CIRCULAR NO.

17 - 95
TO

SUBJECT

THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX

APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN
CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURTS, SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE PHILIPPINES
A. M. NO. MTJ-93-874
AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN, Complainant vs. JUDGE RAFAEL B.
OMIPON, 6th MCTC: Hinunangan-Silago, Southern Leyte, Respondent

Quoted hereunder for the information and guidance of all concerned, is the pertinent portion of
the decision of the Third Division in A. M. No. MTJ-93-874 (AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN,
Petitioner versus JUDGE RAFAEL B. OMIPON, Respondent), dated March 14, 1995, to wit:
"A. M. No. MTJ-93-874, (AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN, Petitioner versus JUDGE RAFAEL
B. OMIPON, Respondent)
"xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

"Complainant is correct in pointing out that based on Pres. Decree No. 705, Sec. 68-A
and Adm. Order No. 59, the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representative has the power
to confiscate any illegally obtained or gathered forest products and all conveyances used in the
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws.
However, as complainant himself likewise pointed out, this power is in relation to the
administrative jurisdiction of the DENR.
"We do not find that when respondent Judge released the truck after he conducted the
preliminary investigation and satisfied himself that there was no reason to continue keeping the
truck, he violated Pres. Decree No. 705 and Adm. Order No. 59. The release of the truck did not
render nugatory the administrative authority of the DENR Secretary. The confiscation
proceedings under Adm. Order No. 59 is different from the confiscation under the Revised Penal
6

6 SEC. 7. NOTICE TO OWNER. For the purpose only of complying with due process, the
Secretary, EED/PENRO/CENRO or their duly authorized representatives shall give the owner or
his representative a written notice of the seizure and shall give him an opportunity to be heard in
reference to the ground or reason for the seizure by requiring said owner or representative to
submit sworn statements or affidavits within three (3) days from receipt of such written notice or
they may elect to have a formal hearing conducted, but they must signify their intention in
writing within the same period. For the purpose of such notice and all proceedings connected
with confiscation, "representative" shall be deemed to Include not only representative-in-fact of
the owner but also any person having possession of the conveyance at the time of confiscation or
seizure.
SEC. 8. REPORT/RECOMMENDATION. Upon receipt of the aforesaid sworn
statement/affidavit of the owner or representative or if none Is received despite due notice, the
PENRO/CENRO or any authorized representative of the DENR for the matter shall determine if

Code, which is an additional penalty imposed in the event of conviction. Despite the order of
release, the truck can be seized again either by filing a motion for reinvestigation and motion to
include the truck owner/driver as co-accused, which complainant has done as manifested before
the lower-court or by enforcing Adm. Order No, 59. Section 12 thereof categorically states that
'[t]he confiscation of the conveyance under these regulations shall be without prejudice to any
criminal action which shall be filed, against the owner thereof or any person who used the
conveyance in the commission of the offense.'
"Petitioner is of the opinion that under the circumstances, respondent Judge should have
turned over the truck to the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of
San Juan, Southern Leyte for appropriate disposition. No doubt, this would have simplified
matters and prevented the present situation from occurring wherein one government official files
a complaint against another. Under Sec. 4 of Adm. Order No. 59, if the apprehension is not made
by DENR field offices, deputized military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending
illegal logs and other forest products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field
offices and turn over said forest products and conveyances for proper action and disposition. A
period of about two weeks lapsed, from the time the seizure was made before a complaint was
filed. During this period, the apprehending policemen had enough time to turn over the logs and
the truck to the nearest DENR field office for proper action and disposition since the duty to turn
over the truck to the nearest DENR field office rests on the officials apprehending the illegal
logs. There being no mandatory duty on the part of respondent Judge to turn over the truck, he
should not be visited with disciplinary sanction when he did not refer the same to the DENR
field office in San Juan, Southern Leyte.
March 23, 1995.
(Sgd.) ERNANI CRUZ PANO
Court Administrator

the seized conveyance was used in the commission of the offense as contemplated in Section 2
hereof, and shall render a report thereon within one week accompanied by the evidence he has
gathered Including his recommendations to the Secretary or the Regional Executive Director, as
the case may be.
SEC. 9. DISPOSITION OF CONVEYANCE. All conveyances found to have been used in the
transport of any forest product from illegal sources and/or covered by spurious documents shall
be declared forfeited in favor of the government, in accordance with Sec. 68-A of PD 705, as
amended. Forfeited conveyances may be used, at the discretion of the DENR, in the forest
protection and development activities, otherwise, the same shall be disposed of through public
auction by the Secretary or the Regional Office, as the case may be, in accordance with existing
policies and procedures for the disposition of government property.

FIRST DIVISION

ERNESTO AQUINO,

G.R. No. 165448

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CORONA,
- versus -

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

BERSAMIN, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Promulgated:

Respondent.

July 27, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review 1[1] assailing the 5 June 1997
Decision2[2] and 24 September 2004 Resolution3[3] of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 17534.

1[1]

Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2[2]
Rollo, pp. 16-31. Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola with Associate Justices
Minerva
P. Gonzaga-Reyes and Hilarion L. Aquino, concurring.
3[3]
L.

Id. at 33-35. Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola with Associate Justices Jose
Sabio, Jr. and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, concurring.

The Antecedent Facts

On behalf of Teachers Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an application to cut down 14 dead
Benguet pine trees within the Teachers Camp in Baguio City. The trees, which
had a total volume of 13.37 cubic meters, were to be used for the repairs of
Teachers Camp.

On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a team composed of

members from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng), a forest ranger of the Forest Section of
the Office of the City Architect and Parks Superintendent of Baguio City,
conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut.

Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a

permit allowing the cutting of 14 trees under the following terms and conditions:

2.
That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-wood by
permittee;

3.

the

As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred forty (140) pine
seedlings in an appropriate place within the area. In the absence of
plantable area in the property, the same is required to plant within forest
area duly designated by CENRO concerned which shall be properly

maintained and protected to ensure/enhance growth and development of

the planted seedlings;

4.

Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is punishable under Section

68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987; and

5.

That non-compliance with any of the above conditions or violations of

forestry laws and regulations shall render this permit null and void without
prejudice to the imposition of penalties in accordance with existing laws
and regulations.

This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10) days from issuance
hereof or as soon as the herein authorized volume is exhausted whichever comes
first.4[4]

On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises Sobrepea, Daniel

Salamo, Pablo Guinawan, Antonio Abellera, and Forester Paul Apilis received
information that pine trees were being cut at Teachers Camp without proper
authority.

They proceeded to the site where they found Ernesto Aquino

(petitioner), a forest ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng supervising the cutting of
the trees.

They also found sawyers Benedicto Santiago (Santiago) and Mike

Masing (Masing) on the site, together with Clemente Salinas (Salinas) and Andrew
Nacatab (Nacatab), who were also supervising the cutting of the trees. The forest
rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which only 12 were covered by the permit.
The volume of the trees cut with permit was 13.58 cubic meters while the volume
4[4]

Records, p. 190.

of the trees cut without permit was 16.55 cubic meters. The market value of the
trees cut without permit was P182,447.20, and the forest charges were P11,833.25.

An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree

No.

7055[5] (PD 705) was filed against petitioner, Cuteng, Nacatab, Masing, and
Santiago, as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993, and subsequent thereto, in the
City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one
another, and without any authority, license or permit, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously cut nine (9) pine trees with a total volume and market
price as P182,447.20 (Volume 16.55 M3 424 bd. ft./M3 and unit price P26.00 bd.
ft.) and with a total forest charge of P11,833.25 or having a total sum of
P194,280.45 at Teachers Camp, Baguio City, without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, particularly the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 05, Series of 1989, in violation
of the aforecited law.6[6]

Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit as he
was not given a copy of the permit. Masing stated that he cut 10 pine trees under
the supervision of petitioner who claimed to be in possession of the necessary
permit. He stated that three of the trees were stumps about four or five feet high
and were not fit for lumber. He stated that while he was cutting trees, petitioner
and Salinas were present.

5[5]

Revised Forestry Code.

6[6]

Rollo, p. 20.

Santiago testified that he cut trees under petitioners supervision. He stated

that petitioner was in possession of the permit. He stated that he cut 10 trees, six of
which were cut into lumber while two were stumps and two were rotten.

Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were merely hired as sawyers and
they merely followed petitioners instructions.

Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that inspected the trees to be cut
before the permit was issued. He stated that the trees cut by Santiago were covered
by the permit.

Nacatab testified that he only went to Teachers Camp on 13 July 1993 and
he saw Santiago and Masing cutting down the trees in petitioners presence.

Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees at

Teachers Camp. He allegedly informed his superior, Paul Apilis, that he was not
aware of the trees covered by the permit. However, he still supervised the cutting
of trees without procuring a copy of the vicinity map used in the inspection of the
trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not prevent the overcutting of trees
because he was just alone while Cuteng and Santiago were accompanied by three
other men.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In its 26 May 1994 Decision,7[7] the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 5 (trial court), ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused ERNESTO AQUINO y
ESTIPULAR, MICHAEL CUTENG y LESCAO and BENEDICTO SANTIAGO
y DOCLES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby
sentences EACH of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of
prision correccional, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Government in the
amounts of P182,477.20 and P11,833.25, representing the market value of and
forest charges on the Benguet pine trees cut without permit; and to pay their
proportionate shares in the costs.
The chainsaw confiscated from the accused Santiago is hereby declared forfeited
in favor of the Government.
On the other hand, the accused ANDREW NACATAB y DODOY and MIKE
MASING y GANAS are acquitted on reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio, and
the cash bonds they deposited for their provisional liberty in the amount of
P7,500.00 each under O.R. Nos. 139605 and 139646, dated February 4, 1996 and
February 23, 1994, respectively, are ordered released to them upon proper receipt
therefor.
SO ORDERED.8[8]

7[7]

CA rollo, pp. 11-18. Penned by Judge Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.

8[8]

Id. at 17-18.

The trial court ruled that the trees cut exceeded the allowed number of the
trees authorized to be cut. The trial court further ruled that the cutting of trees
went beyond the period stated in the permit.

Petitioner, Cuteng and Santiago appealed from the trial courts Decision.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 5 June 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts
Decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. The

accused-appellants Benedicto Santiago and Michael Cuteng are hereby acquitted
on reasonable doubt. The appellant Ernesto Aquino is found guilty, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The award of damages is deleted. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.9[9]
9[9]

Rollo, pp. 30-31.

The Court of Appeals ruled that as a forest guard or ranger of the CENRO,
DENR, petitioner had the duty to supervise the cutting of trees and to ensure that
the sawyers complied with the terms of the permit which only he possessed. The
Court of Appeals ruled that while it was Teachers Camp which hired the sawyers,
petitioner had control over their acts. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners
claim that he was restrained from taking a bolder action by his fear of Santiago
because petitioner could have informed his superiors but he did not do so. The
Court of Appeals further rejected petitioners contention that the law contemplated
cutting of trees without permit, while in this case there was a permit for cutting
down the trees. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trees which were cut by the
sawyers were not covered by the permit.

The Court of Appeals ruled that conspiracy was not sufficiently proven. As
such, the Court of Appeals found that the prosecution failed to prove Cutengs guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeals likewise acquitted Santiago

because he was only following orders as to which trees to cut and he did not have a
copy of the permit.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 24 September 2004
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 68 of PD 705.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be denied because
petitioner only raises questions of facts and not questions of law. We do not agree.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a

certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. 10[10] For questions to be one of law, the
same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence

10[10] Republic v. Heirs of Fabio, G.R. No. 159589, 23 December 2008.

presented by the litigants.11[11] The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.12[12]

In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 68 of PD 705.

Section 68 of PD 705 provides:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest

Products Without License.-Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case
of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens,
they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on
the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of
PD 705, to wit:

(1)Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest

11[11] Id.
12[12] Id.

products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or

disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority; and
(2)Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.13
[13]

The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority. In this case,
petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of the permit.
He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed the pine trees within
the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of the cut
trees because the lumber was used by Teachers Camp for repairs. Petitioner could
not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his coaccused were acquitted of the charges against them.

Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the
sawyers from cutting trees more than what was covered by the permit. As the
Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could have informed his superiors if he was
really intimidated by Santiago.

If at all, this could only make petitioner

administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section
68 of PD 705.

13[13] Revaldo v. People, G.R. No. 170589, 16 April 2009.

Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of

PD 705 as he is not an officer of a partnership, association, or corporation who
ordered the cutting, gathering, or collection, or is in possession of the pine trees.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 5 June

1997 Decision and 24 September 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 17534. Petitioner Ernesto Aquino is ACQUITTED of the charge of
violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 115507 May 19, 1998

ALEJANDRO TAN, ISMAEL RAMILO and FRED MORENO, petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
In denying this petition, the Court reiterates that the gathering, collection and/or
possession, without license, of lumber, which is considered timber or forest product, are
prohibited and penalized under the Forestry Reform Code, as amended.
The Case
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners
seek to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-GR No. CR-12815
promulgated on July 30, 1993, and its Resolution 3 promugated on April 28, 1994. The
assailed Decision affirmed the judgment 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon,

Branch 81, 5 which, in the complaint against petitioners for violation of Section 68, PD
705 (Forestry Reform Code) as amended, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court finds:
a) the accused ALEJANDRO TAN, ISMAEL RAMILO and FRED MORENO GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of lumber under the
Information, dated March 16, 1990, under Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended by
Executive Order No. 277, and sentences each of them to an indeterminate sentence of
SIX (6) MONTHS, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS, as
maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs, and
b) the accused ALEJANDRO TAN, ISMAEL RAMILO and CRISPIN CABUDOL GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of lumber under the
Information, dated March 16, 1990, under Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended by
Executive Order No. 277, and sentences each of them to an indeterminate sentence of
SIX (6) MONTHS, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS, as
maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs.
The two (2) terms of imprisonment of each of the accused shall be served successively
under Article 70, RPC.
The preventive imprisonment which any of the accused may have suffered is credited in
his favor to its full extent.
The Court further orders the confiscation of the lumber described in the aforesaid
Informations in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.

The Facts
On October 26, 1989, about 6:30 p.m., in the town proper of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island,
Romblon, Forest Guards Joseph Panadero and Eduardo Rabino intercepted a dump
truck loaded with narra and white lauan lumber. The truck was driven by Petitioner Fred
Moreno, an employee of A & E Construction. Again, about 8:00 p.m. on October 30,
1989, this time in Barangay Cambajao, Forest Guards Panadero and Rabino
apprehended another dump truck with Plate No. DEK-646 loaded with tanguile lumber.
Said truck was driven by Crispin Cabudol, also an employee of A & E Construction. Both
motor vehicles, as well as the construction firm, were owned by Petitioner Alejandro
Tan. In both instances, no documents showing legal possession of the lumber were,
upon demand, presented to the forest guards; thus, the pieces of lumber were
confiscated.
On March 16, 1990, Tan and Moreno, together with Ismael Ramilo, caretaker and time
keeper of A & E Construction, were charged by First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Felix R. Rocero with violation of Section 68, 6 PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277,
in an Information 7 which reads:

That on or about the 26th day of October, 1989, at around 6:30 o'clock in the Poblacion,
municipality of Cajidiocan, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, with intent of gain and without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in their possession and under their custody and control 13 pieces narra lumber
about 171 board feet and 41 pieces tanguile lumber about 834 board feet valued at
P8,724.00, Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforestated amount.

In another Information, 8 Tan and Ramilo, together with Crispin Cabudol, were also
charged for the same violation in connection with the October 30, 1989 incident.
On April 26, 1990, all the accused, assisted by counsel, were arraigned on the basis of
the aforementioned Informations; each pleaded not guilty. 9 The cases were thence
jointly tried, pursuant to Section 14, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. 10
During the trial, the defense did not contest the above factual circumstances except to
deny that the forest guards demanded, on either of the two occasions, papers or
documents showing legal possession of the lumber. Additionally, Prisco Marin, who
claimed to have been the officer-in-charge (OIC) of the Bureau of Forest Development
of Sibuyan, testified that the seized pieces of lumber were bought by Tan's Cajidiocan
Trading, one of the licensed lumber dealers in the island, from Matzhou Development
Corporation ("Matzhou") which thus delivered to the former Auxiliary Invoice No. 763850
11
dated March 19, 1987 issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue office in Romblon.
According to Marin, the director of forestry had granted Matzhou a Tree Recovery
Permit covering the entire island of Sibuyan. He added that he had inspected the
lumber in question in the compound of A & E Construction or Cajidiocan Trading, where
he was shown the auxiliary invoice covering the subject. 12
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court brushed aside the version of the defense and ruled that the confiscated
pieces of lumber which were admittedly owned by Accused Tan were not legitimate
deliveries but aborted nocturnal hauling. It convicted all the accused as charged, for
their failure to comply with the Forestry Reform Code, which requires the following legal
documents: (1) an auxiliary invoice, (2) a certificate of origin, (3) a sales invoice, (4)
scale/tally sheets and (5) a lumber dealer permit.
Ruling of Respondent Court of Appeals
On appeal, the accused assigned to the trial court these ten errors: (1) holding them
liable under Section 68 of EO 277; (2) ruling that their possession of the lumber were
unauthorized or illegal; (3) retroactively applying E.O. 277; (4) ruling that the accused
did not have the necessary documents to make their possession legal; (5) convicting
them despite the absence of the corpus delicti; (6) admitting in evidence the alleged
seizure receipts or, assuming their admissibility, considering them as evidence of
corpus delicti; (7) finding that the deliveries were aborted nocturnal hauling; (8)

convicting Alejandro Tan on the ground of conspiracy; (9) ruling that the guilt of the
accused was proved beyond reasonable doubt; and (10) sustaining the constitutionality
of EO 277. 13
As regards the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals held petitioners' "artful
distinction between timber and lumber" "to be fallacious and utterly unmeritorious." It
thereby upheld the solicitor general's manifestation that "forest products" include "wood"
which is defined by Webster's Dictionary as "the hard fibrous substance beneath the
back of trees and shrubs." Respondent Court succinctly ruled that to construe "sawn
lumber" as not covered by "sawn timber" would defeat the evident intent and purpose of
the law, for "what would prevent an illegal logger [from bringing] with him a portable saw
and having the timber illegally cut/gathered [and] sawn right on the spot, thus gaining
immunity for himself[?]" 14
As to the next three assigned errors which relied heavily on Prisco Marin's testimony,
Respondent Court dismissed the said witness' account as "anything but credible." It
added that Marin's testimony largely focused on a certification he made stating that, five
years ago, he inspected the same confiscated lumber which were to be used for the
repair of school building by A & E Construction in Sibuyan. But during the crossexamination, he admitted that he made the inspection in December 1989. The appellate
tribunal noted that, by then, he had already been relieved of his position as OIC of the
Bureau of Forest Development in Romblon; hence, he had no business inspecting the
lumberyard of Petitioner Tan. In fact, he admitted that in December 1989, it was
Romulae Gadaoni who was already the highest forest officer in the island. 15
As to the fifth and sixth alleged errors, Respondent Court ruled that corpus delicti does
not refer literally to the object of the crime in this case, the forest products possessed
without the required legal documents. The fact that the crimes charged were
perpetrated by the petitioners was credibly and amply proven by the detailed
testomonies of the prosecution witnesses, including the admission of Defense Witness
Ismael Ramilo. The seizure receipts merely served to corroborate their testimonies. 16
The seventh and ninth assigned errors were deemed answered in the foregoing
discussions. As to the eighth, no other than the admission of his caretaker or katiwala,
Co-Accused Ramilo, proved that Tan was involved in the conspiracy. Ramilo testified
that the deliveries of lumber on the subject dates (October 26 and 30, 1989) were made
pursuant to the instruction of Tan; and that the latter owned said lumber, the trucks and
the construction firm. The two accused truck drivers who were caught in flagrante
delicto were mere employees of Tan. 17
The last assigned error was set aside by Respondent Court as unnecessary. Absolutely
of no concern to the petitioners, who were caught in possession of lumber without the
required legal documents, was the alleged unconstitutionality of the inclusion of
"firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, 'the associated water' or fish"
in EO 277. There being other grounds to resolve the case, the constitutionality of said
phrase was not passed upon. 18

In their motion for reconsideration, petitioners raised these additional grounds: (1) the
Forestry Reform Code and the laws and regulations of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) distinguish between timber and lumber and between
lumber and other forest products; (2) the Informations alleged and the facts proved that
lumber is not covered by the provision supposedly violated; (3) judicial interpretation or
construction may not be resorted to in order to fill a gap or clear an ambiguity in penal
statutes and, assuming the propriety thereof, construction should be in favor of the
accused; (4) lack of documents for possession of lumber is not punishable under the
law; and (5) the perceived weakness in the testimony of Defense Witness Prisco Marin
should not strengthen the case for the prosecution. In its April 28, 1994 Resolution,
Respondent Court found "no cogent reason for the reversal or modification" of its
Decision. Hence, this petition. 19
The Issues
Petitioners now ask this Court to likewise pass upon their foregoing submissions. Many
of the errors raised, however, involve factual questions, the review of which is not within
the ambit of this Court's functions, particularly in this case where the findings of the trial
court were affirmed by the appellate court and where petitioners failed to show any
misappreciation of the evidence presented. 20 We shall therefore limit our review only to
questions of law.
Accordingly, we shall rule on the following legal issues: (1) the constitutionality of
Section 68 of EO 277, (2) the treatment by the lower court of lumber as timber and/or
forest product within the contemplation of PD 705, as amended, and (3) the alleged
retroactive application of EO 277.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Preliminary Issue:
Constitutionality of Sec. 68, E.O. 277
The impugned legal provision reads:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without
License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:
Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations or corporations, the officers who
ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers
are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceeding on
the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or
any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber
or forest products are found.

Petitioners aver that the above provision is violative of substantive due process,
because it requires the possession of certain legal documents to justify "mere
possession" of forest products which, under Section 3(q) of PD 705, includes, among
others, "firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, flowering plant, 'the
associated water' or fish" and penalizes failure to present such required documents.
One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality
of a law is the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination. 21 As Respondent Court of Appeals correctly
pointed out, petitioners were not "charged with the [unlawful] possession of firewood,
bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, 'the associated water' or fish"; thus, the
inclusion of any of these enumerated items in EO 277 "is absolutely of no concern" to
petitioners. They are not asserting a legal right for which they are entitled to a judicial
determination at this time. Besides, they did not present any convincing evidence of a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution that would justify the nullification of
said provision. 22 A statute is always presumed to be constitutional, and one who attacks
it on the ground of unconstitutionality must convincingly prove its invalidity. 23
Main Issue: Under PD 705 and EO 277,
Is Lumber Considered Timber or Forest Product?
Petitioners contend that possession of manufactured lumber is not punishable under the
Forestry Reform Code, as amended. As explicitly provided in Section 68 of both PD 705
and EO 277 (the law that amended the former), only the cutting, gathering, collecting
and/or possession, without license, of timber and other forest products are prohibited.
As expressly defined under Section 3(q) of PD 705, lumber is not timber or a forest
product. It is only in Section 79 of the same law where the sale of lumber, without
compliance with established grading rules and standards, is prohibited. Petitioners
submit that the forest laws and regulations sufficiently differentiate between timber and
lumber; therefore, court should not construe lumber as timber.
The question of whether lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of PD 705,
as amended, has been settled in Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 24 in which
this Court expressly ruled that "lumber is included in the term timber." 25 We quote at
length the Court's discussion:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber of lumber. While the
former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is
found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which
reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination

of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials
into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp,
paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.
Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993
copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter
alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." Simply put, lumber is a
processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases
used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And
insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned,
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed
timber. Neither do we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. 26

Mustang was recently reiterated in Lalican vs. Vergara, 27 where we also said that "'[t]o
exclude possession of 'lumber' from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly
emasculate the law itself. . . . After all, the phrase 'forest product' is broad enough to
encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber" Indeed, to mention
lumber in the aforesaid section would simply result in tautology.
In addition, under American jurisprudence, lumber has been legally accepted as a term
referring to the manufactured product of logs 28 or to timber sawed or split into
marketable form, especially for use in buildings. 29
Consistent with Mustang, we find no error in the holding of both lower courts. Clearly,
petitioners are liable for violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Reform Code, as
amended.
Corollary Issue:
No Retroactive Application of EO 277
Petitioners insist that EO 277 is not applicable to them, because the seized lumber had
been lawfully possessed by Cajidiocan Trading since March 1987, while the amendatory
law was issued only on July 25, 1987, and took effect fifteen days after publication. This
strained reasoning deserves scant consideration. First, at no time during the
apprehensions did petitioners claim that the lumber belonged to Cajidiocan Trading. In
fact, Petitioner Ramilo and the drivers openly claimed that the lumber and the trucks
belonged to A & E Construction which was, in turn, owned by Petitioner Tan. It was only
during the course of the trial, through the testimony of Prisco Marin (characterized by
the appellate court as "anything but credible"), that the alleged ownership thereof by
Cajidiocan Trading was brought out. Second, the supposed sale of the subject lumber
by Matzhou to Cajidiocan Trading, as evidenced by the auxiliary invoice, occurred in
March 1987, or more than two and a half years prior to the apprehension and seizure
that gave rise to this case. It is highly doubtful if the lumber bought at the earlier date
was the very same lumber confiscated in October 1989. No evidence was presented to

overcome this veritable doubt. Third and most important, assuming that indeed they
were the very same lumber, forest laws and regulations also require the following
documents: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) sales invoice, (3) delivery receipt, (4) tally
sheet, and (5) certificate of transport agreement. 30 None of these documents were
proffered in court or elsewhere. Petitioners' unlawful possession of the subject lumber
occurred in October 1989. EO 277, which specifically included "possession" of timber
and other forest products within the contemplation of PD 705, had already been issued
and in effect more than two years previous thereto. Nothing will prevent the indictment
of petitioners for violation of EO 277 at the time they were caught by the forest guards in
flagrante delicto. The prohibited act is a malum prohibitum, and absence of malice or
criminal intent will not save the day for them. 31
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit. The questioned Decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., I reiterate my separate opinion in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. CA
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 49-66.
2 Twelfth Division composed of JJ. Serafin V.C. Guingona, ponente; Antonio M. Martinez,
chairman and now a member of this Court; and Eubulo G. Verzola, concurring.
3 Rollo, p. 98.
4 Ibid., pp. 67-78.
5 Preside by Judge Placido C. Marquez.
6 "Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without
License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:
Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations or corporations, the officers who
ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers
are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings
on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or
any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber
or forest products are found."

7 Docketed as Crim. Case No.1745; records for Crim. Case No. 1745, p. 1.
8 Docketed as Crim. Case No. 1746; records for Crim. Case No. 1746, p. 1.
9 Records for Crim. Case No. 1745, p. 17, and for Crim. Case No. 1746, p. 14.
10 RTC Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 68-69.
11 Exh. "1"; records for Crim. Case No. 1745, p. 116.
12 RTC decision, p. 7; rollo p. 73.
13 Assailed Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 53.
14 Ibid., p. 6; ibid., p. 54.
15 Assiled Decision, pp. 8,10, 11 & 13.
16 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
17 Ibid., p. 15.
18 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
19 This case was deemed submitted for resolution on April 27, 1998 when the Court
noted the letter dated December 12, 1997 of Sheriff Nowell Lim, RTC of Romblon,
Branch 88, stating that the accused are residing in Cajidiocan, Romblon and that their
bail bonds are current.
20 Gobonseng Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 472, July 17, 1995; Fernandez vs.
Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 119, February 16, 1994.
21 Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, July 1, 1993.
22 Dimaporo vs. Mitra Jr., 202 SCRA 779, October 15, 1991.
23 National Pres Club vs. Commission on Elections, 207 SCRA 1, March 5, 1992; Caleon
vs. Agus Development Corporation, 207 SCRA 748, April 7, 1992.
24 257 SCRA 430, June 18, 1996, per Davide Jr., J.
25 At p. 448.
26 At pp. 448-449.
27 GR No. 108619, July 31, 1997, per Romero, J.
28 54 C.J.S. 1, citing White's Case, 128 A. 739, 124 Me. 343. Also in McKinney vs.
Matthews, 82 S.E. 1036, 1037, 166 N.C. 576, cited in Words & Phrases, Vol. 41A, p. 327;
Craddock Mfg. Co. vs. Faison, 123 S.E. 535, 536, 138 Va. 665, 39 A.L.R. 1039, cited in
Words & Phrases, Vol. 25A, p. 519.

29 Ibid., p. 673, citing American Tie & Timber Co. vs. Kansas City Southern R. Co, Texas,
175 F. 28, 99 C.C.A. 44.
30 Primer on Illegal Logging, Legal Affairs Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, pp. 13-14; CA Rollo, pp. 162-163.
31 Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 279, May 18, 1993; People vs. De Gracia, 233
SCRA 716, July 6, 1994.

FIRST DIVISION
AMADO TAOPA,

G.R. No. 184098

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
-versus-

CORONA,
AZCUNA and
TINGA, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

As replacement of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro who is on official leave

per Special Order No. 539.

Respondent.

Promulgated:

November 25, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
R E S O LUTIO N

CORONA, J.:

On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources

Office of Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and
arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca
fiber to prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado
Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized lumber.

Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section
68 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705,14[1] as amended, in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes. The information against them read:

14[1]

Revised Forestry Code.

That on or about the 2nd day of April 1996 at around 9:00 oclock in the
morning at Barangay Capilihan, Municipality of Virac, Province of Catanduanes,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to possess, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally possess, transport in a
truck bearing Plate No. EAS 839 and have in their control forest products,
particularly one hundred thirteen (113) pieces of lumber of Philippine Mahogany
Group and Apitong species with an aggregate net volume of One Thousand Six
Hundred Eighty Four (1,684) board feet with an approximate value of NinetyNine Thousand One Hundred Twenty (Php99,120.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency,
without any authority and/or legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations, prejudicial to the public interest.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.15[2]

Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial
on the merits, the RTC found them guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt.16[3]
15

[2]

Rollo, p. 27.

16[3] Rollo, pp. 30-31. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision read:

WHEREFORE, In view of the foregoing, this Court finds:

Accused Amado Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and applying
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, hereby sentences both of them to suffer imprisonment
from ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years
as maximum.

Accused Placido Cuison GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as

accessory to the crime by transporting the lumber materials in his
truck covered by bundles of abaca fiber, which is akin to concealing
the body of the crime in order to prevent its discovery, and hereby

Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals
(CA). Cuison was acquitted but Taopas conviction was affirmed. 17[4]

The

dispositive portion of the CA decision read:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED with respect

to accused-appellant Placido Cuison, who is ACQUITTED of the crime charged
on reasonable doubt, and MODIFIED with respect to accused-appellants Amado
Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco by reducing the penalty imposed on them to four (4)
years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum,
to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.18[5]
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment, the maximum period of
which is two (2) degrees lower than that of the principal and the
minimum period of which is one (1) degree lower, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hence, from two (2) years four (4)
months and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years eight (8)
months and one (1) day as maximum.

The lumber materials are likewise confiscated in favor of the

government to be disposed of through public auction sale to be
conducted by the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of the
Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes. The truck, which was
included in the Seizure Receipt is ordered released to its owner
inasmuch as the evidence proved that it was hired purposely for the
transport of abaca fibers and not lumber materials.

SO ORDERED.

17

[4]

Despite Ogalescos failure to appeal, the CA held that the modification of the
penalty will benefit him pursuant to Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Rollo, p. 14.

18

[5]

Decision dated January 31, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30380. Penned by Associate
Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang
and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo,
pp. 26-40. The motion for reconsideration thereto was denied in a Resolution dated July

In this petition,19[6] Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him.
He alleges that the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the
seized lumber as he was not in the truck when the lumber was seized.

We deny the petition.

Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopas alibi because
Cuisons testimony proved Taopas active participation in the transport of the
seized lumber. In particular, the RTC and the CA found that the truck was loaded
with the cargo in front of Taopas house and that Taopa and Ogalesco were
accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the truck and lumber were
seized. These facts proved Taopas (and Ogalescos) exercise of dominion and
control over the lumber loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his coaccused Ogalesco) constituted possession of timber or other forest products
without the required legal documents. Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco

28, 2008. Rollo, pp. 56-58.

19[6]

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ran away at the mere sight of the police was likewise largely indicative of guilt. We
are thus convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.

However, we disagree with both the RTC and CA as to the penalty imposed
on Taopa.

Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, 20[7] refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation
of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft. 21[8] The law
treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products
without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified
theft.

Articles 309 and 310 read:

20

[7]
Section 68 provides: Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or
Other Forest Products without License. Any person who shall xxx possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

21

[8]

Merida v. People, G.R. No. 158182, 12 June 2008 citing People v. Dator, 398
Phil. 109, 124 (2000).

Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if
the value of the thing stolen is more 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of
the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. (emphasis supplied)
2. xxx
Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the
next preceding articles xxx (emphasis supplied).

The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630.22
[9] Following Article 310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable penalty should
be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or a period ranging
from 14 years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an additional period of
four years for the excess of P47,630.

22

The CA did not contest the correctness of the value as stated in the information.
However, the CA clarified that the value of the lumber pegged at P99,120 was inclusive
of surcharges and forest charges. The CA thus provided a breakdown of the values for a
more correct computation of the penalties to be imposed on the accused. The relevant
portion of the CA decision reads: The Statement of Lumber Apprehended, which was
prepared by Forest Ranger Jose San Roque, states that the market value of the 113 pieces
of lumber is only P67,630. It appears that that the amount of P99,120 was arrived at by
adding regular forest charges in the amount of P7,940 and 300% surcharges in the
amount of P23,820 to the market value of the lumber pegged at P67,[63]0.Rollo, p. 39.
[9]

The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence 23[10] imposable on Taopa

shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the
minimum term shall be anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14 years and
eight months or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period.

The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the
medium period24[11] of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or
16 years, five months and 11 days to 18 years, two months and 21 days of
reclusion temporal. The maximum term therefore may be anywhere between 16
years, five months and 11 days of reclusion temporal to 22 years, two months and
21 days of reclusion perpetua.
23

[10]
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (RA 4103) provides: SECTION 1.
Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said
Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Code for the offense. xxx

24

[11]

The medium period is imposed following Article 64 of the RPC which states:
When there is neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the
penalty prescribed by law in its medium period. Although PD No. 705 is a special law,
the penalties therein were taken from the RPC. Hence, the rules in the RPC for
graduating by degrees or determining the period should be applied. This is pursuant to
People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994, 234 SCRA 555.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 31, 2008

decision and July 28, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
30380 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Amado Taopa is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 68 of PD
No. 705, as amended, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20
years of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided for
by law.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

C E R T I FI C AT I O N

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

SECOND DIVISION

GALO MONGE,

G.R. No. 170308

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO,
Acting Chairperson,
- versus -

CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,*

TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

March 7, 2008

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

*
*As replacement of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who is on official leave per Administrative Circular
No. 84-2007.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review 25[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
whereby petitioner Galo Monge (petitioner) assails the Decision 26[2] of the Court
of Appeals dated 28 June 2005 which affirmed his conviction as well as the
discharge of accused Edgar Potencio (Potencio) as a state witness.

The factual antecedents follow. On 20 July 1994, petitioner and Potencio

were found by barangay tanods Serdan and Molina in possession of and
transporting three (3) pieces of mahogany lumber in Barangay Santo Domingo,
Iriga City. Right there and then, the tanods demanded that they be shown the
requisite permit and/or authority from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) but neither petitioner nor Potencio was able to produce any.27
[3] Petitioner fled the scene in that instant whereas Potencio was brought to the
25[1]Rollo, pp. 10-25.

26
[2]Docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 25249. The decision was penned by Associate Justice Edgardo F.
Sundiam and concurred in by Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Japar B. Dimaampao, id. at 65-77.
27
[3]TSN, 23 July 1999, pp. 4-5, 12-14.

police station for interrogation, and thereafter, to the DENR-Community

Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO). 28[4] The DENRCENRO issued a seizure receipt for the three pieces of lumber indicating that the
items, totaling 77 board feet of mahogany valued at P1,925.00, had been seized
from Potencio.29[5] Later on, petitioner was arrested, but Potencios whereabouts
had been unknown since the time of the seizure 30[6] until he surfaced on 3 January
1998.31[7]

An information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch
35 charging petitioner and Potencio with violation of Section 6832[8] of
28[4]Rollo, p. 67.

29[5]Records, p. 157.

30[6]The warrant of arrest against Potencio dated 10 March 1997 was returned unserved. The sheriffs
return stated that Potencio has escaped from custody and was in Manila,id. at 48.

31[7]TSN, 30 January 1998, p. 16.

32
[8]SEC. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license Any person
who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land or from private land whose title has no limitation on the disposition of forest
products found therein, without any authority under a license agreement, lease license or permit shall be punished
with the penalty imposed under Arts. 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code : Provided, That in the case of
partnership, association or corporation, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering or collecting shall be liable,
and if such officers are aliens, they shall in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the
part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,33[9] as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No.
277, series of 1997. The inculpatory portion of the information reads:

That on or about the 20th day of [July 1994], at about 9:30 oclock in
the morning, in Barangay Sto. Domingo, Iriga City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating with each other, without any authority of law, nor armed with
necessary permit/license or other documents, with intent to gain, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, transport and have in their
possession three (3) pieces of Mahogany of assorted [dimension] with a[n]
appropriate volume of seventy-seven (77) board feet or point eighteen (0.18)
cubic meter with a total market value of P1,925.00, Philippine currency, to the
damage and prejudice of the DENR in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.34[10]

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or forest products so
cut, gathered, collected or removed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools used therein and the
forfeiture of his improvements in the area: Provided, That the timber or forest products cut, gathered, collected or
removed from a license area shall be delivered to the licensee, lessee or permitee in whose area the forest products
were cut, gathered, collected or removed, free from claims of the illegal cutter, but subject to the payment of the
corresponding forest charges. Should the licensee refuse to accept the products, the same may be confiscated in
favor of the government to be disposed in accordance with law, regulation or policy on the matter.

33[9]REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 389, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE FORESTRY

REFORM CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

34[10]Records, p. 1.

At the 26 November 1996 arraignment, petitioner entered a negative plea. 35

[11]

Trial ensued. On 17 June 1997, Serdan testified on the circumstances of the

apprehension but for failing to appear in court for cross examination, his testimony
was stricken out.36[12] On 16 January 1998, Potencio was discharged to be used as
a state witness on motion of the prosecutor.37[13] Accordingly, he testified on the
circumstances of the arrest but claimed that for a promised fee he was merely
requested by petitioner, the owner of the log, to assist him in hauling the same
down from the mountain. Potencios testimony was materially corroborated by
Molina.38[14] Petitioner did not contest the allegations, except that it was not he
but Potencio who owned the lumber. He lamented that contrary to what Potencio
had stated in court, it was the latter who hired him to bring the log from the site to
the sawmill where the same was to be sawn into pieces.39[15]
35
[11]Id. at 24-25. The decision of the Court of Appeals stated that accused Edgar Potencio had been
arraigned, contrary to what is kept in the records as the Certificate of Arraignment and the Order of Arraignment
indicate that only petitioner Galo Monge had been arraigned.
36
[12]Id. at 215.

37[13]Id. at 76.

38[14]Id. at 215-217.

39[15]Id. at 217-218.

The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner was imposed
nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years and eight (8)
months of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods and ordered to pay
the costs.40[16]

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where he

challenged the discharge of Potencio as a state witness on the ground that the latter
was not the least guilty of the offense and that there was no absolute necessity for
his testimony.41[17] The appellate court dismissed this challenge and affirmed the
findings of the trial court. However, it modified the penalty to an indeterminate
prison sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10)
years and eight (8) months of prision mayor as maximum.42[18] His motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence the present appeal whereby petitioner reiterates
his challenge against the discharge of Potencio.

40
[16]Id. at 220-221.
41
[17]CA rollo, p. 40.
42
[18]Id. at 108.

The petition is utterly unmeritorious.

Petitioner and Potencio were caught in flagrante delicto transporting, and

thus in possession of, processed mahogany lumber without proper authority from
the DENR. Petitioner has never denied this fact. But in his attempt to exonerate
himself from liability, he claims that it was Potencio, the owner of the lumber, who
requested his assistance in hauling the log down from the mountain and in
transporting the same to the sawmill for processing. The contention is unavailing.

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, criminalizes two
distinct

and separate offenses, namely: (a) the cutting, gathering, collecting

and removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from

alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any

authority; and (b) the possession of timber or other forest products without the
legal documents required under existing laws and regulations. 43[19] DENR
Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required
for the transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 thereof materially
requires that the transport of lumber be accompanied by a certificate of lumber
origin duly issued by the DENR-CENRO. In the first offense, the legality of the
acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products
may be proven by the authorization duly issued by the DENR. In the second
offense, however, it is immaterial whether or not the cutting, gathering, collecting

43
[19]People v. Que, 333 Phil. 582, 594 (1996).

and removal of forest products are legal precisely because mere possession of
forest products without the requisite documents consummates the crime.44[20]

It is thus clear that the fact of possession by petitioner and Potencio of the
subject mahogany lumber and their subsequent failure to produce the requisite
legal documents, taken together, has already given rise to criminal liability under
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, particularly the second act punished thereunder. The
direct and affirmative testimony of Molina and Potencio as a state witness on the
circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes petitioners liability.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership over the pieces of lumber
found in his possession nor in his claim that his help was merely solicited by
Potencio to provide the latter assistance in transporting the said lumber. P.D. No.
705 is a special penal statute that punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum. As
such, in prosecutions under its provisions, claims of good faith are by no
means reliable as defenses because the offense is complete and criminal liability
attaches once the prohibited acts are committed.45[21]

In other words, mere

possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents,
even absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal. 46[22] It would therefore make no
44
[20]Id.

45
[21]People v. Dator, 398 Phil. 109, 121 (2000).

46[22]Id.; Tan v. People, 352 Phil. 724, 738 (1998); People v. Que, 333 Phil. 582, 594 (1996).

difference at all whether it was petitioner himself or Potencio who owned the
subject pieces of lumber.

Considering the overwhelming body of evidence pointing to nothing less

than petitioners guilt of the offense charged, there is no cogent reason to reverse
his conviction.

Petitioners challenge against Potencios discharge as a state witness must

also fail. Not a few cases established the doctrine that the discharge of an
accused so he may turn state witness is left to the

exercise of

the trial courts sound discretion47[23] limited only by

the requirements set forth in Section 17, 48[24] Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, whether the accused offered to be discharged appears to be the least guilty
and whether there is objectively an absolute necessity for his testimony are
questions that lie within the domain of the trial court, it being competent to resolve
issues of fact. The discretionary judgment of the trial court with respect this highly
factual issue is not to be interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of
grave abuse of discretion.49[25] No such grave abuse is present in this case.

47
[23]Yu v. Presiding Judge, RTC of Tagaytay City, Br. 18, G.R. No. 142848, 30 June 2006, 494 SCRA 101,
116; People v. Armada, Jr., G.R. No. 100592, 26 August 1993, 225 SCRA 644, 647; Flores v. Sandiganbayan, 209
Phil. 89, 84 (1983).

48[24]Sec. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more

persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the
prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be
discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after
requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed
state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that: (a) There is
absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) There
is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;
and (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the
trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn
statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.

49[25]Yu v. The Honorable Presiding Judge, supra note 23, 116; People v. Sison, 371 Phil. 713, 724
(1999).

Suffice it to say that issues relative to the discharge of an accused must be raised in
the trial court as they cannot be addressed for the first time on appeal.50[26]

Moreover and more importantly, an order discharging an accused from

the information in order that he may testify for the prosecution has the
effect of an acquittal.51[27] Once the discharge is ordered by the trial court,
any future development showing that any or all of the conditions provided in
Section 17, Rule 119 have not actually been fulfilled will not affect the legal
consequence of an acquittal.52[28] Any witting or unwitting error of the
prosecution, therefore, in moving for the discharge and of the court in
granting the motionno question of jurisdiction being involvedwill not
deprive the discharged accused of the benefit of acquittal and of his right
against double jeopardy. A contrary rule would certainly be unfair to the
50
[26]People v. Sison, supra citing U.S. v. Inductivo, 40 Phil 84 (1919).
51
[27]RULES OF COURT, Rule 119, Sec. 18 states:

Sec. 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal.The order indicated in the preceding section shall
amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless
the accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the
basis for his discharge.

52[28]Rosales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 80418-19, 23 October 1992, 215 SCRA 102, 108.

discharged accused because he would then be faulted for a failure attributable

to the prosecutor. It is inconceivable that the rule has adopted the abhorrent
legal policy of placing the fate of the discharged accused at the mercy of
anyone who may handle the prosecution. 53[29]

Indeed, the only instance

where the testimony of a discharged accused may be disregarded is when he

deliberately fails to testify truthfully in court in accordance with his
commitment,54[30] as provided for in Section 18, Rule 119. Potencio lived up
to his commitment and for that reason, petitioners challenge against his
discharge must be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the

Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

53[29]People v. Mendiola, 82 Phil. 740, 746 (1949).

54
[30]Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v. Son, G.R. No. 80268, 27 May 1992, 209 SCRA 329; People v.
Tabayoyong, No. L-31084, 29 May 1981, 104 SCRA 724, 739; United States v. De Guzman, 30 Phil. 416, 425
(1915).

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Acting
Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131270. March 17, 2000]

PERFECTO PALLADA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent. Spped
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals affirming
petitioner's conviction of illegal possession of lumber in violation of 68 [2] of the
Revised Forestry Code [3] (P.D. No. 705, as amended) by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
55

56

57

The facts are as follows:

Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) office in Bukidnon received reports that illegally cut lumber was
being delivered to the warehouse of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in
Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is engaged in rice milling and trading.
DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police, raided the
company's warehouse in Poblacion, Valencia on the strength of a warrant issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon and found a large stockpile of
lumber of varying sizes cut by a chain saw. As proof that the company had acquired the
lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard
of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not,
however, give credit to the receipts considering that R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to
operate had long been suspended. What is more, the pieces of lumber were cut by
chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator. Jo spped
55[1] Per Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes (now Associate Justice of this Court), concurred in
by Justices B.A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz and Demetrio C. Demetria.
56[2] Renumbered 78 by Republic Act No. 7161.
57[3] Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. - Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable,
and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the
part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products
are found. (As amended by PD No.1559, and by EO No. 277, prom, July 25, 1987, emphasis
added).

The team made an inventory of the seized lumber which, all in all, constituted 29,299.25
board feet, worth P488,334.45 in total. The following day, September 29, 1992, the first
batch of lumber, consisting of 162 pieces measuring 1,954.66 board feet, was taken and
impounded at the FORE stockyard in Sumpong, Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The seizure
order [4] was served on petitioner Perfecto Pallada as general manager of the company,
but he refused to acknowledge it.
58

On October 1, 1992, the raiding team returned for the remaining lumber. Company
president Francisco Tankiko and a certain Isaias Valdehueza, who represented himself
to be a lawyer, asked for a suspension of the operations to enable them to seek a lifting
of the warrant. The motion was filed with the court which issued the warrant but, on
October 5, 1992, the motion was denied. [5] Accordingly, the remaining lumber was
confiscated. By October 9, 1992, all the lumber in the warehouse had been seized. As
before, however, petitioner Pallada refused to sign for the seizure orders issued by the
DENR officers (Exhs. E, F & G).
59

On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel Sy, as
assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president of the Valencia
Golden Harvest Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were charged with violation of 68
of P.D .No. 705, as amended. The Information alleged: [6]
60

That on or about the 1st day of October, 1992, and prior thereto at the
Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation Compound, municipality of Valencia,
province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally possess 2,115 pieces [of] lumber of
different dimensions in the total volume of 29,299 .25 board feet or
equivalent to 69.10 cubic meters with an estimated value of FOUR
HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY
FOUR PESOS AND 45/100 (P488,334.45) Philippine Currency, without
any authority, license or legal documents from the government, to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the amount of P488,334.45.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended by E.O.
277.
As all the accused pleaded not guilty, trial ensued. Then on July 27, 1994, judgment
was rendered as follows: [7]
61

58[4] Records, p. 28.

59[5] Id., p. 136-C.
60[6] Id., p. 1.
61[7] Id., p. 255.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Perfecto

Pallada and Francisco Tankiko guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having
in their possession timber products worth of P488,334.45 without the legal
documents as charged in the information in violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree 705, as amended and are, therefore, each sentenced
to suffer imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum
to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion temporal as maximum. The lumber
subject of the crime are confiscated in favor of the government. Spped jo
Accused Isaias Valdehueza and Noel Sy are ACQUITTED for lack of
evidence against them.
Petitioner and Francisco Tankiko appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, on October
31, 1997, affirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted Tankiko for lack of proof of his
participation in the purchase or acquisition of the seized lumber. [8]
62

Hence this petition which raises the following issues:

63

[9]

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS

CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE PROSECUTION HAD PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER PALLADA.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS
CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
THAT THE CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN WAS NOT THE PROPER
DOCUMENT TO JUSTIFY PETITIONER'S POSSESSION OF THE
SQUARED TIMBER OR FLITCHES.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS
CORRECT IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE PRESENCE OF ERASURES IN THE CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER
ORIGIN RENDER THEM VALUELESS AS EVIDENCE.
First. During the trial, the defense presented the following documents, as summarized
by the trial court, to establish that Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation's possession of
the seized lumber was legal: [10]
64

1.
Exh. 6 - Certificate of Timber Origin (CTO for short), dated
December 15, 1991, for 56 pieces of flitches equivalent to 12.23 cubic
meters, transported from Bombaran, Lanao del Sur of the Autonomous
62[8] CA Decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 28.
63[9] Petition, p. 2; Id., p. 4.
64[10] RTC Decision, pp. 3-5; Records, pp. 249-251.

Region of Muslim Mindanao. Taken from the forest area of Wahab and
H.D. Pangcoga
Exh. 6-A - Auxiliary InvoiceMiso
Exh. 6-B - Certificate of Transport Agreement (CTA, for short)
Exh. 6-C - Tally Sheet, dated December 14, 1992, for 463 pieces of
lumber equivalent to 5,056.94 board feet
Exh. 6-D - Delivery Receipt, dated December 16, 1991, from WHP
Enterprises of Maguing, Lanao del Sur, to the Corporation for the lumber
mentioned in Exh. "6-C"
Exh. 6-F - Cash Voucher for P58,832.45 in payment to WHP
Enterprises, dated December 16, 1991, for the 5,056.94 board feet of
lumber
Exh. 6-D-1 - [C]arbon copy of Exh. "6-D" above
2.
Exh. 7 - CTO, (undated), for 961 pieces of log equivalent to 25.4
cubic meter[s] taken from the forest area of a certain Somira M. Ampuan
in Lama Lico, Bombaran of the ARMM
Exh. 7-A - Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 7-B - CTA
Exh. 7-C - Tally Sheet, dated February 6, 1992, for 961 pieces of
lumber equal to 10,758.2 board feet
Exh. 7-D - Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest Corporation issued
by SMA Trading Company, dated February 6, 1992
Exh. 7-E - Official Receipt for environmental fee issued to Somira
M. Ampuan, dated August 9, 1991
Exh. 7-F - Cash Voucher for P126,562.05 issued by the
Corporation in payment to SMA Trading Company for 10,758.02 board
feet of lumber, dated February 6, 1992
3.
Exh. 8 - CTO for 678 pieces of chain-sawn lumber with an
equivalent volume of 18.93 cubic meter from the forest area of Wahab
Pangcoga and H.D. Pangcoga, dated February 25, 1992
Exh. 8-A - Auxiliary InvoiceNex old

Exh. 8-B - CTA

Exh. 8-C - Tally Sheet for the 678 pieces of lumber
Exh. 8-D - Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest Corporation issued
by WHP Enterprises,
Exh. 8-E - Official Receipt for environmental fee
Exh. 8-F - Cash Voucher for P93,614.50 in payment for 8,024.99
board feet of lumber issued by the Corporation payable to WHP
Enterprises
4.
Exh. 9 - CTO for 426 pieces of logs (?) with an equivalent volume of
12.24 cubic meters from licensee Somira M. Ampuan of Lama Lico,
Bombaran, Lanao del Sur, consigned to the Corporation, (undated).
Stamped "Release 3/2/92"
Exh. 9-A - Auxiliary Invoice
Exh. 9-B - CTA, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-C - Tally Sheet, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-D - Delivery Receipt issued by SMA Trading Company to the
Corporation, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-E - Official Receipt for environmental fee
Exh. 9-F - Cash Voucher, for P64,299.50 to pay [for] 5,189 board
feet of lumber
Exh. 9-D-1 - Xerox copy of Exh. "9-D"
The trial court acted correctly in not giving credence to the Certificates of Timber Origin
presented by petitioner since the lumber held by the company should be covered by
Certificates of Lumber Origin. [11] For indeed, as BFD Circular No. 10-83 [12] states in
pertinent parts: Mani kx
65

66

In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability and

responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in
documenting the origin thereof, the attached Certificate of Lumber Origin
65[11] Id., p. 5; Id., p. 251.
66[12] Issued on February 28, 1983, now superseded by DENR Administrative Order No. 07,
issued on February 17, 1994.

(CLO) . . . which form[s] part of this circular [is] hereby adopted as

accountable forms for official use by authorized BFD officers. . . .
5.
Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate
of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . as herein required shall be considered as
proceeding from illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to
confiscation and disposition in accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD
implementing guidelines.
Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber and, therefore, the
Certificates of Timber Origin and their attachments should have been considered in
establishing the legality of the company's possession of the lumber. [13] In support of his
contention, petitioner invokes our ruling in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. [14]
67

68

The contention has no merit. The statement in Mustang Lumber that lumber is merely
processed timber and, therefore, the word "timber" embraces lumber, was made in
answer to the lower court's ruling in that case that the phrase "possess timber or other
forest products" in 68 of P.D. No. 705 means that only those who possess timber and
forest products without the documents required by law are criminally liable, while those
who possess lumber are not liable. On the other hand, the question in this case is
whether separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber. Indeed,
different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest
products. [15] As already noted, the opening paragraph of BFD Circular No. 10-83
expressly states that the issuance of a separate certificate of origin for lumber is
required in order to "pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . .
and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."
69

Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for
Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in
convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and defects found in the
documents presented by the latter. According to the trial court: [16]
70

Although the CTO marked Exh. "6" mentions 56 pieces of flitches, the
supporting documents, like the Tally Sheet, the Delivery Receipt from the
lumber dealer and the Cash Voucher describe 463 pieces of lumber. . . .
Maniks

67[13] Petition, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 7-8.

68[14] 257 SCRA 430 (1996).
69[15] DENR Administrative Circular No. 07, 2&17 (series of 1994).
70[16] RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Records, p. 251-252 (emphasis in the original).

In like manner, Exh. "7" and Exh. "9" mention 961 and 420 pieces of log,
respectively. But the supporting documents describe the forest product[s]
as lumber.
The CTO marked Exh. "[8]" reveals a half-truth: it mentions 678 pieces of
hand-sawn lumber. Its Auxiliary Invoice also states the same load of
lumber. Someone may have noticed the "mistake" of mentioning lumber in
the Auxiliary Invoice and so the words "flitches 87 pieces" were written
down and enclosed in parenthesis.
The said exhibits also appear to be questionable, [t]hus[:]
The CTO marked Exh. "6" is consigned to "any buyer (sic) Cagayan de
Oro", but its Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "6-A") mentions Valencia Golden
Harvest Corporation as the consignee. Moreover, the CTO states (at the
back page) that the same is covered by Auxiliary Invoice No. 00491; in
fact, the Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. 6-A) has invoice number 000488.
In the CTO marked Exhibit "7", the original typewritten name of the
consignee was clearly erased and changed to "Valencia Golden Harvest
Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon". In the Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "7-A") the
blank space for the name and address of the consignee was smudged
with a typewriter correction fluid (the better to erase what was originally
typewritten in it?) and changed to "Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation,
Valencia, Bukidnon".
The CTO marked Exh. "9" and its Auxiliary Invoice marked Exh. "9-A"
[were] "doctored" in the same manner as Exh. "[7]" and Exh. "[7-A]". [17]
71

Additionally, all the Auxiliary Invoice were not properly accomplished: the
data required to be filled are left in blank. Manikan
Indeed, aside from the fact that the Certificate of Timber Origin in Exh. 7 bears no date,
the dorsal side bears the certification that the logs were "scaled on August 7, 1991,"
while the receipt attached to that Certificate is dated February 6, 1992. Moreover, the
four delivery receipts list the sizes and volume of the lumber sold, indicating that the
company purchased cut lumber from the dealers, thus belying the testimony of
petitioner that when the company bought the forest products, they were still in the form
of flitches and logs, and they were cut into lumber by the company. [18]
72

71[17] The original consignee's name, still legible, reads: "NORTHWEST FOOD PROCESSING
CORPORATION, ______, TAGOLCAN, MIS. OR."
72[18] TSN, pp. 10, 13 & 22, March 12, 1994.

These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are found not
only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no credence to
the same. [19]
73

It is argued that the irregularities in the documentary exhibits should not be taken
against petitioner because the documents came from lumber dealers. In addition, it is
contended that the CTOs and Auxiliary Receipts, being public documents, should be
accorded the presumption of regularity in their execution. [20]
74

This contention is untenable. What render these documents without legal effect are the
patent irregularities found on their faces. That petitioner may not have any responsibility
for such irregularity is immaterial. In any case, as the corporate officer in charge of the
purchase of the lumber, petitioner should have noticed such obvious irregularities, and
he should have taken steps to have them corrected. He cannot now feign ignorance and
assert that, as far as he is concerned, the documents are regular and complete. [21]
75

The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the CTOs were
regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned. The presumption invoked by
petitioner applies only when the public documents are, on their faces, regular and
properly accomplished. [22]
76

Second. The penalty imposed should be modified. Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code,
made applicable to the offense by P.D. No. 705, 68, provides:
ART. 309. Penalties.- Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by: Oldmis
o

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than P12,000 pesos but does not exceed
P22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in
this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but
the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this

73[19] Compare DENR Administrative Order No. 59-93, series of 1993, 6 in relation to 2.8,
which provides that certificates of origin with erased or tampered vital entries, such as the name
and address of consignee, are void (now superseded by DENR Administrative Order No.07,
series of 1994.)
74[20] Petition, pp. 6-10; Rollo, pp. 8-12.
75[21] Id., pp. 8-10; Id., pp. 10-12.
76[22] See Veloso v. Sandiganbayan, 187 SCRA 504 (1990).

Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as

the case may be. . . .
As the lumber involved in this case is worth P488,334.45, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, [23] the penalty to be imposed should be six (6) years of
prision correccional to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
77

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 31, 1997, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to six (6) years of
prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Ncm

77[23] People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994).