Lauren Silver POLS 540; Rational Choice Theory 09-10-2009

In An Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony Downs emphasizes that his concept of

rationality [does] not take into consideration the whole personality of each individual when we
discuss what behavior is rational for him, he therefore remains an abstraction from the real fullness
of the human personality p!"#! $ather, Down%s rational individual navi&ates throu&h political
decision'makin& processes focused solely on the potential benefits he has to &ain versus the potential
costs he may be faced with &iven his alternative modes of action! (his rational individual is found
within Down%s lar&er model of a rational democratic &overnment in which competin& parties seek to
ma)imize political support*the incumbent party seeks re'election and the opposition party or parties
seek a chan&e in power! Downs acknowled&es that both his conception of a rational man and a rational
&overnment are narrow, however, he implies that such narrow concepts are necessary for developin& a
positive and more useful# economic model of &overnment amid e)istin& normative models! Downs
proposes this positive behavior rule for democratic &overnments because it is a hypothesis that he
believes is both testable and can be submitted to empirical proof!
+erbert A! ,imon outlines why Down%s rationality model*which he describes as an e)ample
of substantive, ob-ective rationality*does not provide a hypothesis'&eneratin& foundation for
empirically e)plorin& political phenomena! Accordin& to ,imon, rational choice theories that consider
only the effects a decision'maker%s e)ternal circumstances on their choosin& behavior demonstrate
substantive rationality. whereas, theories that consider the effects of both e)ternal circumstances and
internal characteristics*e!&!, limitations of knowled&e and computin& power as well as the ability to
draw inferences from information*of decision'makers on their choosin& behavior illustrate procedural
rationality! ,imon ar&ues that the mere assumption of rationality provides little basis for the prediction
of behavior, and therefore for the prediction of political phenomena# because one must first possess
certain knowled&e about decision'makers, includin& their &oals, knowled&e, and computin&
Lauren Silver POLS 540; Rational Choice Theory 09-10-2009
capabilities! (hus, ,imon prefers the bounded rationality perspective to that of the substantive
rationality view for e)plorin& political phenomena!
/oth Downs and ,imon are tryin& to accomplish the same &oal in their respective discussions
on rational choice theory0 to propose a model of rationality that is most amenable to e)plorin& and
predictin& political phenomena empirically! In support of the substantive rationality view althou&h he
doesn%t refer to it as such#, Downs makes an important point when he emphasizes that such
simplification is necessary for the prediction of behavior because only if human actions form some
pattern can they ever be forecast or the relations between them sub-ect to analysis! Indeed, theory is
an oversimplification of reality that usually will not apply to all relevant situations, but will apply to
situations on a probabilistic basis as opposed to deterministic theory#! 1urthermore, Downs ar&ues that
all analysis of either economics or politics turns into a mere ad-unct of primary'&roup sociolo&y if
this simple definition of rationality is abandoned for one that considers more than a decision'maker%s
processes of action, i!e!, wei&hin& costs vs! benefits! (his assertion is an e)a&&eration, however, and
overlooks the importance of how sociolo&ical attributes impact why decision'makers undertake the
very thou&ht processes that Downs wishes to e)amine! (he behavior of the artificial men in Downs%
model world may very well be more comparable to the behavior of men in the real world if he were
willin& to include these factors in his concept of rationality!
(o that end, ,imon ar&ues that the simplicity of the substantive rationality theory overlooks
assumptions about decision'makers% values, beliefs, and calculations that influence their behavior*
and therefore overlooks relevant factors that can be tested empirically and that should be included in
rational choice theory that posits more than utility ma)imization! (he risk, however, of considerin& all
possible assumptions is that not all assumptions underlyin& a rational choice theory are necessarily
observable and measurable! 2onse3uently, are all bounded rationality theories vulnerable to
incompleteness4