 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines and Section 45, Chapter 5,
Book VI of E.O. No. 292.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution and existing law, I have noted the
proliferation of special provisions authorizing the use of agency income as well as the creation,
operation and maintenance of revolving funds.

I would like to underscore the facts that such income were already considered as integral part of the
revenue and financing sources of the National Expenditure Program which I previously submitted to
Congress. Hence, the grant of new special provisions authorizing the use of agency income and the
establishment of revolving funds over and above the agency appropriations authorized in this Act shall
effectively reduce the financing sources of the 1994 GAA and, at the same time, increase the level of
expenditures of some agencies beyond the well-coordinated, rationalized levels for such agencies. This
corresponding increases the overall deficit of the National Government (Veto Message, p. 3).

Petitioners claim that the President acted with grave abuse of discretion when he disallowed by his veto
the "use of income" and the creation of "revolving fund" by the Western Visayas State University and
Leyte State Colleges when he allowed other government offices, like the National Stud Farm, to use their
income for their operating expenses (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 15-16).

There was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing
similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their
income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying
such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the "one-
fund policy" (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and
Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Management's Procurement
Service).

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2. Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.

In the appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways, the President vetoed the second
paragraph of Special Provision No. 2, specifying the 30% maximum ration of works to be contracted for
the maintenance of national roads and bridges. The said paragraph reads as follows:

2. Release and Use of Road Maintenance Funds. Funds allotted for the maintenance and repair of
roads which are provided in this Act for the Department of Public Works and Highways shall be released
to the respective Engineering District, subject to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the
Department of Budget and Management. Maintenance funds for roads and bridges shall be exempt
from budgetary reserve.

Of the amount herein appropriated for the maintenance of national roads and bridges, a maximum of
thirty percent (30%) shall be contracted out in accordance with guidelines to be issued by the
Department of Public Works and Highways. The balance shall be used for maintenance by force account.

Five percent (5%) of the total road maintenance fund appropriated herein to be applied across the
board to the allocation of each region shall be set aside for the maintenance of roads which may be
converted to or taken over as national roads during the current year and the same shall be released to
the central office of the said department for eventual
sub-allotment to the concerned region and district: PROVIDED, That any balance of the said five percent
(5%) shall be restored to the regions on a pro-rata basis for the maintenance of existing national roads.

No retention or deduction as reserves or overhead expenses shall be made, except as authorized by law
or upon direction of the President
(GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786; Emphasis supplied).

The President gave the following reason for the veto:
258
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While I am cognizant of the well-intended desire of Congress to impose certain restrictions contained in
some special provisions, I am equally aware that many programs, projects and activities of agencies
would require some degree of flexibility to ensure their successful implementation and therefore risk
their completion. Furthermore, not only could these restrictions and limitations derail and impede
program implementation but they may also result in a breach of contractual obligations.

D.1.a. A study conducted by the Infrastructure Agencies show that for practical intent and purposes,
maintenance by contract could be undertaken to an optimum of seventy percent (70%) and the
remaining thirty percent (30%) by force account. Moreover, the policy of maximizing implementation
through contract maintenance is a covenant of the Road and Road Transport Program Loan from the
Asian Development Bank (ADB Loan No. 1047-PHI-1990) and Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
(OECF Loan No. PH-C17-199). The same is a covenant under the World Bank (IBRD) Loan for the Highway
Management Project (IBRD Loan
No. PH-3430) obtained in 1992.

In the light of the foregoing and considering the policy of the government to encourage and maximize
private sector participation in the regular repair and maintenance of infrastructure facilities, I am
directly vetoing the underlined second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (Veto Message, p. 11).

The second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 brings to fore the divergence in policy of Congress and
the President. While Congress expressly laid down the condition that only 30% of the total appropriation
for road maintenance should be contracted out, the President, on the basis of a comprehensive study,
believed that contracting out road maintenance projects at an option of 70% would be more efficient,
economical and practical.

The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It
is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specified how the said
item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
259
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The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an
expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they
are "appropriate" in the budgetary sense (Art. VII, Sec. 25[2]).

The Solicitor General was hard put in justifying the veto of this special provision. He merely argued that
the provision is a complete turnabout from an entrenched practice of the government to maximize
contract maintenance (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 85-86). That is not a ground to veto a provision
separate from the item to which it refers.

The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is therefore
unconstitutional.

3. Veto of provision on purchase of medicines by AFP.

In the appropriation for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the President vetoed the special
provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No.
6675). The vetoed provision reads:

12. Purchase of Medicines. The purchase of medicines by all Armed Forces of the Philippines units,
hospitals and clinics shall strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the
Department of Health (GAA of 1994, p. 748).

According to the President, while it is desirable to subject the purchase of medicines to a standard
formulary, "it is believed more prudent to provide for a transition period for its adoption and smooth
implementation in the Armed Forces of the Philippines" (Veto Message, p. 12).

260
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The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply
with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an
"appropriate" provision. it is a mere advertence by Congress to the fact that there is an existing law, the
Generics Act of 1988, that requires "the extensive use of drugs with generic names through a rational
system of procurement and distribution." The President believes that it is more prudent to provide for a
transition period for the smooth implementation of the law in the case of purchases by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, as implied by Section 11 (Education Drive) of the law itself. This belief,
however, cannot justify his veto of the provision on the purchase of medicines by the AFP.

Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the
AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item (Bolinao
Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]).

4. Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment.

In the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP, the President vetoed the underlined proviso of
Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund," which requires the prior approval of Congress for the
release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provisions
No. 3 on the "Specific Prohibition":

2. Use of the Fund. Of the amount herein appropriated, priority shall be given for the acquisition of
AFP assets necessary for protecting marine, mineral, forest and other resources within Philippine
territorial borders and its economic zone, detection, prevention or deterrence of air or surface
intrusions and to support diplomatic moves aimed at preserving national dignity, sovereignty and
patrimony: PROVIDED, That the said modernization fund shall not be released until a Table of
Organization and Equipment for FY 1994-2000 is submitted to and approved by Congress.

3. Specific Prohibition. The said Modernization Fund shall not be used for payment of six (6)
additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers (GAA of
1994, p. 747).
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As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the
Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, "shall effectively
alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed
necessary to modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines" (Veto Message, p. 12).

Petitioners claim that Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund" and Special Provision No. 3 are
conditions or limitations related to the item on the AFP modernization plan.

The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund" for the AFP modernization program
that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an
exercise of the "congressional or legislative veto." By way of definition, a congressional veto is a means
whereby the legislature can block or modify administrative action taken under a statute. It is a form of
legislative control in the implementation of particular executive actions. The form may be either
negative, that is requiring disapproval of the executive action, or affirmative, requiring approval of the
executive action. This device represents a significant attempt by Congress to move from oversight of the
executive to shared administration (Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The
Executive on a Leash,
56 North Carolina Law Review, 423 [1978]).

A congressional veto is subject to serious questions involving the principle of separation of powers.

However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the
legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be
disposed of on other grounds. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or
requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill.
Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.

262
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As commented by Justice Irene Cortes in her memorandum as Amicus Curiae: "What Congress cannot
do directly by law it cannot do indirectly by attaching conditions to the exercise of that power (of the
President as Commander-in-Chief) through provisions in the appropriation law."

Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization Funds for payment of the
trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of
the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec.
10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself.

The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.

5. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds.

In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, the President vetoed the new provision
authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. The
vetoed provision reads:

2. Use of Savings. The Chief of Staff, AFP, is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
National Defense, to use savings in the appropriations provided herein to augment the pension fund
being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System as provided under Sections 2(a)
and 3 of P.D. No. 361 (GAA of 1994,
p. 746).

According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct
appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated
in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution (Veto Message, pp. 7-8).

263
Choco Notes

Petitioners claim that the Special Provision on AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund is a condition or limitation
which is so intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not be separated therefrom.

The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the
AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5)
and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.

Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, and under
Section 29(1), no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. While Section 25(5) allows as an
exception the realignment of savings to augment items in the general appropriations law for the
executive branch, such right must and can be exercised only by the President pursuant to a specific law.

6. Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU's.

Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU's, including the payment of separation benefits but
it added the following Special Provision:

1. CAFGU Compensation and Separation Benefit. The appropriation authorized herein shall be
used for the compensation of CAFGU's including the payment of their separation benefit not exceeding
one (1) year subsistence allowance for the 11,000 members who will be deactivated in 1994. The Chief
of Staff, AFP, shall, subject to the approval of the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate policies and
procedures for the payment of separation benefit (GAA of 1994, p. 740).

The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item
on the CAFGU's shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A.. No.
6758. He gave the following reasons for imposing the condition:

264
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I am well cognizant of the laudable intention of Congress in proposing the amendment of Special
Provision No. 1 of the CAFGU. However, it is premature at this point in time of our peace process to
earmark and declare through special provision the actual number of CAFGU members to be deactivated
in CY 1994. I understand that the number to be deactivated would largely depend on the result or
degree of success of the on-going peace initiatives which are not yet precisely determinable today. I
have desisted, therefore, to directly veto said provisions because this would mean the loss of the entire
special provision to the prejudice of its beneficient provisions. I therefore declare that the actual
implementation of this special provision shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to the
provisions of P.D. No. 1597 and
R.A. No. 6758 (Veto Message, p. 13).

Petitioners claim that the Congress has required the deactivation of the CAFGU's when it appropriated
the money for payment of the separation pay of the members of thereof. The President, however,
directed that the deactivation should be done in accordance to his timetable, taking into consideration
the peace and order situation in the affected localities.

Petitioners complain that the directive of the President was tantamount to an administrative embargo
of the congressional will to implement the Constitution's command to dissolve the CAFGU's (Rollo, G.R.
No. 113174,
p. 14; G.R. No. 113888, pp. 9, 14-16). They argue that the President cannot impair or withhold
expenditures authorized and appropriated by Congress when neither the Appropriations Act nor other
legislation authorize such impounding (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 15-16).

The Solicitor General contends that it is the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, who should determine when the services of the CAFGU's are no longer needed (Rollo,
G.R. No. 113888,
pp. 92-95.).

This is the first case before this Court where the power of the President to impound is put in issue.
Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available
265
Choco Notes

by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type (Notes: Impoundment of
Funds, 86 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1973]).

Those who deny to the President the power to impound argue that once Congress has set aside the fund
for a specific purpose in an appropriations act, it becomes mandatory on the part of the President to
implement the project and to spend the money appropriated therefor. The President has no discretion
on the matter, for the Constitution imposes on him the duty to faithfully execute the laws.

In refusing or deferring the implementation of an appropriation item, the President in effect exercises a
veto power that is not expressly granted by the Constitution. As a matter of fact, the Constitution does
not say anything about impounding. The source of the Executive authority must be found elsewhere.

Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the authority of the
President. Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by Congress.
Second is the executive power drawn from the President's role as Commander-in-Chief. Third is the
Faithful Execution Clause which ironically is the same provision invoked by petitioners herein.

The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the President desist from
implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public interest. An example given is when through
efficient and prudent management of a project, substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer
folly to expect the President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law (Notes: Presidential
Impoundment: Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, 61 Georgetown Law Journal 1295 [1973];
Notes; Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power, 82 Yale Law Journal 1686
[1973).

We do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that
Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to
deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the
appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and
manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there
266
Choco Notes

are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU's to be amended. Again we state: a provision in an
appropriations act cannot
be used to repeal or amend other laws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.

7. Condition on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc.

(a) In the appropriations for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress added
the following provisions:

The Judiciary

xxx xxx xxx

Special Provisions

1. Augmentation of any Item in the Court's Appropriations. Any savings in the appropriations for
the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts may be utilized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to
augment any item of the Court's appropriations for (a) printing of decisions and publication of
"Philippine Reports"; (b) Commutable terminal leaves of Justices and other personnel of the Supreme
Court and payment of adjusted pension rates to retired Justices entitled thereto pursuant to
Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A.; (c) repair, maintenance, improvement and other operating
expenses of the courts' libraries, including purchase of books and periodicals; (d) purchase, maintenance
and improvement of printing equipment; (e) necessary expenses for the employment of temporary
employees, contractual and casual employees, for judicial administration; (f) maintenance and
improvement of the Court's Electronic Data
Processing System; (g) extraordinary expenses of the Chief Justice, attendance in international
conferences and conduct of training programs; (h) commutable transportation and representation
allowances and fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks of Court, Court Administrator, Chiefs of Offices and
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other Court personnel in accordance with the rates prescribed by law; and (i) compensation of attorney-
de-officio: PROVIDED, That as mandated by LOI No. 489 any increase in salary and allowances shall be
subject to the usual procedures and policies as provided for under
P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws (GAA of 1994, p. 1128; Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

Commission on Audit

xxx xxx xxx

5. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on Audit is hereby authorized, subject to
appropriate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, to use savings for the payment of fringe
benefits as may be authorized by law for officials and personnel of the Commission (GAA of 1994, p.
1161; Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

Office of the Ombudsman

xxx xxx xxx

6. Augmentation of Items in the appropriation of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman
is hereby authorized, subject to appropriate accounting and auditing rules and regulations to augment
items of appropriation in the Office of the Ombudsman from savings in other items of appropriation
actually released, for: (a) printing and/or publication of decisions, resolutions, training and information
268
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materials; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of OMB Central and Area/Sectoral facilities; (c)
purchase of books, journals, periodicals and equipment;
(d) payment of commutable representation and transportation allowances of officials and employees
who by reason of their positions are entitled thereto and fringe benefits as may be authorized
specifically by law for officials and personnel of OMB pursuant to Section 8 of Article IX-B of the
Constitution; and (e) for other official purposes subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations
(GAA of 1994, p. 1174; Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

Commission on Human Rights

xxx xxx xxx

1. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is hereby authorized,
subject to appropriate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, to augment any item of
appropriation in the office of the CHR from savings in other items of appropriations actually released,
for: (a) printing and/or publication of decisions, resolutions, training materials and educational
publications; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of Commission's central and regional facilities;
(c) purchase of books, journals, periodicals and equipment, (d) payment of commutable representation
and transportation allowances of officials and employees who by reason of their positions are entitled
thereto and fringe benefits, as may be authorized by law for officials and personnel of CHR, subject to
accounting and auditing rules and regulations (GAA of 1994, p. 1178; Emphasis supplied).

In his Veto Message, the President expressed his approval of the conditions included in the GAA of 1994.
He noted that:

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The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-
B of the Constitution which states that "no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law." I am, therefore,
confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the
well-established principle on compensation standardization (Veto Message, p. 10).

Petitioners claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal
autonomy of the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR.

In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not
by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or
indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law.

In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations
must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.

(b) In the appropriation for the COA, the President imposed the condition that the implementation
of the budget of the COA be subject to "the guidelines to be issued by the President."

The provisions subject to said condition reads:

xxx xxx xxx

3. Revolving Fund. The income of the Commission on Audit derived from sources authorized by the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1445) not exceeding Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000) shall be constituted into a revolving fund which shall be used for maintenance, operating
and other incidental expenses to enhance audit services and audit-related activities. The fund shall be
deposited in an authorized government depository ban, and withdrawals therefrom shall be made in
270
Choco Notes

accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and implementing rules and regulations: PROVIDED,
That any interests earned on such deposit shall be remitted at the end of each quarter to the national
Treasury and shall accrue to the General Fund: PROVIDED FURTHER, That the Commission on Audit shall
submit to the Department of Budget and Management a quarterly report of income and expenditures of
said revolving fund (GAA of 1994, pp. 1160-1161).

The President cited the "imperative need to rationalize" the implementation, applicability and operation
of use of income and revolving funds. The Veto Message stated:

. . . I have observed that there are old and long existing special provisions authorizing the use of income
and the creation of revolving funds. As a rule, such authorizations should be discouraged. However, I
take it that these authorizations have legal/statutory basis aside from being already a vested right to the
agencies concerned which should not be jeopardized through the Veto Message. There is, however,
imperative need to rationalize their implementation, applicability and operation. Thus, in order to
substantiate the purpose and intention of said provisions, I hereby declare that the operationalization of
the following provisions during budget implementation shall be subject to the guidelines to be issued by
the President pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D.
No. 1445 in relation to Sections 2 and 3 of the General Provisions of this Act (Veto Message, p. 6;
Emphasis Supplied.)

(c) In the appropriation for the DPWH, the President imposed the condition that in the
implementation of DPWH projects, the administrative and engineering overhead of 5% and 3% "shall be
subject to the necessary administrative guidelines to be formulated by the Executive pursuant to
existing laws." The condition was imposed because the provision "needs further study" according to the
President.

The following provision was made subject to said condition:

9. Engineering and Administrative Overhead. Not more than five percent (5%) of the amount for
infrastructure project released by the Department of Budget and Management shall be deducted by
271
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DPWH for administrative overhead, detailed engineering and construction supervision, testing and
quality control, and the like, thus insuring that at least ninety-five percent (95%) of the released fund is
available for direct implementation of the project. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That for school buildings,
health centers, day-care centers and barangay halls, the deductible amount shall not exceed three
percent (3%).

Violation of, or non-compliance with, this provision shall subject the government official or employee
concerned to administrative, civil and/or criminal sanction under Sections 43 and 80, Book VI of E.O.
No. 292 (GAA of 1994, p. 786).

(d) In the appropriation for the National Housing Authority (NHA), the President imposed the
condition that allocations for specific projects shall be released and disbursed "in accordance with the
housing program of the government, subject to prior Executive approval."

The provision subject to the said condition reads:

3. Allocations for Specified Projects. The following allocations for the specified projects shall be set
aside for corollary works and used exclusively for the repair, rehabilitation and construction of buildings,
roads, pathwalks, drainage, waterworks systems, facilities and amenities in the area: PROVIDED, That
any road to be constructed or rehabilitated shall conform with the specifications and standards set by
the Department of Public Works and Highways for such kind of road: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That savings
that may be available in the future shall be used for road repair, rehabilitation and construction:

(1) Maharlika Village Road Not less than P5,000,000

(2) Tenement Housing Project (Taguig) Not less than P3,000,000

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(3) Bagong Lipunan Condominium Project (Taguig) Not less than P2,000,000

4. Allocation of Funds. Out of the amount appropriated for the implementation of various projects
in resettlement areas, Seven Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P7,500,000) shall be allocated to the
Dasmarias Bagong Bayan resettlement area, Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000) to the Carmona
Relocation Center Area (Gen. Mariano Alvarez) and Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000) to the Bulihan Sites
and Services, all of which will be for the cementing of roads in accordance with DPWH standards.

5. Allocation for Sapang Palay. An allocation of Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000) shall be set aside
for the asphalting of seven (7) kilometer main road of Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan
(GAA of 1994, p. 1216).

The President imposed the conditions: (a) that the "operationalization" of the special provision on
revolving funds of the COA "shall be subject to guidelines to be issued by the President pursuant to
Section 35, Chapter 5,
Book VI of E.O. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 in relation to Sections 2 and 3 of the
General Provisions of this Act" (Rollo, G.R.
No. 113174, pp. 5,7-8); (b) that the implementation of Special Provision No. 9 of the DPWH on the
mandatory retention of 5% and 3% of the amounts released by said Department "be subject to the
necessary administrative guidelines to be formulated by the Executive pursuant to existing law" (Rollo,
G.R. No. 113888; pp. 10, 14-16); and (c) that the appropriations authorized for the NHA can be released
only "in accordance with the housing program of the government subject to prior Executive approval"
(Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 10-11;
14-16).

The conditions objected to by petitioners are mere reminders that the implementation of the items on
which the said conditions were imposed, should be done in accordance with existing laws, regulations or
policies. They did not add anything to what was already in place at the time of the approval of the GAA
of 1994.
273
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There is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to
guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are
proper or inappropriate. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds authorized
by Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see that the laws are
faithfully executed (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17; Planas v. Gil 67 Phil. 62 [1939]). Under the
Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry
into execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the ones to be
embodied in the guidelines.

IV

Petitioners chose to avail of the special civil actions but those remedies can be used only when
respondents have acted "without or in excess" of jurisdiction, or "with grave abuse of discretion,"
(Revised Rules of Court,
Rule 65, Section 2). How can we begrudge the President for vetoing the Special Provision on the
appropriation for debt payment when he merely followed our decision in Gonzales? How can we say
that Congress has abused its discretion when it appropriated a bigger sum for debt payment than the
amount appropriated for education, when it merely followed our dictum in Guingona?

Article 8 of the Civil Code of Philippines, provides:

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall from a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.

The Court's interpretation of the law is part of that law as of the date of its enactment since the court's
interpretation merely establishes the contemporary legislative intent that the construed law purports to
carry into effect (People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]). Decisions of the Supreme Court assume the
same authority as statutes (Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA 141 [1985]).
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Even if Guingona and Gonzales are considered hard cases that make bad laws and should be reversed,
such reversal cannot nullify prior acts done in reliance thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED, except with respect to
(1) G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special
provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for payment of
the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds
"to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and (2) G.R. No. 113888 only insofar
as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the
item of appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways (GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786);
and (b) Special Provision No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(GAA of 1994, p. 748), which is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.
Philconsa v. Enriquez digest
GR No. 113105, August 19, 1994

FACTS:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by
both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on
certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also
authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork barrels allotted to them
and to realign their respective operating budgets.

Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution,
Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.

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On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become
Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the
President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on
which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:

1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done
through the 1994 GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or
domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D.
No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of
1987.

2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of
revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs),

3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.

4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law
(R.A. No. 6675).

5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of
the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which requires the prior approval of the Congress for
the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on
the Specific Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund shall not be used for payment
of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers

5. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity
funds.
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7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi

2. Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the
Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights,
(CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f) State Universities and Colleges
(SUCs) are constitutional

3. Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the
automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional.

HELD:
Locus Standi
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal
standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an
appropriation bill.

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution (Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]).

Veto of the Provisions
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The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process
(Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). There is, therefore, sound basis to
indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity
thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.

The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177
(Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court
in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President
vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some
government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose,
it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws
authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National
Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department
of Budget and Managements Procurement Service).

The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is
unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the
subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it
specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.

The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply
with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an
appropriate provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on
purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also
vetoing the said item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]).

The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP modernization program that
the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an
exercise of the congressional or legislative veto. However the case at bench is not the proper occasion
to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3
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because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being inappropriate
provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.

Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the
trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of
the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec.
10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is
therefore valid.

The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the
AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5)
and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.

Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged
Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or
reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if
such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention
must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGUs to be amended.

On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the
Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain
when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the
guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the
Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take necessary and proper steps to carry
into execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the ones to be
embodied in the guidelines.
Bagatsing v. Committee on Privation
G.R. No. 112399 July 14, 1995

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REPRESENTATIVE AMADO S. BAGATSING, petitioner,
vs.
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY and THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, respondents.

G.R. No. 115994 July 14, 1995

NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ERNESTO A. MACEDA, JOHN H. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, JOKER O.
ARROYO, AMADO D. BAGATSING, and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
DELFIN LAZARO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine National Oil Company, MONICO JACOB, in
his capacity as President of PNOC, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL
COMPANY, PETRON CORPORATION, and ARAMCO OVERSEAS COMPANY B.V., respondents.

QUIASON, J.:

The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 112399 sought: (1) to nullify the bidding conducted for the sale
of a block of shares constituting 40% of the capital stock (40% block) of Petron Corporation (PETRON)
and the award made to Aramco Overseas Company, B.V. (ARAMCO) as the highest bidder in the bidding
conducted on December 15, 1993; and (2) to stop the sale of said block of shares to ARAMCO. The
Supplemental Petition in said case sought to annul the bidding of the 40% block held on December 15,
1993 and to set aside the award given to ARAMCO (Rollo, pp. 94-99).

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The petition for prohibition and certiorari in G.R. No. 115994 sought to annul the sale of the same block
of Petron shares subject of the petition in G.R. No. 112399.

The petition in G.R. No. 112399 asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to stop
respondents from selling the 40% block to a foreign buyer (Rollo, p. 15). The petition for a temporary
restraining order was reiterated in a motion filed subsequently (Rollo, pp. 107-108).

The petition in G.R. No. 115994 asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain and enjoin public respondents "from proceeding with the projected
initial public offering on July 18, 1994 of the 20% of Petron" (Rollo, p. 33).

The Urgent Supplemental Petition in said case reiterated the prayer for the immediate issuance of a
preliminary injunction to enjoin the initial public offering of the Petron shares (Rollo, pp. 223-225).

Actions on the petitions and motions for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction were deferred.

The petition in G.R. No. 112399 was filed by Representative Amado S. Bagatsing while the petition in
G.R. No. 115994 was filed by Senators Neptali A. Gonzales, Ernesto A. Maceda, John H. Osmea and
Wigberto E. Taada, Representatives Joker Arroyo and Amado D. Bagatsing and former Senator Rene
A.V. Saguisag all in their capacity as members of Congress, taxpayers and concerned citizens, except
in the case of Mr. Saguisag, who sued as a private law practitioner, member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, taxpayer and concerned citizen.

Respondent Monico V. Jacob was impleaded in G.R. No. 115994 in his capacity as President of
respondent Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). At the time of the filing of the petition, he had
ceased to be the President of PNOC and a member of its governing board. However, he is the Chairman
of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer of PETRON, a respondent in both cases. He asked
for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that having ceased to be PNOC President, petitioners had
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no more cause of action against him. We deny the motion in view of the fact that the petition questions
his acts as President of PNOC.

In G.R. No. 115994, ARAMCO entered a limited appearance to question the jurisdiction over its person,
alleging that it is a foreign company organized under the laws of the Netherlands, that it is not doing nor
licensed to do business in the Philippines, and that it does not maintain an office or a business address in
and has not appointed a resident agent for the Philippines (Rollo, p. 240).

I

PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1966 under the
corporate name "Esso Philippines, Inc." (ESSO) as a subsidiary of Esso Eastern, Inc. and Mobil Petroleum
Company, Inc.

In 1973, at the height of the world-wide oil crisis brought about by the Middle East conflicts, the
Philippine government acquired ESSO through the PNOC. ESSO became a wholly-owned company of the
government under the corporate name PETRON and as a subsidiary of PNOC.

In acquiring PETRON, the government aimed to have a buffer against the vagaries of oil prices in the
international market. It was felt that PETRON can serve as a counterfoil against price manipulation that
might go unchecked if all the oil companies were foreign-owned. Indeed, PETRON helped alleviate the
energy crises that visited the country from 1973 to 1974, 1979 to 1980, and 1990 to 1991.

PETRON owns the largest, most modern complex refinery in the Philippines with a nameplate capacity of
155,000 barrels per stream day. It is also the country's biggest combined retail and wholesale market of
refined petroleum products. In 1992, it garnered a 39.8% share of all domestic products sold, and at
year end its assets totalled P24.4 billion. PETRON's income as of September 1993 was P2.7 billion. It is
listed as the No. 1 corporation in terms of assets and income in the Philippines.
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On December 8, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50 in the exercise of
her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution.

The Proclamation is entitled "Proclaiming and Launching a Program for the Expeditious Disposition and
Privatization of Certain Government Corporations and/or the Assets thereof, and Creating the
Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust."

Implicit in the Proclamation is the need to raise revenue for the Government and the ideal of leaving
business to the private sector. The Government can then concentrate on the delivery of basic services
and the performance of vital public functions.

On December 2, 1991, President Fidel V. Ramos noted that "[t]he privatization program has proven
successful and beneficial to the economy in terms of expanding private economic activity, improving
investment climate, broadening ownership base and developing capital markets, and generating
substantial revenues for priority government expenditure," but "[t]here is still much potential for
harnessing private initiative to undertake in behalf of government certain activities which can be more
effectively and efficiently undertaken by the private sector" (G.R. No. 112399, Rollo, p. 31).

In its meeting held on September 9, 1992, the PNOC Board of Directors approved Specific Thrust No. 6
and moved "to bring to the attention of the Administration the need to privatize Petron whether or not
there will be deregulation [of the oil industry]" (G.R. No. 112399, Rollo p. 67).

In a letter dated October 21, 1992, Secretary Ramon R. Del Rosario, as Chairman of the Committee on
Privatization, endorsed to President Ramos the proposal of PNOC to "privatize 65% of the stock of
Petron, open to both foreign as well as domestic investors." Secretary Del Rosario added: "The entry of
foreign investors in this field is expected to result in improved technology and know-how and will enable
Petron to have access to international information network as well as access to external markets and
refining contracts" (G.R. No. 112399, Rollo, p. 72).
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On January 4, 1993, a follow-up letter was sent by Secretary Del Rosario informing the President that:
"The privatization of Petron, recommended by both the management of Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC) and the Committee on Privatization (COP), will send the right signals that may re-ignite
investor interest in the Philippines for 1993" (G.R. No. 112399, Rollo, p. 73).

In a letted dated January 6, 1993, Secretary designate Delfin L. Lazaro of the Department of Energy,
favorably endorsed for approval the plan to sell up to 65% of the capital stock of PETRON. He also noted
that the said plan was "consistent with the Energy Sector Action Plan approved by the President and the
Cabinet on November 27, 1992" (G.R. No. 112399, Rollo, p. 74).

On January 12, 1993, the Cabinet approved the privatization of PETRON as part of the Energy Sector
Action Plan.

On March 25, 1993, the Government Corporate Monitoring and Coordinating Committee (GCMCC)
recommended a 100% privatization of PETRON.

On March 31, 1993, the PNOC Board of Directors passed a resolution authorizing the company to
negotiate and conclude a contract with the consortium of Salomon Brothers of Hongkong Limited and
PCI Capital Corporation for financial advisory services to be rendered to PETRON.

On April 1, 1993, the GCMCC recommended to COP the privatization of only 65% of the capital stock of
PETRON, instead of the 100% privatization previously recommended.

On June 10, 1993, in a letter addressed to Secretary Ernesto C. Leung, the COP Chairman, President
Ramos approved the privatization of PETRON up to a maximum of 65% of its capital stock.

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The Petron Privatization Working Committee (PWC) was thus formed. It finalized a privatization strategy
with 40% of the shares to be sold to a strategic partner and 20% to the general public through the initial
public offering and employees stock option plan.

The Commission on Audit (COA) was consulted as to the valuation methodologies and privatization
process. The privatization plan was also presented to the COP on July 23, 1993, and to the President on
July 31, 1993 for their approval.

On August 10, 1993, the President approved the 40% 40% 20% privatization strategy of PETRON. In
the press release on the presidential approval of the said privatization, the Office of the President
commented:

For Petron, gaining a long-term strategic partner that will ensure stable crude oil supplies and/or
advance its technological and financial position will be a definite advantage. In addition, its partial
privatization will provide the flexibility and level playing field it needs to remain a major, and therefore
influential player in the oil industry. In 1992, Petron dominated the oil industry with a commanding 40%
market share (G.R. No. 112399, Rollo, p. 83).

The invitation to bid was published in several newspapers of general circulation, both local and foreign.
The deadline for the submission of proposals was set for December 15, 1993 at 5:00 P.M.

PETRON furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) with copies of the draft of the stock purchase
agreement and shareholders' agreement, with a request for the review of the same.

In a meeting of the Petron PWC held on December 15, 1993 at 12:00 noon, it decided that Westmont
Holdings (WESTMONT) was disqualified from participating in the bidding for its alleged failure to comply
with the technical and financial requirements for a strategic partner.

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Salomon Brothers valued PETRON at US$600 million and the 40% block at US$240 million. For the entire
Petron shares, respondent Secretary Lazaro proposed a valuation of US$1.4 billion; Petron management,
US$857 million; and Frances Onate, a member of the Petron PWC, a valuation of US$743 million to US$1
billion.

Finally, the floor price bid for the 40% block was fixed at US$440 million.

The bids of Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS), ARAMCO and WESTMONT were submitted while
the floor price was being discussed.

At about 6:15 P.M. and before the bids were opened, WESTMONT through its representative, Manuel
Estrella, submitted additional documents to prove its financial capability to carry out the purchase of the
40% block. The PNOC Board of Directors adopted Resolution No. 865, S. 1993, rejecting the bid of
WESTMONT for not having met the pre-qualification criteria of financial capability, long-term crude
supply availability, and technical and management expertise in the oil business. It was further resolved
that the bid submitted by WESTMONT would be returned unopened.

At 6:30 P.M., the other two bids were opened. The bid of ARAMCO was for US$502 million while the bid
of PETRONAS was for US$421 million. The PNOC Board of Directors then passed Resolution No. 866, S.
1993, declaring ARAMCO the winning bidder.

On December 15, 1993, the OSG informed PETRON that the drafts of the stock purchase agreement and
shareholders' agreement contained no legally objectionable provisions and could be the basis for
PETRON's negotiation with the winning bidder.

On December 16, 1993, respondent Monico Jacob, in his capacity as President and Chief Executive
Officer of PNOC, endorsed to the COP the bid of ARAMCO for approval. The COP gave its approval on
the same day. Also on the same day, Manuel Estrella filed a complaint in behalf of WESTMONT with
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PNOC, questioning the award of the 40% block of Petron shares to ARAMCO. The COP answered
Estrella's letter on January 14, 1994, explaining why WESTMONT's bid was returned unopened.

On February 3, 1994, PNOC and ARAMCO signed the Stock Purchase Agreement and on March 4, 1994,
the two companies signed the Shareholders' Agreement.

Public respondents submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a proposed price for the
initial public offering of the 20% block set for July 18, 1994, the second phase of PETRON's privatization.
PETRON proposed a price of between P7.00 and P16.00 per share but the SEC approved a price of P9.00
per share.

II

PETRON questions the locus standi of petitioners to file the action (Rollo, pp. 479-484). Petitioners
however, countered that they filed the action in their capacity as members of Congress.

In Philippine Constitution Association v. Hon. Salvador Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994, we
held that the members of Congress have the legal standing to question the validity of acts of the
Executive which injures them in their person or the institution of Congress to which they belong. In the
latter case, the acts cause derivative but nonetheless substantial injury which can be questioned by
members of Congress (Kennedy v. James, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]). In the absence of a claim that the
contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the
Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as
members of Congress.

However, petitioners can bring the action in their capacity as taxpayers under the doctrine laid down in
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994). Under said ruling, taxpayers may question contracts
entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations alleged to be
in contravention of the law. As long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have
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no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the
present action.

III

A. Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 112399 and 115994 claim that the inclusion of PETRON in the
privatization program contravened the declared policy of the State to dispose of only non-performing
assets of the government and government-owned or controlled corporations which have been found
unnecessary or inappropriate for the government sector to maintain. They contend that PETRON is
neither a non-performing asset nor is it unnecessary or inappropriate for the government to maintain or
operate (G.R. No. 112399, Rollo, pp. 3-4, 8-13; G.R. No. 115994, Rollo, pp. 14-17, 216-217).

To say that only non-performing assets should be the subject of privatization does not conform with the
realities of economic life. In the world of business and finance, it is difficult to sell a business in dire,
financial distress. As entrepreneur Don Eugenio Lopez used to advert to his younger executives: "Don't
buy headaches. Don't even accept them if they are offered to you on a silver platter." It is only in a fire
sale that the government can expect to get rid of its non-performing assets, more so if the sequencing
pattern insisted by petitioners (initial public offering of 10% block to small investors) is followed.

While Proclamation No. 50 mandates that non-performing assets should promptly be sold, it does not
prohibit the disposal of the other kinds of assets, whether performing, necessary or appropriate.

Section 1 of the Proclamation reads:

Statement of Policy. It shall be the policy of the State to promote privatization through an orderly,
coordinated and efficient program for the prompt disposition of the large number of non-performing
assets of the government financial institutions, and certain government-owned or controlled
corporations which have been found unnecessary or inappropriate for the government sector to
maintain.
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The said provision classifies two types of assets: (1) Non-performing assets of government financial
institutions; and (2) Government-owned or controlled corporations which have been found unnecessary
or inappropriate for the government sector to maintain.

Under the Proclamation, it is the COP which is tasked with the duty of identifying and arranging the sale
of government assets. Section 5(1) of the Proclamation provides:

Powers and Functions. The Committee shall have the following powers and functions:

(1) To identify to the President of the Philippines, and arrange for transfer to the National
Government and/or to the Trust and the subsequent divestment to the private sector of (a) such non-
performing assets as may be identified by the Committee, and approved by the President, for transfer
from the government banks for disposal by the Trust or the government banks, and (b) such
government corporations, whether parent or subsidiary, and/or such of their assets, as may have been
recommended by the Committee for disposition, and Provided, that no such identification,
recommendation or approval shall be necessary where a parent corporation decides on its own to divest
of, in whole or in part, or liquidate a subsidiary corporation organized under the Corporation Code;
Provided further, that any such independent disposition shall be undertaken with the prior approval of
the Committee and in accordance with the general disposition guidelines as the Committee may
provide; Provided, finally, that in every case the sale or disposition shall be approved by the Committee
with respect to the buyer and price only; (Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

After a long study by PNOC, PETRON was found to be "inappropriate or unnecessary" for the
government to maintain because refining and marketing of petroleum is an aspect of the industry which
is better left to the private sector. In making such finding, PNOC was guided by Section 4(a) of
Proclamation No. 50, which provides:
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. . . (a) divesting to the private sector in the soonest possible time through the appropriate disposition
entities, those assets with viable productive potential as going concerns, taking into account where
appropriate the implications of such transfers on sectoral productive capacities and market limitation, . .
. . These objectives are to be pursued within the context of furthering the national economy through
strengthened and revitalized private enterprise system.

The decision of PNOC to privatize PETRON and the approval of the COP of such privatization, being made
in accordance with Proclamation No. 50, cannot be reviewed by this Court. Such acts are exercises of the
executive function as to which the Court will not pass judgment upon or inquire into their wisdom
(Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 [1991]).

Such identification by the COP of the government corporations to be privatized was not even necessary
in the case of PETRON. Under Section 5(1) of Proclamation No. 50 ". . . [N]o such identification,
recommendation or approval shall be necessary where a parent corporation decides on its own to divest
of, in whole or in part, or liquidate a subsidiary corporation organized under the Corporation Code; . . . ."

The only participation of the COP in the sale of the Petron shares by PNOC, the parent corporation, was
the approval of the buyers and price. The last sentence of paragraph (1) of Section 5 provides:

. . . Provided, finally, that in every case the sale or disposition shall be approved by the Committee with
respect to the buyer and price only.

PNOC, in privatizing PETRON, was simply exercising its corporate power to dispose of all or a portion of
its shares in a subsidiary. PNOC was created under P.D. No. 334, as amended by P.D. No. 927, which
empowers it to acquire shares of the capital stock of any other corporation and to dispose of the same
shares.

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Besides, if only non-performing assets are intended to be sold, it would be unnecessary to provide in the
Proclamation for the rehabilitation of government corporations to make the same more attractive to
investors and potential buyers.

Section 5 (5) of Proclamation No. 50 provides:

In its discretion, to approve or disapprove, subject to the availability of funds for such purpose, the
rehabilitation of assets pending disposition by the Trust or any other government agency authorized by
the Committee, or the Trust with the approval of the Committee, Provided that, the budget for each
rehabilitation project shall be likewise subject to prior approval by the Committee.

Nowhere in the Proclamation can one infer that it prohibits a partial privatization of vital, appropriate
and performing corporations owned by the government.

Proclamation No. 50 contained an Annex listing the corporations to be privatized and those to be
retained. While PETRON was mentioned among the corporations to be retained, Section 6 of the
Proclamation directed a continuing study on what corporations should be recommended for
privatization.

It is markworthy that the said Annex did not indicate the percentage of shares that will be privatized or
that will be retained. It can be interpreted to mean that all the shares of the corporations in the list to
be privatized may be sold, while only some of the shares of the other corporations may be sold. It is also
worthy of note that the list of corporations to be retained added the phrase "As of 31 August 1992,"
meaning that any of the corporations mentioned therein may be delisted after that date if a study would
justify such action.

The government is not disposing of all of its shares in PETRON but is retaining a 40% block. Together
with the widely-held 20% of the private sector control of PETRON by the government is assured. With
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such equity in PETRON, the government can also maintain a window to the oil industry and at the same
time share in the profits of the company.

The privatization of PETRON could well be undertaken under laws other than Proclamation No. 50.

Of significance is Section 2(c) of R.A. No. 7181, which provides that:

Privatization of government assets classified as a strategic industry by the National Economic and
Development Authority shall first be approved by the President of the Philippines (Emphasis supplied).

Section 6, the repealing clause of R.A. No. 7181, expressly repealed Sections 3 and 10 of Proclamation
No. 50 and all other laws, orders and rules and regulations which are inconsistent therewith.

The only requirement under R.A. No. 7181 in order to privatize a strategic industry like PETRON is the
approval of the President. In the case of PETRON's privatization, the President gave his approval not only
once but twice.

PETRON's privatization is also in line with and is part of the Philippine Energy Program under R.A. No.
7638. Section 5(b) of the law provides that the Philippine Energy Program shall include a policy direction
towards the privatization of government agencies related to energy.

Under P.D. No. 334, the law creating PNOC, said corporation is granted the authority "[t]o establish and
maintain offices, branches, agencies, subsidiaries, correspondents or other units anywhere as may be
needed by the Company and reorganize or abolish the same as it may deem proper."

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B. Petitioners next question the regularity and validity of the bidding (G.R. No. 112399, Rollo, pp.
97-99; G.R. No. 115994, Rollo, pp. 17-24, 221). Petitioners in G.R. No. 115994 claim that the public
bidding was tainted with haste and arbitrariness and that there was a failed bidding because there was
only one offeror (Rollo, pp. 17-24).

Taking the cudgels for WESTMONT, petitioners urge that said bidder was only given two days to conduct
a review PETRON's vast business operations in order to comply with the technical and financial
requirements for pre-qualification. Petitioners also complain that the pre-qualification and actual
bidding were conducted on the same day, thus denying a disqualified bidder an opportunity to protest
or to appeal. They question the fixing of the floor price on the same day as the public bidding and only
after the bids had been submitted. Likewise, they say that the approval of the bid of ARAMCO by the
Assets Privatization Trust on the same day it is submitted is anomalous (G.R. No. 115994, Rollo, pp. 22-
24).

On the claim that there was a failed bidding, petitioners contend that there were only three bidders.
One of them, PETRONAS, submitted a bid lower than the floor price while a second, failed to pre-qualify.
Citing Section V-2-a of COA Circular No. 89-296 dated January 27, 1989, they argue that where only one
bidder qualifies, there is a failure of public auction (G.R. No. 115994, Rollo, p. 22).

When a failure of bidding takes place is defined in Circular No. 89-296 of the Commission on Audit,
which prescribes the "Audit Guidelines on the Divestment or Disposal of Property and other Assets of
the National Government Agencies and Instrumentalities, Local Government Units and Government-
Owned or Controlled Corporations and their Subsidiaries."

V. MODES OR DISPOSAL/DIVESTMENT:

xxx xxx xxx

2 Sale Thru Negotiation
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For justifiable reasons and as demanded by the exigencies of the service, disposal thru negotiated sale
may be resorted to and undertaken by the proper committee or body in the agency or entity concerned
taking into consideration the following factors:

a. There was a failure of public auction. As envisioned in this Circular, there is a failure of public
auction in any of the following instances:

1 if there is only one offeror.

In this case, the offer or bid, if sealed, shall not be opened.

2 if all the offers/tenders are non-complying or unacceptable.

A tender is non-complying or unacceptable when it does not comply with the prescribed legal, technical
and financial requirement for pre-qualification.

Under said COA Circular, there is a failure of bidding when: 1) there is only one offeror; or (2) when all
the offers are non-complying or unacceptable.

In the case at bench, there were three offerors: SAUDI ARAMCO, PETRONAS and WESTMONT.

While two offerors were disqualified, PETRONAS for submitting a bid below the floor price and
WESTMONT for technical reasons, not all the offerors were disqualified. To constitute a failed bidding
under the COA Circular, all the offerors must be disqualified.
294
Choco Notes

Petitioners urge that in effect there was only one bidder and that it can not be said that there was a
competition on "an equal footing" (G.R. No. 112399, Rollo, p. 122). But the COA Circular does not speak
of accepted bids but of offerors, without distinction as to whether they were disqualified.

The COA itself, the agency that adopted the rules on bidding procedure to be followed by government
offices and corporations, had upheld the validity and legality of the questioned bidding. The
interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight than the interpretation by that
agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer.

The case of Danville Maritime, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, 175 SCRA 701 (1989), relied upon by
petitioner, is inappropriate. In said case, there was only one offeror in the bidding. The Court said: ". . .
[I]f there is only one participating bidder, the bidding is non-competitive and, hence, falls short of the
requirement. There would, in fact, be no bidding at all since, obviously, the lone participant cannot
compete against himself."

C. According to petitioners, the law mandates the offer for sale of 10% of the Petron shares to
small investors before a sale of the 40% block of shares to ARAMCO can be made.

They theorize that the best way to determine the real market price of Petron shares was to first have a
public offering as required by R.A. No. 7181. The reverse procedure followed by private respondents,
according to petitioners, gave unwarranted benefits to private respondents because they bought the
Petron shares at only P6.70 per share when the shares fetched as high as P16.00 per share in the stock
market (G.R. No. 115994, Rollo, pp. 24-27).

To bolster their theory, petitioners cite Section 2(d) of R.A. No. 7181, which provides:

295
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A minimum of ten (10) percent of the sale of assets in corporation form shall first be offered to small
local investors including Filipino Overseas Workers and where practicable also in the sale of any physical
asset.

Petitioners also invoke the Implementing Guidelines promulgated to implement R.A. No. 7181, which
provides:

In the sale of assets in corporate form, at least 10% of the total shares for privatization shall first be
offered to small local investors. Employees Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPS) and public offerings shall
count towards compliance with these provisions . . . (Sec. 3).

We agree with PETRON that the language of Section 2(d) of R.A. No. 7181 does not mandate any
sequencing for the disposition of shares in a government-owned corporation being privatized.

It is the unfortunate use of the word "first" in Section 2(d) of R.A. No. 7181 that threw petitioners off
track and caused them to misread the provision as one requiring a mandatory sequencing of the sale. As
a wit once said, if a centipede would be compelled to follow a prescribed sequencing of its steps, it could
never move an inch.

A reasonable reading of the provision is that it merely gives a right of first refusal by the small investors
vis-a-vis the 10% block of shares. As far as the 10% block is concerned, the small investors shall have a
first chance to subscribe thereto whenever it is offered. The offer may be made before, after or
simultaneous with the offer of the shares to strategic partners or major investors depending on the
prevailing condition of the market. Certainly, in an initial public offering, it is good judgment and
business sense that should prevail, rather than the rigid and inflexible rules of step one, step two, etc.

The Rules and Regulations issued by the COP to implement R.A. No. 7181 set aside 10% of the shares
subject of the privatization to be offered first to the small local investors, and made clear that as far as
said 10% block is concerned, the small investors shall have the first crack to buy the same. These Rules
296
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have been consistently applied in previous privatizations, and they constitute a contemporaneous
construction and interpretation of a law by the implementing, administrative agency. Such construction
is accorded great respect by the Court (Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 504
[1991]).

What Congress clearly mandated in R.A. No. 7181 was that at least 10% of the shares of a privatized
corporation must be reserved and offered for sale to the general public. In the deliberation of the
Congressional Committee on Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations on December 18, 1991,
the Committee spoke of having the 10% set aside without impeding the privatization process.

Note that when the bidding of the 40% block of Petron shares had been announced, the 10% block for
offering to the small local investors had been identified, reserved and set aside. This is more than a
substantial compliance with the mandate of law.

There is great risk in first making an initial public offering of the 10% block before bidding out the 40%
block to a strategic partner. It may happen that the price of the shares offered initially to the public
plunges below the offering price approved by the SEC.

The sensitive market forces involved in initial public offerings render unrealistic any legislative mandate
to follow a sequencing in the sale of government-owned shares in the market. The legislators, practical
men of affairs as they are, were aware of the vagaries, variables and vicissitudes of the stock market
when they enacted R.A. No. 7181. It is more reasonable to read the said law as leaving to the COP and
the government corporations concerned to determine the sequencing of the sale to strategic investors
and the general public. To require the offer of 10% to the general public before the sale of a block to a
strategic partner may delay or even impede the entire privatization program.

The clear policy behind Proclamation No. 50 is to give the COP and APT maximum flexibility in their
operation to ensure the most efficient implementation of the privatization program.

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Under Section 5(3) of the Proclamation, full powers are given the COP to establish "mandatory as well as
indicative guidelines for . . . the disposition
of . . . assets." Under Section 12(2) thereof, the APT is given the "widest latitude of flexibility . . .
particularly in the areas of . . . disposition . . . ."

Petitioners can not rely on Opinion No. 126, Series of 1992 dated September 28, 1992. The query posed
to the Secretary of Justice in said opinion was the legality of the plan of National Development
Corporation to pass on to the prospective buyer of its shares in a local bank the responsibility of
complying with the requirement prescribed in Section 2(d) of R.A. No. 7181 that a minimum of 10% of
the shares of a corporation "shall first be offered to small local investors . . . ." The Secretary of Justice
naturally opined that said proposal could not legally be done on the principal ground that the
"observance of this legal requirement is incumbent upon the disposition entity, which in this case is
NDC, but as contemplated, the sale to small investors shall be undertaken by the private buyer of the
[local bank's] shares." The query posed to the Secretary of Justice was not about the sequencing of the
sale of the 10% block.

We can not see how the failure to dispose the 10% block to the general public before the sale of the
40% block to ARAMCO gave the latter unwarranted benefits.

Actually ARAMCO paid a total of P14,671,985,306.00 for the acquisition of the Petron shares. This
aggregate amount represents in peso terms: (1) the US$502 million winning bid paid by ARAMCO to
PNOC on March 4, 1994; and (2) the additional amount of US$30,327,987.00 remitted on July 11, 1994,
representing the "purchase price adjustment" stipulated in the Stock Purchase Agreement.
Consequently, ARAMCO's acquisition cost was P7.336 per share.

A fair comparison between the ARAMCO price and the IPO price should take into consideration the
levels of financial, legal and miscellaneous costs directly related to the ARAMCO purchase, including the
consequent opportunity cost or income to PNOC and the National Government, had the proceeds been
invested in Philippine Treasury Bills from March 4 and July 11, respectively, to September 7, 1994. On
this basis, the effective proceeds on the ARAMCO purchase amount to P7.8559 per share, and not P6.70
as claimed by petitioners (G.R. No. 115994, Rollo, pp. 506-507). On the other hand, the seller's expenses
298
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incurred in connection with the IPO, including taxes and other fees paid to the National Government,
reached a total of P833.081 million or P0.833 per share (G.R. No. 115944, Rollo, p. 507).

To make further a fair comparison between the two prices, the proceeds from the IPO should be net of
PNOC's share in PETRON's net income from March to August 1994, because in effect it was giving up this
amount in favor of the IPO investors. As projected, the total net income of PETRON from March to
August 1994 is P1,870,500.00. Twenty percent of this is P374,100.00 which translates to a per share
reduction of P0.3741 from the IPO proceeds. This would further erode the effective proceeds from the
IPO sale to P7.7929 per share.

Finally, cash dividends of P2 billion and property dividends of P153 million, or a total of P2.153 billion
was declared and transferred to PNOC before the ARAMCO purchase was effected. Imputing such
dividends would translate the effective proceeds to PNOC from the ARAMCO sale to P8.2865 per share
(P7.8559 plus P0.4306 [or 40% of P2.153 Billion]). Using this figure, the IPO proceeds of P7.7929 per
share is definitely lower than the ARAMCO proceeds of P8.2865.

Unlike the ordinary buyers of shares listed in the stock exchange, ARAMCO, as a strategic investor, had
to spend for the due diligence review of the business and records of PETRON.

Aside from this monetary considerations, PNOC derived the following value-added benefits:

1) PNOC is assured of an adequate supply of crude oil. The element of uncertainty on sources of
crude oil supply is reduced, if not eliminated, ARAMCO being the world's largest known producer and
exporter of five different types of crude oil.

2) PNOC's refinery can achieve optimum efficiency because of better crude slates.

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3) ARAMCO has to hold on to the Petron shares for the next five years. Aside from its stabilizing
effect on the market price of Petron shares, this holding period will prevent ARAMCO from deriving any
speculative gains. Unlike ARAMCO, the buyers of the IPO can sell their shares any time without
constraints.

4) ARAMCO's presence in PETRON has a tremendous, unquantifiable influence in investor's
confidence in PETRON as a publicly-listed company. This confidence could not be generated if PETRON's
partner has a bad track record.

5) ARAMCO will assist PNOC in raising funds to finance the more than P12 billion in projected
capital expenditures required over the next four years to make PETRON competitive.

The pricing of shares of stock is a highly specialized field that is better left to the experts. It involves an
inquiry into the earning potential, dividend history, business risks, capital structure, management, asset
values of the company; the prevailing business climate; the political and economic conditions; and a
myriad of other factors that bear on the valuation of shares (Van Horne, Financial Management and
Policy 652-653 [8th ed.]); Leffler and Farwell, The Stock Market 573-575 [3rd ed.]).

D. Finally, petitioners contend that PETRON is a public utility, in which foreign ownership of its
equity shall not exceed 40% thereof and the foreign participation in the governing body shall be limited
to their proportionate share in its capital. According to petitioners, ARAMCO is entitled only to a
maximum of four seats in the ten-man board but was given five seats (G.R. No. 112389, Rollo, pp. 30-64;
G.R. No. 115994, Rollo, pp. 30-31, 202-212).

This issue hinges on whether the business of oil refining is a "public utility" within the purview of Section
11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution (adopted from Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution), which
provides:

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No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws
of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such
franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character for a longer period than fifty years.
Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall
encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign
investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate
share in its capital and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must
be citizens of the Philippines (Emphasis supplied).

Implementing Section 8 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, the progenitor of Section 5 of Article XIV
of the 1973 Constitution, is Section 13(b) of the Public Service Act, which provides:

The term "public service" includes every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or
control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether
permanent, occasional, or accidental and done for general business purposes, any common carrier,
railroad, street railway, . . . and other similar public services: . . . .

More pertinent is Section 7 of R.A. No. 387, the Petroleum Act of 1949, which provides:

Petroleum operation a public utility. Everything relating to the exploration for and exploitation of
petroleum which may consist naturally or below the surface of the earth, and everything relating to the
manufacture, refining, storage, or transportation by special methods of petroleum, as provided for in
this Act, is hereby declared to be of public utility (Rollo, p. 519; Emphasis supplied).

A "public utility" under the Constitution and the Public Service Law is one organized "for hire or
compensation" to serve the public, which is given the right to demand its service. PETRON is not
engaged in oil refining for hire and compensation to process the oil of other parties.

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Likewise, the activities considered as "public utility" under Section 7 of R.A. No. 387 refer only to
petroleum which is indigenous to the Philippines. Hence, the refining of petroleum products sourced
from abroad as is done by Petron, is not within the contemplation of the law.

We agree with the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the refining of imported crude oil is not
regulated by, nor is it within the scope and purview of the Petroleum Act of 1949. He said:

Examination of our statute books fails to reveal any law or legal provision which, in explicit terms, either
permits or prohibits the establishment and operation of oil refineries that would refine only imported
crude oil (Opinion, No. 267, S. 1955).

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Bagatsing v. Committee on Privation digest
G.R. No. 112399 July 14,
1995REP RE S E NT AT I VE AMADO S . B AGATS I NG VS COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATIONFACTS OF THE CASE
PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
in 1966 under the corporate name "Esso Philippines, Inc." .ESSO became a wholly-owned company of
the government under the corporate name PETRON and as a subsidiary of
PNOC.P E T R ON o wn s t h e l a r g e s t , mo s t mo d e r n c o mp l e x r ef i ner y
i n t he Phi l i ppi nes . I t i s l i s t e d as t he
No. 1c o r p o r a t i o n i n t e r ms o f a s s e t s a n d i n c o me i n t h e Philippines in
1993.President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50 in the exercise of her
legislative power under the Freedom Constitution. Implicit in the Proclamation is the need to raise
revenue for the Government and the ideal of leaving business to the private sector by
c r e a t i n g t h e c o m m i t t e e o n p r i v a t i z a t i o n . T h e Government can then
concentrate on the delivery of basic services and the performance e of vital public
functions. The Presidential Cabinet of President Ramos approved t he pr i vat i zat i on of PETRON
as par t of t he Ener gy Sector Action Plan. PNOC Board of Directors passed are
solution authorizing the company to negotiate and conclude a contract with the consortium
of
SalomonB r o t h e r s o f H o n g k o n g L i m i t e d a n d P C I C a p i t a l C o r p o r a t i o n
302
Choco Notes

f o r f i n a n c i a l a d v i s o r y s e r v i c e s t o b e rendered to PETRON. The Petron Privatization
WorkingC o mmi t t e e ( P WC) wa s t h u s f o r me d . I t f i n a l i z e d a privatization strategy
with 40% of the shares to be sold to a strategic partner and 20% to the general
public T h e P r e s i d e n t a p p r o v e d t h e 4 0 % 4 0 % 2 0 %privatization strategy of
PETRON. T h e i n v i t a t i o n t o b i d w a s p u b l i s h e d i n s e v e r a l ne ws pa per s of
gene r al ci r c ul at i on, bot h l oc al andforeign. The PNOC Board of Directors then
passed Resolution No. 866, S. 1993, declaring ARAMCO the winning bidder. PNOC and
ARAMCO signed the Stock Purchase Agreement, the two companies signed the Shareholders'
Agreement. The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 112399 sought:(1) to nullify the bidding
conducted for the sale of ablock of shares constituting 40% of the capital stock(40%
block) of Petron Corporation (PETRON) and the
a wa r d ma d e t o Ar a mc o Ov e r s e a s C o mp a n y , B .
V
.(ARAMCO) as the highest bidder and (2) to stop the sale of said block of shares to ARAMCO.
The petition for prohibition and
certiorari
in G.R. No. 115994 sought to a nnul t he s al e of t he s a me bl oc k of Pet r on s har es subject of
the petition in G.R. No. 112399.ARAMCO entered a limited appearance to question the jurisdiction over its
person, alleging that it is a foreign company organized under the laws of the Netherlands, that it is not
doing nor licensed to do business in the Philippines, and that it does not maintain an office or a
business address in and has not appointed a resident agent for the Philippines (
Rollo
, p. 240).Pet i t i oner s howe ver , c ount er ed t hat t he y f i l ed t he action in their capacity as members
of Congress.
ISSUE:
WON Petitioners have a locus standi
DECISION:
Petition is dismissed.
LOCUS STANDI
In
Philippine Constitution Association
v
.
Hon. Salvador Enriquez
, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994, we held that the members of Congress have the legal
standing to question the validity of acts of the Executive whichi n
j u r e s t h e m i n t h e i r p e r s o n o r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f Congress to which they belong. In
the latter case,
theact s ca us e der i vat i ve but nonet hel es s s ubs t ant i al i n j u r y wh i c h c a n b e q u e s t
i o n e d b y me mb e r s o f Congress (Kennedy
v
. James, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]).In the absence of a claim that the contract in
questionvi ol at ed t he r i ght s of pet i t i oner s or i mper mi s s i bl yintruded into the domain of
the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as
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Choco Notes

members of Congress.Howe ver , pet i t i oner s ca n br i ng t he a ct i on i n t hei r capacity
as taxpayers under the doctrine laid down in
Kilos bayan, Inc.
v
. Guingona
, 232 SCRA 110
(1994).Under said ruling, taxpayers may question contractse n t e r e d i n t o b y t h e
n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t o r government-owned or controlled corporations alleged to be in
contravention of the law. As long as the ruling in
Kilos bayan
on
locus

standi
is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal
standingof pet i t i oner s as t axpa yer s t o i ns t i t ut e t he pr e s ent action.
PRIVATIZATION
The only requirement under R.A. No. 7181 in order to
p r i v a t i z e a s t r a t e g i c i n d u s t r y l i k e P E T R ON i s t h e a ppr oval
of t he Pr e s i dent . I n t he ca s e of PETRON' s privatization, the President gave his approval not
only once but twice. PETRON's privatization is also in line with and is part
of the Philippine Energy Program under R.A. No. 7638.Section 5(b) of the law provides
that the Philippine Energy Program shall include a policy direction towards the privatization
of government agencies related to energy.
BIDDING
O n t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e r e w a s a f a i l e d b i d d i n g , petitioners contend
that there were only three bidders. One of them, PETRONAS, submitted a bid lower than the floor
price while a second, failed to pre-qualify

Under said COA Circular, there is a failure of bidding when: 1) there is only one offeror; or (2)
when all the offers are non-complying or unacceptable. In the case at bench, there were three
offerors: SAUDI ARAMCO,PETRONAS and WESTMONT. While two offerors were
disqualified, PETRONAS for submitting a bid below the floor price and WESTMONT for
technical reasons, not all the offerors were disqualified. To constitute a failed bidding under the COA
Circular, all the offerors must be disqualified.

Lacson v. Perez
[G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001]

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PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY
HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 147781. May 10, 2001]

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, et al.,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 147799. May 10, 2001]

RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA,
P/DIR. LEANDRO MENDOZA and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 147810. May 10, 2001]

THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, petitioner, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY
HERNANDO PEREZ, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
MELO, J.:

On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry and violent mob armed with
explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons assaulting and
attempting to break into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of
rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National
Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were
thereafter effected.

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Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a state of rebellion, which allegedly gave
a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were filed before the Court-

(1) G.R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent
application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) filed by
Panfilo M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar O. Mancao; (2) G.R. No. 147781 for mandamus
and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with
prayer for a temporary restraining order filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago; (3) G.R. No. 147799 for
prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order filed
by Rolando A. Lumbao; and (4) G.R. No. 147810 for certiorari and prohibition filed by the political party
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.

All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact an
in law. Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration
of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot
and academic. As to petitioners claim that the proclamation of a state of rebellion is being used by
the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a particular
order to arrest specific persons in connection with the rebellion. He states that what is extant are
general instructions to law enforcement officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation No.
38. Indeed, as stated in respondents Joint Comments:

[I]t is already the declared intention of the Justice Department and police authorities to obtain regular
warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which means
that preliminary investigators will henceforth be conducted.

(Comment, G.R. No. 147780, p. 28; G.R. No. 147781, p. 18; G.R. No. 147799, p. 16; G.R. No. 147810, p.
24)

With this declaration, petitioners apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be laid to rest.
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In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances
so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a
state of rebellion.

Moreover, petitioners contention in G.R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (Defensor-Santiago
Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without
warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an
individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of
law. Such an individual may ask for a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of court,
where he may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to
determine whether or not he should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court.
Further, a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities
within the periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer
could be held liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should the detention be without legal
ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without
prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil
Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they can avail themselves of, thereby
making the prayer for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time (Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65, Rules
of Court).

Aside from the foregoing reasons, several considerations likewise inevitably call for the dismissal of the
petitions at bar.

G.R. No. 147780

In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and Mancao
pray that the appropriate court before whom the informations against petitioners are filed be directed
to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finally
resolved. This relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges have
307
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been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime. And in the event that the same are later filed,
this court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court, for by
that time any arrest would have been in pursuance of a duly issued warrant.

As regards petitioners prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared null and
void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold
departure orders in their petition. The are not even expressing intention to leave the country in the
near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedings initiated for that
purpose.

Anent petitioners allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve
petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a matter which remains
speculative up to this very day.

G.R. No. 147781

The petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-Santiago as one for mandamus. It is basic in
matters relating to petitions for mandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to the performance of a
particular act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and complete. Mandamus will not issue
the right to relief is clear at the time of the award (Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272). Up to the present
time, petitioner Defensor-Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being arrested
without a warrant. In point of fact, the authorities have categorically stated that petitioner will not be
arrested without a warrant.

G.R. No. 147799

Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the Peoples Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues that
the declaration of a state of rebellion is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an
308
Choco Notes

encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional prerogative to determine or
interpret what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an
exception to the general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers.

We disagree. To be sure, section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that *t+he
President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion thus, we held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284,
August 15, 2000):

xxx The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be
objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several
factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of testual standards that the
court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information necessary to arrive at such judgment might
also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or
wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might
decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical
proof.

On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather
information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state.
In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency
situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. xxx

(at pp. 22-23)

The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of this
power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.

309
Choco Notes

G.R. No. 147810

Petitioner Laban ng Demoktratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule requires that a party
must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a
favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the courts jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of
the courts remedial powers in his behalf (KMU Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 *1994]). Here,
petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is
a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest.
Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest
and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose
legal right has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or
infringement.

At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner claiming
that its right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a state
of rebellion and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the Constitution.

However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to petitioner, this
Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5[1], Article VIII of the
Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the Court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. However, in G.R. No. 147780,
147781, and 147799, respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to,
together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting for and in their behalf, are hereby
enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant for all acts committed
in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.

SO ORDERED.
310
Choco Notes

Lacson v. Perez digest

[G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001.]
PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO
,
petitioners

vs
. SECRETARYHERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT.
REYNALDOBERROYA
,
respondents

FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an armed mob assaulting and attempting to break
into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in NCR. She
also issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion. Warrantless
arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" followed. Aggrieved, 4 related petitions
were filed before the Court. The case at bar is for prohibition, injunction,
mandamus
, and
habeas corpus
(with an urgent application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction). Petitioners assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by PGMA and the warrantless arrests
allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. On May 6, 2001, PGMA
ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant
petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners' claim that the proclamation of a "state
of rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies
that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the "rebellion."
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest against the petitioners.
HELD:
No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of
persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the
circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
declaration of a "state of rebellion." Petitioners' contention that they are under imminent danger of being
arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of
mandamus
and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of law. The prayer for prohibition and
mandamus
is improper at this time. As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them
be declared null and void
ab initio
311
Choco Notes

, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders
in their petition. They are not even expressing intention to leave the country in the near future. The prayer
to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Anent petitioners'
allegations
ex abundante ad cautelam
in support of their application for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus
, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful
restraint, a matter which remains speculative up to this very day. Petition is DISMISSED. However,
respondents, consistent and congruent with their under taking earlier adverted to, together with their
agents, representatives, and all persons acting for and in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting
petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in
connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.

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