Venezuela Case NEG Supplement

Russia Relations DA
Top-shelf
1NC Russia relations DA ..................................................................................................................... 5
Uniqueness ext. ......................................................................................................................................... 7
Venezuela investment UQ .................................................................................................................... 8
U.S.-Russia relations stable now ......................................................................................................... 10
A2 No strong energy ties ..................................................................................................................... 11
A2 Public wants U.S. investment ........................................................................................................ 12
Link ext. ................................................................................................................................................... 13
Russia competition link ....................................................................................................................... 14
U.S.-Russia oil competition spills-over ................................................................................................ 16
A2 Different types of investment ........................................................................................................ 17
Impact ext. .............................................................................................................................................. 18
Relations good ext. ............................................................................................................................. 19
Impact comparisons ............................................................................................................................ 20
Turns hegemony ................................................................................................................................. 21
Relations solve prolif ........................................................................................................................... 22
U.S.-Russia relations spill-over ............................................................................................................ 23
Russia becoming militarily involved .................................................................................................... 24
Tensions high now .............................................................................................................................. 25
Venezuela prolif impact ...................................................................................................................... 26
Venezuela is key .................................................................................................................................. 27
Conflict over Venezuela likely ............................................................................................................. 28
Misc. Venezuela impact card .............................................................................................................. 29
A2 Russian investment = instability .................................................................................................... 30
Aff Venezuela DA ................................................................................................................................. 31
Russia losing Venezuela investment now ........................................................................................... 32
No investment trade-off ..................................................................................................................... 33
No impact to U.S. investment ............................................................................................................. 34
U.S. investment good .......................................................................................................................... 35
U.S.-Russia relations resilient .............................................................................................................. 37
No U.S.-Russia war .............................................................................................................................. 38
Neg Update
Solvency .................................................................................................................................................. 40
Maduro de-rails aid ............................................................................................................................. 41
Corruption now ................................................................................................................................... 42
China advantage ..................................................................................................................................... 44
No China-Taiwan war .......................................................................................................................... 45
Latin America relations add-on ............................................................................................................... 46
Relations decline inevitable ................................................................................................................ 47
U.S.-Venezuela wont cooperate ........................................................................................................ 48
Politics ..................................................................................................................................................... 49
Plan unpopular .................................................................................................................................... 50
Misc. Aff Updates
Politics ..................................................................................................................................................... 52
Plan is popular ..................................................................................................................................... 53
Obama wont push plan ...................................................................................................................... 54

Russia Relations DA
Top-shelf
1NC Russia relations DA
U.S.-Russia relations are tense now Venezuela competition post Chavez will be the
litmus test.
Joanna Christou, 4-21-2013, Future Foreign Policy, Russia and Venezuela after Chavez,
http://blog.futureforeignpolicy.com/2013/04/21/russia-and-venezuela-after-chavez/
So following Chavezs death what is the potential of the relationship to continue? Obviously, much depends on domestic developments
in Venezuela. So far continuity has prevailed, with Chavezs appointed successor Nicolas Maduro agreeing to visit Russia in June, while in the immediate aftermath of Chavezs
death both sides pledged to continue co-operation. Maduro stressed the economic and strategic importance of the relationship
while in his aforementioned telegram, Putin expressed his hope for the continuation of political, economic and humanitarian relations. Russia
was also very fast to capitalise on Venezuelan oil, with Rosneft (Russias state oil firm) and Petrleos de Venezuela S.A. (the Venezuelan equivalent) forming a partnership to
exploit a Venezuelan oil field within two weeks of Chavezs death. But despite this continuation in rhetoric and action, the international context may or may not affect how the relationship
continues. Some claim, Maduro is even more anti-American than his predecessor and arguably Russia and Putin have hardened their stance
towards the United States in recent years as the reset in their relationship failed to take off. However, a notable
difference arises when one considers the actions of both states towards the US. Russia, despite its quest for great power status has in many cases fallen in line with American foreign policy
goals. North Korea is a good example. While Russia has never issued rhetoric as strong as that of the United States, Russian politicians have always stressed
Russian desire to mediate in the ongoing disputes arising from North Koreas pursuit of nuclear weapon capability. In fact, in the current impasse which is arising following
continued North Korean provocations Russias Foreign Ministry essentially fell in line with the US view: For Russia which is a member of United Nations Security Council this is completely
unacceptable. Another example where Russia has essentially fallen in line was 9/11, when Vladimir Putin pledged co-operation with the US to defeat terrorism the link here was obviously
Russian desire to justify its own actions against what is saw as domestic terrorism in Chechnya. Obviously, disagreements still exists, and serious
ones at that. Syria is a major case in point, with Russia having blocked three Security Council resolutions to date. None-the-less the Russian side has called for
alleviation of the crisis, and in broader terms that even the Americans would be reluctant to intervene in the conflict. But the point is that Russian foreign policy can in
many cases correspond with that of the US. Russia wont always agree with the US but its actions in the foreign policy arena suggest a mindset where
domestic considerations will prevail, and even if these dont correspond with American desires rhetoric will be strong but overly scornful. Contrast this to Venezuela. Most people remember
Hugo Chavezs bizarre outburst at the UN general assembly when he branded George Bush the devil. In fact, the deceased strongmans words were often inflammatory and, not constrained
by a great power status which Russia has worked so hard to cultivate, he often used colourful language and did not hold back. So an interesting caveat emerges here. While both states share a
broad common foreign policy outlook, Russia is in many ways more constrained by both its international standing, as a permanent member of the Security Council, and its desire to be viewed
as a responsible but independently minded big power. So the future of Russo-Venezuelan relationship depends on two things. One is how
Nicolas Maduro chooses to pursue his foreign policy should he win the upcoming election, which looks ever more likely. The other, and more
important factor, is the international events which occur in the near and further future. The unfolding North Korean crisis suggests that Russia may co-operate with the US to
achieve de-escalation, continuing its quest for greater involvement in the Korean Peninsula which will also allow it to influence events and be seen as a mediator. Obviously Venezuela holds
less clout internationally, but in the case of a Maduro victory it seems likely that anti-US rhetoric will continue. As such, all
indications point to continued Russo-Venezuelan co-operation, in the spheres of trade and energy, however
that the relationship will evolve to one with greater international influence seems unlikely. Instead, it suits both parties to focus on their co-operation at the micro-level. This allows Russia
influence in South America, a trade market and access to Venezuelas highly sought after energy supplies. For Venezuela it means the access to
arms, but more importantly the claim to a major international ally. In all it is a relationship of convenience for both and one which looks set
to continue.
Venezuela oil and military relationships with Russia are stable now U.S. investment
in energy would signal competition and a decline of Russian relations.
F. Michael Maloof, 3-13-2013, WND, Russia-China standoff in Venezuela,
http://www.wnd.com/2013/03/russia-china-standoff-in-venezuela/
As Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez remains gravely ill and may die soon, Russia and China are weighing their future in the country where
they have billions of dollars in oil investments, according to report from Joseph Farahs G2 Bulletin. In an effort to secure a position for the future, Russian
President Vladimir Putin sent close former KGB associate Igor Sechin to Venezuela to discuss with Venezuelan Vice President Nicolas
Maduro future bilateral relations. Sechin has been handling Latin American issues for years. He also happens to be the executive chairman of the Russian oil
conglomerate Rosneft. Sechin and Maduro finalized a number of agreements that help assure Russias future position in
Venezuela and keeps pace with China, which has loaned billions of dollars to the Chavez government to help ensure security of its own oil investments in the country. Both
countries are in the process of helping develop Venezuelas oil reserves, said to be the largest in the world at an estimated 296
billion barrels. Regional sources say that Sechin negotiated almost $47 billion in investments in the Venezuelan oil sector, including agreements to set up a joint
Russia-Venezuela drilling and manufacturing company and to permit increased Russian access to
offshore oil reserves. However, both countries also have an ulterior strategic reason for maintaining their position in Venezuela, and that is having a base from which
to watch and undertake a containment approach toward the United States Russia is using its investments as a way to obtain
more bases for its navy. In 2008, Russia sent in long-range bombers and a naval squadron to Venezuela. While it hasnt done a repeat of these deployments, Russia wants permanent basing
rights in Venezuela. Russia also has expanded its arms sales to Venezuela, including more than 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles, Mi-35 helicopters, Su-30
jet fighters, air defense systems, tanks and armored vehicles. If Chavez dies, there is a question as to what extent a new leader will be as friendly to both Russia and China. Any new
leadership probably will continue working with them but could be friendlier to the United States, unlike the
Chavez regime, according to informed sources. In turn, this could create a climate for further American investment which
the Russians would then find competitive with their own interests.
Effective relations solve extinction.
Tayler 2008 (Jeff Tayler, Atlantic contributing editor, November 2008, Medvedev Spoils the Party,
http://goo.gl/bI39H)
Like it or not, the United States cannot solve crucial global problems without Russian participation. Russia commands the largest landmass on earth;
possesses vast reserves of oil, natural gas, and other natural resources; owns huge stockpiles of weapons and plutonium; and still wields a potent brain trust. Given its influence
in Iran and North Korea, to say nothing of its potential as a spoiler of international equilibrium elsewhere, Russia is one country with which
the United States would do well to reestablish a strong working relationshipa strategic partnership, evenregardless of its feelings about the
current Kremlin government. The need to do so trumps expanding NATO or pursuing full-spectrum dominance. Once the world financial crisis passes, we will find ourselves returning to
worries about resource depletion, environmental degradation, and global warming the greatest challenges facing
humanity. No country can confront these problems alone. For the United States, Russia may just prove the indispensable nation with which to
face a volatile future arm in arm.
Uniqueness ext.
Venezuela investment UQ
Russian oil investment and influence will continue into the future with Maduro.
Pravda.ru, 6-3-2013, What will Russia do without Venezuela?,
http://english.pravda.ru/russia/economics/06-03-2013/123984-russia_venezuela-0/
Should Maduro, who is more leftist than Chavez, come to power, nothing special would follow, deputy director of the Institute of Latin American of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Vladimir Sudarev believes. "Both the opposition and Chavez supporters are aggressive towards each other, so a compromise is unlikely," he added. In
a country, where opposition is quite competitive, opposition forces have all chances to come to power in the absence of popularity of the leader and unstable system, the head of the National
Energy Security Fund, Konstantin Simonov said. General Director of the National Energy Institute, Sergei Pravosudov, believes that the struggle between supporters of the anti-American
position of Chavez and his opponents is very likely to continue. "Russian companies will have to experience all the nuances of the
struggle, which, at worst, could develop into a civil war," he said. The future of Russian companies doing business in Venezuela,
and the future of Venezuelan contracts remains uncertain, experts say. It is highly likely that the new
government of Venezuela will ask Russian investors out, just like Chavez did to U.S. investors, without any compensations, Konstantin Simonov
believes. In this case, Russia will have to say good-bye to the bonuses that our companies paid for the right to invest in Venezuela. Vladimir Sudarev is sure that Russian companies will not be
shown the door. Most likely, the expert believes, the new Venezuelan authorities "will get rid of them in a more intelligent way - they simply will not let them work." In any case, without
Chavez, Russian investors will have a hard time, in Venezuela. Russia is very limited in its opportunities to protect its investments in Venezuela. "The Anglo-Saxons, with their extensive
network of oil companies around the world, in such cases, do their best to defend the politicians, with whom they concluded this or that agreement. They use money,
media campaigns, and if all that doesn't work, aircraft carriers appear near the shores of the stubborn nation," explains the expert. "It is
unlikely that Russia will go for it - he continues. - In practice, Russia can show an influence on the situation only if veto resolutions are adopted in
international organizations." Chavez was consistently pursuing the policy of building friendship with Russia. During the recent years, Caracas has become
one of the most important strategic partners of Moscow on the Latin American continent. First of all, it goes about
the development of Junin-6 field in the Orinoco Oil Belt, where commercial production has already started. The total investment in the project is evaluated at $20 billion. All Russian companies
take part in five projects for the extraction of oil in Venezuela. Russian oil company Rosneft signed documents on the possible participation in a number of projects on the
shelf of Venezuela, including natural gas projects, as well as memorandums of understanding. Agreements in the field of hydropower were also signed. The head of the state-owned company,
Igor Sechin, who visited the country at the end of December, said that Russian investments were protected and projects would be implemented in a long term perspective. Defense
cooperation between Russia and Venezuela takes a special place. As predicted by the Center for the Analysis of World Arms Trade,
Venezuela is to be ranked second in Russia's arms exports in 2012-2015, following India, with the purchasing volume of $3.2 billion.
Bilateral agreements have been established for further military and energy
cooperation.
Ewan Robertson, 10-7-2011, Venezuelananalysis.com, Venezuela and Russia Sign Bilateral Accords
Worth $8 Billion, http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/6545
The United States has previously voiced concern over Venezuelan purchases of arms from Russia, with a state department
spokesperson questioning the need for Venezuela to have such a robust defence system in April 2010. However, in 2009 Venezuela spent 1.4% of its GDP on its military,
which puts it in fifth place relative to other countries in the region. The U.S. spends about 4% of GDP on the military, Colombia 3.4%, and Chile 2.7%, according to the CIA World Factbook.
Nonetheless, Chvez emphasised the importance of the agreement for defence, stating, We have the right to equip our defence forces... *Before Russian assistance+ we were disarmed.
Chvez has consistently stated his commitment to a multi-polar world, where US interests do not dominate
international politics and organisations. Agreements related to oil and gas included the involvement of
Russian company Gazprom in the exploration of gas deposits in the Gulf of Venezuela. A further agreement accelerates the creation of PetroMiranda, a new mixed
capital project between Russia and the Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA. PetroMiranda will develop oil reserves in the Junin 3 Block in the Orinoco Belt in the east of Venezuela, which
contains the largest heavy crude reserves in the world. The project is expected to begin producing 50,000 barrels of oil per day in May 2012. Russian deputy prime minister Sechin commented
that with the accords, a good base has been created to increase cooperation between Venezuela and Russia, and that
energy continued to be the locomotive of that cooperation. Finally, agricultural agreements were reached to develop a joint project to grow and export Venezuelan plantains (bananas) to
Russia. As part of these agreements, Venezuela will also export flowers to Russia, with a first batch of 130,000. Proposal for a New Organisation of Oil Giants Hugo Chvez also suggested the
creation of a new international alliance made up of countries with the largest oil reserves in the world, and proposed watching, discussing, how we can create, in this world that is emerging, a
new organisation of oil giants. He stressed that the new organisation would not affect the role of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), of which Venezuela is a founder
member. OPEC currently has 12 member states. Chvez voiced the idea during a conversation with Russian energy minister Sergei Smatko, who was part of the Russian delegation visiting
Venezuela this week, and later announced we are no more than four or five, the petrol giants, and Venezuela and Russia are two of these. For his part, Smatko showed interest in the idea,
stating I agree, Russia and Venezuela are two oil superpowers, and on the work we are undertaking and that remains for us to do, will
depend the future of the world of oil. Venezuela has enjoyed close bilateral relations with Russia under
president Hugo Chvez, and the new accords build on a series of previous military, economic and development agreements. Chvez
also stated his intention to initiate a visit to Moscow once his period of recovery from cancer is completed, for which he was diagnosed in June and has since undergone treatment.
Russia and Venezuela oil ties will continue post Chavez.
Daria Chernyshova, 3-6-2013, The BRICS Post, Russia says support for Venezuela unchanged,
http://thebricspost.com/russia-signals-unchanged-support-for-venezuela/
Russia vows to continue military-technical cooperation with Venezuela even after the death of the
countrys socialist leader Hugo Chavez. We believe the positive, constructive and mutually-beneficial agenda will be a constant for any Venezuelan leadership,
said Dmitry Peskov, Vladimir Putins spokesperson. Chavez, died on Tuesday at the age of 58, after an almost two-year battle with cancer. Moscow has had strong
traditional ties with Caracas, with defence, oil exploration and transportation being critical areas. Some of the bilateral contracts include the
construction of arms factories and servicing centres for military equipment. According to Russian experts, Venezuela is expected to become the worlds second largest buyer of Russian
weaponry after India by 2015. Condoling the death of Hugo Chavez Vladimir Putin called him an exceptional leader and statesman and Russias good friend. He was an uncommon and strong
man who looked to the future and always set for himself the highest objectives, Putin said. Putin has sent his profound condolences to Vice President of Venezuela Nicolas Maduro and the
Venezuelan people. Dmitry Medvedev, Russias prime minister said Chavez had devoted his life to the battle for justice and equality. We share the pain of your loss we will always
remember this wonderful person, patriot and citizen, he said in a message of condolence to the Venezulean people. President Putin also praised Chavezs personal efforts to lay a solid
foundation for the partnership between the two countries, encourage active political contacts and get major humanitarian and economic projects underway, and said that the two countries
need to keep following this road now, strengthening and developing their ties. Earlier this year Russias state-run oil company Rosneft
announced its plans to increase its investments in Venezuela. Igor Sechin, chief executive of Rosneft said the company is looking to invest
$10 billion in Venezuela in the coming years, beginning with the Mariscal Sucre gas project off the coast. In 2005-2007 Venezuela struck several deals with Russia over the purchase of Russian
armaments. The $4 billion arms deal with Russia, included Sukhoi fighter jets, combat helicopters, and over 100,000 light weapons, primarily the famous AK-103 assault rifles and a license to
produce them in Venezuela. In 2010 Chavez secured a $2.2 billion loan to buy Russians weapons for the Venezuelan army. The death of Venezuelas charismatic leader has caused wide-spread
reactions worldwide. After his re-election in December 2006, Chavez stepped up his verbal and diplomatic
confrontation with the United States, and forged closer ties with countries outside the region like Russia and
China.
U.S.-Russia relations stable now
Relations are stable now but any new tension could ruin cooperation.
Charles A. Kupchan, 6-26-2013, is professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and
senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Global Times, Russia, US should learn from history
and clear air of antagonism, www.globaltimes.cn/content/791668.shtml
The "reset" between Moscow and Washington that was launched during Obama's first term is certainly on hold, but it is not over.
Putin does seem bent on standing up to Washington on a host of different fronts, but the US and Russia
still share many common interests: advancing nuclear arms control, containing Iran's nuclear program, promoting stability in Afghanistan, to name a few. Putin
and Obama need to be restrained and patient about their differences, allowing these common interests to put relations between their countries back on an even keel. Putin's more
confrontational approach to Washington is partly a response to domestic vulnerability. Facing sustained opposition at home, the Kremlin has toughened its foreign policy to strengthen its
nationalist credentials. But Putin is also pushing back against the West's policies. He was particularly angered by NATO's intervention in Libya, claiming
that the Western alliance inappropriately turned a UN-backed mission to protect civilians into a mission to topple the Gaddafi regime. Moscow's ongoing support for the Syrian government,
despite the indiscriminate violence to which it is subjecting its own citizens, is meant to resist the West's proclivity to use force in the service of regime change. Putin is also angered by
Washington's critique of political repression in Russia and its calls for more pluralism. Viewing US criticism as inappropriate interference in Russia's internal affairs, Putin has of late stepped up
pressure on domestic opponents and clamped down on civil society organizations that receive foreign funding. Despite Moscow's provocative policies,
Washington has held its fire and kept the door open to a constructive dialogue. Russia and the US are
working together to convene a diplomatic conference that holds out hope of leading to a political settlement in Syria. Recently in Berlin, Obama proposed that the US and Russia
each cut their nuclear arsenals by one-third. The primary challenge in the months ahead is to replace the air of antagonism
that currently hangs over relations between Moscow and Washington with a more cooperative
atmosphere. Obama plans to travel to Moscow in September, providing a golden opportunity to put relations back on track. Syria remains a serious stumbling block. But at least
Moscow and Washington are working together to advance the prospects for a diplomatic solution. Even Putin, despite his hard-edged rhetoric
toward Washington, realizes that a solid foundation exists for stronger ties between Russia and the US.
A2 No strong energy ties
Venezuela and Russia have strong energy ties now.
RIA Novosti, 5-24-2013, Russia and Venezuela to develop Orinoco oil fields,
http://english.ruvr.ru/news/2013_05_24/Russia-and-Venezuela-to-develop-Orinoco-oil-fields/
The Russian federation and Venezuela have formed a joint venture to produce 120,000 barrels of oil a day
by 2016 in two fields in the Orinoco Oil Belt. Russia will provides a loan to Venezuela in the amount of $1.5 billion to finance the development of the fields under the terms of the agreement,
and invest $1.1 billion for a 40 percent share in Petrovictoria. The agreement establishing Petrovictoria was signed by the president
of the state-owned Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), Rafael Ramirez, and the president of Russian state oil company Rosneft, Igor Sechin. PDVSA will sell to
Russia 72 percent of the heavy and extra-heavy crude produced by the company, which has a long-term goal of producing
400,000 barrels a day. Three mixed capital companies are currently operating in the Orinoco Belt, producing 230,000 barrels a day in a huge area of southeastern Venezuela. The Belt has
estimated reserves of 220 billion barrels of harder-to-refine heavy and extra-heavy oil, the largest in the world.
Russia is investing in Venezuela oil now.
BBC News, 10-15-2010, Russia and Venezuela sign nuclear power and oil deals,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11553239
In addition to the nuclear and Rosneft deals, a shareholder in energy firm TNK-BP said that the company, which is owned by BP and Russian billionaires, would buy three of BP's assets in
Venezuela by the end of the year. Russia's energy ministry and Venezuela's oil ministry signed an agreement in Moscow to
support the deal. TNK-BP shareholder, billionaire German Khan told journalists: "We will buy 16.7% of Petromanagas, 40% of Petroperija and 26.6% of Bouqeron." He did not say how much
TNK-BP would pay for the stakes. European assets While Rosneft will become an owner of a 50% stake in Germany's Ruhr Oel, BP owns the other 50%. Ruhr Oel holds stakes in four German
petrochemical and refinery plants. Rosneft said in a statement that the plants' capacity is 23.2 million tonnes per year, or about 20% of Germany's refining capacity. The Russian firm's
president, Eduard Khudainatov, said: "As a result of this acquisition, 18% of Rosneft's refining capacity will be located in the heart of
industrialised Europe. This transaction is consistent with our strategy to expand our presence with high
quality assets in key international markets."
A2 Public wants U.S. investment
Venezuela public likes Russian interest.
Olivia Kroth, 7-21-2012, Axis of Logic, Venezuelas partnership with Russia: An emblematic step,
http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_64758.shtml
As early as September 2008, Russia sent Tupolev TU-160 bombers for training flights to Venezuela. In November 2008, both countries held joint naval exercises in the Caribbean Sea. The
Russian flotilla, including the nuclear-powered warship Peter the Great, was dispatched from Russias arctic base in Severomorsk. The Russian Federation sells
various kinds of weapons and military equipment to Venezuela, including shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, attack helicopters, combat
aircraft, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers, self-propelled howitzers, self-propelled mortars, assault rifles, sniper rifles, ammunition.
According to The Voice of Russia, the latest Russian armament shipment reached Puerto Cabello, Venezuelas overseas port, in May this year, carrying tanks of the types BTR-80A and BMP-3M,
multiple rocket launchers Smerch and anti-aircraft missiles S-300V. The Venezuelan Government also received various kinds of ammunition and training simulators. A Russian state official,
Sergei Goreslavski, confirmed that the Russian Federation is constructing a maintenance center for military equipment in Venezuela, specialized on repairing helicopters of the types Mi-17B5,
Mi-26T2 and Mi-35M2. Meanwhile, Venezuela is not merely an importer any more, but has started producing its own
armament and military equipment with Russian help. The country produces two types of Catatumbo rifles with Russian design. See:
Independence equals housing, health, agro, defense and political will. (Updated With Photo Essay) By Arturo Rosales, Axis of Logic The first type is modeled after the famous Russian assault
rifle Kalashnikov AK-103, designed by Mikhail Kalashnikov in 1994 and manufactured by Izmash in Russia. The Venezuelan Army uses the standard issue of this weapon which is now
manufactured in the state of Maracuy. The aim is to produce 50.000 units per year. The Venezuelan assault rifle has a caliber of 7.62x39 mm, the same as AK-103. It has a range of 400 meters
and can be used with or without telescope, General Morales of the Venezuelan Armed Forces informed. The second type is modeled after the Russian Dragunov rifle, designed by Yevgeny
Dragunov between 1958 and 1963, manufactured by Izmash in Russia as well. The Snayperskaya Vintovka Dragunova (SVD) is a semi-automatic sniper rifle, designed as a squad support
weapon. The Venezuelan equivalent has a caliber of 7.62x51 mm, an effective range of 800 meters and a maximum range of 1300 meters with telescope. The series of rifles, made in
Venezuela, is named Catatumbo, after a river that flows into Lake Maracaibo in the state of Zulia. Catatumbo lightning occurs over the marshlands at the Maracaibo mouth of the
Catatumbo river during storms at night. The very strong light can be seen up to 400 kilometers away and has been used for ship navigation. It was therefore also called the Maracaibo
Beacon. The beacon of the Venezuelan Armed Forces is its series of Catatumbo rifles. The newest feat which President Chvez proudly presented a few days ago is Venezuelas fist unarmed
drone, built with joint Russian Iranian Chinese technology and assistance. It is one of three aircraft that we have made, and we will continue to manufacture them, he announced. The
drone has a range of 100 kilometers, can reach an altitude of 3000 meters and stay aloft for up to 90 minutes. It transmits real-time video and images. The 3x4 meter drone is part of
Venezuelas defense system, aimed at the monitoring of dams, pipelines and other infrastructure. Venezuela has begun to sell weapons and military vehicles to other Latin American countries
within the alliances of ALBA and UNASUR. Julio Morales Prieto, director of Cavim (Compana Annima Venezolana de Industrias Militares), where the Venezuelan drone is built, says that other
Latin American states want to buy the drone. During a meeting on the 9th of June, when the Russian delegation visited the Miraflores Palace in Caracas, President Chvez said that Venezuela
has the right to defend itself. We have the constitutional obligation to keep our Armed Forces well equipped, well trained and in high spirits morally for national defense. On Venezuelan TV
the President remarked that the Venezuelan-Russian meeting was a signal of both governments political will to continue strengthening bilateral relations and with these to contribute to a
balanced world. In the cultural area, Russian-Venezuelan cooperation has been intensified as well. The Russian language is
taught in national education centers of Venezuela, supervised by the Agency of Cooperation with Russia. These centers organize activities to
introduce Russian culture and history in Venezuela, for example with exhibitions, seminars and workshops. Thus, on the 15th of April 2012, a Russian Music Festival was inaugurated in the Art
Center Daniel Surez of Caracas. Tatiana Rusakova, a Russian specialist in Venezuela, pointed out that interest in the Russian culture is growing. This is due to
the fact that Russian-Venezuelan ties have been intensified during the last ten years.
Link ext.
Russia competition link
U.S. investment with Maduros government could force Russia out straining global
energy relations.
CWCP (Center for World Conflict and Peace), 3-9-2013, Russias Uncertain Position in post-Chvez
Venezuela, http://centerforworldconflictandpeace.blogspot.com/2013/03/russias-uncertain-position-
in-post.html
The domestic and regional implications of the death of Hugo Chvez are numerous and wide-ranging, but
unique to Venezuela is the reverberations the death of its leader will have in faraway Russia and Eastern Europe. With the passing of El
Comandante," its possible that Russias geopolitical influence in Latin America may weaken and that its arms exports will
decline, directly affecting Russias economic growth. Much of this depends on who succeeds Chvez and what sort of relationship his successor pursues
with Russia. In the 21st century, Russia has had a tendency in its foreign policy to pursue relations with smaller, less powerful, but in many cases very central, states in regions around the world
(i.e. Serbia in the Balkans, Syria in the Middle East, etc.) in an effort to increase its own role in the so-called multi-polar world. While Russias major ally in Latin America is actually Brazil,
Russia has found Venezuela to be a willing partner in supporting Russias own foreign policy, with Venezuela even
going so far as to (hypocritically) recognize South Ossetias declaration of independence from Georgia while opposing Kosovos independence from Serbia because of the bad precedent it
would set. Venezuelan vice president Nicols Maduro said that "the unipolar world is collapsing and finishing in all aspects, and the alliance with Russia is part of that effort to build a
multipolar world." Russias ties with Venezuela as its Latin American partner was a perfect match- Chvez was an outspoken critic of the United States and his country controlled vast
reserves of energy, which gave Russia an excellent opportunity to exert its influence in the country and counter
American power in the region, namely, by combining mutual feelings on U.S. influence abroad with the capacity to develop Venezuelas energy industry. Venezuela was billed as a
regional leader for Latin America. For while Chvezs leftist administration was one of several that proliferated throughout the region, his had been by far the most vocal (it is not uncommon,
in fact, for Latin American governments to be relatively aligned on the right-left spectrum, with rightist governments predominating in the 1970s and 80s). Chvez carefully developed
relations with Evo Morales of Bolivia, Rafael Correa of Ecuador and the two most recent Argentine administrations, that of the late Nestor Kirchner and his wife Crisitina Fernndez (who
succeeded her late husband in 2007). His flamboyant anti-American rhetoric was occasionally balanced out by Brazils center-left president Incio Lula da Silva and Lulas successor, Dilma
Rousseff. Nevertheless, Venezuela provided a beacon through which Russia was able to exert geopolitical influence
in a region far beyond its periphery. One of the biggest areas of cooperation between Russia and Venezuela
is the energy sector, a fact recently underscored by Vladimir Putins decision to send Igor Sechin, CEO of Russias state owned oil company Rosneft, as a special presidential
envoy to Hugo Chvezs funeral. Venezuela has the largest proven reserves of crude oil in the world, but the oil is in need of a more intense
refinement process than most other crude supplies around the world. Russia has the technological
capabilities Venezuela needs to refine its heavy crude, and Russian energy companies are active in several aspects of the Venezuelan energy industry. Russian
companies plan to invest $17.6 billion in Venezuela by 2019 and multiply energy output fourfold in an attempt to expand cooperation to offshore areas and oil services, according to Reuters.
Sechin has said Rosneft will finance production with loans from Russian banks and credit lines from international banks. Because the Venezuelan economy is currently in shambles, it is
highly likely that the Russian-Venezuelan energy cooperation will continue, with the possibility that if a
government friendlier to the United States should take power, existing contracts with Russian companies would continue, but that American
companies would be invited to participate in new ventures. The situation in Venezuela may actually effect
Russias energy relations with one of its Eastern European neighbors- Belarus. Belarus has had a rather unique relationship with Russia, and is part of a union state with Russia.
Yet since 2007, the one thorn in the side of Belarus-Russia relations has been energy, mainly because of a dispute which emerged when Russia accused Belarus of siphoning Russian gas
transported through Belarus and selling it at world market prices (Belarus had enjoyed Russian gas at a discounted price). When Russia refused to meet Belarusian quotas for energy imports,
Belarus turned to Venezuela for energy imports starting in 2010, with energy shipped via tankers from Venezuela to the Ukrainian port of Odessa, then up to Belarus through a pipeline.
Belarus has sought 23 million tons of oil from Russia for 2013, but Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko has stated that if Russia will only sell Belarus up to 18 million tons (as it has
stated) and it will import energy from Venezuela and Azerbaijan. Yet if Venezuela for any reason suspends its sales of energy to Belarus, this may give Russia more leverage over Belarus as it
(Belarus) will have lost a valuable supplier of alternative energy. This situation seems unlikely since Venezuela can only benefit from the influx of cash, but is still an example of how far
reaching the implications of the upcoming transfer of power in Venezuela really are. After energy, Russias most valuable export is armaments and
military hardware. Chvez constantly feared a U.S. invasion of Venezuela, and had been engaged in a long-standing dispute with neighboring Colombia over the presence of U.S.
troops in Colombia (these U.S. troops including most notably the U.S.s lite Special Forces, whose purpose is to assist with counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency). This, in principle, was
the basis for his decision to enter into contractual agreements with Russia regarding arms sales. Venezuela is the second-largest customer for Russian military hardware (after India), and as
Russias economy is famously lacking in diversity of exports outside of energy, a willing market for arms is greatly welcomed (a situation only enhanced by the instability in another major
importer of Russian arms- Syria). In 2009, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned of a possible arms race between Colombia and Venezuela. Since 2006, the gross income for Russian
military sales abroad has doubled, and Russian arms sales are now almost exclusively handled through state-owned company Rosoboronexport. Chvezs death, however, could reduce Russias
client relationship with Venezuela in the arms industry, depending on how the succession plays out. It would be easy to assume that Nicols Maduro, Venezuelas vice president, would
succeed the late Chvez, yet Venezuelas opposition is relatively strong. The Venezuelan economy, despite the strength of the countrys crude reserves, is not entirely healthy, and if
the Venezuelan opposition ends up in power they may decide that it is not economically viable to have such contracts arms with
Russia. Viachelav Nikonov, deputy chair of the Russian Parliaments committee on foreign affairs, has stated that he does not believe a new Venezuelan administration would be able to
opt out of currently existing contracts, but future contracts may not be pursued. Given the fragile state of Venezuelas economy, Russia will most likely remain a major player in Venezuelas
foreign relations, because even if the opposition were somehow to come to power, Russian participation in the countrys energy sector is still largely necessary for it to be able to produce
energy in adequate amounts and at sufficient levels of refinement. Yet Russia may lose a large part of its customer base in the armaments industry, and
if a right-wing administration comes to power, or at least a Chvez lieutenant who seeks to improve relations with the United States,
Russia may also find itself with less of a partner in the geopolitical arena of countering U.S. influence in Latin America.
Russia will perceive competition because of the end goal of countering U.S. influence.
Stephen Blank, April 2009, is professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies
Institute of the US Army War college in Pennsylvania, Russia/NIS Center, Russia in Latin America:
Geopolitical Games in the USs Neighborhood, p. 14
Nevertheless, Russia does have genuine interests in Latin America. Those interests are commercial and
political: the former being a means to secure the latter. In regard to Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua those interests are more strategic
and overtly aimed at countering US influence in Latin America. Whether visiting he region or hosting Latin American officials in Moscow,
Russian officials take every opportunity to make rhetorical declarations on a congruence or identity of interests with their interlocutors on current issues in world politics, including
construction of a multipolar world order. 45 In all cases discussion revolves around the following issues: trade, mainly in commodities but in
high-tech and industrial products where possible; energy, whereby Russia either invests in the other states energy firms or
explores for resources there; attempts to gain leverage for each sides investment in the other country; Russian offers of arms sales and space launch services
(particularly to Brazil and Venezuela). Russias anti-American campaign appeared to conform with Latin American
interests as a result of the turn to leftism in several Latin American states beginning around 2006, combined with growing awareness of Chinas penetration
of the region and Latin American economic opportunities. 46
U.S.-Russia oil competition spills-over
U.S. and Russia competition over Venezuelan oil spills over to political policies and
ideologies.
Chris Weafer, 3-11-2013, is chief strategist at Sberbank Investment Research, The Moscow Times, No
Business as Usual for Russia in Venezuela, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/no-
business-as-usual-for-russia-in-venezuela/476739.html
Despite assurances from government officials in Caracas that it will be business as usual after the death
of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez last week, his passing will almost certainly lead to the start of political and social
changes in that country. The only question is the time frame. Chavez's death and the emergence of a new presidential administration will
surely have a significant impact on the global oil industry and price of oil, although perhaps on an even longer timeline. According
to the BP Energy Review, Venezuela sits on the world's largest exploitable reserves of oil. Chavez's policies have led not only to no significant exploitation of those reserves but have actually
directly led to a cut in the country's average daily oil output by one-third in the 14 years he served as president. In 1999, the country produced an average of 3.5 million barrels per day, while
the current average output has dropped to 2.5 million barrels. With the right investments, the country may easily support average daily oil output of 5 million barrels and probably higher,
according to industry estimates. There can be little doubt that as of last week, Venezuela has become the most important target location for
foreign oil majors, especially U.S. companies. Russian oil majors still have a small advantage, and senior executives
from state-owned Rosneft and Gazprom will be eager to ensure good relations with the next administration. But they must know that there is now a
limited window to convert promised cooperation with the Venezuelan state-owned oil company,
PDVSA, into actual projects. Oil executives from Houston will soon be descending on Venezuela with lucrative alternatives, and PDVSA, in dire need of capital
investment, will surely be listening to their offers. For Russia, that means three risks. First, Gazprom and Rosneft will have more competition for joint-venture deals in that country. Second,
Venezuela is an easier alternative to the hostile and unpredictable Russian Arctic for U.S. oil companies, which may make it harder for Moscow to attract joint-venture deals. Finally, the
prospect of more oil coming out of Venezuela adds to the growth projections for shale oil as a significant longer-term threat to the
price of oil, and therefore, to the Russian economy. None of this will be lost on the Kremlin. It means that there will have to be greater urgency to convert promised deals
into real projects in Venezuela. At the same time, the Kremlin will want to conclude more joint ventures to exploit the Arctic. It also means that the clock counting down to lower oil revenues is
now ticking, increasing the need for more urgent progress in economic reforms. The Venezuelan constitution mandates that a new election must take place within 30 days. As it stands today,
the current vice president, Nicolas Maduro, is expected to be elected to replace Chavez. Maduro said he intends to stick with the economic and
political policies and ideologies of his former boss, but since Maduro is no Chavez, this will be virtually impossible to achieve. Chavez was a hugely
charismatic, larger-than-life leader who managed to maintain unity of purpose among the many vested interests in the country. At the same time, he stayed popular with the people even as
the economy slid further into trouble. With oil averaging over $110 per barrel last year, the Venezuelan state budget ran a deficit of close to 20 percent of gross domestic product. Now that
Chavez is gone, the soon-to-be-elected president Maduro will come under increasing pressure to take actions to start improving the economy. No different from President Vladimir Putin's
situation when he took over an ailing economy in Russia in 2000, the only place that the new Venezuelan president can get revenue is from the oil sector. But after Chavez practically destroyed
PDVSA when he fired 20,000 skilled engineers and other workers in 2002, PDVSA will need a huge boost to capital spending and joint-venture partnerships. Although politically risky,
Maduro may have no other choice than to ask ExxonMobil and Chevron, two of the U.S. majors that had their local projects nationalized by
Chavez, to come back. Venezuela is certainly an attractive option for the world's big oil majors. Recoverable reserves are now put at just under 300 billion barrels, compared to
about 265 billion in Saudi Arabia and less than 100 billion in Russia. Most of Venezuelan oil is heavy and more expensive to refine, but it lies only a few hundred meters below the Orinoco Belt.
That makes it a lot more attractive than, for example, speculatively drilling in the hostile Russian Arctic while dodging icebergs. The Orinoco Belt is an extremely important natural
environment, and the inevitable objections from domestic, regional and international environmentalists will slow any development. But as has happened in similar situations elsewhere, the
quest for the prize will almost certainly prevail. Venezuela needs the money. Venezuela has also very likely moved to near the top of the
U.S. government's list of geopolitical priorities. The U.S. is set on a course to become energy independent, and the International Energy Agency
calculates this may take two to three decades based on current trends and with optimistic assumptions for U.S. shale oil production. Such assumptions have always been speculative when it
comes to the oil industry. But a more achievable target for the U.S. is to become regionally oil independent that is, to only source its oil requirements domestically and from Canada, Mexico
and now perhaps from Venezuela. That would allow the U.S. to become completely independent of Middle East oil within 10 years or so. A change in Venezuela's political and economic
priorities would also weaken the Cuban economy since Chavez supplied Cuba with almost free oil. That would hasten the inevitable regime change there as well, an extra bonus for
Washington. But while such an outcome would be very favorable for the U.S. economy, it would accelerate the game change already started in the global oil industry with the rapid growth in
shale oil volumes. No matter how you work the assumptions, the world is heading for a lot more oil supply over
the balance of this decade. New major oil production will come from North America, Iraq and the Caspian Sea, where Kazakhstan's giant Kashagan field starts to produce
from this year, almost certainly from Venezuela if a new administration takes concrete steps to increase foreign investment and production in the oil sector. This may be the
real reason Russian officials shed a few tears at Chavez's funeral on Friday.
A2 Different types of investment
Russias investment is in infrastructure and training.
Olivia Kroth, 7-21-2012, Axis of Logic, Venezuelas partnership with Russia: An emblematic step,
http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_64758.shtml
Venezuela is a strategic business partner for Russia in the exploitation of gas and crude oil. Since 2005, Venezuelas state oil
company PDVSA and the Russian oil company Lukoil have been drilling oil in the Venezuelan Orinoco Oil Belt together. Another joint venture contract was signed in 2011 between Russias
Rosneft and PDVSA to exploit the oil reserves of the blocs Carabobo-2 North and East. Rosneft holds 40 percent, PDVSA owns the majority of 60 percent. Since 2008, PDVSA has furthermore
been drilling gas jointly with Russias Gazprom in the Gulf of Venezuela. The Caribbean Gas Belt, which stretches along the coast of Venezuela, contains 200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
President Chvez wants his country to produce its own gas with Russian help, thanks to the transfer of Russian technology and training. It
is a great advantage for Venezuela to count on Russias presence and Gazprom in the Gulf, Hugo Chvez pointed out. Another shared
Venezuelan-Russian enterprise is the mining of gold in Venezuelas gold mines, Las Cristinas and Las Brisas. Both gold deposits were nationalized under the Chvez Government. The Russian
firm Rusoro was granted partnership with Venezuelan state mining companies. To finance these projects, a bi-national bank was created in 2009. Russias Gazprombank and VTB control 51
percent, Venezuelas PDVSA and the National Treasury own 49 percent. The bi-national banks headquarters are located in Moscow, with offices established in Caracas and Beijing. The bi-
national bank aims to boost financial cooperation between Venezuela and Russia. According to President Chvez, this bank is a step on the way to transform the financial architecture of the
21st century.
Impact ext.
Relations good ext.
Relations prevent US-Russia nuclear war.
Allison and Blackwill 2011 (Graham Allison, director of the Belfer Center at Harvard, and Robert
Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow at CFR, October 30, 2011, 10 reasons why Russia still
matters, Politico, http://goo.gl/BymUN)
That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putins decision to return next year as
president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous,
difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests
in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to
advance our nations interests by engaging and working with Moscow. First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States
from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, Russias cooperation is critical to averting nuclear
war. Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the evil empire, not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third,
Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Irans drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian
choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success. Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations
remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups. Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As
U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. Sixth, Russia is the worlds largest oil producer
and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from
Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russias impact
at our gas pumps. Seventh, Moscow is an important player in todays international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. A Moscow more closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power to shape an environment in which China
can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order. Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United
States across the Arctic. This territory provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy. Ninth, Russias brainpower is reflected in the fact that
it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and
from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin. Tenth,
Russias potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what a Russian president intent on frustrating U.S. international objectives could
do from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling S-300 air defense missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions. So next time you hear a
policymaker dismissing Russia with rhetoric about who cares? ask them to identify nations that matter more to U.S. success, or failure, in advancing our national interests.
Impact comparisons
Extinction likely largest arsenals.
Bostrum 2002 (Nick Bostrum, Professor of Philosophy at Yale, Existential Risks: Analyzing Human
Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards, 2002, http://goo.gl/rmQyl)
A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with
consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a
nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the
US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day
build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would
not destroy or thwart humankinds potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall
see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.
DA happens faster.
Hoove and Scholtbach 2008 (Lotte ten Hoove, policy officer at NIMD, and lvaro Pinto Scholtbach,
NIMD Regional Director for Latin America and the Carribean, August 2008, Democracy and Political
Party Assistance in Post-Conflict Societies, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy,
http://goo.gl/W0UBJ)
Post-conflict countries rarely follow a linear progression, but all of them seem to pass through a number of stages: stabilization and transition
(approximately 1 year), transformation and institution-building (1-3 years) and consolidation (3-10 years). Priorities are
different in each of these three phases. Broadly speaking, security is a top priority during the first phase, but the restoration of infrastructure and basic services, the development of a new
political framework, the pursuit of dialogue and a process of building trust between former warring parties also need to be initiated. Political, economic, judicial reform and institution-building
follow in the transformation phase and require continuation and deepening for many years. 6 Given that the development of democratic, open and accountable
governance institutions is a long-term process, the trade-off between short-term security and long-term democracy and stability is one of the main dilemmas in
post-conflict democratization processes. Ideally, democracy serves as a non-violent method of conflict resolution and of formalizing the competition for power. However, in the absence of
strong political institutions, competitive democratic elections can easily generate conflict and exercise a destabilizing influence. Indeed, elections can involve a radical change in the nature of
political power, undermining established political orders, allowing new entrants to access the political system, and highlighting social divisions.
Turns hegemony
US/Russia relations key to hegemony
Simes 2003Dmitri Simes, President of the Nixon Center, FDCH Political Testimony, 9-30
At the same time, U.S. leaders increasingly recognized the emerging, inter-related threats of terrorism and
proliferation. Though policy makers and experts had devoted some attention to these issues earlier, the tragic events of September 11 rapidly crystallized American thinking about
these threats and transformed the struggle to contain them into the principal aim of American foreign policy. Notwithstanding its diminished status and curtailed ambition, Russia has
considerable influence in its neighborhood and a significant voice elsewhere as well. Moscow can
contribute importantly to U.S. interests if it chooses to do so. Accordingly Russia can markedly decrease, or
increase, the costs of exercising American leadership both directly (by assisting the United States, or not) and
indirectly (by abetting those determined to resist, or not).
Relations solve prolif
US Russian relations are critical to preventing new proliferators
Cimbala 2008Stephen J. Cimbala, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State
Brandywin, Shield of Dreams: Missile Defense and U.S. Russian Nuclear Strategy, 2008
Absent cooperation between Russia and the United States, more states capable of developing nuclear
weapons will decide to jump through the window of opportunity, and the "probability of nuclear
weapons being used in a regional conflict will increase significantly."' Nor is this the worst possible outcome from U.S.-Russian political
antagonism spilling over into lack of cooperation in security and arms control. Existing treaties on nonproliferation and arms control (for example,
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) will be at risk of abrogation or
irrelevance. In addition, Arbatov notes, in a "worst-case scenario, there is a chance that an
adventuresome regime will initiate a missile launch against territories or space satellites of one of the
several great powers with a view to triggering an exchange of nuclear strikes between them. Another
high probability is the threat of a terrorist act with the use of a nuclear device in one or several major
capitals of the world:-` Arbatov's uncommon insights link the emerging multipolar world order with trends in American and Russian security policy and their relationship to
the success or failure of nuclear arms control, deterrence and nonproliferation. The freezing of the frame in favor of continued peace in
Europe, or the containment of adventurism on the part of new or aspiring nuclear states outside of
Europe, cannot be taken for granted. Within this context, further reductions in Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces to levels at or below the Moscow Treaty
of 2002 (SORT) are not merely a luxury or a fillip but a necessary part of a viable post-Putin and post-Bush security regime.

U.S.-Russia relations spill-over
U.S. displacing Russia in Venezuela affects all other joint ventures Libya proves.
Viktor Kuzmin, 3-13-2013, Russia beyond the Headlines, Russian oil deals in Venezuela unclear,
http://rbth.ru/business/2013/03/12/russian_oil_projects_in_venezuela_might_be_at_stake_23741.htm
l
On hearing the news of Hugo Chavezs death, Russias minister of industry and trade, Denis Manturov, told Russian reporters that the possible shake-up in Caracas
should not affect Russia's agreements and contracts with Venezuela. "We signed contracts with the state. Therefore, our
Venezuelan partners have certain commitments. I have no fears. We hope to retain constructive, cordial relations with Venezuela, whatever happens,"
said Manturov, who was one of three high-ranking Russian officials President Vladimir Putin selected to represent Russia at the Venezuelan leader's send-off. Russian companies have long
been welcome guests in Caracas. Cooperation is developing in all spheres from flowers to fighter jets. For instance, Venezuela is second only to India in its procurement of Russian arms. As
of early 2013, the agreements concluded between the two countries were estimated by the state intermediary agency Rosoboronexport to be worth $11 billion. Cooperation in the civil sphere
is even broader. Venezuela was the first country in Latin America to set up a joint venture with Russia. The project was
approved in 2009. In the middle of 2012, Chavez reported that the projects dividends had already reached $5 million. Russia and Venezuela signed five
documents outlining a series of offshore oil and gas projects, the creation of new joint-ventures, and the purchase of Russian-made drilling equipment,
including offshore platforms. Plans existed to involve Russia's Uralmash in one of the joint ventures, and the construction of 50 drilling rigs was also proposed. Russian contractors are engaged
in the assembly of standard panel housing in Caracas. The project includes infrastructure and the creation of nine joint-ventures to produce building materials. Negotiations are also under way
for the completion of a series of nuclear power plants, which were put on ice after the Fukushima tragedy. However, the most progress has been made by the state corporations Rosneft and
Russian Technologies (Rostechnologia). It is no coincidence that the heads of these companies Igor Sechin, in the capacity of special representative of the president, and Sergei Chemezov
were part of the delegation, alongside Manturov, at Hugo Chavez's farewell. Russia's largest oil company Rosneft has signed numerous agreements with Venezuelan companies and owns 40
percent of National Oil Consortium, which is due to develop the Junin-6 field. As for Russian Technologies, in addition to supplying arms, it has managed to penetrate the Venezuelan market
with its subsidiaries' products, too. For example, June 2012 saw the signing of an agreement to manufacture passenger buses in Venezuela, based on a chassis developed by KAMAZ (of which
Russian Technologies is the main shareholder). The Russian team of constructors specifically designed the chassis to adapt fully to the local environment. Over the past 11 years, Caracas has
become a critical strategic partner of Moscow in Latin America. Senior analyst at RIKOM-Trust, Vladislav Zhukovsky, estimates Russia's investment projects in Venezuela to be in the area of
$22-25 billion, while other experts put the figure closer to $30 billion. "There is no doubt that the demise of Chavez will force the
Kremlin to adjust its plans. Given the political and economic risks facing Russia's largest oil and gas
companies, they will try to freeze their investment agreements and ongoing projects, since it is far from certain that Hugo Chavez will be succeeded by his associate and
interim president Nicolas Maduro," says Zhukovsky. "All eyes are focused on what will happen next," says Ivan Kibardin, chief specialist of the securities division at
Intercommerce Bank. He recalls that Chavez won the last election by a relatively small margin about 9 percent. "If the opposition came to power, it is highly likely that the country would
change its political, and hence economic, course. In such case, it would probably impact Russia's arms contracts and complicate further investments in the country," Kibardin says. He adds that
the "black gold alliance" between Russian oil companies and Venezuela was not in any danger, since its importance at least for the next couple of decades is understood by all. If Nicolas
Maduro does succeed in becoming Venezuela's next leader, things will remain roughly the same, according to the analyst. "But there won't be another Chavez. And
even if Russia stays on its economic pedestal, there will probably be a rapprochement with the United States," says Kibardin. Most pessimistic of all is
Konstantin Simonov, director of the National Energy Security Fund. He believes Russia can hold on to its Venezuelan projects only in two cases: either a Chavez supporter wins the election, or
the military comes to power as a result of a failure by the current government and opposition to reach an agreement. If the opposition wins, he believes that Russian
companies will have to pack up and leave, to be replaced by U.S. firms. "Chavez kicked the U.S. out of Venezuela without compensating any of its companies,
says Simonov. If the opposition wins the election, then it's goodbye to all the petrorubles. It will be a repeat of the Libyan scenario, when Russia's
friendship with Gaddafi led to all its projects being suspended.
Russia becoming militarily involved
Russia is using Venezuela as a tool to fight back at what they think is U.S.
expansionism conducting military exercises.
Jamie McIntyre & Laurie Ure, 9-26-2008, CNN, Expert: Russia-Venezuela military exercises reaction
to U.S. moves, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/09/25/russia.venezuela/
Russia is displaying its military power in America's back yard, sending a convoy of warships to Venezuela for joint
naval exercises, the first such deployment since the Cold War. The Kremlin is becoming increasingly cozy with
Venezuela, Cuba and other Latin American countries unhappy with the United States, in apparent response to thorny issues such as U.S. missile
defense plans in Eastern Europe, NATO's eastern expansion, and U.S. warships dispatched to Georgia. "Some of this is the Russians wanting to get even. They see
American warships close to their shore; they're going to put Russian warships close to us," said Russian military expert John Pike of globalsecurity.org. The fleet of ships headed toward the
Caribbean includes some of Russia's finest, like the nuclear-powered Peter the Great cruiser and the anti-submarine warship Admiral Chebanenko. Pike said that while these vessels are
impressive, they are no match for the American Navy and pose little threat to the United States. "They have obsolete technology. They would simply be no match for American warships in a
one-to-one combat," he said. Nonetheless, this deployment adds to the tension created earlier this month when two Russian Tu-160 nuclear long-range bombers arrived in Venezuela, also for
military exercises. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, a vocal critic of the United States, greeted the Russian pilots with a blunt message for Washington. "Venezuela is not
alone! Russia is with us," he said. "They are our strategic partners. The Russian Tu-160 bombers on our land are a warning to the empire of the
U.S.A.!" Chavez is increasing Venezuela's ties with Russia. He arrived in Moscow on Thursday for his second trip there in the past two months. Russia, meanwhile, has sold Venezuela more than
$4 billion in arms. U.S. Defense Department spokesman Geoff Morrell says the Pentagon is not fazed. "Russia is certainly within its rights to conduct exercises with its allies. What's the old
saying? You're sort of known by the company you keep. If they wish to hang out with the Venezuelan navy, that's their business," he said. But Russia knows the United States
is watching, and that seems to be the idea, Pike said. "The Russians, sort of from here on out, every couple months are going to come up with some sort of new event, some sort of
new exercise, some sort of new provocation to keep us focused on them," he said.
Tensions high now
Venezuela is being armed to military destabilize Latin America if Russian relations go
south.
Juan Forero, 12-11-2010, Washington Post Staff Writer, Washington Post, Venezuela acquires 1,800
antiaircraft missiles from Russia, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/11/AR2010121102586.html
Russia delivered at least 1,800 shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles to Venezuela in 2009, U.N. arms control data show, despite
vigorous U.S. efforts to stop President Hugo Chavez's stridently anti-American government from acquiring the weapons. The United States feared that the
missiles could be funneled to Marxist guerrillas fighting Colombia's pro-American government or
Mexican drug cartels, concerns expressed in U.S. diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks and first reported in the Spanish newspaper El Pais. It had been unclear how many
of the Russian SA-24 missiles were delivered to Venezuela, though the transfer itself was not secret. Chavez showed off a few dozen at a military parade in April 2009, saying they could "deter
whatever aerial aggression against our country." A high-level Russian delegation told American officials in Washington in July of that year that 100 of the missiles had been delivered in the first
quarter of 2009. Then earlier this year, Russia reported to the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms, which records the transnational sale of weaponry, that the deal totaled 1,800 missiles. The
U.N. registry did not reveal the model of the delivered weaponry. But the American commander for military forces in Latin America, Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser, publicly expressed concern
this year that Venezuela was purchasing as many as 2,400 of the missiles, also called the IGLA-S. Matt Schroeder, a missile expert at the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, said
the missiles are among the most sophisticated in the world and can down aircraft from 19,000 feet. "It's
the largest recorded transfer in the U.N. arms registry database in five years, at least. There's no state in Latin America of greater concern
regarding leakage that has purchased so many missiles," he said, referring to reports of Venezuelan arms flowing to Colombian guerrillas. The database also shows that from 2006 through
2008, Russia delivered to Venezuela 472 missiles and launching mechanisms, 44 attack helicopters and 24 combat aircraft, purchases funded by Venezuelan oil sales. A self-styled Socialist who
claims that successive U.S. governments want to topple him, Chavez told his countrymen during the 2009 military parade that "we don't want war with anyone, but we are obligated to
prepare." Months later, in December 2009, he said in a nationally televised address that "thousands of missiles are arriving" but did not say what kind. Secret American cables said that the
United States was concerned about the Chavez government's acquisition of Russian arms, which also included attack helicopters, Sukhoi fighter planes and 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles. A
State Department cable on Aug. 10, 2009, to embassies in Europe and South America said Russian sales to Venezuela total "over $5 billion last year and growing." There was also concern about
Spain's plans to sell aircraft and coastal patrol boats to Venezuela. The cables show how both the Bush and Obama administrations tried to stop the arms sales
by highlighting the possibility that the weapons could end up with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, a rebel
group that Colombian officials say has received material support from Chavez's government. "In early March, Secretary Clinton raised the sale with Russian FM Sergey Lavrov," the August 2009
cable says, referring to Hillary Rodham Clinton and Russia's foreign minister. A cable from Washington to Moscow dated Feb. 14, 2009, said FARC computer files seized by Colombia's army
indicated that Venezuela tried to facilitate arms market deals for the rebels. It expressed fear that missiles acquired by the FARC, which is mired in the drug trade, could wind up with Mexican
cartels that "are actively seeking to acquire powerful and highly sophisticated weapons." Chavez has long denied that his government assists the FARC. A spokeswoman for the Venezuelan
Embassy in Washington said diplomats there could not respond to the allegations by U.S. officials. The Venezuelan Foreign Ministry in Caracas did not respond to phone calls. The August 2009
cable notes that Russian ammunition sold to Venezuela was found in FARC hands and that U.S. officials raised the issue with Russian diplomats visiting Washington. The American efforts
to derail Russian and Spanish arms sales to Venezuela appeared to strain U.S. relations with both countries. In a meeting in
Moscow in 2005, Anatoliy Antonov, who oversaw disarmament issues for the Russian foreign ministry, told a U.S. Embassy official that Washington was trying to restrict Russian access to the
arms market.
Venezuela prolif impact
Russia will facilitate Venezuelan proliferation if its perceived that the U.S. is
aggressively containing.
Jonathan Pearl, 10-28-2010, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, 2010-2011, Council on Foreign Relations
(CFR), Washington Must Take a Stronger Stand on Russia-Venezuela Nuclear Deal,
http://www.cfr.org/iran/washington-must-take-stronger-stand-russia-venezuela-nuclear-deal/p23274
Over the past few years, Russia has shown that it may be more interested in making money than in controlling
weapons proliferation. Moscow delivered the fuel for Iran's Bushehr reactor last August, two months after the United Nations Security Council passed a fourth round of
sanctions against Tehran for its nuclear noncompliance and suspicions of possible nuclear military activities. Indeed, despite its increasing cooperation with the United States on tightening UN
Security Council sanctions against Iran, Russia ultimately proved unwilling to use Bushehr as leverage for bringing Iran into line with Security Council demands. Now President Dmitri Medvedev
has decided to build two large reactors, and a smaller research reactor, for President Chavez. It is understandable for Moscow to engage in the lucrative nuclear power business. But it is also
understandable for Washington and its allies to judge states, like people, by the friends they keep. President Chavez's regime in Venezuela, after all, actively seeks to
undermine US interests at every possible opportunity -- a goal he shares with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Yet since 2005, Russia has
sold approximately $4 billion in military hardware to the increasingly autocratic and unpredictable Chavez. More importantly, a recent report indicates that Caracas may be willing to help
Tehran acquire uranium that could eventually be fed into centrifuges to produce weapons-grade material. Iran's uranium enrichment program is at the heart of International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) concerns and Tehran continues to reject UN Security Council demands to halt its enrichment activities. This cooperation could one day flow in both directions, for example, with
Tehran repaying Chavez by sharing centrifuge designs or other sensitive nuclear technologies. Such an outcome is not far-fetched. Many nuclear states' weapons programs have been greatly
aided through such transfers. To be sure, President Medvedev has worked with Washington to further some important mutual goals, including by signing a follow-on agreement to the expired
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Russia's President has also canceled a long-planned sale of advanced S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Iran that had produced consternation in Washington and
Tel Aviv because of their ability to severely limit military options against Tehran. Increased Russian cooperation with NATO may also be on the horizon. But economic motives may play a role in
some of these decisions too. Nuclear force reductions are, after all, in Moscow's economic interest. And Russia may already have a new customer for its S-300 missiles in President Chavez.
Why then has State Department spokesman PJ Crowley asserted that the administration has "confidence" in Russian nuclear export decisions, and why has President Obama asserted
Venezuela's right to civilian nuclear power? Three explanations come to mind. First, the administration might fear that full-throated opposition could undermine cooperative bilateral efforts
with Moscow on arms control and, potentially, missile defense. It might also harbor concerns of risking hard-fought gains in Russian cooperation on Security Council sanctions against Iran -- a
much more pressing concern given that Venezuela is still many years from an active nuclear program. Finally, President Obama likely seeks to avoid giving Chavez
additional fodder for his anti-American propaganda. Even the President's mild suggestion that "Venezuela
needs to act responsibly" as it pursues nuclear energy has prompted Chavez to counter that "Obama has started a war by spreading doubt" about
Venezuela's program. While the administration is wise to be wary of such obvious risks, its talented team of
diplomats and nuclear experts must not succumb to inaction. The stakes involved are too high. A good first step might be for the Obama
administration to privately urge Russia to make construction of nuclear plants in Venezuela contingent upon Caracas signing an Additional Protocol agreement with the IAEA. This agreement
would grant Agency inspectors broad latitude to investigate Venezuelan nuclear activities and, thus, provide an important buffer against diversion of civilian nuclear material for military
purposes. Washington's behind-the-scenes push could be accompanied by a public effort to emphasize the
Iran-Venezuela connection, particularly in the context of U.S., EU, and UN Security Council sanctions. If the Obama administration is able to frame the debate in this way
through deft public diplomacy, it would raise the political stakes and give greater currency to its entreaties to Moscow. Simply put, the United States cannot afford to sit on the sidelines in a
world where states have often pursued nuclear weapons under the cover of civilian programs, least of all when it comes to Venezuela and its friends in Tehran.
Venezuela is key
Venezuela is of key strategic importance to Russia.
Pavel Tarasenko & Ivan Safronov, 3-11-2013, Worldcrunch, Will Russia's Cozy Relationship With
Venezuela Die With Chavez?, http://www.worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/will-russia-039-s-cozy-
relationship-with-venezuela-die-with-chavez-/venezuela-chavez-russia-oil-military-trade-
weapons/c1s11149/
When word first came out in 2011 that Hugo Chavez was suffering from a serious illness, a Russian military
source predicted the consequences of the end of the Chavez era: not only could Moscow lose contracts already
signed, but it might also never get paid for weapons it has already delivered to Caracas. Russia has a lot to
lose in Venezuela. In total, experts estimate that the projects that Moscow had inked with Chavez are worth no less than $30 billion. And now the guarantor is gone. People
started to expect an announcement regarding Chavezs death on Tuesday, when his official successor Nicolas Maduro called an urgent meeting with the countrys leadership. But the vice-
president only said that the president was going through his worst hours since Dec. 11 (when Chavez underwent an operation for his cancer), and used the opportunity to accuse Venezuelas
enemies of provoking Chavezs illness. Nicolas Maduro said that Americas military attach, David Delmonaco, would be removed because he was destabilizing the country. A couple of hours
later, the vice-president was on the TV again. Commandante Hugo Chavez died at 4:25 p.m. local time, he announced with a shaky voice, and called on Venezuelans to come together and
wipe away their tears. Viva Hugo Chavez, he said, raising his fist in a symbol of victory. Thousands of people filled the streets in Caracas, and Venezuela entered a weeklong national
mourning. Chavez was buried on Friday, and Russia sent the head of Rosneft energy giant Igor Sechin, Minister of Industry Denis Manturov and the general director of Rostechnology. Now
Venezuela is preparing to elect a new president. No matter who wins, whether it is Chavezs designated successor or the opposition candidate, experts say that there will likely be serious
changes. No new government is going to continue the sharp anti-Americanism that Chavez governed with," explained Fedor Lukyanov, a representative of the Russian Council on Foreign
Relations. "If Maduro wins, the relationship between Caracas and Washington will improve. If the opposition wins, then the country
will totally reorient itself towards the United States. The Kremlin has expressed hope that the positive and constructive Russian-Venezuelan relations will remain unchanged. But Lukyanov is
convinced to the contrary: The 2000s were an anomaly, when Venezuela became one of Russias most important world trade
partners, and that anomaly is unlikely to survive Chavezs death, because it was connected to Chavez personally, to his personal political views and ambitions. Another experts says:
many of the agreements between Caracas and Moscow will remain, at least on paper, but others will likely be revisited.
Conflict over Venezuela likely
Putin will become aggressive over Venezuela ego.
Adrian Blomfield, 7-22-2008, The Telegraph, Russia and Venezuela in deal to counter 'US
aggression', http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/venezuela/2446112/Russia-
and-Venezuela-in-deal-to-counter-US-aggression.html
With a long shopping list for state-of-the-art defence equipment under his arm, Mr Chavez did his best to
ingratiate himself with his hosts. He first signed off on a deal giving Russia's state-owned energy companies often
accused of doubling as private piggy banks for powerful Kremlin forces exclusive rights to develop new deposits Venezuela's Orinoco Oil Belt. Then he switched smoothly to
flattery, with a call for the Russian rouble to replace the US dollar as the world's global currency. "We in OPEC have proposed to put an end to the dollar," Mr Chavez said, speaking in his role
as self-appointed spokesman for the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Mr Chavez was given correspondingly warm welcome as he met with one old friend, prime minister
Vladimir Putin, and one new one in the form of president Dmitry Medvedev. Mr Medvedev was particularly effusive, describing Venezuela as Russia's "most important partner". Ignoring
accusations of electoral fraud and authoritarianism that have been directed at both countries, Mr Medvedev told his guest: "We have one common task; to make the surrounding world more
democratic, fair and secure." Despite the bonhomie, it was unclear whether Mr Chavez had got everything he had come for. The Venezuelan leader wants to buy three submarines and 20 Tor-
M1 air defence missile systems in a 1 billion arms contract that would undoubtedly infuriate the US. Washington's anger, however, is unlikely to persuade
Russia to desist. Mr Putin, whose anti-American speeches were often as colourful as his Venezuelan
counterpart's, revelled in his status as Venezuela's champion and principal ally. So far Dmitry Medvedev, who became president in May, has
shown few signs of wanting to depart from the foreign policy of Mr Putin, who has become prime minister and remains, in the eyes of many, Russia's most powerful man. During Mr
Putin's last term, Russia sold Venezuela over 2 billion in arms, from combat helicopters and Sukhoi fighter jets to
Kalashnikov rifles.
Misc. Venezuela impact card
Venezuela aggression causes laundry list of problems.
Peter Brookes, November 2010, Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs, The Heritage Foundation,
Infected by VIRUS: The Threat of the Venezuela-Iran-Russia-Syria Nexus,
http://www.heritage.org/events/2010/11/virus
Venezuela has a long history of democracy and friendship with the United States, yet under authoritarian populist President Hugo
Chvez it has established itself as a major opponent of U.S. policies and interests in the Americas and
around the world. Under Chvez, Venezuela has provided covert assistance to Colombian narco-terrorists and
Basque separatists and maintains friendly relations with Islamist terrorists, such as Hezbollah. Given national
limitations, Chvez continues to build a network of anti-American alliances. Russian-Venezuelan military and
energy cooperation continues to expand. Venezuelas burgeoning alliance with Iran poses a destabilizing threat to stability with the willingness to align with
the Ayatollahs in Irans nuclear weapons quest. Finally, terrorist-supporting Syria is striving to acquire nuclear technology and modern missile systems from Iran, Russia and North Korea and, in
the process, has increased its cooperation with Chavezs Venezuela. Despite these and many other troubling signs, President Obama continues to minimize the
nature of the threat posed by VIRUS. Join us as our panel of experts examines recent trends in U.S.-Venezuelan relations and the Iran-Russia-Venezuela nexus and reviews
ways for the U.S. to address these emerging threats.
A2 Russian investment = instability
No security risk from increased Russian investment in Venezuela.
Steven L. Taylor, 10-16-2010, is Professor and Chair of Political Science at Troy University, Outside the
Beltway, Russia and Venezuela Sign Energy Deal, http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/russia-and-
venezuela-sign-energy-deal/
The Russian and Venezuelan energy ministries also signed a memorandum of understanding supporting a
plan for TNK-BP to acquire BPs assets in Venezuela. TNK-BP is a joint venture partly owned by British energy giant BP. BP is considering selling a range of assets to
finance its losses after the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. No doubt this event will cause some folks to run around like their hair is afire (as some did when the Russian-Venezuelan arms deal
from last year was announcedfor example: click). First, as I like to note in situation like this: this is the way states behave. Venezuela has reasons to want to
increase ties with states it considers friendly and Russia has every reason to want to find trading
partners. Second, yes both are also motivated to some degree by the notion of sticking a finger in the eye of the United States (although this is rather unlikely to be the main motivation
for the agreementdespite the way the US looks at things, everything isnt about this country). Third, would the US prefer that the deals not take place? Sure. The US
government considers Venezuela a less than friendly actor and likewise isnt keen in other states getting
involved in what it thinks of as its backyard. Still, the actual security risk to the US or its allies in the region are slight at
best.
Aff Venezuela DA
Russia losing Venezuela investment now
Russia losing influence and oil presence in Venezuela now.
Georgy Bovt, 3-13-2013, is a political analyst, The St. Petersburg Times, Russia Put All of Its Eggs in
Chavezs Basket, http://www.sptimes.ru/story/37080
Chavez was personally behind all the major projects with Russia in energy, transportation, weapons
purchases and banking. For example, military and technical cooperation with Russia to rearm the Venezuelan army took off in full force in 2005-06 after the U.S. refused to
supply the countrys military with spare parts. Moscow signed military and technical contracts with Caracas totaling $11 billion, of which $4 billion is financed with Russian credit. As of today,
$6 billion in contracts has been fulfilled. Now that Chavez is gone, the one factor that has always worked against Russia
its lack of technological innovation will play an even larger role in Venezuela turning to China instead of
Russia for military and technical cooperation. Whats more, with deepening economic difficulties and a resultant currency shortage, Venezuela might have trouble paying off its large
debt to Russia. Russian oil companies should expect even more serious problems. State-owned Rosneft has already signed a contract with the Venezuelan state-owned PDVSA oil company to
develop the Carabobo-2 heavy oil field in the Orinoco River basin as part of a joint venture in which Rosneft holds a 40 percent stake. Rosneft is also part of a consortium with LUKoil, TNK-BP
and Gazprom Neft that is working on the Khunin-6 project, also in the Orinoco River basin. Those companies were required to pay the Venezuelan government $1 billion each just for the right
to join the projects, and according to various estimates, their additional combined investment over many years will reach $40 billion. It seems that there is more politics than profit behind
these projects for two reasons. First, it is strange for Russian oil companies to invest tens of billions of dollars in a country with an unpredictable future, especially when similar projects at
home are terribly underfunded. Second, it has always been extremely difficult to work in Venezuela, and all the more so
now that Chavez, Moscows loyal friend and ally, has died. Chavez did not leave the country in the best condition. He doubled the size of the
bureaucracy, which brought corruption and inefficiency to such high levels that the country is on the brink of collapse. The countrys infrastructure is in ruins, and foreign companies might be
forced one way or another to finance expensive infrastructure programs from their profits. Notably, Rosneft head Igor Sechin, who attended Chavezs funeral last week, spoke with acting
President Nicolas Maduro regarding the delicate issue of that countrys unfulfilled contractual obligations to other Russian companies, including RusHydro. Russia might not have enough
political and economic leverage to influence the behavior of the new Venezuelan leadership, whichever happens to emerge. Of course, Moscow prefers Chavezs hand-picked successor,
Maduro, who is favored to win the election. But under the pressure of mounting economic problems, Maduro might take a more balanced and
pragmatic approach, including subduing anti-U.S. rhetoric and turning to the U.S. and China for
investment and large contracts. Russian-Venezuelan relations could be complicated even further if opposition leader Henrique Capriles Radonski wins the
presidential election on April 14. Even if Maduro wins, relations with Moscow will probably deteriorate all the same. Russian-Venezuelan relations are fundamentally fragile. Compare them to
the long and well-developed relationship between Cuba and Venezuela. Cuba has sent about 40,000 workers to Venezuela, including more than 5,000 specialists in sports, health care and
education, and has acted as the initiator and co-participant in many important social projects. Simply expelling such a partner like Cuba would be difficult, even if a right-wing leader were to
come to power, because that relationship is deeply woven into the fabric of Venezuelas economic and political life. But since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has showed little
enthusiasm for large-scale programs designed to build a broad base in other countries. Notably, China has taken this broad approach toward
building relations with developing states like Venezuela, and as a result, Beijing enjoys a steadily growing
economic presence in those countries, even when ruling regimes change. In contrast, Moscow continues to focus its bilateral relations on top leaders and their small inner
circles in these countries. This might be fine as long as they remain in power, but as soon as they are gone, Russia risks losing political capital and billions of dollars in contracts.
No investment trade-off
Russia wont compete with the U.S. Chinas investing instead.
Chicago Tribune, 3-12-2013, Rachel Marsden: The deal that America and Russia must make
following Chavez's death, http://www.chicagotribune.com/sns-201303121200--tms--amvoicesctnav-
b20130312-20130312,0,6238155.column
The U.S. has significantly cut its oil imports since Chavez took power in 1999. America has sought to
decrease dependence on foreign oil outside of North America. Growth in oil imports from Canada corresponds with simultaneous
reductions in imports from Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and other OPEC nations. America has been trending away from Venezuelan and foreign oil all on its own, independent of Venezuelan
policy. By contrast, in what Chavez called a move toward nations prone to supporting his "21st century socialist revolution," Venezuela agreed to a $16 billion oil production deal with China in
2009 and a $20 billion deal with Russia in 2010. China also awarded Venezuela a 10-year financing loan for oil exploration in 2010. Granted, America is still Venezuela's largest oil buyer, and
China gets less than 20 percent of Venezuela's oil, but it wouldn't be a stretch to figure that China wants a lot more -- of everything. Especially when it is so desperate for raw natural resources.
And although China and Russia are currently in a mutually servicing geopolitical marriage, Russia needs to watch out: If China gets cozy enough
with Venezuela to get its hands on cheaper resources in Venezuela than Russia is selling, Russia could
find itself in a love triangle. Because whatever China will be getting from its new squeeze will likely mean China satisfying and courting Russia less through trade as a
result. China was importing 230,000 barrels of Venezuelan crude a day in 2011, compared with 395,000 barrels a day from Russia, according to FACTS Global Energy.
No impact to U.S. investment
No real partnership between Russia and Venezuela no impact to U.S. engagement.
Pavel Tarasenko & Ivan Safronov, 3-11-2013, Worldcrunch, Will Russia's Cozy Relationship With
Venezuela Die With Chavez?, http://www.worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/will-russia-039-s-cozy-
relationship-with-venezuela-die-with-chavez-/venezuela-chavez-russia-oil-military-trade-
weapons/c1s11149/
Vladimir Semago, the vice-head of the Russian-Venezuelan Commerce Council is even more emphatic. Now that Hugo Chavez is gone, all of this pretense of
friendship with Venezuela will go, too, he told Kommersant. There was never any real partnership between our countries, there were
only attempts to convince Russians that Moscow was colonizing Latin America, like it did in Africa during Soviet times. According to Semago, one of the most ambitious projects the
creation of an oil consortium that is a partnership between the Russian national companies and the Venezuelan oil company is a total myth. The
consortium was never allowed to do anything and never accomplished anything. There were only ever two Russian
companies that were interested, anyway, Semago explained. There are even more questions about the future of Russian-Venezuelan
military partnerships, because those deals were always intimately connected to Chavez himself. When Chavez visited Moscow in 2004, he signed the first two major military
contracts, for over $550 million worth of military equipment. The work was hard, but as soon as Chavez got involved, it was like there was suddenly understanding on both sides, said a
source familiar with the negotiations. And in all of the subsequent weapons negotiations he took a very direct role. In 2011, Chavez was able to get an agreement for Russia to extend a $4
billion dollar credit to Venezuela for weapons purchases. Even though extending this credit was basically suicide, we still did it, because it was important for us to maintain a good relationship
with Caracas, explained a source in the Federal service for military partnerships. But when it became clear that you couldnt have a dialogue
with anyone but Chavez himself, the other members of the Venezuelan delegation stopped making an
effort to work with us.
Russia doesnt view energy investment in Latin America as a diplomatic asset.
Stephen Blank, April 2009, is professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies
Institute of the US Army War college in Pennsylvania, Russia/NIS Center, Russia in Latin America:
Geopolitical Games in the USs Neighborhood, p. 6
Still, while Russia will continue expanding ties with Latin America, its capacity for deep involvement is lower
than it wants as is the ability of Latin American states to support Russian goals. This is especially true for countries like
Venezuela that depend on energy or commodities revenues, their capabilities have also declined due to the global economic crisis. Thus Russia will only partially meet
Latin American expectations for support, even in stricken economies like Cuba.7 For example, Russias upcoming loan of 20 million US dollars to Cuba and a
possible future credit of 335 million US dollars will enable it to buy Russian products, providing only a minimal, short-term boost to Cubas economy8export subsidies hardly offering a
mutual benefit. Likewise, Russian companies charged with developing relations with Latin America recently acknowledged that little or no economic expansion will occur anytime soon. For
example, even though Russia and Venezuela ostentatiously agreed to establish oil and gas companies together, Russian companies have no liquid assets to
invest in Latin America, Not surprisingly, even Venezuela displays skepticism about Russias ability to
transform its tieswhich consist mainly of arms salesinto a relationship based on large-scale investment and diplomatic coordination.9
U.S. investment good
Forcing Russia out of Venezuela is good improves regional security.
Ray Walser, 9-15-2008, is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, The Heritage Foundation, Chvez, Venezuela, and
Russia: A New Cuban Missile Crisis?, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/09/chaacutevez-
venezuela-and-russia-a-new-cuban-missile-crisis
Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez continues to pursue a course of regional provocation aimed at inflaming
relations between the U.S. and Venezuela. On Sunday, September 7, Chvez announced that Russian and Venezuelan warships would hold joint maneuvers
in late 2008. On Wednesday, September 10, he welcomed the arrival of two Russian Tupolev-160 strategic bombers to a Venezuelan airfield, evoking memories of earlier U.S.-Russian
showdowns. On Thursday, as Americans observed the seventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, Chvez expelled the U.S. ambassador, Patrick Duddy, claiming the U.S. was backing a coup
attempt against him. Duddy's expulsion was also a gesture of solidarity from Chvez to his ally Bolivian President Evo Morales, who faces growing protests and internal divisions and expelled
U.S. ambassador Philipp Goldberg the previous day. Together, these actions are a clear and ominous reflection of a rapidly deteriorating U.S. relationship with Chvez and his ally in Bolivia.
Sadly, Russia-once a partner in the fight against radical terrorism-appears ready to seek advantage in the U.S.-Venezuela rift.
A New Cuban Missile Crisis? Although the press and a handful of analysts drew parallels between current U.S.-Venezuela tensions and the era of Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro, the actions
of September 2008 are clearly not a repeat of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 or even of the Central American crisis of 1979-1990. There is no nuclear threat, no Cold War, and no
clear-cut, ideological conflict such as existed in 1962. However, the arrival of Russian bombers, fleet maneuvers, and the frequent sales of Russian military
hardware to Venezuela reflect Moscow's unwelcome readiness to trigger memories of the "Bear in the
Backyard" and the decade-long struggle to contain Communism in the Western Hemisphere. Such provocative actions pressure Washington to
either respond in kind by raising the ante or by demonstrating passivity and inaction. Thus far, the Kremlin has been
careful to skirt potential "red lines" that might trigger an international crisis. Instead, the Kremlin's actions appear calculated to provide a relatively low-cost distraction in response to U.S.
support for Georgia, a strategy designed to rattle the U.S. and entice Chvez, thereby drawing attention away from the Caucasus and other European security issues. But Russia also
appears to view Venezuela as a lucrative weapons market, an energy partner, a potential recipient of domestic security assistance, a possible
location for electronic and intelligence collection, and a platform for expanded influence in Central and South America and the Caribbean. Subsequently, the U.S. now faces a
dilemma: What actions in the past might have been sufficient to trigger a major international crisis today requires prudence
and caution. What Do We Know About Chvez? The current deterioration of relations between the U.S. and Venezuela reveals much about the nature of how Hugo Chvez operates
on the national and international level and why he poses a difficult and long-term challenge to U.S. policymakers. A Dangerous Concentration of Power. For the Venezuelan people, it is a great
misfortune that the nation's fate has been seized by a single individual. While elected by democratic majorities, Chvez has governed in an increasingly undemocratic manner. He is also
choosing to act irresponsibly on the international stage. Chvez harbors an ideological, conspiratorial view of the world that increasingly inclines him to acts of belligerence and paranoia,
manifesting a style of leadership Andres Oppenheimer of The Miami Herald has termed "narcissistic-Leninist." It is safe to say that no other current Latin American leader wields more
executive power and faces fewer institutional and psychological constraints than Chvez. Power Rather Than the People's Interest. The appearance of Russian
bombers and warships belies an essential myth of the Chvez regime: that his primary concern is making life better for Venezuela's
disadvantaged or defending the gains of his social programs. Chvez's turn to Russia-like his previous support for Colombian guerrillas-is unpopular with the
Venezuelan people and underscores a personal ambition to change Venezuela's role from responsible
regional stakeholder to that of an aggressive, roguish player on the international stage. It also once more reflects Chvez's growing penchant
for a diplomacy of threat, surprise, machismo, and brinksmanship. There must be serious concern regarding the direction Chvez intends to pursue and Washington should
view his threats and actions with grave concern. Intimidating the Opposition. By playing the anti-U.S. card, Chvez seeks to flame nationalist fervor in
advance of the November 23 provincial and municipal elections. Following the loss in the constitutional reform referendum last December 2, Chvez fears the appearance of any electoral
setback. Nonetheless, his domestic problems continue to mount. From electrical blackouts to rising crime, to food shortages and mounting inflation, there appears to be growing
disenchantment and disillusionment with the Chvez regime at home. Yet by creating a sense of constant crisis and permanent threat, Chvez hopes that nationalism will prevail over normalcy
and that Venezuelans will overlook the corruption and mismanagement of the regime. A sense of constant threat is also an excellent tool for isolating and attacking the opposition on national
security grounds. Chvez's Security Dilemma. Chvez asserts that the U.S. harbors hostile intentions toward his regime. He argues that given the opportunity, the U.S. will undertake to topple
his regime either indirectly-through coup-plotting and covert operations-or overtly through an invasion. Chvez therefore justifies certain actions as necessary preparations for self-defense:
acquiring advanced armaments, creating militias capable of quelling internal opposition and waging asymmetrical warfare, developing internal intelligence and surveillance bodies, and
establishing cadres of potential combatants loyal not to the nation but to him personally and to the revolutionary regime. By taking steps domestically and internationally that advance these
objectives and by seeking the support of Russia and Iran, Chvez fuels increased opposition inside Venezuela and hostility from the U.S. and other responsible
powers. International polarization is the tiger Chvez rides and dares not dismount. Rewriting the Rules of Hemispheric Security. Chvez's recent support for Russia's use of military force
and actions aimed at dismembering Georgia places in serious doubt the sincerity of Chvez's commitment to the basic cornerstones of peace and
security in the Western Hemisphere. Respect for national sovereignty, non-intervention, and the peaceful settlement of disputes all go out the
window when Chvez aligns with the Russians.
Need to sever Venezuelas relationship with Russia will cause inevitable
confrontation.
Ray Walser, 9-15-2008, is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, The Heritage Foundation, Chvez, Venezuela, and
Russia: A New Cuban Missile Crisis?, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/09/chaacutevez-
venezuela-and-russia-a-new-cuban-missile-crisis
Like his iconic mentor, Fidel Castro, Chvez thrives on mounting tensions and confrontation with the U.S. It is through confrontation that he attains political identity and larger-than-merited
international standing. Like Fidel Castro, Chvez aspires to build and lead an anti-U.S., anti-Western coalition. Unlike Castro, however, Chvez is in possession of
significant petroleum power and has varied sources of international support. There is danger that Chvez, like Castro,
will invite Russia to serve as a guarantor of Venezuela's security and subsequently draw Russia, either
willingly or unwillingly, into additional confrontations with the U.S. At present, Venezuela represents the
single most difficult diplomatic and security challenge facing the U.S. in the immediate future. How the U.S.
chooses to deal with this challenge will say much about the direction the next Administration will take as it shapes its policy toward America's neighbors in the hemisphere.
U.S.-Russia relations resilient
Russia wont break relations with the US
Eugene B. Rumer, senior fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense
University, and Celeste A. Wallander, director of the Russia and Eurasia Program and the Trustee
Fellow at CSIS, Winter 2003, The Washington Quarterly
Given Russia's geopolitical predicament, it is difficult to imagine how a rational, even selfish, assessment of Russian interests
would lead Russia to conclude that it would be best served by undermining the United States. The
fallout from a weaker and diminished U.S. role in global security affairs would carry with it a number of serious challenges to Russian
security interests, ranging from a strong Russian stake in partnership with the United States on geopolitically balancing China to the immediate threat to Russian
security in the event of U.S. abandonment of its security assistance to Central Asia to the prospect of Iran
armed with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles with Moscow well within range. Thus, although Russia apparently has a strong interest in making clear to the
United States that it is not to be taken for granted and that its interests and sensitivities are not to be brushed aside, Russia has no compelling rational
interest in undermining or geopolitically balancing the United States' international position.
No U.S.-Russia war
No U.S. Russia War
Brzezinski 2005 (Zbigniew Brzezinski. (National Security Adviser Under the Carter Administration).
"US Russia: Zbigniew Brzezinski Assesses US Russia Relations." Radio Free America. 11 May 2005.
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/05/b62307e1-832c-4fbc-ab91-ba8fa7a0eb24.html)
There can be no cold war because Russia is in no position to wage either a hot or a cold war. It's a brutal effort to wage war in Chechnya which verges on
genocide; it's at the same time a testimony to the incompetence of the Russian military. Russia's in no position to wage a cold war with America, either. Because Russia is
essentially right now in a very serious social and demographic crisis. So a real cold war is not possible. Some issues are likely to continue being
conflictual. In a broader sense, the American-Russian relationship is probably going to be described in less euphoric
terms than has recently been the case, but the basic reality of a mixed relationship -- partially antagonistic, partially
cooperative -- I think is going to endure. Former 'Sphere Of Influence' RFE/RL: Unlike in the rest of the world, where as you noted the United States is increasingly isolated and
politically unpopular, the former Soviet sphere of influence embraces the United States. Seventy-two percent of Georgians approve of President Bush's visit on [9 April] there.... Under the
circumstances that you outline, and given that this policy is bound to exacerbate tensions with Moscow, what do you think is the U.S. plan in that region, and what do you think it should be?
Brzezinski: The United States is supporting and de facto promoting geopolitical pluralism in the space of the [former] Soviet Union. That is to say, it is supporting the independence of the post-
Soviet states without seeking to turn them into American satellites -- but with the objective of making them viable as independent states. Part of the dilemma that Russia faces is that its
nostalgia for an imperial status creates sustained and extensive hostility with all of its neighbors. It is impossible to mention a single neighbor of Russia with whom Russia has genuinely good
relations. It is impossible to mention a single neighbor of Russia that likes Russia. And that is a problem which only the Russians can correct; it cannot be corrected for them by the Americans
Neg Update
Solvency
Maduro de-rails aid
There is currently corruption going on in Venezuela now, no sign that this will come to
an end.
Washington Post, 6-28-13, The Americas, Venezuela says former governor detained on allegations
of corruption, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/venezuela-says-former-governor-
detained-on-allegations-of-corruption/2013/06/28/5c539396-e002-11e2-8cf3-35c1113cfcc5_story.html
Venezuelas President Nicolas Maduro says a former governor from his ruling party has been detained
on allegations of corruption. Maduro says Guarico states ex-Gov. Luis Gallardo and several former aides are
suspected of embezzlement and misuse of government funds. He made the announcement on state
television Thursday evening, saying the same thing will happen to all those who are involved in strange
things, even if they had been friends. He did not give details about the Gallardo case Officials also recently arrested a high ranking
customs official and the director of the government price-monitoring agency. Gallardo was elected to fill in the remaining
term of Willian Lara, who died in a September 2010 automobile accident. He left office last year and is now 53 years old.
Record corruption in Venezuelan oil companies.
IBT 12 (International Business Times, The International Business Times is an online publication that
strives to produce essential financial news from all the worlds markets through its extended editorial
network and to transmit them instantly to its audience in America and other countries. We have the
unique advantage of working with brilliant and entrepreneurial local individuals allowing our readers to
get a fundamental edge in understanding their own regions and the global economy. Read more:
http://community.nasdaq.com/Profiles/Profile.aspx?username=ibtimes#ixzz2XnlPNOEe)
Venezuela has struggled to take advantage of its bonanza of expanding reserves but a scandal over
embezzled pension funds at state oil company PDVSA has renewed concerns about corruption and
mismanagement.Retired workers from the oil giant have taken to the streets in protest. Their beef: nearly half a billion dollars of pension
fund money was lost after it was invested in what turned out to be a Madoff-style Ponzi scheme run by a US
financial advisor who was closely linked to President Hugo Chavez's government. The fraud case centres on Francisco
Illarramendi, a Connecticut hedge fund manager with joint US-Venezuelan citizenship who used to work as a US-based advisor to PDVSA and the Finance Ministry. Several top
executives at PDVSA have been axed since the scandal, which one former director of the company said
proved Venezuela under Chavez had become a moral cesspool.Pensioners are not the only ones still wondering how such a large chunk
of the firm's 2.5 billion dollars pension fund was invested with Illarramendi in the first place. The question cuts to the heart of the challenges
facing PDVSA, one of Latin America's big three oil companies alongside Pemex of Mexico and Brazil's Petrobras. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries issued a
report last month showing Venezuela surpassed Saudi Arabia as the largest holder of crude oil reserves in 2010. PDVSA is ranked by Petroleum Intelligence Weekly as the world's fourth
largest oil company thanks to its reserves, production, refining and sales capacity, and it has been transformed in recent years into the piggy-bank of Chavez's 21st Century Socialism. The
timing of the scandal is not good for Chavez: the charismatic, 57-year-old former coup leader underwent cancer surgery in Cuba in June and is fighting to recover his health to run for re-
election next year. He needs every cent possible from PDVSA for the social projects that fuel his popularity. The company does a lot more than pump Venezuela's vast oil reserves.
Tapped constantly to replenish government coffers PDVSA finances projects ranging from health and
education to arts and Formula One motor racing. From painting homes to funding medical clinics staffed
by Cuban doctors, the restoration of a Caracas shopping boulevard and even a victorious team at the Rio
carnival, there's little that PDVSA doesn't do.US investigators say Illarramendi, the majority owner of the Michael Kenwood Group LLC hedge
fund, ran the Ponzi scheme from 2006 until February of this year, using deposits from new investors to repay
old ones. He pleaded guilty in March to multiple counts of wire fraud, securities and investment advisor
fraud, as well as conspiracy to obstruct justice and defraud the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
He could face up to 70 years in prison.

Corruption now
There are issues of corruption in the Venezuela oil company now - it is personally
benefitting Maduro.
Kejal Vyas, 4-13-2013, writer for the Wall Street Journal, Venezuela to Take Legal Action Against
Critics Alleging PdVSA Corruption - Oil Minister, The Wall Street Journal,
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130410-714052.html?mod=WSJ_Energy_middleHeadlines
Venezuela's government will take legal action against critics who have accused state officials and
national oil company Petroleos de Venezuela of corruption, Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez said Wednesday. Mr. Ramirez told reporters
that authorities would wait until after this Sunday's presidential election before filing complaints with the attorney general's office against "all of the spokesmen that are going about
discrediting our company, our personnel and workers." He said officials would be submitting at least four complaints to the courts but didn't specify what kind of actions would be taken, nor
who exactly they were looking to penalize. The minister's warning comes as the government's opposition accuses leaders
at PdVSA, as the energy company is called, of cronyism and personally benefiting from Venezuela's oil income. It is
among the top campaign issues taken up by Henrique Capriles, the opposition presidential candidate
who has referred to Mr. Ramirez as "Venezuela's richest man" and has said the minister should be
worried about his job if there is a change in government. In response to charges from critics, Mr.
Ramirez said, "If they can't prove it, they have to assume the legal consequences." Acting President Nicolas Maduro, the
hand-picked successor of late populist leader Hugo Chavez, holds a double-digit lead over Mr. Capriles in most polls. In campaign speeches over the last week, Mr. Maduro has,
much like his predecessor, frequently claimed that unnamed agents working for the opposition have
been looking to sabotage the economy and destabilize the ruling socialist party. Mr. Ramirez said
Wednesday that all of PdVSA's facilities are "on high alert" against any potential acts of sabotage. "Petroleos
de Venezuela is a fundamental institution for stability," the minister said of the top revenue generator for the country, where oil accounts for 95% of exports.
Economic aid being diverted now specific to Meduro.
Padgett 13 (Tim Padgett, http://world.time.com/2013/05/28/venezuelas-latest-scandal-shows-signs-
the-regime-chavez-built-is-falling-apart/)
Venezuelan President Nicols Maduro seems on a constant quest to deflect attention from his countrys
economic mess, its violent-crime crisis and the fact that he only narrowly won last months special election
to succeed his demigod, Hugo Chvez, who died in March. As part of that effort, Maduro last week called for the creation of a workers
militia to defend the sovereignty of the homeland. But while hes girding for imperialist invasions, a
new scandal suggests the biggest threat to Maduros government lies within the socialist, anti-U.S.
Bolivarian revolution that Chvez left him to lead. Theyre calling it Silva-gate, after demagogue TV talk-show host Mario Silva. Hes Venezuelas
left-wing version of right-wing U.S. radio bully Rush Limbaugh. Early last week, the political opposition released what it said was a recording of Silva briefing a Cuban intelligence agent at a
Caracas military base in late April. In it, Silva accuses Maduros rivals inside his United Socialist Party (PSUV) not only of corruption
but also of scheming to oust him in a military coup. For good measure, Silva raises sexist concerns that Maduros
wife, Attorney General Cilia Flores, is manipulating him. The recording lays bare the PSUV discord that began during Chvezs long cancer illness and has gotten louder
since Maduros surprisingly lame April 14 victory. (He defeated centrist candidate Henrique Capriles by 1.5 percentage points. Chvez beat Capriles last year by 11 points.) In fact, according to
transcripts of the recording published in the Venezuelan media, Silva says Maduro should take former Cuban dictator Fidel Castros advice and get rid of these bourgeois elections
because [voters] make mistakes [and] here, with elections the way they are, we could be struck down. They could knock the revolution down. Its not surprising to hear that from Silva, a
radical Marxist who has not denied that its his voice on the tape. But its striking how he confirms what pundits have long speculated: First, that Cuba exercises
inordinate influence in Venezuela. And more important, that the PSUV, or the Venezuelan socialist movement known as chavismo, which has ruled for 14
years, is split between a more ideological faction led by Maduro, whom Chvez anointed as his successor, and a more
pragmatic one headed by National Assembly president Diosdado Cabello, who has strong ties to business and the military and has been at least
indirectly critical of Maduros performance. The fierce chavista infighting and intrigues that *Silva+ so explicitly lays out all sound plausible, says Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-
American Dialogue in Washington, D.C. With Chvez gone, theres no comparable figure who can hold it together. Throughout his conversation with the Cuban agent, Silva blasts
Cabellos penchant for power grabs and the lucrative spoils they yield in Venezuela, which possesses the worlds largest oil reserves. He raises concerns about Cabello
diverting funds from various agencies handling hard currency and tax revenue, among other acts of
malfeasance and at one point he even calls high-level corruption inside the Venezuelan government
a sea of shit, a stunning admission from the spokesman of a revolution that came to power
condemning Venezuelas venal oligarchy. More alarming are Silvas warnings that Cabello is turning the
Venezuelan military against Maduro, and that a coup may already be in the planning stages. Cabellos cabal,
Silva tells the Cuban agent, wants to take over the armed forces and force Maduro to act the way they want or
theyll stage a coup dtat. Says Shifter: We forget that the political polarization you see among Venezuelans in general is reproduced in all of its institutions, including
the military. Cabello has refused to discuss the allegations publicly. But many Venezuelan analysts suggest that the Cuban government which is depending on Maduro to
continue Chvezs policy of sending the communist island more than 100,000 barrels of cut-rate oil a day may have intentionally leaked the recording
in order to weaken Cabello, even if it meant embarrassing Maduro too.
China advantage
No China-Taiwan war
No China/Taiwan warBoth sides will work to avoid war
Jisi 2005 (Wang Jisi, Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, China's Serch for
Stability With America. Foreign Affairs. Sep/Oct 2005.
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84504/wang-jisi/china-s-search-for-stability-with-
america.html)
Meanwhile, at a time when political relations between China and the United States are basically stable and economic and trade links are expanding, Taiwan remains a major source of unease.
War between China and the United States over Taiwan would be a nightmare, and both sides will try
hard to avoid it. Despite their differences, there is no reason the two sides should have to resort to force to resolve the
matter. Yet some people in Taiwan, looking out for their own interests and supported by outsiders -- notably parts of the U.S. defense establishment and certain members of the U.S. Congress
-- continue stubbornly to push for independence, ignoring the will of most Taiwanese. It is a mistake for Americans to support such separatists. If a clash occurs, these parties will be
responsible.China views the status of Taiwan as an internal matter. But only by coordinating its U.S. policy with its policy toward Taiwan can Beijing curb the separatist forces on the island.
Despite U.S. displeasure at China's passage of an antisecession law in March 2005, policymakers in Washington have reiterated their
opposition to Taiwan's independence and viewed favorably the spring 2005 visits by Taiwanese
opposition leaders to the mainland, which eased cross-strait relations. Nonetheless, Washington has now asked Beijing to talk
directly to Taipei's ruling party and its leader, Chen Shui-bian. To improve matters, Chinese and U.S. government agencies and their foreign policy think tanks should launch a sustained and
thorough dialogue on the issue and explore ways to prevent separatist forces from making a rash move, dragging both countries toward a confrontation neither wants.
Cross Strait Interdependence
Yang 2005 (Philip Yang, phD. National taiwan University, Rise of China and the Cross-Strait Relations.
Paper Presented at the 5th Europe Northeast Asia Forum. 2005. http://www.swp-
berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=2705)
The current economic trend across the Taiwan Strait fits into the neo-mercantalist viewpoints about globalization, which cliam that interdependence has not only altered the way people
related with each other but eventually, becomes an arena for power struggle among states. China believes that the increasing cross-strait economic and social integration has become a
unification enhancing mechanism, rather than a limit on its cross-strait policy. However, the interdependence argument cuts both ways. Cross-strait trade and
investments are as much an advantage to Taiwan as a disadvantage. The huge Taiwanese investment in
China means also extremely high economic costs for the Mainland should the latter opt for conflict. Taiwanese scholars
argue that the cross-strait interdependence makes Taiwan overy dependent on the mainland as such a hostage to Beijing's manipulation. It is perhaps right that economic interdependence
constrains China less than Taiwan due to the much larger economic scale of the former. Nevertheless, increasing cross-strait economic and social
interdependence and integration may develop to be a restraining factor on provocative talks or policies
for the both sides. As the economic and social interactions grow, the costs of either Beijing's resorting to military means for unification or Taipei's resurgence of a reckless de
jure independence would become increasingly prohibitive.

Latin America relations add-on
Relations decline inevitable
Obamas inaction and more importantly, the media, is preventing normalization of
Latin American relations
Lahmann 5/30 (Catalina. Writer for TRNS. The Talk Radio News Service is the only information
network dedicated to serving the talk radio community. TRNS maintains a Washington office that
includes White House, Capitol Hill and Pentagon staffed bureaus, and a New York office with a United
Nations staffed bureau. Obama Has Yet To Improve U.S.-Latin America Relations 5/30/13
http://www.talkradionews.com/us/2013/05/30/officials-obama-has-yet-to-improve-u-s-latin-america-
relations.html#.UdGegPk3tAE)EJ
Latin America, particularly South America, has experienced unprecedented political change in the past 15 years said
officials who discussed the issue during a briefing held by the Center for Economic Policy and Research. The briefing analyzed how the Obama administration has responded to the regions
leftward shifting of political dynamics. In the past, during the Bush administration, efforts were made to isolate and
suppress left-leaning political movements in Latin America, said the officials. When President George W. Bush attended the Summit of the
Americas in Argentina, his lecture was received with protests against his administrations polices. When President Barak Obama attended the Summit in Columbia, he spoke
about the need for equal partnerships and a new chapter of engagement with the countries that make up Latin America.
Leaders such as President Hugo Chavez had a new sense of hope instilled after President Obamas remarks, said CEPR Co-Director Mark Weisbrot. When Latin Americas
left presidents watched the campaign of Barack Obama for president in 2008, they thought that they
might finally see a U.S. president who would change Washingtons foreign policy in the region, said Weisbrot.
However, panelists claimed that up to this point in time, little has been done to improve U.S.-Latin America relations. The
Obama administration, like that of President Bush, does not accept that the region has changed, Weisbrot stated. That goal is to get
rid of all of the left-of-center governments, partly because they tend to be more independent from Washington. Panelists offered recommendations for improving U.S. relations with Latin
America. Fellowship of Reconciliation Task Force on Latin America and the Caribbean Co-director John Lindsay-Poland advised Obama to continue moving away from the war on drugs by
embracing regulation rather than prohibition. He also advised Obama against using the military to aid domestic law enforcement. Lindsay-Poland also suggested that the U.S. should stop the
flow of assault weapons, other firearms, and ammunition across the U.S.-Mexico border. Weisbrot added that Obama should focus less on pleasing the
American media since it has a tendency to demonize Latin America. It must be remembered that the
editorials in the newspapers have much more influence, even for members of Congress and other policy
makers, than the news articles, and these are mostly an obstacle to improved relations with Latin
America, Weisbrot said. Despite the differences between the governments of Latin America and the U.S., the experts who spoke today all expressed belief that there is still time for
the Obama administration to forge a better relationship with its southern neighbors.
U.S.-Venezuela wont cooperate
Relations between the US and Venezuela are still terrible 5 Key warrants
Gupta 5/2 (Girish. a British freelance journalist based in Caracas, Venezuela. Global Post. May 2 2013.
5 signs Venezuela-US relations are still rocky after Chavez
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/venezuela/130501/signs-venezuela-us-
washington-rocky-relations)EJ
CARACAS, Venezuela Washington remains the only major government that has not yet recognized the results of
Venezuelas Apr. 14 vote, which election officials here said showed a razor-thin win by Nicolas Maduro. For Maduro, it seems, theres no love lost. Take your
eyes off Venezuela, [US Secretary of State] John Kerry, he said on state television. We dont care about your
recognition. His mentor Hugo Chavez was famous for hours-long televised verbal thrashings against the
US imperialists, even as the superpower became chief buyer of Venezuelas state-owned oil. Chavez's vitriol climaxed before the United
Nations in New York when, a day after a speech by then-President George W. Bush, he said: The devil came here
yesterday. It smells of sulfur still." Now, with Maduro in charge, many are watching for the same fiery
language. What the world is seeing may be somewhat confusing: Venezuelas government has locked up and kicked out alleged American
spies on the one hand, and offered conciliatory messages to Washington on the other. After the country's disputed election, officials agreed to a partial vote recount one minute, but
lawmakers got in fistfights with the opposition the next. Perhaps what were seeing is a nuanced style that Maduro, a 50-year-old former foreign minister, will employ to carry on the late
Comandantes socialist movement. Whatever it is, there are signs that Washington and Caracas' relations are in for a
rocky road. Here are a few of them. 1. The expulsion: Just hours before Maduro solemnly announced Chavezs death, the
government expelled two US diplomats, accusing them of attempting to destabilize the country. Here he is (in
Spanish) making the announcement. Less than a week later, Washington expelled two Venezuelan diplomats in a tit-for-tat move. The countries have not had
ambassadorial-level links since 2010. 2. The detention: Just last week, authorities detained 35-year-old American
filmmaker Tim Tracy, accused of having training as an intelligence agent, according to Interior Minister Miguel Rodriguez, and
fomenting the post-election violence. "They don't have CIA in custody. They don't have a journalist in
custody. They have a kid with a camera," Aengus James, a friend and associate of Tracy's in Hollywood, Calif., told TheAssociated Press. It is not the first
time a US citizen has been arrested in Venezuela under dubious circumstances. 3. The poison: Upon Chavezs death in March, Maduro said he would set up a
scientific commission to investigate the cancer that ultimately killed Chavez. He said historical
enemies might be culprits in some kind of cancer plot, which many interpreted to mean Washington.
Chavez himself had blamed the US government for spreading cancer, after fellow leftist leader, Argentine President Cristina
Fernandez, revealed that she was also suffering from the illness. Its very difficult to explain, even with the law of probabilities, what
has been happening to some of us in Latin America, Chavez said in December 2011. Would it be so strange that
theyve invented technology to spread cancer and we wont know about it for 50 years? Fidel *Castro, of Cuba+
always told me, added Chavez, Chavez be careful! These people have developed technology. You are very careless. Be careful what you eat, what they give you to eat a little needle and
they inject you with I dont know what. On Chavezs cancer plot, the BBCs More or Less did the math and the law of probabilities was not on Chavezs side. 4. The coup: Chavez
loyalists retain a clear memory of the 2002 attempted coup that ousted Chavez for 48 hours. He
repeatedly blamed Washington for backing the revolt. He was outraged, and his anti-American rhetoric
grew venomous, exacerbated by the Bush administrations post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Documents released two years after the coup show that the United States at
least had knowledge of the plot before it took place. But many suspect deeper involvement. In an interview with Colombian newspaper El Tiempo in 2009, former US President Jimmy Carter
said: I think there is no doubt that in 2002 the US had at the very least full knowledge about the coup, and could even have been directly involved. A recent US diplomatic cable released by
WikiLeaks shows that the United States, in the years following the coup at least, aimed to destabilize the Chavez regime. It
says: In August of 2004, Ambassador outlined the country team's 5-point strategy to guide embassy
activities in Venezuela for the period 2004-2006 (specifically, from the referendum to the 2006 presidential elections). The strategy's focus
is: 1) Strengthening Democratic Institutions, 2) Penetrating Chavez' Political Base, 3) Dividing Chavismo, 4) Protecting Vital US business, and 5) Isolating Chavez
internationally. 5. Hablar English: Despite understanding English, Venezuelan opposition leader Henrique
Capriles Radonski who is challenging his election defeat to Maduro refuses to speak the language
on camera. Some analysts suspect thats because hes fearful it would remind Venezuelans of the
oppositions close ties to Washington.
Politics
Plan unpopular
Supporting Maduro is massively politically unpopular powerful interest groups.
Anita Waters, 4-19-2013, Peoples World, U.S. taxes support Venezuelan right-wing opposition,
http://peoplesworld.org/u-s-taxes-support-venezuelan-right-wing-opposition/
Our tax dollars, funneled through the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Defense, and nominally "non-
partisan" organizations like the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED), have trained, supported and equipped members of the Venezuelan opposition, including
Henrique Capriles, for at least a dozen years. Take, for example, the National Endowment for Democracy, a "nonpartisan" foundation that spends 1.5 million tax dollars on
projects with virtuous and wholesome goals like: "creation of a new generation of political leaders with a deeper understanding of democratic values" and "promote dialogue among
Venezuelan youth on the importance of freedom of expression." One can imagine how a deeper understanding of democratic values is conveyed with pro-U.S. messages of allegiance toward
the United States, and "freedom of expression" that doesn't include expressing support for Hugo Chavez. Just how these programs actually work
on the ground can be gleaned from other reports. Almost $400,000 of the NED's budget went through the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), a
nonprofit affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which, in turn, invested in its "partner," (as local organizations are referred to in
contemporary development-aid-speak), the Center for Dissemination of Economic Knowledge (CEDICE), a Venezuelan "free-market think tank" which claims alliances
with ultra-conservative organizations like the Cato Institute and the Heritage Foundation and sponsors events with
titles like "The Antidote to XXI Century Socialism - Overthrow is Constitutional." CEDICE's mission statement states clearly and openly its
opposition to the government and programs of Hugo Chvez. In the pages of Forbes magazine, CEDICE's vice president, Alejandro Chafuen,
recommends allying with his organization and doing business with its affiliated companies as something that U.S. firms can do to undermine the programs begun by Hugo Chvez. Chafuen also
remarks that his organization has had ties with Henrique Capriles since 1999. The International Republican Institute is chaired by Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., and purports to "advance freedom
and democracy worldwide." It has been at work in Venezuela since 1994, seeking "to enhance healthy competition in Venezuelan politics" with "building assistance, technical training and
organizational assistance to political parties." Since 2009, according to its website, it has begun a program at the local level across Venezuelan municipalities, "encouraging citizen participation
in the decision-making process." The goals of the donor agencies, USAID and other government entities, have been so clearly anti-Chvez for so long that we can be sure that only certain forms
of citizen participation are encouraged. Engagement on the municipal level is another strategy to gain audiences for their
messages of discontent with Chvez and now, Maduro. The virtuous mission statements promulgated by these organizations serve to conceal the U.S.
connection with the decidedly anti-democratic outcomes that their programs cause. U.S.-affiliated agencies use extreme caution and circumspection when describing their own actions. When
chaos or violence breaks out under their influence, American diplomats can disavow any connection and claim that they are completely innocent of any wrong-doing. In 2002, when a coup
attempt against Hugo Chavez was launched by the "new generation of leaders" that U.S. tax dollars helped to train, the U.S. proclaimed that none of its agencies had broken any U.S. law. Right
now, the Venezuelan opposition doesn't seem to know that the first characteristic of a democratic process is rule by the people. Instead, the U.S. hand-picked presidential candidate Henrique
Capriles refuses to concede that he lost the election. How deep can his understanding of democratic values be if he cannot accept defeat at the polls?
Misc. Aff Updates
Politics
Plan is popular
Lobby Groups Have Pushed for Trade with Dictatorships.
Ken Silverstein (Writer for Mother Jones News) So You Want To Trade With a Dictator June 1998
Newly leaked memos show Anne Wexler's powerhouse lobby shop, The Wexler Group, working to kill human rights
sanctions. Americans may be fickle when it comes to politics, but as politicians and moviemakers know full well, there's one reliable "gimme": We hate dictators. Tyrants, autocrats,
despotswe just don't like them. So imagine how tough it would be to build a public campaign promoting trade with countries such as Iran, Burma, or Nigeria, whose dictatorial regimes have
horrible human rights records. That's the challenge for a coalition of the nation's biggest corporate exporters, including aerospace titan Boeing;
construction equipment giant Caterpillar; the country's biggest oil companies, including Unocal, Chevron, Mobil, and Texaco; and other
Fortune 500 firms such as IBM and Motorola. All have money to make overseas, and economic sanctions are just
another obstacle. Now the coalition, led by its front group, USA*Engage, will have its two big shots at success. For starters, it plans to file a lawsuit
to overturn the "selective purchasing" laws that have sprung up in 18 different cities across the U.S.
banning government contract work from being awarded to companies that trade with tyrannical
regimes. More impressively, they have already managed to have a bill introduced in Congresswhich
appears to have been drafted by their own lobbyiststhat would severely restrict the use of sanctions,
and would pave the way for greater trade with outlaw nations. How will they convince legislators, or the voting public, that trading with
dictators is good? Their strategy is detailed in a series of internal memos obtained by Mother Jones that describe how to spin the most morally questionable of campaignswith help along the
way from religious leaders and institutions such as the Rev. Billy Graham and the Catholic Church.
Economic Engagement with Latin America Popular
Doug Palmer (Writer for Reuters) Boehner urges deeper US engagement in Latin America May 8,
2012
The U.S. Congress' top Republican on Tuesday called for deeper U.S economic engagement with Latin
America, but also expressed concern over Iranian influence in the region and the "alarming willingness" of some governments to abandon international norms. "In both Colombia and
Mexico, and the entire hemisphere, the U.S. must be clear that we will not disengage in the fight for free
markets and free, secure people," U.S. House of Representatives Speaker John Boehner said in remarks prepared for delivery at the U.S. State Department. "We
must be clear that we will be there, with our friends and partners in the region, committed to fighting and winning the war for a free,
stable, and prosperous hemisphere," Boehner said, speaking to the Council of Americas, an organization representing companies that do business in the region.
Boehner is due on Tuesday to receive an award from the group for his work last year on winning congressional approval of free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama and South Korea.
The pacts were negotiated during the Republican administration of former President George W. Bush, but President Barack Obama, a Democrat, did not submit the agreements to Congress
until late 2011, after negotiating changes to make them more palatable to Democrats and securing a commitment for renewal of a worker retraining program known as trade adjustment
assistance. "When the Colombia Free Trade Agreement enters into force (on May 15), it will be an important moment for the prosperity of our hemisphere. It is equally important that the
Panama Free Trade Agreement be fully implemented in the months ahead," Boehner said, referring to the Obama administration's ongoing work with Panama to implement that agreement.
Boehner said it was important the United States "keep the momentum going" by negotiating new agreements to open markets to American exports, and said he was disappointed Obama has
not sought legislation known as "Trade Promotion Authority" which would help the White House do that. Meanwhile, Boehner called Iran's attempt to gain influence in the region a "major
threat" to democracy and prosperity. Iranian President Mahmoud Admadinejad's visit to Venezuela and Cuba "underscored the designs Iran has for expanding its influence in Latin America,
and its eagerness to forge bonds with governments in the Western Hemisphere that have demonstrated a lesser interest in freedom and democracy," Boehner said. In an apparent reference
to Argentina's expropriation of Spanish oil giant Repsol's subsidiary YPF and the billions in unpaid debt obligations the country still owes foreign investors, Boehner said the United States "must
also be clear about what we expect from all of our neighbors." "We will insist that every nation honor the rule of law, meet its obligations, and respect international norms. That means
paying debts to bondholders; honoring legal commitments and the decisions made by international arbiters; and respecting private property," Boehner said. "Some governments in the
region have demonstrated an alarming willingness to drift away from such norms when it suits their objectives. When this occurs, it's harmful not only to the people of those countries, but to
the potential of all of the Americas. And it cannot be excused."
Obama wont push plan
Obama against Involvement in Venezuela.
Associated Press Obama Says The U.S. Will Not Get Tangled In Venezuela's Politics May 5, 2013
President Barack Obama said the U.S. has not and will not get tangled up in Venezuela's political conflict. Commenting
in an interview with Spanish-language network Telemundo that's set to air Sunday, Obama said the U.S. hasn't tried "in any way" to interfere with the recent election of Nicolas Maduro as
Venezuela's president. On Saturday Venezuela's government accused Washington and the Obama administration of
being behind violence that has followed its recent presidential election. A foreign ministry statement
said that Obama's "fallacious, intemperate and interventionist declaration" will lead toward
deteriorating relations between the countries and "confirms to the world the policy of aggression his
government maintains against our country." The statement read by Foreign Minister Elias Jaua on state television referred to comments the U.S. president
made to Spanish-language television network Univision during his trip to Mexico and Costa Rica. In the interview that aired Friday, Obama wouldn't say if the United States recognizes Nicolas
Maduro as Venezuela's new president following elections that have been disputed by the opposition. When asked, he replied that it's up to the people of Venezuela to choose their leaders in
legitimate elections. He also said that reports indicate that basic principles of human rights, democracy, press freedom
and freedom of assembly were not observed in Venezuela following the election. "Venezuela rejects with all the force of its
Bolivarian dignity the declaration by United States President Barack Obama which again attacks the legitimate Venezuelan government," the foreign ministry statement said. Maduro, the
hand-picked successor to late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, narrowly won April 14 presidential elections. But opposition leader Henrique Capriles contends the election was stolen from
him and has challenged the result. Tensions between supporters on both sides remain high, with tens of thousands of Venezuelans protesting in the streets. Lawmakers even brawled on the
floor of the National Assembly last week. In another interview with Spanish-language network Telemundo that's set to air on Sunday, Obama described as "ridiculous" the idea that an
American filmmaker detained by Venezuela's government is a spy. Thirty-five-year-old Timothy Tracy, of West Hollywood, California, was formally charged last week with crimes including
conspiracy, association for criminal purposes and use of a false document. Obama says Tracy's case will be handled like every other in which a U.S. citizen gets into a "legal tangle" while
abroad. The president also said the U.S. hasn't tried "in any way" to interfere with Venezuela's recent elections.