The Insular Life Assurance Company Ltd. vs.

Ebrado [GR L-44059, 28 October 1977]

First Division, Martin (J): 5 concur
Facts: On 1 September 1968, Buenaventura Cristor Ebrado was issued by the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.,
Policy 009929 on a whole-life plan for P5,882.00 with a rider for Accidental Death Benefits for the same
amount. Buenaventura C. Ebrado designated Carponia T. Ebrado as the revocable beneficiary in his policy. He
referred to her as his wife. On 21 October 1969, Buenventura C. Ebrado died as a result of an accident when
he was hit by a falling branch of a tree. As the insurance policy was in force, Insular Life stands liable to pay the
coverage of the policy in an amount of P11,745.73, representing the face value of the policy in the amount of
P5,882.00 plus the additional benefits for accidental death also in the amount of P5,882.00 and the refund of
P18.00 paid for the premium due November, 1969, minus the unpaid premiums and interest thereon due for
January and February, 1969, in the sum of P36.27. Carponia T. Ebrado filed with the insurer a claim for the
proceeds of the policy as the designated beneficiary therein, although she admits that she and the insured
Buenaventura C. Ebrado were merely living as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Pascuala
Vda. de Ebrado also filed her claim as the widow of the deceased insured. She asserts that she is the one
entitled to the insurance proceeds, not the common-law wife, Carponia T. Ebrado. In doubt as to whom the
insurance proceeds shall be paid, the insurer commenced an action for Interpleader before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal on 29 April 1970. On 25 September 1972, the trial court rendered judgment declaring, among
others, Carponia T. Ebrado disqualified from becoming beneficiary of the insured Buenaventura Cristor Ebrado
and directing the payment of the insurance proceeds to the estate of the deceased insured. From this
judgment, Carponia T. Ebrado appealed to the Court of Appeals, but on 11 July 1976, the Appellate Court
certified the case to the Supreme Court as involving only questions of law.

Issue [1]: Whether a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of a legally married
man can claim the proceeds thereof in case of death of the latter.
Held[1]: NO. It is quite unfortunate that the Insurance Act (RA 2327, as amended) or even the new Insurance
Code (PD 612, as amended) does not contain any specific provision grossly resolutory of the prime question at
hand. Section 50 of the Insurance Act which provides that "(t)he insurance shall be applied exclusively to the
proper interest of the person in whose name it is made" cannot be validly seized upon to hold that the same
includes the beneficiary. The word "interest" highly suggests that the provision refers only to the insured and
not to the beneficiary, since a contract of insurance is personal in character. Otherwise, the prohibitory laws
against illicit relationships especially on property and descent will be rendered nugatory, as the same could
easily be circumvented by modes of insurance. Rather, the general rules of civil law should be applied to
resolve this void in the Insurance Law. Article 2011 of the New Civil Code states: "The contract of insurance is
governed by special laws. Matters not expressly provided for in such special laws shall be regulated by this
Code." When not otherwise specifically provided for by the Insurance Law, the contract of life insurance is
governed by the general rules of the civil law regulating contracts. And under Article 2012 of
the same Code, "any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be named
beneficiary of a life insurance policy by the person who cannot make a donation to him." Common-law
spouses are, definitely, barred from receiving donations from each other. Article 739 of the new Civil Code
provides that "the following donations shall be void: (1) Those made between persons who were guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of donation; (2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same
criminal offense, in consideration thereof; (3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants or
ascendants by reason of his office. In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be
brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donee may be proved by preponderance of
evidence in the same action." In essence, a life insurance policy is no different from a civil donation insofar as
the beneficiary is concerned. Both are founded upon the same consideration: liberality. A beneficiary is like a
donee, because from the premiums of the policy which the insured pays out of liberality, the beneficiary will
receive the proceeds or profits of said insurance. As a consequence, the proscription in Article 739 of the new
Civil Code should equally operate in life insurance contracts. The mandate of Article 2012 cannot be laid aside:
any person who cannot receive a donation cannot be named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of the
person who cannot make the donation. Under American law, a policy of life insurance is considered as a
testament and in construing it, the courts will, so far as possible treat it as a will and determine the effect of a
clause designating the beneficiary by rules under which wills are interpreted. Policy considerations and
dictates of morality rightly justify the institution of a barrier between common-law spouses in regard to
property relations since such relationship ultimately encroaches upon the nuptial and filial rights of the
legitimate family. There is every reason to hold that the bar in donations between legitimate spouses and
those between illegitimate ones should be enforced in life insurance policies since the same are based on
similar consideration. As pointed out, a beneficiary in a life insurance policy is no different from a donee. Both
the recipients of pure beneficence. So long as marriage remains the threshold of family laws, reason and
morality dictate that the impediments imposed upon married couple should likewise be imposed upon extra-
marital relationship. If legitimate relationship is circumscribed by these legal disabilities, with more reason
should an illicit relationship be restricted by these disabilities.
Southern Luzon Employees Association v Juanita Golpeo, et al. GR No. L-6114 October 30, 1954
FACTS: Roman Concepcion put down as beneficiary the name of his common-law wife Aquilina Maloles and
their children. Upon the formers death on 13 December 1950, three sets of claimants presented themselves,
namely: Juanita Golpeo, legal wife and her children, and Elsie Hicban, another common-law wife, and her
child. Plaintiff association instituted in the CFI an action for Interpleader against the three conflicting claimants
as to which of the parties the amount of P2, 505 should be delivered to. After hearing, the CFI declared
Maloles and her children the sole beneficiaries, defendant Golpeo and her children thereafter appealed to the
Supreme Court. The Southern Luzon Employees Association, although not an insurance company,
nevertheless, have for its purpose mutual aid for its members and their dependents in case of death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI erred in ruling Maloles and her children as the rightful beneficiaries upon the
contention of Golpeo that designating a common-law wife as beneficiary is contrary to law, morals and public
policy.
HELD: No. The contract between the plaintiff and Roman Concepcion partook of the nature of an insurance
and that, therefore, the amount in question belonged exclusively to the beneficiaries (Del Val v Del Val, 29 Phi
534). Moreover, appellant Golpeo, by her silence and actions, had acquiesced in the illicit relations between
her husband and appellee Maloles.

Social Security System v Candelaria Davac, et al.GR No. L-21642 July 30, 1966
FACTS: Petronilo Davac became a member of the SSS in 1957 and designated respondent Candelaria Davac as
his beneficiary and indicated his relationship to her as that of wife. He died in 1959 and, thereupon,
respondents Candelaria Davac and Lourdes Tuplano filed their claims for death benefits with the SSS. It
appears from their claims that the deceased contracted two marriages, the first, with claimant Lourdes
Tuplano in 1946 and the second with Candelaria in 1949. The Social Security Commission passed a resolution
declaring Candelaria as the person entitled to receive the death benefits. Not satisfied with the said
resolution, Lourdes appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the designation made to the second, and
therefore, bigamous wife is null and void because (1) it contravenes the provisions of the Civil Code, and (2) it
deprives the lawful wife of her share in the conjugal property as well as her own childs legitime in the
inheritance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Social Security Commission acted correctly in declaring respondent Candelaria
Davac as the person entitled to receive the death benefits in question.
HELD: Yes. The disqualification mentioned in Article 739 is not applicable to Candelaria Davac because she was
not guilty of concubinage, there being no proof that she had knowledge of the previous marriage of her
husband Petronilo. Regarding the second point, the benefits accruing from membership in the SSS do not form
part of the properties of the conjugal partnership of the covered member. They are disbursed from a public
special fund created by Congress in pursuance to the declared policy of the Republic to develop, establish
gradually and perfect a social security system which shall provide protection against the hazards of disability,
sickness, old age and death. Moreover, if there is a named beneficiary and the designation is not invalid (as it
is not so in this case), it is not the heirs of the employee who are entitled to receive the benefits (unless they
are the designated beneficiaries themselves). It is only when there are no designated beneficiaries or when
the designation is void, that the laws of succession are applicable. And it has already been held that the Social
Security Act is not a law of succession.

TRADERS INSURANCE & SURETY CO vs. JUAN
GOLANGCO Y OTRA
Facts:
Tomas Lianco and the Archbishop ( no name indicated)entered into a contract of lease on a parcel of land
owned by church . As lessee, Lianco erected a building on the leased portion of the churchs land. Lianco later
transferred ownership of this building to Kaw Eng Si,who later transferred the same to Golangco. This
transfers by Lianco of his right to lease and the building ownership were without consent of the Archbishop.
The Archbishop filed an ejectment case against Lianco, who appears to be occupants of the premises building
with others paying rent to Golangco. This right of Golangco to receive rent on the building was judicially
recognized in a case decided between Lianco and some others occupying the premises pursuant to a
compromise agreement. At the moment, the Archbishop did not exercise his option to question Golangcos
rights as lessee, as the transfer by Lianco was without the Archbishops consent. On April 7,1949,Golangco
applied for fire insurance with TradersInsurance and Surety Co. of which Golangco was issued fire insurance
policy stating that all insurance covered under said policy, includes the 'rent or other subject matter of
insurance in respect of or in connection with any building or any property contained
in any building'. On June 5, 1949, fire ravaged the building premises pursuant of which Golangco requested
Traders Insurance to pay the insurance amount of 10,000 including the amount of rent P1, 100monthly.
Traders insurance refused to pay the insurance as pertaining to the rent averring that Golangco has no
insurable interest therein.
Issue: WON Golangco has insurable interest ( in the property) on the rent of the building premises which may
lawfully/validly be subject of insurance?
Held:
Yes, Sec. 13 of the Insurance Code provides that Every interest in the property, whether real or personal, or
any relation thereto, or liability in respect thereof of such nature that a contemplated peril might directly
damnify the insured, is an insurable interest. By virtue of the contract between Tomas B. Lianco and the
Archbishop, Lianco erected the building of which the premises in question form part and became owner
thereof . He transferred the ownership of the premises in question to kaw Eng Si, who in turn transferred it to
plaintiff Juan Golangco .Lianco and the actual occupantof the premises acknowledged plaintiff's right to collect
rentals thereon in a compromise agreement which was incorporated in a judicial judgment. Both at the time
of the issuance of the policy and at the time of the fire, plaintiff Golangco was in legal possession of the
premises, collecting rentals from its occupant. It seems plain that if the premises were destroyed - as they
were - by fire, Golangco would be, as he was, directly damnified thereby; and hence he had an insurable
interest therein (section 13, Insurance Law). It is to be noted that the policy so worded indicates that the fire
insurance policy includes 'rent or other subject matter of insurance in respect of or in connection with any
building or any property contained in any building'. The argument of Traders Insurance that a policy of
insurance must specify the interest of the insured in the property insured, if he is not the absolute owner
thereof, is not meritorious because it was the Traders, not Golangco, who prepared that policy, and it cannot
take advantage of its own acts to plaintiff's detriment; and, in any case, this provision was substantially
complied with by Golangco when he made a full and clear statement of his interests to Trader's manager. The
contract between Lianco and the Archbishop only forbade Lianco from transferring 'his rights as LESSEE but
the contracts Lianco made in favor of Kaw Eng Si and plaintiff Golangco did not transfer such rights; and hence
no written consent thereto was necessary. At worst, the contract would be voidable, but not a void contract,
at the option of the Archbishop; but this would not deprive Golangco of his insurable interest until such option
were exercised; and it does not appear that it was ever exercised. The ejectment case filed by the Archbishop
against Lianco did not remove nor destroy plaintiff's insurable interest: first, because plaintiff was not a party
thereto
and cannot be bound thereby; and second, because the judgment of the Municipal Court, at least as late as
February 14, 1950, had not been executed so far as possession of the premises were concerned; so that, as far
as plaintiff Golangco was concerned, his right to the premises and to the rentals thereon continued to exist on
June 5, 1949 when the fire took place."
Filipino Merchants Insurance Co. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals [GR 85141, 28 November 1989]
Second Division, Regalado (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: In December 1976, Choa Tiek Seng insured said shipment with Filipino Merchants Insurance Company
(FMICI) under cargo Policy M-2678 for the sum of P267,653.59 for the goods described as 600 metric tons of
fishmeal in new gunny bags of 90 kilos each from Bangkok, Thailand to Manila against all risks under
warehouse to warehouse terms. Actually, what was imported was 59.940 metric tons not 600 tons at $395.42
a ton CNF Manila. The fishmeal in 666 new gunny bags were unloaded from the ship on 11 December 1976 at
Manila unto the arrastre contractor E. Razon, Inc. and FMICI's surveyor ascertained and certified that in such
discharge 105 bags were in bad order condition as jointly surveyed by the ship's agent and the arrastre
contractor. The condition of the bad order was reflected in the turn over survey report of Bad Order cargoes
120320 to 120322, consisting of 3 pages. The cargo was also surveyed by the arrastre contractor before
delivery of the cargo to the consignee and the condition of the cargo on such delivery was reflected in E.
Razon's Bad Order Certificates 14859, 14863 and 14869 covering a total of 227 bags in bad order condition.
FMICI's surveyor has conducted a final and detailed survey of the cargo in the warehouse for which he
prepared a survey report with the findings on the extent of shortage or loss on the bad order bags totalling
227 bags amounting to 12,148 kilos. Based on said computation, Choa made a formal claim against FMICI for
P51,568.62 the computation of which claim is contained therein. A formal claim statement was also presented
by the Choa against the vessel dated 21 December 1976, but FMICI refused to pay the claim. Consequently, an
action was brought by the consignee (Choa Tiek Seng) of the shipment of fishmeal loaded on board the vessel
SS Bougainville and unloaded at the Port of Manila on or about 11 December 1976 and seeks to recover from
FMICI the amount of P51,568.62 representing damages to said shipment which has been insured by FMICI
under Policy M-2678. FMICI brought a third party complaint against third party defendants Compagnie
Maritime Des Chargeurs Reunis and/or E. Razon, Inc. seeking judgment against the third party defendants in
case judgment is rendered against FMICI. The court below, after trial on the merits, rendered judgment in
favor of Choa, ordering FMICI to pay Choa the sum of P51,568.62 with interest at legal rate from the date of
the filing of the complaint; and, on the third party complaint, the third party defendant Compagnie Maritime
Des Chargeurs Reunis and third party defendant E. Razon, Inc. are ordered to pay FMICI jointly and severally
reimbursement of the amounts paid by FMICI with legal interest from the date of such payment until the date
of such reimbursement; without pronouncement as to costs. On appeal, and on 18 July 1988, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court insofar as the award on the complaint is concerned and
modified the same with regard to the adjudication of the third-party complaint. A motion for reconsideration
of the aforesaid decision was denied, hence FMICI filed the petition for review.
Issue [1]: Whether an "all risks" marine policy has a technical meaning in insurance in that before a claim can
be compensable it is essential that there must be "some fortuity," "casualty" or "accidental cause" to which
the alleged loss is attributable.
Held [1]: NO. The "all risks clause" of the Institute Cargo Clauses read as follows "5. This insurance is against all
risks of logs or damage to the subject-matter insured but shall in no case be deemed to extend to cover loss,
damage, or expense proximately caused by delay or inherent vice or nature of the subject-matter insured.
Claims recoverable hereunder shall be payable irrespective of percentage." An "all risks policy" should be read
literally as meaning all risks whatsoever and covering all losses by an accidental cause of any kind. The terms
"accident" and "accidental", as used in insurance contracts, have not acquired any technical meaning. They are
construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptance. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean
that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual
and unforeseen. An accident is an event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation; an event that
proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected. The
very nature of the term "all risks" must be given a broad and comprehensive meaning as covering any loss
other than a wilful and fraudulent act of the insured. This is pursuant to the very purpose of an "all risks"
insurance to give protection to the insured in those cases where difficulties of logical explanation or some
mystery surround the loss or damage to property. An "all risks" policy has been evolved to grant greater
protection than that afforded by the "perils clause," in order to assure that no loss can happen through the
incidence of a cause neither insured against nor creating liability in the ship; it is written against all losses, that
is, attributable to external causes. The term "all risks" cannot be given a strained technical meaning, the
language of the clause under the Institute Cargo Clauses being unequivocal and clear, to the effect that it
extends to all damages/losses suffered by the insured cargo except (a) loss or damage or expense proximately
caused by delay, and (b) loss or damage or expense proximately caused by the inherent vice or nature of the
subject matter insured.
Issue [2]: Whether the failure of Choa to adduce evidence, showing that the alleged loss to the cargo in
question was due to a fortuitous event, precludes his right to recover from the insurance policy.
Held [2]: NO. Although generally, the burden of proof is upon the insured to show that a loss arose from a
covered peril, under an "all risks" policy the burden is not on the insured to prove the precise cause of loss or
damage for which it seeks compensation. The insured under an "all risks insurance policy" has the initial
burden of proving that the cargo was in good condition when the policy attached and that the cargo was
damaged when unloaded from the vessel; thereafter, the burden then shifts to the insurer to show the
exception to the coverage. As held in Paris-Manila Perfumery Co. vs. Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. the basic rule
is that the insurance company has the burden of proving that the loss is caused by the risks excepted and for
want of such proof, the company is liable. Coverage under an "all risks" provision of a marine insurance policy
creates a special type of insurance which extends coverage to risks not usually contemplated and avoids
putting upon the insured the burden of establishing that the loss was due to the peril falling within the policy's
coverage; the insurer can avoid coverage upon demonstrating that a specific provision expressly excludes the
loss from coverage. A marine insurance policy providing that the insurance was to be "against all risks" must
be construed as creating a special insurance and extending to other risks than are usually contemplated, and
covers all losses except such as arise from the fraud of the insured. The burden of the insured, therefore, is to
prove merely that the goods he transported have been lost, destroyed or deteriorated. Thereafter, the burden
is shifted to the insurer to prove that the loss was due to excepted perils. To impose on the insured the burden
of proving the precise cause of the loss or damage would be inconsistent with the broad protective purpose of
"all risks" insurance.
Issue [3]: Whether the insurer is liable
There being no showing that the loss was caused by any of the excepted perils, the insurer is liable under the
policy. It is believed that in the absence of any showing that the losses/damages were caused by an excepted
peril, i.e. delay or the inherent vice or nature of the subject matter insured, and there is no such showing, the
loss was covered by the policy. Herein, there is no evidence presented to show that the condition of the gunny
bags in which the fishmeal was packed was such that they could not hold their contents in the course of the
necessary transit, much less any evidence that the bags of cargo had burst as the result of the weakness of the
bags themselves. Had there been such a showing that spillage would have been a certainty, there may have
been good reason to plead that there was no risk covered by the policy (See Berk vs. Style [1956] cited in
Marine Insurance Claims, p. 125). Under an all risks policy, it was sufficient to show that there was damage
occasioned by some accidental cause of any kind, and there is no necessity to point to any particular cause.
Contracts of insurance are contracts of indemnity upon the terms and conditions specified in the policy. The
agreement has the force of law between the parties. The terms of the policy constitute themeasure of the
insurer's liability. If such terms are clear and unambiguous, they must be taken and understood in their plain,
ordinary and popular sense.
Issue [4]: Whether the consignee (Choa) has an insurable interest in said goods.
Held [4]: Choa, as consignee of the goods in transit under an invoice containing the terms under "C & F
Manila," has insurable interest in said goods. Section 13 of the Insurance Code defines insurable interest in
property as every interest in property, whether real or personal, or any relation thereto, or liability in respect
thereof, of such nature that a contemplated peril might directly damnify the insured. In principle, anyone has
an insurable interest in property who derives a benefit from its existence or would suffer loss from its
destruction whether he has or has not any title in, or lien upon or possession of the property. Insurable
interest in property may consist in (a) an existing interest; (b) an inchoate interest founded on an existing
interest; or (c) an expectancy, coupled with an existing interest in that out of which the expectancy arises. As
vendee/consignee of the goods in transit has such existing interest therein as may be the subject of a valid
contract of insurance. His interest over the goods is based on the perfected contract of sale. The perfected
contract of sale between him and the shipper of the goods operates to vest in him an equitable title even
before delivery or before he performed the conditions of the sale. The contract of shipment, whether under
F.O.B., C.I.F., or C. & F. as in the present case, is immaterial in the determination of whether the vendee has an
insurable interest or not in the goods in transit. The perfected contract of sale even without delivery vests in
the vendee an equitable title, an existing interest over the goods sufficient to be the subject of insurance.
Further, Article 1523 of the Civil Code provides that where, in pursuance of a contract of sale, the seller is
authorized or required to send the goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a carrier, whether named by
the buyer or not, for, the purpose of transmission to the buyer is deemed to be a delivery of the goods to the
buyer, the exceptions to said rule not obtaining in the present case. The Court has heretofore ruled that the
delivery of the goods on board the carrying vessels partake of the nature of actual delivery since, from that
time, the foreign buyers assumed the risks of loss of the goods and paid the insurance premium covering
them. C & F contracts are shipment contracts. The term means that the price fixed includes in a lump sum the
cost of the goods and freight to the named destination. It simply means that the seller must pay the costs and
freight necessary to bring the goods to the named destination but the risk of loss or damage to the goods is
transferred from the seller to the buyer when the goods pass the ship's rail in the port of shipment.

Spouses Cha vs. Court of Appeals [GR 124520, 18 August 1997]
First Division, Padilla (J): 4 concur
Facts: Spouses Nilo Cha and Stella Uy-Cha, as lessees, entered into a lease contract with CKS Development
Corporation, as lessor, on 5 October 1988. One of the stipulations of the 1 year lease contract states that "The
LESSEE shall not insure against fire the chattels, merchandise, textiles, goods and effects placed at any stall
or store or space in the leased premises without first obtaining the written consent and approval of the
LESSOR. If the LESSEE obtain(s) the insurance thereof without the consent of the LESSOR then the policy
is deemed assigned and transferred to the LESSOR for its own benefit" Notwithstanding the above stipulation
in the lease contract, the Cha spouses insured against loss by fire their merchandise inside the leased premises
for P500,000.00 with the United Insurance Co., Inc. without the written consent of CKS. On the day that the
lease contract was to expire, fire broke out inside the leased premises. When CKS learned of the insurance
earlier procured by the Cha spouses (without its consent), it wrote the insurer (United) a demand letter asking
that the proceeds of the insurance contract (between the Cha spouses and United) be paid directly to CKS,
based on its lease contract with the Cha spouses. United refused to pay CKS. Hence, the latter filed a
complaint against the Cha spouses and United. On 2 June 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Manila,
rendered a decision ordering United to pay CKS the amount of P335,063.11 and the Cha spouses to pay
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs of suit. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals in CA GR CV 39328 rendered a decision dated 11 January 1996, affirming the trial court decision,
deleting however the awards for exemplary damages and attorney's fees. A motion for reconsideration by
United was denied on 29 March 1996. The spouses Cha and United filed the petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether paragraph 18 of the lease contract entered into between CKS and the Cha spouses is valid
insofar as it provides that any fire insurance policy obtained by the lessee (Cha spouses) over their
merchandise inside the leased premises is deemed assigned or transferred to the lessor (CKS) if said policy is
obtained without the prior written consent of the latter.

Held: NO. It is basic in the law on contracts that the stipulations contained in a contract cannot be contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Section 18 of the Insurance Code provides that "No
contract or policy of insurance on property shall be enforceable except for the benefit of some person having
an insurable interest in the property insured." A non-life insurance policy such as the fire insurance policy
taken by the spouses over their merchandise is primarily a contract of indemnity. Insurable interest in the
property insured must exist at the time the insurance takes effect and at the time the loss occurs. The basis of
such requirement of insurable interest in property insured is based on sound public policy: to prevent a person
from taking out an insurance policy on property upon which he has no insurable interest and collecting the
proceeds of said policy in case of loss of the property. In such a case, the contract of insurance is a mere
wager which is void under Section 25 of the Insurance Code, which provides that "Every stipulation in a
policy of Insurance for the payment of loss whether the person insured has or has not any interest in the
property insured, or that the policy shall be received as proof of such interest, and every policy executed by
way of gaming or wagering, is void." Herein, it cannot be denied that CKS has no insurable interest in the
goods and merchandise inside the leased premises under the provisions of Section 17 of the Insurance Code
which provides that "The measure of an insurable interest in property is the extent to which the insured might
be damnified by loss of injury thereof." Therefore, CKS cannot, under the Insurance Code a special law
be validly a beneficiary of the fire insurance policy taken by the spouses over their merchandise. This
insurable interest over said merchandise remains with the insured, the Cha spouses. The automatic
assignment
of the policy to CKS under the provision of the lease contract previously quoted is void for being contrary to
law and/or public policy. The proceeds of the fire insurance policy thus rightfully belong to the spouses Nilo
Cha and Stella Uy-Cha. The insurer (United) cannot be compelled to pay the proceeds of the fire insurance
policy to a person (CKS) who has no insurable interest in the property insured