Heidegger and Deleuze

i
It is difficult to determine the exact relation Deleuze has with Heideggers work since Deleuze never
wrote an extensive text on Heidegger.
ii
Nevertheless, on the basis of Deleuzes numerous mentions of and
allusions to Heidegger,
iii
we are able to determine two points of intersection.
iv
irst and most importantl!,
there is the issue of difference or even the difference, that is, the difference between being and beings
"between Sein and Seiende, in #erman$ between ltre and ltant, in rench%, but also the difference
between thinking and being, between sub&ect and ob&ect, between words and things, between things said
and things seen, and between statements and visibilities. Here the issue is how to conceive the 'between(
of these doubles. )oth Deleuze and Heidegger recognize one fundamental re*uirement for conceiving the
'between(+ the 'between( must not be conceived as a separation$ there must be no dualism. ,herefore,
both Deleuze and Heidegger make use of the image of the fold. ,his image suggests no separation, since
folding one sheet of paper over itself does not tear the sheet into two separate pieces. -et, what Deleuze
sees in the Heideggerian fold is a sameness between being and the beings, between all the doubles. .o
what distinguishes Deleuze from Heidegger is a second re*uirement for conceiving the 'between(+ the
'between( must not be conceived as a middle$ there must be no continuit!. or Deleuze, the 'between(
must be conceived through an image that differs from the neat alignment of the fold+ it must be conceived
as a struggle or even as chaos that breaks, stretches or unhinges the fold, the as!mmetr! of a zigzag.
v
,he
second issue in which Deleuze and Heidegger intersect is thinking. ,he second issue flows out of the first
since for both Deleuze and Heidegger the problem is once again that of the 'between,( the 'between( of
thinking and what is to be thought. Heidegger seems to conceive this relation on the basis of a repetition
of the original sense of philosoph!, as philia, while Deleuze conceives this relation / transforming
philosoph! into misosoph! / as violence. 0nl! the violence of an encounter makes thinking be creative.
1s we can see alread!, the problem in both of these issues is that of the foundation+ sameness and original
sense function as the foundation, while struggle and violence are the non2foundation.
vi
Now we can see
these two points of intersection most clearl! in one of Deleuze most sustained discussions of Heidegger,
1
his 'Note on Heideggers 3hilosoph! of Difference( found in 4hapter 0ne of his 5678 Difference and
Repetition "D9 86265:7;277%.
4hapter 0ne of Difference and Repetition brings us directl! to the issue of difference "and the
'between(% since it is called 'Difference in itself.( Here, Deleuze brings to light the various wa!s in
which the <estern metaph!sical tradition has made difference come to be reconciled with the demands of
'the concept in general.( ,he concept in general demands that difference be represented. 4onverted to a
representation "a mental representation in the human sub&ect%, difference becomes a difference between
two determinable things. 1s a 'between( two, it comes to be defined as resemblance, and then
resemblance is able to be transformed into the identit! of an abstract or general concept. ,he concept is
the third or middle term through which the two determinable ob&ects are compared and made e*ual, in a
word, mediated. 1s representation, difference is subordinated to identit! and mediation, it is subordinated
to dialectic in either its ancient or modern form "D9 ;;2;=:>6%. ,hus difference comes to be conceived
onl! for or in relation to something that serves as its foundation or ground. Indeed, difference becomes
nothing but the negation of the foundation, a negation which, when it is itself negated, returns difference
to the foundation from which it derived. "<e shall turn to this idea of 'return( in a moment, but we can
see alread! that in the representational concept of difference, difference is nothing but a bare repetition of
the foundation$ the dialectic is alwa!s circular.% 4learl!, in this conception 22 difference "or differences%
relates negativel! back to a foundation, which is the abstract identit! of the concept "the third term of
mediation% 22 difference is no longer conceived in terms of itself or 'in itself.( 1lthough he anal!zes
1ristotle "ancient dialectic% and Hegel "modern dialectic%, Deleuze orients the entire chapter towards one
over2arching movement in <estern metaph!sics+ 3latonism "D9 65:77%. 1s is well2known, in this chapter,
Deleuze defines the task of contemporar! philosoph! as 'the reversal of 3latonism( "D9 8>:=6%.
However, and not so well2known, echoing Heidegger, Deleuze also calls for a 'destruction( of 3latonism
"D9 65:77%. Indeed, it is precisel! in the center of this 'destruction( that we find Deleuzes five2point
summar! of 'Heideggers 3hilosoph! of Difference( "D9 86265:7;277%.
2
Here are the five points. .ince 3latonism defines difference as the negation of the foundation,
Deleuze starts with the 'not( in Heidegger.
vii
?ore specificall!, he starts here because Hegelian dialectic,
as we &ust suggested and as Deleuze had shown earlier in the chapter, had tried to explain negation in
propositions b! putting non2being right into being$ this non2being within being would be the negative$ but
the negative would have no other function, according to Deleuze, than to be itself negated, and therefore
difference, as in 3latonism, would be returned to identit! "D9 7;:;=$ D9 @8:==$ D9 88286:7A%. .o, in the
first point, Deleuze sa!s that, in Heidegger, the 'not( does not express the negative / Heidegger is not
Hegel / rather the 'not( expresses the difference between being and beings. In the second point, Deleuze
sa!s that the difference between being and beings is not the 'between( in the ordinar! sense.
viii
Instead, it
must be understood as the fold, the 'Bwiefalt.( or Deleuze, the fold image means that being constitutes
the being in the double movement of unconcealment "or 'clearing(% and concealment. Difference
understood as the fold is constitutive of being. In other words, being, in Heidegger, differentiates the
being off from a sort of background of obscurit!. In this wa!, Deleuze gives a new sense to Heideggers
expression 'ontological difference(+ being is the active 'differenciator( of beings "D9 6C:7=$ see also D9
5=;:55@%.
ix
Dike the first two points, the third takes up a well2known aspect of Heideggers thought+ 'the
*uestion of being.(
x
Deleuze sa!s that 'ontological difference corresponds to the *uestion.( In other
words, through the 'correspondence,( Deleuze makes an e*uivalenc! between being and *uestioning. He
makes this e*uivalenc! not onl! because it seems to be faithful to Heideggers thinking, but also because
Deleuze had alread! suggested that 3lato "not 3latonism% had transformed being itself into *uestions and
problems b! means of his m!thological accounts of origins. or instance, the oracular sa!ing at Delphi
explains .ocrates origin, but the sa!ing itself raises problems and *uestions for .ocrates "D9 88:7A%.
,hrough this paradoxical origin, Deleuze is arguing, one is able to insert non2being into being but not in a
wa! that non2being exists simpl! to be itself negated and thereb! returned "as in a circle, again% to the
identit! of being. 1s e*uivalent to a *uestion, being activel! constitutes beings as differences, as if the!
were so man! different answers to a *uestion that remains open and conse*uentl! unanswerable. 1s a
kind of non2being, difference "or the *uestion% / fourth point / 'is not,( as Deleuze sa!s "our emphasis of
3
'not(%, 'an ob&ect of representation.(
xi
,he 'turn be!ond metaph!sics,( in Deleuzes interpretation of
Heidegger, amounts to insisting that metaph!sics cannot think 'difference in itself.( ,he Heideggerian
'turn,( for Deleuze, is a resistance to conceiving difference as a third term 'between( being and beings, it
is a 'stubborn( resistance to mediation. inall!, the fifth point+ 'Difference cannot, therefore, be
subordinated to the Identical or the E*ual, but must be thought as the .ame, in the .ame( "Deleuzes
capitalizations%. ,hrough the .ame "'le ?Fme( in rench, 'die .elbe( in #erman%, Heidegger is tr!ing to
think a 'gathering( that is not reducible to empt! indifferent oneness.
Deleuze intends these five point to show how certain readings of the later Heidegger "Deleuze
probabl! has .artre in mind% are reall! misunderstandings. In particular, Deleuzes five points aim to
outline a more accurate reading of the Heideggerian 'not+ 'the Heideggerian N0, refers not to the
negative in being, but to being as difference$ it refers not to negation but to the *uestion( "Deleuzes
capitalization of 'not(%. Deleuzes defense of Heidegger is so strong here that he sa!s that he considers
the Heideggerian 'correspondence( between difference and the *uestion, between the ontological
difference and the being of the *uestion, 'fundamental.( Despite this attachment to Heideggers thought,
Deleuze suggests that Heideggers own formulas for the 'not( might be to blame for the
misunderstandings of his later work. Indeed, through a series of *uestions, Deleuze distances himself
from Heideggers thinking. In particular, Deleuze is not certain that speaking of the .ame "gathering%,
rather than Identit!, is reall! enough to think original difference "see also D9 5=;:55@%.
xii
Deleuze asks,
'Is .ameness enough to disconnect difference from all mediationG( ,his *uestion implies, as we shall see,
that the fold, for Deleuze, must not be a 'homolog!( between being and beings. ,he distance, however,
that Deleuze takes from Heideggers thought reall! comes down to the status of the being "Seiende or
ltant%, not the status of being "not Sein or ltre%. ,he *uestion for Deleuze is the following+ 'Does
Heidegger make the conversion b! means of which being HltreI must be said onl! of difference and in
this wa! being HltreI revolves around the being HltantIG( "translation modified%. In other words, 'Does
Heidegger conceive the being HltantI in such a manner that the being HltantI is removed from all
4
subordination in relation to the identit! of representationG( Deleuze concludes, 'It seems not, given
HHeideggersI interpretation of Nietzsches eternal return( "D9 65:77%.
xiii
<hether or not Deleuzes claim about Heideggers interpretation of Nietzsches eternal return
doctrine 22 in Difference and Repetition "but alread! in the 567> Nietzsche and Philosophy Hsee N3
>55n5:>>CnA5I%, it is clear that Deleuze thinks that Heidegger does not understand the eternal return
doctrine 22 is correct, it tells us a lot about how Deleuze conceives his own thinking in relation to that of
Heidegger. <hen Heidegger interprets the eternal return doctrine as being 'metaph!sical,( Deleuze thinks
that Heidegger is claiming that the return of the eternal return is a founded repetition. ,hat is, it is the
repetition of an identit! that predetermines all the answers to the *uestion, as if for Nietzsche the
repetition was a repetition of permanence, as if for Nietzsche repetition did not produce a multiplicit! of
new answers, as if for Nietzsche therefore there was no true becoming. In contrast, what Deleuze sees in
the eternal return doctrine is a ver! specific kind of repetition, one that, as he sa!s, 'makes a difference(
"D9 8=:7C%. ,he repetition to which the eternal return refers, in Deleuzes interpretation of Nietzsche, is a
repetition that repeats no identit!. It is a foundationless repetition. It is foundationless insofar as it repeats
the being "ltant%, but the being / an individual thing 22 is not conceived as cop! of an original or of a
model. ,he being is conceived as a singularit! or as an event. 1 singular event, for Deleuze, is a true
'commencement( so that the repetition of the eternal return is a 'recommencement.( )eing based in a
commencement, in an event, the recommencement is not determined. ,herefore the recommencement /
the return of the eternal return 22 has the potential to produce more differences, more events, more
novelties, more answers to the *uestion "D9 >=8275:>CC2C>%. ,he repetition is creative. ,his formula
seems to be contradictor! since repetitions repeat and therefore cannot be creative. -et, one can
understand the formula if one thinks of the artwork. 1n event such as the writing of Hamlet was based in
no determinate model, no exact foundation, and no self2identical origin$ therefore its subse*uent theatre
productions, while repetitions, all are able to be different. Jndoubtedl!, with this description of
recommencement "creative repetition
xiv
%, Deleuze seems to be ver! close to Heideggers own reflections
on the artwork, on the Abgrund "the foundationless%, on the reignis "the event of propriation%, and on
5
another beginning. Indeed, the rench word 'recommencement( could be rendered in English as 'another
beginning.( -et, insofar as Deleuze thinks that Heidegger does not understand Nietzsches eternal return
doctrine, he thinks the real issue between his own thinking and that of Heidegger is the idea of
foundation+ founded repetition versus unfounded repetition. It is a *uestion, as Deleuze would sa! in his
later works, of becoming and deterritorialization.
xv
,he *uestion of foundation is at work as well in the issue of thinking. In Difference and
Repetition, Deleuze refers several times to Heideggers famous *uestion of what calls for thinking "in
particular, D9 588:5;;$ but also D9 >=>2>=A:56=2567$ D9 >=6:>CC$ D9 A=A:>@=%.
xvi
0f course, Deleuze
recognizes that this *uestion means that it is possible for humans to think. )ut, he also recognizes that for
Heidegger that possibilit! does not mean that we are thinking or even capable of thinking. In short, for
Heidegger / and Deleuze completel! agrees with Heidegger / thought thinks onl! in the presence of what
is to be thought. 1nd what is to be thought is not onl! what gives food for thought, but also and especiall!
the unthinkable or the non2thought, that is, the fact that 'we are not !et thinking( "D9 588$ here Deleuze
is *uoting Heideggers !hat is called "hin#ing$$ the passage from Difference and Repetition that we are
paraphrasing here from D9 588:5;; is untranslated in the English translation%. -et, for Deleuze what is at
issue is how Heidegger conceives the relation between thought and what is to be thought. Deleuze claims
"in a footnote, which reinforces what we saw in ',he ive 3oints(% that the later Heidegger "the
Heidegger of !hat is %alled "hin#ing$% remains attached to 'the primac! of .ame( "Deleuzes
capitalization of the word 'the .ame,( 'le ?Fme(%. ,he primac! of the same means that Heidegger,
according to Deleuze, conceives the relation between thought and what is to be thought as a 'homolog!(
"D9 588n5:A>5n55%. ,hus, the homolog! between thought and what is to be thought, according to
Deleuze, turns the Heideggerian fold into a kind of benevolent desire$ it bears a strong resemblance to the
philia of philo2soph!. In short, Heidegger seems to conceive the fold as an interlacing, or even a chiasm.
or Deleuze, however, the fold must be understood as a fold between two kinds of forms, as if being and
beings, thought and the ob&ect of thought, and between things said and things seen, as if all of the doubles
are formalized. ,hese two forms are not homologous but heterogeneous and different from one another$
6
the fold is in fact a 'non2relation( " 55@:5C6%.
xvii
-et, although different, the! encounter one another
across an element that is not the form of either of the doubles. ,he element must be conceived as formless
or informal. ,his negation / in2formal 22 implies that prior to the fold, there is an 'unfold.(
xviii
,he
'unfold( is not an interlacing but a 'stranglehold( " 556:55>%. or Deleuze, therefore, and unlike for
Heidegger, the fold between being and beings, between things seen and things said, between words and
things, sub&ect and ob&ect, etc., the 'between( of all of these differences is conceived as violence or a
struggle. Indeed, without the violent relation, without 'an encounter,( it is not clear wh! humans would
ever start to think. 1s Deleuze sa!s, 'ever!thing begins with misosoph!( "D9 58>:5A6%.
,he *uestion of philosoph! is the one that Deleuze asks in his last book "co2authored with Klix
#uattari%+ !hat is Philosophy$ In fact, this *uestion brings us to what must count as a third point of
intersection between Deleuze and Heidegger+ the fact that philosoph! historicall! begins in #reece. 0f
course, it is not controversial to claim that Heideggers philosoph! revolves around some sort of retrieval
of the original #reek inspiration for philosoph!. Deleuze, however, explains Heideggers impulse to
retrieve the #reeks as a particularl! modern "56
th
and >C
th
centur!% endeavor, and, even more, a
particularl! #erman endeavor "L3h 6@:5C5%. #enerall!, according to Deleuze, #erman philosoph!
"Deleuze mentions Mant, Hegel, and Heidegger% wants to 'recon*uer( the #reek philosophical territor!
"that seemingl! has been given over to barbarians, nomads, and anarch! HL3h 5CC:5C;
xix
I%. In order to
recon*uer the #reek territor!, #erman philosoph! 'must constantl! clear and consolidate the soil, that is,
it must found HfonderI( "L3h 5CC:5C;%. 0nce again, we see how the issue of foundation organizes all of
Deleuzes reflections on Heideggers thought. )ut more specificall!, Heidegger, according to Deleuze,
conceives the #reeks as the 1utochthon+ philosoph! arises naturall! out of the #reek soil. It is not
imported from elsewhere$ it does not come from another territor!. ,hus, according to Deleuze, #reece is
for Heidegger an origin "L3h 65:6=%. 1s the word 'autochthonous( suggests, origin means something like
an internal necessit! between the #reeks and philosoph! "L3h 86:6A%, as if philosoph! could not have
appeared elsewhere, as if from this origin the histor! of philosoph!, which Heidegger calls 'the histor! of
being,( develops according to a kind of 'anal!tic and necessar! principle( "L3h 6C:6;%. )ecause the
7
#reeks are the origin, and despite the fact that the #reeks do not articulate their relation to being, 'in
Heidegger,( Deleuze sa!s, 'there is no *uestion of going farther than the #reeks$ it is enough to resume
their movement in an initiating, recommencing repetition( "L3h 65:6=, translation modified%. Deleuze is
arguing that since the histor! of being is necessaril! connected to a repetition of the #reek origin,
Heideggers idea of 'another beginning( / 'the initiating, recommencing repetition( 22 is a founded
repetition. Heideggers repetition congeals at and around the #reek origin as if what the #reeks did 'is
valid once and for all( "L3h 6>:67%.
,he congealed repetition of the #reeks brings Deleuze to Heideggers so2called 'political
mistake,( his association with Nazism in 56AA. In fact, what Deleuze is doing here is providing an
explanation of the so2called 'mistake.( Deleuze sa!s, 'Heidegger wanted to re&oin the #reeks through the
#ermans at the worst moment of their histor!( "L3h 5C;:5C8%. '1t the worst moment of their histor!(+
this occurred when the #ermans conceived themselves as a pure race. ,he 'mistake( is that Heidegger
takes the #ermans, the pure race, for the #reeks, the origin of philosoph!. 1lthough Deleuze wonders if
Heideggers philosophical concepts are therefore not 'intrinsicall! sullied,( he admits that Heidegger ma!
have &ust been confused, that he lost his wa!, that his e!es got tired. Nevertheless, it seems that, for
Deleuze, Heideggers confusion had its source in the concept of the #reeks as an autochthonous origin / a
virtuall! pure origin of virtuall! pure philosoph! could only call forth a pure people. In contrast, for
Deleuze, the #reeks were not an origin and the! were not pure+ philosoph! was 'brought Hto #reeceI b!
immigrants( "L3h 86:6A%. If Heidegger had understood philosoph! on the basis of this migrator! event,
he would have known that the people called forth b! philosoph! "and art% is 'not one that claims to be
pure, but rather an oppressed, bastard, lower, anarchical, nomadic, and irremediabl! minor race( "L3h
5C;25C=:5C6%. Earlier we said that for Deleuze ever!thing begins with misosoph!. Now we can see that,
for Deleuze, ever!thing begins with non2philosoph!, with the non2philosophers, the artists, the barbarians,
the anarchists, the nomads, with the ones who contaminate us, who make the violence of the encounter.
,he! are the ones who make us think$ the! are the ones who call for thinking. -et, Deleuze knows that we
8
would not have the *uestion of what calls for thinking without Heidegger. ,his is wh! he sa!s, '<e must
not refuse to take Heidegger seriousl!( " 558:555%.
Nanae .holtz and Deonard Dawlor
9
i
,he following abbreviation are used here to refer to Deleuzes works+ D9& Diffrence et rptition "3aris+ 3resses
Jniversitaires de rance, 5678%.English+ Difference and Repetition "New -ork+ 4olumbia Jniversit! 3ress, 566;% b! 3aul
3atton$ N3+ Nietzsche et la philosophie "3aris+ 3resses Jniversitaires de rance, 567>%.English+ Nietzsche and Philosophy
"New -ork+ 4olumbia Jniversit! 3ress, 568A% b! Hugh ,omlinson$ + 'oucault "3aris+ Oditions de ?inuit, 5687%. English+
'oucault "?inneapolis+ Jniversit! of ?innesota 3ress, 5688% b! .ePn Hand$ L3h+ 22with Klix #uattari+ (u)est*ce +ue la
philosophie$ "3aris+ Oditions de ?inuit, 5665%. English+ !hat is Philosophy$ "New -ork+ 4olumbia Jniversit! 3ress, 566;%
b! Hugh ,omlinson and #raham )urchell.
ii
,here is evidence that earl! in his career, during the 56=Cs, Deleuze studied Heidegger. .ee #illes Deleuze, 'Luest2ce *ue
fonderG(, accessed on December 7, >C55, http+::www.webdeleuze.com. ,his text is the transcription of Deleuzes 56=7256=@
'cours h!pokhQgne,( at D!cKe Douis le #rand. In the context of a discussion of foundation in Mant, he refers several times
to Heideggers ,ant and the Problem of -etaphysics. 1lso, in 56=A he wrote book reviews on 9Kgis Nolivets .e probl/me
de la mort chez -0 Heidegger et 10*P0 Sartre and M.E. DRgstrups ,ier#egaard und Heideggers 2istenzanalyse und ihr
3erh4ltnis zur 3er#5ndigung.
iii
or references to Heidegger, see+ N3 "Nietzsche and Philosophy% ;;2;=:A6, 5>A:5C8, 5@;:5=5, 56;:576, 56;n;:>CAnAC,
5@;n:>5=nA, >55n5:>>CnA5$ D9 "Difference and Repetition% xvi2xvii, 5:xix, =>:A=, 86265:7;277, 5=;:55@, 576:5>6,
588:5;;, >=>2A:56=27, >7C:>CC25, A=A:>@=, A8;:AC5 S AAAn55, 588n5:A>5n.55, A65:AA;$ DI 5C7:@=, 55C:@@, 55>:@6,
>56:5=@, >>>:5=6, >>=:575, A7A:>7C, 5=7:AC5n5;$ D "Dialogues% 58256:5>25A$ ?3 "A "housand Plateaus% 5=7:5>=, =C52
>n@8:=75n.8=$ 45 "%inema 6% >Cn5:>56n5=$ 4> "%inema 7% >C;:5=7, >58:57@, >58n>A:A5Cn>A$ "'oucault% =@2=8:=C,
77:=6, 6=266:8626A, 5C>:6=, 55=25>5:5C@255A, 5>525>8:55;25>C, 5C@n57:5;7n57, 55=nAA:5;8nAA, 558nA7:5;8nA7,
556nA8:5;6nA8, 5>5n;5:5;6n;5$ , ""he 'old0 .eibniz and the 8aro+ue%57:5C, A7:>7, ;>:AC, =C2=5:A=2A7, @5,
A7n>@:5=;n5;$ L3h "!hat is Philosophy$% 9:;;C, ==:==, =7:=7, 8625CC:6A25C;, 5C;2=:5C826, 88n=:>>An=, 5;Cn5C:>>8n5C,
576n5@:>A5n5@$ N "Negotiations% ;@:A5, 5AC25AA:6=26@, 5;;25;=:5C@, 5=>25=A:55>25A$ ,9? ""<o Regimes of -adness%
5>6:5;5, >>7:>;5, >A6:>=7, A=7:A8C$ 4D# "seminars at the JniversitK 3aris TIII Tincennes and Tincennes .t. Denis 56@52
8@, accessed on ebruar! A, >C5>, http+::www.webdeleuze.com% I?1#E ?0JTE?EN, I?1#E ,E?3.+ Tincennes 2 .t
Denis 2 CC:CC:568>, C5:CC:568>$ M1N,+ Tincennes 2 >5:CA:56@8, >8:CA:56@8, C;:C;:56@8$ DEI)NIB+ Tincennes 2
>C:C=:568C, CC:CC:568@, Tincennes 2 .t Denis 2 >C:C5:568@.
iv
1lain )adiou argues for their proximit! based on the univocit! of )eing ""he %lamor of 8eing. ?inneapolis+ Jniversit! of
?innesota 3ress, >CCC "orig. pub. 566@%$ 4onstantin )oundas views Deleuzes Difference and Repetition as a response to
Heideggers 8eing and "ime but claims the lines of divergence ultimatel! outweigh those of proximit! "'?artin
Heidegger(. #raham Nones and Non 9offe "eds.% Deleuzes Philosophical .ineage0 Edinburgh Jniversit! 3ress, >CC6. A>52
AA8%$ ?iguel de )eistegui draws them together as thinkers of different sides of )eing, ultimatel! irreconcilable ""ruth and
=enesis& Philosophy as Differential >ntology0 Indiana Jniversit! 3ress, >CC;% 4laire 3arnet identifies a correlation in their
occupation with the non2thought within thought, !et admits in her conversation with Deleuze that '-ou HDeleuzeI are not a
Heideggerian( "Dialogues A5:>A%$ Nanae .holtz claims Deleuze radicalizes the Heideggerian relation between the aesthetic
and a people2to2come ""he "ransformati?e Potential of Art& %reating a People in Heidegger and Deleuze. / dissertation.
Jniversit! of ?emphis. >CC6%. 1lso see+ Dronsfield, Nonathan. ')etween Deleuze and Heidegger ,here Never is 1n!
Difference.( David 3ettigrew S ranUois 9affoul "eds.%, 'rench @nterpretations of Heidegger& An 2ceptional Reception.
.un! .eries in 4ontemporar! rench ,hought. .tate Jniversit! of New -ork 3ress. >CC8$ 9obinson, Meith. ',owards a
3olitical 0ntolog! of the old+ Deleuze, Heidegger, <hitehead and the 'ourfold( Event.( Deleuze and the 'old& A %ritical
Reader0 3algrave ?acmillan, >CC6.
v
,he zigzag is imaged repeatedl! b! Deleuze+ as undermining totalit!, a crack, as!mmetrical "A "housand Plateaus,
>7A:>57 S A;5:>@8%$ 'an extremel! sinuous foldV a primal tie that cannot be located( ""he 'oldA 57>:5>C%$ 'something
which passes or happen between two as though under a potential difference( and a 'broken lineV that slips betweenB
CDialogues, 5A:7 S ;5:A>DE FGcest ptt le mou?ement lmentaireA cest ptt le mou?ement +ui a prsid H la cration du
mondeGB C.)Abcdaire de =illes DeleuzeA filmed b! 3ierre21ndrK )outang in 568825686%0
vi
<e have simplified Deleuzes distinction between foundation and non2foundation. In fact, in Difference and Repetition,
what is at issue is to found or ground "fonder% and begin "commencer%. -et, for Deleuze a genuine founding must
'metamorphose($ however to have a genuine founding what is founded must be related to a 'without ground( "sans*fond%
"D9, >CC:5=;%. ,hus to ground in Deleuze is never a repetition of the same.
vii
Deleuze cites Heideggers '0n the Essence of #round,( and '<hat is ?etaph!sics,( both in Pathmar#s.
viii
Deleuze cites Heideggers '0vercoming ?etaph!sics, in "he nd of Philosophy.
ix
.ee also "he 'old where Deleuze late in his career "5688% takes up again Heideggers language of the I<iefalt ", ;>:AC%.
x
Deleuze cites again '0n the Essence of #round.(
xi
Deleuze cites again '0vercoming ?etaph!sics.( )ut here in the fourth point, he also cites Nean )eaufrets @ntroduction to
Po/me de Parmenide "3aris+ 3resses Jniversitaires de rance, 56==%, and )eda 1lleman, HJlderlin et Heidegger "3aris+
3resses Jniversitaires de rance, 56=;%.
xii
)! focusing on the same "gathering%, Deleuzes criticism of Heidegger is virtuall! identical to that of oucault and that of
Derrida. .ee ?ichel oucault, .es mots et les choses "3aris+ ,el #allimard, 5677%, p. A;=$ anon!mous English translation as
"he >rder of "hings "New -ork+ Tintage, 56@C%, p. AA;. .ee Nac*ues Derrida, -moires pour Paul de -an "3aris+ #alilKe,
5688%, p. 5A7$ English translation b! 4ecile Dindsa!, Nonathan 4uller, and Eduardo 4adava as -emoires for Paul de -an
"New -ork + 4olumbia Jniversit! 3ress, 5687%, pp. 5;525;>.
xiii
Here Deleuze cites Heideggers interpretation of Nietzsche in !hat is %alled "hin#ing$
xiv
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze calls what we are calling a 'creative repetition( a 'clothed( or disguised(
repetition. .ee D9 55;:8;.
xv
Deleuze develops the concepts of becoming and deterritorialization in A "housand Plateaus. .ee ?3 AC=:>;6 for
becoming$ see ?3 >55:5@>
xvi
.ee also 5>;:557+ 'In truth, one thing haunts oucault / thought. ,he *uestion Wwhat does thinking meanG <hat do we
call thinkingG is the arrow first fired b! HeideggerV the arrow par excellence( "translation modified%.
xvii
,he fold in Deleuze is e*uivalent to what he calls a 'plane of immanence.( ,he most important definition of the plane of
immanence appears in !hat is Philosophy$ .ee L3h =C:;82;6.
xviii
Deleuze speaks of the 'unfold( "dpli% in "he 'old "3 =C2=5:A=2A7%.,he word 'unfold,( however, reall! comes from
oucault. .ee oucault, .es mots et les choses, p. A=A$ "he >rder of "hings, p. A;>. In our discussion of the fold in Deleuze,
we have inserted some comments from Deleuzes 'oucault. Near the end of this book, Deleuze compares oucaults
thought to that of Heidegger "and to that of ?erleau23ont!% " 55=25>C:5C8255A%. ,his is an important and trul!
illuminating comparison. Indeed, there can be no *uestion that Deleuzes 'oucault is one of the best books ever written on
oucaults thinking. -et, as some have claimed, 'oucault appears to be as much a book about Deleuzes thinking itself as is
it about oucaults. .ee ,homas l!nn, SartreA 'oucaultA and Historical ReasonA 3olume "<o "4hicago+ Jniversit! of
4hicago 3ress, >CC=%, p. A=Cn>>+ 'V HDeleuzesI important book on oucaultV is an original attempt to think his own
thought through that of oucault.( It is possible therefore that Deleuze is presenting his own thinking under the proper name
'oucault.( -et, Deleuze does not put the name 'oucault( between scare *uotes and he claims une*uivocall! that he is
presenting oucaults thinking as such in his book. ,he possibilit!, however, that 'oucault( is actuall! Deleuze presents a
serious interpretative problem for an!one who wants to incorporate 'oucault into an exposition of Deleuzes thinking. ,his
problem explains wh! we have used 'oucault sparingl! in our exposition. No matter what, however, we think 'oucault is
one of the most important philosoph! books written in the >C
th
centur!. or instance, what Deleuze sa!s about dualism in
oucault specificall! and about dualism generall! is extraordinaril! illuminating " 86:8A%.
xix
In this comment, Deleuze cites the 3reface to the irst Edition of Mants %riti+ue of Pure Reason, where Mant speaks of
the land of metaph!sics being given over to barbarians, nomads, and anarch!.