Running head: NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 1

Conflict Analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh War

David S. Spencer
Thomas Edison State College
Author Note
This is the Final Project for the May 2014 term of POS-420-OL, Conflict in International
Relations. This project adapts the APA writing style to substitute the use of in-line citation for
endnotes. This allows for the reference of multiple sources and unclutters the body of the text.
The references section remains at the end of the project in standard APA style.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 2
Conflict Analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh War
Beginning in a genesis of divisive imperial aggression, the Nagorno-Karabakh War
emerged as a civil struggle for minority protection and self-determination that over years and
decades deteriorated into a brutal war rife with ethnic cleansing and state terror. This paper
examines the conflict with a focus on the period of hostilities between 1988 and 1994. This
paper focuses on Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as the primary
actors in this conflict and examines them at the state level of analysis. From the actions of
Imperial Russia, Ottoman Turks, Imperial British, Soviets, Armenians, and Azeri it is clear that
the primary cause of the conflict is nationalism.
Origins of the Conflict
The conflict that begat the Nagorno-Karabakh War is a product of the modern era.
Russian and Ottoman imperial interests and mismanagement set the stage for Soviet ethnic
delineations that fixed Armenians and Azerbaijanis on an inevitable course towards conflict.
In the beginning of the 19th Century, Nagorno-Karabakh and the entire Caucasus Region
was under the control of the Russian Empire. As Russian control solidified in the early 19
th

Century, there were ethnic migrations of Muslim Azerbaijanis into Persia as Christian Armenians
moved north into the Russian South Caucasus
1
. Throughout this period the Karabakh was
ethnically Armenian, but always administratively united with the Turko-Islamic population
known then as Tartars, who are today Azerbaijanis
2
. Russian hegemony generally maintained
stability and order in the region until the end of Czarist Russian at the conclusion of World War
One. The only exception to this was internal strife encouraged by the Russian regional
authorities between the Tartars and the Armenians. This led to violence in 1905 and 1906, and
resulted in the establishment of local Armenian self-defense forces in Karabakh
3
.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 3
Transcaucasian Union Fails
With the fall of the Russian Monarchy in 1917, the Russian Provisional Government
created the Special Transcaucasian Committee to govern the entire Caucasian Region including
Nagorno-Karabakh
4
. After the Bolshevik overthrow of the Russian Provisional Government, the
Transcaucasian Committee formed a government independent from the new Russian Bolshevik
regime under the control of the Transcaucasian Commissariat, known as the Sejm. By early
1918 the Sejm officially declared independence from Russia and formed the Transcaucasian
Democratic Federative Republic; however, the union collapsed in May 1918 as ethnic tensions
resurfaced with the Ottoman invasion of Transcaucasia
5
. The area divided into three ethnic
nation-states: Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
The local leaders and people of Karabakh rejected Ottoman-backed Azerbaijani
sovereignty over the area through the summer of 1918; however the Karabakh assembly relented
to the Turks in October and allowed Azerbaijanis and 5000 Turkish troops into the ethnically
Armenian region under the promise of stability and law. The arriving Turkish troops did not
respect the terms of their admission and began arresting local leaders and intellectuals and
erecting gallows in Shusha just days before the Ottoman defeat in World War One
6
.
While the Ottomans controlled Shusha and major towns in Karabakh, they did not control
the highlands. Karabakh highlanders appealed to Armenian partisans for military assistance
against the Ottomans and Azerbaijanis and by mid-November the Armenians controlled the
highlands and were prepared to take Shusha
7
. But the Armenians did not take the town and
instead stopped all military operations at the behest of the commander of Allied forces in
Transcaucasia as the Peace Conference of Paris started. Because the Armenian leaders trusted
the Allies to resolve their conflict with the Turks and Azerbaijanis at the peace conference, they
NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 4
forfeited the opportunity to achieve a decisive victory that would have eliminated the political
separation of Karabakh from the rest of the Armenian nation.
After the war the Allies favored the Azerbaijani claims and allowed them to install local
leaders with pan-Turkish views, which sought initially to unify Anatolian Turkey and eastern
Transcaucasia across an extinct Armenia"
8
. During this time the democratic and ethnically
Armenian Assembly of Karabakh repeatedly rejected British favored Azerbaijani military
control. To counter this civil resistance, Azerbaijan began a violent repression of Armenians in
Karabakh including the murder of 600 ethnic Armenians in and around the village of
Khaibalikend in early June 1919
9
.
Armenian-Azerbaijani War and Early Soviet Actions
The withdrawal of the British from the Caucasus in the late summer of 1919 set the stage
for the resumption of the hostilities forestalled by the Paris Peace Conference. By early 1920,
both sides in the conflict had accumulated significant stocks of arms. The Armenians of
Karabakh attempted to preempt an Azerbaijani attack with an uprising. This uprising was
doomed from the start due to mismanagement and was ultimately crushed when the Azerbaijanis
slaughtered the Armenian population of Shusha on 4 April 1920
10
.
The Bolshevik invasion of Baku in late April 1920 further complicated the situation. The
expansionist Bolsheviks saw an ideological ally in Azerbaijani Pan-Turkism, as their views could
help unite the Caucasian and Anatolian Turks under Bolshevik socialism
11
. In August 1920, the
independent Armenian government in Yerevan yielded to the Bolshevik occupation of Karabakh
and other disputed territories. A month later, independent Armenia collapsed under an
Azerbaijani invasion. This lead to the sovietization of Armenia that began in earnest with the
arrival of the 11
th
Red Army in Yerevan in December 1920
12
.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 5
Soviet hegemony over Transcaucasia ended the hostilities of the Armenian-Azerbaijani
War. It also largely removed the territorial conflict from local leaders and concentrated decision-
making in the Soviet high command. The Soviets kept upper, Nagorno, and lower Karabakh in
Azerbaijan as Stalin led the creation of ethnic soviet states in the early 1920s
13
. As part of the
creation of ethnic soviet states, the Soviets forcibly migrated populations to the state intended for
their ethnicity
14
. During this program of ethnic division the Soviets had two competing interests
in Karabakh to consider. The first was the ethnic divisions and the second was maintaining the
recently drawn Caucasian borders; to that end, the Soviets organized the Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) for the Armenian dominated area drawn into Azerbaijan
15
.
Annexation of the NKAO was a recurring Armenian demand during the Soviet era but
overwhelming central Soviet authority prevented action on the issue throughout most of the
Soviet era
16
.
Soviet Decline and Reignition of the Conflict
By the late 1980s the ability of the central Soviet authority to subdue regional and ethnic
tensions began to fail throughout the Russian domain. In Transcaucasia one manifestation of this
decline was the renewal of demands for the incorporation of Nagorno-Karabakh into the
Armenia. This began with Armenian demonstrations in the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh,
Stepanakert. The NKAO Soviet appealed to the USSR Supreme Soviet for incorporation of
Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenia. The swelling support for integration of Nagorno-Karabakh
spread into Armenia and sparked violent protests. These protests in Nagorno-Karabakh and
Armenia led to the intervention of Soviet troops in Stepanakert and the violent deportations of
hundreds of thousands of Armenians from Azerbaijan and the over one hundred thousand Azeris
fleeing mob and state violence in Armenia to Azerbaijan
17
.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 6
After debating the issue, the USSR government declined the request of the NKAO Soviet
and Armenia, and thus affirmed Azerbaijani claim to Nagorno-Karabakh. This decision did not
settle the issue, and instead led to further violence in Stepanakert. Two months after the
Supreme Soviet decision violent clashes between Armenians and Azeri in Stepanakert led to the
nearly complete displacement of the Azeri minority from city. The USSR responded in January
of 1989 by placing Nagorno-Karabakh under Moscows direct administration backed up by
USSR Interior Ministry troops
18
; however, these measures did not quell the violence that was
quickly turning into a war.
Hostilities
The hostilities of the Nagorno-Karabakh War encompassed the full spectrum of low
intensity and conventional combat. Hostilities that started out as violent protests, became raids,
became organized barbarisms, became full-scale conventional war, and two decades after the
armistice continues as low intensity conflict to this day.
Azerbaijani Unrest
Azeris saw Moscows direct administration of the NKAO as dominative and an affront to
local Azerbaijani authority
19
. This stoked the flames of Azerbaijani nationalism and bolstered
the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF). The APF declared a boycott of Armenia and Nagorno-
Karabakh in August 1989 and was instrumental in the organization of a railroad blockade against
the Armenians
20
. While the USSR restored Azerbaijani administration of Nagorno-Karabakh to
Azerbaijan in November 1989, the Soviets saw the APF as a direct threat to their interests,
regional stability, and the Baku and low-land Armenian population.
In January 1990 Soviet Troops used brutal force while storming Baku with the stated
intent of protecting Armenians, but with the more likely unstated objective of countering the
NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 7
APF. The Russian incursion did little to protect Armenians in Azerbaijan and reprisals from both
sides continued through 1990 and 1991
21
.
Pogroms and Operation Ring
Atrocities began at the beginning of the conflict in 1988, but increased significantly in
their brutality and occurrence in 1990 and 1991. The atrocities were described as pogroms
22
.
Pogroms are violent riots targeting an ethnic group with lethal intent
23
. Armenians charged that
the first pogrom of the conflict was in Sumgait, an industrial town north of Baku, in 1988
24
. The
pogrom mob raids were committed by both sides, largely with the intent of ethnically-cleansing
territories of minority Armenian or Azeri populations. Between 1988 and 1994 it is likely that
thousands of civilians on both sides died as a result of the pogroms
25
.
Azerbaijani and Soviet troops also conducted systematic ethnic cleansing in the Spring
and Summer of 1991 in Operation Ring. The operation consisted of using violent force to
conduct passport and arms inspections in Armenian villages in Nagorno-Karabakh. This
operation resulted in the depopulation through deportation of 22 to 24 Armenian villages in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Operation Ring was significant in the conflict as it demonstrated to the
Armenians a systematic violation of human rights by Azerbaijan against the Armenians of
Nagorno-Karabakh
26
.
USSR Disintegration and Declarations of Independence
The USSR disintegrated in the autumn of 1991
27
. Azerbaijan declared independence on
30 August 1991, while Armenia followed suit on 23 September. During this time clashes
between Azerbaijani forces and Armenians became more frequent in Nagorno-Karabakh as the
Armenians fought to reclaim villages lost during Operation Ring
28
.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 8
USSR troops in the region pulled out in the late fall of 1991, removing the last
impediments to direct military engagement between the Armenian and Azerbaijani forces.
Azerbaijan abolished the NKAO in November 1991 with the intent of fully integrating the
Nagorno-Karabakh into the newly independent Azeri state; however, in December the Armenian
government in Stepanakert declared independence and had formed the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic by January 1992
29
.
Full-scale Combat Operations
Full-scale combat operations commenced in the beginning of 1992 with the heavy
Azerbaijani artillery shelling of Stepanakert. Through the Spring the Armenian forces
consisting of fighters from Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, possibly rough Russian Army units,
and mercenaries
30
made significant gains including securing highway access from the
contested region into Armenia and taking the strategic town of Shusha. By May, Armenian
forces controlled the entire mountainous region of the Karabakh
31
.
Atrocities and gross human rights violations increased with the escalation of the conflict.
Both sides frequently shelled their opponents cities and villages and pogroms continued against
minority populations that had not yet fled. One significant Armenian atrocity of early 1992 was
the Armenian and 366
th
Regiment of the former Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs attack on
Azeri civilian population of Hojaly
32
.
By the summer of 1992 both sides in the conflict had extensive stocks of heavy military
equipment and munitions including heavy armor, artillery, attack aircraft, and air-defense
artillery. The proliferation of arms was another result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union
and loss of central control of forward stationed military units
33
.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 9
Azerbaijani forces counter-attacked in June to try to regain ground lost to the Armenians
in the Spring; however, the assault was generally unsuccessful and only yielded the capture of
several villages at the cost of heavy Azerbaijani causalities due to disorganization and poor
training
34
. The Azerbaijani gains in this offensive were largely the result of withering artillery
bombardments that devastated the local populations
35
.
Despite the minor gains by the Azerbaijanis as a result of their June offensive, Karabakh
Armenian forces solidified their gained positions by September. In the first months of 1993, the
Armenian forces made significant gains against the Azerbaijanis including reclaiming territories
in Mardakert lost to the Azeri June offensive
36
. The Karabakh forces also secured Azerbaijani
territory immediately to the north and to the east of their republic, as well as a portion of land
along the Azerbaijani-Iranian border to the south
37
.
The Azerbaijani military lacked effective command and control from the beginning of the
conflict, and the swift and significant tactical defeats in early 1993 put the military into disarray
and threatened the stability of the running Popular Front government. The Azerbaijani military
was significantly weakened by internal factionalism that further degraded the effectiveness of
insufficient command and control structures
38
. A Military coup in June toppled the Azerbaijani
Popular Front government and reinstalled the former communist leader and KGB general. The
new regime was not any more effective against the Karabakh Armenians than was the former,
and by August 1993, nearly 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory was under Armenian
occupation
39
.
Conflict End State
The major powers and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
40

had been working to secure an end to the hostilities throughout the war, and had crafted concrete
NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 10
proposals by 1993
41
; however, these proposals were largely overcome by the events of that year.
Serious negotiations had to wait until the Karabakh Armenians had fully secured their territorial
gains that were ready to negotiate and formalize their victory; while at the same time it was not
until the Azerbaijanis had suffered unqualified defeat that they were willing to recognized the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic leaders as a legitimate counterparty
42
.
The active hostilities ended in May 1994 in a Russian-mediated cease-fire agreement
between Azerbaijan and the de facto independent Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The cease-fire
created a line of control along the borders between Azerbaijan and the Armenians, in Armenia
and Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, that is heavily mined and subject to periodic skirmishes,
paramilitary raids, and sniper attacks
43
. The conflict also resulted in the displacement of over
one million Armenians and Azeri as a result of ethnic violence and military operations. These
populations remain displaced and it is unlikely that they will return to their pre-war ethnically
mixed cities and villages
44
.
The conflict also resulted in blockades and embargoes have significantly disrupted the
lines of communication and transportation through Transcaucasia. These disruptions are
minimized in Azerbaijan by its Caspian Sea ports and significant energy and petro-chemical
economy; conversely, these disruptions have had a significant impact on the landlocked
population and economy of Armenia which faced shortages of imported food and energy in the
1990s
45
.
Post Conflict Political Situation
Decades after the end of hostilities, and over a century since the conflict began, the
political ramifications of the Nagorno-Karabakh war shape the domestic and international
politics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 11
Azerbaijan
The Nagorno-Karabakh War left Azerbaijan with a deeply scared internal political
landscape. The war compounded political strife caused by an intransigent communist regime
that was slow to reform in the wake of the collapse of the soviet union and domestic economic
struggles
46
. All these factors led to the sacking of the Azerbaijani government three times during
the course of the war, with the last instance at the hands of a military coup that regressed the
liberal progress of the APF, Liberal Democratic Party, and National Democratic Party back into a
state of security-service driven strong-man politics
47
. Despite military defeat and internal
political turmoil, Azerbaijan was vindicated at the international-level for defending its territorial
sovereignty.
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
In the late eighties the Armenian SSR and NKAO sought unification into a greater
Armenia; however after the breakup of the USSR, the Armenians changed their political strategy
and declared an independent Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. This was likely to avoid international
sanctions for violating the internationally-recognized sovereign territory of Azerbaijan. Two
decades after the cease-fire the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is not recognized by a single U.N.
member state, not even Armenia
48
. While not legally integrated into Armenia, the Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic operates economically and militarily as a vassal of Armenia. It is also
politically integrated to some degree as politicians from Nagorno-Karabakh have become senior
leaders in Armenia
49
. This is also true internationally, as the trilateral negotiations that achieved
the 1994 cease-fire by 2006 shifted to bilateral negotiations where the Armenian President
represents the interests of both Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
50
.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 12
Armenia
Despite severe economic hardship, Armenia suffered the fewest political ramifications
from the hostilities. This is largely due to three factors. First, Armenian and Armenian allied
forces were highly successful during the course of the war. Second, the conflict was seen as a
protection or liberation of the Karabakh Armenians and this view served to unify the Armenian
public in support of government. Third, Armenia managed to continue to support Nagorno-
Karabakh Armenians against Azerbaijan while skirting international law after the breakup of the
Soviet Union, and thereby avoided international sanctions.
Assessment
It is clear that throughout the century long history of this conflict that armed violence could have
been averted and true peace achieved if it were not for the corrosive effects of nationalism.
Through each stage of Transcaucasian modern history, narrowly defined and nationalist self-
interest further developed a conflict that should never have happened.
The ethnic populations of Transcaucasia have been heterogeneous for millennia as
different cultures and empires rose and fell across the regions varied terrain. The beginnings of
the conflict started with Russian Imperial aggression in the area in the nineteenth century. Local
Russian leaders chose to divide and conquer to limit the need for direct military intervention.
This process began a modern balkanization that was not existent in the late middle ages. This is
the genesis of the conflict and was the source of hostilities at the turn of the twentieth century.
The allies contributed to the conflict by not resolving the first Armenian-Azerbaijani war
through the Paris Peace Conference. The Allies principally the British insisted that hostilities
against the Turks and Azeris stop and that the conference would resolve the conflict peacefully;
however, allied national and imperial interests prevented this promise from being fulfilled.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 13
Instead of resolving the conflict, the allies memorialized it in international law and demonstrated
outside mediation as ineffective.
Despite the failure of the Paris Peace Conference, the region was able to briefly unite in
the ethnically diverse Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic. The TDFR was likely
the greatest chance to peacefully avoid balkanization and the Karabakh conflict. It could have
united the region under a Caucasian nationalism rather than under divisive ethnic nationalist
views. The TDFR lasted only months as Pan-Turkic nationalism from within and from the post-
Ottoman Kamalist Turks fractured the union under Turkish military pressure.
The early Soviet action of ethnic national delineation and ethnic cleansing further
institutionalized the conflict into the structure of the USSR. The issue of Karabakh was debated
by the Soviets; however, they found it in their national interest to sidestep the issue in the
creation of the NKAO.
The late Soviet actions of the 1980s were no better than those of Lenin and Stalin.
Moscows efforts in the region were more focused on the immediate pacification of militants
than the resolution of the underlying conflict. These counter-insurgency tactics and strategies
laid the groundwork for the main period of hostilities and was the last missed opportunity for
peace of the Soviet era.
While all the other opportunities missed to create a lasting peace were largely due to the
nationalistic policies of outside actors, the most recent failures were internal to the region. In the
early stages of the hostilities the Azerbaijan government missed a key opportunity to recognized
the Karabakh Armenians grievances and solidify civil political authority over the region;
instead, the Azerbaijanis undertook Operation Ring and thereby solidified the hostility of the
government against the local population.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 14
For two decades since the cease-fire the conflict has been frozen
51
. The post-conflict era
is continuous failure to achieve a lasting peace. The status quo and nationalist struggle has
emerged as an integral part of the legitimacy of both the government of Armenia and Azerbaijan.
In conclusion, it is unlikely that there will be a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh War
until there is a significant change to the regions political, economic, or military environment.
International institutions have been able to hold the negative peace, but only the Azeri and
Armenian people themselves can create a lasting positive peace.
Running head: NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 15
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NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 17
Endnotes

1
Farhadoglu, 2014
2
Walker, 1996, p. 97
3
ibid.
4
Khlevniuk, Raleigh, & Transchel, 1995, p. 23
5
Walker, 1996, p. 98
6
ibid.
7
ibid., p. 99
8
ibid., p. 98
9
ibid., p. 99
10
ibid., p. 100
11
ibid.
12
Drobizheva, 1996, p. 229
13
Khashan, 2013
14
Martin, 1998
15
Drobizheva, 1996, p. 229
16
ibid., p. 230
17
Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 1
18
ibid.
19
Brown, 2004
20
Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 2
21
ibid.
22
Drobizheva, 1996, p. 231
23
Elon, 2002, p. 103
24
Drobizheva, 1996, p. 231
25
Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 6
26
ibid., p. 5
27
Drobizheva, 1996, p. 232
28
Human Rights Watch, 1994, p 6
29
Batalden & Batalden, 1997, p. 113
30
Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 6
31
Drobizheva, 1996, p. 233
32
ibid.
33
ibid.
34
Batalden & Batalden, 1997, p. 113
35
Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 7
36
Drobizheva, 1996, p. 234
37
Batalden & Batalden, 1997, p. 113
38
Human Rights Watch, 1994, p 11; Drobizheva, 1996, p. 234
39
Drobizheva, 1996, p. 236
40
CSCE changed its name to OSCE in 1995
41
UNSC Resolutions 822, 853, 874, 884
42
Drobizheva, 1996, p. 237
43
Batalden & Batalden, 1997, p. 113
NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR 18

44
Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 102
45
ibid., p. 130
46
Batalden & Batalden, 1997, p. 114
47
ibid.
48
Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 155
49
Brown, 2004
50
Zourabian, 2006
51
Ajemian, 2011