SOMALIA TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

FINAL DRAFT




NATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILIZATION PLAN

(NSSP)

2011 to 2014





18 OCTOBER 2011















TABLE OF CONTENT

Abbreviations/Acronyms ... i

Foreword ii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................... 3

1 INTRODUCTION

Defining the purpose of the NSSP 5
Strategic Environment Analysis .. 6
Threats and Risks Analysis . 8
Important gaps and challenges to the Somalia security and justice
Sectors . 9

2 National Security Vision . 11

3 Strategic Objectives of the NSSP .. 11

4. Guiding Principles to support the realization of the Vision through the
NSSP. 15

5 Priority Actions and Interventions 20

6. Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms

Implementation and Management Frameworks 20
Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms .. 23

7 Funding and Resource Mobilization Mechanism . 23

8 Risks and Critical Assumptions 24

ANNEXES

NSSP Implementation Action Plan .. 26
Costing and Budgeting Plan .
Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation Plan
Communication Plan








Abbreviations/Acronyms

AMISOM. ..................................................................... African Union Mission in Somalia
ASWJ .......................................................................................... Ahlu Sunna Wal J amaa
AU ................................................................................................................. African Union
AVR. ........................................................................................ Armed Violence Reduction
CONOPS. ........................................................................................... concept of operations
CSOs. ....................................................................................... Civil Society Organizations
DDR. ...................................................... Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EASFCOM. ..................................................................................... East African Command
EU. ............................................................................................................. European Union
IC. ................................................................................................. International Community
ICG. ......................................................................................... International Contact Group
IHL. ................................................................................... International Humanitarian Law
J NA. ............................................................................................... J oint Needs Assessment
J SC. ............................................................................................. J oint Security Committee
LAS. .................................................................................................. League of Arab States
NSA. ............................................................................................ National Security Agency
NSC. ............................................................................................ National Security Council
NSF. ............................................................................................... National Security Force
NSSP. ..................................................... Somalia National Security and Stabilization Plan
PPP. ............................................................................................... purchasing power parity
SNF. ................................................................................. Somalia National Security Force
SOPs. ............................................................................... Standard Operational Procedures
SPF. .................................................................................................... Somalia Police Force
SSA. ......................................................................................... Security Sector Assessment
SSD. ...................................................................................... Security Sector Development
SSI. ............................................................................................. Security Sector Institution
SSR. ................................................................................................ Security Sector Refrom
TFG. ................................................................................ Transitional Federal Government
TFP. .................................................................................... Transitional Federal Parliament
TWG. ......................................................................................... Technical Working Group
UK. ............................................................................................................ United Kingdom
UNPOS United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNSCR. ......................................................... United Nations Security Council Resolution
USA. ............................................................................................. United States of America

FOREWORD


Since elected in J anuary 2009 as President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of
Somalia, my governments primary focus has been to end the internal armed conflict that has
engulfed my beloved country for over two decades. A conflict that has been characterised by
different threats and risk factors such as Al-shabaab linked to international terrorists networks,
proliferation of arms and ammunition, including landmines, transnational economic crime, and
piracy. Indeed, years of prolonged war in Somalia has caused the loss of many lives,
humanitarian disaster, and displacement of over millions of Somalis now settled in various parts
of the world either as displaced persons or refugees. My government currently has limited
resources (human, financial and institutional) to reinforce the national security institutions in
order for them to effectively tackle threats outlined above. Therefore, rebuilding of our nascent
national security sector institutions, particularly the Somalia National Force (NSF), the National
Security Agency (NSA) and the Somalia Police Force (SPF) remain critical tasks for my
government. The good is to make them more responsive and in better compliance with
international humanitarian law (IHL) and respect for human rights, as they work to defend and
secure the state and its citizenry. This will create the enabling environment for protection of
civilians, delivery of humanitarian assistances, completion of the remaining transitional political
tasks such as the constitution, political outreach and reconciliation and the conduct of peaceful
free, fair and transparent elections. The underlying tenet is that without security there can be
limited scope for sustaining the political peace process: Peace needs security just as security
needs peace.

While the process for planning and drafting this revised three-year National Security and
Stabilization Plan (NSSP) (2011 to 2014) has been a strenuous one, it is an important
achievement by all involved given the short time allotted for this task to be accomplished. The
credit for this must be given to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), including regional
entities such Puntland, Galmudug, and Al Sunna Wal J amaa (ASWJ ), to our numerous
international partners, whose representatives participated with openness and honesty, in an
unfamiliar and ambitious integrated planning, mutual trust and confidence building exercise.

The document has evolved as result of several confidence building steps and consultative
processes, which I commissioned following my interaction with former Somali Senior Military
Officials in Washington D.C in August, 2010. There, I had requested the former officials to
travel to Somalia to conduct a Somalia-owned Security Sector Assessment (SSA) to complement
an early version produced in 2010. The findings and recommendations of their SSA reports form
the basis for the revision of this NSSP for Somalia.

To further demonstrate the level of political commitment the NSSP process deserved, I consulted
Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali to appoint a strategic planning team from across all
relevant ministries, the transitional parliament and civil society. Under the leadership of
Honourable Abdihakim E. Guleh the Deputy Minister of Interior and National Security, the
review process has been successfully completed.

The NSSP provides the immediate, medium to long-term priority actions required to strengthen
the security and justice sector institutions in Somalia; it will help defend and secure the state and
its citizens respecting and promoting human rights and the rule of law. Likewise, the fighting in
Somalia has been marked by widespread and systematic use of children as soldiers. Following
allegations of the use of child soldiers by TFG security forces, the TFG investigated allegation in
J une 15, 2010. A high level committee which conducted an investigation has issued strict
1

guidelines to all security forces not to allow the recruitment of children under the age of eighteen
and anyone under eighteen found in the arm to be immediately released.

My Government is aware of its international obligations prohibiting the use of children in
hostilities and is committed to ratifying the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The NSSP
reflects our policy of no recruitment of children into its security forces. Under the NSSP, Somalia
is committed to ensuring that gender perspectives are integrated in all security sector
development activities, the practice of child soldering is eradicated and the protection of civilians
in Somalia is enhanced.

In a similar vein, through the NSSP, we will seek assistance to reform the Somalia military penal
codes of war and peace both of which predate the 1949 Geneva Conventions. We have
reconstructed our national security vision as follows: A secure and enabled federated Somalia
which is in lasting peace with itself and with its neighbours; ensuring the restoration of security,
access to justice and the rule law institutions such as police, judiciary and custodial corps);
upholding of the human rights of its citizens; accountable, and able to defend its constitution,
people, territorial unity and integrity. The restoring of security here refers to the creation a safe
environment where local communities and citizens can foster a positive and thriving economic
base, underpinned with strong security guarantees that can cultivate and sustain peace, access to
justice, trust and confidence both at home and overseas. The net effect will be to create the
condition where political transformation in line with the Djibouti peace agreement and the
Kampala Accord can be sustained.

On that note, I wish to send out special messages about the NSSP, and the subsequent
implementation process:

First, to all Cabinet and National Security Council Colleagues: the NSSP will assist our
government to achieve two immediate central objectives. First, it will strengthen our security and
justice institutions in order to sustain our recent military and security gains against Al-shabaab in
Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia. Second, it will ensure a safe and enabling environment is
established to complete the remaining transitional political tasks during our tenure, particularly
the constitution making process. I believe a successful implementation of the five core elements
(policy development, professionalism, partnership building, inclusive and participation of
parliament and civil society, and enhancing international support for consolidation of stabilization
efforts e.g. AMISOM) of the NSSP will increase public trust and confidence in the security sector
institutions and improved livelihoods for the people.

Second, to the international community and donor partners: I believe the NSSP directly supports
the first priority benchmark of the Kampala Roadmap: Improved Security in Mogadishu and the
rest of Somalia. Hence, it is expected that the NSSP will serve as the main conduit for creating a
safe and enabling environment for a peaceful end to the transitional process in Somalia. It will
ensure that security and justice assistance are well coordinated through the work of the J oint
Security Committee (J SC) from 2011- 2014. The NSSP implementation must be seen as an
enabler for the pursuance of the other benchmarks of the Roadmap: the constitution, political
outreach and reconciliation and good governance. It provides a unique harmonization of priorities
for the development of affordable security and justice sector institutions. The broad consultative
and inclusive nature of the NSSP process and the resulting key priority actions outlined in the
Strategic Implementation Matrix serves as a real menu of options to consider in rebuilding the
Somalia security sector in Somalia.



2

Third, to supporting Ministries: Indeed, the NSSP is a nationally owned programme for
mitigating threats of serious and transnational crime, directly linked to underdevelopment,
political instability and humanitarian crisis in Somalia. In effect, improving security should
greatly assist development and political stability in Somalia. The implementation of the NSSP
priority actions must be seen as a team effort and capacity building opportunity, which must be
recognised favourably as such by donors and external institutions alike. The NSC will provide
executive oversight of the implementation of the NSSP. The J oint Security Committee (J SC) will
continue to direct and monitor progress in the implementation of immediate priorities in the
NSSP.

Fourth, to Senior Security Military and Justice Sector Officials: Under the direction of the NSC,
the J SC and its Technical Working groups, the NSSP Secretariat and all related senior officials
and Ministries will work as one body. The inclusive, consultative process of planning and
drafting this revised NSSP will continue during implementation and beyond. We will all be
included in the information and communication flow during the NSSP roll-out and
implementation in an accountable, transparent way.

Fifth, to the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) Sub-committees on defence, national security
and justice: I will like you to feel able to play your vital role in legislating laws and providing
oversight of the security services of Somalia on behalf of the electorate and your constituencies.

Finally, to the regional entities, including Civil Society, Media and the Public: There is a key role
for you in the NSSP implementation process. Regional authorities such as Puntland, Galmudug,
and Al Sunna Wal J amaas and the public have greatly been involved in the process of revising
and adopting this NSSP; we will continue to involve and include you now and during
implementation. The NSSP and the resulting improved security and justice sectors is there to
serve you, the citizens. Security is no longer a Secret; it must be a public service, requiring
public support and increased confidence.

On behalf of my Government and my personal behalf, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to
Dr. Augustine P. Mahiga, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for the
United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) for providing the support deserved to the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to have completed this work in the shortest possible
time. Similarly, I wish to commend the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), IGAD,
United Nations agencies and programmes, the European Union, United States of America
Embassy Security Sector Development (SSD) staff, the United Kingdom, J apan, Egypt, and
various international partners, who through the work of the Joint Security Committee (J SC),
provided the needed professional guidance and for facilitating the process, and many people,
including former senior Somalia military officials who made the production of a revised three
years NSSP document possible. I wish, to conclude by reiterating, Peace needs Security just as
Security needs Peace. The successful implementation of the NSSP must be a priority for all
Somalis.

WITH THE COMPLIMENT OF
H.E PRESIDENT SHEIK SHARIF SHEIKH AHMED
CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) AND COMMANDER IN
CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES, OF TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
OF SOMALIA


3


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This revised Somalia National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) 2011 to 2014, has
been developed to ensure priority security tasks and benchmarks identified in the
Kampala roadmap are implemented in a holistic, timely and well coordinated manner
across various TFG ministries, departments, parliament, regional, districts and local
communities in Somalia
1
. The plan is designed to serve as the main conduit for alignment
of both national and international assistances for the implementation of prioritized,
coherent, harmonized and sustained security, access to justice and stabilization
interventions in Somalia.

The document defines the process by which the Federal Government of Somalia will lead
in re-orienting the policies, structures and operational capacities of security and justice
institutions and groups in Somalia, in order to make them more effective, efficient and
responsive to the provision of security and justice needs of its people. Its main focus is to
consolidate military and security gains in the South Central region of Somalia,
particularly in Mogadishu, Puntland and Galmudug; while concurrently creating the
enabling environment for completion of the remaining transitional political tasks: the
constitutional making process, political outreach and reconciliation, and good governance
as envisaged in the Kampala Accord
2
.

This revised NSSP is a product of a series of integrated strategic planning and
consultative processes. The actors involved include representatives from the Office of
President, Prime Minister, Transitional Federal Parliament(TFP), senior TFG civil and
public officials, strategic advisors, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Puntland State of
Somalia, Galmudug State of Somalia, Ahlu Sunna Wal J amaa (ASWJ ) and international
partners such as United Nations, African Union (AU), IGAD, European Union (EU),
United States of America (USA), Italy, United kingdom(UK), East African Command
(EASFCOM), League of Arab States (LAS), Egypt, J apan, members of the J oint Security
Committee (J SC) and the International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia.

Building on the findings and recommendations of the reports of 2010 and 2011 Somalia
Security Sector Assessment (SSA), this revised Somalia NSSP clearly articulates an
envisioned National Security Vision for Somalia; sets out strategic objectives for
achieving the vision, shaped by specific guiding and operational principles; identifies
priorities; outline roles and responsibilities of each actors, as well as specific set of
benchmarks, resource mobilization, tracking and monitoring processes.
The NSSP, in the main, provides for strengthening higher level security and justice policy
and strategy development and coordination mechanisms to make security and justice
service delivery more equitable, transparent, effective and better co-ordinated; rebuilding
affordable, accountable, representative and professional defence, army, security,
intelligence, immigration, maritime police/coastal guards, custodian corps, justice

1
Kampala roadmap for ending the transition was adopted in Mogadishu on 6
th
of September, 2011
2
Priority Tasks for ending the Transition before 20 August, 2012
4

agencies and institutions, from the provision of a uniformed response to serious crime,
piracy, insurgency and international terrorism; ensuring effective partnerships and
coordination between state and non-state security and justice agencies and institutions;
creating substantial parliamentary and civil society inclusion and public participation in
security and justice sector issues; enhancing and sustaining international support for
AMISOM in consolidating stabilization interventions, to include Mine Action, small
arms and light weapons control, armed violence reduction, and DDR related interventions
in Somalia.
The rest of the NSSP is structured as follows: Section 1 provides a brief background, the
political and strategic environmental security context of the NSSP, defines its rationale or
purpose, identifies generic threats, risks and important challenges to the security and
justice sectors of Somalia; Section 2 briefly describes the strategic national security
vision reconstructed for Somalia as envisioned in the NSSP; Section 3 outlines the
strategic objectives to achieve the national security vision; Section 4, advances the
guiding and operational principles envisaged in order to realize the strategic national
security vision; Section 5 focuses on the NSSPs priority actions and interventions that
will support the strategic vision and objectives; Section 6, briefly describes the
implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms; Section 7 refers
to the funding and resource mobilization mechanisms to support the implementation of
priority actions outlined in chapter 5; Section 8, examines the potential risks and
assumptions that will impact on the NSSP implementation process. An implementation
action plan for the NSSP, 2011 to 2014, in the form of a Results Framework with
benchmarks, timelines, costing, and measurable indicators is annexed.























5

1. INTRODUCTION
The Djibouti Agreement of 2008 succeeded in bringing together opposing political
groupings which led to the formation of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of
national unity in J anuary 2009. Its function is underpinned by the Transitional Federal
Charter of 2004, which provides direction on constitutional matters. The International
Community (IC) recognizes TFG as a credible partner to move the peace process forward
and restore stability in Somalia, but that the TFG requires substantial assistance in
developing capacity to restore security and stability.

In J une 2011, the Kampala Accord permitted a 12-month extension to the TFGs mandate
to enable completion of the transition tasks and also directed the permanent establishment
of the J oint Security Committee (J SC) in Mogadishu. The TFG had developed National
Security and Stabilization Plans (NSSPs) in 2006 and 2009, respectively, but substantial
changes in the military and security dynamics have prompted a requirement for a fresh
version. This current NSSP provides the framework for describing how the TFG will
continue to respond to the security sector stabilization and justice/rule of law needs of its
people and the State.

1.1 Purpose
The desired end-state of this current NSSP is to create an environment that meets internal
security needs and securing basic functioning of criminal justice system, while promoting
recovery from conflict. Any sustainable security and stabilization plan has to meet
citizens expectations of provision of basic services. The NSSP is also intended to
provide the foundation for building capacity in order to restore stability to the country. It
is an articulation of shared responsibility, pointing the way for the TFG and its national
and international partners to work together towards the realization of a shared national
and regional security vision, and to monitor the consolidation of political, peace and
stability throughout Somalia.

1.2 Scope
The TFGs mandate was extended by 12 months in J uly 2011, but the requirements of a
NSSP necessarily need a longer-term planning horizon. Therefore, there is an implicit
understanding that a revision will be required in the post-TFG era and that the document
should be living and dynamic, to take advantage of changing situations. The plan covers
the Offices of the President, Prime Minister, Ministries of Defence, Interior and National
Security and J ustice and Corrections institutions, the transitional federal parliament,
regional and district security committees, and civil society organizations. It recognizes
that the ministries and their associated primary forces are engaged in security operations
whilst concurrently developing their organizational capacity, posing significant
challenges to a nascent organization with limited resources. Additionally, it recognizes
that this is not a post-conflict policy document, as there is no widespread cease-fire yet.
Accordingly, some traditional models of such a policy document are not so appropriate in
the Somali context. Thus, this document seeks to balance the requirements to improve
performance on operations, and organizational development and democratic governance
and oversight.

6

1.3 Background: Strategic Environment Analysis
After the fall of the Mohamed Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somali plunged into a civil
war. A period of anarchy has followed. The conflict stems from the dynamics of
continuous bad governance during the civilian and/or military rules, characterized by the
absence of the rule of law. This bad governance has resulted in nepotism, clanism,
embezzlement of the public purse and widespread corruption. Subsequently, the
combination of many other contributing factors, such as: the Cold war, the Horn of Africa
war of 1977-1978, the proxy war led by clan-militias, armed and supported by
neighboring countries, and the economic hyperinflation, had a detrimental effect on the
countrys meager economy.

Consequently, all state institutions were enormously weakened and incapacitated,
including the law enforcement agencies, such as the court-system, the armed forces,
police, custodian corps, intelligence services and coast guards. Public confidence and
trust in these institutions have been lost; as these institutions became moribund. The
people of Somalia have been left at the mercy of clan-based militia groups that
proliferated after the ousting of the Barre regime
3
.

With the support of the international community, a peace process was initiated in 2004
based on the IGAD Mbagathi process. This process lead to the adoption of a Transitional
Federal Charter in 2004, the signing of the Djibouti Agreement in August, 2008, and
recently the Kampala Accord in 2011, respectively. Both the Agreement and Accord
pave the way in ending the conflict in Somalia. The 2008 agreement allowed for the
establishment of a broad-based TFG incorporating opposition groups, provided hope for
the war-ravaged country.
Both the Djibouti Agreement and Kampala Accord provides for security and justice
sector development interventions. For example, Article 8c in the Djibouti agreement, and
Article 5 of the Kampala Accord calls for the establishment and reform of a J oint
Security Committee (J SC); cessation of hostilities and deployment of UN peacekeeping
force, and the subsequent withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. The TFG has continued efforts
to both consolidate its authority particularly with respect to security sector development.
However, limited achievements have been made in reaching out to many groups,
including clan-based militias as possible as mandated. This includes their integration into
a robust formal security sector structures.
As part of its outreach and reconciliation implementation strategy the TFG signed an
agreement with Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ ) on March 15 2009. ASWJ continue to
be described as a moderate Sufi Islamist group formed in 1991 to counter the growing
influence of militant reformist movements like Al-Ittihad Al-Islamic. Though a power
sharing agreement with the ASWJ had been contentious, the Somalia National Security
Force (SNF), the army and ASWJ (although fragmented) still serves as a bulwark against
Al Shabaab and other similar groups offensive against the TFG. Apart from ASWJ ,
radical Islamists and other clan and militia forces continue to resist calls by the TFG to
join an inclusive administration.

3
Report of a Security Sector Assessment Scoping Mission in Somalia, prepared by Former Somalia Senior
Military and Security Officials ( J une 2011), pp 20
7


Apart from the lack of an adequately articulated and clear reconciliation framework and
of a determined effort on the part of the TFG leadership, the TFG has also not established
an effective security sector development legal and policy framework, executive and
legislative oversight mechanisms, as well as an effective communication strategy.

TFGs public relations campaign and outreach strategy to mobilize support from Somalis
within and outside Somalia has therefore been inadequate to counter Al Shabaabs more
radical messages. There has been little if any effort to reach out to various Somali
constituencies. Consequently, the TFG is less engaged with the Somali public. TFG
needs to continue to work towards building trust and confidence of the public
4
.

At the operational level, the primary defence and security forces are still weak to sustain
the military gains already made after Al-shabaabs organized withdrawal from
Mogadishu on 6
th
of August, 2011. The National Security Force (NSF) for example lacks
sufficient training, equipment, and logistics to face the non-state actors insurgent groups,
which have grown powerful over time. There is significant necessary reliance on the
African Union - the AMISOM stabilization force. Together with the AMISOM forces
TFG forces now control Mogadishu.

Efforts to initiate dialogue and relations with the J ihadists are proving a daunting task.
That said, it is clear that support for the J ihadists or Islamic ideological groups is
diminishing from a significant section of Somalis opposed to the foreign nationals forces
linked to Al Qaeda. Al-shabaabs withdrawal from Mogadishu in early August 2011 is an
opportunity which, if not seized promptly, could be lost if warlords and their militias
moved in to fill the vacuum. This could results in inter-factional fighting replacing that
which was previously against a recognized common enemy. There is an urgent need to
continue to support the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the TFG
forces with requisite resources to enable them discharge their responsibilities effectively,
especially to enable them consolidate and control the areas recently vacated by Al-
shabaab. The NSSP is designed to meet this immediate goal.

1.4 Current Measures and Achievements
The TFG and the Somalia security institutions together with loyal militia groups such as
ASWJ reinforced by AMISOM are determined to foster peace and stability in Somalia. In
recent times, the combined forces have made serious military and security gains against
the insurgent militias leading to their defeat and ultimate withdrawal from Mogadishu
and some regions in the south central. It is now evident that Mogadishu is almost 100
percent under the control of the TFG forces and AMISOM.

These gains could be attributed to continuous military training for the NSF with support
from the international community particularly through AMISOM. The training offered to
the security forces has enhanced discipline and morale of the security forces and boosted

4
Somalia dilemmas: Changing security dynamics, but limited policy choices
8

cordial relations with AMISOM. This has had a significant positive impact in national
security.
5


In essence, the technical, training and financial support of the international community
including UN agencies, EU, United States SSR Team, the United Kingdom, AMISOM
and other bilateral donors are proving critical and essential to the rebuilding of the Somali
Security and justice sector institutions. President Sheik Ahmed Sharif, Prime Minister Dr.
Abdiwali M Ali, TFG relevant Ministers, heads of the security and justice sector
institutions, parliament and civil society indicated that more support (technical and
financial) from donors through the work of the J oint Security Committee and its technical
working groups is required and would enable the government to overcome major threats
to the establishment of security, justice, peace and recovery in Somalia. They all call for
consistent, sufficient and well-coordinated international assistance.

On 6 May 2011, the TFG revived its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) after a lapse of 20
years. The EEZ extends 200 nautical miles from the Somali coast-line, following
concerns about illegal and over-fishing and dumping of toxic waste. However, the SNA
has no means with which to enforce the EEZ, thus depriving it of revenue and necessary
protection of its natural resources.

Public perception of TFG and AMISOM forces is positive. The Anti-TFG propaganda
machinery is proving ineffective. There is need to continue proving additional support to
TFG/AMISOM civic education and to raising public awareness of its role and mandate.
However, despite these achievements, a number of generic threats and risks outlined in
the preceding section persist that continue to undermine peace and stability in Somalia.

1.5 Threats and Risks Analysis
The threats and risks facing war-torn Somalia are many and include: instability,
protracted violence and human rights violations including gender-based violence
perpetuated by extremists/insurgent armed groups such as Al-shabaab, proliferation of
small arms and ammunition including landmines, clan-based armed militia groups with
potential to cause de-stabilization, unprotected borders, weak public sector institutions,
corruption, piracy, illegal fishing and destruction of other marine resources belonging to
Somalia, illegal economic activities including logging, charcoal production and money
laundering, absence of social services, poverty, and chronic unemployment. If these
threats and risks are not immediately tackled, the national economy and interest, as well
as the security of the Somali people will be profoundly affected.

Beyond Mogadishu, the security situation remains difficult in South-Central Somalia.
The number of Al Shabaab fighters can be estimated at several thousands mostly
concentrated in Bay and Bakool (Mukhtar Robows militias) and around the port of
Kismayo. TFG and allied forces are composed of the 2,000 Isiolo, Kenya trained soldiers
to which must be added 600 men recently trained in Dhobley. The Raskamboni
Movement of Sheikh Aden Madobe in J ubbaland comprises at least 3,000 men of which
about 2,000 were trained by Kenya near Mombassa, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army,

5
See pp 7 of the Report of the Somalia SSA, published in J une 2011
9

ASWJ and smaller clan militias giving an estimated total of 9,000 men. It is urgent to
strengthen and rebuild national security institutions to respond and eliminate the above
mentioned threats and risks
6
.

1.6 Key Challenges
The current Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) have limited resources (human,
financial and institutional) to tackle those threats and risks. They are faced with important
structural challenges that continue to undermine the operational effectiveness of the
security and justice sectors agencies and institutions in tackling the above threats. For
example, the ability to develop and implement robust policies and strategies is critical to
the success of TFGs agenda for security and justice sector development based on the
provisions of the Djibouti and Kampala peace processes. At the moment, however,
although the political will and commitment exists, the TFG lacks adequate institutions
and experienced human resources that can effectively and efficiently support strategic
and policy development processes in the security and justice sectors. A focus on
strengthening the legal and policy making structures, institutions and human resource
capital for Security Sector Development (SSD) in Somalia is essential. This should be
done in a wide effort that seeks both to improve training for civil and public servants in
the security and justice line ministries and institutions, and to deliver a broader campaign
on the importance of improved security and access to justice.

For primary Somalia Security and J ustice Agencies, such as the army and the police, on
the other hand, the delivery of specialized training, equipment, payment of stipends,
rehabilitation of office spaces and having in place Standard Operational Procedures
(SOPs) and management systems are the main structural challenges ahead. In addition,
the lack of adequate command leadership in the NSF, to develop, defence and military
policies, serve as a serious limitation towards improving the effectiveness and
professional standards of the NSF with adherence to the rule of law, respect for human
rights and the protection of civilians.

Right sizing, doctrinal development, integration of the various militias and
professionalism remain a huge challenge for the TFG. The 2009 National Security and
Stabilization Plan (NSSP) projects the security forces levels as: NSF - 25,000 (including
the Navy and Coast Guards); National Police Force- 12,000; the National Security
Agency (NSA) - 3,000, and the custodian corps- 5,000 personnel. These projections are
yet to be met
7
and need to be re-evaluated. A new assessment of the infrastructure and
logistical needs of the security, justice and custodian corps in a rapidly changing
environment, especially in areas under the control of TFG/AMISOM is urgently required.

There is limited progress in building justice and corrections sector institutions in Somalia
to serve as the main sources of jurisprudence of Islamic Law based on international
principles and best practices. Twenty years of HR violations, and the absence of an

6
See Somalia SSA report of J une 2011 for more details on Generic threats and risk analysis., pp 22 to 27
7
See pp 8, Somalia SSA report of J une 2011
10

effective courts system, has created a generation that has no experience of the Rule of
Law: they are not socialised to the idea of criminals being prosecuted. This lost
generation also means that there is a lack of experience within the judiciary. Access to
justice is also limited as the judiciary, courts, custodian corps, etc are not equipped and
functioning effectively.

The perverse interpretation of Islam by Al Shabaab has resulted in multiple, flagrant
abuses of human rights. The civil population is subjected to targeted killings and
assaults, repressive forms of social control, and brutal punishments under its draconian
interpretation of sharia
8
. With the withdrawal of Al Shabaab from Mogadishu, it is
important that the administration of justice is conducted by the adherence to international
norms. The absence of sharia law was an original Al-Shabaab claim. The introduction
and upholding of true sharia law therefore undermines its cause, and thus it has both a
political utility and is legally valuable.
On 27 April 2010, the UN passed UNSCR 1918 (2010) calling upon member states to
criminalise piracy under domestic law. Since much piracy activity takes place within the
EEZ, Somalia has a greater responsibility to comply with the UNSCR, but currently lacks
sufficient resources to fulfil its obligations. It also lacks legislation. There are other
opportunities in maritime law that the TFG and the International Community should
consider in order to attack piracy more comprehensively. These include the 1988
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation; the 1979 Convention against the taking of Hostages and the 2000 UN
Convention on Transnational Organised Crime.

The Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) is weak on defence and security matters and
lacks the capacity to support the drafting of appropriate legislation related to the security
and justice institutional development that is needed before the end of the political
transition. Somali civil society and NGOs have limited capacity to engage in SSD
interventions. Above all, they continue to be marginalized from the efforts of rebuilding
the national security sector. Neither the Executive power nor the Parliament have
historically encouraged civil society and NGOs to contribute to public debates about
national security including the police, the army, correctional corps and intelligence. The
NSSP contains a number of initiatives to strengthen the role and capacity of civil society
in this respect, and also to raise awareness in the ranks of the security forces through
civic education and training. A more open dialogue is desirable and this can be
engendered by better and consistent strategic communications that inform the public and
public opinion.

The NSSP will help to overcome the threats, risks and important challenges identified
above. The NSSP ultimately offers an opportunity to improve the quality of justice and
the judiciary, and new legislation, ratification of treaties etc would help Somalias battle
against criminality and terrorism. It is not a detailed long-term programmatic plan for
Security Sector Reform. It is essentially a strategic policy document to compliment the
on-going stabilization efforts as well as provide a vision for the security sector
development in Somalia in coming years.

8
Harsh War, Harsh Peace, Human Rights Watch, April 2010, p2.
11


A clear national security vision, a set of five strategic objectives, shaped by a series of
guiding and operational principles for improving security and stabilization in Somalia are
outlined in the succeeding sections.


2. NATIONAL SECURITY VISION
The national security vision of the NSSP is as follows:

A Secure and enabled federated Somalia that is in lasting peace with itself and
with its neighbours; enjoying restored security, access to justice and the rule of
law; upholding the human rights of its citizens; accountable, able to defend its
constitution, people, territorial unity and integrity.

3. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE/S
The realization of a shared national security vision as outlined above is shaped by a set of
five strategic programmatic objectives. They are:

Objective 1: To strengthen higher level security and justice policy and strategy
development and coordination mechanisms
The purpose of policy development is to institutionalize a set of international norms,
rules, principles, identities and organizational structures and processes to be adequately
put in place to ensure democratic governance and accountability of the security sector in
Somalia. Support should be provided at the political level for the development of
strategic higher level security and justice policies and decision making processes. Such
policies will enable relevant security and justice institutions and agencies to develop their
own sectoral priorities, reform and implementation strategies.

Important entry points for supporting policy and strategy development processes are the
National Security Council (NSC), cabinet, relevant ministries and the J SC. Such
interventions includes, capacity building on strategic planning, functional and
management reviews, priority setting, decision making, resource management and
budgeting; development of standard operational guidelines for security and justice sectors
personnel about the value of a Whole-of-Government approach that defines the roles and
responsibilities of each security and justice sector components in the delivery of these
services.

Objective 2: To rebuild affordable, accountable and professional defence/army,
security and justice agencies and institutions
AMISOM and TFG have increased their operational tempo and now control Mogadishu.
As they expand their area of control, so the airport, sea-port and other critical
infrastructure are no longer contested, but still remain attractive targets and the TFG lacks
adequate resources to protect them adequately. Momentum need to be sustained.
Relations between AMISOM and the TFG National Security Forces continue to
strengthen, with TFG regularly fighting alongside AMISOM troops.
12


The TFG will ensure the combat readiness and the operational effectiveness of Somalias
National Security Force personnel by imparting them an improved and comprehensive
capacity-building programme, including the provision of appropriate selection and
recruitment mechanisms, training, equipment, and gender compliance.

The TFG will take advantage of existing regional and international training supports for
the NSF, the Somalia Police Force (SPF), NSA, custodian corps, etc, as a step towards
standardizing its national security and defence doctrines; and improving the professional
development of all elements of the security and justice agencies. To ensure the retention
of the instruction of the troops, the TFG should consider conducting the NSF troops
basic military training inside Somalia. The training curricula in addition to the regular
training cycle should also address those areas of serious challenges in todays battle
ground and provide soldiers the foundation of guerilla warfare, counterinsurgency,
counterterrorism and urban and asymmetric warfare. The NSF training should also
encompass a strong civic orientation program that teaches the troops citizenship, peace
and religious education (i.e. citizens rights and responsibilities, human rights, the rule of
law, common good and loyalty to the state, etc.). The curriculum and pedagogy of this
civic orientation programmust be prepared by the Ministry of Education and Ministry of
Religious Affairs in coordination with the Ministry of Defense. And the instructional
program should be incorporated in the regular military training and taught by competent
teachers in civic and religious subjects. To ensure the combat readiness of the NSF,
priority should be given the training of junior commanders (junior officers, such as,
second lieutenant to captain) and the NCOs. To that end, the TFG should put a particular
emphasis on train-the-trainers program, whereby former officers and NCOs are given a
brief refreshment course so that they could properly train the troops.

Besides, the NSF should establish a standardized organizational military structure for
small and medium level units (battalion, company, platoon and squad) that would
determine unit formation and a clear ranking structure corresponding to its size. The
Somali NSF, the Army, the Police Force (SPF), NSA, and the Custodian Corps, should
standardize its national security and defense doctrines; and improve its professional
development of all elements of the security and justice agencies.

To secure Somalias territorial water and enhance the capacity to protect coastal and
maritime security, including piracy, toxic waste dumping, and illegal fishing, and armed
robbery in the Somali coast, it is critical that in addition of strengthening the operational
capability of NSF elements in land, to build a viable Somali Navy with efficient
operational capacity, training; and armed and equipped with adequate weaponry,
technology and supplies (Patrol Boats, adequate ships, radar and radios).

Developing the capacity-building of the Somali air force is an essential prerequisite of the
Somali defense mechanism. Notwithstanding, its cost, building an adequate air force
capable of conducting air, land and sea reconnaissance, and tactical operations is
indispensable. Therefore, light patrol aircraft capable of conducting reconnaissance;
helicopters & transport aircraft, Radar and Radio HF & VHF is required. It is paramount
13

that the headquarters and training facilities, as well as, the troops barracks are
immediately refurbished. This will guarantee that the command and control of NSF units
is secure; the troops have adequate quarters; the routine trainings programmes are
regularly and frequently carried out.

To rebuild the Somali NSF and equip them with the necessary weaponry and heavy
equipment it is important the previous United Nations Resolutions embargo be lifted. The
existence of these resolutions will hinder the NSF to carry out their defensive mandate.
The TFG will ensure that the structure and command and control of NSF (army, police,
navy and coastal defense, air force, and custodial corps) are in conformity with the
Somali Transitional charter, chapter X Art.65.

The Command and Control structure will be based on these two principals: Operations
(communications, artillery, reconnaissance, engineering and armor units) and Logistics
(supply, personnel, administrations, health, transportation and armament). A code of
conduct for the NSF officers will be created and published. Military Courts with their
Attorney Generals will be established. A database of the existing codes and status will be
created; J urisdiction and the relationship between the Military Courts and Civilian Courts
will be reconciled.

The process of selecting, vetting and recruiting Somalis into the ranks of NSF will be
done in a transparent and accountable way to ensure regional and clan balance within the
NSF. To ensure the size and strength of the security forces, a proper registration process
will be established. All personnel should be issued a picture ID carried all the time and
they must be verified and accounted for. TFG will contact all Pro-government leaders of
all armed groups to broaden the reconciliation process and convince them to join the
peace process and integrate their militias with TFG security forces.

The development and strengthening of procurement policy and procedures for the
purchase, supply and disposal of all defence, and security equipment will be clearly
defined and applied based on standard operational procedures. Appropriate structural
support is required, including organizational decision making and change management
structures in relevant security and justice agencies to improve their level of
professionalism, and in establishing a strong and neutral transitional chain of command
and control mechanisms and structures. Capacity-building is an essential prerequisite to
increase absorptive capacity.

Objective 3: To ensure effective partnership and coordination between state and non-
state security and justice agencies/institutions
Dealing with transnational organized crime and terrorism will require an increased level
of collaboration, cooperation and information exchange between state and non-state
security actors. Partnerships between the TFG ministries, security and justice institutions,
AMISOM, friendly militia groups, private security and military companies, the
international community, local, regional and district authorities, NGOs and civil society
organizations, and the diaspora can enhance the complemetarity of interventions and
support capacity in the face of scare financial and human resource in Somalia. Such
partnerships will also help foster shared threats and risks analysis, data management
systems, support trust and confidence building regulations on joint operational planning
14

and investigations; support a framework for regular meetings between and across the
various structures of the NSSP implementation process and oversight platforms, and fill
capacity gaps in the security and justice sectors.

If included through effective partnerships, non-state security and justice actors can feed
information to the relevant state security and justice agencies and institutions such as
information on the current security threats as a result of Al-Shabaabs withdrawal, and on
incidents involving abuses and human rights violation. CSOs may also provide a pool of
expertise in research, administration and management which can support a successful
implementation of the NSSP. Interaction and the level of collaboration and cooperation
will be enhanced through the work of the NSC, J SC, NSSP Secretariat, line Ministries
project implementation secretariats, regional and district security committees.

Objective 4: To increase the inclusion and participation of parliament and Civil Society
Organizations in Somalia security and justice sector Development efforts
The TFP is generally considered to be weak, both in terms of process and effect, and the
same applies to the sub-committees which should be active in the field of defence and
security, justices and human rights. Civil society is similarly lacking in capacity and
voice in the security sector in Somalia. The NSSP will support the TFP in training of the
parliamentary committees in matters of defence, security and justice; conducting an
analysis of the gaps in the existing legal framework for security governance, and provide
model laws to support the drafting of legal frameworks for the Somalia Police Force,
Army, NSA, Coast guards etc. It will also support the development of reporting and
analytical processes, especially security sector budgeting analysis. The engagement of
CSOs and NGOs on Somalias security sector development issues will enable the
perspective of the general public to be factored into security and justice policy
development and governance processes. The capacity of specialized SSD sensitive CSOs
will be built to advocate, monitor and report on SSD interventions with respect to human
rights, gender equality and the rule of law. It is also important to establish a democratic
institutional arrangement to ensure easy and transparent access for citizens to express
their concerns in any of these respects. Their contribution in this respect can help with the
high level strategic monitoring of the progress and effectiveness of the NSSP and can
inform assessment and situational awareness in respect of trends that demonstrate
whether stability is improving, and whether life for citizens is getting better, getting
worse, or stable but at least not subject to the daily horrors and frustrations of conflict.

Objective 5: To enhance and sustain international support for the stabilization of
Somalia
The recent withdrawal of Al-shabaab demands an urgent need of review of the African
Union Mission to Somalia. AMISOM is currently conducting planning for the expansion
of its mission outside of Mogadishu. This must be carefully harmonized with operations
of the NSF and its allied friendly forces, to ensure that neither becomes over-stretched
and vulnerable. Expanding AMISOMs role will require additional troops, helicopters
and other operational enablers, including management of explosives. It will also require
different C2 structures and more robust communications and logistics. The TFG will
request the AU to revise and re-formulate its mandate to include a second phase concept
15

of operations (CONOPS) in support of international stabilization support in Somalia. The
role of the TFG would be crucial to ensure national sovereignty is maintained.

Somalia has endured decades of continuous armed violence, resulting in proliferation of
small arms which are trafficked across the porous Somali borders. Combined with a
warrior ethos, Somalis use weapons as an accepted form of conflict resolution, and this
stimulates a lack of accountability which fosters a culture of impunity and disrespect for
the Rule of Law. The problem is most acute in south-central Somalia; in Somaliland and
Puntland, progress has been made in demilitarizing society.

Assessments indicate that Al-Shabaab could change tactics and employ more IEDs and
suicide bombers to stretch TFG and AMISOM manpower by conducting attacks in
ostensibly secure areas, thus reducing their capacity to mount further offensive
operations. A vigorous initiative is required to reach out to communities to encourage
them to report suspicious activity and collaborate with the security sector. Whilst
enjoying more success at the tactical level, the TFG currently does not possess the
capability to generate Operational level gains that can be guaranteed to be sustainable.
The establishment of District Security Committees will be useful.

The NSSP will promote stabilization programmes for disengaging combatants, DDR,
Armed Violence Reduction (AVR), small arms and light weapons reduction, Mine
Action and broader explosive management to assist in de-militarization of Somalia. Such
programmes will be carefully managed, to prevent the recruitment and training of radical
youths that could defect to Al-Shabaab or international terrorist organizations.
Meanwhile, reports of newly trained Al-Shabaab recruits being trained near Kismayo is a
constant reminder that the threat has not disappeared. The NSSP must address the issues
of de-radicalisation of such recruits, many of whom may have been coerced into
membership. Conversely, opportunities to conduct second-generation DDR activities,
based on community interests, are required to contribute to the overall goal of
stabilisation.


4. OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES
As a founding principle, the NSSP, will be approved by the council of ministers of the
Transitional Federal Government on the recommendation of the NSC, and subsequently
by the Transitional Federal Parliament. A number of operational principles have been
identified below along the lines of the five strategic programmatic objectives for a
successful implementation of the NSSP. Key elements of the NSSP strategic
programmatic interventions will be executed along the lines of the following operational
principles: making sure appropriate legal and policy frameworks are set out; clearly
defining roles and responsibilities of all security and justice institutions; ensuring that all
supports are based on shared and Somali ownership, financial sustainability,
accountability to the public, transparency, protection of civilians, women and childrens
rights and minority groups; the process is as inclusive and participatory, subject to
democratic oversight, respect for the culture, customs and religious belief.

16

Legal environment: The Transitional Federal Charter authorizes the creation of an
Army
9
and Police (Article 65). The same article requires that the structure, function and
system of cooperation between elements of the Somalia National Army should be
regulated by law. Any changes to the structure advocated in the NSSP should therefore
be approved by legislation. In addition, legal pluralism is a key feature of the rule of law
in Somalia, with 3 principal sources: xeer- which is customary law; sharia, based in
Islam and formal secular law, based on colonial and post-independent developments.
The NSSP will be implemented bearing mind in improving security and access to justice,
and respect for human rights requires the establishment of an integrated justice system
that is accessible to all, and which uses the strengths of the various systems and
mechanism under these 3 different codes.

National ownership: The true hallmark of the NSSP is the collaborative effort of various
Somali government agencies in partnership with the international donor community.
Such a partnership is needed to give better focus and importance on mobilizing political,
financial and human resources needed to do the job. At this juncture however, the idea of
national ownership is crucial because it places responsibilities on the right shoulders and
promotes the principle of accountability. A viable and functional NSSP Secretariat in
Mogadishu is fundamental to support the execution and implementation of the NSSP
implementation action plan (2011 to 2014).

Somalias national ownership of the NSSP would initially involve creating legal
ownership by way of legislation as well as the centrality of regional, district and local
grass-roots participation throughout the process of implantation of the NSSP. Lessons
can be learned in this respect from the ways and means undertaken by both Somaliland
and Puntland. In both places all sectors of society assembled themselves and forged
together a peaceful way forward in their respective communities and neighborhoods.
Evidently then, any meaningful stabilization effort for Somalia to be truly locally
owned and successful must be conceived and understood within the context of public
participation.

Financial Sustainability: The UN/WB J oint Needs Assessment (J NA) of 2006
10

concluded that Somalia was one of the poorest countries in the world with an annual per
capita income of $226, compared to an average of $515 in sub-Saharan Africa. Mis-
management, inequitable and cumbersome tax systems and weak administration of tax
resulted in government revenue being only 5-7% of GDP between 1984 and1990. The
combination of natural disasters, local conflict and the absence of government has also
negatively impacted the economy. 20 years of anarchy, broken infrastructure, a
dysfunctional judicial system and a poor technological base have all ruined the economic
base. Moreover, large numbers of unemployed male youths are vulnerable to being
recruited by militias. The J NA estimates that 43% of the population lives below the
extreme poverty line of $1 per day at purchasing power parity (PPP). The recent
declaration of a famine, together with large-scale loss of live-stock makes the situation
even more precarious. High levels of insecurity and very scarce resources promote the

9
The term Army is a collective noun for all elements of the SNA.
10
Somali J oint Needs Assessment Macro-Economic Policy Framework and Data Development Cluster
Report dated August 2006.
17

conditions where clan loyalty thrives, since clan solidarity then offers the only hope of
survival.

Foreign investment in Somalia is very low. The lack of security, political instability,
weak financial management mechanisms, poor infrastructure and land rights issues
collectively create a negative environment for investors. Moreover, there is a lost
generation who has little formal education, reducing the pool of skilled labour for
foreign investors. For the security and justice sector ministries, the priority to enhance
security is clear. The TFG needs sustained economic support from the international
community to successfully implement the provisions of the NSSP.

Robust relationships with partners are required, and this must be underpinned by
improved coordination processes and transparency. Potential donor fatigue must be
mitigated by active engagement and demonstrable progress. Active engagement should
also seek to ensure optimal communication in order to assist, or manage a process of
harmonisation for Development Partners. This will help to avoid wasteful duplication,
repetition or the danger of swamping the current weak and limited absorptive capacity of
the TFG as stabilization of Mogadishu starts to permit a greater influx of development
assistance and support.

Over time, the international community will require the relevant security and justice
ministries and agencies to assume full budgetary responsibility, so force generation and
development (of the military, for example) must take into account the longer-term
requirements for self-financing and sustainability by the Somali Government. Financial
expectations at all times will be carefully managed.

Accountability to the public: The NSSP will only be as meaningful if its implementation
enhances the security of citizens. The NSSP implementation process must therefore
benefit all citizens equally. From the start, in order to build confidence and ensure
legitimacy, NSSP has to be based on the principles of accountability. Putting in place
accountability mechanisms will safeguard concerns about the provision of financial and
technical support by international partners and actors. Therefore, the NSSP
implementation process will be subject to independent monitoring, oversight and
evaluation procedures of all its operations and financing transactions.

Transparency: the NSSP will be implemented based on clearly articulated legal and
policy frameworks; established structures, standards and practices that will enhance the
transparent management of public financial supports to the security and justice sector
institutions and agencies, including parliament and civil society organizations in Somalia.
The implementation process will also be subject to enhance cooperation and information-
sharing between relevant line ministries, security and justice institutions and agencies,
oversight bodies and the general public through regular the work of the Kampala
Coordinating and Monitoring Mechanisms of the roadmap, the J SC, NSSP Secretariat,
public debates, briefings and established monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. It is
essential that citizens and the International Community gain confidence in the conduct of
Government as an institution and as individuals. Probity and transparency of personal
interests will be an important factor in building such confidence.

18

Inclusive and participatory, democratic oversight: So far, the process of revising the
NSSP has been highly inclusive and participatory, involving a wide range of TFG
ministries, the TFP, international partners, regional authorities( specifically the Regional
States of Puntland and Galmudug), pro-TFG non-state actors, such as ASWJ , CSOs, and
NGOs to the extent possible. The NSSP therefore is the result of a continuous integrated
strategic planning, consultative and dialogue processes. It is crucial that the process of
implementation of the NSSP remains that way, as transparent and as consultative as
possible to ensure appropriate service development, delivery and accountability. The
TFG has committed to work jointly with regional administrations in the implementation
of the NSSP, and to collectively seek support and assistance of international development
partners.

Article 33 of the TFG Charter makes provision for Parliament to investigate any matter
of public interest. There are concerns about the professional knowledge of
Parliamentarians to be effective overseers of the security sector, and capacity-building is
required. Under the Djibouti process, the J SC is mandated to lead the process of creating
security institutions and coordination and oversight of the security issues with the
international community for assistance programmes. It also provides policy advice to the
Technical Working Groups. Article 5 of the recent Kampala Accord also reiterate the
importance of the J SC : The parties agreed that support for the current military
operations and completion of the rebuilding the security forces are fundamental to the
success of the transitional period and agreed that a reformed J oint Security Committee
will seat permanently in Mogadishu.

The engagement of CSOs and NGOs to conduct research, advocate; monitor and provide
oversight of the NSSP will add real value to the NSSP process.

Protection of Civilians, women and childrens rights and minority groups: Somalia is a
signatory to some International Humanitarian Law (IHL) treaties
11
, such as the Geneva
Conventions; the Convention of the Rights of a Child, and the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict
and the Convention on cluster munitions. Protecting civilians, including women, children
and minority groups rights from violations including from sexual exploitation and abuse
and other forms of gender-based violence, requires the adherence to all internationally
agreed conventions, resolutions, international human rights law, international
humanitarian law and other bodies of the law; access to justice and equality before the
law; establishing the ROLs; creating a safe environment and building social and
economic stability. Lagging behind this explosion in humanitarian and human rights law,
Somalia is at a significant disadvantage: it has no laws for combating people or human
trafficking, financing terrorism, money laundering, drugs, dealing with piracy, or for
combating illegal dumping of toxic waste. Furthermore, much criminal activity is trans-
national, yet Somalia has no effective means of prosecuting criminals outside their
borders for crimes committed within. The NSSP implementation will be sensitive to
Somalias increased need for adherence to IHL or Human Rights Law, and established
Rules of Engagement for the national security forces and institutions.


11
ICRC database of treaties signed by Somalia: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/Pays?ReadForm&c=SO
19

In addition, the TFIs and AMISOM are both obligated to ensure that civilians including
vulnerable groups such as women and children are protected from violence and atrocities
as a legal and moral endeavor. AMISOMs civilian protection strategy include: support
for the Transitional Federal Government, peace process, protection from physical
violence and creating a safe and violent free environment. The national security apparatus
will have the legal obligation to protect and serve the people including, women, children
and minority, IDPs etc. Translating these obligations during the implementation of the
NSSP will be a priority. Prioritizing the protection of civilians particularly women,
children and minority is both a legal and moral endeavor.

Respect for the culture, customs and religious beliefs: The majority of Somalis belong
to a pastoral, nomadic culture, herding camels and live-stock. Today, some of these live
in urban areas for part of the time. Dir, Isaq, Hawiye and Darod clans are primarily
pastoralists, and descended from the common ancestor Samale; in the south, the agro-
pastoralists are primarily Rahanweyn and Digil, descendents of Sab. The next largest
group is primarily cultivators, whilst smaller proportions of the population derives its
economic livelihood through commerce and fisheries, and live principally in the coastal
communities. There are numerous examples in which elders have brought inter-clan
violence to an end. This suggests that implementation of the NSSP should encourage
bottom-up solutions and traditional mechanisms as well as de-centralisation of some
functions. Ministry policies should reflect these traditional mechanisms where
appropriate, especially in the establishment of regional and district security committees. .
The NSSP must serve as a conduit for reaching out to these different groups and be
sensitive to their needs.

The informal method of resolving conflict through the use of clan elders is a key feature
of Somalias customs. The active participation of district commissioners, clan elders, and
religious and community leaders including women elders, leaders and preachers in the
NSSP implementation process and the link to restorative justice are strengths. These local
authorities, religious and community leaders can be powerful actors in conflict mediation
and SSD for Somalia. The NSSP must ensure that gender-based violence and the
protection of the vulnerable are addressed appropriately through main-streaming gender
issues in the detailed implementation plans that will be cascaded for all components
under the Strategic Objectives outlined in the broader results framework that is annexed
to this document.

The National Security vision is designed to adhere to Islamic legal principles as per the
TFG Charter. The NSSP therefore will be implemented bearing in mind the importance
of the human rights including womens rights in Islam, the unity of the Somali people,
embedding the progressive cultural values, traditions and customs for instance, the
training doctrines or other rules and regulations for the security sector institutions. The
NSSP must ensure that gender-based violence and the protection of the vulnerable are
addressed appropriately through ensuring gender responsive mechanisms are in place to
include engaging experts on gender and Sharia law, sensitizing and enforcing laws and
policies that guard women and girls from harmful cultural practices.


20

5. PRIORITIZATION AND SEQUENCING
As envisioned in the NSSP, the office of the President, Prime Minister, government
ministries, departments and agencies as well as non-state actors and relevant components
of the wider public make up the security and justice sectors in Somalia. This particularly
includes, the NSC, J SC and its technical working groups, line ministries of Interior,
Defense, justice, the NSF, SPF, NSA, coast guards, as well as structures from other
organs of government. The process or campaign of stabilizing Somalia would
immediately require prompt interventions and joint operations of each of these security
and justice apparatus.

Although the stabilization of Somalia would be the product of their direct effort, each of
these security and justice structures will need to develop their own areas of intervention
in a prioritized manner. The NSSP serves as the conduit for harmonization, merging,
coordinating and streamlining the priority actions and intervention of these security and
justice bodies at the strategic national level. Security is more sustainable when linked
institutionally and through policies and practices at all levels of government. Strong
coordination, collaboration and participation of all stakeholders is required. The NSSP
emergency phase requires capturing public attention and donor support.

Comprehensively improving the professionalism and operational effectiveness of the
security forces and institutions are urgent priority interventions for the NSSP. This is
reflective of what the Somalia government is going to do towards reclaiming the country
back from outlaws and various criminal groupings. A consolidated list of priority actions
and interventions are outlined in the annexes, to serve as a quick reference point to
support negotiation for support by the international donor community and to act as the
basis for the more detailed programmatic planning that both the TFG itself, and its
international development partners will wish to undertake in a phased, sequenced and
harmonized way. (see the Annex).


6. IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND EVALUATION
The limited institutional setting and human resource capacity available in Mogadishu, to
support the realization of critical transitional security sector development tasks as
outlined in the provisions of the Djibouti peace agreement has been a major source of
concern to the international community through the work of the J SC. In many instances,
the lack of adequate staffing and national institutional structures, has led to much lower
absorptive capacity of resources provided by the international community for sector
specific interventions. The implementation of the NSSP will not be an exception to this
trend if effective and credible strategic advisory support, coordination, implementation,
supervisory and monitoring systems are not put in place at all levels of the Somali
society.

The NSSP implementation process will be nationally owned, therefore the primary
responsibility will rest with all Somalis. The general institutions involvement for
implementation will consist of the TFG, line ministries, the security and justice
agencies/institutions, the TFP, regional and district security committees, and relevant
21

civil society (including traditional male and female leaders and elders, religious leaders/
preachers, sultans, NGOs community based organizations and womens groups), the
private sector, the UN, AU/AMISOM, EU, IGAD and the international community at
large. Effective collaboration and coordination among these entities will be crucial to
successfully implement the NSSP. While ownership will lie with Somalis, success will be
contingent upon building effective and strategic partnerships with the International
Community.

6.1 NSSP Coordination Mechanism
Four coordination and oversight bodies will be strengthened or set up to provide the
necessary implementation, quality assurance, oversight and leverage required for timely,
effective and efficient implementation of the NSSP, namely i) the J oint Security
Committee linked to the overall Kampala Roadmap Coordination and Monitoring
Mechanism, and (ii) the J SC Technical Working Groups (TWGs) (iii) the NSSP
Secretariat, and iv) the regional and district Security Committees.

a) Coordinating Development Assistance through the Joint Security Committee
(JSC)

In collaboration with UNPOS and AMISOM, the TFG has already in place the J SC
framework that supports security sector development policy and decision making
processes between the TFG and the international community. The J SC will also continue
to serve as a platform for coordinating all international assistance for the implementation
of the NSSP. The NSC will be its national counterpart. The Committee will also be
responsible for tracking, monitoring and evaluation of all sector specific projects related
to the NSSP. The J SC will have a secretariat in Mogadishu, to work closely with the
Somali-lead NSSP Secretariat.

b) JSC Secretariat and its Technical Working Groups (TWG)

The J SC Secretariat will comprise Liaison officers from the TFG, AMISOM and UNPOS
the three co-chairs of the J SC. The Secretariat will be established to support the J SC
policy guidance, monitoring and evaluation of the NSSP implementation process. The
J SC Secretariat and its technical working groups will have responsibility for

i) organizing J SC Meetings,
ii) reviewing sector specific progress and plans, consistent with the NSSP
benchmarks and indicators, and
iii) reviewing the work of the J SC technical working groups, and d)
promoting civil society/NGO and parliamentary participation and
inclusion in the implementation of the NSSP.

The J SC Secretariat will ensure international assistance is well coordinated for the
implementation of the NSSP. The Secretariat will appraise the J SC on progress and
problems in the implementation of the NSSP. A comprehensive set of Terms of
References for the J SC Secretariat will be developed and adopted by the J SC, with
emphasis on monitoring and evaluation functions.
22


c) The NSSP Secretariat

In the first year of implementation, the TFG will set up a NSSP Secretariat within the
Office of the President or the Prime Minister to provide technical support to the Somalia
National Security Council (NSC), line ministries and security and justice agencies and
CSOs to fast track the operationalisation of the NSSP Implementation Action Plan. Other
key functions of the Secretariat will include to:

i) set up and provide strategic advisory capacity support for the
implementation of the NSSP to all relevant defense, security and justice
line ministries, parliament, CSOs, and district security committees,
ii) support the development of sector specific project proposals based on a set
of results framework and monitor the outcome from all sectors and
districts security committees,
iii) coordinate with the J SC Secretariat in the preparation of the first annual
report on NSSP implementation, and
iv) work collaboratively with the J SC structures established for coordination,
monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the NSSP.

The institutional location of the Secretariat will be evaluated in the second year of
implementation of the NSSP. The secretariat will provide all progress reports on the
implementation of the NSSP to the J SC through its Secretariat.

d) Regional Administrations and District Security Committees

During the drafting process for the NSSP, a delegation of the TFG Ministers and officials
visited the regions and held discussion with regional administrations and ASWJ to
confirm to seek their agreement to and formal endorsement of the NSSP. The regional
states expressed that the principal security sector priorities were: dealing with al-shabaab,
many of whom have been arriving in the regions since being pushed out of Mogadishu;
the need for AMISOM to expand its operations to the north, and the need to deal with
piracy. They also expressed the serious need for humanitarian aid with a reported
400,000 IDPs in Puntland and no food aid ships coming into Bossasso.

Hence, in line with TFGs emerging security sector decentralization policy and
programmes, security coordination structures will be set up in each region and districts to
support tactical and operational planning, implementation and monitoring of the NSSP
process. All regional and district security committees will be set up through the Ministry
of Interior and National Security. The composition and size of the regional security
committees will be determined by each state authority with the support of the Federal
Government. On the other hand, the districts security committees will comprise of the
District Commissioner, district representatives of line ministries, the district/regional
police commander, district/regional brigadier commander, AMISOM, UN agencies,
international multilateral and bilateral partners, NGOs and representatives of civil
society, including womens groups, under the chairmanship of the TFG. Among others,
the district security committees will

23

i) monitor and track the implementation of NSSP specific projects and
activities at the district level,
ii) serve as early warning mechanisms for security threat and risks analysis,
and
iii) prepare weekly progress reports for review by the NSSP Secretariat and
the J SC secretariat.

6.2 Monitoring and Evaluation
It is evidence that M&E provisions were missing in the 2006 and 2009 NSSP
frameworks. Hence, it is desirable for the TFG and the international community to
develop joint results based monitoring and evaluation system that will support the
successful implementation of the NSSP. The proposed NSSP M&E framework must be
based on robust monitoring and performance benchmarks. The framework will attempt to
integrate and measure positive changes and impact of the NSSP on peoples lives in
Somalia. It will involve greater coordination of efforts at all levels.

The J SC Secretariat will take the overall lead in coordinating all higher level monitoring
and evaluation and oversight of activities of the NSSP. The NSC and its committees will
provide the national counterparts. In particular, the J SC will oversee and coordinate the
activities of the its technical working groups; ensure effective collaboration in data
collation to inform progress and adjustment of planned actions, analysis and reporting on
established and agreed benchmarks consistent with the NSSP implementation Action
Plan, the provisions of the Kampala Roadmap, and its monitoring and reporting
mechanisms.


7. FUNDING AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION OUTLOOK
Sustained and timely advisory, human and financial supports the implementation of the
NSSP priority actions need to be assured. Clearly, implementation of the 2006 and 2009
NSSPs suffered from funding gaps. Resource mobilisation is therefore crucial for
successful implementation of the NSSP. Time and means should be provided to harness
resources in a well coordinated manner. The NSSP implementation action plan will
require significant financial resources, especially meeting the costs of training, office
facilities/rehabilitation or reconstruction, stipends and salaries, and equipment to
strengthen the operational capabilities of the primary security and justice institutions and
agencies. Three main sources of funding have been identified: TFG own resources,
bilateral and multilateral resources/support, including the UN SSI Trust Fund
Mechanism.

TFG Resources-National Budgetary Allocations: The overall responsibility for
financing the NSSP implementation process lies with the TFG. The TFG will therefore
coordinate with international partners, bilateral and multilateral agencies, through the
work of the J SC and other stakeholders to ensure immediate and long-term financial
sustainability for the NSSP activities is maintained.
24

Bilateral Supports: Direct bilateral assistance to support the implementation of the NSSP
is envisaged. This has been the case in the past and it is necessary to ensure that such
assistance is, to the extent possible, well coordinated within the framework of the work of
the J SC, its technical working groups and the NSSP Implementation Action Plan. It will
be a duty of the J SC and the NSSP Secretariat to try at the very least to ensure that
activities funded in this way are harmonized in terms of their phasing and sequencing,
and their alignment with other activities and support especially if both types of support
are for one particular component, or with a view to contributing outputs to the
achievement of a common higher level outcome or strategic objective of the NSSP.
UN Programmes, Agencies and Security Sector Institution (SSI) Building Trust Fund
Mechanism: As a result of the current low level domestic revenue base, security sector
development interventions in Somalia has been heavily donor dependent. Continuing lack
or the availability of only limited donor support to some programmes, such as training,
reconstruction and rehabilitation of barracks and office space, stipend payments,
equipping the Somalia Police Force, army, coastal guards, and immigration officers, will
seriously impact on consolidating recent military gains in Mogadishu and in Somalia as a
whole.
The UN SSI Trust Fund mechanism established after the Istanbul conference in 2009
could be a perfect financial management and disbursement framework for SSD
interventions in Somalia. New donor support is required. There is huge funding gap to
continue to support Somalias security and justice sector development activities,
including issues around disengaging or defecting fighters/DDR in Somalia. Donor
contributions to the UN Somali Security Institution building Trust Fund need to increase,
not only to support SSD interventions, but also those that relate to stabilization and
recovery efforts in support of regional authorities and administrations.

On 22 December, 2010, The Security Council emphasizes the importance of
strengthening the Somali Security forces including the development of effective
command and control. While emphasizing the Somalis hold the primary responsibility
for achieving political stability, security and the rule of law, the Council urges Member
States and regional and international organizations to contribute generously and promptly
to the United Nations Trust Fund for the Somali security institutions, and to provide
assistance to the Somali security forces. The NSSP is resource intensive and its success
will require the fulfillment of pledges and contributions from bilateral and multilateral
organizations.

8. RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Article 11 of the TFG charter requires Somalia to have a decentralized system of
administration based on federalism, and provides a geographic definition of its
boundaries. This defines the scope of the task, but masks some of the current realities in
other regions such as Somaliland and Puntland. The NSSP should help to create the
conditions for improved security and access to justice throughout Somalia. It will require
25

increased political will from the TFG, Somaliland and Puntland authorities to collectively
engage in translating the envisioned National Security Vision for Somalia.

8.1 CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS
It is recognized that the mandate of TFG expires in August 2012, but that security and
stabilisation planning require longer horizons. Accordingly, this plan has a 3-year
horizon, and identifies some quick wins to create momentum. The NSSP will need to be
reviewed in the post-TFG mandate era.
26

ANNEX 1 : SOMALIA NATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILIZATION IMPLEMENTATION ACTION PLAN (NSSP) (to be implemented from
2011 to 2014)

Area/sector Key Issues Priority Action Benchmarks Responsibility Risks and Assumption
12


Strategic Objective One : To strengthen higher level security and justice policy and strategy development and Coordination Mechanisms
1.1. National Security
Policy and strategy
development capacity
strengthened
1.1.1. National Security
Council (NSC) Decision
making structure and
processes.
Establish a Secretariat to
support the work of the
National Security Council
(NSC) and the
implementation of the
NSSP.
4 6 weeks
Develop Terms of Reference, J ob
Description and Action plan.
3 months: Recruit personnel and
6 months: provide training, such
as confidentiality and procedures

Office of the President
lead
Office of the Prime
Minister (OPM)
executive body to
carry out all the tasks
in the benchmark
column
No political support. No
pre-planning process. Not
followed through all tasks in
the benchmarks column;

Absence of funds renders
NSSP implementation more
difficult

1.1.2. Joint Security
Committee Meetings
A J SC Secretariat
established, equip and
staff in Mogadishu


Baseline : UNPOS and Somalia
Embassy in Kenya currently
provide JSC Secretariat support
since August, 2010

Target : 4 6 weeks
TOR to be adopted, recruitment
process completed. Suitable
office identified with office
equipment.
UNPOS lead

OPM to oversee the
process.
AMISOM/AU and
other partners to be
consulted

A: UNPOS, TFG and
AMISOM identify a
conducive office space in
Mogadishu. Donors support
the J SC with technical
advice through the SSI trust
fund, R: Bureaucratic
process could delay the
establishment of the J SC
Secretariat.

Location of office not
properly consulted to all
concerned parties.
R: Violence spreads in run-up

12
The 2 Main Assumptions made in this document are:
1. that fulfilment of the requirements of the Kampala Accord will enable this NSSP to be valid for 12 months and then indicatively for a further 24 months to
consolidate the political transformation process; and
2. that IC funding support will be forthcoming to support Governments own revenues for many of the proposed activities.
27

to the end of the transition

1.1.3. Functional NSSP
Secretariat
Establish the NSSP
Secretariat to effectively
provide strategic advisory
support relevant line
ministries and agencies
Baseline : 0

Target : 2 months
NSSP Secretariat established,
NNSP Implementation
Coordinator appointed; staff and
equipped with Somalia qualified
strategic advisors to support the
implementation of the priority
actions in the NSSP by line
ministries, security and justice
agencies/institutions

Lead : Office of the
President/Office of the
Prime Minister

Partners: Ministry fo
National Security and
Interior, MOD,
J ustice, SPF, NSF,
Custodian corps, NSA,
planning, Min of
Gender & Family
Affairs; TFP and
CSOs
A: Political will and funding
available to establish NSSP
Secretariat.

R: Misunderstanding of
roles and responsibilities
between the JSC Secretariat
and NSSP Secretariat.

Selection and Recruitment
of strategic advisors
compromised
Organized regular
briefing sessions,
seminars and exchange
visits for National
Security Council (NSC)
members
Baseline : One Higher level
Senior Leadership seminar on
security decision making process
conducted in J anuary, 2011.

Target : 3 to 12 months

At least 5 to 10 briefing sessions
and seminars attended by NSC
members. Level of understanding
of SSD in Somalia, and the roles
and responsibilities of each line
ministries clearly understood.

Lead : Office of the
President

Partners: OPM, NSC
members, and
international
partners.
A: NSC willingness to
continue with higher level
briefings and seminars for
Ministers and head of
security and jsutcie
institutions.

R: Ad hoc arrangement,
change of ministers and
head of security institutions.
Politcial wrangling.
1.1.4. Legal and policy
framework
Undertake the reformation
of out-dated and
incompatible policies and
requirements as well as
draft new laws that are all
inclusive.

Baseline : 0

Target for assessment and
drafting: 6 to 9 months.

Establish a policy development
coordinating unit. All ministries
OPM Lead


Partners: All
ministers are
responsible to bring
new or revised
A: Prioritization of funding
due to competing priorities,
if not prioritized with strict
deadlines.
No proper appraisal to
ministers.
R: Lack of competent legal
28

existing policy and
legislation conforms to
international best
practice and standards
to assess all policy documents and
to identify and draft new laws.
Ministers to present their draft to
the COM for approval and
adoption, then OPM to forward
approved new laws to be tabled to
the parliament for ratification
before dissolution and elections.
documents to the
COM.
OPM to devise action
plan with timelines, so
each ministry can
report progress on a
weekly basis.
experts to assist ministers.
Bureaucratic process within
TFIs or No political support

1.2. Strategic planning 1.2.1 Decentralization of
Security Sector Asessment/
Development assistance.
Support the conduct of a
comprehensive Security
Sector Assessment (SSA)
in all regions of Somalia,
that include mapping of
gaps, needs and priorities
vulnerable sectors, such
as IDPs, women and
children
Baseline: SSA already completed
for South Central. DPs to fund
Regional

Target : In one year

SSA conducted in other regions
of Somalia, and start
implementation of actions plans
consistent with international
standards

Lead : Office of the
President and Prime
Minister


Target: Regional
administrations such
as Puntland,
Galmugud ,
Somaliland . Gedo etc;
UN and IC Partners
A: it will be possible to
align regional SSAs for
Federal policy making.
R: Lack of cooperation
between Regional
authorities;

Political risk in relations to
other emerging
administrations in Somalia
1.2.2 National Security
policy development
following the adopting of a
new constitution for
Somalia
Establish a gender
balanced sub-committee
to develop a National
Security Policy
Baseline: SSA and NSSP
Implementation Action Plan
developed


Target: By 2013
A comprehensive National
Security Policy formulated and
published for Somalia
Lead: Office of the
President/Prime
Minister

Partners: MIO,
MOD, Ministry of
Finance, TFP, CSOs,
J ustice, and
international partners
A: Political decision and
leadership, and
commitment to complete
a national security policy


R: disruption to NSSP
implementation due to
political wrangling
among the TFIs about
ending the transition

1.2.3 Develop a
comprehensive financial
Use external and local
resources and engage
Baseline: National budgetary
allocation and SSI Trust Fund.
Office of the
President;
A: TFG seek private sector
support to ensure continuity
29

resource mobilization
strategy that will finance the
implementation of the
NSSP.
more with private sector
and diaspora
Bi-lateral arrangements already
exist.

Target: 3 months
Donor pledging conference will
follow circulation of NSSP to IC.
OPM;
Ministry of Finance
for MDTF and bi-
lateral arrangements.
of funding and manage
expectations for the NSSP

R: Pace of transformation
slows/stops during run up to
ending the political
transition
1.3. Policy development on
cross-cutting issues
1.3.1 Protect the Somali
Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ)
Establish a J oint Maritime
Authority (J MA)


Baseline : Coast guards exist
within the National Security
Force (NSF) and the Somalia
Police Force (SPF)

Target : 1 year
Policy and Legislation drafted
and enacted to establish a J MA,
support the capacity building of
the Coast Guard and enhance
monitoring, control and
surveillance (MCS) of Somali
EEZ in accordance with United
Nations Convention of on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Action Plan developed in year 2.

Lead: MOD

Partners: Ministry of
Marine Resources,
Ministry of Interior,
Ministry of Justice,
and international
partners

A: Political will, human and
financial support available

R: security risk to personnel
and civilians, especially
international partners

1.3.2. Maritime Security and
Counter piracy policy,
legislation and programs
Appoint a Counter Piracy
Coordinator under a
designated Minister
Baseline : 0
Target : by 20 J anuary Effective
maritime security and counter
piracy policy and legislation in
conjunction with regional entities
including Puntland State of
Somalia and Somaliland
established:

Lead : Office of the
Prime Minister

Partners: Ministry of
Marine Resources,
MOD, Foreign
Affairs, Ministry of
Interior, Ministry of
J ustice, and relevant
international partners

A: The security
environment continue to
improve; political and
technical commitment
maintained

R: Lack of cooperation and
collaboration between the
regional entities, including
Somaliland and Puntland.
Develop an integrated Baseline : IOM and UNODC Lead : Ministry of A: Funding and technical
30

maritime security
management pilot
initiatives
support

Target: 6 months
Develop programmes for anti-
piracy community engagement
and linked coastal economic
projects by 20 December 2011
and begin implementation by 20
March 2012

Fisheries and Marine
Resources
Partners: MOD,
MOI, Office of the
President, Prime
Minister,
capacity available

R: Overcoming Political and
institutional structural
challenges in the creating or
design of a Somalia
Integrated Maritime
Security Programme
1.3.3. Counter-Terrorism
Policy and Strategy
: Undertake legal reviews
of the various defence and
security forces; prepare
organic laws; organise
stakeholder consultations;
build consensus and enact
organic laws/legal
frameworks related to
counter-terrorism in
Somalia
Baseline: 0, a number of counter-
terrorism training supports are
currently being provided to the
Somalia security institutions. No
national CT strategy has been
developed.

Target : National counter-
Terrorism Policy/Act and disaster
management/prevention and
preparedness schemes developed
Lead Agency: NSA

Partners: MOI, NSF,
SPF, Office of the
President, Prime
Minister, regional
states, TFP,
international partners
A: Eensure that Somali as
Counter-Terrorism Strategy
is guided by a legal
framework; ensure that the
defence and security forces
operations on CT within
legal codes; ensure civilian
oversight of the CTS
R:

1.3.4.Child Protection Prioritize action for the
release and reintegration
of children and youth
associated with armed
forces. Establishment of
a process to prevent the
recruitment of children
(under age 18) by all
Armed groups.
Baseline: Focal point appointed.
General orders issued by SNA
and AMISOM.
Target: 3 months
SoPs, policy and action plan
developed.
Legislation enacted ASAP.
Continuous process thereafter to
support pilot reintegration
programmes for children
associated with armed
forces/groups and children at risk
in Mogadishu and Dhusmareb
Lead: Ministry of
Women and Family
Affairs,
Partners: Ministry of
Interior, Ministry of
Defence, Ministry of
Labour & Youth; UN
Agencies, UNPOS,
UNICEF, IOM,
AMISOM, and donor
partners
A: TFG ensure timely
implementation of the
recommendations of the UN
Security Council Working
Group on Children and
Armed Conflict.

R: Increased threats from
insurgent groups such as Al-
shaabab

Lack of funding to support
reintegration of children
into local communities
1.3.5 Protection of women
and girls from all forms of
Prioritize action for the
prevention and response
Baseline: Focal point appointed.
General orders issued by SNA
Lead: Ministry of
Women and Family
A: TFG ensure timely
implementation of the
31

violence including sexual
exploitation and abuse
to sexual violence in
conflict in line with
UNSCR 1325, 1820, 1960
and AMISOM.
Target: 3 months
Task Force, Policy and action
plan developed.

Affairs,
Partners: Ministry of
Interior, Ministry of
Defence, Ministry of
Labour & Youth; UN
Agencies, UNPOS,
UNICEF, IOM,
OCHA, UNHCR,
AMISOM, and donor
partners
recommendations of related
UN Security Council
Resolutions on sexual
violence in conflict


Lack of funding to support
survivors of violence


1.3.6 Disaster Management Establish a National
Disaster Risk
Management
Department/structure to
develop a coherent policy
framework aligned with
the NSSP implementation
mechanism for Somalia
Baseline : NIL

Target: 6 to 12 months

Rehabiliate, equip, and staff a
start up National Disaster Risk
Management Department align
with the overall NSSP
framework.
Lead: Office of the
President

Partners: OPM,
Ministry of Interior
and National Security,
MOD, Fire Services,
SPF, NSF and the
international
community
A: Resources are provided
and the political will
maintained to support the
establishment of a National
Disaster Management
Department under the office
of the President.
R: Potential resistance from
some line ministries and
state institutions. Legal
instrument not enacted on
time .

1.4.Functional Security
Sector Ministries
1.4.1Ministry of Defence Develop a policy and
strategy on defence
transformation, military
integration, wounded in
action (WIA) and killing
in action (KIA);
collection and control of
weapons, including heavy
and small arms,
ammunition and
explosives, as well as
other dual-use items from
liberated areas;

Baseline : 0

Target :

Within 6 months for policy; 6
months for FR and Strategic Plan
cascading to 1 year Op Plan and
costing.
Lead MOD/NSF;

Partners: Cabinet,
MOI, NSF, Parliament
Consultants and
international partners;

A: Provided there is
political will and
commitment.

R: Lack of commitment,
changes in the actors;
deterioration of the security
situation; Lack of
consultancy funds;


32

Establish a SNF
transformation Secretariat
Baseline: 0

Target: 6 months
Support the establishment of a
defence and military
transformation Secretariats in
Mogadishu, South central
Somalia
Lead : MOD

Partners: office of the
President, prime
Minister, Ministry of
Interior, Finance,
J ustice, planning, and
international bilateral
and multilateral
partners
A: Defence and military
policy development and
making, including the
integration of friendly
forces and, administration
enhanced.

R: lack of fundingto
supports the transformation
process.
Refurbish and equip the
Ministry of Defence
Baseline : The US and the UK
are currently supporting the
rehabilitation of the Army/NSF
HQs, including Villa Baidoa

Target : one year
Additional donors come in to
support the Unted States and UK
in the refurbishment and
rehabilitation of the Defence
HQs in Mogadishu
Lead: MOD

Partners: Office of
the President, Prime
Minister, Ministry of
Finance


A: High-level commitment
and leadership exists within
relevant TFG ministries,
Parliament and agencies
Non-traditional donors
support this initiate to
enhance a number defence
and military related policies
and legal instruments e.g
Protection of Civilians,
Military integration etc; Use
of Child Soliders etc

R: TFG political
commitment falters (key
programme assumptions
prove wrong)
Somalia Defence
Transformation and the
national security vision
Baseline : o


Target: 6 months

Functional & Management
Review of Ministry. Strategic and
Operational Plans
Lead : MOD

Partners: office of the
President, OPM,
Ministry of planning,
Finance and National
Security, international
partners, including the
UN, CSOs/NGOs
A: Minister of Defence and
Director General provide
the leadership and funding
for a functional and
management review


R: SNF military posturing
along the frontline with
33

AGEs OR increased hostile
rhetoric towards Mogaishu
Draft legislations that will
tackle military integration
of friendly forces, killing
in action and wounded ,
child soldiers, GBV,
corruption, piracy,
Develop a policy
framework for child
soldiers, protection of
civilians;

Draft legislation ASAP.
Enactment and action planning:
6-12 months
Lead: Min J ustice;

Partners: MOD, Min
Gender & Family
Affairs, Min of
Interior, Cabinet,
Parliament and
Consultant

A: Provided there is
political will and
commitment.

R: Lack of commitment,
changes in the actors;
deterioration of the security
situation; Lack of funding;

1.4.2 Ministry of Interior
and National Security
Functional &
Management Review;
Results-oriented Strategic
and Operational Plans
Baseline : O

Target:
18 months
To train ministry personnel,
conduct FR, facilitate Strategic
Plan and Op Plan; provide office
equipment and adequate
operational cost. Attain an
effective professional and
accountable Ministry;

MOI-

Partners : lead Police,
NSA, office of the
Presdient and Prime
Minister; Ministries of
planning and Finance,
Local Government
authorities, Mayors
office and
international partners
A: Ministry needs met.
Establish internal guidelines
for the smooth functioning
of the J ustice Ministry is
acceptable continuously
check developments against
guidelines
R. Lack of political will,
security, lack of continuity,
lack of timely resource,
Policy and strategy
development capacity of
the Ministry of Interior
and national Security
enhanced
Baseline: Government of Japan
has already provided a start up
support for the creation of a
function Ministry of National
Security and Interior through the
SSI Trust Fund for 2011 to 2012

Target: 6 months
Policy development Unit
established, and qualify strategic
advisory staff selected and
recruited to support the unit under
Lead : MOI


Partners: Office of
the Prime Minister,
SPF, NSF, NSA,
Ministry of Finance,
A: An environment
which enables the
Ministry of Nattional
security and interior to
focus on the start up of
basic functions and
government services in a
responsbible and
accountable manner;
R:
Increased participation of
Ministery staff, and the
34

the Minister/Director General adherence of cabinet to a
reform and organization
=al change management
structure of the MOI
A coordinated intelligence
collection and analysis
established
12 months
Built all necessary machinery,
provide equipment and train
personnel
Lead: MOI
Partners: NSA, SPF,
and Coast guards,
adminstrationa staff of
the Ministry and
relevant international
partners

A. Ministry achieves
integration of
departments
R. competing and
rivalry environment
Rehabilitation and
equipment of the ministry

Baseline: some minimum
rehabilitation work has
commenced already, but very
minimal.


Target 24 months

Rehabilitate the three HQs in the
first 6-12months. By 18 months
refurbish all 16 police stations in
Mogadishu. By 24 months rebuild
or rehabilitate the rest district
police stations, NSA district
offices and MOI infrastructure.

Lead : MOI


Partners: Ministry of
Finance, planning,
works, private sector,
and international
partners
A. Complete some of the
work
R. buildings and
equipment overtaken by
other regimes.

R: Political and security
environment

Establish a Discipline
Internal Investigation Unit
to combat corruption and
corrupt practices within
SPF, NSA and other
departments in the MOI
Baseline: 0

Target: 2 years ( 2014)

MOI capacitated to combat
corruption and corrupt practises
Lead : MOI

Partners : Ministry of
Finance, office of the
Prime Minister, audito
general and
international partners
A: Participtaion of all
relevant ministries in charge
of security in setting up
transparency and
accountability structures in
there ministries
R: lack of standard
operational procedures and
procurement systems
35

undermines government
administration and
management
Ensure efficient use of
SPF and NSA financial
resources
Baseline : Obsolete financial
management and administrative
procedures
Target: one year

Accountability of SPF and NSA
resources enhanced and
comprehensive financial reporting
Lead: MOI

Partners : Ministry of
Finance and relevant
international partners
A: Imporved financial
transparency and
accountability measures
through the SSI trust Fund
mechanism; build financial
management capacities

R: Lack of adequate human
resources capacity to
enhance financial and
administrative capacities
1.4.3. Executive Oversight
Functions
Legal and policy
frameworks of the NSA,
SPF, and other relevant
security agencies under
the MOI reviewed with a
view of broadening the
civilian democratic
governance
Baseline : Minister and Director
General appointed, but with
limited human and institutional
resources to provide executive
oversight functions


Target : Develop and strengthen
corporate governance of the SPF ,
NSA, and introduce the change
Management Strategy for the
service
Lead : Ministry of
Interior

Partners: Office of the
President, Prime
Ministerr, Ministry of
Planning, NSA, SPF
and coast gaurds
A: An environment which
enables the Minister of
Interior and National
Security to exercise
executive oversight
functions of the police and
the other security services
under its pruview.

R: Political and executive
willingness to restructure
line of reporting between
the Minister and heads of
security agencies.
To build the capacity of
immigration department
in order to prevent illegal
movements (terrorist) in
collaboration with other
agencies.
12 months
Establish immigration points on
newly liberated borders.
Recruit, train and equip
immigration officers, due to
expanded territory
NSA lead
Immigration, police in
partnership with
customs and military
A. Government reaches all
its borders
R. Lack of coordination
with other agencies and
regional authorities,
lack of cooperation with
neighboring countries.

Establish a Coordinating 3 months MOI partners Lack of legal framework,
36

Secretariat to support
disengaging fighters
To establish the secretariat,
recruitment process, J ob
description, training,
Defense political support.
Establishment and
strengthening of regional
administrations and
district security
committees; Functional
Reviews and Plans.
Baseline: 0, however, the
Government of J apan has
provided initiatal funding for the
establishment of at least six
District Security Committees in
Mogadishu.

Targets: 12 months

At least 15 District Security
Committees Established,
including regional administrations

To consult with community,
launch public awareness
campaign, identify suitable
individuals, form committee with
roles and responsibilities
Lead :MOI

Partners: Office of
the President, Office
of the Prime Minister,
local government
authorities. Traditional
leaders, District
commissioners, SPF,
NSF, MOD, CSOs,
AMSOM, UN, and
relevant international
partners.
A: The Ministry provides
leadership and direction in
the establishment of District
Security Committee;
cooperation and
partnerships enhanced
amongst state and non-state
security stakeholders in
each identified districts.


R: Lack of security and
stability, cooperation and
partnership between the
Ministry and local
authorities, including
traditional leaders, and
warlords
Establish a clear national
legal and regulatory
framework for Defectors,
Small Arms and Light
weapons (SALWs),
including Safe storage
and management of
ammunition and
stockpiles, Mine Action,
and IED.
Baselien : 0
\
Target: 6 9 months

To review current policies and
procedure, prepare legislation
with consultation of legal experts,
prepare an action plan with
timeframe.
Lead : MOI, MOD
and office of the Prime
Minister

Partners: Office of
the President,
AMISOM, Ministries
of defence, planning,
Gender, NGOs/CSOs,
UNMAS, UNDP and
other agencies, and
international donors
and partners
A: continued leadership and
political commitment to
policy development
sustained.





R: Political support, delays
of legal frame work
ratification.
Lack of legal experts,
Develop policies and
SOPs between TFG and
AMISOM targeting
Baseline: Provisional measures
already initiated with TFG

Lead: MOI,

Partners: AMISOM,
A: Funding for meeting the
profiling, rehabilitation and
reintegration of
37

registration, screening,
vetting, care and follow-
up for disengaging
fighters/defectors and
their dependants.

Ensure the policies and
SOPs are in conformity
with international
standards, including
International Human
Rights and Humanitarian
Laws, other international
legal instruments related
to child soldiers,
protection of civilians
etc).

6 9 months
To appoint focal point to ensure
all agencies are consulted,
informed. Prepare terms of
reference and procedures. Draft
policy agreed and implemented.

Consult with legal experts to
ensure conformity with
international human rights
standards,

6 9 months



MOD, Office of the
Prime Minister, NSA,
SPF, NSF, Ministry of
Women Affairs and
Family Care, UN,
agencies, IOM, and
international partners
defectors/disengaging ro
surrendeees made available

R: Lack of coordination
among partners, lack of
political support, lack of
expertise.
1.4.4. Ministry of Justice
and Religious Affairs
Inaugurate the
functioning J SC J ustice
and Corrections Technical
Working Group and hold
the meetings regularly.

Baseline : 0

Target : 3 month
Provision of operation costs for
organizing coordination and
strategic planning meetings and
workshops on J ustice and
Corrections

Lead: JSC framework


Partners: Ministry of
J ustice, Office of the
Prime Minister,
planning, defence, and
international partners


A: The government in
proactively creating a legal
framework for the
establishment of a strong
independent judiciary;
Conduct Functional &
Management Review;
Facilitate mid term Strategic
ad annual operational plans

Office space and
demonstration of no
political will nd
commitment from the
relevant actors.

R. The justice will not
progress, efficient etc; R- if
security of judges is not
secured the judges will not
38

take up post etc


Rehabilitation and
refurbishment of the
Ministry of J ustice
building to include a
technical coordinating
secretariat for J ustice and
Corrections
Baseline : 0


Target : one year
A temporary building identified
and refurbished to support the
work of the Ministry of Justice

Lead : Ministry of
J ustice, Religious and
Affairs

Partners : Through the
J SC framework, UN
agencies, Ministry of
Finance, and office of
the Prime Minister
A: Build political will on
the part to reactivate the
Higher J udicial Council; in
the interim the Chief J ustice
should be empowered to
issue a transitional order to
provide judicial oversight;

R: Funding and donor
willingness to provide
assistance for reconstruction
and rehabilitation

Conduct a functional and
management review of
the Ministry of Justice,
religious affairs with view
of enhancing efficiency
and effectiveness of the
justice system and
administration a well as
the independence of the
judiciary.
Baseline : O


18 months

To train ministry personnel,
conduct FR, facilitate Strategic
Plan and Op Plan; provide office
equipment and adequate
operational cost. Attain an
effective professional and
accountable Ministry;

Lead : Minstry of
J ustice, Religious
Affaris


Partners: Partners :
lead Police, NSA,
office of the Presdient
and Prime Minister;
Ministries of planning
and Finance, Local
Government
authorities, Mayors
office and
international partners
A: Development of the
Somali J ustice and
Corrections Institutions
towards a normal
framework of accountability
and oversight and the
capacity to combat threats to
the peace process.

R: Political and security
stability


J ustice and Corrections
Capacity Technical
Secretariat aligned with
the J SC mechanisms
Procurement of equipment,
infrastructure development and
hiring of staff for the Justice and
Corrections Technical Secretariat
in Mogadishu under the Ministry
of Justice, Religious Affairs and
Lead: J SC Technical
Wokring on J ustice
and correction co-
chairs

Partners : Ministry fo
A: Development of the
Somali J ustice and
Corrections Institutions
towards a normal
framework of accountability
and oversight and the
39

Endowment.


J ustice, Judiciary,
Attorney generals
office, Custodiap
corps, SPF, NSF, UN,
and international
partners
capacity to combat threats to
the peace process.

R: partnership and
cooperation with
international actors within
the framework fo the jSC
working group on J ustice
and Corecctions
Evidenced-based Policy
and research support
Conduct mapping, research or
review on Islamic legal pluralism
in Somalia: exploring an
understanding of the interplay
between customary law (xeer),
sharia, and State Law as they
relate to Somalis Islamic legal
systems and principles, while
examining their compliance with
national laws and international
human rights standards


LEAD: Ministry of
J ustice , Religious
Affairs and
Endownment
Partners : Office of
the President, OPM,
ministries of finance,
planning, foreign
affairs, defence, and
national security ,
Ministry of Women
Affairs and Family
Care; CSOs,
Universities, TFP, and
international partners
A: Funding urgently made
available to support the
management and
functioning of the Ministry
of Justice, Endowment and
Religious Affairs. In terms
legal review and policy
formulation;

R: Political will and
leadership not sufficiently
developed around this issues
with all Somalis.

1.4.5. Running and
operational cost of the
Ministry of Justice,
Religious Affairs and
Endownment
Provision of operation
costs for organizing
`coordination and
strategic planning
meetings and workshops
on J ustice and Corrections

Baseline : TFG national
budgetary allocations for 2011

Target: 24 months

Provide extra-budgetary support
to the Ministry for meeting the
running cost for J ustice policy
development and coordination
Lead : Ministry of
J ustyice

Partners: Ministry of
Finance, Office of the
Prime Minister, UN
ahencies and
international partners
A: Governments continued
willingness to provide
running cost to the Ministry
R: Lack of adequate funding
and risk of corruption
1.4.6. Support formal court
structures and institutions
Provision of adequate
resourcing, stipends and
rehabilitation of the
infrastructure
Baseline : 0

Target : Within 12 months at least
one court in every district in
Lead : MOJ

Partners : MOF, UN,
donors and
A. Security will improve

R. if security doesnt
improve then buildings
40

Mogadishu functioning. In 24
months one court in each of
regional headquarters

international partners


could be taken over by
others and equipment
looted.
Renovate and equip the
supreme court, central
prisons in Mogadishu
Baseline : 0

Target : In 12-24 - Months
Renovation of the Supreme Court,
Mogadishu central prison and
Ministry of Justice compound and
all office equipment must be in
place.

Lead : MOJ

Partners: MOF,
J udiciary, Mayor of
Benadir, and Ministyr
fo Interior
A. Security will improve

R. if security doesnt
improve then buildings
could be taken over by
others and equipment
looted.
Case management support Baseline : 0

Target : Within 6 to 12 months
courts must have case
management system

Lead : Judiciary

Partners; MOJ , SPF,
Formal courts, NGOs,
UN and international
partners
A. Security will improve

R. if security doesnt
improve then buildings
could be taken over by
others and equipment
looted.
Sustainability of stipend
payments
Baseline :
with 12 months judges,
corrections corps and prosecutors
should be paid in full salary,
AG office functional in 6 months

Lead : MOJ

Partners; Ministry of
Finance, UN and other
international partners
A: Domestic revenue
increases to meet salaries
and stipends, and
international partners
continue to provide support.

R: financial crisis persist,
and funding to sustain
stipend scarce.
Training and capacity
building for judges,
prosecutors and other
personnel
Various capacity building
activities and training for
judges, prosecutors and
other personnel including
correctional officers in the
areas such as
development of codes of
conduct, disciplinary
Baseline : Some professional
training have been delivered
through UNDP.
Target : 12 months
Continue and sustain current
professional training programmes,
including human rights and
gender, for the judges and
Lead : MOJ


Partners: Ministry of
Finance, Office of the
Prime Minister, UN,
AMISOM, and
relevant international
A. human resources, in
place

R. availability of many
actors claiming judiciary
accreditation
41

mechanisms and selection
and appointment
procedures, the
publication of judicial
decisions, the adoption of
anti-corruption measures,
and the promotion of
public awareness
campaigns to improve the
image and credibility of
the justice system.
prosecutors including tailor made
training for Sharia scholars and
traditional elders.

In 6 months -3 years - Provide
Correctional Corps recruit and
training, including instruction in
the development of registers,
standing and operational order to
approximately 8000 -10000
guards and officers.

partners




Legal training centres for
magistrates etc
Baseline : 0


Target : 36 months

Establish magistrates schools,
legal training centres and
continuing education courses for
judges, prosecutors and lawyers,
utilizing the capacity of national
trainers and training institutions
Lead : MOJ

Partners : Ministry of
Finance, Office of the
Prime Minister, UN,
AMISOM, IGAD, and
relevant international
partners

A: Funds are available to
support the establihsmnet of
training centres for
magistrates

R: Insecuirty and lack of
funding to support the
establishment of higher
institution of training for
maogistrates etc
Improve gender justice
though the development
of women's professional
associations; review of
laws to ensure adequate
gender issues that have
particular importance to
women such as gender-
based violence
Baseline 0

Target : 12 to 24 months

Organised several consultative
meetings on SSD, CEDAW ,
Resolution 13 25, 1820 to
mainstream gender sensitive
approach to security sector
development in Somalia
Lead : Ministry of
Gender and Children

Partners: MOD, MOI,
SPF, NSF, Ministry of
Finance, planning ,
NSSP Secretariat and
international partners,
including NGOs etc
A: Funds are available to
support the establihsmnet of
training centres for
magistrates

R: Insecuirty and lack of
funding to support the
establishment of higher
institution of training for
maogistrates etc
Creation of J unile courts Baseline : limited

Target : 24 months

Lead : MOJ

Partners : Magistrate
courts, supreme,
A: Finances are available to
support the establihsmnet of
training centres for
magistrates
42

Enhance justice for children
through alternatives to detention
for children; the creation of
juvenile courts/panels, and the
development of child-sensitive
procedures and protective
measures for child victims and
witnesses
Ministry of Finance,
Partliament, CSOs and
international partners

R: Insecuirty and lack of
funding to support the
establishment of higher
institution of training for
maogistrates etc
Create coordination body
of MOJ , Courts, Police
and Correctional


In 6 months coordination of
justice law and order institutions
is created with terms of reference
elaborated.
MOJ is lead
MOI
A; J udiciary delivery will be
effective

R: Could result in
duplication, conflict of
interest
Creation of abridging
mechanisms such as
temporary mobile courts
to facilitate justice
delivery in lieu of the
establishment of district
and regional courts..


Establish free legal aid system in
12 months that includes the
recruitment and training of
women paralegals to support
survivors of gender related
violence.

Within 6 to 12 months Several
mobile courts should be setup


Re-open regional /district courts
as security improves under TFG
control

Lead : Court is lead


Partners : MOJ,
Parliament to endorse
and international
partners to fund as
deem necessary
A: No courts outside the
capital

A. Security

R: Duplication of work of
other justice providers like
traditional elders.
Create and establish
Referral Networks
Baseline : 0
Target : 36 months

Support a referral network for
victims services such as legal
assistance, strengthening of the
alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms, and the setting up of
Lead : MOJ

Partners : CSOs,
Ministry of Finance,
education NSSP
Secretariat, OPM, and
international partners.
A: No courts outside the
capital

A. Security

R: Duplication of work of
other justice providers like
traditional elders
43

court service centres and help
desks.
Transitional J ustice and
Reconciliation issues

Dual track justice and
reconciliation mechanism
to deal with ex insurgents
and other militias
providing criminal
proceedings for war
crimes and gross human
rights abuses
Create government inter
departmental body that will
recommend ways and modalities
to deal with those insurgents to be
prosecuted and not amnestied and
perpetrators of sexual violence
ASAP

Government should act
on recommendations within 6
months

Government must have an overall
transitional justice policy in 3
years
Prime Minister A: the Government will
agree to set up this body.

A: Al Shabaab fighters will
ask for
amnesty/surrender/re-
integration.

R: Rivalry, conflict of
interest, duplication, lack of
political will, could raise
security issue

Gross justice violations may
happen.

R: Lack of clarity in the
scope and modalities of
jurisdiction
Establishing laws
ensuring respect for
private properties and
communally owned lands
and national land and
ensure the prevention of
land grabbing by any
actor.



Within 24 months Develop
legislation and regulation of
construction and land usage;
property rating system for
taxations etc.
Municipal authorities. A. government will agree to
address land issues.

R. increased conflict
Strategic Objective two: To rebuild affordable, accountable and professional defence/army, security, justice and Custodian Corps Agencies and Institutions
2. 1. National Security
Force
2.1.1. Build functional and
efficient military forces

Recruit, train, equip and
sustain the Somali
National Forces that is
capable of fulfilling their
Baseline :

3 years projection is 26,000.
Currently there is 7000 well
Lead : MOD;

Partners: Min of
Finance, Min of
A:
Provided there is continuous
funding from the IC, Political
will and adequate training
44

mandates, by imparting
them an improved and
comprehensive capacity-
builoding programme,
including the provision of
appropriate selection and
recruitment mechanism,
training , equipment, and
gender complaince

trained but not well equipped
and 9000 not well trained.
- 6000 to be trained in 12
months.
- 12 000 to be trained in 24
months.
- 18 000 to be trained in 3 years.
Health, Min of
Interior and
AMISOM.
support.

R: Lack of financial support,
lack of training facilities,
inadequate trainers.
Establish standardized
organizational military
structure for small units
(company, platoon and
squad) that would
determine unit
formation and a clear
ranking structure
corresponding to its
size.
Baseline : Baseline: Some units
are already organized.

Target: 12 months
The process of selecting , vetting
and recruiting Somlis into the
ranks of NSF will be done in a
transparent and accountable way
to ensure regional and clan
balance within the NSF. To
ensure the size and strength of
the security forces , aproper
registration process will be
established.

All personnel should be issued a
picture ID carried all the time
and they must be verified and
accounted for.
Lead : NSF

Partners : MOD,
Office of the
President, Prime
Minsiter, Ministry of
Interior and Ntaional
Security, Ministry of
planning and finance


.A: Political decision to
reorganize the military
structure for small units etc

R: Lack of financial support to
manage organisationa change
management processes relted
to the NSF.
Conduct a gender
mapping of NSF to
promote the integration of
gender perspectives in the
reforms (from
recruitment, training,
promotion, logistics)

Baseline : 0

Target : 12 months

Encourage recruitment and
training of female trainees
Lead : MOD/NSF

Partners: EUTM,
US, AMISOM, and
international partners
A: Funding available to
conduct gener and SSR
mapping and research

R: Cultural beliefs and
concerns.
45

2.1.2. Military Integration
and transformation
Facilitate a unified
Command and Control
structure for the NSF,
including the integration
of all armed groups into a
unified national force


Baseline: Between now and 2
years time. The agreement
between Al-Sunnah W.J is
already in place.

Target: 12 months

The Somali NSF in collaboration
with the IGAD Coordinating
Mechanism, AMISOM and other
international partners are
reorganized

The Executive
Branch;

Partners: MOD, IC,
AMISOM and IGAD

A: Provided all state armed
groups allied to TFG are
willing to integrate. More
J unior Commanders trained

R: Lack of Political will and
commitment; lack of funding;
security situation allowing.

Split and fragmentation of the
NSF, friendly militias and the
emergency and increased
warlordism once more
2.1.3.Terms and Conditions
of Services (TACOS)
Harmonization and
sustainability of stipend
payments
Baseline: The IGAD
Coordinating Mechanism
established for payment of
stipends. US and Italian
Governments have agreed to
continue to pay stipends to the
NSF up to mid 2012.

Target : 2 years
Additional non-traditional
donors required to sustain and
complement stipend payments to
the Somali NSF for to meet the
cost of at least 18,00 personnel
Lead: Office of the
President, MOD/NSF

Partners: Office of
the Prime Minister,
Ministry of Finance
and international
partners, e.g. US,
Italy, UK,
A: Biometric electronic
database completed. Efficient
payment mechanisms ensure;
morale, loyalty, cohesion
prevent defections to Anti-
government Elements (AGEs)



R: Lack of sustained donor
funding to improve Terms and
Conditions of Services for the
NSF
2.1.4. Force size and
composition
Streamline selection,
recruitment and training
process for new NSF
personnel; establish a
harmonized NSF
biometric database
system; ensuring vetting
process and criteria in
accordance with
international norms and
Baseline : 3,500 NSF personnel
have been registered through a
harmonized biometric database

Target: 12 months

Entire NSF personnel registered
in the biometric database by
2012
Lead: MOD/NSF

Partners: Ministry
of Finance, Office of
the President and
Prime Minister; UN,
AMISOM and
international bilateral
partners
A: Political will to complete
project before the expiration
of funding

R: Funding, continued lack of
transparency and
accountability for every NSF
personnel; existing JSC/donor
coordination mechanisms not
adhered to
46

standards.

2.1.5. Equipment of the
NSF
Sustaining the equipment
of the Somalia national
Security Forces
Baseline: A number of bilateral
donors are currently providing
funding vehicles, food, fuel,
boots and uniform;
Target : 12 months
Provide additional vehicles to
include tactical vehicles and
comms for deployment of NSF l
Lead : MOD/NSF

Partners: Ministry of
Finance; and
international partners
e.g US, UK, Italy
AMISOM, and UN
A: Government and
international communitys
willingness to support
additional NSF transportation
and communication
equipments;

R: Operational Sustainability ,
maintenance and repair costs
2.1.6 Capacity building of
the coast guards/Navy
To secure Somalias
territorial waters and
enhance the capacity to
protect coastal and
maritime security,
including piracy, toxic
waste dumping, and
illegal fishing and armed
robbery in the Somalia
coast., it is critical that in
addition of strengthening
the operational
capabiloity of NSF
elements in land, to build
a viable Somali Navy.
Baseline : Limited capacity

Target 24 months

Build efficient operational
capacity , training , arm and
equip with adequate weaponry,
technology an dsupplies ( patrol
Boats, adequate ships , rada and
radios)
Lead : NSF/MOD

Partners : SPF, NSA,
and international
partners.
A: Government and
international communitys
willingness to support
additional NSF transportation
and communication
equipments;

R: Operational Sustainability ,
maintenance and repair
services when government
revenue is currently weak.

Political instability etc
2.1.6. NSF Medical Support Reconstruction and
equipment of the Di
Martini Hospital.
Baseline: Italian Government is
currently funding the partial
reconstruction of the Di Martini
hospital.

Target: Additional donor
funding required to complete the
reconstruction of the hospital.
More Somalia Diaspora doctors
attracted/
Lead ; MOD

Partners: AMISOM
NSF; SPF and
civilians; Italian and
other international
partners
A: TFG appointed medical
Director and nurses is
maintained; AMISOM to
continue to provide medical
care and personnel

R: Relocation support and
salaries to staff of the Military
Hospital; Medical supplies
sustained through government
funding
47

Encourage dialogue and
consultations, meetings
and conferences that lead
to national reconciliation
Baseline : 0

Target: 6 months

Continuous process of
participation of the NSF in
district security committee
meetings, public debate with
local communities

Lead: Min of
Constitution & Nat.
Reconciliation
- Partners:
MOD, NSF,
Executive and
Parliament, IC.

A: Provided aggrieved parties
are ready to dialogue.
R: Lack of Political will and
commitment, lack of funding,
security situation allowing.


Find a lead nation willing
to coordinate, train and
equip the National
Security Forces (NSF)
Baseline :

Target : Within 1 year
Lead Executive; and
Lead : MOD :


Partner: Min of
Foreign Affair,
Finance and planning
Relevant bilateral and
multilateral partners
e.g UN , US, and EU
A: Provided there is interested
member state to take the lead.
R: Unavailability of a willing
nation and/organization, Lack
of political will.


2.1.7. Future Training
Needs and Policy
Additional technical and
specialized trainings
received, including
Command and Staff
training for NSF

The NSF training should
also encompass a strong
civic orientation
programme that teaches
the troops citizenship,
peace and religious
education (i.e. citizens
rights and responsibilities,
human rights, the rule of
law, common good and
loyalty.
Baseline: 16 000 NSF (7,000
well trained and 9000 not well
trained). Training Needs
Analysis Conducted

Target : 12 month
6000 to be trained in specialized
skills e.g. C2; and a total of
18000 trained by 2014
Lead : MOD/NSF

Partners: US,
AMISOM, EUTM,
UN, and other
relevant international
partners
A: Findings and
Recommendations of the J SC
MTWG TNAs are utilized to
review the NSF Training
Curriculum based on the
current and merging military
scenarios
R: Provisions of parallel and
competitions for the delivery
of training services without
reference to the work of the
MTWG
48

2.1.8. Delivery of NSF
trainings inside Somalia
Rehabilitation of Al
J azeera Camp in
Mogadishu
Baseline : Rehabilitation of Al
J azeera Training camp have
started
Target : 6 months
Rehabilitation and expansion of
training camp using EU funding
to provide the camp with 2000
beds. NCOs recruits trained in
Somalia
Lead : MOD/NSF

Partners: NSF, NSA,
etc AMISOM/
EASFCOM, US, EU
and other bilateral
and international
partners
A: The training camp will
ensure NSF forces are trained
inside Somalia, including T#
(Trainer-the-Trainers.
Courses). Donor Funding
sustained

R: Protective security and
access control to the training
camp site are relaxed;
The TFG takes advantage of
existing regional and
international training
support for the NSF, the
Somalia Police Force (SPF),
NSA, custodian corps, etc as
a step towards standardizing
its national security and
defence doctrines and
improving the
professionalism
development of all elements
of the security and justice
agencies.
Sustain training and
capacity building support
for other regional forces
outside Mogadishu and
beyond
Baseline: Uganda, Djibouti,
Kenya and Ethiopia providing
training for NSF and associated
friendly forces.
Target: 6 months
More training assistance,
equipment and logistics support
required for the regional forces
outside Mogadishu, e.g.
Puntland, Galmugud, Gedo,
Lower Shabelle, Somaliland etc,
including ASWJ
Lead : MOD/NSF

Partners: Office of
the President, Prime
Minister; National
Security Council,
Bilateral donors, and
regional member
states
A: All training assistance,
equipment and logistics
support required or provided
for the regional forces outside
Mogadishu are endorsed and
approved by the J SC through
respective technical working
groups.

R; Non-compliance with the
J SC provisions by bilateral
donors
2.1.9. Stockpile
management
Establishment of
Government armories
Baseline : 0


Target : 2 year
Partners are willing to provide
support for the establishment at
least one to two international
standard armory
Lead: MOD; -

Partners: Min of
Interior, international
partners

A: Provided there is a political
will, commitment and
adequate funding.
R: Lack of funding, lack of
capacity.

Monitor and report the
effects of the nuclear and
chemical waste dumping
and the illegal fishing in
the National waters
Baseline : 0


Target : 1 year

Lead: Min of
Fishery, Marine
Resources and
Environment;
Partners: Executives
A: Provided there is support
and cooperation from the IC.
R: Lack of funding, lack of
capacity, lack of cooperation
of International agencies.
49

Policies and strategies to deal
with chemical waste dumping
and illegal fishing developed and
implemented.
& International
Agencies.


2.1.10. Prevention and
Recruitment Children in the
Somalia Conflict
Ensure timely
implementation of the
recommendations of the
Security Council working
group on Children and
Armed Conflict
Baseline: TFG focal point and
human rights for child soldiers
appointed. General Orders on
the use of child soldiers have
been prepared and circulated.

Target: 3 months
Task force on Child Protection
issues urgently required
Lead : Office of the
Prime Minister

Partners; MOD,
Ministry of Gender,
Women and children
Affairs; MOI;
CSOs/NGOs, TFP,
UN, AMISOM, and
relevant international
partners
A: Continue political will and
commitment maintained;

R: Lack of cooperation from
the NSF and its associated
friendly forces.
2.1.11. Prevention and
Protection of women and
girls from sexual violence in
conflict
Ensure timely
implementation of the
recommendations of the
Security Council
resolutions on women,
peace and security
Baseline: TFG focal point on
sexual violence in conflict
appointed. General Orders on
the armed forces code of conduct
revised/prepared and circulated.

Target: 3 months
Task force on women, peace and
security urgently required
Lead : Office of the
Prime Minister

Partners; MOD,
Ministry of Women
Affairs and Family
Care; MOI;
CSOs/NGOs, TFP,
UN, AMISOM, and
relevant international
partners
A: Continue political will and
commitment maintained;

R: Lack of cooperation from
the NSF and its associated
friendly forces.
2.2. Somalia Police Force 2.2.1. SPF size and
composition, including the
conduct of a census of the
SPF;

Recruit and train
additional SPF personnel
(ensure gender balance);
Development of a
transparent accountability
mechanism for the SPF

Baseline : 5,000 SPF personnel

Target: 10,000 by year 3
Capacity of SPF to provide
peace and security and public
order enhanced. Biometric
System for the SPF established.
Lead : SPF

Partners: MOI,
NSA, AMISOM
Police Component,
and relevant
international partners
A: Strong political will and
commitment currently exist
among the TFIs to engage on
SSD activities in Somalia. The
IC indeed working hard to
sustain this momentum;

2.2.2. SPF transformation Organizational structure
and Operating procedures,
including the Integration
of serving SPF personnel
Better understanding of the
concept of SPF corporate service
enhanced and policy for
corporate governance formulated
Lead: SPF

Partners: MOI,
NSA, Un agencies,
A: Strong political will and
commitment currently exist
among the TFIs to engage on
SSD activities in Somalia. The
50

and comprehensive human
resource records of SPF
maintained
AMISOM Police
Component, and
relevant international
partners
IC indeed working hard to
sustain this momentum;
R: Resistance from the rank
and file of the SPF leadership
structure
2.2.3. Transportation and
Logistics Restructuring of
the SPF
Provide adequate
transport and logistics to
enhance the operational
effectively of the SPF
Baseline: SPF currently have 6
pick ups

Target : 6 months

Provide 5 APCs, 25 Police 4*4
pick up trucks procured and
provided to the Somali Police
Force; 3 trucks (7 tons
capacity) procured and provided
to the Somali Police Force; ; 2
Ambulances procured and
provided to the SPF

Lead : SPF

Partners:

MOI, NSA, NSF, and
other security/justice
agencies
A: Government of J apan
funding through the SSI trust
Fund is available and
procurement process is
concluded as soon as possible.

R: Procurement delays
obstructs the performance of
the SPF.

Insecurity as a result of
renewed fighting.
2.2.4. Special Crowd
Control, Riot and Patrol
Units
Establish rapid response
frontline units to enhance
community policing
together with AMISOM
Police enforcement
capabilities.
Baseline: Already established
consistent with the Mogaidhsu
security plan following Al-
shaababs withdrawal.


Target: SPF special patrol, riot,
crowd control and community
police units established to work
with AMISOM Formed Police
Units (FPU).
Lead : SPF

Partners: NSF,
Coast guards,
Custodian corps,
NSA. Office of the
President and the
NSC. Relevant
international partners
A: Adequate riot and crowd
control equipments are
provided such as handcuffs,
helmets and batons.

R: Al-shaabab snipers and
increased asymmetric warfare
Logistic and equipment
support
Baseline : 0

Target: 6 months

Through the SSI trust Fund,
Procure relevant office
equipment, weapons and
Lead : SPF

Partners: MOI,
Ministry of Finance
and UN through the
SSI Trust Fund
A: Government of J apan
funding already available to
start provision of logistics and
equipment for the SPF

R: Delays in procurement and
disbursement of funds. Lack
51

communications, Vehicles,
systems., uniform and transport

of Maintenance and repair
costs may have impact on
sustainability of equipment;

Insecurity and accident/IEDs
2.2.5. SPF Communication
Network
Review existing SPF
communication strategy
to further enhance the
effectiveness of the SPF
Baseline : Reliance of NSF and
AMISOM communication
network

Target : 3 months

Communication capability of
SPF enhanced by procuring
installing equipments including
20 VHF bases and 1800 VHF
handsets for the SPF
Lead: SPF
Communication
department

Partners: NSF,
NSA, coast guards,
AMISOM and UN
police, UN agencies
and relevant
international partners
A; 1068 communication VHF
hadn radios, 20 VHF based
and 8 communication mats
are now in Mogadishu to be
handed over to the SPF.

R: frequency assessment
mission have been undertaken,
but expectations of the SPF
need to be managed and
training is urgently required.
2.2.6. Training support Middle management
skills: Provide local and
overseas training
/exchange programmes
for staff of the Anti-
Teerorism Unit, CID,
Drugs of the SPF

Baseline : UNDP and other
bilateral countries such as
Sudan, Egypt, etc have been
providing middle level
management trainings to the SPF

Target : 12 months

Target: At least 200 SPF senior
officers trained in middle level
management skills. SPF
capability to manage personnel
records/files improved. Capacity
of SPF CID, and other
specialized units/Departments
to gather intelligence enhanced.
Quality training for SPF
provided.


Lead : SPF/J SC
PTWG
Partners: Ministry
of National Security
and Interior, NSF,
NSA, Ministry of
Finance, and relevant
international partners
such as UN agencies,
AMISOM, EU, and
other bilateral and
multilateral partners
A: All specialized
management courses provided
consistent with the
J SC/PWTG training curricula
for the SPF.

R: Selection, recruitment and
training of the SPF personnel
conducted without reference to
international accredited and
harmonized training processs

Not linking training provisions
to stipend payments
52

2.2.7. Refurbishment and
rehabilitation of SPF police
stations
Refurbish or rehabilitate
the SPF stations in
Mogadishu and other
regions of Somalia
Baseline: 6 to 7 Police Stations
in Mogadishu/under the control
of TFG/AMISOM are partially
functional.

Target : 12 months
Rehabilitate 20 SPF police
stations with the south central
region, and the HQ in
Mogadishu.


Lead : SPF

Partners; J SC
PTWG sub-
committee on
Rehabilitation of SPF
police stations;
relevant donors

A: Funding for phase 1 ( 6
SPF Police Stations) of the
rehabilitation is already
available from Government of
J apan. Phase 2 will required
substantive donor support.

R: Rehabilitation delays due
to procurement procedures
involving local tenders and
bidding process. Inusfficient
funding to undertake phase 2:
rehabilitation and
reconstruction of more SPF
stations.
2.2.8. Sustainability of
stipend payments to the SPF
Sustained Somali Police
Force stipend payments



Baseline: A total of 3065 SPF
personnel have received stipend
payments up to May 2010.

Target: 36 months ( June 2010
to 2014)

Stipends payment lists for the
entire SPF registered and
verified personnel through the
J SC PTWG harmonized and
sustained by the international
community till end of 2014.,
with the Somalia Government
gradually taking over the cost of
stipends.


Lead: J SC
PTWG/SPF

Partners: MOI,
Ministry of Finance,
Stipend payment and
monitoring
committee, Office of
the Prime Minister,
UN agencies,
AMISOM, and
donors
A: Government of
J apan and the European
Union support to
stipend payments for
the SPF sustained.
Other non-traidtional
donors provide
additional funding to
close the funding gaps.

R: Insecurity due to
payment
delays/absence of
payment for

Establish a biometric
system for the SPF
Baseline : Electronic database
exists through UNDP


Lead : SPF


Partners: MOI,
A: PTWG decision to
harmonise biometric database
to register all SPF personnel

53

Target : 12 months

Streamline selection, recruitment
and training process for new SPF
personnel; establish a
harmonized NSF biometric
database system; ensuring
vetting process and criteria in
accordance with international
norms and standards.

MOD, SPF, ministy
of Finance, and
international partners.

R: Not conducting proper
vetting and screening process.
2.2.9. Terms and Conditions
of Services (TACOS) for
the SPF
Review Terms and
Conditions (TACOS) of
the SPF
Baseline : SPF quarters, barracks
and training centres deplorable
in and outside Mogadishu, e.g in
Puntland

Standard of living of SPF
personnel improved, including
construction
Lead : MOI

Partners : SPF,
Ministry of works,
Finance, and
potential international
partners
A: Funding to support
reconstruction of
barracks/accommodation for
the SPF through south central
Somalia made available.

R: Access to SPF buildings
and land constrained due to
insecurity and escalation for
conflict.
2.2.10. Basic operational
and administrative needs of
the SPF met

Define SoPs for the SPF
Command , Control and
organizational structures
Baseline :

Target : 24 months

Benchmark: outreach ongoing


Lead : SPF

Partners: MOI,
Ministry of Finance,
J SC PTWG, UNDP,
UNPOS,
A: need a strong will and
commitment from SPF
Command.

R: frequent change of
command in SPF
2.2.11Logistics and running
cost s SPF Police Stations
Maintenance and
operation cost for of the
SPF Police Stations,
including running cost for
police operations (Main
HQ) and District police
stations, wards ,
maintenance and fuel for
vehicles

Baseline : National budgetary
allocation (30%), limited
running costs available to cover
up to 5 to 8 police stations

Target : 24 months

Support the running costs of
Lead: SPF

Partners: MOI, UN
agencies, ministry fo
Finance, J SC PTWG,
UNDP, UNPOS, and
international partners
A: Funding for running and
maintenance costs are
sustained; TFG meets at least
30% of this cost.

R: Limited domestic revenue
impacts of national budgetary
allocation, including less
budget to the SPF. TFG
54

police vehicles, generators for
20 Police Stations by 2013,
including HQ and the airport
police station

limited capacity to take over
running costs, particularly
maintenance and repair
services to vehicles and office
generators.
2.2.12. Accommodations for
SPF
Construct/rehabilitate
barracks for SPF
personnel nationwide that
are sensitive to needs of
female personnel
Baseline : 0

Improved working and living
environment lead to better
performance of the SPF
respectful of men and women
SPF needs
Lead: SPF

Partners; MOI,
Ministry of Finance,
Office of the Prime
Minister and
international partners
A: Funding availability and
political will
R: National domestic revenue
doest not increase due to
insecurity from Al-shabaab
and other anti-governmental
elements.
2.2.13. SPF Airport/Civil
Aviation Security Capability
Provide adequate support
for response capability
against armed attack,
plane crash and hostage
taking at the Airport
Baseline: IOM currently
providing support to the SPF and
NSA for immigration support.

Target : 12 months
At least 30 SPF Airport security
officers trained and equipped
with relevant devices and
communication sets. Capability
on civil aviation security
enhanced, Provide adequate
support for response
Lead : Somalia
Airport Management

Partners; SPF, NSF,
Fire brigade/Force,
MOI, Ministry of
Transport and
Communication, and
relevant international
partners
A: Mapping and assessment
of the threats and risks to
aviation security in Somalia
carried out based on ICAO
standards. Funding is available
to support the SPF and other
relevant security sector
agencies.

R: Selection and recruitment
process into the aviation
security wing of the SPF.
Terrorism and organized crime
infiltration
2.2.14. Maritime Police
/Coast Guards
Select, recruit, train and
equip the Maritime
Police/Coast Guards unit
within the SPF on
Maritime and border
security
Baseline:

Target: Capacity of SPF coast
guards to handle maritime and
border security improved
Lead : MOI
Partners: MOD,
SPF, NSF, Ministries
of planning and
Finance.
A: Given the strageic
importance of Somalia natural
resource base for its peace
building efforts, the
strengthening of coast guards
will ensure an integrated
maritime security capability is
sustained to effectively
promote monitoring
surveillance and control
(MSC) mechanisms for the
55

EEZ.

R: lack of funding and
insecurity, worst lack of
political commitment and
instability.
2.2.15. SPF medical
support
Refurbish SPF hospital to
meet the medical needs of
all personnel (men and
women)
Baseline: minimum SPF
medical facilities/allowances are
being provided to the SPF by
TFG.

Target: 12 months
SPF health care delivery
capability enhanced
Lead : MOI


Partners: MOD,
SPF, NSF, Finance,
AMISOM, Ministry
of Health and
international partners
A: Funding for medical
facilities for SPF is available

R: Low domestic revenue
impact on budgetary
allocation.
2.2.16. SPF anti-Terrorist
Unit
Train and equip the Anti-
Terrorist Unit of the SPF
to effectively perform
duties assigned to them
Baseline: Limited training
delivered to the SPF on Counter-
Terrorism

Target: 12 months

Establish a transnational crime
and terrorism unit within the
SPF. Provide adequate security
intelligence and police records
on terrorism in Somalia
Lead : SPF

Partners: MOI,
NSA, NSF, JSC
PTWG, and
international
donors/bilateral
partners
A: IGAD regional counter-
terrorism programme initiative
is sustained. International
partners are willing to provide
funding to draft and legsilatte
a Somalia Counter-terrorism
act.

R: Lack of funding or political
will and prioritization of legal
reforms, including transitional
justice instruments
2.2.17. Criminal
Intelligence gathering and
Analysis
Develop credible and
sustainable intelligence
system that will assist
SPF in combating crime
in the communities
Baseline: CID exist, but have
limited capacity to gather and
analyze credible criminal
intelligence.

Target: 6 months

At least 50 SPF officers trained
in Intelligence gathering, and
sharing capabilities of SPF
enhanced
Lead: SPF
Partners: NSA,
NSF, and the MOI,
with IGAD regional
security forces, and
international partners
A: Funding support for
training in intelligence
gathering and analysis is
prioritized.

R: Not sustain the funding
needs will undermine the
recent military gains or
support from the local
communities.
56

2.2.18. Forensic analysis Speed up the
establishment of a
Forensic Science unit for
SPF
Baseline : relationship between
Interpol and the East Africa
Police Chief Association on
forensic expertise is evolving

Target: 36 months
Forensic capability enhanced in
Somalia
Lead: SPF

Partners: Interpol,
MOI, Ministry of
Health, MOD and
international partners

A: Funding, level of
collaboration and partnership
with IGAD member states

R: Lack of funding to establish
and support forensic
laboratory analysis
2.2.19. SPF Explosive
Ordnance Disposal/Counter-
IED capacity
Increase the capability of
the SPF EOD teams to
address and mitigate
explosive contamination
from mines/ERW/IED
and stockpiles.
Baseline: Initial training
completed for 62 staff: Level I
training for 16 EOD operators,
and Phase I training for 7
forensic IED investigators, 2
medics, 28 security/cordon
officers, and 2 explosive
detection dog handlers.

Target:
24 months:
Participation by TFG SPF in
planning, administration and
budgeting for EOD capacity
100% operators to EOD Level 2
2 members per team identified
for advanced training to EOD
Level 3
IED response functional
Forensic exploitation of blast
sites is conducted thoroughly
and systematically
Lead: SPF

Partners: MOI,
NSA, NSF, JSC
PTWG, UNMAS and
international
donors/bilateral
partners
A: Funding for EOD support
is prioritized, with
engagement by relevant
supporting ministries.

R: Lack of commitment by
relevant TFG ministries or
international community
members (financial, human
resources, equipment support)
could limit delivery of outputs.
2.2.20. Gender-based
violence and child
protection

Establish a rape, gender
violence, child
exploitation unit in SPF

Select, recruit, train and
equip a rape/gender
violence, child
Baseline : Nil

Target : 12 months

Establish a Gender-based
Violence or Family support Unit
within the SPF
Lead: SPF

Partners: Partners:
MOI, MoGFA, UN
agencies, and
international partners
A: Funding is made available
to include gender issues in the
change management structures
of the SPF.
R:
57

exploitation unit in SPF
2.3. National Security
Agency
2.3.1. Coordinate the
Assessment of National
Security Threats and Risks
Analyze national
security threats to
Somalia, its neighbours
and the international
community with respect
to IHL and human rights;
Baseline : Threat assessments is
being carried out disjointly
among security agencies;

Target: 12 months

A holistic national security
threat assessment established
Lead: NSA

Partners: Office of
the President, Prime
Minister, Ministries
of Defence, National
Security, NSF, SPF
Foreign Affairs, and
international partners
A: Establish and/or link into
early warning mechanisms
e.g. intelligence on arms
shipments. Strengthen
mechanisms of feeding back
information to the NSC
structures

2.3.2. Legal and Policy
framework for the NSA in
existence
Develop, rationalize,
clarify all legal and policy
issues;

Baseline: Draft legislation is
already in place.

Target : 3 months
To hire expert/consultant to
ensure that the draft can be
presented to the COM.
Parliament to ratify.

Lead: MOI


Partners:
Office of the
President, Prime
Minister, NSA,
Parliament and
international partners
A. No more delay in the
process of the ratification and
legislation of the draft bill on
establishment of the NSA.

R: Lack of political support
Security lack of continuity
Lack of timely resources
2.3.3. Organizational
change management and
leadership development of
the NSA
Conduct Functional &
Management Review;
Facilitate Mid term (3
year) and annual
operational planning


12 months
To review strategic plan and
complete the process.
Find relevant male and female
experts and programs.
Implement training programs.
Lead : NSA


Partners;
MOI, SPF, office of
the President, Prime
Minister, regional
administrations,
District
Commissioners, and
international partners
A: Neutral, impartial and
credible NSA established and
functional with sustained
funding.

R: maintaining or upholding
political neutrality principles,
or how to ensure politicians do
not resort to politicisation of
the NSA interventions
2.3.4. Training and Capacity
building (knowledge
enhancement)
Training and Capacity
building (such as, build
open source capability
and signal intelligence
capability).

Baseline: Limited training in
higher threat and risks analysis

Target: 6 to 12 months

Over 100 NSA male and female
personnel trained and capacity
Lead ; NSA

Partners: MOI, SPF,
NSF, Immigration,
Coast guards,
Ministry of Finance,
office of the
A: Funding is made available
for continue training and
capacity building of NS
personnel

R: The security situation
though improved in the south
58

developed to carry out assigned
national security tasks in a
transparent and accountable
manner.
President and Prime
Minister, and
international partners
central, Mogadishu, the
situation still remain fragile
and precarious with high
influx of IDPs, unemployed
youth, many of whom where
former combatants alongside
al-shabaab..
Establishing checks and
balances on the use of
information gained by
state surveillance
Baseline : 0

Target: 24 months
Standard Operational Procedures
(SOPs) and Guidelines
developed to support
information gathering by state
surveillance institutions
Lead : NSA

Partners: MOI,
MOD, SPR, NSF,
and international
partners
A: Information collection and
analysis is coordinated without
violation of human rights, and
contrary to the principles of
the Rule of Law.
R; The risk of political
manipulation of state
intelligence services.
Office equipments and
Communication systems
Procure relevant office
equipment, logistics, weapons
and communications systems
Lead : NSA

Partners: MOI,
Ministry of Finance,
and international
partners
A: Funding made available

R: sustaining maintenance and
repair costs office equipment
and communication systems
2.3.5. Renovation and
rehabilitation support
Reconstruction and
Rehabilitation of
offices/centres

Assess the rehabilitation needs
and costs. Prepare project
proposals and financial
requirement.

Lead ; NSA/MOI

Partners: Ministries
of Finance, works,
and international
partners
A: Funding and
reconstruction or rehabilitation
costs

R: Renewed fighting, and
political instability
2.3.6. Logistics for
personnel
Logistics, , ensure the
supply of uniforms
specific for both men and
women personnel, and
transport

Basleine : Limited Vehicles
assigned to support the day to
day operations of the NSA

Target: 12 months
Additional logistics toinclude
pickup vans and vehicles
secured to improve the
operational effectiveness of the
NSA.
Lead ; NSA

Partners: MOI,
ministry of finance,
A: Financial and procurement
support
R; Cost of sustaining
maintenance and repairs
services
59


2.3.7. Sustainability of
salaries and stipends
Regular stipends

Baseline : Stipend payments are
relatively satisfactory compared
to other Somalia National
Security Institutions

Target: 36 months

To establish realistic salary
scaling system. Find key
partners to support while the
same time improving local
revenue generation system

Lead : MOI

Partners: Office of
the President, Prime
Minister, Ministries
of defence, planning,
and Finance,
international partners
A: Bilateral support are
sustained till 2014

R: political disruption and
nepotism
2.3.8. Patrol weapons
management
Weapons supplies and
management

Baseline: Limited and
unregulated NSA weapons
available to support its
operations.

Target : 12 months

NSA receive additional
weapons, registration and
stockpile management trainings
Lead : MOI

Partners: NSA, SPF,
NSF, MOD, and
international partners
A: Adherence to rules and
regulations for arms
procurement, control and
management

R: misuse of weapons
supplied for crime
perpetuation in local
communities.

2.4. Custodian Corps 2.4.1. Selection, recruitment
and re-training
Recruitment and Training
of Custodian corps
Baseline : 300 staff strength with
working conditions military in
nature

Target: 12 months

At least 500 staff strength
trained and capacity built to
efficiently, professionally and
effectively service delivery
achieved and managerial
capacity improved
Lead; MOJ

Partners: Custodian
Corps, NSF, Ministry
of Finance and
international partners.
E.g UN agencies
A: Funding available

R: Peace process disintegrates;
sporadic fighting re-emerges
through out South central or
Somalia
60

2.4.2. Organizational
management structure of the
Custodian Corps:
Restructuring the
Custodian Corps to reflect
current Somalia
Government security
policy, particularly with
respect for human rights
IHL and gender principles
Baseline : 0

Target : 12 months
Size , composition of the
Custodian corps determined
through mapping; Better
oversight mechanism of the
Custodian Corps enhanced and
threats posed by inefficiencies in
prison system mitigated
Lead : Ministry of
J ustice

Partners: Office of
the Prime Minister,
Ministry of Finance,
and relevant
international partners
A: Funding available

R: Peace process disintegrates;
sporadic fighting re-emerges
through out South central or
Somalia
2.4.3. Terms and Conditions
of Sevices (TACOS)
Review salaries and
conditions of service for
male and female prison
staff to reflect current
economic trend
Baseline: minimum salaries and
remuneration to the custodian
corps are being paid by the TFG.

Target : 36 months
Sustain stipend payments to the
custodian corps.

Better performance and service
delivery of Custodian Corps
achieved
Lead : Custodian
Corps

Partners: OPM,
Ministry of J ustice,
Religious Affairs and
Endowment, and
Ministry of Finance
A: Clear political messages on
TACOS communicated to the
Security services, explicitly
rendering NSSP
implementation and
continuation successfully.
R: Indiscipline and low
morale, leading to

2.4.4. Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction of barracks
and Correction facilities,
ensuring gender sensitive
management of
infrastructure
Construct new and
rehabilitate existing living
quarters for male and
female Custodian corps
personnel and inmates
with adhering
international minimum
standards for prisons
Baseline: Limited
accommodation for custodian
corps exist.

Target: 36 months

Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction of Correction
facilities and barracks for male
and female Custodian Corps
personnel in Mogadishu,
Puntland and Galmudug
Lead : Custodian
Corps

Partners: OPM,
Ministry of J ustice,
Religious Affairs and
Endowment, Ministry
of Finance and
Ministry of Works,
Somalia NGOs, and
international partners,
including NGOs
A: Funding is available



R: Renewed fighting and
insecurity in the south central
region of Somalia
2.4.5. Network and
Communication facilities
for the male and female
Custodian Corps
Strengthen, expand and
equip the Prisons
Communication Unit
Physical security of male and
female inmates, Custodian
Corps and citizens achieved
Lead: Custodian
Corps
Partners: MOJ ,
Ministry of
A: The custodian corps
security sector communication
arrangements are linked to the
NSF and SPF. Funding to
61

Information and
communication,
MOD, Finance and
international partners
establish the custodian corps
communication network
provided
R: the absence or of lack of
trained custodian corps to
support the communication
unit. Political stability, safety
and security issues.
2.4.6 Prisons biometric
database ( Transparency and
Accountability System)
Establish a
comprehensive database
of male and female
inmates of prisoners
nationwide with ensuring
confidentiality and access
provisions to database
A comprehensive database of
male and female inmates
generated and maintained
Lead: Custodian
Corps
Partners: MOJ ,
Ministry of
Information and
communication,
MOD, Finance and
international partners
A: Funds are available to
establish, link and harmonize
the database for all national
security institutions in
Somalia.
R: Technical capacity to
maintain and operate an
electronic biometric database
for the Custodian corps.

Through the establish
database on inmates,
extend educational
facilities to male and
female inmates in prisons
nationwide, ensuring
access to equal
opportunities
Baseline: Minimum training
supports have been provided to
support the inmates at the
Mogadishu central prisons in the
last few years.

Target : 12 months
At least 300 inmates are
provided with basic educational
support/rehabilitation or
reformatory education.

Lead: Custodian
Corps
Partners: MOJ ,
Ministry of
Information and
communication,
MOD, Finance and
international partners
A: Funds are available to
establish, link and harmonize
the database for all national
security institutions in
Somalia.
R: Technical capacity to
maintain and operate an
electronic biometric database
for the Custodian corps.

2.4.7. Prisons Oversight
Functions
Establish a prisons
council to oversee the
affairs of the prisons
Baseline: MOJ capacity to
provide executive oversight of
the correction services limited.
Same for CSOs and Parliament.

Target: 24 months

Effective oversight control of the
Lead: Ministry of
J ustice, Religious
Affairs and
Endowment
Partners: Office of
the President, OPM,
Ministry of Finance
and international
A: Funds are available to
establish, link and harmonize
the database for all national
security institutions in
Somalia.
R: Technical capacity to
maintain and operate an
electronic biometric database
62

prisons department enhanced partners. for the Custodian corps.

Strengthen investigation
and discipline capacity of
the Custodian corps
Baseline : 0


Target : 24 months
Establish an internal
investigations and discipline unit
to investigate and act upon
alleged assault, corruption and
abuses against prison inmates.
Lead: MOJ

Partners: Custodian
corps, office of the
Prime Minister,
Ministry of Finance,
and international
partners
A: Political will and
commitment; funds available
to support the establishment

R: Establish investigative
system in the absence of a
clear legal and policy
framework on how to address
impunity , Gender-based
violence, assault etc
2.4.8. Transportation Provide adequate
transportation facilities
for prisons personnel and
inmates
Baseline: Very limited vehicles
to support the day-to-day work
of the custodian corps.

Target: 12 months
Procure at least 10 pick up
vehicles to support the work of
the custodian corps.
Maintenance of transport of
prisons enhanced

Lead : Custodian
Corps

Partners: MOJ and
Ministry of Finance;
potential international
partners and NGOs


A: Funds are available

R: No revenue allocated or
donors unwilling to provide
support to the custodian corps
2.4.9. Reformation of
inmates
Provide reformatory and
recreational facilities for
gender responsive prison
inmates
Baseline : 0

Target: 24 months

Mental and physical conditions
of inmates and prisons personnel
improved
Lead : Custodian
Corps
Partners: MOJ ,
Ministry of Gender,
NGOs and
international partners
A: Funds are available to
support reformatory and
recreational facilities

R: No revenue allocated or
donors unwilling to provide
support to the custodian corps
2.4.10. Medical facilities Upgrade the prisons
hospital to meet the health
care needs of both officers
and inmates
Baseline : Limited access to a
common security medical
hospital utilized by army and the
SPF

Target: 12 months

Lead:
MOJ /Custodian
Corps

Partners: Ministry
of health; Ministry of
defence/National
A: Money is available to
support the rehabilitation and
upgrading the prisons medical
facilities

R: No budgetary allocation,
or lack of donor support
63

Improved medical facilities
extended to prison personnel and
inmates.
security and
international partners
2.4.11. Provision of Water
and Sanitation Facilities
Reconstruct or refurbish
the central prisons water
and sanitation facilities.
Baseline : 0

Target : 6 months

Adequate water and sanitation
facilities provided at the central
prisons in Mogadishu
Lead:
MOJ /Custodian
Corps

Partners: Ministry
of health; Ministry of
defence/National
security and
international partners
A: Water and sanitation
facilities exist are needs
refurbishment.

R: No budgetary allocation,
or lack of donor support

2.5. Disengaging
Combatants/Defectors and
DDR Commission
2.5.1. Inter-Ministerial
Coordination Committee on
dealing with Disengaging
Combatants/ Defectors
Establish an Interim Inter-
ministerial Coordination
Committee on
Disengaging Combatants/
Baseline: formation on-going

Target:

Establish by November, 2011 an
inter-ministerial coordination
mechanism for dealing with
defectors/former combatants
Lead: Prime
Ministers Office

Partners :
Ministry of National
Security and Interior,
MoDef,, MoFin,
MoJ ust, MoInf,
MoYouth, MoEd and
Ministry of Women
& Family Care, UN
agencies
A: various line ministries are
willing to continue to
cooperate and participate in
coordination mechanism.
Funds made available to
support the establishment of a
coordination secretariat for
defector issues.

R: Capacity of the member
ministries (No ToR for each
ministry)

R: Political Changes of the
Government overtime affects
retention of trained staffs and
government officials to lead
the process.
2.5.2. JSC Task Force on
Disengaging
Combatants/Defectors
Technical Capacity
Assessment
Institutional capacity
needs assessment

Baseline: UNPOSs scooping
mission reports, Lessons
Learned Workshop

Target : 6 months

Lead : Interim Inter-
ministerial Former
Combatant /defectors
Coordination
Committee;

A: Political and technical
commitment sustained as
already demonstrated.

R: Donors and partners not
willing to support defector
64

Submission of Report and
project prosal to the Ministry fo
Interior and the Prime Ministers
Office by November, 2011
Partners: UN . IOM
and Intl stakeholders
progarmmes. No political
support; Security situation
No funding availability
No partner inside
Capacity building
initiatives to various TFIs
Baseline: lessons Learnt
Workshop on Disengaging
Fighters
Benchmark: Ongoing process
Lead: IIMCC

Partners: UNPOS,
UNDP, UNICEF,
IOM
Changes in government,
Lack of technical staff in
ministries,
Lack of funding
2.5.3. Coordination Roles
and Responsibilities
Strategic Planning and
Programming (SPP)
coordination workshop
for roles and
responsibilities
Baseline: ToR for the SSP have
been developed

Target : Conduct workshop in
Mogadishu before end of
November, 2011
Lead : IIMCC

Partners: AMISOM
and International
Stakeholders
A: Willingness, level of
collaboration and cooperation
between TFG line ministries,
particularly defence and
national security, justice,
AMISOM and the UN on
defection issues sustained.

R: No political support
Security situation
No funding availability
2.5.4. Framework
(Disengaging fighters from
anti-government insurgents
and other armed groups and
militia)
Development of legal and
policy framework for
Disengaging fighters/non-
conventional DDR
approaches to address
immediate needs of the
disengaging fighters and
other armed militias in
conformity with
international human rights
standards and other norms


Baseline: TFGs Provisional
measures already developed to
respond to the immediate
caseload of disengaged fighters,
Reviewed NSSP

Target: 12 months

Submission of draft legal and
policy framework which could
work as agreement with
international community by 31
December 2011

Submission of proposals for
funding programmes by 31
December 2011
Lead: Interim Inter-
ministerial
Coordination
Committee on
Disengaging
fighters/former
combatants

Partners: IIMCC-
DDR, UNPOS,
UNDP, UNICEF,
IOM, Intl
stakeholders
A: Funding and staffing is
available to support the TFG
and the international
community in developing a
coherent policy and legal
framework on disengaging
fighters.

R: No political support
Security situation
No funding availability
65

2.5.5. Standard Operational
Procedures (SOP)
Creation of the SOP
targeting reception,
screening, registration,
vetting, care and follow-
up of disengaged fighters
and their dependants,
adhering international
norms and standards
Baseline: Provisional measures
already exist

Target : Creation by November,
31 2011 of a revised SOPs

Lead ; Ministry of
Interior

Partners: AMISOM,
MoJ , NSA, UNPOS,
IOM, ILO, UNICEF,
UNDP)
A: The importance of
addressing issues related to
disengaging fighters
considered as a priority for
both the TFG and the
international community.

R: No political support
Security situation
No funding availability
2.5.6. Outreach
Information collection and
Management

Outreach to armed groups
(e.g. warlords, armed
militia, clan militia,
freelance) to negotiate.

Baseline: Nil


Target : 12 months
Complete baseline assessment
by 31 December 2011, and
outreach activities ongoing

Lead : Ministry of
Interior and national
security

Partners: UN,
AMISOM, Ministry
of Constitution and
Reconciliation)
A: Political will to engage in
outreach to armed groups to
negotiate evolved.


R: No political support
Security situation
No funding availability

2.5.7.Demobilization Assessment and
development of capacity
for intake, disposal and/or
destruction of weapons
from demobilized
fighters.
Baseline: No system in place, or
capacity for safe and effective
storage or disposal of out-of-
commission or damaged
weapons.

Target : 12 months

Safe disposal of weapons.
Focal point: IIMCC-
Disengaging fighters/
DDR with Police
Commissioner and
Chief of Army?

Partners: Police,
Army, AMISOM,
UNPOS, UNDP,
UNMAS, Bilateral
partners
A: Desire for disposal of out-
of-commission weapons, and
political engagement to
encourage demobilization.

R: Resource limitations,
limited number of demobilized
fighters
2.5.8. Reinsertion

Gender sensitive
assessment and mapping
of the armed groups and
armed militia, sex and age
disaggregated data
collection, analysis and
management
Baseline: Existence of data base
system

Target : Establish secretariat for
the IIMCC-DDR,
Start assessment and collection
of data by J anuary 2012,
Lead IIMCC-
Disengaging fighters
and DDR

Partners: UNPOS,
IOM, UNICEF,
UNDP, ILO,
A: Funding and technical
assistance is provided to
engage in a continued gender
sensitive assessment and
mapping exercise.

R: Resource limitation
66

Bilateral Partners (financial resource, human
resource, etc.)
No partner inside
Community Re-insertion
support that will be
provided to communities
where the ex-fighters will
be registered and are
currently residing
Baseline: Nil


Target : 24 months

Start reinsertion support by 1
April 2012

Lead : IIMCC-
Disengaging
fighters/DDR

Partners:
Regional/District/Co
mmunity authorities,
Community leaders,
Ex-combatant,
UNDP, UNPOS,
IOM, ILO, and intl
stakeholders

A: Security conditions
continue to improve; trends in
disengaging fighters increases.


R: No political support
Security situation
No funding availability
No partner inside
2.5.8. Reintegration

Prioritization of action for
the released and
reintegration of children
and youth associated with
armed forces
Baseline: project on going
(Youth at Risk)

Immediate and ongoing
Prime Ministers
Officer

Partners: Min of
Women Affairs and
FC, UNICEF, IOM,
ILO, UNDP, ICRC,
INGOs)
No political support
Security situation
No funding availability
No partner inside
Assessment for socio-
economic reintegration,
including business/job
market research, profiling,
and referral system to
seek support from
business community
Baseline: Nil

Complete assessments by 30
April 2012

Start Reintegration Opportunity
Support on incremental approach
by 31 May 2012
IIMCC-DDR

(Partners: IOM,
UNDP, ILO),
INGOs, CBOs,
No political support
Security situation
No funding availability
No partner inside
Assessment for host
community support
Baseline: Nil

Complete assessments by 30
April 2012

Start Community Support by 31
IIMCC-DDR

(Partners: UNPOS,
IOM, UNDP, ILO),
INGOs, CBOs,
No political support
Security situation
No funding availability
No partner inside
67

May 2012
2.5.9. Media Strategy Conduct a one day
consultation meeting to
draft a gender responsive
media strategy
Baseline: Existence of a Public
Information Structures with the
UN and the TFG
Benchmark: By 15 November
2011
Lead: Ministry of
Information and
IIMCC

Partners: UN, CSOs
INGOs,
Lack of funding and
international partners on the
ground
2.5.10. DDR Commission Provide support for the re-
establishment and
functioning of the
National DDR
Commission
Baseline: DDR Commission
already exists within the
Ministry of Interior and National
Security.
Target : 24 months

Source funding for institutional
capacity building and staffing
for re-establishing the DDR
National Commission
Lead : Ministry of
Interior and national
security

Partners: Office of
the President, Prime
Minister, Ministry of
defence( MOD),
A: Funding made available to
start the process of re-
establishing the DDR
Commission.

Formal ceasefire or peace
agreements signed between
conflict parties with DDR
provisions.




Strategic Objective three : To ensure effective partnership and coordination between state and non-state security and justice agencies/institutions
3.1. Support technical,
operational and coordination
structures at all levels to
integrate SSD within public
administrations reforms
3.1.1 Establish a holistic
National Security
Architecture
Establish Regional,
District Security
Committees
Baseline: A few exists , but less
inclusive and functioning


Target : 24 months

At least 10 regional and district
security committees established.
In 3 months -


Lead: Ministry of
Interior and National
Security

Partners: Office of
the President/NSC
Secretariat, Office of
the Prime Minister,
Ministry of Justice &
Religious Affairs
A: Work through NSC
Security Committee and other
forums to ensure coordinated
messages and influence on
national security threats and
to manage risks
3.1.2. Defining roles and
Responsibilities of security
and justice
agencies/institutions
Clearly delineated roles
and responsibilities for
addressing security
challenges established
Baseline : 0

Target : 3 months

Standard Operational Procedures
Lead: Office of the
President/National
Security Council

Partners: Office of
A: Work through NSC
Security Committee and other
forums to ensure coordinated
messages and influence on
national security threats and to
68

( SOPs) or Guidelines developed
to support effective coordination
among the Somalia security
forces and other international
security forces.
the Prime Minister,
all relevant ministries
of security and
defence, and justice.
International
partners.
manage risks.

R: Unwillingness to cooperate
and collaborate among the
security institutions, including
the friendly militias to the
Government.
3.1.3. Organized Crime
Analysis Cell
Establish a crime analysis
system, which will
facilitate purposeful
deployment of resources
to quantify various crimes
committed
Baseline: A criminal
Investigation Department (CID)
exists.

Target : 24 months

Proper records of crime
generated and effective/reliable
information networks enhanced
Lead : National
Security Agency

Partners: SPF, NSF,
Ministries of Interior,
defence, office of the
President, Prime
Minister and
international partners.
A: Funds available to
establish crime analysis cells

R: Confusion among security
sector agencies about lead
institutions, possible.
3.1.4. Joint Operational
Centres
Create scope for joint
national security exercises
to enhance coordination.
Baseline : Limited

Target : 6 months

Support the establishment of a
J OC in Mogadishu
Lead : Office of the
President/NSC

Partners : Ministries
of Defence, MOI,
planning , finance,
SPF, NSA, and the
NSF
A: TFG security forces team
formalise appropriate
partnerships and management
arrangements/agreements with
national and international
partners.

R: Al-shabaabs regular
asymmetric warfare because
of a failure of not promoting
the importance of a =n
integrated and holistic
operational planning structure.

3.1.5. Protective Security
Measures for VIP .,
Ministries and dignitaries
Provide personnel for
state ceremonial/public
duties including
presidential Guard Duties
Baseline: Limited trained
capacity exists, already working
alongside AMISOM.


Target : 24 months
Ministries receive hands-on
Lead ; Minstry of
Interior and
national Security

Partners: SPF, NSF,
NSA, office of the
President, Prime
A: Funding to train and
enhance additional protective
security personnel available.

R: Not properly vetting and
screening selected and newly
trained personnel into the
69

training in protective security
measures, SPF and NSF jointly
organized to provide VIP
protective measures under a
unified command a structure
Minister, Mod, and
relevant international
partners.
Protective security cadre of
the siomali security forces.
Serious and transnational
organized crimes
All security institutions in
the south central,
Punltand, Galmugud and
other regions in Somalia
work to prevent and
combat international
terrorism, money-
laundering and other
Transnational organised
crimes such as human and
child trafficking
Baseline : Limited support to
tackle serious and organized
crime


Target : 12 months

Programmes to tackle threats of
Transnational organised crime
enhanced and incidence reduced.
Lead : NSA

Partners: SPF, NSF,
MOI, UN agencies ,
IOM, regional and
international
organisations
A: Legal and policy
frameworks to address serious
and transnational organized
crime drafted and legislated.

R: lack of political will and
commitment; limited capacity
of the Somali security forces.
Institutionalize peace
culture for all security
Forces/institution in
Somalia
Provide joint civic
education training to
promote the Peace and
Political Transformation
processes in Somalia for
NSA,, SPF, Custodian
Corps, NSF, and the
entire Somalia National
Security Sector personnel
Baseline : Somalia National
Security (NSF) forces existing
training curricula cover some
elements of national
reconciliation

Target : 12 months

All training curriculum and
courses for the Somali security
institutions are developed to
include culture of peace
courses/modules and lessons

Lead : Ministry of
Education


Partners: MOD,
MOI, SPF, NSF,
NSA, custodian
corps, MOJ , and
international partners,
particularly the UN
mission and agencies
A: Training needs assessment
are conducted and required to
be included in curricula.


R: Insecurity and continued
violence; Al-shabaab not
willing to engage; continued
indiscipline and intolerance
3.1.6. Security information
flow between agencies and
the public
Improve information flow
between the SPF, NSF,
NSA, Custodian Corps
and the public
Baseline : level of collaboration
and cooperation between
security institutions need to be
strengthened

Target: 36 months

Lead: NSC

Partners : Office of
the President, Prime
Minister, MOD,
MOI,
A; All security sector
institutions in Somalia are
willing to cooperate and
collaborate; SOPs developed
to support increased level trust
and confidence between and
among the security sector
70

Partnership between and
amongst Somalias primary
security forces improved; and
local public awareness of tasks
and responsibilities of each of
the security institutions
improved
institutions

3.1.7. Strengthen
Neighbourhood
watch/Community safety
and security
see 5.3 See 5.3 See 5.3 See. 5.3
3.1.8. Sustain existing peace
structures
Strengthen Regional,
Distirct and community
security committees
Baseline : Community safety
and security committees
established in few district

Target : 12 months
Address drivers of violence
through socio-economic
development
Lead : Ministry of
Interior and National
Security

Partners: Office of
the President, OPM,
MOD, regional and
district security
committees and
international partners
A: Improved security is
maintained. Relationship and
level of collaboration and
cooperation

R: Political and security
conditions deriorates further.
3.1.9. Unified Command
and Control structure of the
Somalia Coast Guards
Strengthen the Coast
Guards of both the SPF
and the NSF

Baseline : Limited capacity of
the coast guards

Target : 12 months
Somalia maritime capability
enhanced through regular
training and capcity building for
over 200 coast guards by 2014.

Lead : MOI/MOD

Partners: NSF and
SPF, Finance,
ministry of Fisheries
and Marine
Resources,
international partners.
A: Political will to ensure
reoragnisation of the coastal
guards under a unfied
command and control
structure.

R: Political and security
conditions does not
deteriorates
3.1.10. HL, Human rights,
Rule of Law and gender
advance trainings
Provide advanced training
on Human Rights, Rule of
Law, gender and due
process of law for middle
level and senior NSF,
SPF, Custodian Corps and
NSA Personnel, including
Baseline : UPR report with
recommendations developed and
adopted.

Target: 12 to 24 months

HR record of all the Somalia
Lead : Relevant
ministries

Partners: UN and
human rights
organizations,
AMISOM
A: Continued political will
to engage in the
implementation of human
rights recommendations based
on the UPR report..

R: Political and security
71

civilians as well. Security Forces improved conditions does not
deteriorates
3.1.11. Regulation of private
security companies in
Somalia
Strengthen the capacity of
government to effectively
regulate Private
Security/Military
Companies
Baseline : 0
Target : 24 months

legal and policy frameworks
established for PSCs/PMCs
activities in Somalia
Lead : Ministry of
Interior

Partners: office of the
Prime Minister,
MOD , finance with
international
assistance
A: Political willingness and
action required

R: Not taking action to
regulate the activities of
private security companies
operating in Somalia may
continue to undermine the
peace process.
3.1.12 Organisational
institutional arrangements
. Consideration and
decision of optional
institutional arrangements
on the issues related to
landmines, explosive
remnants of war
Baseline : 0

Target : 12 months

Institutional arrangements to
collectively address issues
around landmines and IEDs
resvolved and legal or policy
framework established.
Focal point: MA
Inter-ministerial
Committee

Partners: MoI, MoD
A: Availability of dedicated
personnel, expertise, capital
and facilities
3.1.13. Establishment of
District Security Committee
Structures
Equip District Security
Committee structures that
include women to support
the security
sector/agencies in
maintaining the security
in their localities
Baseline : 0

Target: 10 between in 2011 to
2013: Performance of District
security committees improved
Lead : MOI

Partners : MOD,
Office of the
Preisident, SPF,
Local government
,AMISOM, UN, and
international partners
A: Funding aready exists and
provided without delays

R: Insecurity and lack of
cooperation between state and
non-state security institutions
at the district level

Strategic Objective four: To increase the inclusion and participation of parliament and Civil Society Organizations in Somalia security and justice sector development efforts
4.1.1 Support to TFP
sub/committee on defence,
security and justices
(Effective parliamentary
oversight of the Security
and Justice Sectors requires
Hold seminars in
Mogadishu to create
awareness and strengthen
the capacities of
Parliamentary
Committees (defense,
Baseline:
Relationship between TFP and
Somalia Security Institutions
(SSI)SI is weak:

Target : In 2 months, - establish
Lead : Actors: Parliament
must identify the type of
trainings required and the
participants;

Partners: Minister of
Risk and Assumption


A: funding made
available and
parliamentarians
72

expertise and adequate
resources)



security, justice in
oversight functions












an accountable relationship
between TFP and SSI;






Finance, justice, MOD,
Interior, Office of the
President, Prime Minister,
and the international
community, including
UN, NGOs and bilateral
to support SSIs.

R: Become too close and
compromise
accountability.
Lack of political will /
commitment to improve
relationship between TFP
and SSI (business as
usual);
Insecurity. No action
(business as usual)

Facilitate awareness
raising and advocacy
support on the importance
of SSD in promiting
peace and security in
Somalia.
Baseline : 0

Target 6 to 12 months

Suppport to deliver at least 6
workshops on the concept of
SSD in Somalia; the role of
CSOs, media etc in SSI. how to
how to draft legislations,
conduct hearings, research
capacities, related to security
sector development

Lead : Parlaimentary Sub-
committee on defence,
security and justice in
Somalia.

Partners: The TFP, TFG,
CSO (media), Min. of
Interior, J ustice, the NPF,
and other security sector
institutions, international
community e.g UN


A: Political space is
created and funding
available to support
capcity building efforts of
parliament.


- Insecurity, lack of
political support, no
behaviour and structural
changes business as
usual


Insecurity, no changes
(business as usual)
behaviour, structural and
policy changes.

Insecurity, lack of
political support,
73

Strengthen relations
between Parliament and
SSI.


Baseline : Non-existent

Timeframe: 24 months
A working relationship between
TFP and CS strengthened with
SSI. Public debates and meetings
jointly organized .

Lead : CSOs Netowrk on
SSD in Somalia

Partners: African
Security Sector Network
(ASSN), NGOs, and
international partners.

A: Political will and
commitment to support
CSOs, local communities,
and womens organization
to engage with parliament
on SSD in Somalia.



R: TFG may not create a
conducive environment
for CS to participate in
public debates on security
issues;


Establish Parliamentary
website and resource
centre with equipment,
furniture to support the
work of the sub-
committee on defense and
security issues;


Baseline : 0

Target : 12 months

Non-existent. In 12 months, a
Parliamentary web-site and
resource center that is fully
equipped (secure access to
documentation);

Lead: TFP to seek out the
support of other
Parliaments;

Partners: TFG ministry of
Finance; IC can provide
financial and technical
support to the
establishment of centre;


A: Funding made
available to the sub-
committee for defence
and security


R: Funding is not
provided for
parliamentary sub-
committee to participate
in public debates on
security issues;


Capacity to legislate
enhanced
Baseline: Parliaments access to
external resources is very
limited.

Target : In 12 to 24 months,
increase Parliaments access to
external funding for the
Lead: TFP to seek out the
support of other
Parliaments;

Partners: TFG ministry
of Finance; IC can
provide financial and
A: Funding made
available to the sub-
committee for defence
and security


R: Funding is not
74

ractification and legislation of at
least four (4) laws related to
security and justice sector
development in Somalia;


technical support to the
establishment of centre;

provided for
parliamentary sub-
committee to participate
in public debates on
security issues;

Engage CS in discussions
of drafting and reviewing
security policies;


Baseline : Non-Existent


Target : Timeframe: 24 months
more CS participation in
reviewing security policies, by
engaging in evidence-based
research on SSD in Somalia


Lead : TFP sub-
committees on
Defence,security and
J ustice

Partners: Ministry of
Defence, Ministry of
Interior, NSSP
Secretariat, African
Security Sector Networks
(ASSN) , UN, and
international partners.
A: Political willingness
and space continue to be
maintained.

R: Lack of
encouragement,
government policies and
behaviours towards CS
remain unchanged.

Organize informed public
debates / hearings on
justice, security policy
issues;


Baseline : Non-existent.

Target :Timeframe: 6 to 12
months secure more public
debates / hearings on security
policy issues ( at least 6 public
debates organized)


Lead: Parliamentary
defense and security
Committees and SSI to
hold monthly consultative
meetings on security
issues
Partners: Ministry of
Interior, MOD, SPF, NSF,
Universities in Somalia,
international CSOs,
NGOs and relevant
international partners.

A: Political willingness
and space continue to be
maintained.

R: Lack of
encouragement,
government policies and
behaviours towards CS
remain unchanged.

Encourage (through
passing motions) the
participation of CS in
public debates around
justice, national security,
the armed forces,
Baseline : Non-existent.

Target : Timeframe: 12 to 24
months increased participation
of CS in public debates on
justice and security issues;
Lead : TFP

Partners : CSOs,
womens groups, Office
of the President, Prime
Minister etc.and

A: Financial resources
and expertise made
available to support
public debates etc.

75

policing, violation of
human rights and gender
based violence (GBV)
and so on;



international partners




R: Cultural intolerance to
openly discussed gender-
based violence issues


4.1.2 Support to Civil
Society Organisations
(CSO).

(CS have understanding of
citizens security and can
be a link between
government and the public.
Raise awareness of the
importance roles which
CS can play in security
and justice issues,
including Civilian and
child protection,
responsibility to protect
and gender























Baseline : There is some space
where CS can exercise their
oversight - however, most of
them lack the capacities to
articulate on governance and
security/justice issues;

Timeframe: 12 months

More recognition and awareness
of CSs roles in security and
justice issues; at least six
workshops/seminars involving
CSOs organized.

A space for CS to voice their
concerns, educate the public,
facilitate alternative debates in
the public domain












Lead : CSOs
The Parliament to
legislate a law that will
regulate the work,
mandate of CS in relation
to the role of CSOs in
security sector
development in Somalia ;

Partners : Office of the
President, POM, Min. of
Interior (registration),
TFP, other security sector
institutions and Ministries
such as J ustice, Min. of
Gender and Family
Affairs; United Nations
and international partners













A: Provide the space for
civil society to exercise
their oversight and engage
in legislation processes;

B: Lack of understanding
of the role of CS in
security issues, TFG may
restrict CSs activities;

TFG, TFP and TFIs
including SSI may not
create opportunities /
space for CS to participate
in security issues;

Some CS may not take
advantage of the space
given to them and
exercise their oversight
and some of them may
abuse the privileges given
to them and this may
closed up the space.

If all the challenges are
mitigated, perhaps, there
will be more CS influence
in decisions and policies
with regard to the security
issues;
76















A working relationship
between CS and TFP.
Deliver workshops to
build the capacities of CS
to advocate, monitor and
report on SSD
interventions with respect
for HR, GBV especially
Sexual Violence in
conflict, and ROLs within
all national security
institutions;

Baseline : Non-existent

Timeframe: 12 to 36 months
more organized CS in thematic
areas (human rights, justice);
Some trainings were offered to
some members of CS
particularly those involved HR
there is a need to build on
existing work that was
previously carried out (expand to
other areas).



Lead : Somalia CSOs and
NGOs

Partner :

ASSN, NGOs, UN
agencies and programmes
and the international
community
A: Political and funding
requirement made
available.


R: CS may fail to
participate in public
debates around security
and justice due to lack of
expertise, experience and
trust;

Organize an annual
gathering for all for CS to
share and exchange
information on their
contributions to
establishing and
maintaining security and
access to justice;

Baseline : Non-existent.
An annual CS symposium on
security issues;

Target : Timeframe: once in a
year.

Annual conference of the
Somalia SSD Civil Society
Network
Lead : NSSP Secretariat

Partners: Office of the
President, POM, Min. of
Interior (registration),
TFP, other security sector
institutions and Ministries
such as Justice, Min. of
Gender and Family
Affairs; United Nations
and international partners
A : Human and financial
capacity, and resources,
are available to conduct
research.

R: No organizational
changes in the ways in
which CS does its work
(business as usual).


Gender and SSD related
issues, access to justice,
accountability,
Baseline : Some workshops
delivered

Lead : Ministry of
Gender and children
affairs
Insecurity. CS may not
streamline their work in
thematic areas and their
77

transparency to strengthen
the role of CS in security
sector development;
Preferably after the
gender assessment/
mapping of the security
sector components



Target : 24 months
Deliver at least 4 workshops on
gender issues are needed. Have
CS that can articulate and
advocate for the inclusion of
gender issues in SSR
Timeframe: 24 to 36 months;



Partners: NSSP
Secretariat, SPF, NSF,
relevant security and
justice ministries, UN and
other international
partners. Including NGOs
and CSOs
current structure and
organization may remain.

No structural changes /
reform (business as usual)


Establish Somali SSR
network to generate
public debates and
discussions on security
issues;

Baseline : Non-existent.
Universities and research centers
in Somalia are yet to produce
experts in the field of security
sector development (academics
and researchers).

Target : Timeframe: 24 to 36
months,

Identify credible international
consortium such as ASSN to
work and support Somalia
universities and research centers
that can produce independent
research, analysis (as well as
monitoring SS) and information
on security and justice issues to
both Parliament and the public
Lead : NSSP Secretariat/
Ministry of Interior and
National Security

Partners: Affiliate
CSOs/NGOs, regional,
district and communitye
security committees
A: Funding and expertise
deployed to support the
process of establishing
Somalia SSD Network

R: Insecurity, lack of
resources, lack of
commitment and expertise
to organize such a
conference;
R: Insecurity, lack of
commitment and efforts
to enable CS to participate
in security issues; lack of
structural and behavior
changes; lack of interest
(CS) and due to fear, CS
not willing to exercise its
oversight;

Establish consultative
relations with members of
CS and the constitutional
making process, to
increase public input and
oversight of the SS

Baseline :0

Target : 12 months

At least four consultative
meetings organized on SSD
provisions in the constitution
Lead : NSSP Secretariat

Partners: CSOs, Ministry
of Constitution, J ustice,
MOD, and international
partners
A: Funding and political
space created

R: Lack of security,
commitment and
facilitation, capacity-
building;
78



making and electoral processes.
Increased CSOs
understanding of the SSD
provisions in the Djibouti
Peace Agreement and the
Kampala Accord
Baseline : There is some existing
capacities but need to build on
these existing capacities

Target : Timeframe: 6 to 12
months
.Organize four public education
forums on SSD and political
peace processes according to the
Djibouti and Kampala peace
processes;


Lead : NSSP Secretariat

Partners:
Somalia CSOs and NGOs,
Universities and research
centres, local
communities; district and
regional security
communities, and
international partners.
A: Polictical will,
commitment and
tolerance for CSOs to
relate to the the Security
Sector in Somalia


R: Insecurity. Failing to
hold the conference due
lack of resources.



Mapping Civil Society
Organisations (CSOs)
working in the Security
Sector in Somalia
CS need to re-organize -
streamline and work in
thematic areas and form
shadow bodies i.e human
rights CS and so on;

Baseline : Non-existent and it is
worth noting that CS are not
united actors;

Target : Timeframe: 12 to 24
months: cohesive CS with a
united civic agenda towards
security issues; In 12 months,
establish their own rules and
regulations Standard
Operational Procedures


Lead : NSSP Secretariat

Partners: Ministry of
Interior, Local
Governance structures,
Office of the Prime
Minister, CSOs and
NGOs, international
partners.
A: Funding available to
engage with CSOs
capacity building.

R: Lack of security,
commitment and
facilitation, capacity-
building
Commission universities
and research centres to
conduct research on
improving security and
eliminating insecurity;


Baseline : Limited capacity to
conduct Security and Justice
Sector Development research

Target : 24 months

Research training and capacity
building efforts strengthened
Lead : University of
Somalia

Partners: NSSP
Secretariat, line
ministries, CSOs, and
international partners
A: Funding available to
engage with CSOs
capacity building.

R: Lack of security,
commitment and
facilitation, capacity-
building
Encourage CS to Baseline : Limited capacity Lead : Ministry of A: Funding available to
79

participate in monitoring
activities of crime related
to armed violence, sexual
violence, mine actions,
community safety
currently exists.

Target : Timeframe: 4 times in a
year, CS that have the ability to
carry out advocacy, monitoring
and reporting on SSD; more
involvement of CS in monitoring
of armed violence and mine
action;

Interior and National
Security

Partners: CSOs, SPF,
NSF and UN,
international NGOs and
partners.
engage with CSOs
capacity building.

R: Lack of security,
commitment and
facilitation, capacity-
building
Support mapping and
research activities related
to the link between
Terrorism, security sector
development as disaster
prevention and
preparedness tool and
humanitarian space
Baseline : 0
Target : in mapping of
Conduct at least 4 awareness
raising involving civil society
groups, humanitarian
organisations, donor agencies on
disaster prevention and
preparedness schemes around
Terrorism
Lead : NSSP Secretariat

Partners: Universities,
research centres, line
ministries and
international partners.
A: Research funds are
sourced to engage with
research related to
counter-terrorism, SSD
and humanitarian
assistance

R: Lack of security,
commitment and
facilitation, and capacity
to engage in research.
Strategic Objective five : To enhance and sustain international support for the stabilization of Somalia
5. 1. AMISOM 5.1.1. International
Stabilization force
agreement
Renewal of Agreement
between the AU and TFG
Baseline : SOMA of March 2007
exists between AU and the
Somalia TFG

Target : 6 months
Review the Status of the Mission
Agreement (SOMA) of March
2007 between TFG and AU
according to troop increase
mandated by UN resolution
(from 8,000 , 12,000 to 20,000).

Lead: Executive,


Partners : AU, UN
and relevant
national and
international
partners

A: Provided there is Political
will.
R: Lack of Political will and
commitment

5.1.2.Protective Security
Measures
Protection of VIPs, TFIs,
and installations
Baseline : Already being
provided

Lead: AMISOM

Partners : UN and
A: AMISOM mandate
expanded, additional funding
and resources provided to meet
80

Target : Additional support
required to complement
AMISOMs expanded mandate

TFG protective security tasks

R: Expiry of the mandate &
inadequate resources provided
AMISOM continues to remain in
Somalia.

5.1.3.Support training and
capacity building of the
National Security Force and
the Somalia Police
Force(SPF)
Reinforcing the Somalia
Security Forces and
institutions to stabilize
and consolidate military
gains
Within the period of AMISOM
mandate


Lead: AMISOM,

Partners : MOD,
Ministry of
Interior, UN, IC

Expiry of AMISOM mandate,
Inadequate resources & lack of
good will, provided AMISOM
continues to remain in Somalia.

5.1.4. Enhancing
partnership between
AMISOM and TFG SPF to
mitigate IED threats.
Reinforce reduction of
mine/ERW/stockpile and
IED threat in Mogadishu,
and other areas of TFG
control

Baseline : Ongiong efforts
Target
3 months:
- J oint operations coordinated
by the EODCC at the
International Airport
6 months:
Strengthen existing cooperation
through SOP for joint operations
Lead : Lead:
AMISOM,
Ministry of Interior

Partners: MOD,
UNMAS, NGOs,
Ministry of Health
and other relevant
international
partners
i A: Continued ed
engagement of TFG Police in
EOD. Non-renewal of AMISOM
mandate

R: Severe deterioration in the
security situation causing
refocus of AMISOM operational
efforts
5.1.4. Size of the AMISOM
Police Component which
should include both female
and male forces
Force size and
composition
Baseline : 9, 200

Target : 6 months
12,000 and more subject to
renewed agreement and UN SC
mandate of AMISOM
Lead : TFG/UN

Partner: AU, TFG,
IGAD, and relevant
international
partners
A: UN Security mandate
renewed

R: Not receiving adequate
funding to support TCCs.

5.2. Mine Actions 5.2.1. Legal and policy
framework
Developing legal and
policy frameworks for
effectively managing
threat of landmines, and
explosive remnants of
war.
Baseline : MOU exist between
UNMAS and former TFG
governments.

Target : 4 months

Ensure MOU between UNMAS
Lead : Focal point:
MoD?

Partners: MOI,
Ministry of
Planning and
International
A: Availability of dedicated
personnel


R: Limited cooperation to
support the development of a
coherent legal or policy
81

and the Somalia government
authority revisited and agreed
unpon.
Cooperation, UN,
IC
framework for landmines
management etc.
5.2.2. Organisational and
institution management
support for landmines
Management of activities
to mitigate the threat of
landmines, explosive
remnants of war
A: Baseline : MOU exist
between UNMAS and former
TFG governments.

Target : 12 months

Ensure MOU between UNMAS
and the Somalia government
authority revisited and agreed
unpon.
Focal point: MA
Inter-ministerial
Committee

Partners: MoI,
MoD
A: Availability of dedicated
personnel, expertise, capital and
facilities

R: Political instability and
security environment suddenly
deriorates.
5.2.3. Reduction of threat of
landmines, explosive
remnants of war for freedom
of movement of TFG, IDPs
and other vulnerable groups,
humanitarian actors.
Support international
implementation capacity,
develop concept for
national capacity for mine
action.
3 months:
Establish Mine Action Working
Group

Focal point: MA
Inter-Ministerial
Committee

Partners: MOD,
SPF, UN,
International
partners, IC
A: Availability of dedicated
personnel, expertise, capital and
facilities

Security and socio-political
conditions permissive for Mine
Action

5.3. Community Safety
and Security/Armed
Violence Reduction
5.3.1. Establish district
mechanism for peace and
District or regional
/community security
committees

1) Establish committee
including representative
from youth, elder,
women, business,
religious leaders, Police,
and local authorities
2) Establish Community
Peace Centre
3) Establish coordination
structure between the
District, Region and
Ministerial level

Baseline : 0 1) Every district in
Mogadishu has a functioning
District safety Committee,
2) Four Peace centre constructed
and operational,
3) Coordination structure in
Place.

Target : 12 months

Addditional Dsitrict and safety
committees established and
functioning.
Lead: Min of
Interior;

Partner: SPF,
MOD, NSA, J SC
& other agencies
and international
partners

A: The community is willing to
partner with authorities,

R: Lack of cooperationa among
key security agencies and local
communities.

Political instability and security
environment suddenly deriorates
5.3.2.Demobilization of Pre-mediation and Baseline : 15 March 2010 Lead: Min of A: Security level is reached to
82

armed groups negotiations arrangements
to support ceasefie and
peace making processes
with willing armed groups
agreement between TFG and
ASWJ
Target 12 to 24 months
1) Community mediation and
reconciliation for the
demobilization of armed groups
2) Registration and community
probation mechanism in place
3) demilitarization training and
socio-economic integration
Interior;

Partner: SPF,
MOD, NSA,
MoYS, MoH, MoJ ,
MoGA, J SC &
other agencies and
international
partners .

gain the confidence of the armed
groups

R: Lack of cooperation and
willingness to engage
5.3.3. Establishment of the
Civic Protection Unit
1) Establish the
community policing unit,
2) Identify and train
women peace agent from
the community,
3) public order, services
and information activities
implemented
1,600 Peace Agent Unit supports
public order, services to the
victims, referral and information
Lead: Min of
Interior;

Partner: SPF, JSC
PTWG & other
agencies and
international
partners.

A: The police and the
community accepts to work
together.
R: Insecurity and lack of
cooperation with local
authorities

5.4. Small Arms and Light
Weapons (SALWs)
5.4.1. Community weapons
collection and destruction
Establish procedures and
conditions for weapon
and ammunition
collection and disposal
Baseline: No systematic method
for management of weapons,
stockpiles, ammunition.

Benchmarks:
Establish DDR/ SALW working
group to focus on physical
transportation, secure storage,
and disposal of weapons.

Establish policy and procedures
for weapon collection including
handover process, accounting,
transport, storage, and disposal

Establish secure weapon storage
facility, and mobile or static
Lead: Min of
Interior;

Partners: MOD,
SPF, UN,
international
partners, IC


A: Provided armed groups and
individuals are willing to drop
their arms
R: Lack of funding, lack of
capacity, unwillingness to
surrender weapons,
Lack/inadequate sensitization.


83

weapon transportation/disposal
capacity

5.4.2. Firearms registration
and controlled
1) Develop the
registration database for
firearms
2) development of the
legal framework
3) sensitization ,
Baseline : 0

Target : 12 to 24 months
Legal review of existing
firearms laws; develop a
comprehensive registration
database for firearms
Lead: Min of
Interior; -Partner:
MOD & other
agencies, UN ,
IGAD and
international
partners


A: Funding available for
consultants to conduct a legal
review of existing firearms laws;

The level of security and
confidence in the state security
sector