Facts: The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court assailing COMELEC Res. No. 98- 1419 which resolved to approve the issuance of restraining order to stop the petitioner or any groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit survey. The electoral body believed that the exit survey might conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). It also had not authorized or deputized petitioner to undertake the exit survey. The petitioner filed for a temporary restraining order which was granted by the court on May 9, 1998. Solicitor General contends that the petition is already moot and academic because the May 11, 1998 elections has already been held and done with and there is no longer any actual controversy. SG further contends that the Petition should be dismissed for petitioners failure to exhaust available remedies before issuing forum, especially the filling of a motion for reconsideration. The Court believed that the issue is not totally moot because of the basic feature of our democratic government which is the periodic elections where exit polling is said to be tied with it. The Court ruled that the procedural requirement may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available. The Court based its judgment on the span of time the instant petition was filed by the respondent and the time when the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof. Under the circumstances, the court believed that there was hardly enough opportunity to move for reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. And the court also resolved to settle the issue because the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked. Argument of the Petitioner: The petitioner argues that holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press. That the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion and grossly violated the petitioners constitutional right. Argument of the Respondent: It insists that the issuance was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections" and "to protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot." That "exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots," as the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution; and relevant provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. That the exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process Issue: Whether or not the respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any other group, its agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during the May 11, 1998 elections. Ruling: Validity of Conducting Exit Polls: No law prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit polls. Nature and Scope of Freedoms of Speech and of the Press: Freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. Limitation: a limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Even though the governments purpose is legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly conceal fundamental liberties, when the end can be more narrowly achieved. Secrecy of the Ballots The Court noted that the COMELEC has the duty to secure the secrecy of the ballot and to preserve the sanctity and the integrity of the electoral process. However, in order to justify a restriction of the people's freedoms of speech and of the press, the state's responsibility of ensuring orderly voting must far outweigh them. The Court contends that the contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly violated the sanctity of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification. What is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been casted in accordance with the instruction of a third party. In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Moreover, the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but VOLUNTARY. On the contention of the COMELEC that exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process, the court ruled that such arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. Because: 1) the participants are selected at random; 2) the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official COMELEC count. It is merely an opinion. 3) credibility and integrity of the elections are not at stake here. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the exit poll is only part of the election. The Court argues that the COMELEC has other valid and reasonable ways and means to avoid or minimize disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys.
The petition is granted and the temporary restraining order issued by the court is made permanent. Resolution No. 98-1419 issued by the COMELEC is nullified and set aside.
Bayan vs Zamora Petition for certiorari and prohibition. Facts: Philippines and USA forged Military Bases Agreement on 14 March 1947 which formalized the use of installations in the Philippine territory by the United States military personnel. On 30 August 1951, both countries entered into Mutual Defense Treaty to further strengthen their defense and security relationship. The parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels and aircraft. On 16 September 1991, Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On 18 July 1997, US panel met with the Philippine panel to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of the US and PH in the Asia-pacific region. The Visiting Forces Agreement was among the things discussed. On 10 February 1998, Pres. Ramos approved VFA; and on 5 October 1998, Pres. Estrada, through respondent Sec. of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA which was officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines on 6 October 1998 for concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On 27 May 1999, the Senates Committee on Foreign Relations submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 recommending the concurrence of Senate to the VFA and the creation of Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee its implementation. This was approved by the Senate on 27 May 1999, by a 2/3 vote of its members. Senate Res. No. 443 was re-numbered to Senate Res. No. 18. The VFA consists of a Preamble and 9 Articles which provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. Petitioners- as legislators, non-governmental organizations, citizen and taxpayers- assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute the respondents with grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to question the constitutionality of the VFA Whether or not VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution Ruling: The Court ruled that the petitioners have no legal standing to question the constitutionality of VFA on the ground that they failed to substantiate that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the operation of the VFA. This was counter-argued by the petitioners which they contend that the validity or invalidity of the VFA is a matter of transcendental importance which justifies their standing. The Court ruled that the petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the VFA. Consequently, as taxpayers, they have not established that the VFA involves the exercise of Congress of taxing and spending powers, for a taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Which provision of the constitution applies with regards to the exercise by senate of its constitutional power to concur with the VFA? The petitioners argue that Sec. 25, Art. 18 is applicable considering that the VFA has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines. Sec 25, Art 18 provides: "After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State." The respondents argue that Sec. 21, Art. 7 should apply as the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves merely the temporary visits of United States personnel engaged in joint military exercises. Sec.21, Art. 7 provides: "No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
The Court further examined the provisions: Sec. 25, Art. 18 is a special provision that applies to treatise which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. The provision requires that "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities" may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state. Concurrence of Senate is only one of the requisites. Sec. 21, Art. 7 deals with treatise or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective. Both provisions include the fundamental law that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements Lex specialis derogate generali- special provision or law prevails over general one In both provision, concurrence of senate is present, therefore, it is not an issue. On the provision in Art 18, requiring ratification by the majority of the votes cast in a national referendum is deemed necessary since the Congress has not required it.
Grave abuse of discretion of power of the respondents The Court ruled that the president acted within the confines and limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution in ratifying the VFA and submitting it to the Senate for Concurrence. No abuse of discretion may be imputed to the Pres. in his act of ratifying the VFA and referring it to the Senate. The Pres. merely performed a constitutional task and exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of his office. The President merely performed a constitutional task and exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the function of his office. Even if he erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of Section 25 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, still, the President may not be faulted or scarred, much less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of discretion in some patent, gross, and capricious manner.
The instant petitions are dismissed.
In re: Saturnino V. Bermudez Facts: The petitioner in his petition quotes Sec. 5 (1) of Art. 18 of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides: The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice- President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. Under the proposed Constitution, it is also provided that the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May 1992. Petitioner claimed that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers. He asked the Court to declare and answer the question as to who, among the present incumbent Pres. Aquino and Vice-Pres. Laurel, and the elected Pres. Marcos and Vice- Pres. Tolentino being referred to under the said provision. Issue: Whether or not the petition is ambiguous. Ruling: The petition is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action. This Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. The Court also finds that the petition would amount to a suit against the incumbent President and it is useless for the incumbent President of the Philippines are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
The petition states no cause of action for the petitioners allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of Sec. 5, Art. 18 is manifestly gratuitous (without cause), it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President and Vice-President to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. The Court further contends that the petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The legitimacy of Aquino government is not a justiciable matter for it belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. The petition is dismissed.
Lozano vs Nograles Facts: Petitioners hoped for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon the members of Congress to convene for the purpose of considering proposal to amend or revise the Constitution, upon a 3/4 vote of all members of Congress. The petition seeks to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article 17, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The duty of the judiciary is to say what the law is. The determination of the nature, scope and extent of the powers of government is the exclusive province of the judiciary. This Courts power to review is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of arguments by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. The case-or- controversy requirement bans this court from deciding abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions. An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: 1) The fitness of the issues for judicial decision 2) The hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. Issue: Whether or not petitioners case has met the requirements for a judicial review. Ruling: The fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. 1) The petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. 2) House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No convention has yet transpired, no rules of
procedure have yet been adopted, and no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a typical example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all. There is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight since the proposed amendments is still unacted. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Locus standi or standing to sue: Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that 1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; 2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; 3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy of sought. The petitioners have not shown the elemental injury that would grant them with the standing to sue. They failed to show that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury in the promulgation of the act. Moreover, the claim of the petitioners that they are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens do not grant them with locus standi. It is because a taxpayers suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. The possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi under the transcendental importance doctrine. The petitions are dismissed.
Salonga vs Cruz Pano The Petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filling of an information for subversion against him. Facts: There were series of bombing occurred in Metro Manila in the months of August, September and October of 1980. On 6 September 1980, Victor Burns Lovely, Jr. almost killed himself and injured his younger brother as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at YMCA building in Manila. At the Presidents anniversary television radio press conference held on 20 September 1980, the younger brother of Lovely was interviewed and stated that his brother has a connection with the petitioner as he had driven Lovely to the petitioners house twice on the month of August. Because of his statement, the petitioner has been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila. The explosion of a small bomb minutes after the President had finished delivering speech before the International Conference of the American Society of Travel agents at the Philippine International Convention Center held on 19 October 1980 triggered the issuance of Arrest, Search, and Seizure Orders (ASSOs) against persons who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. On 21 October 1980, the petitioner was arrested at the Manila Medical Center where he was confined due to his recurrent and
chronic ailment of bronchial asthma. The arresting officer showed the ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against the petitioner. The petitioner was transferred against his objections on 2 November 1980 from his hospital arrest to an isolation room without windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. The petitioner states that he was not informed why he was detained, nor was he ever investigated or questioned by any military or civil authority. On 27 November 1980, the petitioner was released from military custody for humanitarian reasons and placed under house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Salonga still without the benefit of any investigation or charges. On 24 February 1981, the respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing the petitioner of having violated RA No. 1700, as amended by PD 885 and BP 31 in relation to Art 142 of the Revised Penal Code. On 6 March 1981, the petitioner was allowed to leave the country to attend a series of church conferences and undergo comprehensive medical examinations of the heart, stomach, liver, eye and ear including a possible removal of his left eye to save his right eye. The petitioner is totally deaf in the right ear and partially deaf in the left ear. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges against the petitioner for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. It was denied by the respondent judge on 2 December 1981 and issued on 4 January 1982 a resolution ordering the filling of information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act against 40 people including the petitioner. Actual Case The resolution of the respondent judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject on the petition at bar. The petitioner contended that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today. Ruling: The Court finds that the evidence offered by the prosecution is insufficient to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner. The Court contends that even if the evidence were unexplained or uncontradicted they wont sufficiently overcome the presumption of innocence and warrant his conviction. This is because, as the records reveal in finding a case against the petitioner, respondent judge only relied on the testimonies of Col. Balbino Diego and Victor Lovely. Testimonies that are based on affidavits of other persons and purely hearsay can hardly qualify as a prima facie evidence of subversion. "Prima facie evidence" denotes evidence if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction. The respondents admit that no evidence was presented directly linking petitioner Salonga to actual acts of violence or terrorism. There is no proof of his direct participation in any overt acts of subversion. However, he is tagged as a leader of subversive organization for 2 reasons: 1) Because his house was used as a contactpoint; and 2) Because he mentioned
some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should reforms be instated by President Marcos immediately. The Court ruled that the contact point theory is too weak as a basis to conclude that petitioner Salonga was a leader or mastermind of the bombing incidents. Moreover, the Court believed that the testimony of Lovely is full of inconsistencies. Salonga and Atty. Tanada could not have whispered to one another because the petitioner is almost totally deaf. It is also impossible for Lovely to meet Salonga at a Manglapus party in D.C. in 1977 because Salonga left for US only on November 1978. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the presence of Lovely in a group picture taken at Mr. Raul Dazas birthday party in Los Angeles where Salonga was a guest is not proof of conspiracy. The Court ruled that the alleged opinion of the petitioner contended by respondent judge is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression. No man deserves punishment for his thoughts. Cogitationis poenam memo meretur. The Court firmly stated that the prosecution has failed to produce sufficient evidence that would establish any link between petitioner and any subversive organization. The prosecution fails to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. The petition is dismissed for having become moot and academic as the prosecution have taken initiative of dropping the charges against the petitioner. Tanada vs Cuenco Petitioners pray that the respondents be issued writ of preliminary injunction, restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude and/or hold or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Facts: On 22 February 1956, Senate is in session for the nomination of senators for Senate Electoral Tribunal which will be composed of 3 majority senators (party having the largest number of votes in the Senate), 3 minority senators (party having the second largest number of votes), and 3 justices to be designated by the Chief Justice. Petitioner Tanada refused to elect 2 senators to fill in for the remaining 2 minority senators positions in the Senate Electoral Tribunal as he is the only one coming from the minority group. During the nomination, respondents Sen. Cuenco and Delgado were appointed by the Senate to fill in the vacant position of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Tanada is the lone member of the Citizens Party (minority group). Senate consists of 23 senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party. Petitioners alleged that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating Sen. Cuenco and Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal had acted absolutely without power or color of authority which is a violation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution, which reads:
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." On the other hand, respondents argue that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case since it poses a political question. Issue: Whether or not the issue is a political question. Whether or not the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal valid and lawful. Ruling: I. Though the legislative power is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. Judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses may not be determined in the proper actions. The Court states that the contention of the respondents that the case is of political question is not true. The Court ruled that the case at bar is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with full discretionary authority in the choice of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." Because of the above-mentioned points, the Court believed that they not only have jurisdiction, but also the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties. II. The purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power.- Senator Sabido The most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of said parties and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. The Court contends that the framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals and it is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and minority parties, with the Justices of the Supreme Court. The provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. The
Court resolved that the compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void. The spirit of the law prevails over its letter. The Court holds that: Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution. That the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal That the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal That neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein That the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio. The j Sen Cuenco and Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and they are not entitled to act as such and they are enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of the said Electoral Tribunal. The petition with regards to respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is dismissed for the reason that, though they were recommended by Sen Cuenco and Delgado, they were appointed by the Chairman.