BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 1

Bhopal Gas Tragedy



Submitted to: Submitted by:
Ms. Sabina Salim Aditya Dassaur 206/10
Assistant Professor, U.I.L.S Prinkle Singla 207/10
Jasroop Chauhan 11/10
Rashi Gosain 15/10
Varun Bhardwaj 204/10




BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 2

Acknowledgement

I take this opportunity to express my profound gratitude and deep regards to my teacher Ms. Sabina
Salim for her exemplary guidance, monitoring and constant encouragement throughout. The blessing,
help and guidance given by her time to time shall carry me a long way in the journey of life on which I
am about to embark.
I am obliged to the library staff for their cordial support, valuable information and guidance, which
helped me in completing this task through various stages.
Lastly, I thank almighty, my parents, siblings and friends for their constant encouragement without
which this assignment would not be possible.





BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 3

Table of Contents
Contents
Acknowledgement ....................................................................................................................... 2
Introduction: Bhopal Gas Incident.................................................................................................. 4
Previous Warnings .................................................................................................................... 6
After effect .................................................................................................................................. 7
Short term ................................................................................................................................... 7
Long term ................................................................................................................................ 8
Post the Tragedy .......................................................................................................................... 9
Trial Of The Bhopal Gas Incident ................................................................................................ 11
Are we prepared for another Bhopal? ........................................................................................... 14
Legal aspects of Bhopal Gas Tragedy ........................................................................................... 18
The Criminal Proceedings .................................................................................................... 21
Since 1984 ................................................................................................................................ 23
Legal Issues ............................................................................................................................... 26
Absolute Liability ...................................................................................................................... 28
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 31








BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 4

Introduction: Bhopal Gas Incident
On the night intervening 2
nd
and 3
rd
December, 1984, there occurred in Bhopal the most tragic industrial
disaster in which thousands of persons lost their lives and lakhs of people suffered injuries of various
kinds. On a clear night, with little wind and no rain expected, the worst nightmare was unleashed on the
unsuspecting people of Bhopal. Workers, on the night shift in the plant detected a faint smell of boiled
cabbage (associated with MIC), but they ignored it. What they did not know was that shoddy
maintenance and poor safety precautions had meant that water was leaking into tank 410, carrying 40
tons of MIC, and a violent reaction was about to take place. When a few workers dared to venture out
towards that tank, they felt the rumble under their feet and in a few moments, the tank burst out of its
concrete casing and exploded, sending a deadly cloud of MIC into the air. The prevailing wind at ground
level sent the cloud swirling across the surrounding slums and into the city of Bhopal.
This was the first time that an accident had occured in a Union carbide plant. In the Indian plant itself,
one of the workers, Ranjit Singh, had died in 1981 of exposure to MIC when a few drops of it fell on his
clothing and he removed his safety mask a little too early. Compensation was paid, the event was hushed
up and there was little to indicate that this was more than an isolated aberration. However, in the 80s the
plant started running at a loss due to diminishing demand for Sevin and hence was forced to cut back on
costs. Unfortunately, the person responsible for cutting costs did not know the first thing about
chemicals and ended up getting rid of all the safety mechanisms, including the all important flare to burn
off any escaping MIC in case of a leak. Between 1981 and 1984, six such leaks were documented, but
did not lead to any deaths, according to a subsequent report by the Madhya Pradesh government. In the
American plant manufacturing 'Sevin' as well, over 28 such leaks were documented, but the information
wasn't released for the fear of causing an uproar in the local community. The Bhopal plant, in 1984, had
ceased to conform to any international safety standards and Indian standards being non-existent, it
continued to cut back on safety.
Around 570,000 people were affected because of the incident. This massive figure includes
approximately 5,000 who died instantly and several hundred thousand maimed for life, including
children born with defects arising from the disaster. Such a large number almost matches, another
tragedy - the bombing of Hiroshima at the end of World War II.

BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 5

History Of Union Carbide Plant In Bhopal
There is an interesting history behind the setting up of the plant, and it is intricately linked to the 'Green
Revolution' that was underway in India in the 70s. The increasing emphasis using high-yield varieties of
seeds and chemical fertilizers and pesticides, to ensure self-sufficiency in grain meant that India became
a huge consumer of these products, leading to a severe shortage within the country itself. Foreign
multinationals, such as Union Carbide, saw the massive potential to sell such pesticides and fertilizers to
the country's 300 million or so farmers. One of these products was the 'miracle' pesticide 'Sevin' which,
while not being as polluting as DDT, was equally effective against numerous kinds of pests, and hence
was in great demand in many Third World countries at that time, India being no exception. In the
government of the day as well, Union Carbide's proposal to build the plant at Bhopal was welcomed and
permission granted readily. Bhopal was chosen primarily because of its central location, good access to
resources and easy communications with the rest of India. But instead of promoting Green Revolution in
the country it devastated the country and totally changed the face of Bhopal.
The Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) factory was established in 1969 near Bhopal. 50,9 % was
owned by Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) and 49,1 % by various Indian investors, including public
sector financial institutions. It produced the pesticide carbaryl. In 1979 a methyl isocyanate (MIC)
production plant was added to the site. MIC, an intermediate in carbaryl manufacture, was used instead
of less hazardous but more expensive materials. UCC understood the properties of MIC and how to
handle it. The Leakage On the night of December 2, 1984, during routine maintenance operations at the
MIC plant, at about 9.30 p.m., a large quantity of water entered storage tank no. 610 containing over 40
tons of MIC. This triggered off a reaction, resulting in a tremendous increase of temperature and
pressure in the tank. 40 tonnes of MIC, along with Hydrogen Cyanide and other reaction products burst
past the ruptured disc into the night air of Bhopal at around 12.30 a.m. Safety systems were grossly
under-designed and inoperative. Senior factory officials knew of the lethal build-up in the tank at least
one hour before the leakage, yet the siren to warn neighbourhood communities was sounded more than
one hour after the leak started. By then, the poisonous gases had covered an area of 40 sq.kms. killing
thousands of people. Over 500 thousand experienced acute breathlessness, pain in the eyes, and
vomiting as they inhaled the deadly vapours. They ran in panic to get away from the poisonous cloud
that hung close to the ground for more than four hours. When people poured into hospitals by thousands,
their eyes and lungs in burning, choking agony, the doctors called up the plant medical officer to find
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 6

out what they ought to do. Dr Loya, UCIL's official doctor in Bhopal replied, "It is not a deadly gas, just
irritating, a sort of tear gas."
Previous Warnings
A series of prior warnings and MIC-related accidents had occurred:
In 1976, the two trade unions reacted because of pollution within the plant.
In 1981, a worker was splashed with phosgene. In panic he ripped off his mask, thus inhaling a large
amount of phosgene gas; he died 72 hours later.
In January 1982, there was a phosgene leak, when 24 workers were exposed and had to be admitted
to hospital. None of the workers had been ordered to wear protective masks.
In February 1982, an MIC leak affected 18 workers.
In August 1982, a chemical engineer came into contact with liquid MIC, resulting in burns over 30
percent of his body.
In October 1982, there was a leak of MIC, methylcarbaryl chloride, chloroform and hydrochloric
acid. In attempting to stop the leak, the MIC supervisor suffered intensive chemical burns and two
other workers were severely exposed to the gases.
During 1983 and 1984, leaks of the following substances regularly took place in the MIC plant:
MIC, chlorine, monomethylamine, phosgene, and carbon tetrachloride, sometimes in combination.
Reports issued months before the incident by scientists within the Union Carbide corporation warned
of the possibility of an accident almost identical to that which occurred in Bhopal. The reports were
ignored and never reached senior staff.
Union Carbide was warned by American experts who visited the plant after 1981 of the potential of
a "runaway reaction" in the MIC storage tank; local Indian authorities warned the company of
problems on several occasions from 1979 onwards. Again, these warnings were not heeded


BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 7

After effect
Short term
Apart from MIC, the gas cloud may have contained phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, carbon monoxide,
hydrogen chloride, oxides of nitrogen, monomethyl amine (MMA) and carbon dioxide, either
produced in the storage tank or in the atmosphere.
The gas cloud composed mainly of materials denser than the surrounding air, stayed close to the
ground and spread outwards through the surrounding community. The initial effects of exposure
were coughing, vomiting, severe eye irritation and a feeling of suffocation. People awakened by
these symptoms fled away from the plant. Those who ran inhaled more than those who had a vehicle
to ride. Owing to their height, children and other people of shorter stature inhaled higher
concentrations. Many people were trampled trying to escape.
Thousands of people had succumbed by the morning hours. There were mass funerals and mass
cremations as well as disposal of bodies in the Narmada river. 170,000 people were treated at
hospitals and temporary dispensaries. 2,000 buffalo, goats, and other animals were collected and
buried. Within a few days, leaves on trees yellowed and fell off. Supplies, including food, became
scarce owing to suppliers' safety fears. Fishing was prohibited as well, which caused further supply
shortages.
A total of 36 wards were marked by the authorities as being "gas affected", affecting a population of
520,000. Of these, 200,000 were below 15 years of age, and 3,000 were pregnant women. In 1991,
3,928 deaths had been certified. Independent organizations recorded 8,000 dead in the first days.
Other estimations vary between 10,000 and 30,000. Another 100,000 to 200,000 people are
estimated to have permanent injuries of different degrees.
The acute symptoms were burning in the respiratory tract and eyes, blepharospasm, breathlessness,
stomach pains and vomiting. The causes of deaths were choking, reflexogenic-circulatory collapse
and pulmonary oedema. Findings during autopsies revealed changes not only in the lungs but also
cerebral oedema, tubular necrosis of the kidneys, fatty degeneration of the liver and necrotising
enteritis. The still birth rate increased by up to 300% and neonatal mortality rate by 200 %.

BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 8

Long term
It is estimated that 20,000 have died since the accident from gas-related diseases. Another 100,000 to
200,000 people are estimated to have permanent injuries.
The quality of the epidemiological and clinical research varies. Reported and studied symptoms are
eye problems, respiratory difficulties, immune and neurological disorders, cardiac failure secondary
to lung injury, female reproductive difficulties, and birth defects among children born to affected
women. Other symptoms and diseases are often ascribed to the gas exposure, but there is no good
research supporting this.
There is a clinic established by a group of survivors and activists known as Sambhavna. Sambhavna
is the only clinic that will treat anybody affected by the gas, or the subsequent water poisoning, and
treats the condition with a combination of Western and traditional Indian medicines, and has
performed extensive research.
Union Carbide as well as the Indian Government long denied permanent injuries by MIC and the
other gases. In January, 1994, the International Medical Commission on Bhopal (IMCB) visited
Bhopal to investigate the health status among the survivors as well as the health care system and the
socio-economic rehabilitation.


BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 9

Post the Tragedy
Within months after the disaster, the GoI issued an ordinance appointing itself as the sole representative
of the victims for any legal dealings with UCC as regards compensation. The ordinance was later
replaced by the Bhopal Gas Leak (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985. Armed with this power, the GoI
filed its suit for compensation and damages against UCC in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. Besides filing the suit, one of its prime responsibilities was to register
the claims of each and every gas victim in Bhopal. Analysts felt that this job was never done, or rather,
not with any seriousness for the next ten years. The government set up various inquiry commissions to
investigate the causes of the disaster; they remained half-hearted initiatives at best. UCC, on the other
hand, moved more quickly with its 'investigations': it announced by March 1985 that the disaster was
due to 'an act of sabotage' by a Sikh terrorist. Then they shifted blame to a disgruntled worker.
In May 1986, Judge J.F. Keenan ruled that India and not the US was the appropriate forum for the
Bhopal compensation litigation. In the first pre trial hearing in the consolidated Bhopal litigation in US
federal courts, John F Keenan, asked UCC as 'a matter of fundamental human decency' to provide an
interim relief payment of $5 - 10 million. UCC agreed to provide $5 million, provided a satisfactory
plan of distribution and accounting of the funds was devised. For 8 months, the UCC and the GoI
haggled over terms of reference and conditions for using the $5 million interim relief.
Finally, in November 1986, the parties agreed to channel the money through the American Red Cross to
the Indian Red Cross. Even after one year of the tragedy, no one-not even the official of the MP
Government in charge of relief for the victims-had any idea what the Red Cross would do with the
money. On December 17, 1987, a Bhopal District Court Judge passed an order directing UCC to pay Rs.
3.5 billion as interim relief. UCC challenged this order in the MP high court (at Jabalpur) on the grounds
that the trial judge was not authorised to pass the order under any provisions of the Indian Civil Penal
Code. On April 4, Justice S. K. Seth of the High Court upheld the liability of UCC for the Bhopal
disaster, but reduced the interim compensation to Rs 2.5 billion. UCC appealed to the Supreme Court of
India against the High Court order saying "No court that we know of in India or elsewhere in the world
has previously ordered interim compensation where there is no proof of damages or where liability is
strongly contested." On February 14, 1989, the Supreme Court directed UCC to pay up US $ 470
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 10

million in "full and final settlement" of all claims, rights, and liabilities arising out of the disaster. The
Supreme Court of India ruled that the $470 million settlement was "just, equitable and reasonable."
UCC described the court's decision as fair and reasonable, and the company's stock soared in the London
market. Analysts felt that the Bhopal Gas disaster, which left thousands of people dead and injured, was
settled for a mere US $ 470 million-which worked out to around Rs. 10,000 per victim (if it was divided
equally). In the same year, a leading national daily stated that approximately US $ 40,000 was spent on
the rehabilitation of every sea otter affected by the Alaska oil spill. Each sea otter was given rations of
lobsters costing US $ 500 per day. Thus the life of an Indian citizen in Bhopal was clearly much cheaper
than that of a sea otter in America. In 1991, the Bhopal court summoned Warren Anderson to appear on
a charge of 'homicide in a criminal case.' However, he did not turn up. On September 9, 1993, UCC sold
its entire 50.9% stake in UCIL to the Calcutta based Mc Leod Russell India Ltd., a company of the B M
Khaitan Group. Till 2000, attempts to serve a summon on Warren Anderson by victims' organizations in
the Federal Court on Southern district of New York have been unsuccessful. Kenneth McCallion, who
was the lawyer for some of the victims and their family members, said a private investigator also hired
to deliver the summons at Anderson's residences in Vero Beach, Florida, and Manhattan and Long
Island in New York was unable to locate him. Asked if he believed Warren Anderson had gone into
hiding to avoid the summons, McCallion said, "We are just surprised we have been unable to find him, a
former CEO of a major corporation." He observed, "And there is also a legal process which has been
issued by the courts in India for him to appear in Bhopal district court to answer criminal charges and
those attempts to serve him... have been unsuccessful as well.
In 2001, in their book, It was five past midnight in Bhopal, Dominique Lapierre and Javier Moro wrote
that bringing UCC to justice was unlikely because UCC had been sold out. In August 1999, Dow
Chemical purchased UCC for US$ 9.3 billion.


BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 11

Trial Of The Bhopal Gas Incident
After a trial lasting more than two decades, the judgement on Bhopal Gas tragedy, pronounced as on 7
th

june 2010. Chief Judicial Magistrate Mohan P Tiwari pronounced the judgment after a 23-year-long
trial .During the trial, a total of 178 prosecution witnesses were examined and 3008 documents were
produced while eight defence witnesses deposed in the court. Out of the nine accused tried for the
offences, R B Roy Choudhary, the then former Assistant Works Manager Union Carbide India Ltd
(UCIL), Mumbai died during the trial.
The remaining eight accused in the case are Keshub Mahendra, the then UCIL chairman, Vijay Gokhle,
the then managing director, Kishore Kamdar, the then vice president, J Mukund, the then works
manager, S P Choudhary, the then Production Manager, K V Shetty, the then plant superintendent, S I
Quershi, the then production assistant of UCIL and UCIL Calcutta.
The three accused -- the then chairman of Union Carbide Corporation of USA Warren Anderson,
besides Union Carbide Corporation, USA and Union Carbide Eastern, Hong Kong -- escaped the trial.
FIR in the tragedy was filed on December 3, 1984 and the case was transferred to CBI on December 6,
1984. The CBI filed the charge sheet after investigation on December 1, 1987.
The accused have been held guilty under sections 304-A (causing death by negligence), 336, 337 and
338 (gross negligence), and 35 (common intention) of the India Penal Code.
They have also been fined under section 304-A (causing death by negligence), given imprisonment of
three months and a fine of Rs250 under section 336, six months and Rs500 under section 337 and two
years and Rs1,000 under section 338.
The sentences will run concurrently. Eyebrows have been raised at the quantum of fine that chief
judicial magistrate Mohan P Tiwari of the trial court in Bhopal has imposed. A lawyer said the court
could have awarded exemplary fine on the accused and the delinquent company. There is no legal bar
on awarding a hefty fine on the company and the accused. The CBI must challenge the judgment to raise
the amount of fine, he said.
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 12

WARREN ANDRESON, as the Union Carbide CEO at the time of the disaster, was charged with
manslaughter in the Bhopal disaster case. He travelled to India with a promise from Indian authorities
that he would not be arrested. However, authorities placed Anderson in custody. Anderson posted bail,
returned to the US, and has refused to return to India.
He was declared a fugitive from justice by the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Bhopal on February 1, 1992,
for failing to appear at the court hearings in a culpable homicide case in which he was named the chief
defendant.

The chief judicial magistrate of Bhopal, Prakash Mohan Tiwari, issued an arrest warrant for
Anderson on July 31, 2009.

The United States has declined to extradite him, citing a lack of evidence.


In August 2009, a spokesman for Union Carbide said "Union Carbide had no role in operating the plant
at the time as the factory was owned, managed and operated by employees of Union Carbide India
Limited."

Eight former senior employees of this subsidiary were found guilty on June 7, 2010. After
these convictions, a Union Carbide spokesperson said, "All the appropriate people from UCIL -- officers
and those who actually ran the plant on a daily basis -- have appeared to face charges."
Indian government too seems to be in denial mode as far as bringing justice to those thousands of people
affected by the tragedy. David Headley is being tried by all hooks and crook to be punished for his
possible involvement in the killing of 200 people in 26/11 Mumbai terrorists attack but the main culprits
of Bhopal Gas Tragedy or killer of more than 20,000 people are walking scot-free and government is not
trying to bring those culprits to book of justice.
Affected people are blaming the government that Anderson is a corporate tycoon and political parties
gain financially to fight elections from businessmen. If they do not get justice, government intention will
remain in questions.
All this is happening before the government under different political parties. In these 26 years the
Congress and the BJP have been in power in the state but have done nothing to bring those culprits to
book of justice. Compensations have been insufficient to those survivors struggling for their lives
because of killer diseases not to talk of the dead ones.
Now, there is one more risky business waiting in to come into force. Nuclear plant has to be set up on
Indian land on the line of Union Carbide. In case of mishap government has prepared nuclear liability
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 13

bill. But many sections in our politics of society are against the current format of the compensations
referred in the bill. On international standard too it lacks behind and does not meet the criterion. So, the
question remains to be answered- is government going with the attitude couldnt care less?
Founder of Gas Pidit Mahila Udyog Sansthan Abdul Jabbar and an activist Satinath Sarangi also hailed
the decision of the Supreme Court and expressed the hope that the justice would be delivered soon.
While expressing happiness over CBIs initiative to approach the Supreme Court, S R Mohanty, the
Principal Secretary, Madhya Pradesh government, said that CBI took it up and the Supreme Court had
issued notice. This opens the possibility of meeting the ends of justice.
Sunita Narain, Chairman of Centre for Science and Environment, said the apex courts decision has
assured that we are on the road to justice.
During the trial, 178 prosecution witnesses were examined and 3008 documents were exhibited.









BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 14

Are we prepared for another Bhopal?
The Bhopal Gas leak and the disaster that ensued raise a series of questions regarding industrial safety,
risk, compensation and relief for victims of industrial disasters, multinational enterprises and liability,
regulation of the transfer and use of hazardous technology. Internal documents that came to light during
the discovery process in the US courts in the contamination case over the last few years clearly indicate
that UCC:
a. Transferred unproven technology to UCIL.
b. Did everything it could to ensure that it maintained a majority stake of over 50% in UCIL.
c. Was aware of the possibility of a potential runaway reaction that triggered the MIC leak in Bhopal.
d. Had lower safety standards in place in Bhopal than it had in USA.
e. Was aware from 1982 that the Bhopal plant suffered from serious safety problems.
Even as UCCs responsibility for the accident is well established, there is no doubt that the Governments
of India and Madhya Pradesh too have to accept their share of responsibility for not regulating the safety
of the plant. Between the late 1970s and 1984 there were several accidents in Bhopal plant, including
the death of a worker due to phosgene gas leak. It is also significant to note that while the GOI was
allowing industries employing hazardous substances, technology and processes to operate, no attempt
was made to develop appropriate regulatory framework to govern the safety and risk of such industries.
Further little attention was paid for enhancing capacities of bodies responsible for industrial safety to
actually monitor hazardous industries.
Following the Bhopal Gas Leak, the Factories Act 1948 was amended. This included:
The acknowledgement that the impact of accidents and disasters was increasingly likely to spill
beyond the boundaries of factories, affecting the general public in the vicinity of the factory.
Information regarding potential disasters should be communicated to the local authority and those in
the vicinity of the factory; this should include information on what may be done to mitigate harm in
the event of a disaster.
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 15

A Site Appraisal Committee be established to decide on matters of safety and hazard every time a
new factory is set up, or an old one expanded.
Workers right to participate in safety management, including the right to obtain information from
the occupier relating to workers health and safety at work;
To get trained in matters relating to workers health and safety at work; To represent to the inspector
of factories or their representative when there is inadequate provision for protection of health and
safety in the factory.
A new chapter on Hazardous Industries was added in 1987. This amendment also incorporated some of
the Supreme Court pronouncements on industrial safety made in context of an oleum gas leak in Delhi
in 1986. The amendments essentially focussed on ensuring that information regarding potential risks and
hazards are made available to local authorities and communicated to the vicinities of the plants and that
workers have a right to participate in safety management and regulation of the location.
The 1987 amendments also redefined the occupier (the person designated to be responsible for the
affairs of the factory-specifically safety in the present context) to be one of the Directors and explicitly
laid down that the occupier has an obligation to show, in the event of an accident, that due diligence had
been exercised to enforce the safety obligations laid down in the Act.
In 1991, India enacted the Public Liability Insurance Act (PLIA) to provide for interim compensation on
a no-fault basis. In 1995 the National Environment Tribunal Act was enacted to set up tribunals to deal
exclusively with the determination and disbursement of compensation.
Criminal conduct
The law governing criminal conduct, of omission and commission, by corporations and corporate
directors and managers, has not evolved significantly. There has, in fact, been a certain regression that
set in with the decision of the Supreme Court in Keshub Mahindra v State of Madhya Pradesh (1996),
where the court reduced the charges in connection with the Bhopal gas disaster from culpable
homicide to rash and negligent conduct. The knowledge of the harm likely to be caused by their
conduct as corporate managers, and their intention, was watered down even before it could be judicially
established whether the decisions made by them, and the practices they adopted in operating and
maintaining the plant, could be considered to constitute criminal conduct. Given the number of people
dead, disabled and harmed by the disaster, and the allegations of design defect, malfunctioning, reduced
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 16

allocation of resources in matters of safety, and disinformation that followed on the heels of the disaster,
the assumptions that underlie this change in the law are not easy to explain.
Yet, even as the Union of India was arguing in court for UCC to be held responsible for design defects
and non-use of the information that the UCC had on matters of safety of the plant, Parliament amended
the Factories Act, 1948. In 1987, without any public debate, Parliament legislated to absolve the
designer, manufacturer; importer or seller of plant and machinery after the user to whom the plant and
machinery were handed over gave an undertaking that, if properly used, no harm would ensue. Seen in
the context of Bhopal, had this amendment been in place before the disaster, Union Carbide Corporation
could not have been held liable for the disaster. Rather, Union Carbide India Ltd would be solely
responsible.
This was a strange provision introduced into the law, providing a pre-judgment of culpability. And this,
in a law that had nothing to do with contracts and liability, but with standards being maintained at the
workplace.
Industrial secrecy
The law has, for some time now, been protective of the right against disclosure in matters connected
with industry. In the Factories Act 1948 (S.91), an Inspector of Factories is authorised to take samples of
any substances used, or intended to be used, in the factory, where there is reason to believe that it is
being used in contravention of the Act, or if in the opinion of the inspector (it is) likely to cause bodily
injury to, or injury to the health of, workers in the factory. Once tested, and found to constitute
evidence that an offence under the Factories Act has been committed, a prosecution may be launched.
But disclosing the results of the analysis otherwise would be a wrong, punishable with imprisonment for
a term extending up to six months or with fine upto Rs 10,000 or both. It is interesting that even as
disclosure of information was prescribed in Chapter IV A of the Factories Act in 1987 as being a
necessary aspect of safety and preparedness for hazards, the punishment for disclosure of the results
from analysing samples was actually increased from three to six months imprisonment, and fine from Rs
500 to Rs 10,000.
There is a further provision that has survived the Bhopal gas disaster which places restrictions on the
disclosure of information. No inspector shall, S.118 reads, while in service or after leaving the
service, disclose otherwise than in connection or execution, or for the purposes of this Act, any
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 17

information relating to any manufacturing or commercial business or any working process which may
come to his knowledge in the course of his official duties, unless it is with the written consent of the
owner of the business, or it is for the purposes of legal proceedings. An inspector breaching this
injunction may be punished with up to six months imprisonment, or with fine up to Rs 1,000 or both. It
is the right against disclosure that informs the mood in this provision. It is striking that there is no
provision that has been considered to make punishable the non-disclosure of all the information that is in
the possession of the owner which may help in mitigating the effects of the disaster. The emphasis on
industrial secrecy and the enforced silences rest uneasily with the dire need for disclosure and of
information-sharing witnessed in the days, months and years following the Bhopal Gas Disaster.

BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 18

Legal aspects of Bhopal Gas Tragedy
The Bhopal gas tragedy is, till date, the worlds worst industrial disaster. It occurred in December of
1984 at Bhopal in Madhya Pradesh. The tragedy was a result of the leak of the methyl isocyanate (MIC)
gas from the Union Carbide India Ltd (UCIL) plant which manufactured pesticides. On the night of
December 2-3, 1984, there was a leak of the MIC gas which is considered to be the most toxic chemical
in industrial use. All around the city of Bhopal, people were exposed to this gas and the immediate
effects of inhaling the gas were coughing, vomiting, severe eye irritation and a feeling of suffocation.
Thousands of people died immediately and lakhs of people sustained permanent injuries.

The Legal Battle
In the February of 1985, the Indian Government filed a case in the U.S Court for a claim of $3.3 billons
against the Union Carbide Corporation. But by 1986 all of these litigations in the U.S District were
transferred to India on the grounds of forum non conveniens. It means that the case should be transferred
to a more convenient forum so that the trial proceeds smoothly. Meanwhile in March 1985, the Bhopal
Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act was passed which empowered the Central Government to
become the sole representative of all the victims in all kinds of litigations so that interests of the victims
of the disaster are fully protected and the claims for compensation are pursued speedily. In the year
1987, cases were filed in the Bhopal District Court which ordered the Union Carbide Corporation to pay
350 crores as interim compensation. But the interim order could not be decreed and therefore the UCC
refused to pay the amount. Later on, at the High Court, this interim compensation amount was reduced
to 250 crores. Both the Union of India and the UCC preferred appeals by special leave against this High
Court's order.

The Settlement Order
But a major twist to these legal proceedings came through the settlement order which was stroked out
between the Indian Government and the Union Carbide in an out of Court settlement in February 1989.
Through this deal the liability of the Union Carbide was fixed at $470 millions in full and final
settlement of all claims, rights, and liabilities arising out of the disaster. The terms of the settlement were
such that it limited liability under all future claims as well, whether they were civil or criminal. This
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 19

would mean that henceforth, all kinds of liability arising out of the disaster could be fixed only upon the
Government of India and the Union Carbide would be held liable only to the extent of $470 millions.

Settlement
This settlement shall finally dispose of all past, present and future claims, causes of action and civil and
criminal proceedings (of any nature whatsoever wherever pending) by all Indian citizens and all public
and private entities with respect to all past, present and future deaths, personal injuries health effects
compensation, losses, damages and civil and criminal complaints of any nature whatsoever against
UCC, Union Carbide India Limited, Union Carbide Eastern, and all of their subsidiaries and affiliates as
well as each of their present and former directors, officers, employees, agents representatives, attorneys,
advocates and solicitors arising out of, relating to or concerned with the Bhopal gas leak disaster,
including past, present and future claims, causes of action and proceedings against each other.

This was indeed a bad move as the settlement would limit liabilities under future claims as well.
Moreover, $470 millions was not sufficient to compensate all the injured. In fact, it is hardly 15% of the
original claim of $3.3 billions at the U.S Supreme Court.

This obviously evoked criticisms from all corners. A number of review petitions were filed at the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the settlement order. The settlement order was challenged on
various grounds. Firstly, it was pointed out that the settlement order was between the Union of India and
the Union Carbide Corporation, whereas the actual people who are going to be affected by such a
settlement order would be the victims of the tragedy. Thus, the first argument raised was that the
settlement order is void because no notice was given to any of the people whose interests would be
affected.

It was also assailed on the grounds that this order also applied to future claims and this would mean
stifling prosecution and that it was opposed to public policy. The order was also questioned for the
inadequacy of the compensation and for the absence of any re opener clause. The absence of re opener
clause is a very significant issue as latency period for the manifestation of the effects of the toxic injuries
was unpredictable and therefore the amount of compensation was wrongly arrived at. Moreover, a lot
genuine claims might arise in the future and limiting the liability arising out of such a major industrial
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 20

disaster with such gravity and magnitude, without a re opener clause is clearly against justice, and if
such a thing be allowed, it would definitely amount to unfair treatment from the view of the lakhs of
people who were injured as a result of the gas leak.

But all these contentions were rejected by the Supreme Court and the validity of the settlement order
was upheld in the case, Union Carbide Corporation v Union of India, the judgement being delivered on
October 3, 1991. The Court upheld the validity of the settlement order in all aspects except the condition
quashing the criminal proceedings. The condition quashing the criminal proceedings alone was held
unjustifiable but all other aspects including the amount of compensation decided in the settlement order
were held to be valid.

The Court was of the opinion that the subject matter of the deal was not illegal and that there was no
valid reason to render the contract void. The settlement only limits the liability of the Union Carbide and
this does not affect the victims in anyway because in any case the settlement fund is to be found
insufficient, then the deficiency is to be made good by the Union of India. Thus, no liability could be
fixed on the Union Carbide. This would obviously mean that if the claims exceed $470 millions, the
excess liability can only be compensated by the Union of India and the Union Carbide cannot be made
responsible for that in any manner.

The settlement order was reached because of the urgent demands to compensate the victims. The very
basic consideration motivating the conclusion of the settlement order was the compelling need for urgent
relief. Though the amount stroked out may prove to be inadequate the deal stands valid in all aspects and
no further liability could be placed on the Union Carbide. The rationale behind the judgement is that
withdrawal of a prosecution with a good motive, such as providing relief to the victims of a disaster is
not opposed to public policy and hence the deal would stand valid. Moreover, on the question of accord
and satisfaction, it was held that even a promise to pay a lesser sum would be a full satisfaction of the
claim if it was agreed upon by both parties based on a compromise. Therefore, the whole claim is
discharged at $470 millions as the Government of India agreed upon this as a full and final settlement
for all past and as well as future claims.


BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 21

The Criminal Proceedings
Apart from these civil proceedings, criminal proceedings were also initiated before the Chief Judicial
Magistrate in Bhopal. The case was instituted in the year 1987. Since the clause in the settlement order
which quashed the criminal proceedings was held invalid and unjustifiable, the criminal proceedings
initiated could continue. The judgement was delivered only on June 7, 2010, 26 years after the disaster.
The proceedings were initiated under Section 304 A, and Sections 336, 337, and 338 read with Section
35 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 304 A deals with causing death by negligence. Sections 336, 337
and Section 338 deal with the offences of endangering life and personal safety of others. This is read
along with Section 35 which deals with the aspect of common intention.
In this case, the prosecution argued that the whole disaster was a result of running a defectively designed
plant with a number of operational defects without any reasonable care. The prosecution submitted the
findings by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) to substantiate their contentions.
The team of scientists from the CSIR noticed that MIC was stored in large tanks instead of stainless steel
drums. The flare tower and the vent gas scrubber had been out of service for five months before the
disaster. The gas scrubber therefore did not treat escaping gases with sodium hydroxide (caustic soda),
which might have brought the concentration down to a safe level. To reduce energy costs, the
refrigeration system, designed to inhibit the volatilization of MIC, had been left idle. Slip-blind plates
that would have prevented water from pipes being cleaned from leaking into the MIC tanks through
faulty valves were not installed. Carbon steel valves were used at the factory, even though they corrode
when exposed to acid. On the night of the disaster, a leaking carbon steel valve was found, allowing
water to enter the MIC tanks. The pipe was not repaired because it was believed it would take too much
time and be too expensive. Thus, insufficient caution in design choice of material and other alarming
instruments, inadequate control on systems of storage and on quality of stored materials and as well as
lack of necessary facilities for quick effective disposal of material are the main reasons which lead to the
incident. All these show that the business was carried out with reckless indifference to the public. The
Company authorities had the knowledge and the properties of how dangerous a gas is MIC and still
carried on the activities with gross negligence, recklessness and utter disregard to the public. The
element of criminality is introduced by the accused having run the risk of doing such an act with
recklessness and indifference to the consequences. The UCC being a company dealing with a substance
like MIC, it owes a duty of care to the public. The activities of the enterprise falls far below the
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 22

standards required and therefore, the prosecution argued that it amounted to gross negligence.

For all these contentions, the UCC came up with several defences. Firstly, they argued that the reports
by the CSIR cannot be admitted as evidence. It was that CSIR was merely a fact finding body and that it
was constituted for a very limited purpose. Therefore, it was argued that its contents could not be taken
as proof. Secondly, it was contended that the Company had obtained all licenses and approvals from the
Government for carrying out the business under the Designed Transfer Agreement & Technical Service
Agreement. All other permits required were also duly obtained and hence the UCC argued that they
carried out their business in a completely authorised manner with the permission being obtained by the
Government of India itself. Moreover, it was submitted that none of the Company officials had any
criminal intention to cause any harm to any member of the public. The Company refused to admit any
kind of negligence on its part and further argued that the officials were in no way involved with the day
to day activities of the business and therefore they cannot be held responsible for any negligence on the
part of the workers. It was further argued that the accused officials were not even present in the occasion
where the disaster took place. All these were based on the principle that vicarious liability is not
applicable under criminal law and therefore the directors cannot be held liable for the negligence of the
workers.
The UCC also denied all allegations that the UCIL plant in India was not properly designed. It further
submitted that the MIC plant at Bhopal was designed in the same pattern as that of the MIC plant in
Verginia, USA. But it is important to note that The Government of India was never permitted to visit the
plant at Vergina. Also, no brochure or any other documentary evidence demonstrating the similarity
between the two plants at Verginia and Bhopal was produced before the court by the UCC to support its
contentions.

The Judgment: - But all of these contentions were rejected and all the accused were found guilty and
were subjected to imprisonment and were also liable to fine. But these orders could not be enforced as
some of the accused did not appear in the Court. Mr. Warren Anderson, who was the chairman of the
UCC at the time the disaster took place, is still absconding and all requests for his extradition still
remain unsuccessful as the U.S Government rejected it.

BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 23

Since 1984
Following the events of December 3 1984 environmental awareness and activism in India increased
significantly. The Environment Protection Act was passed in 1986, creating the Ministry of
Environment and Forests (MoEF) and strengthening India's commitment to the environment. Under the
new act, the MoEF was given overall responsibility for administering and enforcing environmental laws
and policies. It established the importance of integrating environmental strategies into all industrial
development plans for the country. However, despite greater government commitment to protect public
health, forests, and wildlife, policies geared to developing the country's economy have taken precedence
in the last 20 years.
India has undergone tremendous economic growth in the two decades since the Bhopal disaster. Gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita has increased from $1,000 in 1984 to $2,900 in 2004 and it continues
to grow at a rate of over 8% per year . Rapid industrial development has contributed greatly to economic
growth but there has been significant cost in environmental degradation and increased public health
risks. Since abatement efforts consume a large portion of India's GDP, MoEF faces an uphill battle as it
tries to fulfill its mandate of reducing industrial pollution . Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants
and poor enforcement of vehicle emission laws have result from economic concerns taking precedence
over environmental protection.
With the industrial growth since 1984, there has been an increase in small scale industries (SSIs) that are
clustered about major urban areas in India. There are generally less stringent rules for the treatment of
waste produced by SSIs due to less waste generation within each individual industry. This has allowed
SSIs to dispose of untreated wastewater into drainage systems that flow directly into rivers. New Delhi's
Yamuna River is illustrative. Dangerously high levels of heavy metals such as lead, cobalt, cadmium,
chrome, nickel and zinc have been detected in this river which is a major supply of potable water to
India's capital thus posing a potential health risk to the people living there and areas downstream.
Land pollution due to uncontrolled disposal of industrial solid and hazardous waste is also a problem
throughout India. With rapid industrialization, the generation of industrial solid and hazardous waste has
increased appreciably and the environmental impact is significant.
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 24

India relaxed its controls on foreign investment in order to accede to WTO rules and thereby attract an
increasing flow of capital. In the process, a number of environmental regulations are being rolled back
as growing foreign investments continue to roll in. The Indian experience is comparable to that of a
number of developing countries that are experiencing the environmental impacts of structural
adjustment. Exploitation and export of natural resources has accelerated on the subcontinent.
Prohibitions against locating industrial facilities in ecologically sensitive zones have been eliminated
while conservation zones are being stripped of their status so that pesticide, cement and bauxite mines
can be built. Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants and poor enforcement of vehicle emission laws
are other consequences of economic concerns taking precedence over environmental protection.
In March 2001, residents of Kodaikanal in southern India caught the Anglo-Dutch company, Unilever,
red-handed when they discovered a dumpsite with toxic mercury laced waste from a thermometer
factory run by the company's Indian subsidiary, Hindustan Lever. The 7.4 ton stockpile of mercury-
laden glass was found in torn stacks spilling onto the ground in a scrap metal yard located near a school.
In the fall of 2001, steel from the ruins of the World Trade Center was exported to India apparently
without first being tested for contamination from asbestos and heavy metals present in the twin tower
debris. Other examples of poor environmental stewardship and economic considerations taking
precedence over public health concerns abound.
The Bhopal disaster could have changed the nature of the chemical industry and caused a reexamination
of the necessity to produce such potentially harmful products in the first place. However the lessons of
acute and chronic effects of exposure to pesticides and their precursors in Bhopal has not changed
agricultural practice patterns. An estimated 3 million people per year suffer the consequences of
pesticide poisoning with most exposure occurring in the agricultural developing world. It is reported to
be the cause of at least 22,000 deaths in India each year. In the state of Kerala, significant mortality and
morbidity have been reported following exposure to Endosulfan, a toxic pesticide whose use continued
for 15 years after the events of Bhopal.
Aggressive marketing of asbestos continues in developing countries as a result of restrictions being
placed on its use in developed nations due to the well-established link between asbestos products and
respiratory diseases. India has become a major consumer, using around 100,000 tons of asbestos per
year, 80% of which is imported with Canada being the largest overseas supplier. Mining, production and
use of asbestos in India is very loosely regulated despite the health hazards. Reports have shown
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 25

morbidity and mortality from asbestos related disease will continue in India without enforcement of a
ban or significantly tighter controls
UCC has shrunk to one sixth of its size since the Bhopal disaster in an effort to restructure and divest
itself. By doing so, the company avoided a hostile takeover, placed a significant portion of UCC's assets
out of legal reach of the victims and gave its shareholder and top executives bountiful profits. The
company still operates under the ownership of Dow Chemicals and still states on its website that the
Bhopal disaster was "cause by deliberate sabotage".
Some positive changes were seen following the Bhopal disaster. The British chemical company, ICI,
whose Indian subsidiary manufactured pesticides, increased attention to health, safety and
environmental issues following the events of December 1984. The subsidiary now spends 3040% of
their capital expenditures on environmental-related projects. However, they still do not adhere to
standards as strict as their parent company in the UK.
The US chemical giant DuPont learned its lesson of Bhopal in a different way. The company attempted
for a decade to export a nylon plant from Richmond, VA to Goa, India. In its early negotiations with the
Indian government, DuPont had sought and won a remarkable clause in its investment agreement that
absolved it from all liabilities in case of an accident. But the people of Goa were not willing to acquiesce
while an important ecological site was cleared for a heavy polluting industry. After nearly a decade of
protesting by Goa's residents, DuPont was forced to scuttle plans there. Chennai was the next proposed
site for the plastics plant. The state government there made significantly greater demand on DuPont for
concessions on public health and environmental protection. Eventually, these plans were also aborted
due to what the company called "financial concerns".

BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 26

Legal Issues
One of the main issues which the Bhopal Gas tragedy raises is the issue of absolute liability. This issue
was elaborately discussed in the case of M.C Mehta v Union of India. The principle of absolute liability
states that when an enterprise is engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous industry and if any harm
results in account of such activity then the enterprise is absolutely liable to compensate for such harm
and that it should be no answer to the enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that the
harm occurred without any negligence on its part. In such industries, the principle of safe design would
be that one does not guard merely against the most predictable, routine type of accidents. Rather one
tries to anticipate the worst that could happen, even if it is highly unlikely, and not only guard against it,
but prepare to contain it and make sure that there is no way for that even to take place.
n India, absolute liability is a standard of tort liability which stipulates that
where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to
anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity
resulting, for example, in escape of toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to
compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the
exceptions which operate vis--vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v.
Fletcher.
In other words absolute liability is strict liability without any exception. This liability standard has been
laid down by the Indian Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Oleum Gas Leak Case). These
exceptions include:-
Plaintiffs own mistake
Plaintiffs consent
Natural disasters
Third Partys mistake
Part of a statutory duty
The Indian Judiciary tried to make a strong effort following the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, December, 1984
(Union Carbide Company vs. Union of India) to enforce greater amount of protection to the Public. The
Doctrine of Absolute Liability was therefore evolved in Oleum Gas Leak Case and can be said to be a
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 27

strong legal tool against rogue corporations that were negligent towards health risks for the public. This
legal doctrine was much more powerful than the legal Doctrine of Strict Liability developed in the UK
case Rylands Vs. Fletcher. This meant that the defaulter could be held liable for even third party errors
when the public was at a realistic risk. This could ensure stricter compliance to standards that were
meant to safeguard the public.

This is the principle of absolute liability and liability can be fixed even if there is no negligence on part
of the accused. In the case of absolute liability, even the defences available under strict liability would
not apply. Thus, even if the accident is some freak incident, liability would still be fixed. In such a case,
it would be no good defence to argue that the direct or the proximate cause of the accident or the causa
causan of the accident was not the carrying of such hazardous activity, but it actually is an Act of God or
that it is due to some third party intervention. Even if the Company had taken extreme precautions to
ensure that such events do not take place, responsibility would still be fixed on them. This principle of
absolute liability in India evolved primarily because of the awakening that the Bhopal Gas Disaster and
the Oleum Gas Leak case gave.

The Bhopal Gas Tragedy is also in a way responsible for the passing of the Public Liability Insurance
Act, 1991 which provides for compulsory insurance of any unit or factory undertaking a hazardous
activity.

Apart from all of this, the tragedy has recently been much discussed in the light of the Nuclear Liability
Bill. This bill has a lot of controversial provisions which aim at capping the total liability in case of a
nuclear accident. The bill also prohibits the victims from suing the suppliers directly and allows them to
recover only from the operators. The bill also lays a cap on the amount that an operator can recover from
the suppliers.

In the light of the events that followed Bhopal, it is clear that there is a need for a proper mechanism of
compensation and it is important that any kind of cap on liability should be removed as it would be
unconstitutional.


BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 28

Absolute Liability
Our Constitution provides protection against laws imposing criminal liability for actions
committed prior to the enactment of the law. Article 20 (1) under the Part III (Fundamental Rights),
reads:
20. (1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of
the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which
might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence.
Thus, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on an offender cannot exceed those specified by the
laws at the time. In the context of the Bhopal Gas tragedy in 1984, the Indian Penal Code (IPC) was the
only relevant law specifying criminal liability for such incidents. The CBI, acting on behalf of the
victims, filed charges against the accused under section 304 of the IPC(See Note 1). Section 304 deals
with punishment for culpable homicide and requires intention of causing death.
By a judgment dated September 13, 1996, the Supreme Court held that there was no material to show
that any of the accused had a knowledge that by operating the plant on that fateful night whereat such
dangerous and highly volatile substance like MIC was stored they had the knowledge that by this very
act itself they were likely to cause death of any human being. The Supreme Court thus directed that the
charges be re-framed under section 304A of the IPC(See Note 2). Section 304A deals with causing death
by negligence and prescribes a maximum punishment of two years along with a fine.
Consequently, the criminal liability of the accused lay outlined by section 304A of the IPC and they
were tried accordingly. Civil liability, on the other hand, was adjudged by the Courts and allocated to the
victims by way of monetary compensation.
Soon after the Bhopal Gas tragedy, the Government proposed and passed a series of laws regulating the
environment, prescribing safeguards and specifying penalties. These laws, among other things, filled the
legislative lacunae that existed at the time of the incident.
Given the current provisions (See Note 3), a Bhopal like incident will be tried in the National Green
Tribunal (once operationalized) and most likely, under the provisions of the the Environment
(Protection) Act, 1986. The criminal liability provisions of the Act (See Note 4)prescribe a maximum
penalty of five years along with a fine of one lakh rupees. Further, if an offence is committed by a
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 29

company, every person directly in charge and responsible will be deemed guilty, unless he proves that
the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent
the commission of such an offence.
The civil liability will continue to be adjudged by the Courts and in proportion to the extent of damage
unless specified separately by an Act of Parliament.
Notes
1) IPC, Section 304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder
Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment for
life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of
causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,
Or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or
with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention
to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
2) IPC, Section 304A. Causing death by negligence
Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable
homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
years, or with fine, or with both.
3) Major laws passed since 1984:
1986 The Environment (Protection) Act authorized the central government to take measures to protect
and improve environmental quality, set standards and inspect industrial units. It also laid down penalties
for contravention of its provisions.
1991 The Public Liability Insurance Act provided for public liability insurance for the purpose of
providing immediate relief to the persons affected by an accident while handling hazardous substances.
1997 The National Environment Appellate Authority Act established to an appellate authority to hear
appeals with respect to restriction of areas in which any industries, operations or processes are
disallowed, subject to safeguards under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 30

2009 The National Green Tribunal Act, yet to be notified, provides for the establishment of a tribunal
for expeditious disposal of cases relating to environmental protection and for giving relief and
compensation for damages to persons and property. This Act also repeals the National Environment
Appellate Authority Act, 1997.
4) Criminal liability provisions of the Environment Protection Act, 1986
Section 15. Penalty for contravention of the provisions of the Act
(1) Whoever fails to comply with or contravenes any of the provisions of this Act, or the rules made or
orders or directions issued thereunder, shall, in respect of each such failure or contravention, be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years with fine which may extend to
one lakh rupees, or with both, and in case the failure or contravention continues, with additional fine
which may extend to five thousand rupees for every day during which such failure or contravention
continues after the conviction for the first such failure or contravention.
(2) If the failure or contravention referred to in sub-section (1) continues beyond a period of one year
after the date of conviction, the offender shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to seven years.
Section 16. Offences by Companies
(1) Where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who, at the time
the offence was committed, was directly in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the
conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the
offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any
punishment provided in this Act, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or
that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.



BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 31

Conclusion
The tragedy of Bhopal continues to be a warning sign at once ignored and heeded. Bhopal and its
aftermath were a warning that the path to industrialization, for developing countries in general and India
in particular, is fraught with human, environmental and economic perils. Some moves by the Indian
government, including the formation of the MoEF, have served to offer some protection of the public's
health from the harmful practices of local and multinational heavy industry and grassroots organizations
that have also played a part in opposing rampant development. The Indian economy is growing at a
tremendous rate but at significant cost in environmental health and public safety as large and small
companies throughout the subcontinent continue to pollute. Far more remains to be done for public
health in the context of industrialization to show that the lessons of the countless thousands dead in
Bhopal have truly been heeded.













BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

ENVIRONMENT LAW Page 32

Bibliography
http://environmentalartilces.wordpress.com/bhopal-gas-tragedy-20-years-after/
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1142333/
http://www.icmr.nic.in/final/bhopal_gas.pdf
http://twoeyesmakeonesight.wordpress.com/2012/05/14/the-legal-and-moral-implications-of-the-
bhopal-gas-tragedy/
http://environmentalartilces.wordpress.com/bhopal-gas-tragedy-20-years-after/
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bridgethanna/files/Unending_Disaster.pdf
http://www.econ.upf.edu/~lemenestrel/IMG/pdf/bhopal_gas_tragedy_dutta.pdf
http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/article/legal-aspects-of-the-bhopal-gas-tragedy-373-
1.html
http://www.mse.ac.in/pub/op_sankar.pdf
http://www.prsindia.org/theprsblog/?p=219