Summary: Even as a winner

of numerous elections and

referenda, 18 months of
electoral contests is still
a considerable challenge
for Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdoan. He
faces corruption allegations,
urban popular unrest, and an
unfavorable economic climate,
but was still successful in the
recent municipal elections. He
faces two challengers in the race
for president of Turkey, but is
also likely to emerge triumphant
then.
Analysis
Turkeys Longest Year Continues
with Presidential Elections
by Emre Erdoan
July 17, 2014
Washington, DC Berlin Paris
Brussels Belgrade Ankara
Bucharest Warsaw
OF F I C E S
Analysis
With three consecutive elections
local, presidential, and parlia-
mentary Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdoans longest year
is also becoming the longest year for
Turkey. In a previous piece written in
this series, Erdoans Longest Year, I
elaborated on the political motivations
and strategies of the leader of Turkey,
and argued that even as a winner of
numerous elections and referenda, 18
months of electoral contests would still
be a considerable challenge.
Erdoan was successful in the frst
stage of the three consecutive elec-
tions, the local elections of March 30.
Te governing Justice and Develop-
ment Party (AKParty) got more than
43 percent of total votes and won in
most of the municipalities. Due to
voter consolidation, major opposi-
tion parties vote shares also increased
but this did not lead to a signifcant
change in the control over the local
administrations.
Erdoan and the AKParty faced three
challenges in these elections. First of
all, the oppositions election campaigns
focused on corruption allegations
rather than the typical local election
themes such as the candidates and
their platforms. Citizens of Turkey
witnessed a tape war as allegedly
wire-tapped incriminating conversa-
tions of the prime minister, his son,
and other members of the political
elite were leaked through the Internet
and social media. Te government
responded to these attacks by refuting
the allegations and restricting Internet
access. Not surprisingly, the local elec-
tions were seen as a plebiscite for the
governing style of the prime minister
by almost all major actors.
Secondly, another development
showed that the popular unrest of the
2013 Gezi Protests survives. About
1.2 million people participated in
the funeral of 15-year-old Berkin
Elvan, who had been shot by a tear
gas canister during the protests and
passed away afer lying in a coma
for nine months. Te reaction of the
police force reminded the funeral
participants of June 2013 and led to
new wave of popular demonstrations
across the country. Te anger of these
protesters was channeled to a kind of
active citizenship, mobilizing more
than 30,000 people to independently
monitor the electoral ballots.
Tirdly, the economic environment
has not been favorable for the govern-
ment. Econometric analyses show
that a minimum 5 percent economic
growth in Turkey is needed for the
Analysis
2
Analysis
incumbent government to maintain its previous vote. Te
government has failed to achieve this target in 2013 and
estimates for 2014 are not promising either. Prominent
political scientists argue that the economic situation is
echoed at the ballot box, and that the AKPartys relative
losses are due to a decline in economic optimism.
Considering these factors corruption allegations, urban
popular unrest, and an unfavorable economic climate
Erdoans success should be admired. But why do almost
half of Turkish voters continue to vote for the AKParty?
Te answer lies in Erdoans ability, together with his team,
to frame the corruption allegations as a coup attempt, a
threat to the stability and well-being of the country. It is
known that voters tend to ignore corruption of politicians if
they otherwise think of them as being competent. Erdoans
campaign strategy was broadly based on this premise,
putting the government services such as healthcare or infra-
structure on the primary agenda. A recent analysis showed
that Erdoans speeches emphasized programs, while his
major competitors most ofen talked about corruption.
Te question is now if a similar strategy will ensure Erdoan
victory in the upcoming presidential elections, which will
be held by popular vote for the frst time in Turkeys history.
Erdoan has announced his candidacy, and he will compete
with two interesting opponents.
Te main opposition Republican Peoples Party (CHP) and
the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) nominated a joint
candidate, Ekmeleddin hsanolu, former secretary-general
of the Islamic Cooperation Organization. Unknown to the
majority of Turkish society before his candidacy, hsanolu
is an academic whose work has focused on the history
of scientifc activity and institutions of learning within
Islam, and is a successful diplomat who has actively advo-
cated intercultural dialogue. hsanolu was born in Cairo,
as his father had decided to leave Turkey in reaction to
Kemal Atatrks decision to abolish the Caliphate in 1924.
hsanolus candidacy was so surprising that his name was
Googled more than 200,000 times on the day his candidacy
was announced. It seems that he has been proposed as a
conservative alternative to Erdoan, to attract a signifcant
portion of the conservative constituency.
Meanwhile, the pro-Kurdish Peoples Democracy Party
(HDP) nominated the chairman of the party, Selahattin
Demirta, who is not only a very strong fgure in the party,
but also one who is known for being moderate and whose
appeal goes beyond Kurds to various lef-wing groups
in Turkey. While Demirta can get a signifcantly higher
vote than what his party usually gets in elections (around
6 percent), he is highly unlikely to make it to the second
round, if there is one.
Te real competition will be between Erdoan and
hsanolu. Te oppositions decision to nominate a conser-
vative candidate has made life more difcult for Erdoan.
His religious rhetoric will not function as well as it could
against an ultra-secular candidate, and personally attacking
a distinguished conservative academician/diplomat would
not be a good strategy to attract conservative voters.
Erdoan will try to maintain his constituency and attract
some nationalist voters without losing the support he has
enjoyed from the conservative Kurds. If he cannot win
during the frst round, he will try to gain the support of
the constituency of the pro-Kurdish party. Meanwhile,
hsanolu will try to attract some AKParty voters who are
frustrated with Erdoan as well as getting votes from a large
majority of CHP and MHP voters.
While the candidates have just started their campaigns,
the odds already look in Erdoans favor. Erdoan is using
his same strategy, based on framing and emphasizing
programs, very successfully. He portrays himself as the
candidate of the nation while portraying hsanolu, his
main opponent, as the candidate of the establishment.
He declares that he will be an active president who will
continue to serve by instituting major infrastructure proj-
ects while his opponent would be just a symbolic presiden-
tial fgure. He portrays himself as a national candidate and
his opponent as a candidate imposed by foreign lobbies. He
positions himself as a man of the people while portraying
his opponent as just another elite.
hsanolus main argument is that, while Erdoan has
already announced that he would claim more power than
the constitution grants to the president, hsanolu would
act within the limits of the constitution, as a president in a
parliamentary system. He positions himself as a consensus
candidate and claims that he would maintain an equal
distance from all political parties and embrace all segments
of Turkish society. In order to appeal to the AKPartys voter
base, hsanolu ofen uses religious rhetoric and makes
Analysis
3
Analysis
references to his friendship with Turkeys conservative
leaders, including Erdoan himself.
Te other candidate, Selahattin Demirta, nominated by the
parliamentary group of the pro-Kurdish Peoples Democ-
racy Party (HDP), claims to be the candidate of not only
the Kurds, but of excluded groups, including minorities and
the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community. His
rhetoric is very positive and moderate and he has already
formed a support base that goes beyond the Kurdish polit-
ical movement in Turkey. Demirta does not seem to have a
chance to make it to the second round, but he could succeed
in broadening his partys support base in this election by
dominating the lef end of the ideological spectrum.
Both candidates messages and how they get them across
are important. It is here that Erdoan makes a big diference
thanks to his party organization, professional campaign
management, governmental power, and control over media.
Erdoan announced his candidacy at a very well organized
press event attended by 4,000 of his supporters in Ankara.
He organized another press conference to present his vision,
which was attended by well-known actors, singers, sports
club presidents, businessmen, and other celebrities. Tese
meetings were covered live by most of the TV channels in
Turkey. Erdoan has already started to hold public rallies
and is expected to organize many of those throughout the
campaign period.
hsanolus campaign start was not nearly as impressive or
professional. Te lack of strong support from the parties that
nominated him is obvious, as they are not expected to orga-
nize any public rallies for him. Unlike Erdoan, hsanolu
does not enjoy the support of the media. For example,
during July 4-6, when the three candidates held their press
conferences, the main TV channel of Turkeys publicly
fnanced broadcasting company, TRT1, provided 24 minutes
coverage to Erdoan, 2 minutes coverage to hsanolu, and
no coverage to Demirta. On the same dates, the national
news channel funded by all citizens through electricity
bills, TRTHaber, provided Erdoan 204 minutes coverage,
hsanolu 2 minutes, and Demirta less than a minute.
It will not be surprising if Erdoan is successful in the
second of the three electoral challenges facing his party in
18 months. Yet, there are still questions to be answered.
Who will succeed Erdoan as prime minister of Turkey and
president of the AKParty? Will there be a swap between
President AbdullahGl and Prime Minister Erdoan, or
will Erdoan opt for a lower profle prime minister whom
he can better control? Will Erdoan be able to impose his
will on the new prime minister and create a de facto presi-
dential system in Turkey? How will Turkeys foreign policy
be afected afer the transition? What about the Turkish
economy? How will the AKParty do in the parliamentary
elections that are scheduled to take place in May 2015,
under a new leadership? Last but not the least, in which
direction will the Turkish democracy evolve? As Turkeys
longest year continues, the answers to these questions will
be revealed one by one.
About the Author
Emre Erdoan, Ph.D., is an expert in public opinion and foreign
policy. He is one of the founders of Infakto RW, an Istanbul-based
independent research institute, and a professor of political method-
ology in Istanbul Bilgi University and Boazii University. Erdoan is
author of several articles about public opinion, foreign policy, political
participation, and social capital. Tey Know Us Wrongly, about percep-
tions of Europeans about Turks and Turkey, was published in 2012.
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