G.R. Nos.

150773 & 153599 September 30, 2005

SPOUSES DAVID . !ARPO & "#$ RE!%I&DA S. !ARPO, Petitioners,
vs.
E&EANOR !%UA "#$ E&'A D( NG, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
)*#+", J.,
Before this Court are two consolidated petitions for review. The rst, doc!eted as ".R. No. #$%&&', assails
theDecision
#
of the Re(ional Trial Court )RTC*, Branch +, of Na(a Cit- dated +, Octo.er +%%# in Civil Case
No. //01'&,. RTC 2ud(e 3ile4on B. 5ontene(ro dis4issed the co4plaint
+
for annul4ent of real estate
4ort(a(e and conse6uent foreclosure proceedin(s led .- the spouses David B. Carpo and Rechilda S.
Carpo )petitioners*.
The second, doc!eted as ".R. No. #$'$//, see!s to annul the Court of 7ppeals8 Decision
'
dated '% 7pril
+%%+ in C70".R. SP No. $&+/&. The Court of 7ppeals Third Division annulled and set aside the orders of
2ud(e Cora9on 7. Tordilla to suspend the sheri:8s enforce4ent of the writ of possession.
The cases ste44ed fro4 a loan contracted .- petitioners. On #; 2ul- #//$, the- .orrowed fro4 Eleanor
Chua and El4a D- N( )respondents* the a4ount of One <undred Sevent-03ive Thousand Pesos
)P#&$,%%%.%%*, pa-a.le within si= ),* 4onths with an interest rate of si= percent ),>* per 4onth. To secure
the pa-4ent of the loan, petitioners 4ort(a(ed their residential house and lot situated at San 3rancisco,
5a(arao, Ca4arines Sur, which lot is covered .- Transfer Certicate of Title )TCT* No. +'#;%. Petitioners
failed to pa- the loan upon de4and. Conse6uentl-, the real estate 4ort(a(e was e=tra?udiciall- foreclosed
and the 4ort(a(ed propert- sold at a pu.lic auction on ; 2ul- #//,. The house and lot was awarded to
respondents, who were the onl- .idders, for the a4ount of Three <undred Si=t-0Seven Thousand 3our
<undred 3ift-0Seven Pesos and Ei(ht- Centavos )P',&,1$&.;%*.
@pon failure of petitioners to e=ercise their ri(ht of rede4ption, a certicate of sale was issued on $
Septe4.er #//& .- Sheri: Rolando 7. Bor?a. TCT No. +'#;% was cancelled and in its stead, TCT No. +/'';
was issued in the na4e of respondents.
Despite the issuance of the TCT, petitioners continued to occup- the said house and lot, pro4ptin(
respondents to le a petition for writ of possession with the RTC doc!eted as Special Proceedin(s )SP* No.
/;0#,,$. On +' 5arch #///, RTC 2ud(e Ernesto 7. 5i(uel issued an Order
1
for the issuance of a writ of
possession.
On +' 2ul- #///, petitioners led a co4plaint for annul4ent of real estate 4ort(a(e and the conse6uent
foreclosure proceedin(s, doc!eted as Civil Case No. //01'&, of the RTC. Petitioners consi(ned the a4ount
of Two <undred 3ift-0Seven Thousand One <undred Ninet-0Seven Pesos and Twent-0Si= Centavos
)P+$&,#/&.+,* with the RTC.
5eanwhile, in SP No. /;0#,,$, a te4porar- restrainin( order was issued upon 4otion on ' 7u(ust #///,
en?oinin( the enforce4ent of the writ of possession. In an Order
$
dated , 2anuar- +%%%, the RTC suspended
the enforce4ent of the writ of possession pendin( the nal disposition of Civil Case No. //01'&,. 7(ainst
this Order, respondents led a petition for certiorari and 4anda4us .efore the Court of 7ppeals, doc!eted
as C70".R. SP No. $&+/&.
Durin( the pendenc- of the case .efore the Court of 7ppeals, RTC 2ud(e 3ile4on B. 5ontene(ro dis4issed
the co4plaint in Civil Case No. //01'&, on the (round that it was led out of ti4e and .arred .- laches.
The RTC proceeded fro4 the pre4ise that the co4plaint was one for annul4ent of a voida.le contract and
thus .arred .- the four0-ear prescriptive period. <ence, the rst petition for review now under
consideration was led with this Court, assailin( the dis4issal of the co4plaint.
The second petition for review was led with the Court after the Court of 7ppeals on '% 7pril +%%+ annulled
and set aside the RTC orders in SP No. /;0#,,$ on the (round that it was the 4inisterial dut- of the lower
court to issue the writ of possession when title over the 4ort(a(ed propert- had .een consolidated in the
4ort(a(ee.
This Court ordered the consolidation of the two cases, on 4otion of petitioners.
In ".R. No. #$%&&', petitioners clai4 that followin( the Court8s rulin( in Medel v. Court of Appeals
,
the rate
of interest stipulated in the principal loan a(ree4ent is clearl- null and void. Conse6uentl-, the- also ar(ue
that the nullit- of the a(reed interest rate a:ects the validit- of the real estate 4ort(a(e. Nota.l-, while
petitioners were silent in their petition on the issues of prescription and laches on which the RTC (rounded
the dis4issal of the co4plaint, the- .elatedl- raised the 4atters in their Memorandum. Nonetheless, these
points warrant .rief co44ent.
On the other hand, petitioners ar(ue in ".R. No. #$'$// that the RTC did not co44it an- (rave a.use of
discretion when it issued the orders dated ' 7u(ust #/// and , 2anuar- +%%%, and that these orders could
not have .een Athe proper su.?ects of a petition for certiorari and 4anda4usA. 5ore accuratel-, the
?usticia.le issues .efore us are whether the Court of 7ppeals could properl- entertain the petition for
certiorari fro4 the ti4eliness aspect, and whether the appellate court correctl- concluded that the writ of
possession could no lon(er .e sta-ed.
Be rst resolve the petition in ".R. No. #$%&&'.
Petitioners contend that the a(reed rate of interest of ,> per 4onth or &+> per annu4 is so e=cessive,
ini6uitous, unconsciona.le and e=or.itant that it should have .een declared null and void. Instead of
dis4issin( their co4plaint, the- aver that the lower court should have declared the4 lia.le to respondents
for the ori(inal a4ount of the loan plus #+> interest per annu4 and #> 4onthl- penalt- char(e as
li6uidated da4a(es,
&
in view of the rulin( in Medel v. Court of Appeals.
;
In Medel, the Court found that the interest stipulated at $.$> per 4onth or ,,> per annu4 was so
ini6uitous or unconsciona.le as to render the stipulation void.
Nevertheless, we nd the interest at $.$> per 4onth, or ,,> per annu4, stipulated upon .- the parties in
the pro4issor- note ini6uitous or unconsciona.le, and, hence, contrar- to 4orals )Acontra bonos moresA*,
if not a(ainst the law. The stipulation is void. The Court shall reduce e6uita.l- li6uidated da4a(es,
whether intended as an inde4nit- or a penalt- if the- are ini6uitous or unconsciona.le.
/
In a lon( line of cases, this Court has invalidated si4ilar stipulations on interest rates for .ein( e=cessive,
ini6uitous, unconsciona.le and e=or.itant. In Solangon v. Salazar,
#%
we annulled the stipulation of ,> per
4onth or &+> per annu4 interest on a P,%,%%%.%% loan. In Imperial v. Jaucian,
##
we reduced the interest
rate fro4 #,> to #.#,&> per 4onth or #1> per annu4. In Ruiz v. Court of Appeals,
#+
we e6uita.l- reduced
the a(reed '> per 4onth or ',> per annu4 interest to #> per 4onth or #+> per annu4 interest. The
#%> and ;> interest rates per 4onth on a P#,%%%,%%%.%% loan were reduced to #+> per annu4 in Cuaton
v. Salud.
#'
Recentl-, this Court, inArrofo v. uino,
#1
reduced the &> interest per 4onth on a P#$,%%%.%%
loan a4ountin( to ;1> interest per annu4 to #;> per annu4.
There is no need to unsettle the principle aCr4ed in Medel and li!e cases. 3ro4 that perspective, it is
apparent that the stipulated interest in the su.?ect loan is e=cessive, ini6uitous, unconsciona.le and
e=or.itant. Pursuant to the freedo4 of contract principle e4.odied in 7rticle #'%, of the Civil Code,
contractin( parties 4a- esta.lish such stipulations, clauses, ter4s and conditions as the- 4a- dee4
convenient, provided the- are not contrar- to law, 4orals, (ood custo4s, pu.lic order, or pu.lic polic-. In
the ordinar- course, the codal provision 4a- .e invo!ed to annul the e=cessive stipulated interest.
In the case at .ar, the stipulated interest rate is ,> per 4onth, or &+> per annu4. B- the standards set in
the a.ove0cited cases, this stipulation is si4ilarl- invalid. <owever, the RTC refused to appl- the principle
cited and e4plo-ed in Medel on the (round that Medel did not pertain to the annul4ent of a real estate
4ort(a(e,
#$
as it was a case for annul4ent of the loan contract itself. The 6uestion thus sensi.l- arises
whether the invalidit- of the stipulation on interest carries with it the invalidit- of the principal o.li(ation.
The 6uestion is crucial to the present petition even if the su.?ect thereof is not the annul4ent of the loan
contract .ut that of the 4ort(a(e contract. The consideration of the 4ort(a(e contract is the sa4e as that
of the principal contract fro4 which it receives life, and without which it cannot e=ist as an independent
contract. Bein( a 4ere accessor- contract, the validit- of the 4ort(a(e contract would depend on the
validit- of the loan secured .- it.
#,
Nota.l- in Medel, the Court did not invalidate the entire loan o.li(ation despite the ine6uita.ilit- of the
stipulated interest, .ut instead reduced the rate of interest to the 4ore reasona.le rate of #+> per annu4.
The sa4e re4edial approach to the wron(ful interest rates involved was e4plo-ed or aCr4ed .- the
Court in Solangon,Imperial, Ruiz, Cuaton, and Arrofo.
The Court8s ulti4ate aCr4ation in the cases cited of the validit- of the principal loan o.li(ation side .-
side with the invalidation of the interest rates thereupon is con(ruent with the rule that a usurious loan
transaction is not a co4plete nullit- .ut defective onl- with respect to the a(reed interest.
Be are aware that the Court of 7ppeals, on certain occasions, had ruled that a usurious loan is wholl- null
and void .oth as to the loan and as to the usurious interest.
#&
<owever, this Court adopted the contrar-
rule,
as co4prehensivel- discussed in !riones v. Camma"oD
#;
In "ui 2on( E Co. vs. Rivera, et al., 1$ Phil. &&;, this Court li!ewise declared that, in an- event, the de.tor
in a usurious contract of loan should pa- the creditor the a4ount which he ?ustl- owes hi4, citin( in
support of this rulin( its previous decisions in "o Chioco, Supra, 7(uilar vs. Ru.iato, et al., 1% Phil. $&%, and
Del(ado vs. Du6ue Fal(ona, 11 Phil. &'/.
. . . .
Then in Gope9 and 2avelona vs. El <o(ar 3ilipino, 1& Phil. +1/, Be also held that the standin( ?urisprudence
of this Court on the 6uestion under consideration was clearl- to the e:ect that the @sur- Gaw, .- its letter
and spirit, did not deprive the lender of his ri(ht to recover fro4 the .orrower the 4one- actuall- loaned to
and en?o-ed .- the latter. This Court went further to sa- that the @sur- Gaw did not provide for the
forfeiture of the capital in favor of the de.tor in usurious contracts, and that while the forfeiture 4i(ht
appear to .e convenient as a drastic 4easure to eradicate the evil of usur-, the le(al 6uestion involved
should not .e resolved on the .asis of convenience.
Other cases upholdin( the sa4e principle are Palileo vs. Cosio, /& Phil. /#/ and Pascua vs. Pere9, G0#/$$1,
2anuar- '#, #/,1, #% SCR7 #//, +%%0+%+. In the latter Be e=pressl- held that when a contract is found to
.e tainted with usur- Athe onl- ri(ht of the respondent )creditor* . . . was 4erel- to collect the a4ount of
the loan, plus interest due thereon.A
The view has .een e=pressed, however, that the rulin( thus consistentl- adhered to should now .e
a.andoned .ecause 7rticle #/$& of the new Civil Code H a su.se6uent law H provides that contracts and
stipulations, under an- cloa! or device whatever, intended to circu4vent the laws a(ainst usur-, shall .e
void, and that in such cases Athe .orrower 4a- recover in accordance with the laws on usur-.A 3ro4 this
the conclusion is drawn that the whole contract is void and that, therefore, the creditor has no ri(ht to
recover H not even his capital.
The 4eanin( and scope of our rulin( in the cases 4entioned heretofore is clearl- stated, and the view
referred to in the precedin( para(raph is ade6uatel- answered, in 7n(el 2ose, etc. vs. Chelda Enterprises,
et al. )G0+$&%1, 7pril +1, #/,;*. On the 6uestion of whether a creditor in a usurious contract 4a- or 4a-
not recover the principal of the loan, and, in the aCr4ative, whether or not he 4a- also recover interest
thereon at the le(al rate, Be said the followin(D
A. . . .
7ppealin( directl- to @s, defendants raise two 6uestions of lawD )#* In a loan with usurious interest, 4a-
the creditor recover the principal of the loanI )+* Should attorne-Js fees .e awarded in plainti:Js favorIA
"reat reliance is 4ade .- appellants on 7rt. #1## of the New Civil Code . . . .
Since, accordin( to the appellants, a usurious loan is void due to ille(alit- of cause or o.?ect, the rule of
pari delicto e=pressed in 7rticle #1##, supra, applies, so that neither part- can .rin( action a(ainst each
other. Said rule, however, appellants add, is 4odied as to the .orrower, .- e=press provision of the law
)7rt. #1#', New Civil Code*, allowin( the .orrower to recover interest paid in e=cess of the interest allowed
.- the @sur- Gaw. 7s to the lender, no e=ception is 4ade to the ruleK hence, he cannot recover on the
contract. So H the- continue H the New Civil Code provisions 4ust .e upheld as a(ainst the @sur- Gaw,
under which a loan with usurious interest is not totall- void, .ecause of 7rticle #/,# of the New Civil Code,
thatD A@surious contracts shall .e (overned .- the @sur- Gaw and other special laws, so far as the- are not
inconsistent with this Code.A
Be do not a(ree with such reasonin(. 7rticle #1## of the New Civil Code is not newK it is the sa4e as
7rticle #'%$ of the Old Civil Code. Therefore, said provision is no warrant for departin( fro4 previous
interpretation that, as provided in the @sur- Gaw )7ct No. +,$$, as a4ended*, a loan with usurious interest
is not totall- void onl- as to the interest.
. . . -".ppe//"#ts 0"*/ to 1o#s*$er t2"t " 1o#tr"1t o0 /o"# 3*t2 4s4r*o4s *#terest 1o#s*sts o0
pr*#1*p"/ "#$ "11essor5 st*p4/"t*o#s6 t2e pr*#1*p"/ o#e *s to p"5 t2e $ebt6 t2e "11essor5
st*p4/"t*o# *s to p"5 *#terest t2ereo#.
A#$ s"*$ t3o st*p4/"t*o#s "re $*7*s*b/e *# t2e se#se t2"t t2e 0ormer 1"# st*// st"#$ 3*t2o4t t2e
/"tter. Art*1/e 1273, !*7*/ !o$e, "ttests to t2*s, 8)2e re#4#1*"t*o# o0 t2e pr*#1*p"/ $ebt s2"//
e9t*#+4*s2 t2e "11essor5 ob/*+"t*o#s6 b4t t2e 3"*7er o0 t2e /"tter s2"// /e"7e t2e 0ormer *#
0or1e.8
)2e :4est*o# t2ere0ore to reso/7e *s 32et2er t2e *//e+"/ terms "s to p"5me#t o0 *#terest
/*;e3*se re#$ers " #4//*t5 t2e /e+"/ terms "s to p"5me#ts o0 t2e pr*#1*p"/ $ebt. Art*1/e 1<20 o0
t2e Ne3 !*7*/ !o$e pro7*$es *# t2*s re+"r$, 8I# 1"se o0 " $*7*s*b/e 1o#tr"1t, *0 t2e *//e+"/ terms
1"# be sep"r"te$ 0rom t2e /e+"/ o#es, t2e /"tter m"5 be e#0or1e$.8
I# s*mp/e /o"# 3*t2 st*p4/"t*o# o0 4s4r*o4s *#terest, t2e prest"t*o# o0 t2e $ebtor to p"5 t2e
pr*#1*p"/ $ebt, 32*12 *s t2e 1"4se o0 t2e 1o#tr"1t =Art*1/e 1350, !*7*/ !o$e>, *s #ot *//e+"/. )2e
*//e+"/*t5 /*es o#/5 "s to t2e prest"t*o# to p"5 t2e st*p4/"te$ *#terest6 2e#1e, be*#+ sep"r"b/e,
t2e /"tter o#/5 s2o4/$ be $eeme$ 7o*$, s*#1e *t *s t2e o#/5 o#e t2"t *s *//e+"/.
. . . .
The principal de.t re4ainin( without stipulation for pa-4ent of interest can thus .e recovered .- ?udicial
action. 7nd in case of such de4and, and the de.tor incurs in dela-, the de.t earns interest fro4 the date
of the de4and )in this case fro4 the lin( of the co4plaint*. Such interest is not due to stipulation, for
there was none, the sa4e .ein( void. Rather, it is due to the (eneral provision of law that in o.li(ations to
pa- 4one-, where the de.tor incurs in dela-, he has to pa- interest .- wa- of da4a(es )7rt. ++%/, Civil
Code*. The court a 6uo therefore, did not err in orderin( defendants to pa- the principal de.t with interest
thereon at the le(al rate, fro4 the date of lin( of the co4plaint.A
#/
The Court8s wholehearted aCr4ation of the rule that the principal o.li(ation su.sists despite the nullit- of
the stipulated interest is evinced .- its su.se6uent rulin(s, cited a.ove, in all of which the 4ain o.li(ation
was upheld and the o:endin( interest rate 4erel- corrected. <ence, it is clear and settled that the
principal loan o.li(ation still stands and re4ains valid. B- the sa4e to!en, since the 4ort(a(e contract
derives its vitalit- fro4 the validit- of the principal o.li(ation, the invalid stipulation on interest rate is
si4ilarl- insuCcient to render void the ancillar- 4ort(a(e contract.
It should .e noted that had the Court declared the loan and 4ort(a(e a(ree4ents void for .ein( contrar-
to pu.lic polic-, no prescriptive period could have run.
+%
Such .enet is o.viousl- not availa.le to
petitioners.
Let the RTC pronounced that the co4plaint was .arred .- the four0-ear prescriptive period provided in
7rticle #'/# of the Civil Code, which (overns voida.le contracts. This conclusion was derived fro4 the
alle(ation in the co4plaint that the consent of petitioners was vitiated throu(h undue inMuence. Bhile the
RTC correctl- ac!nowled(ed the rule of prescription for voida.le contracts, it erred in appl-in( the rule in
this case. Be are hard put to conclude in this case that there was an- undue inMuence in the rst place.
There is ulti4atel- no showin( that petitioners8 consent to the loan and 4ort(a(e a(ree4ents was vitiated
.- undue inMuence. The nancial condition of petitioners 4a- have 4otivated the4 to contract with
respondents, .ut undue inMuence cannot .e attri.uted to respondents si4pl- .ecause the- had lent
4one-. 7rticle #'/#, in relation to 7rticle #'/% of the Civil Code, (rants the a((rieved part- the ri(ht to
o.tain the annul4ent of contract on account of factors which vitiate consent. 7rticle #''& denes the
concept of undue inMuence, as followsD
There is undue inMuence when a person ta!es i4proper advanta(e of his power over the will of another,
deprivin( the latter of a reasona.le freedo4 of choice. The followin( circu4stances shall .e consideredD
the condential, fa4il-, spiritual and other relations .etween the parties or the fact that the person alle(ed
to have .een undul- inMuenced was su:erin( fro4 4ental wea!ness, or was i(norant or in nancial
distress.
Bhile petitioners were alle(edl- nanciall- distressed, it 4ust .e proven that there is deprivation of their
free a(enc-. In other words, for undue inMuence to .e present, the inMuence e=erted 4ust have so
overpowered or su.?u(ated the 4ind of a contractin( part- as to destro- his free a(enc-, 4a!in( hi4
e=press the will of another rather than his own.
+#
The alle(ed lin(erin( nancial woes of petitioners per
se cannot .e e6uated with the presence of undue inMuence.
The RTC had li!ewise concluded that petitioners were .arred .- laches fro4 assailin( the validit- of the
real estate 4ort(a(e. Be wholeheartedl- a(ree. If indeed petitioners unwillin(l- (ave their consent to the
a(ree4ent, the- should have raised this issue as earl- as in the foreclosure proceedin(s. It was onl- when
the writ of possession was issued did petitioners challen(e the stipulations in the loan contract in their
action for annul4ent of 4ort(a(e. Evidentl-, petitioners slept on their ri(hts. The Court of 7ppeals
succinctl- 4ade the followin( o.servationsD
In all these proceedin(s startin( fro4 the foreclosure, followed .- the issuance of a provisional certicate
of saleK then the denite certicate of saleK then the issuance of TCT No. +/''; in favor of the defendants
and nall- the petition for the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the defendants, there is no
showin( that plainti:s 6uestioned the validit- of these proceedin(s. It was onl- after the issuance of the
writ of possession in favor of the defendants, that plainti:s alle(edl- tendered to the defendants the
a4ount of P+,%,%%%.%% which the defendants refused. In all these proceedin(s, wh- did plainti:s sleep on
their ri(htsI
++
Clearl- then, with the a.sence of undue inMuence, petitioners have no cause of action. Even assu4in(
undue inMuence vitiated their consent to the loan contract, their action would alread- .e .arred .-
prescription when the- led it. 5oreover, petitioners had clearl- slept on their ri(hts as the- failed to
ti4el- assail the validit- of the 4ort(a(e a(ree4ent. The denial of the petition in ".R. No. #$%&&' is
warranted.
Be now resolve the petition in ".R. No. #$'$//.
Petitioners clai4 that the assailed RTC orders dated ' 7u(ust #/// and , 2anuar- +%%% could no lon(er .e
6uestioned in a special civil action for certiorari and 4anda4us as the re(le4entar- period for such action
had alread- elapsed.
It 4ust .e noted that the Order dated ' 7u(ust #/// suspendin( the enforce4ent of the writ of possession
had a period of e:ectivit- of onl- twent- )+%* da-s fro4 ' 7u(ust #///, or until +' 7u(ust #///. Thus,
upon the e=piration of the twent- )+%*0da- period, the said Order .eca4e functus o#cio. Thus, there is
reall- no sense in assailin( the validit- of this Order, 4ooted as it was. 3or the sa4e reason, the validit- of
the order need not have .een assailed .- respondents in their special civil action .efore the Court of
7ppeals.
On the other hand, the Order dated , 2anuar- +%%% is in the nature of a writ of in?unction whose period of
eCcac- is indenite. It 4a- .e properl- assailed .- wa- of the special civil action for certiorari, as it is
interlocutor- in nature.
7s a rule, the special civil action for certiorari under Rule ,$ 4ust .e led not later than si=t- ),%* da-s
fro4 notice of the ?ud(4ent or order.
+'
Petitioners ar(ue that the ' 7u(ust #/// Order could no lon(er .e
assailed .- respondents in a special civil action for certiorari .efore the Court of 7ppeals, as the petition
was led .e-ond si=t- ),%* da-s followin( respondents8 receipt of the Order. Considerin( that the ' 7u(ust
#/// Order had .eco4efunctus o#cio in the rst place, this ar(u4ent deserves scant consideration.
Petitioners further clai4 that the , 2anuar- +%%% Order could not have li!ewise .een the su.?ect of a
special civil action for certiorari, as it is accordin( to the4 a nal order, as opposed to an interlocutor-
order. That the , 2anuar- +%%% Order is interlocutor- in nature should .e .e-ond dou.t. 7n order is
interlocutor- if its e:ects would onl- .e provisional in character and would still leave su.stantial
proceedin(s to .e further had .- the issuin( court in order to put the controvers- to rest.
+1
The in?unctive
relief (ranted .- the order is denitel- nal, .ut 4erel- provisional, its e:ectivit- hin(in( on the ulti4ate
outco4e of the then pendin( action for annul4ent of real estate 4ort(a(e. Indeed, an interlocutor- order
hardl- puts to a close, or disposes of, a case or a disputed issue leavin( nothin( else to .e done .- the
court in respect thereto, as is characteristic of a nal order.
Since the , 2anuar- +%%% Order is not a nal order, .ut rather interlocutor- in nature, we cannot a(ree with
petitioners who insist that it 4a- .e assailed onl- throu(h an appeal perfected within fteen )#$* da-s
fro4 receipt thereof .- respondents. It is a=io4atic that an interlocutor- order cannot .e challen(ed .- an
appeal,
.ut is suscepti.le to review onl- throu(h the special civil action of certiorari.
+$
The si=t- ),%*0da-
re(le4entar- period for special civil actions under Rule ,$ applies, and respondents8 petition was led with
the Court of 7ppeals well within the period.
7ccordin(l-, no error can .e attri.uted to the Court of 7ppeals in (rantin( the petition for certiorari and
4anda4us. 7s pointed out .- respondents, the re4ed- of 4anda4us lies to co4pel the perfor4ance of a
4inisterial dut-. The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an e=tra?udicial foreclosure is 4erel-
a 4inisterial function.
+,
Thus, we also aCr4 the Court of 7ppeals8 rulin( to set aside the RTC orders en?oinin( the enforce4ent of
the writ of possession.
+&
The purchaser in a foreclosure sale is entitled as a 4atter of ri(ht to a writ of
possession, re(ardless of whether or not there is a pendin( suit for annul4ent of the 4ort(a(e or the
foreclosure proceedin(s. 7n in?unction to prohi.it the issuance or enforce4ent of the writ is entirel- out of
place.
+;
One nal note. The issue on the validit- of the stipulated interest rates, re(retta.l- for petitioners, was not
raised at the earliest possi.le opportunit-. It should .e pointed out thou(h that since an e=cessive
stipulated interest rate 4a- .e void for .ein( contrar- to pu.lic polic-, an action to annul said interest rate
does not prescri.e. Such indeed is the re4ed-K it is not the action for annul4ent of the ancillar- real estate
4ort(a(e. Despite the nullit- of the stipulated interest rate, the principal loan o.li(ation su.sists, and
alon( with it the 4ort(a(e that serves as collateral securit- for it.
B<ERE3ORE, in view of all the fore(oin(, the petitions are DENIED. Costs a(ainst petitioners.
SO ORDERED.